Everyday state of emergency

The influence of French counterterrorist security measures on public spaces in Paris

Alexandre Gaiser Fernandes

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A Fundament

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This work investigates the influence of counterterrorist measures on public spaces in Paris. It starts with a theoretical background on securitisation and militarisation in urban spaces and highlighting historic events in the French context related to the topic. Then, the work focuses on two major security tools of the French counterterrorist apparatus: a) the Vigipirate plan – the main national permanent counterterrorist security plan –; and b) the state of emergency – a legal tool that gives extra power to the executive branch and police forces, put into force since the November 2015 attacks in the Île-de-France region.

Observing the process of decision and implementation of these measures, a list of involved actors is identified, which gives bases to understand the application of security measures in the physical spaces of the city. The observation of 47 sites in the metropolitan area of Paris lead to the identification of 26 security elements playing different roles to the counterterrorist security.

These different manifestations of the security framework are seen in depth in three spaces of Paris: *Forum des Halles*, *Gare du Nord* and *Place de la République*. A highly frequented commercial centre, the Europe's largest railway station and one of the most social and political representative square of the city reveal to what extend the counterterrorist measures affect the everyday life in Paris. They also serve as a fundament to question the French counterterrorist security apparatus and its potential uses beyond the combat against terrorism.

Fundament

A

– I got a question.

– Go ahead.

– In the war, can we take slot machines?

– Yes.

– No charges if we take old men's eyeglasses?

– No.

– Can we break a kid's arm? Both arms? Stab a guy in the back? Rob apartments? Burn towns? Burn women?

– Yes.

– And steal classy pants?

– Yes.

– If we want, we can massacre innocent folks?

– Yes.

– Denounce folks, too?

– Yes.

– Eat in restaurants and not pay?

– Yes, yes. That's war.

(Godard, 2007 [1963])

The essential act of war is destruction, not necessarily of human lives, but of the products of human labor. War is a way of shattering to pieces, or pouring into the stratosphere, or sinking in the depths of the sea, materials which might otherwise be used to make the masses too comfortable, and hence, in the long run, too intelligent. Even when weapons of war are not actually destroyed, their manufacture is still a convenient way of expending labor power without producing anything that can be consumed"

(Orwell, 2002 [1949]: 191)

Historic evolution of French security and defence

Legend:
- War
- Terrorist attacks
- Independence movements
- Manifestations and riots
- Security measures
- Contested police violence
- Political events
- Large events and festivals

World

1939-1945 Word War II

1945 Establishment of United Nations

1955-1975 Vietnam War

11.Sep.2001 US Attacks Including planes crash into World Trade Center's towers Deaths: 2977+19

2003-2011 Iraq war

2001-2014 War in Afghanistan

1990-1991 Golf War

15.Mar.2011-present Syrian civil war

Dec.2010-Dec.2012 Arab Spring Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Jordan, Oman, Egypt, Yemen, Sudan, Iraq, Bahrain, Libya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Syria, Iran

2014-present Iraqi civil war France participates from 2014

2013-present France in Syrian civil war providing lethal aid to local armies

2013-2014 France militar operation in Mali

Sep-Nov.2011 Occupy Wall Street

May.2011 Movimiento 15-M Anti-austerity movement in Spain

EU

22.May and 3.Jun.2017 Manchester Arena bombing London Bridge Attack Deaths: 22+1 and 8+3

23.Jun.2016 Brexit referendum

19.Dec.2016 Berlin vehicle-ramming Deaths: 11+1

French colonies

1941 Franco-Thai War

1946 Indochina War

1945 Independence of North Vietnam

1943 Independence of Syria

1946 Independence of Lebanon

1953-54 Independence of Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam

1960 Independence of Dahomey (Benin), Ivory Coast, French Sudan (Mali), Mauritania, Senegal, French Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), French Togoland (Togo), Chad, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Cameroon, Madagascar

1958 Independence of French Guinea and Niger

1954-62 Algerian war

1962 Independence of Algeria

1956-1957 Independence of Morocco and Tunisia

1977 Independence of Djibouti

1975 Independence of Comoros

1984 State of emergency In New Caledonia, due to independist movements

France

22.Jul.2005 Death of the Brazilian migrant Jean Charles de Menezes by London Metropolitan Police Service

7.Jul.2005 London bombings Deaths: 52+4

11.Mar.2004 Madrid train bombings Deaths: 192

2013 French White Paper on Defence and National Security

2008 French White Paper on Defence and National Security

Jul.2005 Red alert of Vigipirate plan due London bombings It was never lower than red until 2014, when the level system changed.

Mar.2003 Change of levels' system of Vigipirate plan introduction of color levels

Oct-Nov.2005 Riot on suburban housing estates

2006 White Paper on Domestic Security against Terrorism

2001 Maximal level of Vigipirate plan is activated After 9/11

1998 Football World Cup in France

1994 French White Paper on Defence and Nat. Security

1998 Serie of Attacks by Iparretarak (Basques)

1972 French White Paper on Defence and Nat. Security First version

31.Jul.1978 Attack with hostage at Iraqi Embassy by members of Palestine Liberation Organization

1995 and 1996 Vigipirate is reapplied due the terrorist attacks in Paris

1991 First time Vigipirate plan is applied due to Golf War

1961 State of emergency Nationwide, due to Generals' putsch from Algiers

1958 State of emergency Nationwide, due to uprisings in Algeria

1978 Vigipirate plan is created

Nov.2005 State of emergency Specific areas in Île-de-France, due to riots on suburban housing estates

1989 Fall of the Berlin Wall

1955 State of emergency 8 months in Algeria, due to independent unrest

1958 Start of the Fifth Republic in France

May.1968 May 1968 events

EU / France

13.Feb.2014 Change of levels' system of Vigipirate plan Only two levels: 'Vigilance' and 'Attack alert'

1.Dec.2016 Change of levels' system of Vigipirate plan 3 levels: 'Vigilance', 'Sécurité renforcée – Risque d'attentat' and 'Urgence attentat'

Île-de-France

10.Jun-10.Jul.2016 UEFA Euro 2016

13.Nov.2015-1.Nov.2017 (tbc) State of Emergency metropolitan France, due to Paris attacks

14.Jul.2016 Nice vehicle-ramming Bastille's Day Deaths: 86+1

30.Nov-12.Dec.2015 UN Climate Change Conference (COP21)

Metropolitan Paris

26.Mar.2017 Black young man assaulted by police Aulnay-sous-bois

26.Mar.2017 Death of Chinese migrant Liu Shaoyo by police 19th Arr.

Mar-Apr.2016 Nuit Debout

20.Apr.2017 Champs-Élysées attack Deaths: 1+1

7 to 9.Jan.2015 Charlie Hebdo and kosher grocery shootings Charlie Hebdo (11th Arr.) Hypercacher (20th Arr.) Deaths: 17+3

13.Nov.2015 Paris attacks Stade de France (Saint-Denis) Le Petit Cambodge; Le Carillon (10th Arr.) Café Bonne Bière; La Casa Nostra (11th Arr.) Bataclan theatre (11th Arr.) La Belle Équipe (11th Arr.) Comptoir Voltaire (11th Arr.) Death: 130+7

1995 Paris Métro and RER bombings 25.Jul Saint-Michel Station (5th Arr.) 17.Aug Arc de Triomphe (8th Arr.) Deaths:8

17.Oct.1961 Paris Massacre Manifestation, in favour of Algerian independent movement, repressed by Police Deaths: unclear (40 to 200)

Timeline years

1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

1 Introduction

Interests and aims

If, at one side, the world is facing singular events such as the refugee crisis and the rise of the terrorist attacks, it is also worrisome how the role of the nation-states and their political power have been modified in the last years, concerning control, warfare and counterterrorist security.

This topic first caught my attention when I was living in Paris during in the second semester of 2016. I was impressed by the ostensive military presence in the public space, the fear of an imminent attack, the sensation of being constantly controlled. On the other side, the visible aggressiveness between the different milieus and the clear unresolved situation with migrants, refugees and ethnic groups were also visible. Therefore, I questioned myself: what is the role of a powerful and centralised national state in Paris, the symbolical, political and economic centre of France?

The work here aims to show the influence of counterterrorist security measures in the physical spaces of the city of Paris. It focuses on two important tools of the counterterrorist security apparatus: the Vigipirate plan, an operational-administrative tool used to reinforce security, inclusive with military forces, to protect strategic spaces of the territory; and the state of emergency, a legal instrument that gives extra power to the executive branch and police forces.

Nevertheless, the work does not focus in the terrorism logic itself and does not discuss what are the meanings or causes of terrorism. Rather, the research looks to the historical process of increase of surveillance and control over the public urban spaces and verifies to what extent are individual liberties and democratic principles constrained.

The work has two main approaches to tackle the issue: first, starting from the larger political structure, the main actors involved on the decision and application of the abovementioned instruments of control are identified and the present French security system is observed under a historical perspective.

Second, starting mainly from empirical observation, the work turn to physical objects that are related both to general security and counterterrorist security. This culminates into the identification of certain elements, its uses for security purposes and its relations with locally engaged actors.

These two scales are brought together in the observation of three representative areas of Paris – Forum des Halles, Gare du Nord and Place de la République – to unveil the different procedures related to urban control and to demonstrate the relation and contradictions of both scales of security. All these steps allows the reflection on the use of counterterrorist security in public spaces in Paris. ∎

Redaction and translation notes

Before the discussion about the applied methods, some observations should be exposed:

- All quotes originally in French from interviews and consulted literature were translated by the author.
- The terms "counterterrorism" and "anti-terrorism" had been differently applied throughout the consulted literature. In succinct definitions, counterterrorism is related to measures and strategies undertaken after a terrorist attack, while anti-terrorism is used to name preventive actions. However, as most of the cases preventive actions blur with reactions against attacks, the word "counterterrorism" is applied in this work to represent any form of measure against terrorism. The term "anti-terrorism" is then restricted to explicit preventive actions, or follows the terminology of a referenced literature.
- Charlie Hebdo attacks is referring to all attacks on that day, except when describing the event itself.
- Vigipirate is written in its official documents with all capital letters (VIGIPIRATE). But, in order to improve the reading fluency, the name of plan will be written just with the first letter in capital, accordingly to other consulted references.
- Whenever possible or convenient, the name of French institutions or institutional actors was translated to English, but the acronyms were kept in its original form.
- To emphasise the difference between both *Mairie de Paris,* the administrative institution of the city, and the *Préfecture de Paris*, the local policy authority of Paris and neighbouring departments, I choose to translate the first as "municipality of Paris" (and consequently the *Maire de Paris* as mayor of Paris), but keep the latter in its original form (so as its chief in command as *préfet*). For a similar reason, the *Police National* will be translated to "National Police" and its force will be named only as "police officer/ agents". In contrast, the *Gendarmerie National* and its officers, *gendarmes*, are kept in its original spelling. When speaking generically about police forces/ apparatus, both institutions are being considered.
- All name of streets, square and places were kept in its original form, unless the English version is already commonly used (for example, Eiffel Tower). ∎

Methods and tools

"The importance of bringing in grounded social science perspectives lies precisely in shifting the debate's center of gravity from the unleashed and de-territorialized flows themselves to the dynamic, territorial, human institutions and networks that produce them in the first place, and which, in the second place, serve to re-territorialize, translate, and resolidify them into concrete forms of social and spatial change" (Kalb, 2000: 7).

The different methods applied to gather and analyse material were used accordingly to the different stages of the work. On the very beginning, a **first approach** to the research topic was made by reading part of the specific literature about securitisation and militarisation. This first literature research provided me a fundament for basic concepts and vocabulary about the topic. The tight relation with the state-nation with control, violence and urban transformations (Graham, 2011); the importance of the borders and its representation for the state sovereignty (Bauman, 1999; Jones, 2016); the use of urban development as a military strategy or military strategies for urban development (Virilio and Lotringer, 2008; Weizman, 2017); and the consequences of terrorism in urban environments (Coaffee, 2003; Graham, 2004a) were the main covered topics.

Also in the first steps of the research, an interview was conducted with Léopold Lambert, architect and researcher on physical manifestation of securitization and control, and editor of *The Funambulist Magazine*. This semi-structure interview, organised by thematic question helps me to integrate the researched literature with the French context. He also provided further literature related to the topic.

Concerning the research on the focused **security plans**, the main strategy was to analyse the latest version of the Vigipirate plan's public document and the laws concerning to the state of emergency. The new Vigipirate plan was disseminated in December 2016 and the state of emergency's law has been modified throughout the research process. Therefore, few or no analysis is already produced about these modifications and I relied much of my analysis on the primary documentation. To follow the repercussion in news media was especially important to link to previous events, contributing to the context's panorama. In the case of Vigipirate plan, the repercussion in the press was surprisingly slight and restricted to retransmit official declarations. On the other side, the state of emergency had a large repercussion on the press and the relation

with the state of emergency and the Algerian war was often remembered. This historical importance of the law shifts the research also to a historic contextualisation, in other to have a broader view of the French securitisation and militarisation process. This investigation, mainly did with works on legislative studies and colonisation studies, and allows the construction of a timeline after World War II, concerning security and defence in France. Additionally, I could understand some details and contradiction between the researched materials with a conversation with Lisa Bachir, a student from MSc *Magistère Aménagement* in the Panthéon-La Sorbonne University (Paris) working at time on her thesis about Vigipirate plan and *Opération Sentinelle*, and with a valuable access to military institutions.

The **actor**'s identification and the understanding of their responsibilities and powers required a sequence of approaches through the time. If in the first moment I could draft an actor's map using specialised literature in French criminology and information provided by the institutional websites of security actors, but a lot of contradictions and new actors appeared by the first field researches. These inconsistencies were then confronted in the expert interviews conducted with Mathieu Zagrodzki, (researcher from CESDIP – *Centre de recherches Sociologiques sur le Droit et les Institutions Pénales*), Virginie Malochet and Camille Gosselin (sociologist and urban planner respectively, both researchers by the *Mission Prévetion et Sécurite* of the *Institut d'Aménagement et d'Urbanisme* – IAU). The

interviews were also important to understand the exception of the Parisian context and some of its historical reasons. Finally, the information was one more time confronted and checked with the last field's observations in the case studies' areas.

Also the **applied human force** for security was observed. What kind of security agent (national police, gendarme, soldier, private security etc)? Was the agent alone or in a group? Uniformed? Carrying weapons? Stopped or walking? Finally the relation between the objects with the security actors and other people in the space were observed, identifying certain security procedures and some patterns of reactions from the other involved actors.

The research of the **physical security elements** in different public spaces or spaces with public access were conducted mainly by systematic observation in the first field accesses (3 fieldtrips between January and April 2017). The chosen sites (defined by considering their symbolically relevant Paris, with public access, and a potential target of a terrorist attack according to the description of Vigipirate plan) were observed differently, according to their size and complexity, varying between 30 minutes and 2 hours. The observation focused on the identification of objects designed for securitization measures (like CCTV cameras, fences etc), and objects that might be used also for security purposes (benches, garden boxes etc). The objects were photographed and relevant physical characteristics were noted (material, size, position in the site). The noted material were later

on organised in a logbook, which served as fundament for a catalogue of physical objects, produced to highlight the element's security uses and establishing four broad categories: surveillance, orientation, communication and punishment.

While the gathering of material was influenced by the seminal research of William Whyte on New York squares (Whyte, 1988), the analysis reviewed the relations between objects and people, building a network through their agencies. Using the notion of "reversibility", where "an actor is nothing but a network, except that a network is nothing but actors" (Latour, 2011: 800), uncovered certain procedures and practices in those spaces.

After identifying the **case studies** from the previously observed sites (see further justifications on chapter 5), most part of the material gathering was gathered in the last field research in Paris (June 2017), being present in the three chosen sites for regularly for several hours, in different times of the day, during one week. While some approaches of systematic observation were used (observing one of entrances of *Forum des Halles*, specifically the procedure of controlling bags; or the ticket gate at the *Gare du Nord*), several hours were spent in unsystematic observation, which uses methodological elements of participant observation, as described by Gerd Spittler (2001). At one side, I was one of the "users" of these spaces, when taking the metro and trains, being controlled by security guards, eating at the restaurant and cafés at the places and so on. On the other side, I have few conversations with other involved actors, as I had limited knowledge of the language.

In fact, the French language was a challenge in several aspects of the work: the difficulty to find English literature about the topic, to talk with people (even with experts), and to understand the bureaucratic language in official documents. In that sense, I saw the need of doing French classes, making me improving the language during the research and being able to conduct interview partially in French the last time I was in Paris.

Thinking critically about different scales cannot be achieved only by denouncing one scale from the stand point of another one (Valverde, 2009: 146) a the importance and limitations from each scale were evaluated, according the different abovementioned approach. The analysis combining these different steps and material from diverse scales and qualities, and is then understood as part of an urban assemblage, here considered as "the study of the heterogeneous connection between objects, spaces, materials, machines, bodies, subjectivities, symbols, formulas and so on that 'assemble' the city in multiple ways". (Farías, 2011: 14). Adding to it, an special effort was made to include historical

elements and the theoretical background investigated during the whole research, in order to keep a critical view of the situation (see Wachsmuth et al., 2011 for remarks on urban assemblage). ■

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2

State control and urban warfare

The new military urbanism

"Warfare, like everything else, is being urbanized" (Graham, 2004b: 4).

New military urbanism is a term to define a set of trends where military applications merges with civic life in urban space, and the city then becomes a source of targets and threats (Graham, 2011: xiii). On one side terrorist attacks are the most representative manifestation of a "asymmetrical and transpolitical" war (Virilio and Lotringer, 2008: 8) in Western countries' cities, the response of it – with the discourse of "War on Terror" – took form of real wars in cities in like Bagdad or Kabul. As Graham illustrates, "contemporary warfare takes place in supermarkets, tower blocks, subway tunnels, and industrial districts rather than open fields, jungles or deserts" (Graham, 2011: xiv–xv).

This warfare state can be seen in a certain level in cities: besides the terrorist attacks, soldiers patrolling the streets and buildings, ostensive presence of police forces with heavy firearm, airport-like luggage control, enclosure of streets and train stations for security reasons among others. However, the warfare logic and the military urbanism is by no means only local, as explain Graham:

Just as it is no longer adequate to theorize cities as local, bounded sites that are separated off from the rest of the world, so, similarly, political violence is now fueled and sustained by transnational networks that can be global and local at the same time (2004b: 3).

Hence, between transnational companies and global cities, the nation-state has a key role on this process, as we will see in the French case further below. But the

Before approaching the security apparatus in France – and specifically the counterterrorism tools used in Paris – some used concepts and background information will be addressed, in order to establish a preliminary theoretic–analytical framework for the discussion. ■

new military urbanism involves the defence industry, made by large transnational company involved with the production of weapons, security and surveillance equipments, but also with news media, airplanes and buildings [▸ **chap. 5**]. The combination of both is what Graham calls "the new military urbanism's political economy", when "policies are intended to help build local industrial champions by developing their own defence, security or technology companies so they can compete in booming global markets for security technology" (Graham, 2011: xxii).

Additionally, Graham also define as "citizen soldiers" the mixture the military tasks of tracking, surveillance and targeting using civilian technologies: Internet interactions and transactions as basis for data-mining to identify threatening behaviour, private CCTV cameras transformed into "anti-terrorist" surveillance systems and so on (Graham; 2011: xxv). The commercial centre *Forum des Halles*, discussed in the chapter 5, is maybe one of the best spaces to reflect on it.

But from citizen soldier we can also see the population's vigilant aspect: "we are all counterterrorists, engaged in the development of a more resilient and robust urban landscape" (Coaffee, 2017: 63). At the same time though, "every citizen is a potential terrorist" and their relation with the state is defined by "suspicion, police filing and control" (Agamben, 2017: 46). This duality can be seen in the combination with the counterterrorist security plan Vigipirate with the declaration of the state of emergency, further discussed in this chapter. ∎

Urbicide

Urbicide serves as a concept to reflect on the risk for the urban existence itself. Urbicide can be understand as the deliberate killing, or denial, of the city, which take many forms: the annihilation of the city's population, the intentional destruction of urban infrastructures, the deliberate urban underdevelopment as a strategy of domination and even the violent repression of protest to eliminate a political instance of the city (Graham, 2004c: 138–140). This notion of systematic destruction of the city can be compared with David Harvey's understating of "creative destruction" as the surplus absorption through urban transformation and restructuring (2012: 16, 22), and the concept of "shock doctrine" from Naomi Klein (2015: 7–9) that looks for the profitable side of the disaster – either natural or human made. ∎

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"A whole series of colonial models was brought back to the West" (Foucault, 2003: 103).

Boomerang effect

According to Stephen Graham, the concept of the 'Boomerang Effect' can be understood as colonial models of pacification, militarisation and control incorporated into the homeland security operations in the cities of capitalist heartlands (2011: xvi–xvii). While panoptic prisons, fingerprinting and the Haussmannian interventions in Paris (see below) can be seen as past examples of the boomerang effect, Graham shows how the concept is applied in the contemporary context: Israeli drones which used to target Palestinians are now deployed in North America, Europe and East Asia; private military-security actors are now both involved in Middle Eastern interventions and homeland security; the use of more repressive forms of policing ("shot-to-kill" procedure or use of 'non-lethal weapons' in manifestations) originally developed in Israel, and the increasing levels of militarisation and securitisation in the French banlieues, resulting in a socio-ethnical segregation previously applied in former colonies, such as Algeria (Graham, 2011: xvii–xx).

Also called as "Foucault's boomerang", the concept originally comes from a single mention in a lecture from Michel Foucault at the *Collège de France*, in 1976:

> At the end of the sixteenth century we have, then, if not the first, at least an early example of the sort of boomerang effect colonial practice can have on the jundico-pohtical structures of the West. It should never be forgotten that while colonization, with its techniques and its political and juridical weapons, obviously transported European models to other continents, it also had a considerable boomerang effect on the mechanisms of power in the West, and on the apparatuses, institutions, and techniques of power. A whole series of colonial models was brought back to the West, and the result was that the West could practice something resembling colonization, or an internal colonialism, on itself (Foucault, 2003: 103).

As Graham explains, Foucault's thoughts are rarely related to colonialist and post-colonialist issues, and this concept might had came from Hannah Arendt studies on totalitarianism (Graham, 2013). Indeed, she used the concept "boomerang effect" (although did not define it) in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, first published in 1951, but in a broader sense from what could come from the colonies, either control mechanisms or insurgent movements (Arendt, 1973: 155, 223). As the boomerang effect appears in Arendt's text in the context of continental imperialism, further literature also interpreted her writings, either if the term can (or cannot) be used for the case of the Nazi regime (King and Stone, 2007; Owens, 2007: chapter 4; Rothberg, 2009: 64; Stone, 2010)

I use this term in this work to name the different forms of military and security reinforcements in metropolitan France in connection to former colonialist repressive strategies. However, I would be careful to connect it to Foucault's thinking, as it has happened already (as in Simpson et al., 2017, for example). The incontestably important name of the philosopher might draw attention to the idea, but this understanding of "boomerang effect" is more a product from Graham's work.

Hence, the concept can still be object of supplementary studies, and might gain complexity and reliability when comparing not only with its usage in Hannah Arendt's work, but also with its application in psychological studies, where the "boomerang effect" presents also divergent meanings (Brehm and Brehm, 1981, for example).

Anyway, Graham's definition of the concept is still helpful to understand relations between the colonial and post-colonial periods in France, putting in a historical perspective the legal tool of the state of emergency. ∎

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3

French state, control and order

First notion of terror comes from France

It is in France, by the time of the French Revolution, that the negative connotation of "terrorism" became dominant, when the use of violence by public authorities marked the *Jacobine* actions taken in the *régime de la terreur* (Dagron, 2004: 276; Schorkopf, 2004: 8). Only in the 19th century the term became associated with non-governmental groups, motivated by the right to resist oppression, as states in the 1789 French Declaration (Dagron, 2004: 276; Schorkopf, 2004: 8).

Nowadays, the definition of terrorism in France is diffuse and still open for many interpretations. According to Stéphanie Dagron, "French law does not provide a definition for the concept of terrorism" (2004: 268). Nevertheless, a list of activities are considered terrorist practices under the broad intention to "seriously disturb public order through intimidation or terror" in the penal code (*Code pénal*, 2017, Article 421-1). ■

Colonialist military apparatus in the metropolitan France: Paris of Haussmann

During the period between 1853 and 1870, when Georges-Eugène Haussmann was Prefect of Seine, the basis for the present physical structure of Paris was defined, and it is particularly important in this work for a couple of reasons.

Firstly, the three case studies developed in the chapter five are situated in spaces primarily defined by Haussmannian interventions. If *Gare du Nord* and *Place de la République* are still formally very similar to the former plans for the city, *Forum des Halles* still occupies the same space from the Baltard pavilions, glass and iron structure conceived in 1854 to shelter the central market.

Secondly, beyond the architectural legacy from Haussmann's envisions, the plan is also a manifestation of violence, once the modification of the urban form displaced the deprived population and insalubrious industries from the centre of Paris, which would constitute a "threat to public order, public health and [...] political power" (Harvey, 2012: 16). In that sense the new spaces of Paris would allow the necessary surveillance and military control (Harvey, 2012: 16).

Finally, this Haussmann's main intervention of widening street for military purposes have already been applied in a French colony before, in accordance with Graham's notion of the boomerang effect (Graham, 2011: xvii).

"Since the enemy was already inside the city, the city had to be controlled from within. It is the city fabric itself, its streets and houses, that were to be adapted accordingly" (Weizman and Misselwitz, 2003).

