# Contents

**Contents** v

**List of Figures** viii

**List of Tables** x

**List of Abbreviations** xi

**List of Original Papers** xii

**I Summary** 1

**II Research Papers** 7

**1 Optimal Policy and Taylor Rule Cross-Checking Under Parameter Uncertainty** 8

1.1 Introduction . . . . . 8
1.2 The theoretical framework . . . . . 11
1.2.1 The conduct of monetary policy . . . . . 11
1.2.2 The model economy . . . . . 16
1.3 Simulation . . . . . 19
1.3.1 Simulation setup . . . . . 19
1.3.2 Simulation results - commitment . . . . . 22
1.3.3 Simulation results - discretion . . . . . 30
1.4 Conclusion . . . . . 33

**2 Trust in the Monetary Authority** 36

2.1 Introduction . . . . . 36
2.2 The model . . . . . 40
2.2.1 Baseline trust game . . . . . 40



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2.2.2 Extended trust game . . . 41
2.2.3 Payoffs aggregation . . . 47
2.2.4 Implementing the trust game in a macro model . . . 48
2.2.5 Aggregate economy . . . 52
2.2.5.1 Household . . . 52
2.2.5.2 Final good firm and intermediate good firms . . . 54
2.2.5.3 Equilibrium conditions and the monetary authority 55
2.2.5.4 Calibration and shock processes . . . 56
2.3 Quantitative analysis . . . 58
2.4 Empirical evidence . . . 62
2.4.1 Eurobarometer surveys and macroeconomic data . . . 63
2.4.1.1 Estimation strategy . . . 65
2.4.1.2 Time series analysis of trust: Issues and results . . 65
2.5 Conclusions . . . 74

**3 Trust Me! I am a European Central Banker** **75**
3.1 Introduction . . . 75
3.2 Literature review . . . 76
3.3 Determinants of trust in the European Central Bank . . . 78
3.3.1 Data sources and descriptive statistics . . . 78
3.3.2 The role of socio-economic characteristics . . . 81
3.3.3 The role of macroeconomic conditions . . . 82
3.3.4 A structural break in trust during the crisis . . . 87
3.3.5 The role of macroeconomic conditions during the crisis . . . 88
3.3.6 The role of within-country heterogeneity . . . 91
3.4 Conclusion . . . 92

**4 Trust in the Fiscal Authority** **94**
4.1 Introduction . . . 94
4.2 Empirical evidence . . . 96
4.3 Theoretical model . . . 101
4.3.1 Trust game . . . 101
4.3.2 Aggregation and implementation . . . 105
4.3.3 Aggregate economy . . . 106
4.3.3.1 Representative household . . . 106
4.3.3.2 Representative firm . . . 107
4.3.3.3 Equilibrium conditions and the fiscal authority . . 108
4.4 Quantitative analysis . . . 109
4.4.1 Calibration . . . 109
4.4.2 Simulation results . . . 110
4.5 Conclusion . . . 111

**Bibliography** 114

**Appendices** 123

A Appendix to Chapter 2 . . . . . 123
A.1 Utility specification . . . . . 123
A.2 Impulse responses for different values of $\theta$ . . . . . 124
A.3 Generalized impulse response functions . . . . . 125
A.4 Eurobarometer data sets . . . . . 126

B Appendix to Chapter 3 . . . . . 127
B.1 Eurobarometer data sets . . . . . 127
B.2 Figures referred to in the main text . . . . . 128
B.3 Tables referred to in the main text . . . . . 133

C Appendix to Chapter 4 . . . . . 144
C.1 Average level of citizens' trust in national parliaments . . . . 144
C.2 Eurobarometer data sets . . . . . 147
C.3 Impulse responses for different values of $\theta$ . . . . . 148

**Acknowledgements** 150

**Curriculum Vitae** 151