In 1840's, by the time of the French conquest of Algeria, Marshall Thomas Robert Bugeaud invaded Algiers, destroying entire neighbourhoods in reprisals for guerrilla attacks and replacing them with construction in accordance to the "rules of modern design" (Weizman and Misselwitz, 2003). Furthermore, Bugeaud returned to Paris in 1847, publishing a manual called *La Guerre des Rues e des Maisons* (the war of streets and houses) and proposed a reorganisation of the city for preventing civil unrest in Paris, which Haussmann most likely have read (Weizman and Misselwitz, 2003). Eyal Weizman decribes the plan's intentions (Weizman and Misselwitz, 2003):

> Bugeaud understood that [...] military thinking has to guide urban design. If strategic urban design previously focused on strengthening the city's peripheral walls and fortifications to keep out the enemy, here, since the enemy was already inside the city, the city had to be controlled from within. It is the city fabric itself, its streets and houses, that were to be adapted accordingly.

In that sense, Weizman argues that the experiment of Algier influenced Haussmann's plan, and the creation of wide boulevards would provide necessary space to control riots and barricades (Weizman and Misselwitz, 2003). Recent examples of the territory control of police forces during protests and riots are further reflected in the case study on *Place de la République* [▶ chap.10]. ∎

(Post-)colonialist military apparatus in the metropolitan France

After the World War II, the idea of world government became the base for the institutionalisation of US hegemony – through the control over world money and global military power –, culminating into the creation of the United Nation (UN) (Arrighi, 1994: 68). Hence, the UN was one of the protagonists of the decolonisation process at the time, defending not only global peace but also expressing the desire of poor nations for independence (Arrighi, 1994: 67).

In the French context, the first independent movements at the colonies had already begun during World War II. However, this movement intensified after the war, and independent movements such as in Syria were moderated by the UN.

But the key moment for the French decolonisation process was at the end of the Fourth Republic, when the intensification of independent movements was followed by a development of the defensive and security institutions of the French government.

According to Mathieu Rigouste, it was at that time when the notion of "threat [*menace*]" was developed within the French military institutions, culminating into a doctrine of surveillance and repression, and developing institutions oriented to homeland control. This would be the base for the establishment of the figures that Rigoustes calls as "enemy within [*ennemi intérieur*]" (Rigouste, 2011: 7) and lead to the transfer of the repressive apparatus of the colonies to the French cities.

And it is in this context that the law of the state of emergency is created (as further described below).

A paradigmatic demonstration of the use of colonialist forms of repression was against a protest in Paris on 17 October 1961. At the time of the Algerian war, a group of 30,000 pro-Algerian protesters marched in the central area of Paris, manifesting against discriminatory practices. As the state of emergency was declared at the time, police forces make use of their extra power to violent repress the gathering and persecute participants. At least 120 people died or disappeared between 17 and 20 October (Rigouste, 2011: 101).

The *préfet de police* in Paris at the time, Maurice Papon, was in charge of the police operations. He was Inspector General of the Extraordinary Mission Administration in Algeria in 1960 and helped to defeat the Algerian Revolution. Furthermore, Papon made use of police forces in Paris, which were also trained in Algeria, by serving in the army or during police training at the African colony (Rigouste and Lambert, 2016: 43). Hence, this process, with the help of the state of emergency, can also be considered as the boomerang effect.

This internalisation process of repressive measures is accentuated from the late 1970's, with the development of deprived suburb areas in French metropolis, concomitantly with their stigmatisation and criminalisation. The working-class *banlieues* are then a spatial representation of class inequality in Paris metropolitan area and a form of "political production of advanced marginality", culminating into what Wacquant coins "anti-ghetto" (Wacquant, 2013, 2014). ∎

Post-9/11 military apparatus in the metropolitan France

Springing to 21st century, the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 were a crucial factor to change counter-terrorist and general security policies in France. While the attack triggered the process of modification of the French counterterrorist strategies to a system similar to the American National Security Agency (Rigouste, 2012), the national general security shifted in 2002 to a model centred on arrests (Roché and de Maillard, 2009: 36).

In the legal point of view, France was also influenced by the discourse of the emergence of a new type of "hybrid" terrorism, which "adds a dimension of technical and financial organisation of such a high calibre that modern terrorism is sometimes considered a substitute of war" (Dagron, 2004: 274). There was then a tendency to give more power to the police and the judiciary in order to combat terrorism (longer detention in police custody, longer detention without the right to a lawyer, property searches without a special offence, property searches at night, banishment from French territory in case of foreigners, among others) (Dagron, 2004: 274, 294–295).

In this context, adding the abandonment of riot's risk assessment for political reasons, the aggressive rhetoric from the then Ministry of the Interior Nicolas Sarkozy and the death of two minors running from police control in a suburb area of *Clichy-sous-Bois*, a series of protest and riots started in the metropolitan region of Paris in October 2005, spreading to the whole French territory and culminating into the declaration of the state of emergency once again. The use of the state of emergency marks its first utilisation to deal with problems raised in the metropolitan territory, corresponding with the historical process of implementation of colonialist practices in the national security. ∎

Charlie Hebdo attack and freedom of speech

On 7 January 2015 in Paris, the office of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo located in the 11th arrondissement and the Hypercacher kosher grocery store at the 20th arrondissement were attacked and 17 people were killed. Already on the same day, manifestations supporting the victims took place in diverse French cities and the phrase *"Je suis Charlie"* began trending in social media (CNN Library, 2016).

The attack raised the discussion about the role of the media concerning terrorism. As Frank Schorkopf argues, "mass media have a symbiotic relationship with terrorists", and the perpetrator of political violence would use their communication capacities as a transponder and amplifier. Schorkopf also raises the question (in a post-9/11 context) how the freedom of speech can be reconciled with security (2004: 14).

Nevertheless, after the January attacks in Paris, freedom of speech was not only the main claim at many of the civic demonstrations, but it was also integrated in the political discourses at the time. The defence of the controversial drawing from the magazine, including satire on religious symbolism and personalities, raised though questions to the dual discourse about freedom of speech, when French secularism (*laïcité*) was being reinforced by media and political actors, while counter opinions could be considered as an "apology for terrorism" by law (Delphy and Broder, 2015: vii–xv).

France has a history of strong media control, especially during 1950's to 1970's, and nowadays the impartiality of new media companies can be questioned, once they are owned by the French state, real estate companies, and defence companies (Balbastre and Kergoat, 2012) **[▶ ch. 5, French defence industry]**.

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4

Two manifestations of state control: Vigipirate plan and the state of emergency

"War, it will be seen, is now a purely internal affair" (Orwell, 2002 [1949]: 199).

After the 2015 Paris attacks, the security apparatus against terrorism took different dimensions: Vigipirate plan, extended state of emergency, use of private security, increase of power of police, courts and army, strengthened legal tools, and intensification of devices for terrorism prevention (Malochet, 2016). From these measures concerning counterterrorism security, we focus here on two of them: the operational tool of the Vigipirate plan, which establishes different counterterrorist measures concerning strategic spaces in the city; and the state of emergency, a legal tool that increases the power of the executive branch and the police forces.

The analysis of both instruments reviews their historical evolution, unveils the role of the involved actors in their operationalisation, and some consequences in the spaces of the city. In the end, a reflection combines elements from both tools, raising some previous considerations. ■

Vigipirate plan: permanence and militarisation of anti-terrorist measures

What happens when exceptional circumstances become habitual circumstances, that is to say, when we are constantly in a state of alert, when there is no possibility of not being alert to a possible terrorist threat? How is the subject addressed as a subject during a constant state of siege? (Schehr, 2008: 432)

The Vigipirate plan is a permanent national security tool for terrorism's prevention and it is the first anti-terrorist action undertaken by the French government as a preventive action (Dagron, 2004: 283; SGDSN (Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale), 2016: 7). The name of the plan is an acronym of *"vigilance et protection des installations contre les risques d'attentats terroristes à l'explosif"* (vigilance and protection of installations against the risk of terrorist bombings) (6 Medias, 2016). Although the acronym was kept, the name of the plan changed and, in 2014 the plan was already called *Plan gouvernemental de Vigilance, de Prévention et de Protection Face aux Menaces d'Actions Terroristes* (Governmental plan of vigilance, prevention and protection against the threat of terrorist action), which was kept in the December 2016 version. The new name of the plan reflects the Vigipirate plan's concern not only with bombings, but also any kind of what can be considered a terrorist action. Furthermore, the name does not restrict the plan only to "installations" anymore, and indeed it can be used in the whole national territory and abroad (although it has still defined "areas of action", as explained below). Finally, the new name also emphasises the preventive nature of the plan.

In order to understand the present situation of the plan, it is necessary to look back to its conception. At first a temporary tool, the Vigipirate plan evolved into a permanent plan through progressive changes in its implementation levels, reinforcing its measures outside crisis situations.

The Vigipirate plan was created in **1978**, after an attack and hostage taking at the Iraqi Embassy in Paris, with the purpose of being applied only in exceptional cases. Indeed, the plan was not triggered at the time. Nevertheless, it began as a classified document and was never entirely published, having its legitimacy

ultimately attached to the chief of the armed forces (Rigouste, 2011: 174), demonstrating its strong link with military forces.

Its measures may have been applied in **1985** and **1986** (Bauer and Bruguière, 2016: 111; Dagron, 2004: 283; Fragnon, 2009: 289), contradicting the present public document of the plan, which states its first activation only in **1991**, during the Gulf War (SGDSN (Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale), 2016: 3). After a series of attacks in **1995**, the plan was applied one more time, designating soldiers to help the National Police and the Gendarmerie with the surveillance of public spaces. The same year, instructions were given to replace public litterbins in order to keep their contents visible (Sévaux, 2003, see details in chapter 3). Furthermore, a collective engagement for security and surveillance was requested, justified because of both its efficacy and civic responsibility (Fragnon, 2009: 183). In **1996**, the Vigipirate plan was activated one more time, after a bomb attack in Gare de Port-Royal in Paris. Another activation in **1998**, in order to reinforce the security for the Soccer World Cup in France, is remarkable for its use for preventive purposes instead as a reaction to past events.

After the **9/11 attacks**, the plan is reactivated, benefiting from a reinforcement of 4,500 police officers and gendarmes and more than 1,000 soldiers (Vaillant, 2001). At the time, the Ministry of the Interior sent to the Senate a law project proposing further security measures, under the justification of the extraordinary situation:

> [W]hat is Vigipirate if it is not supported by reinforced legal tools, adapted to the means used by the terrorists themselves?
> I am aware of the unusual character of [a reinforcement] [...] But under exceptional circumstances, unusual procedure [Mais à circonstances exceptionnelles, procédure inhabituelle]. (Vaillant, 2001)

Despite the discourse of exceptionality, the Vigipirate plan would not be deactivated anymore, being reformulated in **2003**, when the Vigipirate plan became a permanent plan and four different levels of action were defined by colours, mimicking the American homeland security coding (Fragnon, 2009: 294):

· **Yellow:** real risk, but imprecise;
· **Orange:** plausible risk of terrorist action;
· **Red:** proven risk of serious attack;
· **Scarlet:** risk of major attacks with serious damage and/or many victims (Bauer and Bruguière, 2016: 111).

Additionally, in the 2003 plan the notion of "security culture" became more explicit, sharing the responsibility of the security with the population (Fragnon, 2009: 274; Rigouste, 2011: 254). In 2006, the *White book of the*

[4.1] Vigipirate plan's logo in 2014
http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Archives/Archives-des-actualites/2014-Actualites/Un-nouveau-plan-Vigipirate

government on homeland defence against terrorism emphasises the use of the Vigipirate plan as a tool to consolidate anti-terrorist security measures on the everyday level: "Everybody is aware of the existence of the VIGIPIRATE plan. This degree of knowledge is a good thing. But we must go further in extending a culture of prevention." (Secrétariat général de la défense nationale, 2006: 100)

After the attacks in the metro of London on 7 July **2005**, the level was raised to "red" and it has never been retracted to orange or yellow again. Eventually in **2014**, in a similar movement to 2003, a new Vigipirate plan is launched and the level system is "simplified" (SIG (Service d'information du Gouvernement), n.d.) to only two levels, as states in the public version of the plan at the time:

> The expression of the level of vigilance by a colour code has been abandoned in favour of a simpler and more operational approach distinguishing two levels of mobilisation: a permanent level of vigilance, reinforced if necessary on an ad hoc basis in certain places or field of activity; and a level of alert against an imminent risk of attack. (SGDSN (Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale), 2014: 5)

The lower level, "permanent level of vigilance", called *vigilance*, was applied from the beginning of the plan's operation until the January 2015 attacks at the office of the newspaper Charlie Hebdo and the Hypercacher kosher grocery store, when the level was raised to *alerte attentat*, which allows "temporary and exceptional measures" (SGDSN (Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale), 2014: 12). Thirty mobile police units reinforced the security under the jurisdiction of the Préfecture de Paris, and the number of mobilised soldiers increased from 450 to 1100 (Cadot, 2015).

This version of the plan also established a logo for the plan: the word VIGIPIRATE written below a red triangle and both elements inside a black triangular contour. In the case of the maximal level of vigilance, the name *"alerte attentat"* should be written below the symbol **[4.1]**. In the case of high level of security, it was recommended for operators of buildings with public access and event's organisers to display the logo, keeping the public informed about the measure and encouraging people's engagement (SGDSN (Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale), n.d.).

The level was kept at the highest level for almost two years, when, once again, a new plan Vigipirate was announced in **December 2016**, less than one month after the attacks in Paris and Saint-Denis. The major difference was the change of the structure of the Vigipirate levels, now with three different gradations **[compare with 4.2]**:

· **Vigilance:** this lower level of security is similar to the equivalent of the previous version of plan. It is applicable "everywhere and at all times" (unless higher levels of security are applied). All permanent measures of Vigipirate plan are applied.
· **Sécurité renforcée – risque attentat (Reinforced security – threat risk):** this level is a response to "heightened level of terrorist threat". The permanent levels are reinforced and additional measures are applied. It has a very similar discourse comparing to the previous *alerte attentat*, but with the major difference that it does not have a set time limit. Considering that the level "reinforce security – threat risk" was applied since the new plan's release – succeeding the previous highest level of security – reinforces their similarity. *Sécurité renforcée – risque attentat* is in force at the whole French territory since December 2016.
· **Urgence attentat (Attack emergency):** An even higher level of security is defined, and it should be triggered in case of "a documented and imminent terrorist attack threat, or immediately after an attack", only for a short period of time, in order to manage the crisis. Permanent and additional measures

Levels	Level-activation principles	Implementation conditions	Types of measures activated
Vigilance (VIGIPIRATE)	This level relates to the permanent security stance	This level is valid everywhere and at all times.	Implementation of all permanent measures (base).
Reinforced security – threat risk (VIGIPIRATE SÉCURITÉ RENFORCÉE RISQUE ATTENTAT)	This level expresses the State's response to a heightened level of terrorist threat.	This level can apply to the whole of national territory, or it can be targeted on a geographical area or a particular sector of activity. This level does not have a set time limit.	Reinforcement of permanent measures and activation of additional measures.
Attack emergency (VIGIPIRATE URGENCE ATTENTAT)	This level triggers a maximum state of vigilance and protection, either in the event of a documented and imminent terrorist attack threat[6], or immediately after an attack. Activating this level enables the protection arrangement to be adapted to prevent any risk of a follow-up attack.	This level can be activated across the whole of national territory, or across a defined geographical area. The "attack emergency" level is of short duration, and can be deactivated at the end of crisis management.	Permanent measures reinforced and additional measures activated. This level is associated with constricting additional measures, and with a reinforcement of the alert that can be coupled with information being circulated using the SAIP[7] telephone application, the various institutional web sites, and radio. Behavioural advice can also be circulated to the population in case of the risk of a follow-up attack.

[4.2] Plan's level since December 2016
in: SGDSN 2016: 20

are activated, including "constricting additional measures" and information alerting the population is circulated, as well "behavioural advices" (SGDSN (Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale), 2016: 20).

Nowadays, besides the permanent character of the plan, there is also an intrinsic possibility of its constant adaptation and evolution: "VIGIPIRATE is the only national plan that is permanently implemented. Thus, VIGIPIRATE is a planning document as well as a national security arrangement that is in constant development." (SGDSN (Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale), 2016: 6).

Concerning the involved actors in the decisional level, power is mainly concentrated in the national sphere. The 300 permanent and additional measures that constitute the plan – whose entire list is kept in secret – are applied accordingly to each case, but also the overall level of security. The Prime Minister has the decision to increase or decrease the security levels and is the highest authority on the plan's structure.

Following the Prime Minister, the General secretariat of defence and national security (SGDSN) develops these measures based on the risk assessment made by the intelligent services (SGDSN (Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale), 2016: 7), of which the different specialised working groups (DGSE, DGSI, DRM, DRSD, DNRED and TRACFIN) are coordinated by the National Intelligence Co-ordinator (Coordonnateur national du renseignement), who advises directly the President of the Republic concerning the issue. SGDSN has also direct communication with UCLAT, which produces the risk assessment of terrorist attack under the authority of the National Police and represents the General Directorate of the National Police in the meetings with SGDSN (SICOP (service d'information et de communication de la police nationale), 2016).

As an exception of the general rule, DGSI (General directorate of interior security) has no offices in Paris, where the intelligence service is coordinated by DRPP (Inteligence directorate of *Préfecture de Police de Paris*) (Bauer et al., 2017: 193), increasing the responsibility of the Préfecture de Police over the issue.

SGDSN is also responsible for the measures' dissemination to all Ministries. Consequently, the Ministry of the Interior retransmits it to departmental prefectures (the *Préfecture de Police*, in the case of the French capital), which are responsible for the measures' application, together with local authorities. While the Ministries are responsible for passing the instructions to public and private operators, the *Préfecture de Police* is responsible for the coordination between different local actors **[4.3]**. These different steps of dissemination open margins for different interpretations of the plan. As explained Virginie Malochet, the application of its measures varies between the local actors (Malochet and Gosselin, 2017, personal communication).

The préfet de police can also make use of different armed forces against terrorist threats. Besides their own agents (officers from National Police), the *préfet* can request *gendarmes* and soldiers (both military servants) to reinforce the contingent against terrorist threats (Zagrodzki, 2017, personal communication).

The measures' application can be broadly divide in three topics. In its public document, the Vigipirate plan is defined as a "government plan for vigilance, prevention, and protection" (SGDSN (Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale), 2016: 12). "*Vigilance*" is understood by the intention to increase the knowledge and recognition of the terrorist threat, in order to better adjust the measures. The *preventive* side of the plan is oriented to raise awareness of this threat amongst state agents, operators (private and public) and the general population, disseminating the protective measures, according to each context (place and potential threat). Finally, "*protection*" is based on the adaptable measures made to reduce the "vulnerabilities without inducing disproportionate constraints on the economic and social life of the Nation." (SGDSN (Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale), 2016: 12)

As previously mentioned, the Vigipirate plan is a national plan with measures that surpass the territory, but it focus on the following "areas of action" **[4.4]**:

· Alert and mobilisation;
· Gatherings;
· Installations and buildings;
· Dangerous installations and material;
· Cybersecurity;
· Air sector;
· Maritime and river sector;
· Land transport;
· Health;
· Food chain;
· Network (communications, water, electricity, hydro-carbons, gas);
· Border control;
· Abroad (protecting French national and interests) (SGDSN (Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale), 2016: 13).

[4.3] Representation of circulation of stance memos and instructions of the Vigipirate plan
in: SGDSN 2016: 21

From the thirteen "areas of action", one is specifically oriented towards international issues, concerning French protection abroad. This "area of action" is not territorially based, as it concerns to "all countries where France has a presence, which host French nationals, and which are likely to receive French travellers." (SGDSN (Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale), 2016: 69)

The other 12 action areas are concerned with different activity sectors or specific vulnerabilities. In that sense, these areas can overlap in some aspect. An airport, for example, fits both into "Air sector" and "Border control" and the Eiffel Tower should be the object of attention to "Gathering" and "Installations and buildings". Or even the area of action "Alert and mobilisation" can be potentially embedded into all others. In each action area, the decision, responsibility and application from the applied measures are different, and new actors may be added.

The "areas of actions" help to reflect on the visited sites in the first field researches and are further discussed in chapter 6.

Reinforcing the Vigipirate plan, supplementary plans with temporary character are related to certain action areas. Among the so-called "PIRATE family plans" (SGDSN (Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale), 2016: 7), it is worth mentioning the METROPIRATE plan, which allows the intervention in case of an attack on underground rail public transport; and the PIRATENET, for an event of an information-technology crisis (SGDSN (Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale), 2016: 70).

Additionally, the Vigipirate plan's public document calls for the civil society's engagement for a collective vigilance: "As a citizen, what can I do?" (SGDSN (Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale), 2016: 24). In French, the document is named as "Faire face ensemble" – literally "to face together"* – and has an entire section giving general instructions, concerning the population's preparation, prevention and reaction concerning terrorist threats.

Public and private operators have additional information available in *good practice guides*, also disseminated by SGDSN (SIG (Service d'information du Gouvernement), n.d.). For instance, a guide oriented to schools and other educational establishments for minors includes instructions on how to conduct training exercises for children (Ministère de la Ville, de la Jeunesse et des Sports, 2016). ▫

* In the English version, the title of the publication was translated to "Tackling terrorism together".

[4.4] The Vigipirate plan's 13 "areas of action"
in: SGDSN 2016: 13

> 30,000 French soldiers are deployed in total   ... 13,000 soldiers only in France

[4.5] From the more of 30,000 French soldiers engaged in operations, 13,000 ones are deployed in the metropolitan France
Map: in http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/rubriques_complementaires/carte-des-operations-et-missions-militaires. Diagram: AGF

Opération Sentinelle and the use of military force

The use of military force for counterterrorist purposes has been an integral part of the Vigipirate plan. However, it is manifested presently under the *Opération Sentinelle*, an operation launched by the President François Hollande after January 2015 attacks in Paris, and later reinforced after the November attacks. Since then, 7,000 soldiers have been mobilised for this mission, 3,500 of them only in the Île-de-France region (Armées de Terre, 2016; État-major des armées, 2017).

Including the forces from *Opération Sentinelle*, there are 13,000 soldiers presently deployed in metropolitan France. This number is especially impressive when compared to the total number of soldiers placed on missions by the French army, reaching 30,000 (État-major des armées, 2016) **[4.5]**.

Concerning its application and decision structure, the *Opération Sentinelle* is under the authority of the President – and not the Prime Minister –, who has to consult the Chief of the Defence Staff (*Chef d'État-Major des armées*). Afterwards, a cooperation between the Ministry of Armed Services and the Ministry of the Interior implements the military forces within the French territory (Bachir, 2017, personal communication).

By observing this historical process of reiterated reinforcements of the Vigipirate plan, including with the use of military forces, it shows not only the process of militarisation of French urban environments, but also a "hybridisation" of police and military forces (Rigouste, 2011: 243). As Rigouste argues, its main effect is "to increase the militarisation of the surveillance of large cities and the use of the army in a police function. We have thus entered into a "time of permanent exception", both banalised and graduated" (Rigouste, 2011: 254).

This "martial rhetoric" has already been used by the French government in the international context, since the intervention in Mali in 2013 (Hecker, 2017: 2). As we could see, after the Paris attacks in 2015, this military approach at former French colonies was extended to the European area of France, and presently more than one third of the French soldiers are watching the main land. In that sense, the plan can be seen as a manifestation of the "boomerang effect", once the colony-oriented control measures are being permanently applied in the metropolitan territory. Nevertheless, this procedure is clearer in the next studied security tool, the state of emergency. ∎

Historic evolution of the Vigipirate plan

31.Jul.1978
Attack with hostages at Iraqi Embassy

1990-1991
Gulf War

1995
Series of attacks in Paris (Arc du Triomphe and RER Saint Michel) and the metropolitan region of Lyon

1996
Bomb attack in Gare de Port-Royal, Paris

1998
Soccer World Cup in France

2000
Conflicts in Kosovo and in Corsica

11.Sep.2001
World Trade Center and Pentagon attack

11.Mar.2004
Madrid train bombings

7.Jul.2005
London bombings

2013
French intervention in Mali

7.Jan 2015
Charlie Hebdo and Hypercacher Super-market attacks

13.Nov.2015
Île-de-France attacks

"Unusual procedures for exceptional circumstances"

1995
Instructions regarding public litterbins

Sep.2001
Maximal level of Vigipirate plan is activated

Dec.2016
New Vigipirate plan is announced (3 levels)

a logo is established

13.Feb.2014
New Vigipirate plan is announced (2 levels)

Urgence attentat

20.Mar.2003
New Vigipirate plan is applied (colour levels)

Sécurité renforcée

Alerte attentat

Scarlet

Vigilance

Red

Vigilance

8.Set.1995
The Vigipirate plan is activated

Orange

1985
The Vigipirate plan is activated

Jan.1991 to Apr.1991
The Vigipirate plan is activated

1998
The Vigipirate plan is activated

Yellow

Jan.2015
Opération Sentinelle is triggered

1978
Creation of the Vigipirate plan
but not activated

1986
The Vigipirate plan is activated

1996
The Vigipirate plan is activated

2000
The Vigipirate plan is activated

Nov.2015 - today
State of Emergency

1980   1985   1990   1995   2000   2005   2010   2015

State of emergency

> In the fight against terrorism, our democratic principles are our best weapon. Our strength lies in our tolerance, our respect for civil liberties, and our respect for the identities that our country has always defended. To renounce these values would be to play into the terrorists' hands. To give in to the temptation to the exception [la tentation de l'exception] would be to begin to lose the fight. So let us remain faithful to our values: they are our greatest strength in our fight against terrorism (Villepin, 2006: 6).
>
> Dominique de Villepin. Preface for the "White book of the government on homeland defence against terrorism". Villepin was the Prime Minister at the time of the state of emergency in 2005.

There are three legal instruments that give exceptional powers to the French state.

Firstly, Article 36 of the Constitution allows the Council of Ministers to declare a state of siege, restricting public liberties and the police powers being exercised by the military authorities with increased powers (Direction de l'Information Légale et Administrative, 2017b). The state of siege is in principle restricted to 12 days and an extension must be decided by the Parliament, in the form of legislation. The armed forces' attributions in case of the state of siege are described in the Defence code (*Code de la défense*, 2017 Art. L2121-1 to L2121-8) (*Code de la défense, Art. L2121-1 to L2121-8*). The Article 36 has not yet come into force in French history so far (Dagron, 2004: 308).

Article 16 of the Constitution, in turn, gives to the President full legislative and executive power (Dagron, 2004: 307) in the case that "the integrity of its territory or the fulfilment of its international commitments are under serious and immediate threat, and where the proper functioning of the constitutional public authorities is interrupted". The president has the decision upon the measures, but has to consult the Prime Minister, the presidents of assemblies and the Constitutional Council. (*Constitution of 4 October 1958*, n.d.). It has been used once, between 23 April and 30 September 1961, at the time of the Algiers putsch (Dagron, 2004: 307) (an unsuccessful attempt to overthrown the President Charles de Gaulle by retired French army generals in Algeria), even though the functioning of "public authorities" was not interrupted (Agamben, 2005: 14). At the time, Article 16 was used in combination with the last and most relevant instrument in our case: the law n° 55-385 of 3 April 1995.

The law of 3 April 1995 was the legal instrument used to declare the present state of emergency. Differently from the previous ones, this law was written at the end of the Fourth Republic, an important period in French history, "marked by the experimentation of legal mechanisms to liberate military practice from its constitutional obstacles and to reorganise internal control from a counter-subversive perspective." (Rigouste, 2011: 82)

The state of emergency increases the power of the executive branch, like Article 16 of the Constitution, and is declared by the Council of Ministers in case of serious threat to public order or public emergencies (which would include natural disasters). Just like Article 32 of the Constitution, it can last up to 12 days, when, afterwards, a law must be approved by the Parliament, fixing the extension of the measure.

Therefore, the measures give specific powers to the departmental prefect (the *préfet de Police*, in the case of Paris) to combat disturbances to public order. Article 5 of the law allows intervening in people's movement (1) and gatherings (2). Furthermore, extra power is given to repress any obstructions of public authorities' actions (3):

> 1°) To prohibit the movement of people or vehicles in the places and at the times fixed by decree;
> 2°) To establish, by order, protective or security zones where the stay of people is regulated;
> 3°) To prohibit the stay in all or part of the department to any person seeking to hinder, in any way, the action of the public authorities. (Loi n° 55-385 du 3 avril 1955 relative à l'état d'urgence, n.d. Art. 5)

The law also gives power to the police force (under the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior) to establish curfews in determined zones and constrain individual movement. People who can be considered a threat to security and public order can be confined under house arrest. Furthermore, communication with certain people can be prohibited, or one has to be present in a police station periodically. People with criminal records involving terrorism under house arrest might be requested to wear a device for electronic mobile surveillance.

The public prosecutor (*Procureur de la République*) shall be informed (but not consulted) about new mandates of house arrest or any modification on existing ones (Loi n° 55-385 du 3 avril 1955 relative à l'état d'urgence, n.d. Art. 6).

Additionally, the intelligence services have been authorised to make use of electronic surveillance for the purpose of the prevention of terrorist acts without judicial order (Loi n° 55-385 du 3 avril 1955 relative à l'état d'urgence, n.d. Art. 6-1). Hence, public authorities can make use of electronic means to watch someone who is suspected of being related to terrorist acts, but proof is not necessary, as in a regular condition (Interviewee A, 2017, personal communication, employee from CNIL).

It is important to mention that the law is a changing process, where different actors are fighting for different interests. This conflict can be tracked in the law's writing itself, where several recent modifications were made. For instance, a limit of 12 months of house arrest was approved in December 2016; a note explains that the Constitutional Council considered unconstitutional certain paragraphs of Articles 6 and 11; and Article 5 was rewritten for the same reason, brought back into force on 14 July 2017, after a suspended period.

The law n° 55-385 was applied five times before the 2015 Paris attacks. On 3 April **1955** this law was at the same time created and applied, as mentioned, still in the Fourth Republic. Presented as an "intermediate solution between common law and state of siege" (IHEDN, 1954, quoted in Rigouste, 2011: 83), it was triggered only in Algeria, in order to increase the power of the French Government to combat local independent insurrections. The measure lasted until the National Assembly's dissolution, on 1 December 1955 (Cassia, 2016: 15–17).

The state of emergency was activated a second time, then in metropolitan France, to combat a potential coup d'état from generals in Algeria. The measure was activated by the promulgation of law from the Parliament on 17 May **1958**. It was previewed for 3 months, but, with the resignation of the President of the Council of Minister Pierre Pflimlin in 28 May 1958, the state of emergency consequently ended (Cassia, 2016: 17).

On 22 April **1961**, President Charles de Gaulle invoked the power of Article 16 of the Constitution and declared a state of emergency at the same time, as mentioned above. Article 16 was also used to give the President the power to extend a state of emergency without consulting the Parliament. There are disagreements about the date the measure was lifted, varying between 9 October 1962, 31 May 1963 and 1 July 1963 (Cassia, 2016: 18; Direction de l'Information Légale et Administrative, 2017b; Thénault, 2007: 71). The state of emergency gave reinforced power to the *préfet de Police de Paris* to violently repress the manifestation for Algerian independence on 17 October 1961.

Besides the use of Article 16 of the Constitution in 1961, a state of emergency would be triggered in the Fifth Republic on 12 January **1985** only in New Caledonia, because of conflicts between independence movements and their opponents. The decision stayed in force until 30 June 1985.

After 20 years, the state of emergency was declared once again in **2005** after a series of riots after two minors died when running away from police control in 27 October. The unrest started in the Parisian suburb area, spread out to the whole country and, on 8 November, the President triggered the state of emergency, which enabled the introduction of curfews in certain areas (the state of emergency was partially applied over the whole territory, but completely valid in part of twenty-five departments, including the whole of the Île-de-France (*2005-1386*, 2005; *2005-1387*, 2005). On 18 November, the Parliament approved a three-months extension, but the state of emergency was lifted before, on 4 January 2006.

Although the state of emergency has been used throughout history to control unrest and movements against the government, its target changed in 2005 from colonised populations to deprived urban populations in metropolitan areas. If on one hand, both populations from the colonies and suburb areas have similar origins, cultural backgrounds and social roles in French society, on the other hand, it is possible to verify that this security measure has spatially shifted, from colonies to metropolitan areas, from Algeria and New Caledonia to Paris. Therefore, this process fits into the concept of Graham's "boomerang effect".

After the attacks on **13 November**, the president François Hollande mentioned the state of emergency on the evening of the same day and formally declared it by the decree n° 2015-1475 on the next day (AFP (Agence France-Presse), 2015; Cassia, 2016: 21). Although he triggered a tool that was not meant to be a stage of siege, its discourse on 14 November blurred it, by pleading the "war on terror", similar to the discourse after 9/11:

> What happened yesterday in Paris and Saint-Denis [...] is an act of war and, in the face of war, the country must take appropriate decisions. It is an act of war that was committed by an terrorist army, Daech, an army of jihadists, against France, against the values we defend throughout the world, against what we are, a free country that speaks to the entire planet. (France 24, 2015)

Restricted to metropolitan France and fully applied in the Paris region, the state of emergency was then reinforced to the whole of metropolitan France and some overseas territories (such as Guiana, Martinique and Réunion) on 19 November.

The state of emergency has been extended 6 times so far. The first two extensions were approved by the Parliament in the form of legislation on 20 November 2015 and 19 February 2016 (both for three months) and were justified by the State Council as proportional to the circumstances. Afterwards, a two-month extension,

in force by the law of 20 May, was justified by both the Euro 2016 Football Championship and the Tour de France bicycle race (Cassia, 2016: 24–25). This marks the definition of the state of the emergency not by an attack suffered, but concerning the possibility of future threats, similar to the application of Vigipirate in 1998, because of the Football World Cup.

Thereafter, the attacks in Nice on 14 July served as justification for a fourth extension of the state of emergency, this time for 6 months. The fifth extension, also for 6 months, again aimed at reinforcing the security of a future event, the Presidential and parliamentary elections (AFP (Agence France-Presse), 2016a).

Finally, the sixth extension was motivated by the Manchester attack on 22 May 2017, as well by the intention of the Executive branch to promulgate a new law reinforcing the anti-terrorist security, including some of the measures of the state of emergency into the common law, to be voted by the Parliament before 1 November.

Making use of the power given by the state of emergency, the police led over 3500 searches of homes and ordered more than 400 house arrests until November 2016 (Lambert, 2016: 20), most of them with no further conclusive results (Lambert, 2017). Until May 2017, 639 individual measures to prevent people participating in public assemblies were adopted, being 574 in the context of the public assemblies opposing the reform of labour laws; and 155 decrees prohibited public assemblies (Amnesty International, 2017: 6)

If in 2005 the use of the state of emergency shifted from colonial towards metropolitan France, after the long-term use of this tool, in 2015 it was internalised into the everyday routine. This process might be cemented with the approval of the president Emmanuel Macron's proposed law. ∎

Historic evolution of the State of Emergency

13.Nov.2015
Île-de-France attacks

14.Nov.2015
Declaration of the state of emergency by the President (decree n°2015-1475)

26.Nov.2015
Extension of the state of emergency for 3 months (LAW 20/11/2015)

26.Fev.2016
Extension of the state of emergency for 3 months (LAW 19/02/2016)

10.Jun.2016 to 24.Jul.2016
Euro 2016 Football Championship and Tour de France bicycle race

26.May.2016
Extension of the state of emergency for 2 months (LAW 20/05/2016)

14.Jul.2016
Nice attack

26.Jul.2016
Extension of the state of emergency for 6 months (LAW 21/07/2016)

19.Dec.2016
Extension of the state of emergency until 15 July 2017 (LAW n°2016-1767/19.12.2016)

Apr.2017 to May.2017:
French presidential elections

22.May.2017
Manchester attack

Jun.2017:
French parliamentary elections

11.Jul.2017
Extension of the state of emergency until 1 November 2017 (LAW n°2017-1154/11.07.2017)

Nov.2015 - today
State of Emergency

15.Apr.1960
Law n°60-372, which modifies the law n°55-385 State of emergency declared by Council of Ministers; duration up to 12 days and further extension only by law approved by the Parliament.

3.Apr.1955
Law n°55-385 Law regulating the state of emegency

3.Apr.1955 to 1.Dec.1955
State of Emergency is applied 8 months only in Algeria

17.May.1958 to 28.May.1958
State of emergency is declared 11 days, in metropolitan France

22.Apr.1961
Algiers Putsch

23.Apr.1961 to 30.Sep.1961
Article 16 of the Constitution is applied 5 months, the whole French territory

17.Oct.1961
Police force violently repress the pro-Algeria independence manifestation in Paris

Further extention until at least 9.Oct.1962

12.Jan.1985 to 30.June.1985
The state of emergency is declared 5 months, only in New Caledonia

27.Oct.2005
Two minors die running from police forces

28.Oct.2005 to 8.Nov.2005
Riots in France

8.Nov.2005 to 4.Jan.2006
State of emergency is declared 2 months, in metropolitan France

13.Nov.2015
Île-de-France attacks

Nov.2015 - today
State of Emergency

(Un)conclusive notes

Reflecting on the historic development of both the Vigipirate plan and the state of emergency and their present application, some tendencies can be identified.

Firstly, the historic process of the Vigipirate plan's development and the long-term use of the state of emergency shows the transformation of temporary measures into permanent ones, including the increase in police powers and military presence in urban spaces. The activation or extension of both measures based on future events reinforces this logic. This ambivalence between past and future, reaction and prevention is discussed again in the chapter 11, in the context of the empirical work.

Afterwards, the military presence in urban spaces reinforces the control procedures experimented in the former colonies (not only by the colonialist time, but also recently, with the present French military operations in Africa and Middle East). Beyond that, the law of the state of emergency itself was created in the colonialist period, and used in principle to control subversive independent movements.

Thirdly, the present focus on a "security culture" emphasises the double character of civilians, simultaneously soldiers and suspects, justifying the intensification of control – and self-control – on an everyday basis.

Next, both instruments are used to increase the power of the executive branch on a national scale, which is reinforced in the case of Paris because of the special position of the *Préfecture de Police* and the direct connection with the Ministry of the Interior.

Finally, combining this concentration of power, with the military apparatus given by the Vigipirate plan and the power of the state of emergency to suspend constitutional rights, the actual political panorama in France constitutes what Giorgio Agamben calls *state of exception* (see Agamben, 2005: 5). According to the Italian philosopher, the state of exception is a juridical tool that suspends the juridical order itself, becoming the "threshold of indeterminacy between democracy and absolutism" (Agamben, 2005: 4). The state of emergency has this same juridical form, as Agamben warned just after the attacks (Agamben, 2015). Complementarily, I argue here that the Vigipirate plan plays a key role in the application of the state of emergency, by operationalising its military forces, and making the exceptional measures permanent. This logic was reinforced when the Vigipirate plan changed its structure *during* the state of emergency.

As the whole plan is classified and the public document has limited information to allow me to form a conclusion in this research, the change in its structure levels raises questions on how far exceptional measures are being implemented in a permanent form. ∎

[4.6] Inauguration of Emmanuel Macron as president of France: broking the tradition to use a civilian limousine, he paraded in a military jeep
Abd Rabbo Ammar/EPA (in: Chrisafis, 2017)

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[4.7] Digital display at Eiffel Tower
AGF

The social-democratic presidents of Weimar Republic have often made use of this article, which declares the state of exception. Once in the power, Adolf Hitler also made use of it, lasting during the entire Nazi period. This article is then the legal basis to the Third Reich. As Agamben asserts, this "voluntary creation of a permanent state of emergency (though perhaps not declared in the technical sense) has become one of the essential practices of contemporary states, including so-called democratic ones" (Agamben, 2005: 2).

Artikels 48 der Weimarer Reichsverfassung

[1] Wenn ein Land die ihm nach der Reichsverfassung oder den Reichsgesetzen obliegenden Pflichten nicht erfüllt, kann der Reichspräsident es dazu mit Hilfe der bewaffneten Macht anhalten.

[2] Der Reichspräsident kann, wenn im Deutschen Reich die öffentliche Sicherheit und Ordnung erheblich gestört oder gefährdet wird, die zur Wiederherstellung der öffentlichen Sicherheit und Ordnung nötigen Maßnahmen treffen, erforderlichenfalls mit Hilfe der bewaffneten Macht einschreiten. Zu diesem Zwecke darf er vorübergehend die in den Artikeln 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 und 153 festgesetzten Grundrechte ganz oder zum Teil außer Kraft setzen.

[3] Von allen gemäß Abs. 1 oder Abs. 2 dieses Artikels getroffenen Maßnahmen hat der Reichspräsident unverzüglich dem Reichstag Kenntnis zu geben. Die Maßnahmen sind auf Verlangen des Reichstages außer Kraft zu setzen.

[4] Bei Gefahr im Verzuge kann die Landesregierung für ihr Gebiet einstweilige Maßnahmen der in Abs. 2 bezeichneten Art treffen. Die Maßnahmen sind auf Verlangen des Reichspräsidenten oder des Reichstages außer Kraft zu setzen.

[5] Das Nähere bestimmt ein Reichsgesetz.

Article 48 of the constitution in the Weimar Republic

[1] In the event of a State not fulfilling the duties imposed upon it by the Reich Constitution or by the laws of the Reich, the President of the Reich may make use of the armed forces to compel it to do so.

[2] If public security and order are seriously disturbed or endangered within the German Reich, the President of the Reich may take measures necessary for their restoration, intervening if need be with the assistance of the armed forces. For this purpose he may suspend for a while, in whole or in part, the fundamental rights provided in Articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 and 153.

[3] The President of the Reich must inform the Reichstag without delay of all measures taken in accordance with Paragraphs 1 or 2 of this Article. These measures are to be revoked on the demand of the Reichstag.

[4] If danger is imminent, a State government may, for its own territory, take temporary measures as provided in Paragraph 2. These measures are to be revoked on the demand of the President of the Reich or of the Reichstag.

[5] Details are to be determined by a law of the Reich. This article gave power to the presidents of Weimar Republic to declare the state of exception. This article was in force during the entire Nazi period, being the legal basis to the dictatorship of Hitler (Agamben, 2005: 14–15)

Glossary

B

"The Ministry of Love was the really frightening one. There were no windows in it at all. Winston had never been inside the Ministry of Love, nor within half kilometer of it. It was a place impossible to enter except on official business, and then only by penetrating through a maze of barbed-wire entanglements, steel doors, and hidden machine-gun nests. Even the streets leading up to its outer barriers were roamed by gorilla-faced guards in black uniforms, armed with jointed truncheons."

(Orwerll 2002 [1949]: 4-5)

Île de la cité 2024
A dystopian scenario for the Summer Olympics in Paris

The city is now watched by governmental drones (operated by reliable private companies), to verify unusual behaviour in the city, so as to guarantee the absence of other unauthorized drones.

The number of CCTV camera is increased to protect monuments and governmental buildings. The access to important squares has now control similar to an airport. Direct metro connections are closed.

The new applications for smart phones allow one to buy everything with a mobile. It is safer than dealing with cash and you can receive oriented advises for the various activities in the city. In Île de la Cité, the commercial stores are not allowed to accept cash and any people using it in the area is a potential suspect.

As all the bridges are severely controlled, it was clear that the Seine itself represented a vulnerability. The margins of Île de la Cité were altered to increase the security levels of the city. Different strategies were applied, from redesigning the landscape with special benches and planters; or glass walls to allow the view; or even high fences with barbed wire.

The private CCTV system are directly connected to governmental authorities, for counterterrorist security purposes, increasing the surveillance capacities of the police.

For security reasons, Île de la Cité is fully controlled. Mixing the discourse of counterterrorist security and environmental issues for less cars in the city, the circulation of vehicles is strongly constrained in the Île de la Cité and the control of vehicles is made by diverse barriers.

A special force of the French navy is now constantly watching the river with the use of military boats.

Network of actors involved in Parisian security and defence

Type of relations

- State of Emergency
- Vigipirate
- Opération Sentinelle
- Hierarchic relations
- Financial relations
- Membership
- Inverted hierarchic relations

Type of actors

- **St** Public institution
- **Sc** State-owned company
- **Pr** Private company
- Management (includes Executive brench)
- Legislative brench
- Juridical actor
- Head of Department/Institutions (exception to President and Prime Minister)
- Security/Defence actor
- Intelligence services
- Defence Industry
- Research Instutions
- Social-driven institutions
- Independent observers

Role in general security

- Human presence, visual vigilance, to advise, to communicate other authorities
- To fine concerned infractions, to combat petty crime
- To combat major crime, to control personal identities, to arrest

Role in counterterrorist security

- Human presence, visual vigilance, to communicate other authorities
- Control bags, regulate access
- To intercept, kill or arrest (potential) terrorists
- Heavy fire power

Transnational

Defence Industry
- **Sc** Airbus — AIRBUS DEFENCE & SPACE
- **Pr** Thales — THALES
- **Pr** Naval Group — NAVAL GROUP
- **Pr** MBDA — MBDA

Members of the head commission

$$$ Sponsors of the Fondation

The French State has shares from the defence companies

France

Grands enjeux stratégiques contemporains
Chair at Université Paris 1 – Panthéon Sorbonne

Member of the head commission

Les écoles de Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan
Military high school. Related to "Grand enjeux..." through the Fondation Saint-Cyr

APE
Agence des participations de l'État
State agency that manages stock exchange shares

CEMA chief of the general staff headquarters of the Armed Forces

St French armed forces

OTIAD
Organisation that mobiles soldiers for civil governmental requests

Soldiers (EMIAZD)

military servants

The present General Secretary is the director of the chair

[VP-1] validades the measures change security levels

VIGIPIRATE

Vigipirate plan

[VP-2] SGDSN coordinates/develops

Opération Sentinelle

[OS-2] Orientations are transmitted

St Ministry of the Armed Services
Minister of Armed Services

[OS-3] Ministries coordinate the actions to be undertaken by the soldiers

SG-CIPDR
Inter-ministerial Committee for the Prevention of Crime and Radicalisation

military servants

St Gendarmerie Nationale

Gendarmerie Mobile Extra police force for local level

Gendarmes extraordinarily requested Because of Vigipirate and State of Emergency

Gendarmes responsible for the security of National buildings

[SoE-2]
After 12 days, the Parliament has to approve a law for an extension of SoE. The law's project was usually formally requested by the Council of Ministers

Parliament

General Secretary

St SGDSN
General Secretariat for Defence and National Security

State of Emergency

[SoE-1]
Council of Ministers, led by the President, declares the State fo emergency for 12 days by decree

[VP-3] SGDNG disseminates the measures

President CNCTR was the former general secretary SGDSN

St Ministère de l'Intérieur

St Ministry of Interior
Minister of Interior

DGSI Intelligence service of the Ministry of Int. No jurisdiction in Paris area, whose responsible is DRPP (Préf. de Paris)

St Prime Minister

appoints

responds directly to

[OS-1] President activates/reinforces the Opération Sentinelle (previous consultation of CEMA)

St President

presides

St Council of Ministers

Other ministers

[VP-4] Instructions further disseminated directly to local level

St General Director
St National Police

civil servants

UCLAT Counterterrorist Coordination unit

RAID Special forces of Nat. Police

UCSTC Public transportation Coordination Unit

CRS Riot police of Nat. Police

Main social driven activities are supervised for (or totally made by) UCLAT

C.M. appoints

Préfet de Police Préfet + Chief of Police

St Préfecture de Police de Paris

DRPP Inteligence directorate of Préf. de Paris

BRI Special forces of Préf. de Paris

CSI Riot police of Préf. de Paris

Street Units

P.M. appoints

can request extra police force temporarily

[SoE-3]
Constrains the power of the Procureur

St Procureur de la République

supervises issues concerning security and individual liberties

$$$ Prime Min. has influence over the the budget of AAI

Control abuses of the use of personal data, but has no power to intervene

[SoE-3] Increases the power of...

President of the commission

St CNCTR National control commission of intelligence techniques

Independent admnistrative authority (AAI)

$$$ Reduction of the budget of 6,5% from 2015 to 2016

St CNIL Chair of the French data protection authority

Île-de-France

Paris

Increase of firearm power

$$$ **St Municipality of Paris**

have a seat in the meetings of

St Council of Ministers

presides

St Municipal police
Contrary to all other municipalities in France, the Municipality of Paris is not allowed to have its own police force

5

Actor's presentation

As Sebastian Roché and Jacques de Maillard assert, the French police has three main features: it is largely public, national and dual (2009: 35). It is public, because France has proportionally more public than private agents when comparing to UK and other northern nations. National, because the great majority of these public police agents are under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior. In 2009, there were 260,000 national agents against 16,000 to 19,000 municipal ones. Finally, it is dual, because the national police forces are divided into two main groups: the National Police and Gendarmerie National (Roché and de Maillard, 2009: 35). In general, National Police is generally responsible for larger cities and Gendarmerie acts in towns and rural areas. But as we see in the below and in further chapters, this relation have a much more intricate relation when concerning counterterrorism and, especially, Paris.

As Zagrodzki metaphorically rendered, "Paris is like a state, is like a country in itself" (2017, personal communication). On the one hand, Paris is like a state because it has its owns rules and logic: it does not have municipal police force, it does not have a préfet – but the préfet de police – its local-level intelligence service has more power than usual. On the other hand, Paris is like a state because Paris represents France, not only symbolically, but it is also the politico-economic centre of the country. So Paris centralises the national governmental apparatus in a very state-centralised country. And this makes Paris so particular in the French context.

Here I present a list with a brief description of the main actors involved in security – especially counterterrorist security – in Paris. The presentation of these actors also highlights the hierarchic structure and the decision's power in each level, concerning both Vigirate plan and State of Emergency. In the folder B, a diagram represents some of these actors and their interrelation, concerning decision and receiving instructions of both Vigipirate plan and the state of emergency, clarifying and connecting both actor's description and the security measures' analysis. ∎

Record cards

President of Republic

St Management
Public Institution
France

The President of the French Republic is directed elected, with a mandate of 5 years. As the head of the Council of Ministers, the President has authority to declare the state of emergency for the first 12 days without consulting the legislative power. The President is also the Chief of the Armed Services and is especially responsible to issues concerning the country sovereignty, territory integrity, international agreements and nuclear power. The president nominates the Prime Minister and also presides the National Defence and Security Council. ▫

Prime Minister

St Management
Public Institution
France
Under President

Directly nominated by the President, the Prime Minister is an extension of the presidential powers and interests, being responsible for the coordination of interministerial national affairs. Concerning security issues, the Prime Minister has authority over several interministerial offices, including SGDSN, SG-CIP-DR and SIG; decides over the level's change of Vigipirate plan and represents the President in some occasions in the subject of national security. ▫

National council of intelligence services (Conseil national du renseignement – CNR)

St Intelligence services
Public Institution
France
Under President

CNR is an adapted composition of the *conseil de défense et de sécurité nationale* (CDSN) under authority of the President of Republic. It defines the strategic orientations and priorities concerning intelligence services. The *coordonnateur national du renseignement* is responsible to prepare the meetings of CNR and report the activities of all specialised intelligence services (*services spécialisés de renseignement*) and assure its good cooperation. The specialised intelligent services are DGSI, TRACFIN, *direction générale de la sécurité extérieure* (DGSE), *la direction du renseignement militaire* (DRM), *la direction du renseignement et de la sécurité de la défense* (DRSD), *la direction nationale du renseignement et des enquêtes douanières* (DNRED). The coordinator also prepares both the national strategy of intelligence (*stratégie nationale du renseignement*) and the national orientation's plan of intelligence, as well advises directly the President concerning intelligence services. (Académie du renseignement, n.d.; Direction de l'Information Légale et Administrative, n.d.; SGDSN (Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale), n.d.). ▫

Council of State (Conseil d'État)

St Juridical actor
Public Institution
France

At one side, the Council of State is a legal adviser to both Government and Parliament. It verifies law's proposals from the executive branch to be sent to the Parliament, but bills from Parliament's private members can also be referred to the Council. On the other side, it is an administrative court, hearing disputes between persons governed by private law and the State (Conseil d'État, n.d.). ▫

General Secretariat for Defence and National Security (SGDSN)

St Security/Defence actor
Public Institution
France
Under Prime Minister

Under authority of the Prime Minister, SGDSN supports the former to issues concerning the national defence and security. Reorganised (and re-named) under the Decree No. 2009-1657 of 24 December 2009 (mandate of Nicolas Sarkozy), it develops the Vigipirate plan and coordinates its strategies between the different involved Ministries (notably Ministry of Armed Services and Ministry of the Interior).

SGDSN monitors security threats, takes part in the drafting of bill and decrees related to the subject and deals with classified documents, ensuring the protection of governmental communication. Inside the General Secretariat, he National agency of informational system's security (Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d'information, ANSSI) deals specifically with cybersecurity.

The General Secretary is also member of National defence and security council (CDSN, see CNR) and takes part of its meetings. General Secretary since 2014, Louis Gautier is also the Director of the Chair *Grands enjeux stratégiques contemporains* (Major contemporary strategic issues), inside the *Institut des Etudes sur la Guerre et la Paix* in University Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne. ▫

Governmental information service (Service d'information du Governement – SIG)

St **Management**
Public institution
France
Under Prime Minister

Under direct command of the Prime Minister, this Directorate work as a press service for the Government and especially for the Prime Minister. It has three main broad attributions: 1) to analyse the evolution of the public opinion and media content concerning governmental actions; 2) to inform governmental actions as well from the Prime Minister to the broad public (being also responsible for the website *Gouvernement.fr*); 3) to coordinate the governmental communication between ministries (SIG (Service d'information du Gouvernement), n.d.).

It is responsible to edit and manage the website *stop-djihadisme. gouv.fr*, where services for combating radicalisation, especially jihadism, are provided. The main services are preventive advices for families, communication channel to report suspects and dissemination of governmental initiatives.

Hence, SIG deals with sensitive information about security and can be a mediator between the Prime Minister and public institutions like SG-CIPDR and UCLAT (has the control of the communication channel of *stop-djihadisme.gouv.fr*), but also verify the level of acceptance of certain security measures by the public opinion and mass media. ▫

Comité Interministériel de Prévention de la Délinquance et de la Radicalisation (SG-CIPDR)

St **Social driven institution**
Public institution
France
Under Prime Minister

The Interministerial Committee of Delinquency and Radicalisation Prevention is responsible for a series of activities concerning prevention of radicalisation, such a the management of the Centres of prevention, insertion and citizenship (centre de prévention, d'insertion et de citoyenneté – CIPC), which offer a reinsertion programme to young adults (18-30 years old, up to 30 people per centre), who apply themselves in a voluntary basis, called *"Réinsertion et citoyenneté"*. The first and only centre, in the region *Indre-et-Loire* (but managed by the department of Paris), opened in July 2016, but it was with empty in February 2017 (Bouanchaud, 2017; SG-CIPDR, n.d.).

The telephone number to appoint people with indications of radicalisation disseminated by CIPDR is under the control of UCLAT, which indicates the orientation towards policing instead social support. ▫

Parliament

📖 **Legislation**
Public institution
France

Formed by the National Assembly and the Senate, Parliament renders all French laws, inclusive counterterrorist and policing legislation. They determine the extension of the state of emergency after the first 12 days, by legislation. ▫

Ministry of Armed Services

St **Management**
Public institution
France
Under President

Previously the Ministry of Defence, its name was changed in 2017, in the beginning of the mandate of the President Macron. The name Minister of Armed Forces was used before in the beginning of the Fifth Republic, between 1959 and 1969. ▫

National Army

St **Security/Defence actor**
Public institution
France
Under Ministry of Armed Services

Presently, the Army has more than 30,000 soldiers engaged in mission, but almost half of that, 13,000, are just in continental France. The Joint territorial organisation of Defence (Organisation Territoriale Interarmées de Défense – OTIAD) is the army division used as linking point to civil society and civilian affairs. Its soldiers are depployed according to civil governmental requests, concerning public security. ▫

Ministry of the Interior

St **Management**
Public institution
France
Under President

The Ministry of the Interior has authority over National Police, Gerdarmerie, and direct communication with the *Préfecture de Paris*. The Ministry of the Interior has authority over the homeland security in France and gives feedback to SGDSN, Prime Minister and the President concerning terrorism risk assessment and efficiency of applied security measures.

In the recent history, several Ministers of the Interior became to be either President (Nicolas Sarkozy and the unsuccessful attempt of François Fillon as candidate in 2017) or Prime Minister (Dominique de Villepin, Manuel Valls and Bernard Cazeneuve). ▫

General directorate of interior security (Direction générale de la sécurité intérieure – DGSI)

St **Intelligence services**
Public institution
France
Under Ministry of the Interior

Created in 2013, by the change of name and the structure of the *Direction centrale du reseignement intérieur* (DCRI), the directorate is responsible for intelligent services concerning the national territory and it is under the command of the Minister of the Interior. It works together with the *Service central du renseignement territorial* (SCRT), which deals with a less-priority cases in the local level. However, as an exception from the French general rule, both institutions do not have local offices in Paris (Bauer et al.,

2017: 193). The intelligent services in Paris are undertaken by DRPP, with cooperation of UCLAT (see below). ▫

National Police

St **Security/Defence actor**
Public institution
France
Under Ministry of the Interior

It responds to Ministry of the Interior and its officer (civil servants) work mainly in larger cities. The National police officers deployed in Paris are not under authority of the *directeur général de la police nationale*, but under the *préfet de Police*.

CRS, *Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité*, is the riot police of the institution, is famous in France for its violent reactions against protesters. They are also deployed in other situations of mass gathering, as Stadiums and peak-time trains stations. ▫

Unité de Coordination de la lutte AntiTerroriste (UCLAT)

St **Security/Defence actor**
Public institution
France
Under National Police

Created in 1984, UCLAT is responsible for the operational coordination of the services of the combat of terrorism and it is since 2014 the mainstay of the new apparatus against the violent radicalisation and jihadist channels. The phone number against radicalisation disseminated in the SG-CIPDR website is under UCLAT control.

UCLAT represents the French interest at Europol (SICOP (service d'information et de communication de la police nationale), 2016). ▫

Préfecture de Police de Paris

St **Security/Defence actor**
Public institution
petite couronn
Inside National Police, but responds to Ministry of the Interior

Although the Préfecture de Police is inside the National Police, the *Préfet de Police* responds directly to the Ministry of the Interior and has authorities over the police officers working in the Metropolitan area of Paris. As Zagrodzki (2017, personal communication) illustrated, it is "an isolated island" within the National Police. In that sense, the 27,500 police officers working in Paris, although many wearing National Police's uniforms, respond to the *Préfet de Police*. In turn, the *préfet* does not respond to the General Director of the National Police, but directly to the Minister of the Interior.

Its jurisdiction comprises in the city of Paris and the surrounding departments, the so-called *petit couronne*. In this sense, while it has to deal with municipal police forces in the suburb's departments, the *Préfecture* is the only local police force in Paris, as the city does not have the right to have municipal police force **[▸ Paris Municipality]**

The *Préfet de Police* is a specificity of Paris, once this post merges the *préfet* and the chief of police (that are split in other districts of France (Zagrodzki, 2017, personal communication).

Concerning CCTV, in order to install or modify surveillance camera systems in Paris is necessary to request an authorisation in advance for the *Préfecture*. Addionaly, the *Préfecture* has the right to install temporary cameras for up to 4 moths without consulting the *commission départementale des*

systèmes de vidéosurveillance, in case of terrorism prevention (Ministère de l'Intérieur, 2010). ▫

Inteligence directorate of Préfecture de Police (Direction du renseignement de la préfecture de police – DRPP)

St **Intelligence services**
Public institution
France
Under Préfecture de Paris

DRPP is responsible for the intelligence services for and in the jurisdiction of *Préfecture de Paris* by providing information, analysis and anticipation on the issues concerning the *Préfecture*. Notably, the directorate collaborates to terrorism's prevention, maintenance of public order (including the fight against violence in sport events) and fight against illegal immigration. It works in collaboration with UCLAT. ▫

Gendarmerie National

St **Security/ Defence actor**
Public institution
France
Under Ministry of the Interior

It responds to Ministry of the Interior and its officers are military servants.

Generally speaking, *Gendarmerie National* are responsible for the security in towns and villages, as well the countryside. But their officers were often found in Paris for 3 main reasons: 1) Because of the State of Emergency and the higher level of Vigipirate, *Gendarmerie* is also summoned to increase the police force in the cities. 2) The troops of *Gendarmerie Mobile* can be deployed in any need of reinforcement (in case of terrorist attacks,

but also football games, protests, natural disasters). 3) Buildings of national government (like Élysée Palace or the Parliament) are under jurisdiction of the nation and are securitised by *gendarmes*. ▫

Ministry of transport

St **Management**
Public institution
France
Under President

Competent authority in matters of civil-aviation and land transport security, coordinating other concerned administrations and guaranteeing the adequate transmission of the security policies (especially from Vigipirate plan) to transport operators and other related actors. The Minister also represents the government in European and consultative bodies on the issue. ▫

Procureur de la République

St **Juridical actor**
Public Institution
France

Gives authorisation to certain security interceptions, especially to sensitive issues concerned to privacy and individual rights. The *Procureur* is not consulted in some cases concerning terrorism combat during the state of emergency. ▫

National control commission of intelligence techniques (Commission nationale de contrôle des techniques de renseignement – CNCTR)

St **External observer**
Public institution
France

Replacing the *Commission nationale de contrôle des interceptions de sécurité* (CNCIS), it is responsible for verifying the legality of authorisations for the use of intelligence techniques and, in particular, for monitoring the use of surveillance by French intelligence services and advising on applications for placement under surveillance by a person. [At least according to Dagron] "This commission must render its opinion on the legality of all decisions taken by the Prime Minister in that field [security interceptions/ use of intelligence techniques] (…) The powers of this commission are real, as it can make pressure through the annual report on its activity which is published. The president of the Commission is Francis Delon, the previous secretary of SGDSN, which raised some questions to its impartiality for the position (Alonso and Le Devin, 2015; Dagron, 2004: 287; Direction de l'Information Légale et Administrative, 2017a). ▫

Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés (CNIL)

St **External observer**
Public institution
France

CNIL is an independent authority that watches misuse of personal digital data from private and public institutions. It has no authoritative power under the public institutions and its budget is subject of decision of the Prime Minister. ▫

Constitutional Council (Conseil Constitutionnel)

St **External observer**
Public institution
France

"[T]he legal organ in France which, since 1971, has exercised control over the compatibility of laws with fundamental rights of individuals." But "the submission to the CC is not obligatory and the decision to allow its intervention may only be taken by political authorities" (Dagron, 2004: 273). ▫

National Consultative Commission of Human Rights (NCCHR)

St **External observer**
Public institution
France

NCCHR is also an observer to Human Rights concerning law against terrorism. The commission considered the 2001 law against terrorism a threat to the fundamental rights to individuals (Dagron, 2004: 274). The commission published several warning about the possible misuse of the state of emergency. ▫

Transnational Police Organisations

St **Security/ Defence actor**
Public institutions
Transnational

The international cooperation consists mostly of the exchange of information, involving police, customs and intelligence services, and financial intelligence services. (Dagron, 2004: 279)

The French government participates of both the European Police Organisation (Europol) and the International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol), which have specific task forces to provide assistance to the police and intelligence services concerning terrorism (Dagron, 2004: 280), and are important organisation for exchange of information concerning transnational criminality.

UCLAT represents the French interest at Europol (SICOP (service d'information et de communication de la police nationale), 2016)

The Counter Terrorist Group (CTG) is a derivative of the Club de Berne, a multilateral forum for cooperation between the heads of security and intelligence services of a large number of European Countries, Norway and Switzerland (Dagron, 2004: 280; DiMario and Starosvit, 2015). "CTG members voluntarily exchange intelligence and engage in discussion to develop cooperation in counterterrorism efforts. CTG specifically focuses on Islamic extremist terrorism, and regularly meets to facilitate operational cooperation among the EU's police and intelligence agencies. CTG additionally generates and communicates threat assessments to EU policy makers" (DiMario and Starosvit, 2015). ▫

French Financial Intelligence Unit (Traitement du renseignement et de l'action contre les circuits financiers clandestins, TRACFIN)

St **Intelligence services**
Public institution
France

Created in 1990, it combats against money laundering. Authorised to exchange information to equivalent international counterpart, under certain conditions. It has no power to sanction transactions believed to be connected with terrorism (Dagron, 2004: 280 and 291). ▫

SNCF (Société nationale des chemins de fer français)

Sc **Management**
State-owned company
France

SNCF is national state-owned railway company and manages the rail traffic in France. SNCF has the right to have armed security agents.

Besides that, it is very likely that SNCF is an operator of vital importance (opérateurs d'importance vitale – OIV). However the list of the 200 OIV is secret, the transportation sector is one of the 12 *secteurs d'activités d'importance vitale*, and SNCF has clearly a important position concerning the railway network. As an OIV, the operator is obliged to appoint a security liaison officer and develop a security plan and its communication with the governmental counterterrorism security actors is increased (*Code de la sécurité intérieure*, 2017: Art. L223-2; SGDSN (Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale), 2017: 2). ▫

RATP (Régie Autonome des Transports Parisiens)

Sc   **Management**
State-owned company
Île-de-France

RATP is a state-owned public transport operator that controls all metro and bus lines in Île-de-France. They are also likely to be an OIV and their security agents can also have firepower.

After the Paris attacks, the agents of RATP/SNCF can be dressed as civilian and be armed (Malochet and Gosselin, 2017, personal communication). ▫

Paris Municipality (Mairie de Paris)

St   **Management**
Public institution
Paris

The municipality of Paris has no right to have its own municipal police force. Government of France considers that the security of Paris is a responsibility of the State and fears rebellions or revolutions in Paris, consequently, fears the idea of a local armed police force. So, the national government has direct control over the security in Paris (Zagrodzki, 2017, personal communication).

Nevertheless, the municipality has different agents concerning general security: (de Maillard and Zagrodzki, 2017: 55)

Night-correspondents (correspondants de nuit – CdN) are in charge of co-producing public tranquillity in specific neighbourhoods. *Social housing surveillance group (Groupement parisien interbailleurs de surveillance – GPIS)*, with a semi-public status, responsible for improving safety in social housing areas.

Inspectors of security of Paris (inspecteurs de sécurité de la ville de Paris – ISVP), also with semi-public status, are uniformed agents in charge of public salubrity that dates back to the late 1970s and tackle tranquillity and quality of life issues.

Municipality of Paris is also responsible for parking control (including feeing infractions) and to give authorisation for public gatherings, but only without "protest character" (Cadot, 2016). This shows a tendency highlighted by Gosselin to increase the power of the municipality of Paris (Malochet and Gosselin, 2017 personal communication). On the other side, also show the reiteration of the national control over issues concerning "public order or circulation" (Cadot, 2016).

Inspectors of security are under the authority of Mairie de Paris. The uniformed agents do not carry lethal weapons and they have authority only under municipal facilities (parks, stadiums, libraries etc). They may fine any violation of the regulation of these places, and also littering, noise disturbances and other minor offences (de Maillard and Zagrodzki, 2017: 56–57). ▫

Chair Grands enjeux stratégiques contemporains (Major contemporary strategic issues)

St   **Research institution**
Public institution
France

This Chair is a multidisciplinary project of teaching and research inside the Institute of Studies on War and Peace of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University. Its main activities are to mobilise funding to promote symposia, bring international specialists and fund researches (doctor and post-doctor). The chair is lead by the General Secretary of SGDSN, Louis Gautier. The steering committee defines the teaching and research programme, as well the budget. The committee is composed, beyond others, by representatives of Fondation Saint-Cyr, AIRBUS (AIRBUS Group and Defence&Space), DCNS, MBDA and Thales (*Université Paris 1 – Panthéon Sorbonne*, n.d.). ▫

Fondation Saint-Cyr

Sc   **Research institution**
State-owned company
France

The Fondation Saint-Cyr inside the military school Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan. The foundation is create in 2006 to enhance defence research and mediates the interests between the armed services and civil society, especially the business sector. The foundation has increasing its resources pool since 2011 (from around € 29,000 to almost € 700,000 in 2015), being around 75% provenient from private companies, including AIRBUS (AIRBUS Group and Defence&Space), DCNS, MBDA, Thales.

Fondation Saint-Cyr is one of the partner of the Chair Grands enjeux stratégiques contemporains. It has also a partnership with the military school Saint-Cyr, SNCF and United Nations' Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) to develop the centre d'expertise de lutte contre le terrorisme (centre of expertise in the combat against terrorism). As states in the foundation's report, "the role of CELT is to consider the fight against terrorism in a global approach. As such, it studies the effects of this threat on the banking sector that supports the economy." ▫

Institute for Higher National Defence Studies (Institut des hautes études de défense nationale – IHEDN)

St   **Research institution**
Public institution
France

IHEDN is responsible for the direct and governmental research for SGDSN, focusing on defence, security, foreign policy, armaments and defence economics.

In January 2010, the Institute merged with the *Centre des hautes études de l'armement* (Centre for Higher Armaments Studies), contributed to training organised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and moved closer to the *Institut national des hautes études de la sécurité et de la justice* (National Institute for Higher Studies in Security and Justice) (Institut des hautes études de défense nationale, n.d.). ▫

French defence industry

Sc   **Defence industry**
State-owned companies and private companies
Transnational

Pr

The relation between the French defence industry with the French government are multiples. First, France government, through the APE (Agence des Participations de l'État, as state agency participating on stock market), holds stock exchange shares from all mayor defensive companies*****.

Economic model of White Paper from 2013 also reinforce the importance of the defence industrial sector as an important exporter and a high-end technology producer, also for civilian market; and suggest that the connection with the defence can be reinforce in a situation of budget regarding defence is shrinking (Ministère de la Défense, 2013: 117-124).

Large French defence companies have also influence on public research on strategic issues by participating on the coordination of Chair Grands enjeux stratégiques contemporains [aaaaa].

Finally, in 2009 France returned to full participation in NATO, increasing its military operations abroad and developing "American-style" model for homeland security.

For instance, Airbus is second largest space company, biggest European Satellite Industrial Player and "Europe's No. 1 in defence" (Airbus S.A.S., n.d.). And Thales owns, besides the defensive industry, the newspaper *Figaro* and has real-estate sector. ▫

* The work of Apergis and Apergis demonstrate that stocks of global defence companies – the French companies were not included in the study – increased their value after the November Paris attacks (2017).

Atalian (Lancry)

Pr   **Security/ Defence actor**
Private companies
Transnational

Atalian is a French multinational facility management with 95,000 employees, providing cleaning and security services among others. Most third-part security agents observed in *Gare du Nord* and the station *Chatêlet-Les Halles* were from this company (see chapter 5). Atalian generates a yearly turnover of 1.860 billion euros and operates in more than 30 countries across Europe, North America, South-East Asia and Africa. ▫

Securitas AB

Pr   **Security/ Defence actor**
Private companies
Transnational

Securitas AB is a Swedish Multinational company specialised in security services. The company operates in 53 countries in America, Europe, Africa and Asia, having 335,000 employees with a total revenue of circa € 9 billion in 2016 (Securitas AB, n.d.). Only in France, Securitas employs 16,000 people distributes in 130 branches managers. On 1 December 2016 (same day of the publication of Vigipirate's new public version), Securitas signed a partnership with *Défense Mobilité* – the governmental agency that organises the professional transition from former servants of Ministry of Armed Services –, in order to facilitate the reconversion of military servants (Ministère de la Défense, 2016). Securitas has a partnership with Unibail-Rodamco (Securitas AB, 2016), the main owner of *Forum des Halles*, where Securitas deploys employees using uniforms from the commercial centre. Eurostar also uses employees from Securitas in *Gare du Nord* (see chapter 5). ▫

Stentorius and Honeywell

Pr   **Security/ Defence actor and defence industry**
Private companies
Transnational

Pr

Stentorius deals with systems' development in France, concerning mainly electronic security. The cameras of several rail stations in Paris carry its logo (Gare du Nord, Gare de l'Est and Gare Saint Lazare for example). With a team of 40 people, this company is attached to the Honeywell, an American

multinational conglomerate. Honeywell offers a range of different services, systems and commercial products including diverse security solutions and aerospace system, also for military purposes. It works in 70 countries and its revenue was 40 billion US dollars in 2015 (Honeywell, n.d., n.d.; Stentorius, n.d.). ▫

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6

Counterterrorist design in urban spaces in Paris

Empirical survey of security elements in public spaces in Paris **41**; First explorations **42**; Analysis of "areas of action" of the Vigipirate plan in regard to observed sites **44**; Bibliography **46**

According to Neil Smith and Setha Low, there is a "multiplicity of divergent meanings attaches to 'public', 'public space', and the 'public sphere'." Public space would mean then "the range of social locations offered by the street, the park, the media, the Internet, the shopping mall, the United Nations, national governments, and local neighborhoods" (Smith and Low, 2006: 3).

Empirical survey of security elements in public spaces in Paris

The first incursions to the field were made in different spaces in order to verify the physical manifestation of any kind of security, reflecting on how far it is being used to counterterrorism purpose.

This first survey did not aim to have information to build a catalogue of spaces concerning security, as the time spend on each space only produces a limited view of the area. Nevertheless, it was used to identify physical elements related to security, so as to show some characteristics and contradictions that were further explored in the case studies. Also it is a selection from these spaces that the case studies are defined.

As part of the consulted literature discuss intensive process of securitisation in financial districts in global cities (Coaffee, 2003; Simpson et al., 2017) and in peripherical zones as a tool of segregation and stigmatisation (Wacquant, 2014), places like La Defense and areas in Saint-Denis and Bobigny were observed, but no further empirical studies were undertaken to counterpoint suburb and central areas of Paris metropolis. ∎

First explorations

① Arc de Triomphe
② Avenue des Champs Élysées
③ Bibliothèque Nationale de France
④ Bourse du travail
⑤ Canal Saint-Martin
⑥ Centre George Pompidou
⑦ Châtelet – Les Halles (Forum des Halles) [▸ ch. 8]
⑧ Eiffel tower
⑨ Élysée Palace
⑩ Embassy of Israel
⑪ Embassy of the United States
⑫ Galeries Lafayette
⑬ Gare and Tour Montparnasse
⑭ Gare de l'Est
⑮ Gare du Nord [▸ ch. 9]
⑯ Gare Magenta
⑰ Gare Saint-Lasare
⑱ Holy Trinity Cathedral
⑲ Hôtel de Ville
⑳ Hôtel des Invalides
㉑ Institut du Monde Arabe
㉒ Jardin des Tuileries
㉓ Ministry of the Armed Forces
㉔ Ministry of the Interior
㉕ Musée de quay Branly
㉖ Musée d'Orsay and Musée National de la Legion
㉗ Musée du Louvre
㉘ Notre Dame Cathedral
㉙ Palais Garnier (Opéra)
㉚ Panthéon
㉛ Place de la Bastille
㉜ Place de la Concorde
㉝ Place de la Nation
㉞ Place Joachim du Bellay
㉟ Place Jussieu
㊱ Place de la République [▸ ch. 10]
㊲ Place des Voges

Outside Paris Municipality:
㊳ Airport Charles de Gaulle
㊴ Airport Orly Gare du Nord
㊵ Bobigny – Commercial centre
㊶ Bobigny – Park and palace de justice
㊷ Bobigny – Saint Denis administrative centre
㊸ La Défense – Paris de la Défense
㊹ La Défense – Société Générale
㊺ Saint-Denis – Central train station
㊻ Saint-Denis – Gare du Stade de France and Place aux Etoiles
㊼ Saint-Denis – Stade de France

Analysis of "areas of action" of the Vigipirate plan in regard to observed sites

One of the main parameters to define the chosen areas of study, the comparison between the sites and the "areas of action" of the Vigipirate plan (see further information on Chapter 2) allow to come to the further conclusions. Here I divided the discussion between the action areas of the plan.

Alert and mobilisation is related to fast communication (either passing information to authorities or disseminating it to the large public) and consequently rapid intervention and adaptation of security measures. It also has to do with the coordination of decentralised alert chains (from different administrative departments and operators).

As "[o]perators of vital importance [OIV] have specific legal obligations in matters of alerting and intervening" (SGDSN (Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale), 2016: 54), SNCF and RATP (with are very likely to be OIV) have further responsibilities into communication and intervention's cooperation.

Concerning *communication to mass public*, two main approaches can be indentified, especially in metro and train stations. Firstly, *preventive* actions to promote a vigilance posture to the users are made by communication displays **(C2)**, digital displays **(C3)** and loudspeakers **(C4)**. Secondly, *alert messages* are transmitted can be transmitted to the same digital displays and loudspeakers, but also with operators' personnel, either security agents or not.

Concerning *communication to authorities*, two levels can be highlighted: the need of increase of internal communication (The surveillance of third-part security, regular staff; cleaning staff may be oriented to identify what can be suspicious activities and posses a radio – or even a mobile – to communicate rapidly directly authorities), and the intensification of communication between the operators and counterterrorist forces. The good communication between the surveillance system of the police and the RATP/SNCF (Zagrodzki, 2017, personal communication) poses a question in how far only the communication concerning terrorism is increased.

Concerning coordinated *mobilisation*, the main visible aspect is to close stations and interrupt transit lines. This can be used in the case of an attack or attempt of attack (closing station when going back to paris), an

attack suspicion (closing gare du nord, bomb suspicion), but also may used to control de access to manifestations (interviews).

In that sense, basically any space that runs a public transportation system (not only metro and train, but also buses, also coordinated – and watched – by RATP) can be target of this area of action. Besides that, important institutions, where the control is reinforced, also the either communication, alert and mobilisation strategies would be strengthened.

In the case of **gatherings**, or mass meetings, special procedures are specified in a separated "area of action". In the public version of the Vigipirate plan, the different actors (and consequently, their different attributions) are highlighted. The organisers (either private or public) are the main responsible for the events and its participants. They may also guarantee the security inside the event's area, including access filtering (control entrance's flow, check bags and people etc). On the other side, the administrative authorities are responsible for the "public order", checking the measures planned by the organisers, verifying the site configuration and analysing the unique circumstances of the event. In case of a "risk of breach of the peace or of a particular threat to a gathering", the administrative authority may cancel the event and prohibit the gathering. Finally, the law-enforcement agencies, under authority of administrative actors, are applied for traffic management, crowd management and general surveillance (SGDSN (Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale), 2016: 55).

In the Parisian case, the authorisation's request and law-enforcement agency is centralised in the Préfecture de Paris. (Zagrodzki, 2017, personal communication) Since February 2016, the Municipality of Paris became responsible to authorise public manifestations, but only concerning "local, cultural, associative [and] sportive" activities. All manifestation potentially impacting to "public order or circulation" keeps under entire control of the Préfecture de Paris (Cadot, 2016: 3). In the observed case of the manifestation of 10 June 2017, it was also observed that the traffic control was managed both by the police force and RATP traffic control agents [▸ ch. 10].

The "area of action" on **installations and buildings** cover "all buildings that may be potential targets, whether because of their symbolic, economic, political, or ecological value, or because of the public that they deal with." Although certain areas of activities' infrastructures are subject to specific normalisation, the main organisation structure is divided between the installation's operators, who are responsible for the protection of internal areas and the access control; and

public authorities, responsible for the external protection and traffic management (SGDSN (Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale), 2016: 56).

In that sense, as Paris becomes a territory spread of potential targets: most of the French governmental institutions are located in Paris (inclusive the ones related to national defence and security), besides numerous embassies, museums, churches, mosques, synagogues, financial institutions and many other building with historic and symbolic meanings. In that sense, hardly all surveyed open spaces are also subject to this security reinforcement, once there is a representative building or installation nearby. This is logic is reiterated by the mentioned external protection, made by public authorities. Considering the case of the Place de la République, the *Caserne Vérines*, a governmental building and the Bourse du Travail, respectively at the square and just at the street nearby, could both be considered representative buildings subject to this "area of action".

Concerning the access-control, which is the operator's responsibility, present also different levels of severity, activating various procedures, and objects. While museums tend to have an airport-like verification (with baggage scanner machine and walk-through metal detectors) a church might have only a visual bag's verification (occasionally with a hand held metal detector). It is although remarkable that third-party companies make the great majority of the access-verification security.

Cybersecurity is the less tangible concept concerning urban security, and therefore is difficult to identify paradigmatic urban element concerning this "area of action". On the other side, it has the potentiality to increase the control capabilities of state actors and large companies to many situations. Vigipirate-plan limits the operational description into list importance stakeholders concerning digital-system protection (SGDSN (Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale), 2016: 58). Nevertheless, reflecting further on the fact that digital tools like CCTV surveillance and online data control might be watched to identify potential threats – as well the power of certain governmental institutions as ANSSI –, it raises the question of respect to individual privacy, especially when the state of emergency is declared, and consequently the control of CNIL (see actor's record) over abuses of governmental surveillance is even more constrained (Interviewee A, 2017, personal communication, employee from CNIL) [▸ ch. 4].

Also in that sense, the public document also differentiates cybersecurity and cyberdefence. While the first is a permanent stance of security, the second imposes reinforced-protection in case of higher levels of threat, which might be related to the use of data.

What I am bringing to the discussion is not only the ability to better *protect* data, but also to *use* collected data. The potential use of information from CCTV cameras **(S2)**, data transferred by a free Wi-Fi **(S3)** connection provided by the operator, or information collected by ID verification has clear advantages to terrorism combat and prevention, but also might result to restriction of civil liberties, also in the physical environments, beyond terrorism issues.

The **Air sector** has specific orientations both to protect national airspace, aircrafts and all related air-transport, user, professionals and infrastructures. The Ministry of Transport represent the state interests and coordinate the involved actor and guarantee the adequate application of the measures. Operators and other private actors may implement the security, whose surveillance is also carry out by the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of the Budget (SGDSN (Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale), 2016: 59).

Similarly, the **Land sector** is also under authority of the Ministry of Transport. The measures of Vigipirate plan cover physical infrastructures (roads, railways, nodal interchanges and certain) and information system (signalling, traffic management, information for users among others).

In the context of Paris, it is remarkable the importance of SNCF and RATP to the application of the measures of this "area of action", once they manage directly or indirectly, all the public transportation in the city. Beyond that, security agents from both companies have the right to carry firearms, which is an exception to the general rule that does not allow private armed force (de Maillard and Zagrodzki, 2017: 56; Zagrodzki, 2017, personal communication). Also the police force works differently in rail infrastructures. There is a police force specifically in charge of transportation security, which acts in an area larger than the jurisdiction of the Préfecture of Paris (although still under its command).

The **Networks**' specific protection covers a range of different types of networks. The electronic-communication and audiovisual network, include all physical infrastructure to electronic communication (such fibre optic or satellite) but also the data itself, including access to Internet data (and social networks) and television broadcast. While the plan emphasises the importance of two actors: one related to the Ministry for Electronic Communications (Commissariat aux communications électroniques de défense – CCED); and

the other being an independent authority (Autorité de régulation des communications électroniques et des postes – ARCEP), the document does not clarify the relation with ANSSI and the measures concerning cybersecurity. (SGDSN (Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale), 2016: 64).

The specificities of the "areas of action" concerning dangerous installations and material, maritime and river sector, health sector, food chain, and the protection of French interests and people in the foreign territories are not subject of scrutiny in this work, once they have few or no relation to the researched sites. ∎

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Personal Communication

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7 Physical elements related to security

Surveillance

(S1) Baggage scanner machine

`Security as main purpose` **YES**

Baggage scan machine is a conveyor belt, where one shall leave it baggage and occasionally jackets and metallic small objects. The objects pass then through an x-ray machine, showing the contents of packages and metallic elements inside a . Security agent is needed to see the images produced by the machine. Always used to control the access in airport's check-in areas, the machines are very recurrent in the Parisian museums, and were encountered in the *Hôtel de Ville* and in *Gare du Nord*. Their used is combined with the walk-through metal detectors. ▫

(S2) CCTV

`Security as main purpose` **YES**

Video surveillance is one of the main tools to help general security and is also included in the counter-terrorist discourse. It is used in both indoor and outdoor environments, and was encountered in all visited spaces during field research.

CCTV has a range of different shapes, more or less integrated with the surrounds. The cameras have several formats (directed, domes, multiples); installed in independent structures or poles – associated or not with illumination –, or directed installed at the wall or ceilings; and frequently some sort of protection from rain or vandalism. Despite the relative small materialisation in the physical space, CCTV is a centralised circuit, which requires a space, where the images of the different cameras are being transmitted, involving security agent(s) watching it.

Throughout the city of Paris, there are almost 2,000 installed cameras in open spaces with public access, most from the *Préfecture de Paris* (Préfecture de Police, 2016). This is a relative small number comparing with London – a comparable city in geopolitical importance and issues relating terrorism. Being a tiny part of London metropolitan area, the city of London has 2.90 km2

and 1500 surveillance camera (the area of Paris is 105,4 km2) (Coaffee, 2003: 232)

The images from CCTV can be recorded and kept for a limited amount of time. In Paris, the installation or modification of any video surveillance system must be authorised by the *Préfecture de Paris* (Préfecture de Police, 2014). Additionally, the police and other competent authorities have the right to access images from private operators, in cases involving terrorism (*Code de la sécurité intérieure*, 2017: Art. L223-1). After 2011, the discourse on security with CCTV has shifted to "*vidéoprotection*", including terrorism prevention as one of its function. See further reflection in the case study of *Forum des Halles* . ▫

(S3) Free Wi-Fi connection

`Security as main purpose` **YES**

A complementary tool to the mobile **(V2)** itself, free Wi-Fi connection offered in train stations, commercial centres and museums can also be used to increment the electronic surveillance for commercial and security purposes. ▫

(S4) Handheld metal detector

`Security as main purpose` **YES**

The observed handheld metal detectors were a circa 50 cm flat stick, which in proximity of metallic object produce an alarm sound, manipulated by private security agents in order to control the access to a certain area. It can be used to verify both luggage and people's body. ▫

(S5) Litterbin

Security as main purpose　　NO

Since 1995, the Vigipirate plan prohibited the installation of new litterbins in public spaces, whose content was not visible, in order to dissuade from bomb threats (Sévaux, 2003). Nowadays, there is a large range of litterbins' shapes in Paris (although the model made by vertical metallic rounded bars is the most common) that allow seeing the used bag, which are usually a whitish or greenish transparent bag. Litterbins are generally fixed on the floor and might have a surface to put out cigarettes. The cleaning personnel has a role in the counterterrorist security, once they inevitably verify any uncommon object in the litterbin. See the case study of *Forum des Halles* [▸ ch. 8]. ▫

(S6) Security booth

Security as main purpose　　YES

Security booth or guard booth is a cabin, where a security agent can stay inside and survey the area. Normally not bigger than 1 or 2 m², it can be not much more than covered bench (*Élysée Palace*), but usually it has a door and possibility to the security agent be enclosed inside. Associations are possible with vehicle barriers (becoming a checkpoint, as in the Embassy of Israel) or a CCTV control-room **(S2)** (as in the *Jardin des Tuileries*). Regularly, security booth stays outside, either in an open area inside the property, or nearby, at the sidewalk. However, it can be inside building, usually as border police control.

　An interesting example is at *Gare du Nord*, where the guard booth is located in the middle of a glass wall **(O3)** dividing the departure area from trains to London and the public accessible area. The security agent can only enter in the security both from the controlled area [▸ ch. 8]. ▫

(S7) Walk-through metal detectors

Security as main purpose　　YES

Walk-through metal detector is a portico slightly bigger than a conventional door, and one has to pass through to enter in certain area. In case of a presence metallic object in the person's body, the machine might produce an alarm sound or light a red light (instead of a green one). The entrance of people is not continuous, but controlled by a security agent, who authorises each person to pass through it. There is a variability of the machine's rigorousness. While in airport one usually has to take off shoes and belt, in many museums it is not necessary even to pass separately wallets or keys.

　It is used in combination with the baggage scanner machine, so it is present on the same places (mainly airport and museums). ▪

Orientation

(O1) Bollards

(O2) Concrete blocks

(O3) Fences and Walls

(O4) Gates and doors

(O5) Retractable barriers

(O6) Reinforced planters

(O7) Vehicle barrier

(O1) Bollards

Security as main purpose　　YES

Bollards are vertical posts to direct vehicle traffic and might be intended to guide pedestrian circulation (National Capital Planning Commission, 2005: 3). There is also a range of design and sizes and resistance, and can be more or less integrated with other surrounded elements. Bollards are an important element for the so-called hostile vehicle mitigation and the development of applied technologies intend to increase their resistance against large vehicles at considerable speed (Simpson et al., 2017: 319). ▫

(O2) Concrete blocks

Security as main purpose　　YES

Concrete block have a similar use to bollard to reinforce hostile vehicle mitigation, but are apparently more robust and in most of cases is not integrated with the architecture

　A notable exception is in *Forum des Halles*, a element in between a bench and a simple concrete block [▸ ch. 8]. ▫

(03) Fences and Walls

`Security as main purpose` `YES` `NO`

As suggested by Simpson et al. (Simpson et al., 2017: 321) the differences between fence and wall are very diffuse and can be seen as similar elements concerning security elements. Nevertheless, here I focus on elements with to avoid unauthorised access and to control people or vehicle's circulation.

The vast possibility of fencing is applied in almost every observed space during the research (notably *not* in *Place de la République*) with a large variation of shape, size, resilience, transparency and other physical factors. For instance, low fences can divide the road and the sidewalk, preventing both cars to access the latter, but also avoiding pedestrians in the sidewalk itself (such and in Élysée Palace). It was remarkable to see common temporary fences in *Place des Vosges* fixed in the floor, as a physical manifestation of permanently temporary security measures.

Walls and fences might be integrated with gates and doors **(04)**. □

(04) Gates and doors

`Security as main purpose` `YES` `NO`

Gates and doors are very basic elements in architecture that define a passage between two rooms at the same time the possibility to close it. They can be well integrated with architecture and become "invisible" when open. Many doors and gates have the so-called *digicode*, which is the popularised commercial name given to electronic door locks, which work with a numerical code or a security token, widely used in Paris.

Gate and door are normally opening a passage in a fence/wall **(03)**. □

(05) Retractable barriers

`Security as main purpose` `YES`

Retractable barriers are small moveable poles with built-in ribbons, mainly used to organise the queues. They help to control the access in temporary cases of gathering, in internal places (just before the ticket control or sale of museums for example) or outside, in front of the main visitor's access. □

(06) Reinforced planters

`Security as main purpose` `NO`

Reinforced planters and elevated gardens are, as benches, pieces of urban furniture that can have a less visible function to be used to direct vehicle traffic.

A large tree can be used itself as an obstacle for vehicles, especially in combination with other physical elements (lighting poles, for example. □

(07) Vehicle barrier

`Security as main purpose` `YES`

Vehicle barrier are moveable structure to control vehicle access. In can be open remotely or in presence and force of a security agent. The combination of vehicle barriers and security booths are the checkpoints. ■

Punishment

(P1) Non-lethal weaponry

(P2) Spikes and "Pig ears"

(P1) Non-lethal weaponry

Security as main purpose   **YES**

Non-lethal weapons are an important part of the new military doctrine for urban control (Graham, 2011: 27) and "designed to facilitate control of mass urban populations, and to disrupt protests, without including civilian deaths" (Graham, 2011: 245). Rubber bullets guns, rubber balls grenade, tear gas bombs, pepper spray are common in larger protests and riots in Paris, so as other mass gatherings as football games. Nevertheless, police officers and SNCF security agents carrying non-lethal weapons during regular patrolling.

The use of non-lethal weapon was not observed during field research, but further discussion on securitisation in protests and manifestations can be seen in the case study of *Place de la République* **[▶ ch. 10]**. ▫

(P2) Spikes and "Pig ears"

Security as main purpose   **YES**

Spikes, metallic pieces, rough surfaces and a range of other elements made to avoid people laying down or skating. The raised metal lumps, usually installed on the corner of concrete benches **(O1)**, made to prevent skateboarding are called "pig ears" (Omidi, 2014). During the research, no counterterrorist purpose was figured out. ■

Communication

(C1) Communication display

(C2) Digital communication display

(C3) Loudspeakers

(C4) Bulletproof vest

(C5) Two-way handheld radio

(C1) Bulletproof vest

Security as main purpose   **YES**

The bulletproof vest is a self-defensive element for security agents, used not only by police, gendarmes and soldiers, but also to SNCF and RER security agents and municipal guards. The bulletproof vest has also a double symbolism, both indicating a risk (and consequently a need for protection), and communicating a higher status of the security agent. Uniformed agents with bulletproof vest tend to represent a greater authority and, having relation with weapons, indicated that the person might have firearm – which is not always true, as the case of municipal guards seen in *Place de la République* on 14 June **[▶ ch. 10]**. ▫

(C2) Communication display

Security as main purpose   **YES**

Different displays are encountered in the spaces of Paris, expressing issues concerning security: the Vigipirate symbol, occasionally with description of the security agent's procedures and asking for comprehension and cooperation; posters asking for vigilance and to not forget any object; other forms of prohibition; and the message about CCTV **(S2)**.

Concerning graphic design, some displays are "rigid", emphasising the topic by written messages (like the notice of Vigipirate); or "softer", using symbols and colours to transmit the messages, similar to advertisements (such as the security advises from SNCF and RATP). They are very visible in public transportation, but are also encountered almost every observed place. ▫

(C3) Digital communication display

Security as main purpose YES **NO**

The digital communication display has a similar function to transmit messages, but additionally it can change the information character. Mostly encountered in train and metro stations, digital display, which size is from the size a television to a large wall surfaces, usually alternates between general news and orientations of preventive actions. Furthermore, while monitors of the *grand lignes* are normally displaying the trains in the platform and its current departure or arrival situation, in RER and metro lines can be found display with information about all regional and metro lines, informing any problem or interruption in the whole network. This helps people to avoid a line with problems or knowing about a closed station. ▫

(C4) Loudspeakers

Security as main purpose **YES** NO

Similar to digital communication displays, the loudspeakers have the feature to change the informed content and provide live news. Presently in museums and commercial centres to play music and indicating the closure of the establishment, in train stations and airports they are also used to provide security preventive advices – "mind the gap", "be aware of pickpockets", "don't leave you baggage unattended" – and live exceptional information – closure of station, delays. Namely, on 19 June, instructions and alerts were heard, after an attempt of attack on the Champs Élysées, to avoid the area and indicating the closure of a metro station. ▫

(C5) Two-way handheld radio

Security as main purpose **YES**

Two-way handheld is largely used by all security actors, from police forces to private security agents, to guarantee fast and adequate communication through an exclusive channel between the security agents or with a security central controlling CCTV **(S2)**. The use of earpiece accelerate the communication between actors and reception of specific instructions.

Handheld radio is a tool that reinforces the role in security from cleaning staff. Controlling possible suspect elements during cleaning services – including inside the litterbins –, the cleaner possessing a radio could rapidly communicate other instances of security and start the activation of a counterterrorism procedure. ∎

Various

(V1) Benches

(V2) Checkpoints

(V3) Escalators and stairs

(V4) Mobile

(V5) Turnstile

(V1) Benches

Security as main purpose **NO**

Surveillance
Orientation
Punishment

Benches are elements that can present different features concerning security.

Firstly, as bollards and concrete blocks, reinforced benches in outside areas can have a similar function to impede vehicle traffic in undesired zones or mitigate the first impact of an attack with vehicle. The difference is that the main purpose – and visual appearance – is to be a place to sit. It can present different size, shapes and materials.

The shape of the bench can also avoid someone to lie down in the bank (similar function of a spike), or to hide an object under it. The absence of benches in certain areas might be used to guarantee a flow of people and to discourage people to occupy the space. This happens, for instance, at the *grand lignes'* area in *Gare du Nord*, where the few benches are located out the circulation zone. On the other side, the presence of benches might induce the use of certain spaces and promote natural surveillance, as in *Place de la République*. ▫

(V2) Checkpoints

Security as main purpose **YES**

Surveillance
Orientation

Checkpoints are understand here as the combination of vehicle barrier **(O7)** and a security booth **(S6)**. A security agent has to control the access. A remarkable example is at the Embassy of Israel, where two vehicle barriers and a security booth. ▫

(V3) Escalators and stairs

Security as main purpose	NO

Surveillance
Orientation

Escalators and stairs are important elements to concentrate and orient people's flows. At the same time, it has usually a great visibility (different from the abandoned staircase in a social house estate from Newman's analysis). This features make them nodes of surveillance as well, both security agents and CCTV **(S2)**.

Different from a stair, the escalator defines a direction, being generally more predictable and increasing its control features. However, with other spatial elements, stairs can have a similar feature, as we see in the case study of *Gare du Nord*. ▢

(V4) Mobile

Security as main purpose	NO

Surveillance
Communication

The mobile, while an alternative to a two-way handheld radio **(C5)** in some observed cases, plays a role concerning surveillance. Private agents can use information from a smart phone for commercial purpose (the use of an application from a commercial centre, as described in the case study of *Forum des Halles*), but also police forces can access personal electronic data in case of terrorism suspicion. This power is increased during the state of emergency **[▸ ch. 4]**. ▢

(V5) Turnstile

Security as main purpose	YES

Surveillance
Orientation

The turnstiles are physical demarcations that control the flow between two zones with different privileges. To pass through turnstile it might be necessary to insert or scan a ticket, a *"Navigo"* (Parisian public transportation's card) or a boarding pass.

Although present in museums and airports, its main use is in railway public transportation. There is a range of design, forms and procedures. But there are some major differences between metropolitan connections (RER) and the metro lines.

In the case of the RER, a ticket/card is necessary to both enter and exit from the controlled area. This procedure inspects if the travellers are inside their paid zones. Hence, RER stations have the same control to enter or exit the controlled area.

On the other side, one single rate applies for the entire metro network, and the exits at metro stations are not controlled by ticket. In that case, the turnstiles control only the flow's direction (way out), opening automatically (by movement's sensor) or not (a door without knob to be pushed).

Normally there is a special way to allow the entrance/exit for wheelchairs, baby carriages and large suitcases. It can be a regular metallic fence with gate, which has a doorbell to request the opening for a station's staff, or a larger turnstile with a double barrier. The latter is present in *Gare du Nord*, where soldiers used this passage to enter into pairs in a controlled area. ∎

Embassy of Israel

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Simpson D, Jensen V and Rubing A (eds) (2017) The city betwenn security and freedom: contested public spaces in the 21st century. Basel: Birkhäuser. ■

"Sounds Orwellian? Curiously enough, the early surveillance studies literature, dating from the 1970s and 1980s, used not Foucault but Orwell as its model. Work done in political and sociological analysis was frequently framed with the idea of a 'total surveillance' state or society derived from the Nineteen-Eighty-Four scenario."

(Lyon, 2006: 12)

Focusing

C

Introduction: justifications

On one side, the chapter 2 to 5 intend to describe a systemic view of the actors related to counterterrorist security in Parisian urban spaces. By focusing on one operational and one legal tool (Vigipirate and state of emergency, respectively), it unveils the concentration of power by national actors, which is reinforced by the specific administrative characteristics of Paris.

On the other side, chapter 6 and 7 starts from the other way around, looking at the physical elements in the city that are being used as a security tool. The relation between these physical objects and locally engaged actors disclose some security procedures and its structures.

After looking at the problem of security through this dual perspective, chapters 8 to 10 aims to bring together the knowledge from these previous chapters, by combining it into three case studies, verifying both those instances of security measures in the everyday production of public-accessible spaces. How do security measures affect, interfere, or determine the daily activities in these spaces? To what extent are general security measures and counterterrorist defence combined or dissociable between each other? Is it possible to identify in public spaces any conflicts, dysfunctionalities or missing links between the administrative-operative level and the daily securitisation?

Therefore, the choice of the case studies relied in some basic principles. First of all, the chosen places present features that make them potential targets of an attack, which also connect them to the security principles of Vigipirate plan. Thus, the economic, social, political and symbolic importance of these places were taken into account, as well their strategic position in the city, and the number of people using the spaces.

To have a large amount of people is also a characteristic connected to a second principle: fully controlling the place must be a challenge. Places like the Élysée Palace or the Embassy of Israel, although deeply charged of political and symbolical meanings, have vulnerabilities that are in a way easier to manage, since their reduced flow of people facilitates (or makes feasible) their robust security measures.

The case studies also present a diversity of social groups, which can also represent an obstacle to counterterrorist surveillance. Within a homogeneous group, any unusual person, behaviour or object quickly become more visible. The mix of different groups makes spaces less predictable and thus more vulnerable from this point of view.

Finally, the accessibility (in an urban perspective) is also an element that challenges standard security guidelines. Multiple accesses and good connection with public transportation increase the fluidity of a space and, consequently, the difficulty to its securitisation.

Considering these aspects, *Place de la République*, *Gare du Nord*, and *Forum des Halles* constitute three exemplary cases to verify the dynamics of security measures. All three selected areas have a large number of different groups of people and activities, are in central and very well connected locations of the city, and have an important role in the functioning of the city, so as a strong attached symbolic meaning.

The choice to develop three cases instead of one was made to verify the different security measures in different types of public spaces. While *Place de la République* is a quintessential public space in its legal and practical aspects, a profit-driven state-owned company controls *Gare du Nord*, which is nevertheless part of the city public infrastructure, and *Forum des Halles* is owned and managed by private initiative.

The three case studies are presented in a similar structure: after a short contextualisation, the cases focus on the application of security measures and its physical manifestations, presenting the involved actors and the main security procedures. Starting from the "less" public *Forum des Halles* and finishing with *Place de la République*, the chapter concludes by comparing these spaces in terms of security practices. ∎

8 Forum des Halles

**[8.1] Localisation Forum des Halles
1st arrondissement**
AGF

(M) (RER)   Metro/RER station

🚌   Bus station

(V')   Municipal rental bike (Vélib') station

Bourse du Commerce et de l'Industrie
Jardin Nelson Mandela
Church of Saint-Eustache
Rue Pierre Lescot
Rue de la Cossonnerie
Jewish neighbourhood Marais
200m radius
Musée du Louvre
Building site
Place Edmond Michelet
Church of Saint-Merri
Fontaine Stravinsky
Centre Georges Pompidou

[8.2] Surroundings of Forum des Halles
AGF. Based on Google Maps and OpenStreetMap.
Icon Pierre-Luc Auclair (Bus)

Context and historical panorama

Forum des Halles is a commercial centre located in the first arrondissement of Paris **[8.1]**, near the Gothic Church of St Eustache, a 5-minute walk from Centre George Pompidou and the traditionally Jewish neighbourhood *Marais* **[8.2]**. The commercial centre is inserted in the largest transportation hub of the city, where 5 metro lines (lines 1, 4, 7 11 and 14) and 3 regional train lines (RER A, B and D) intersect, totalising a daily flow of 750,000 people **[8.3]**.

An occupied place since medieval times, its first remarkable redevelopment happened when Georges-Eugène Haussmann was the prefect of Seine (1853-1870). In 1854 the construction of a large glass and iron structure designed by Victor Baltard was started, sheltering the already existing Parisian central market.

The so-called Baltard pavilions **[8.4]** were demolished in 1970's, though not without controversy. This allowed the construction of the *Châtelet – Les Halles* station, an enormous underground structure to receive the regional trains RER and connect the existing metro lines from both stations *Châtelet* and *Les Halles*. Integrated with the transportation complex, a commercial centre was raised: *Forum des Halles*, the largest underground development project in France (Les Halles, the new heart of Paris, 2014).

Forum des Halles' spaces were mainly at the underground level, emerging only in certain parts on the ground floor and leaving a large green area (where, presently, the *Jardin Nelson Mandela* is being built), which was kept due to public pressure evidenced by independent popular consultations (Vincendon, n.d.). The construction of the postmodern project, designed by Claude Vasconi and Georges Pencreac started on 1977, and several additions were implemented during

[8.3] Railway network at the stations Châtelet-Les Halles, Châtelet and Les Halles
AGF

[8.4] Surroundings of Forum des Halles
Louis Schmidt (in: Kaltenbach, 2014)

* For instance, building sites were still blocking certain areas above the RER platforms by the time of the field researches. The construction is scheduled to finish on 2018 (SemPariSeine, n.d.)

the 1980's (Les Halles, the new heart of Paris, 2014). These former arrangements constitute the main spatial structure of the present complex **[8.5]**.

Concerning security issues, *Forum des Halles* was already target of a terrorist attack in 1986, when a bomb exploded in the store FNAC Sport and injured 9 people at the commercial centre. The attack was connected to a series of bombings that happened in Paris between December 1985 and September 1986. (Fragnon, 2009: 148; Rignault and Deligny, 1989) However, no documentation on security modifications was found regarding this incident.

After the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the municipality of Paris, concerned with the vulnerabilities in the city, pointed out problems at the escapes routes of the complex, which triggered a new redevelopment process, set to change both the underground station and the commercial centre. After several forms of public consultations, an international competition for the redevelopment project was organised in 2004. The winner was the architect David Mangin and his team SEURA, despite controversies involving the selection (Jarrigeon, 2012: 561; La Canopée des Halles, n.d.; Vincendon, n.d.). Another complementary competition was held in 2007 and the selected architects Patrick Berger and Jacques Anziutti became responsible for the project management and the design of the several new structures in the complex, including the main construction above the surface, on the eastern side of the left square, named the *canopée* (Edelmann, 2016) **[8.8]**.

The name *canopée*, suggested by the architects, is a reference to the upper foliage in a forest, or a canopy (La Canopée des Halles, n.d.), and serves as a metaphor for a large glass and steel structure that overlays two double-storey blocks and a wide open space in between. Inaugurated in April 2016, this open space – subject to the weather, as the roof is not sealed – connects both the *Rue Pierre Lescot* and the *Jardin Nelson Mandela*, and covers the infamous "hole" from the previous version of the commercial centre, which is now called *Patio Pina Bausch* **[8.9]**.

Presently, the complex became a multifaceted structure, with different uses, architectonic styles and is still not completely finished.***** Together with the insurance company AXA, Unibail-Rodamco – Europe's largest commercial real estate company – holds the commercial centre, (Unibail-Rodamco, n.d.: 178) where, in 2016, 33.9 million people visited its 150 commercial stores. It also houses several municipal facilities, such as film and media libraries, a swimming pool, a gymnasium and a music conservatory (Espace Expansion, n.d.; Unibail-Rodamco, n.d.: 49). There are 5 direct accesses to the commercial centre from the ground floor, and several other direct connections with transportation system **[8.7]**.

And one has to pass through a security control in all of these entrances. Or should pass. ∎

[8.5] Comparison between the former and the new Forum des Halles
clockwise, from upper left : Keystone-France (in Edelmann, 2016);
AGF (a); no author (in: Kaltenbach, 2014); AGF (b)

1850

1854
Beginning of the construction of Baltazar pavilions

1900

1900
Opening of Châtelet station and Metro line 1

1908
Metro line 4 at Châtelet station

1926
Opening of the metro line 7, previously as an independent station, late integrate to Châtelet station

1935
Opening of the metro line 11 at Châtelet station

1950

1971
Beginning of the demolitions of Baltazar pavilions

1977
Opening of Châtelet–Le Halles station, with the RER lines A and B; beginning of the construction of first of Forum des Halles (10-years process)

1986 (4 February)
a bomb explosion in the store FNAC-Sport at Forum des Halles

1987
Opening of RER D at Châtelet–Le Halles station

1998
Opening of metro line 14 in Châtelet station

2000

2001
9/11 Attacks

2002
Beginning of the consultation process for the redevelopment of the complex

2005

2004
Competition for the redevelopment project

2007
Architectural competition

2010

2015

15 January 2015
Charlie Hebdo Attack

13 November 2015
Charlie Hebdo Attack

14 November 2015 to present
State of emergency

2016

5 April 2016
Inauguration of the Canopée

2017

2018

[8.6] Timeline: Forum des Halles
AGF

Rue Pierre Lescot
Police station

Main staircase entrance

Jardin Nelson Mandela

Commercial stores
Municipal facilities
Canopée
Access to train station

Ground floor

Level -1   *Commercial stores*

Level -2   *Commercial stores*

Patio Pina Bausch

Place Carrée

Level -3   *Commercial stores*
Municipal facilities
Patio Pina Bausch
Place Carrée
Access to train station

Level -4   *Commercial stores*
Access to train station

[8.7] Axionometric Forum des Halles (1:5000)
AGF

[8.8] Canopée seen from Rue Pierre Lescot
AGF

Access control

All entrances to *Forum des Halles* have, in principle, the presence of at least one uniformed security agent, controlling the access. The agents – mostly black men between 30 and 50 years old, although exceptions of gender and ethnicity were seen – are dressed with black boots and pants, white shirt with a discreet badge on its pocket and the *Forum des Halles'* logo on the shoulder. The logo is also seen on their caps, which have same dark-blue colour of the tie that partially hides the cable connecting the radio and its earpiece. The security agent also carries a metal detector and might be sometimes beside a table.

In order to explain their procedures, the best example was seen in the main entrance of the underground part of *Forum des Halles*, under the *canopée* and near to the *Jardin Nelson Mandela*. A wide staircase under the glass-metal roof, with a waterfall in the middle (which was never functioning during the observations) and two sets of escalators at the sides, leads to a lower area, where three security agents stand **[8.10]**.

Two of them guarded the side entrances on the same level of this platform, while the third stood in the centre, in front of two long escalators towards *Patio Pina Bausch*, two levels underneath. The direct visual contact to the busy courtyard incites the curiosity and encourages one to go down. Besides that, the escalators provide a direct connection to the largest stores' level and a faster connection to the RER station. Therefore, it is not surprising that the security agents by the escalators have to deal, between these three agents, with the most intense flow of visitors.

Nevertheless, there are a number of physical elements to help him or her. Firstly, the escalators are slightly recessed from the glass-wall plan – which divides the controlled and not controlled area – forming a sort of vestibule, where the security agent stands. Secondly, each of the escalators moves in one direction, so only the one towards the patio needs to be controlled. Third, the area itself below the larger staircase can be used as a buffer zone where people can wait without pushing onto the security agent.

[8.9] Under canopée: main staircase entrance on the left and Patio Pina Bausch on the lower level
AGF

[8.10] Main entrance security control
AGF

Level -1

Area after control

[8.11] Types of luggage verification in Forum des Halles
AGF

- Nothing
- Allowance to go without being controlled
- Look inside the bag/pursue
- Look inside suitcase/luggage
- Look inside the bag/pursue and verify the weight of it
- Look inside the bag/pursue and verify with a metal detector
- Look inside the suitcase/luggage and verify with a metal detector
- Verify the person's body with a metal detector
- Look inside the suitcase/luggage, verify with a metal detector and verify the person's body with a metal detector

[8.12] Types of reactions to security control
AGF

- To circumvent the control
- To not notice or to ignore the presence of the security agent
- To show the bag only if requested
- To open previously the bag and showing it without stop walking
- To open previously the bag and pass the control only with authorisation from the security agent

Table
The table shrink the passage, facilitating the surveillance and provides a surface to better verify suitcases.

Hand metal detector

The escalators help to separate entrance and exit flows

FORUM DES HALLES

Security staff member
with uniform from Forum des Halles

[8.13] Security control at main entrance
AGF

Additionally, a table with black cover stands in the middle of the above-mentioned vestibule and helps to reduce the flows for the control. This temporary element is clearly perceived as an obstacle and, in combination with the security agent itself, it can only mean one thing for the visitor: bag control **[8.13]**.

The rigorousness of bag control in *Forum des Halles* can vary **[8.11]**. Differences were observed between security agents: some people tend to inspect more methodically than other. There were also variations depending on the flow of visitors: when there are more people, the control tends to be faster, but less "relaxed" and more standardised. Differences depending on the visitor were also observed: no difference between ethnicities was seen, but especially men dressed closer to a stereotype of "bad boy" were more controlled. Finally, the size of the bag or luggage also made a difference: bigger backpacks and suitcases took more time to inspect.

Therefore, what is a simple procedure had in fact several nuances: to allowing the passage without any control or just looking rapidly inside a purse; to request to open a large suitcase, inspecting visually with a metal detector; or even to use the detector to inspect the visitor's body (in situations that he or she is wearing a jacket). In the same way, the visitors' reaction also varied from attempting to circumvent the control to behaving themselves as they were in an airport control **[8.12]**.

Hence, there is a difference between a standard instruction for bags verification and its real application. The difference between each agent's inspections reveals a zone of interpretation, which is based on the person's own experience, much more related to an everyday security than to counterterrorism.

The uneven presence of security agents at the difference accesses represents also a contradiction in the security scheme. A remarkable example is the access near the church, directly from the *Jardin Nelson Mandela* to the underground part of the commercial centre.

Firstly, the control happened only in a late moment, almost at the *Place Carrée*. In that sense, the free access into a larger extension of underground area shows vulnerabilities concerning an attack targeting the overall structure of the complex **[8.14]**. Beyond that, on Sunday 11 June (when most stores were closed, but there were access to the commercial centre) there was no security agent guarding that entrance – while people were being controlled at the entrances under *canopée*. ∎

[8.14] Access control to Place Carrée
AGF

Custom security design

Beyond the control of bags, *Forum des Halles* presents a range of other objects and actors involved with security.

Concerning objects, they are integrated to the architectonic structures and therefore are less visible at first glance. CCTV cameras have more or less success in this case and, while some are supported by conventional structures, other are installed in customised poles, resembling lighting poles [8.16] [8.17]. The same aesthetic is applied to bollards that prevent the vehicle traffic on the area between the commercial centre and the gardens [8.15]. Glass doors, so as metallic roller doors, have a discreet presence when not used [8.21].

Other elements do not have security as the main purpose, but still play a role in the security apparatus. Benches and garden boxes, invites one to stay or define green areas, but are also used to prevent access from vehicles and orient pedestrian flow. Additionally, round metallic "pig ears" are installed in some of the benches or larges surfaces next to the *Jardin Nelson Mandela* [8.18].

Finally, the rubbish litters at the commercial centre present also a customised design, including the *Forum des Halles'* logo, but still attending to the same anti-terrorist specifications as the regular public litterbins [8.19] [8.20]. ∎

CCTV   Bollards

[8.15] Seurity elements near main entrance
AGF

[8.18] "Pig ears" on benches
AGF

[8.19] [8.20] Rubbish litters
AGF

Private security agent

Concrete blocks   CCTV

[8.16] Entrance from rue Pierre Lescot
AGF

[8.17] CCTV under canopée
AGF

[8.21] Gates main entrance (open and closed)
AGF

Security network: from soldiers to cleaners

Concerning security actors, the soldiers are remarkable at the first glance. Normally in groups of four (usually young white men), all carrying assault rifles or submachine guns, they walked in open areas around the complex and cross regularly the *canopée*. Although less frequented, they were also present in underground areas during the observations **[8.22]**. Their behaviour was similar in *Gare du Nord*, where their presence were more evident **[▸ ch. 9]**.

An ostensive presence of security agents beyond the private actors was more visible on Saturdays, when the movement at the commercial centre is more intense. On 17 June, *gendarmes* were seen at the *Place Carrée*, which has a busy connection to the *Châtelet – Les Halles* station **[8.24]**; and RATP security were watching the west entrance at the *canopée* towards the underground areas, accompanied by a third party company's agent with a sniffer dog **[8.23]**.

On the opposite side of this entrance of the covered area, there was a police station, at the corner of *Rue Pierre Lescot* and *Rue de la Cosson-nerie*, which inevitably increased the presence of National Police officers, as well as of police cars. Temporary low fences and a CCTV surveillance was protecting the police station **[8.25]**.

Also police officers from the specialised ground brigade (*Brigade spé-cialisée de terrain* – BST) were observed inside the commercial centre. BST "Le Halles" is a special force from the *Préfecture de Paris* – attached to the central commissariat of the 1st arrondissement – to combat petty crime in a special perimeter in both 1st and 4th arrondissements, includ-ing *Forum des Halles* and *Centre George Pompidou*. Since April 2015, 24 officers reinforced the local security as a visible and dissuasive pres-ence against different minor infractions and local delinquency. They also had access to the area's CCTV surveillance controlled by the *Préfecture de Paris* and, most important here, the cameras from *Forum des Halles* (Boucault, 2015: 2–3). This represents a remarkable increase of surveillance capacity from the National Police, once they have free access to almost 400 cameras from the commercial centre – a representative number when comparing that *Préfecture de Paris* and the Municipality of Paris to-gether owns less than 2,000 cameras over the entire city (Boucault, 2015: 3; Préfecture de Police, 2016) **[8.28]**.

Concerning private security, the abovementioned agents with *Forum des Halles'* uniforms were the most present and were presumably under responsibility of *Securitas* **[▸ ch. 5]**, since one of the agents was carrying the company's badge. However, other security actors could be seen during the field research. Agents from the company *Trigion securité* were watch-ing certain busy underground areas and wearing a specific uniform. The larger stores (such as FNAC) and some of the municipal facilities also have their own agents, who might ask for controlling bags visually a second time **[8.26]**. During the evening and very early in the morning, the night guards, using red polo shirts with the logo of *Forum des Halles*, are re-sponsible for closing and opening the *Patio Pina Bausch*, so as the rest of the commercial centre **[8.27]**.

[8.22] Soldiers under canopée
AGF

[8.23] RATP Security agents with sniffer dog
AGF

Access to train station   Submachine gun   Gendarmes

[8.24] Gendarmes at Place Carrée
AGF

Police station

[8.25] Police station near Forum des Halles
AGF

Beyond the explicit security actors, other actors play an important role through "surveillance by employees". The person at information post, located in the underground square *Place Carré*, has a position that both sets of escalator and the train station's access are visible **[8.29]**.

The clearest case of "surveillance by employees" is from cleaning staff, which constantly empty the rubbish litters – automatically verifying any suspicious object inside of them–, have a good informal communication with security staff – increasing transmission of knowledge –, and possess a radio – being able to rapidly communicate any irregularity to the control-room **[8.30] [8.31]**. ∎

[8.26] Private security inside stores
AGF

[8.27] Night guards
AGF

[8.28] The number of cameras in Forum des Halles is equivalent to 1/5 of the entire CCTV public system in Paris
AGF

Paris
area 10,540 ha   ~2,000 cameras

Forum des Halles
area 1.3 ha   ~400 cameras

Security agent   Security agent   Information post   Mobile recharge slots and free WiFi

[8.29] Place Carrée
AGF

[8.30] [8.31] Cleaning staff
AGF

Intangible security

The control-room is probably the most relevant intangible security actor in *Forum des Halles*, although not observed during the field research. The coordinators of the impressive number of more the 390 cameras in the commercial centre also moderate the communication between the different security actors, receiving alerts from any involved actors, or passing instructions to the security to verify physically what has been watched by CCTV **[8.32]**.

Additionally, Wi-Fi and a mobile application also can be seen as a tool for surveillance and control, gathering data for commercial purposes from their users. By enjoying the free Wi-Fi connection from the commercial centre, one accepts the conditions that the downloaded data will be subject to analysis. Similarly, in order to use the mobile application *"Forum des Halles"* – advertised inside the commercial centre and offering discount for first users –, one has to allow the software to access the Internet history on the device, as well to collect information about the user's contacts, localisation, pictures, downloaded files, and Google services configurations (Centre Commercial, 2017) **[8.31]**. Differently from the other types of surveillance, here is established an exchange relation, where a mode of reciprocity is initiated – free access to Internet and shopping discounts in return of data gathering (see Zurawski, 2014: 44–45). ∎

[8.32] Forum des Halles mobile application
Centre Commercial (in: Centre Commercial, 2017)

[8.33] Forum des Halles CCTV control-room
AFP (in: AFP, 2016)

Following the norms

Returning to the securitisation of physical spaces, an empirical example of the security apparatus' operation, concerning minor infractions, was experienced on 15 June, when I decided to drink a bottle of beer at *Patio Pina Bausch*. Although drinking discreetly and no ostensive security was present on the first moment, I did not have the time to finish it before two uniform security agents of *Forum des Halles* asked me to leave.

More than underlining the extension of surveillance power of CCTV or the security personnel's efficiency (which would require further studies), the event highlights a set of norms inside the commercial centre that are differently applied according to each space.

For instance, at *Patio Pina Bausch* a sign is displayed indicating the prohibition of dogs, bicycles and any kind of skate or scooter (but not mentioning consumption of alcoholic drinks). Nevertheless, it is a smoking area and diverse employees of the different stores and from RATP used the area for this purpose.

Just on the backside of that sign, on the other side of the glass wall and inside the air-conditioned spaces, there was another notice with the same size, forbidding smoking **[8.34]**. Despite the fact that was not written the other previous prohibitions – which were also valid to this area, including the non-written alcohol restriction –, at the sign stated that "Smoking in this public space exposes you to a fixed fine of € 68 or to prosecution before the police court." Therefore, the space is not only called as "public space" (although the legal controversies of it), but also emphasises the power to fine the infraction according to a state regulation (*Code de la santé publique*).

Finally, people smoking, drinking and using in-line skates were observed on the ground floor under the roofing, at *canapée*. Additionally, this area was open also during the night.

Therefore, there is a zoning defining (with the help of security actors) where certain actors can be in the area. As we usually take for granted, no beggars, informal commerce or homeless people were seen at the shopping area, but they were present in the station *Châtelet – Les Halles*. This set of restrictions and control contradicts with the notion of transparency and fluidity, expressed by the new building's architecture. ∎

[8.34] Signs in Forum des Halles
AGF (a); AGF (b)

(Un)conclusive notes

The field research at Forum des Halles reveals the different actors and physical elements, which are contributing to its both general and anti-terrorist security. But they are not without contradictions. If on one side there is an ostensive presence of security actors, on the other side the amount of cameras indicates a hidden control apparatus merits to be further scrutinised. To what extent does the CCTV surveillance serves to prevent general crime and – more relevant here – to prevent terrorism attacks?

In 2011, the French government changed in all laws and regulations the term "vidéosurveillance" for "vidéoprotection" (2011-267, 2011; Comité d'étique, 2012: 2). Since then, national authorities, security specialists and Parisian local authorities have been defended as a fundamental tool not only to arrest perpetrators, but also to prevent terrorist actions (Bauer and Soullez, 2015: 153; Comité d'étique, 2012, 2012; Préfecture de Police, 2016).

On the other side, all the expert interviewees raise doubts on the preventive capabilities of CCTV surveillance against terrorism, when asked about the topic (Interviewee A, 2017; Malochet and Gosselin, 2017; Zagrodzki, 2017, pers. comm.). Virginie Malochet (Malochet and Gosselin, 2017, pers. comm.) explained further this contradiction:

Political and technical, national and local authorities speak about 'vidéoprotection', the video that protects you. […] This term is made to charge a positive feeling. […] On the other side, there is nothing showing that CCTV camera can be used as a tool for protection.

Thus, the discrepancy between the preventive discourse and the real uses of video surveillance raise questions to the governmental uses of private CCTV systems. Whom are CCTV cameras – managed by the one of the largest security company worldwide, watching an asset from the Europe's largest commercial real estate – protecting? What are the consequences of governmental authorities having access to private cameras under the justification of terrorism prevention, when its efficiency is limited on this aspect?

A second concern is related to the two types of surveillance present in Forum des Halles. Surveillance is here understood as "the systematic gathering and organizing of information about individuals and their activities, opinions and values in order to exercise various types of control […] over the subjects and/or a certain social territory" (Jansson and Christensen, 2014: 4–5). In that sense, the security surveillance – making use of CCTV and security agents –controls very similar subjects and social territories of the digital tool of commercial surveillance –Wi-Fi connection and mobile application. Therefore, further studies are desirable concerning the relation between these two surveillance systems. To what extent can data gathering for commercial purposes be used for policing control, especially with the increased police power concerning electronic surveillance, granted by the state of emergency? How far is the communication between private security actors, data gathering institutions and governmental policing authorities?

Finally, the multiples normative values adopted in Forum des Halles can be seen as a contradiction to the architectonic intentions of continuity and interconnection [8.35]. Long staircases, escalators, glass walls, transparent divisions and visibility between levels attempt to materialise a fluid space, but, in fact, respond to variable norms and forms of controls throughout the commercial centre. This normative territorialisation can be compared with the intricate overlapping of the security actors' jurisdiction on the next case study, *Gare du Nord*. ∎

[8.35] Patio Pina Bausch seen from level -2
AGF

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Zagrodzki M (2017) Researcher from CESDIP – Centre de recherches Sociologiques sur le Droit et les Institutions Pénales, recorded interview. *Interview with A. Gaiser Fernandes on 17 June,* Paris. ∎

9

Gare du Nord

[9.1] Localisation Gare du Nord 10th arrondissement
AGF

Ⓜ ⓇⒺⓇ   Metro/RER station

🚌   Bus station

Ⓥ   Municipal rental bike (Vélib') station

Théâtre des Bouffes du Nord

Metro station La Chapelle

Hôpital Fernand-Widal

Hôpital Lariboisière

200m radius

Rue de Dunkerque

Boulevard de Denain

Rue du Faubourg Saint-Denis

Gare de l'Est Ⓜ

[9.2] Surroundings of Gare du Nord
AGF. Based on Google Maps and OpenStreetMap.
Icon Pierre-Luc Auclair (Bus)

Context and historical panorama

Gare du Nord is the largest railway station in Europe in number of visitors and the third worldwide, receiving 700,000 people and 2,100 trains daily. It is a vital transportation hub in Paris from local to international levels. Locally, *Gare du Nord* has 5 regional lines (RER B and D; direct connection to Magenta station, RER E; as well two regional lines called Transilien – K and H), 3 metro lines (number 4 and 5 and an underground passage to the station *La Chapelle*, metro line number 2), and 19 bus lines (including night buses) (SNCF Gares & Connexions, 2015: 3–4). The station is well connected with the whole city of Paris, serving the northern part of Île-de-France and offering direct connection with Airport Charles de Gaulle **[9.4]**.

Nationwide, this station receives trains from north and northeast regions of the country, including high-speed trains, whose services are offered by three companies: SNCF (also the station manager), Thalys and Eurostar. While SNCF and Thalys connect France with Belgium, Netherlands and Germany, Eurostar is the only responsible for the connection to London, an area outside the Schengen zone. Consequently, *Gare du Nord* is considered a border crossing point (points de passage frontaliers – PPF) (Journal officiel de l'Union européenne C 401/04, 2016), increasing its importance concerning security matters. Administratively, a special group of the National Police might cooperate with local patrols: the so-called *Police Aux Frontières* (Border Police). Formally, they have the power to request an identification document for any person within the areas of public access in the station (Ministère de l'Intérieur, n.d.).

Replacing an older station from 1846, the main building of *Gare du Nord* was open to the public in the 1864. Designed by the architect Jacques-Ignace Hittorff, the hall's structure and almost all façades are

[9.3] Timeline: Gare du Nord
AGF

[9.4] Railway network at Gare du Nord
AGF

[9.5] Main entrance Gare du Nord: artistic intervention (statue)
AGF

[9.6] Platform RER B: white ceiling roof and colourful artistic intervention
AGF

[9.7] Brasserie l'Etoile du Nord
AGF

[9.8] Main entrance Gare du Nord: façade
AGF

very different architectonic styles and materialities, but also various contrasting groups of people with different aims **[9.9]**.

In 2014, a major refurbishment plan was launched and has been being applied since then. The very first measures, which have taken place on that same year, were to improve the maintenance of the space by cleaning the glass surfaces (which increased the daylight on internal spaces), and to restore stairs, walls and floors in the area of the regional trains and metro lines. The cleaning capacities were also improved with a cleaning staff 7/7 and new equipments (SNCF Gares & Connexions, 2015: 11).

In April 2015, a new and larger police station was inaugurated, with extended opening hours (nowadays until 1 am). In the same year, the platforms of RER B and D were renovated, so as the commercial area above them. The interventions increased the illumination levels of the area, by improving artificial lighting, painting walls (including artistic interventions) with brighter colours and applying light coloured coatings **[9.6]**. Also sculptures in the main entrances were installed **[9.5]**.

In the following year two important interventions were built: the Eurostar's lounge, on its mezzanine in level 1; and the *Brasserie l'Etoile du Nord* **[9.7]**. The restaurant, near to the entrance for the train *Transiliens*, at *Rue de Dukerque*, has extended open hours (from 6h to 23h) is lead by a recognised chef and presents a gastronomic alternative in the station. Its construction, designed by Patrick Bouchain, makes largely use of glass, functioning both as showcase and observatory to the movement of the station.

At the time of the field trips, new modification were being made in the Eurostar's mezzanine and the area below it was partially interrupted by a building site. ∎

still preserved, defining the built ensemble. However, many modifications were made, especially internally. The main interventions concerned the integration of new transportations lines in the station: the metro line 4 (in 1906), metro line 5 (1907), RER B (1981), RER D (1987), the high-speed trains from SNCF (1993) and Eurostar (1994), Magenta station and RER E (1999), and the platform for the regional trains *Transilien* (2001) (SNCF Gares & Connexions, 2015: 4–5). Therefore, the station presents not only

Check-in area Eurostar
Upper level Brasserie 'l'Etoile du Nord'
Bus station

Main entrance
'Grand lignes'
Access to regional trains 'Transiliens'
Police station
Entrance level Brasserie 'l'Etoile du Nord'
Access to mezzanine Eurostar
Arrivals area of Eurostar

Underground passages to the other side of
Rue de Dunkerque
Passage between RATP area and
grand lignes'
Access to regional trains 'Transiliens'

Metro/RER onnection area
Commercial area upon RER
Underground passage to 'grand lignes'

Platforms of RER Band D

Level +1
Ground floor
Level -1
Level -2
Level -3

Grand lignes
Police station
Main entrance
Departure exit from Eurostar

Rue de Dunkerque
Boulevard de Denain
Access to Magenta station (RER E)

Access to Magenta station (RER E)

Underground access to grand lignes
Commercial area
Access to metro line 5
Connection area

Metro line 4

[9.9] Axionometric Gare du Nord (1:5000)
AGF

First visible security elements

CCTV   Rubbish litters

[9.10] Platform RER B and D
AGF

[9.11] Camera from Securitas in Gare du Nord
AGF

[9.12] Soldiers
AGF

[9.13] Soldiers before 2015 attacks
Simon, 2013

Differently of the *Forum des Halles*, the surveillance cameras in *Gare du Nord* are less discreet and less integrated with the building's architecture. For instance, many of the cameras are installed in independent structures and protected with a large case, in which is written the name of the electronic security company *Stentorius* (related to the American conglomerated *Honeywell* [▸ **ch. 5**] [**9.10**] [**9.11**].

Adding to it, the human force applied for security purposes in the station is also remarkable. A range of actors watches the space in an everyday basis and most of them were noticed in a very first glance: soldiers, national police officers, *gendarmes*, and security agents from SNCF, RATP and third party companies. Soldiers were found mainly in the commercial area upon to the platforms of RER C and D, but they move freely around the train station [**9.12**]. They also circulated in the connection hall, on the *grand lignes'* platforms and at the Eurostar's mezzanine. They walked normally in groups of four, all wearing red, blue or green berets, bulletproof vests and camouflage uniforms, carrying helmets, as well an assault rifle or a submachine gun. No interaction between the soldiers and other people was noticed and they usually do not stop moving or keep very few time stand (a notable exception was in the *Eurostar* mezzanine, where soldiers have a good view of the *grand lignes'* platforms – also *gendarmes* made use of this privileged position to watch the area).

It is noteworthy that there were soldiers engaged in the security of *Gare du Nord* before the Paris attacks in 2015, as documented by the movie *Géographie Humaine*, released in 2013 (Simon, 2013) [**9.13**]. This is another evidence of the securitisation and militarisation processes in the station previously to the 2015 attacks.

In comparison to soldiers, the officers of National Police and *Gendarmerie* are more active, either persecuting crime suspects or giving information to people who demand them. National Police officers was constantly observed in the entire *Gare du Nord*. This was visually reinforced by the recent installation of a police station, located on the ground floor, above the connection hall between metro and RER lines [**9.15**]. Patrols circulate in groups between 3 to 6 people and frequently one of each group is carrying a heavy weapon. On the other side, the *gendarmes* were present in the space more unevenly and normally in groups of 3 (one of them also with heavy firepower). On some days they were not encountered, while on other ones several officers were seen. On 13 June, when gendarmes were watching the exit of the platforms of the trains to London, another four of them were seen at the mezzanine and six officers in the central entrance at *Rue de Dunkerque* [**9.16**] [**9.17**]. The *gendarmes* have an active role in interrogating people, inclusive asking for ID, as well arresting people (bringing them to the National Police station), which blurs with the function of National Police. On the other side, they have some level of intercommunication, as it was observed a joint operation in the entrance's area of the regional trains on 10 July [**9.14**].

National police officers
National police officers   Suspect

[9.14] Joint operation between National Police and Gendarmerie
AGF

[9.15] Police station
AGF

[9.16] Gendarmes position at Eurostar mezzanine on 13 June
AGF

[9.17] Gendarmes position on the groundfloor on 13 June
AGF

[9.18] SNCF security agents
AGF

[9.19] RATP security agents
AGF

[9.20] Lancry/SNCF security agents
AGF

[9.21] Lancry/SNCF security agents
AGF

As already mentioned in the chapter 5, the SNCF **[9.18]** and RATP **[9.19]** security agents constitute an exception to the general rule from other private agents, and they have the right to carry firearms (de Maillard and Zagrodzki, 2017: 56; Zagrodzki, 2017, personal communication), including heavy weapons. Differently of the previous officers, both security agents are territorially constrained, as explain Zagrodzki (2017, personal communication):

RATP and SNCF are totally separated agencies [...] [T]he access to the main train lines, like the Eurostar and the trains to Lille and Northern France [...] this is SNCF and this is Sûreté Géneral jurisdiction [...]. So, downstairs, you are in the metro station, this is RATP jurisdiction and those are the GSPR (Grupe de Sécurité de Protection de Réseaux). That's for metro. [...] And they don't talk to each other. For instance, SNCF cannot go inside of the metro stations, because it's not their jurisdiction and the metro into [...] the store area. This is not their jurisdiction. They are really physically separated.

Finally, there is a bunch of private agents, wearing fluorescent orange vests, on which the name of SNCF and Lancry were normally written **[9.20] [9.21]**. They have a radio, but do not carry any firearm. All agents observed were black men, usually between 40 and 60 years old. These agents give information to passers-by and observe the area, usually staying long periods standing in the same spot in multiple points of the station.

From the field observations, three areas were remarkable by presenting particular dynamics and relation between the involved actors and the physical space: the commercial area above the platforms of RER B and D, the connection area between metro and RER lines, and the Eurostar's trains area. ∎

Access to metro line 2

Access to grands lignes

Access to Magenta station (RER E)

Level -2

Upstairs: Transiliens lines

Downstairs: RER B and D
Upstairs: Transiliens lines

Access to metro lines connection area

Access to bus station

[9.22] Commercial area between regional lines' platforms
AGF

[9.23] Commercial area between regional lines' platforms
AGF

Wi-Fi

[9.24] Use of Wi-Fi in the commercial area
AGF

[9.25] SNCF staff
AGF

Consuming in between: commercial area between regional lines' platforms

The commercial area in the level -2 is relatively narrow, reflecting the shape of the platform of RER lines at the lower level. It constitutes a long corridor with commercial stores on both sides and a sequence of staircases (towards both to RER – level +3 – and *Transiliens* lines – at the ground floor), besides some occasional stores in the middle. The two ends of this 'corridor' connect *La Chapelle* station and the metro line 2, with the other metro lines stations. Around in the middle of this space, there is a crossing point, where, at one side, another underground corridor gives access to the *grand lignes*. At the other side, one access to the station Magenta (RER E) and a vertical circulation with stairs and lifts leads to the bus station at the level +1 **[9.22] [9.23]**.

Therefore, it is not hard to imagine that there is an intense flow of people in different directions in this area. What was less expected though was the amount of people not circulating. Besides the people rapidly grabbing some food at the café or the bakery, it could be observed people calmly looking products in the clothing stores as a regular shopping mall and some groups of people just standing, normally in small groups or alone, leaning in the guardrail of the staircases to the RER platforms. Some (including myself) make use of the free Wi-Fi connection available in the area **[8.24]**. The groups that are neither visiting the stores or moving to other areas are more present when the stores close, after 8pm.

The natural surveillance here is reinforced by the SNCF security agents, police officers and soldiers, who regularly patrol the area. Besides that, the bigger chain stores make use of private security, apart from the private agents from SNCF/Lancry. Mostly black men between 25-40 years old, they wear black suits and an orange armlet and stand inside the stores. They also carry a radio and might check people's bags **[8.26]**.

The SNCF personnel also plays a role in the security surveillance in the area, by standing an information post, a small glass cabin booth, in front of the turnstiles raw that separates the regional trains area to the *grand lignes* underground passage. In that position, they can provide information to people who are in the restricted area of regional trains, but they also watch the area for and any outstanding irregularity **[8.26]**. Not far from it, there is a ticket office of SNCF, which usually has a queue in front of it, and is supervised by a private agent with orange vest, who keeps people near the wall and gives general orientations.

[9.26] Private security in the stores
AGF

Level -2

The opposite of this natural surveillance is observed in lateral stairs and escalators. They must be accessed through discreet rooms between two commercial stores, and the narrow and long escalators (that goes directly to the ground floor to the regional trains *Trasiliens*) are not visible from the main commercial area. Surveillance cameras explicitly watching the small hall's back part and reflective metallic curved panels were installed at the corners, to be used as a mirror and increase the visibility of the space from the main corridor. A signboard that states "This staircase sometimes serves as a urinal and it makes difficult for us to maintain it", the strong smell of urine and the broken escalator show that the measures were not successful **[9.27]**. ■

[9.27] Lateral access to Transiliens platforms
AGF

[9.28] Eurostar area
AGF

[9.29] Access to Mezzanine
AGF

Mezzanine

Ground floor

Crossing the borders: Eurostar's trains area

The trains that go to London occupy 5 tracks in the west side of the station. But to be sitting inside one these yellow, white and blue high-speed trains, it is necessary to take a path longer than just walking to the platform **[9.28]**.

The first step is to go up to the mezzanine, which can be done either by a lift hidden between the current building sites, or by a set of escalators and staircases **Ⓐ**. At that point a new actor show up, though manifested in the space only by one person: a young man stand at the lower part of these escalator, wearing a yellow vest, carrying a radio and showing a sign, which indicates forbidden items in the check-in area. This agent, subcontracted by Securitas, has basically the same function (and motivation) of the signboard placed upstairs, with the same warning **[9.29]**.

Once upstairs, a large corridor leads to the ticket control, which is first made by Eurostar's personnel **Ⓑ**. One or two women uniformed with blue vest resembling flight attendants visually inspect the tickets and inquire about the desired time departure. Afterwards, they organise the flow of people using retractable barriers. The queues lead to the next security step: ID verification **Ⓒ**. Inside cabin booths, uniformed officers from the Border Police inspect the documents and ask some occasional questions. Freed from this procedure, travellers then enter an enclosed and air-conditioned space **Ⓓ**, where they are verified using walk-through metal detectors and their luggage must go into the baggage scan-machine **[9.30]**.

Finally, passengers are free to enjoy the lounge space and the stores **Ⓔ** as they are obliged to pass through them before going to the footbridge, where one can finally use stairs, escalators or lifts to go down to the corresponding platform on the ground floor **Ⓕ**.

The platforms are similar to the other *grand lignes* ones, except for the fact that there is a glass wall dividing them from the rest. A security booth with a slight futuristic style is encrusted in the wall faces the public circulation area in front of all platforms. On this same side there are several doors that open when the trains arrive and let people leave the area directly from the ground floor **Ⓖ**.

This procedure happens normally each hour and involves at least four private security agents, surprisingly from SNCF/Lancry, and not from Eurostar/Securitas, as in the mezzanine's access. They stand normally beside the open door, one in the inner side and the other outside the glass wall, guaranteeing only one direction for the flow of people: out. Very often though soldiers, police officers or SNCF security agents were watching the operation **[9.31]**.

This airport-security style is being also partially reproduced in the other platforms with international lines (within Schengen Area), where temporary structures, with the symbol of Vigipirate stamped on it, shelter also walk-through metal detectors and baggage scan-machines **[9.32]**. Although they are not used in every travel, people are always demanded to queue outside the platforms, and retractable barriers are used for this organisation **[9.33]**.

The second phase of the refurbishment plan for the station also reinforces the security by enlarging the check-in area of Eurostar's trains, over an area that today is dedicated to taxis (SNCF Gares & Connexions, 2015: 42). This has a double consequence concerning security issues: a) to increase

the commercial area inside the check-in area, which creates a large homogenised space, concerning the groups of people; and b) to increase the buffer zone around the platforms, as no vehicles would be able to enter in the area.

Concerning the risks involving vehicles, the *Boulevard de Denain*, a secondary street that leads directly to the old buildings' central entrance (and the Eurostar's lounge area), might be pedestrianised. This would avoid vehicles to have enough distance to accelerate and hit the station perpendicularly, which tends to be more destructive than a vehicle hitting the wall when running parallel to the façade (as in the *Rue de Dunkerque*). Nowadays, two rows of concrete blocks between the lanes of *Rue de Dunkerque* are a physical manifestation that lowers the vulnerabilities of the building **[9.34]**. Furthermore the *Rue de Dunkerque* itself will also have its access restricted to vehicles (SNCF Gares & Connexions, 2015: 39–47; Wilmotte & Associés, n.d.). ■

[9.30] Mezzanine Eurostar
AGF

[9.31] Eurostar departure area
AGF

[9.32] Temporary security control for international departures
AGF

[9.33] Temporary waiting area for international departures
AGF

[9.34] Concrete blocks
AGF

[9.35] Flower shop A
AGF

Meeting point of control and subversion: connection area between metro and RER lines

The most dynamic area in *Gare du Nord* is the connection hall between the metro lines 4 and 5, so to the RER trains, in the level -2. The area has a complex form, with several exits, turnstiles, stairs and escalators, which creates several possible trajectories, although with various constrains. It also shows some of the intricate aspects of the security system [9.38].

The area can be divided in 3 interconnected subspaces [9.37]. The first one is a rectangular space under authority of RATP, near to the access in level to metro line 4 in the direction to *Porte de Clignancourt*. It is not covered by the upper floors, receiving direct daylight from the glass ceiling of the covering structure at the ground floor. The space is similar to an internal courtyard and can be observed from all upper levels. From the small stores located there, it calls the attention the flower shop A, which occupies a dead-end zone of the area with plants during its opening times; and at photo booth B, where some people sit without the purpose to take pictures. There is also a stair to the level -1 [9.35] [9.36].

Differently from an escalator, one can walk on a staircase in both directions. But, when another security element is applied, its possibilities can be constrained. This happens in the abovementioned stairs C. This staircase connects the metro lines to the upper level -1, where one can have fast access to some exits on the other side of *Rue de Dunkerque*, as well to the grand lignes area. At the top of this staircase, there is a turnstile (gates with a door without knob, to be pushed), which allows one just to go out from this area, but not to enter. In that sense, this flux is restricted to one direction, without the use of escalators or signs. This is clearer when someone tries to subvert this order. Occasionally, people are waiting outside until someone goes out, when they hold the pushed door and enter without using a ticket. But walking in the contrary direction in this stairs calls the attention and it can be easily noticed. Indeed, when the ticket controllers are watching this connection hall, this staircase is a special focus and everyone who goes down from there is controlled.

There is also "Le Club RATP" D, on the west side of the area, which offers services from the metro company, such as giving information, selling transit card, and providing after-sales services. In front of this store there is usually a queue, which is monitored by a private agent from Lancry.

[9.36] Area 1 seen from level -1
AGF

[9.37] Connection area
AGF

Level -2

Commercial area between regional lines' platforms

Escalator and stair direct to ground floor

Turnstiles between RATP and SNCF areas

Access (controlled by turnstiles) to Magenta station (RER E)

Access to metro line 4

Access to level -1 (outside RATP controlled area)

Access to metro line 5

Increased natural and artificial lighting

Stair and escalators control the circulation flow

Police station

Good overview and fast access from police station

SNCF/Lancry private security agents

Turnstiles and glass walls

Free Wi-Fi

Loudspeakers CCTV

SNCF security agents

RATP security agents

Turnstiles

Emergency alarm

SNCF ticket controllers

Gendarmerie

Firearm

[9.38] Panorama of securitisation in the connection area
AGF

[9.39] Uniformed RATP ticket controllers at the connection area
AGF

The second area is also inside the RATP perimeter, closer to the accesses of metro line 5 and the connection to Magenta Station (RER E), and it has a reduced ceiling high **[9.40]**. Therefore, although it is a continuous space from the walking perspective, it is a space protected from other levels' observation. On the other side, exactly on the corner between these two mentioned areas **E**, there is a service entrance, where the ticket controllers from RATP gather, having good perspective from these spaces. They stand in this corner either before or after the controlling process, but also during the ticket inspection. The controllers are divided into 2 mixed-gender groups, the ones who intercept people asking for tickets, and a group to verify the identity and apply the penalty fee to the offenders. The formers are not uniformed (only wearing orange armlet and badge) and are dispersed in the connection area. They bring the offenders to this corner, where the other group (uniformed, with the penalty fee machines) stands and takes the responsibility for the rest of the process **[9.39] [9.41]**.

Surprisingly, it was observed an informal market taking place on this second area in different times of the day and even in the presence of the private security agents and the ticket controllers. The market was mainly constituted to black young men, selling peanuts, phone call cards, trinkets, cigarettes (and probably drugs, considering the behaviour of both costumers and sellers). On the late evening of 15 July, while the place was dirty and there was a person sitting upon one of the rubbish litter in the area, two private security agents were observing the scene passively and the police station two floors above was still open **[9.42]**.

On 11 April, this space had another completely different conformation, when a group of CRS National Police was dealing with a bomb suspicion (see logbook extract). While the area was closed by the police officers, the staff service from SNCF was orienting the passengers, instead of RATP officers, which also blurs the previously thought clear limit of jurisdiction from each company.

[9.42] Informal market in the Area 2
AGF

[9.40] Area 2
AGF

[9.41] Not uniformed RATP ticket controllers
AGF

[9.43] Ticket control in area 3 (seen from a non-controlled area)
AGF

Finally the third part of this area is inside the SNCF area, towards the previously mentioned commercial area. This area is also mainly uncovered by the upper floors and can be seen from the upper levels. This advantage is both used by police officers, who observe the area when going through the footbridge on the ground floor (toward the police station), and the people monitoring a possible control of the area.

The control from SNCF takes a different form from RATP. There is just one type of controller group that both request the ticket and applies the penalty fees. They are uniformed men and women, and carrying penalty fee machines. On 12 June, around 20 agents were positioned themselves in a line formation, controlling the flow from this connection area toward the commercial area. The armed security agents from SNCF were behind the line, backing them up. This is an important function of these security agents, as explains Mathieu Zagrodzki (2017 personal communication):

> [O]ne of their big missions is when you have agents of the SNCF controlling the tickets. Sometimes they get into conflicts. People who don't have tickets and they are getting aggressive, they don't want to pay the fine. They are just there [...] to be like: "ok, there are five of us, we have gear, we have a weapon, so you either pay the fine or we are taking you to police station, ok?" No power to investigate anything, they only have the power to fine whatever violation it could be when it comes to train or metro regulations.

Indeed there was a group of 6 to 10 SNCF security agents watching the whole operation on the backside of the line. At the same time of this operation, other controllers were also on the level -1, and security agents were equally supporting them [9.43] [9.44] [9.45]. ∎

(Un)conclusive notes

The security system in *Gare du Nord* is ostensive and plural, presenting a combination of different physical elements with diverse security actors. It is especially remarkable the simultaneous presence of diverse security actors in the same space, also at the same time. Part of the distribution of activities, responsibilities and power are indeed distinguishable, but some contradictions can also be observed.

Firstly, National Police and Gendarmerie overlap responsibilities and power. If at some point some coordination can be seen, as they conducted operations together, the regular activities were undertook independently. In order to reflect their level of interaction, it useful the compare it with the levels of cooperation stated in the paper from Jacques de Maillard and Mathieu Zagrodzki (2017: 62). An "executive" cooperation is not the case here, as it is not restricted to the relation between the administrative bodies of the institution. Their cooperation might then alternate between a "managerial" (when the joint operations are planned and roles are distributed) or an "operational" one (when the operation's coordination is made directly on the field) (de Maillard and Zagrodzki, 2017: 62). If some specific operations are possible to be coordinated in a managerial level, most of their activities show little interaction. Therefore the initiative of a tighter cooperation might come from bottom initiatives. It arises the question, then, to what extent are the *gendarmes*, a military force less constant in the space, is cooperating and using the knowledge gathered by local actors, specially with the National Police.

However, if some sort of cooperation can be seen between police force, no interaction was noted between them and the outsourced security agents. As they stand longer in certain places, they have different knowledge from the everyday activities of the station and could contribute for the coordination of the security system. It is also remarkable that the private security agents themselves have little or no decision power, but they represent larger actors, such as the multinational security/management companies Securitas and Lancry/Atalian.

It is also necessary to reflect on the efficiency of this large security apparatus, as well to what extent are certain irregularities allowed in certain spaces and moments. The constant presence of informal sellers in the corridor that connects the station *La Chapelle* and *Gare du Nord*, so as the small market in the connection area of RATP, are clearly know by all the actors in the security system, when they continue their activities even with security actors' presence. On the other side, this recurrent subversion takes place in spaces protected to observation from longer distances and where the uses of the space are restricted to movement. This is also the case of the "hidden" escalators in the commercial area.

Finally, it could be said that SNCF has a more important role in the security issues than expected. If in the first moment, one can identify different territories, operated by different companies (SNCF, RATP, Eurostar), the presence of security agents operated by SNCF (either outsourced or not) cross these area's borders. We should remember that SNCF is likely to be an operator of vital importance (OIV), being obliged to appoint a security liaison officer and to develop a security plan and to increase its

Level -2

SNCF security agents

ticket controllers

[9.44] Ticket control in area 3
AGF

[9.45] Ticket control in area 3 (seen from a non-controlled area)
AGF

communication with the governmental counterterrorism security actors (Code de la sécurité intérieure, 2017: Art. L223-2; SGDSN (Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale), 2017: 2).

Therefore, SNCF has a strategic importance for the train station's security, concerning not only the accumulation of responsibilities, but also the amount of knowledge about the different dynamics taking place at Gare du Nord. ∎

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Personal Communication

Zagrodzki M (2017) Researcher from CESDIP – Centre de recherches Sociologiques sur le Droit et les Institutions Pénales, recorded interview. *Interview with A. Gaiser Fernandes on 17 June*, Paris. ∎

10
Place de la République

[10.1] Localisation Place de la République 10th arrondissement
AGF

Ⓜ(RER) Metro/RER station
🚌 Bus station
Ⓥ Municipal rental bike (Vélib') station

Bourse du travail
Le République theatre
Caserne Vérines
Apollo Théâtre
Canal Saint Martin
Boulevard Saint-Martin
Target of one of the November 2015 attacks
200m radius
Synagogue Nazareth
Rue du Temple
Rue de Turbigo
Théâtre Déjazet
Boulevard Voltaire

[10.2] Surroundings of Gare du Nord
AGF. Based on Google Maps and OpenStreetMap.
Icon Pierre-Luc Auclair (Bus)

Space of memories: context and historical panorama

Place de la République is a rectangular public square located in the intersection of the 3rd, 10th and 11th Arrondissements from Paris (traditionally left-wing neighbourhoods) and it is an important node for the transportation system **[10.1]**. Six larger streets converge at the square, besides other smaller ones, which make the square a busy passage area for vehicles, as private car and motorcycles, but also ambulances, fire trucks, police cars, taxis among others. Four regular buses lines and six night buses lines are spread out in different bus stops around the square. Additionally, five metro lines (number 3, 5, 8, 9 and 11) form an intricate subterranean structure, which are partially manifested by 12 metro entrances. Finally, the area is well served from the municipal rental bicycle system *"Vélib"*, having 5 stations nearby **[10.2] [10.3]**.

Located at the border between the central arrondissements and the northeastern part of Paris, the construction of the *Caserne du Prince* (today *Caserne Vérines*) in 1854 marks starting point of the square's reconfiguration towards its present morphology, previously called place du *Château d'eau*. This first intervention during Haussmannian times (1853-1870) was followed by the construction of the *boulevard Voltaire* and the removal of the theatres facing the former *boulevard plantés*, which used to divide both parts of the city. The square was established in 1866, following the project of Gabriel Davioud (APUR (atelier parisien d'urbanisme) et al., 2009: 5–11, 15).

[10.3] Time-line: Place de la République
AGF

From the public spaces designed during the mandate of Georges-Eugène Haussmann, *Place de la République* can be considered a primary one, because of its size and number of intersections of main streets (Jallon et al., 2017: 19, 91). But differently from other similar primary public spaces, the square is not explicitly combined with a major architecturally significant building with an equivalent area (like *Place de la Madeleine* and its church or *Place de l'Opéra* and the *Palais Garnier*). Instead, a statue was built in 1884: the *Monument à la République*. This 25 m high statue is an allegory of liberty, equality and fraternity, and is located in the axe of *Rue du Temple* and *Rue du Faubourg du Temple*. In 1889, the square is then renamed as *Place de la République* [10.4].

Also remarkable is the inauguration of the *Bourse du Travail* in 1892, the Parisian unit of the labour council, which is a representative place for different labour movements and for the celebration on 1st May (APUR (atelier parisien d'urbanisme) et al., 2009: 12) [10.13]. Finally, in combination with the increase of street traffic in the beginning of 20th century (where the statue as used as a roundabout), the opening of the 5 metro lines at the square (1904, 1906, 1931, 1933 and 1935) reinforced the centrality and the importance of this space to the city (APUR (atelier parisien d'urbanisme) et al., 2009: 15) [10.5].

The next major reconfiguration of the square started only in December 2008, when public consultations and diagnosis of public institutions culminate into a competition for the redevelopment of *Place de la République* (Balez and Tixier, 2009; Gouyette, 2012; Mairie du 3e arrondissement de Paris et al., n.d.). In January 2010, the office *Trévelo & Viger-Kohler Architectes Urbanistes* (TVK) won the competition and, after the design phase, approval of the city council and the construction in phases, the refurbished square is inaugurated in June 2013 (TVK (Trévelo & Viger-Kohler Architectes Urbanistes), 2013).

The new project reorganises the motorised-vehicle flow and increase the area for pedestrians in the square by enlarging the outer sidewalks, connecting both sides of the square and transforming the street at the square's northeast side in a shared trafficked area, creating a continuous pavement toward the Canal Saint-Martin (TVK (Trévelo & Viger-Kohler Architectes Urbanistes), 2013) [10.6]. The square becomes then a unified area with circa 20,000 m2, which can be divided in three main parts [10.9]: a) the north part, protected by four rows of trees, where is located the only permanent building inside the square (a café), and a reflecting pool [10.10]; b) the central part, where is located the Monument à la République, surrounded by a fountain [10.11]; and c) the south part, also an area shadowed by trees, where a skate area and the Ludomobile l'R de Jeux were installed after the refurbishment in 2013 [10.2]. Between the southwest and northeast side there is a slope and a ramp overcomes it in the central area, while two staircases were built in both on north and south area, creating two terraces to the northeast side.

Differently from the other case studies, *Place de la République* is symbolic attached to the 2015 attacks for three main reasons. Firstly, the square is located near to the Charlie Hebdo's head office so as to many targets in 13 November attacks. Being already a consolidated space of civic manifestations, the square became also a space of mourning. On the same day of Charlie Hebdo attack, *Place de la République* was one of the main gathering points between the several

[10.4] Former configuration of Place de la République
APUR (in: APUR (atelier parisien d'urbanisme) et al., 2009: 14)

[10.5] Place de la République before last configuration
APUR (in: APUR (atelier parisien d'urbanisme) et al., 2009: 46)

Before transformation:
2/3 traffic
1/3 pedestrian area

Today:
2/3 pedestrian area
1/3 traffic

[10.6] Square reconfiguration's scheme
TKV (in: TVK (Trévelo & Viger-Kohler Architectes Urbanistes), 2013: 6

rallies throughout the country. Flowers, candies and condolences' messages surrounding the base of the statue, made the *Monument à la République* a memorial to the victims [10.14]. Reinforcing it, the square was the place of the official commemoration for the victims one year after the attacks, including the presence of the former president François Hollande (Chrisafis, 2016; Quinn, 2015).

Secondly, the café inside the square changed its name in memory of the events. The construction from the former *Monde & Médias Pavilion*, was designed and built during the refurbishments finished in 2013, but took fire on February 2015. It was still under reconstruction by the time of the November 2015 attacks, when the Paris' motto *"Flutuac nec Mergitur"* was painted on its temporary fencing. Afterwards, the group SOS, the NGO responsible for the commercial place, used this Latin phrase as the café's name. The motto, which means "Tossed by the waves but never sunk", is written in the Parisian coat of arms and become a symbol of resilience after the November attacks (BFMTV, 2016; Whatman, 2016) [10.15].

Finally, the police force controversially inhibited a series of protests in Paris, making use of its increased power after the declaration of the state of emergency. A countermovement had an importance physical manifestation in the square through the establishment of *Nuit debout*.

Similarly to 2011 protests in Spain and US (*Indignados* and Occupy Wall Street), *Nuit debout* started in 31 March 2016 as a movement that occupies the square continuously, also during the night. Literally meaning "night standing", its main claims were the lift of the state of emergency and to end the process of approval of a new labour law project, head by the former Prime Minister Manuel Valls. The "static manifestation" took place in the square continually for twelve days [10.17]. Afterwards, further manifestations were allowed for limited times (no later than midnight) (Farbiaz, 2016: 12–17; Lichfield, 2016; Pinchon, 2017, personal communication). By the time of the field researches, the presence of *Nuit debout* could still be seen in the square, where tents and other temporary structures were installed on weekends to shelf political debates and other related activities [10.16]. ∎

[10.7] Present situation of the square
AGF

Monument à la République
Canal Saint Martin
Caserne Vérines
Bourse du Travail
Café Flutuac nec Mergitur
Boulevard Saint-Martin
Boulevard Voltaire
Rue du Temple
Rue de Turbigo

Ground floor
Level -1
Level -2
Level -3

[10.8] Axionometric
Place de la République (1:5000)
AGF

[10.9] Plan Place de la République
AGF

Staicase and terrace
Café Fluctuat Nec Mergitur
Reflecting pool
Ramp
Monument à la République
Staicase and terrace
Ludomobile l'R de Jeux
Skate area

north area
central area
south area

[10.10] North area: terrace and café
AGF

[10.11] South area: terrace and ludomobile
AGF

[10.12] Central area: ramp and Monument à la République
AGF

[10.13] Bourse du Travail
AGF

[10.14] Memorial at the statue's base on 15 January 2016
AGF

[10.15] Café Fluctuat Nec Mergitur and reflecting pool
AGF

[10.16] Present Nuit debout's activities
AGF

Private CCTV   Street CCTV

[10.18] Distribution of CCTV cameras in the Place de la République
AGF (partially based on https://paris.sous-surveillance.net/)

[10.19] [10.20] [10.21] Different types of CCTV cameras
AGF

L'organisation géographique de la place

[10.17] Former Nuit Debout's organisation
AGF

Everyday life and security

In comparison to the previous case studies, *Place de la République* is the space with less visible security elements. The ones with exclusive security purposes are the surveillance cameras. While the cameras from the *Préfecture de Paris* gaze the open public areas, other cameras are watching specific buildings or private properties.

The camera watching the open spaces are installed together with urban lighting or in independent poles, and can be single dome cameras or combination of multiple cameras for a global view **[10.19] [10.20] [10.21]**. They are located not inside the pedestrian central area, but at the accesses of all main streets towards the square, evidencing traffic control as one of their functions **[10.18]**.

Two cameras protect the entrances of the *Caserne Vérines* at *Place de la République* and one of the doors has a *"digicode"* [▶ ch. 7, **Gate or door**] with another built-in camera **[10.22]**. Other cameras are also installed to watch some stores at the square and an ATM **[10.23]**. Although they are used for restricted purpose of property protection, they can complement the surveillance area of open areas' CCTV, once they cover some public spaces outside the sight of *Préfecture de Police's* cameras. This is made possible as "public competent authorities" can request the recordings in case of terrorism prevention (Code de la sécurité intérieure, 2017: Art. L223-1).

Besides CCTV, there are also other physical elements at the square that contribute to the security. Large wood benches made by railway sleepers and elevated garden boxes for the trees at the southwest side can be seen as obstacles to the entrance of vehicles [10.24]. However, the square is still accessible to vehicles from the street with shared-traffic, and cars and vans were observed inside it. Finally, tall lighting poles guarantee an overall illumination in the square also during the evening and night.

Concerning armed security forces, the National Police' officers, *gerd-armes* and soldiers were often watching the area, but from two specific spots at the outer sidewalks [10.25]. As in the previous case studies, they have heavy firepower and wear uniforms with bulletproof vests [10.26].

Additionally, two different types of agents from the municipality could be seen in *Place de la République*: traffic controllers with yellow vests, and municipal guards. The latter were seen on 14 June, wearing bullet-proof vests but not carrying firearms. They came in a vehicle and walk around the square controlling minor and very specific activities (people sitting in the upper part of the fountain or playing music as form of religious propaganda) [10.27] [10.28].

The café *Flutuac nec Mergitur* had also one security agent: a black corpulent middle-aged man, who stand in the main place's entrance, preventing beggars to talk with customers and people to enter with skates or inline skates in the terrace's area.

On the other side, *Place de la République* presented, between the case studies, the greatest variety of activities that significantly transformed its spaces. More evident than the previous places, the square has a great difference between certain days of the week [10.29].

Three times per week (on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays) the organization *Restaurants du Cœur* serves food for free. Isolating part of the square with security tape, in order to set up their installations for serving food and the queue, they distribute hot meals, sandwiches, snacks and drinks between 8 and 9.30 pm [10.31]. On Wednesdays, the children leaves earlier the school, which reflects in the square, by having a larger presence younger – and beginner – skaters, as well children playing at the water surface or running around. The *ludomobile l'R de Jeux*, a red container that offers different table games and other leisure activities for children and young adults, is also open. Chairs and other bigger objects for playing are distributed, creating a sort of temporary playground at the south part of Place de la République [10.32]. It is noteworthy that there is no separation between the playground and the skate area and no major conflict was

[10.22] CCTV Caserne Vérines
AGF

[10.23] CCTV Caserne Vérines
AGF

[10.24] Benches und garden boxes
AGF

Vigilance points

[10.25] Common vigilance points from armed forces
AGF

[10.26] Gendarmes
AGF

[10.27] [10.28] Municipal agents
AGF

Restaurant du Cœur on Saturday   Restaurant du Cœur on Thursday

Ludomobile l'R de Jeux

[10.30] Localisation observed activities
AGF

[10.31] Restaurant du Cœur
AGF

[10.32] Ludomobile l'R de Jeux
AGF

Ludomobile opens on Thursdays and Fridays only in the summer

Children leave earlier the school

[10.29] Weekly timeline of Place de la République
AGF

**[10.33] Protest concentration at Place de la République**
AGF

[10.34] National police mediating the protest and general vehicle traffic ⓐ
AGF

[10.35] Front line of the protest ⓑ
AGF

[10.36] Sidewalk during the protest
AGF

observed. The *ludomobile* is also open on weekends, when much more people are at the square, especially on Saturday, when the surrounding commercial stores are open.

Also political manifestations can be considered an everyday activity at *Place de la République*, once their recurrence in the place. One protest was observed on 10 June (Saturday), a vegetarian movement demanding the closure of slaughterhouses in France, which reconfigured the spaces at the square. While at the south part of the square the regular weekend activities were not interrupted (skating, people playing at the Ludothèque), the north part was occupied by an open market. The t-shirt from the event, souvenir and vegan food were been sold in several booths and two food trucks, and there were stands from different independent organisations. Although the market occupies a great area, the café was kept open and part of the protester were consuming there.

On that day, the police force was reinforced: Gendarmerie were present, but standing in distance; and a special group of National Police officers were in charge to conduct the manifestation. Most of the police officers were not using bulletproof vests and none of them was carrying a heavy weapon. There also observed RATP security agents near to some of the metro station's exits.

The booths were organised in a way that a free space were kept in the middle of the square and people were gathering in front of a vehicle with public address sound system [10.33]. After different pronouncements from people upon this truck, it departs towards the Rue de Temple and then right to the Rue Turbigo, followed by the mass of protesters [10.37]. In front of the procession one police car and some motorcycles of National Police were being conducted, mediating the manifestation and the regular vehicle traffic. Police officers, also with motorcycles, were some blocks further already reorienting the vehicles. They were calm and talking actively with passer-bys [10.34] ⓐ.

Most of the demonstrators were walking on the road, while the sidewalks allowed other people's movement, and the displacement of two types of protest's organisers [10.36]. The first was a staff group wearing red t-shirts (as most of the protesters), yellow or orange armlet and badge. The second group was non-uniformed agents, but also with a badge and using two-way handheld radios, closer to the figure of security agents.

Finally, after the last group of protesters, the National Police was again using car and motorcycles to make the mediation with the regular traffic, this time with the help of a RATP car specific for traffic regulation [10.38] ⓒ.

Although no disturbances were observed and there were relatively few police agents; on a street nearby, at *Boulevard Saint-Martin*, 10 vans from CRS riot police were parked, carrying also equipment to close the street [10.39] [10.40]. ∎

**[10.37] Protest disposition after the beginning of the march**
AGF

Protest: *Vehicles* ▬ ; *Protester* ○ ; *Staff and security* ● ; *Tents* ⊗
External security: *Police vehicle* ▬ ; *Police officer* ● ; *RATP vehicle* ▭
Civilians: *Civilian's vehicle* ▬ ; *civilian* ●

Rubbish litters · RATP Staff · CCTV · Possible control of the metro entrances · National Police · Protest's staff agent · Protest's security agent · Protesters · Gendarmerie

[10.38] Police and RATP traffic coordination at the final part of the protest march ⓒ
AGF

Equipment to block streets

CRS riot police vehicles

[10.39] [10.40] CRS riot police at Boulevard Saint-Martin ●
AGF

Protesters

CSI riot police vehicles

CRS riot police vehicles

[10.41] CRS and CSI police forces coordination
AGF (based on Taranis News, in Taranis News 2017)

[10.41] [10.42] CRS riot police at Place de la République on 29 November 2016
Taranis News (in: Taranis News 2015)

* The *Gendarmerie Mobile* can also deal with protests and riots, having a similar role of CRS (Préfecture de Police, 2013; Zagrodzki, 2017, personal communication). Despite the involved groups, all are responding to the *préfet de police* in these situations.


[10.43] CSI logo
Taranis News (in: Taranis News 2017)

[10.44] CRS logo
no author (in: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compagnies_R%C3%A9publicaines_de_S%C3%A9curit%C3%A9)

[10.45] Kettling during protest on 29 November 2016
AGF (based on drawings and interview with Interviewee B, and interview with C. Bonvoisin)

Space of protests and temporary control

While in the everyday activities the security control in *Place de la République* was not as visible as in the other case studies, the temporary forms of control during larger manifestations and riots show another face of the French security system. Generally, larger manifestations are managed by two groups of police force: *compagnies républicaines de sécurité* (CRS)***** and *compagnie de sécurisation et d'intervention* (CSI). CRS is a very well-known (and with much attached symbolism) National Police's division, but it acts in a second instance of the manifestation, after CSI, as explains Mathieu Zagrodzki (2017, personal communication):

> *"In Paris, actually across all France, you have a unit called CSI, which is 'compagnie de sécurisation et d'intervention'. And they have training for riot control. So, they will be the first one to be sent to try to contain the riot. And, then, you have the CRS [...] [which] are very heavily equipped. They have large numbers, very well trained and they will be the next step of response [...]. They will try to totally stop the riots, make arrests, and, actually, occupy the area [...] with this physical presence to totally stop any sort of unrest."*

In that sense, the policing authorities have mobile human forces, which can be requested according to each situation. As explained in chapter 5, every gathering for political manifestation must be authorised by *Préfecture de Paris*, which in turn plans the security framework, requesting the necessary extra power for each situation, which includes CRS police officers and *Gendarmerie Mobile*. In order to reflect upon the different forces applied in protest, is necessary to compare the observed protest on 17 June with other manifestations discussed in the interviews and well documented by different new media.

The relation between CRS and CSI is visible at the manifestation organised by the *Front Social* on 8 May 2017, one day after the first round of Presidential Elections, occurred from *Place de la République* to *Place de la Bastille*. On one side, the CSI was the closest police force to the protesters, managing the flow of people and intervening with force punctually, but returning to a defensive position. On the other, CRS officers were in more strategic positions, closing the cross streets and intervening in order to redefine (and increase) the police's territory (Taranis News, 2017) **[10.41]**.

Police temporary tactics were also applied on the manifestation on 29 November 2015. The protest against the Climate Change Conference (COP21), international summit to start on the following day in the metropolitan region of Paris, was interdicted after the terrorist attacks on 13 November. Even though, protesters gathered at *Place de la République* and start to proceed with the demonstration. After conflicts between protesters and the police force, CRS officers closed all streets towards the square, using vans, temporary fences and officers with shields, controlling the entrance and exit at the square. Afterwards the police slowly shrunk the space for the manifestation and, after four hours, more than 200 arrests were made (Bonvoisin, 2017, personal communication; Mouillard and Siméon, 2015; Taranis News, 2015) **[10.41]**.

Considering that systematic enclosure from police forces did not allow people to leave the manifestation for longer periods of time, this procedure can be compared to *"kettling"*. A controversial tactic of containing large number of protests against their will, *kettling* (or also *nasse* in

French) was first mentioned in the press after its use in a manifestation in May 2001 in London (Lewis, 2009, 2012). Similar procedure happened in the protest in front of the National Assembly in 5 July 2016, where protesters were kept several hours at the *Pont de la Concorde* (Interviewee B, 2017, female militant of a left-wing party, personal communication; Taranis News, 2016).

Additionally, RATP has a key role to control the access and the exit of *Place de la République* by closing the metro station at the square in case of a demonstration, which happened in 29 November 2016 and has been occurring more frequently after the 2015 Paris attacks (Interviewee B, 2017, personal communication; Pinchon, 2017, personal communication). Interruption of public transportation lines and temporary closing of stations are important counterterrorist measures, once it helps to regulate the access of a certain areas – a main concerns according to Vigipirate plan [10.46]. In this case, RATP could constrain protesters to access – or leave – *Place de la République*. In that sense, a counterterrorist measure is also being used for the aim to better control protest and riots.

Reflecting further on the accessibility levels in spaces of gathering, the first recommendation against terrorist attacks for festivals or cultural events is exactly the control of the perimeter's event, by ensuring the possibility of restricting or prohibiting the circulation in the area, managing public flows (Service du Haut Fonctionnaire de Défense et de Sécurité (Ministère de la Culture et de la Communication), n.d.). In the case of political manifestations, the procedure of police forces has a similar rationale, however applying it for issues beyond terrorism, as explains Zagrodzki (2017, personal communication):

> [W]hen it comes to protests (once again, when it is organised, pretty planned and everything) you have not only deployed a certain number of police officers in those locations, they will decide in advance, which streets will be blocked, which streets will be open, to let people inside [...] Do we decide to let people from the streets nearby join the protest? Or do we totally shut down the streets?

This reinforces the strategic aspect of temporary enclosures of spaces concerning manifestations. Therefore, adding the use of *kettling*, the police forces can define an enclosed perimeter even before the protest start.

A paradigmatic example of these procedures took place on 23 June 2016 at *Place de la Bastille*, when the police forces restricted the access in all the perimeter of the planned course of the manifestation, around the Bassin de l'Arsenal. To enter inside the area, one should pass through luggage verification (Franceinfo, 2016). Also several interviewees saw it as a remarkable event (Bonvoisin, 2017, personal communication; Interviewee B, 2017, personal communication; Zagrodzki, 2017, personal communication). Mathieu Zagrodzki (2017, personal communication) explains the procedure for the protest in Place de la Bastille from the perspective of the police's strategies:

> If you want to take part in the protests, you have to be at the beginning of it, at Bastille, and [the police] filtered anyone [who] wants [to go] in or out in the Place de la Bastille. So, you will have to pass a security control. They will verify your bag, to make sure that you don't have molotov cocktails, no weapons or knives. There was not that much about terrorism.

Nevertheless, Interviewee B (2017, personal communication), a female militant of a left-wing party, sees the police control to prevent violent acts from another perspective, explaining her own experience on the same protest:

> It was in June, I think. It was summer in Paris. [...] And the manifestation should be done around the square. When we enter at the manifestation, we had to show our bags and if one had a scarf, it would be confiscated, because you could hide your face with it. And there were also people, whose saline was confiscated. Swimming goggles were also prohibited. [...] The people carrying first aid supplies were controlled. [...] There were people from our group that were held in custody only because they had this type of material.

In that sense, preventive actions usually applied in situations against terrorism – access-control and bag verification by armed police – have been used in a context to control protests. Another important aspect is that not only the limitation of means of violence (weapons) was controlled, but also the protesters' defensive forces against police repression were reduced (saline and swimming goggles helps, for instance, combat the effects of tear gas).

Ultimately, the power given by the declaration of the state of emergency to confine certain invidious in their residence was also used to restrict political manifestations. Before the protest against the COP21 on 29 November 2016, house arrests were imposed to 24 of its protest's leaders (Bonvoisin, 2017, personal communication; Borredon and Pécout, 2015; Pascual, 2017; Taranis News, 2015).

Hence, to discuss the physical manifestation of security in *Place de la République* is necessary not only to look at the elements present on an everyday basis, but also the potentiality of reinforced control. ■

[10.46] Control over metro station access
AGF

(Un)conclusive notes

The security apparatus in *Place de la République* is manifested in two different forms and has to be seen under different lenses, one related to the daily production of the spaces and the second about the ability from police force to rapidly change the security rationale at the space.

Firstly, the square offers a quite unique space for leisure, meetings, political activities and, specially, for physical transformations on an everyday basis. Different actors have the possibility to modify the space, concerning not only the uses, but also the manipulation of physical spaces new physical elements. This tangible spatial production happens in a space with less visible security elements and actors in a less normalised space. Without the intention to develop further here, one can ask then to what extent does an intense production of the everyday spaces help to increase safeness in public environments without the use of excessive policing means.*****

Furthermore, this spatial production promotes the establishment of new layers of memories attached to the square. If *Place de la République* presents less visible anti-terrorist security elements, this is, between the three case studies, the most attached space to the recent history of terrorism in Paris.

Here, the reflection can be further expanded using the notion of "multidirectional memory", developed by Michael Rothberg (2009). Understating memory as "past made present" and therefore also a form of action, "multidirectional memory encourages us to think of the public sphere as a malleable discursive space in which groups do not simply articulate established positions but actually come into being through their dialogical interactions with other; both the subjects and spaces of the public are open to continual reconstruction" (Rothberg, 2009: 3–5). The everyday spatial production in *Place de la République* leads to this continual reconstruction and accumulation of memories, which creates different types of emotional relations to the square, so as different notions of belonging. Multidirectional memory can be then a tool to understand the relation of public squares and another form of resilience to terrorism, besides policing strategies: beyond a space of mourning, a space of reinforcement of democratic values and specifically of urban values. Reaffirming that "I am Paris" (*Je suis Paris*), like similar responses in England, might be then one tool against discourses reinforcing urbicide, as discussed in chapter 2 [figure 5.57].

The second type of security manifestation refers to the temporary measures that rapidly transform the space of the square. If at the observed protest the police force was not actively repressive, there was the possibility of activating the reinforced security measures, as a fast response in any case of disturbance. The conducted interviews – looking both from police and protesters' perspective – unveil this propensity, which raises a couple of questions. First of all, counterterrorist security becomes a justification to reinforce general security, when restricting measures are imposed to protests – from control of bags to the complete interdiction of the protest. Afterwards, although these measures are not spatially present a priori, the counterterrorist security rationale helps to increase the implementation speed of temporary repressive responses. In that sense, this framework against terrorism – extra powers for the police given by the state of emergency, increased presence of police officers with heavier firepower and also military forces in the urban environment – can be easily activated to other uses.

This is consistent with the concept of "rheostatic military-police surveillance" from Mathieu Rigouste (Rigouste and Tomahawk, 2016: 70). The levels oscillation of Vigipirate plan, the power given to the *préfet de police* to increase security measures without previously consulting any juridical instance, and all the security elements to enclose temporarily open spaces can be understood as electrical resistors, which can be use to activate repressive powers, not only against terrorism, but to any kind of potential threat.

Hence, the case of *Place de la République* highlights a security apparatus that can be seen as piece of urban infrastructure with repressive "disposition". Looking through Keller Easterling's reading of the concept, "[d]isposition is the character or propensity of an organisation that results from all its activity. It is the medium, not the message. (...) It is not the text but the constantly updating software that manages the text. Not the object form, but the active form" (2014: 21).

Finally, this disposition is not only present in military-police apparatus, but also in urban basic infrastructure, manifested here in the form of transportation infrastructure. As in *Gare du Nord*, RATP has a key role on security, this time with the possibility to regulate both road and metro traffic towards the square, rapidly decreasing the accessibility of the space and contributing to police territorial control. ▪

* Is relevant to note, however, that the relative discreet presence of tourists in comparison to other cases studies and the nature of the daily activities evidence the importance of the square in a local level, serving as leisure facility and meeting point for the near neighbourhood. On the other side, it was visible an unbalance between the number of men and women in the square, especially of women with foreign background. For instance, almost no women with veil or colourful African vests was seen in the square during the field researches, which poses the question to what extend local actors are proportionally represented in *Place de la République*.

[10.47] Different symbols of civic resilience against terrorist attacks

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[10.48] Monument à la République
AGF

"By sitting in the alcove, and keeping well back, Winston was able to remain outside the range of the telescreen, so far as sight went. He could be heard, of course, but so long as he stayed in his present position he could not be seen. It was partly the unusual geography of the room that had suggested to him the thing that he was now about to do."

(Orwell, 2002 [1949]: 6)

D

Reflecting

11 Reflections on the case studies

The analysis of the three case studies unveils the diversity of physical elements, actors, procedures and rules involved in the securitisation of Parisian spaces. These key areas for the city are charged with political and symbolical meanings and are representative places to analyse the counterterrorist measures in the city.

Common points can be identified, relating the case studies with previous chapter's considerations. To do so, this review borrows the conceptual framework of Valverde (2014) on governance of crime and security, dividing the confluent findings into three perspectives: scale, jurisdiction and time. This division allows comparing certain common aspects – as well as disparities – between the case studies, without oversimplification or excessive fragmentation.

In the conclusion, making use of the abovementioned concept of disposition (Easterling, 2014), I propose to reflect further on the intrinsic potentialities of counterterrorist security apparatus. ∎

Scale: from defensive design to transnational security

Understanding scale in a first moment as intrinsically territorial, it is possible to find in the three case studies a range of elements from the local-scale object to the world-scale flows. Acknowledging that scale is a social construct and that it "represents territorialisaton as a process of evolution" (Löw, 2008: 284), the political will of certain scales' manifestation can be questioned.

The physical manifestation of objects has a very local consequence, but might be connected with larger scales as well. A part of the research was exactly to identity physical elements of security, especially during field research, various objects in the scale of urban furniture and architecture can also be pointed out.

Firstly, all of the three spaces have been recently renovated (or are still under renovation) and all their projects present – in different levels – a preoccupation on safety and security. There is a general application of measures related to the "broken window" rationale (Kelling and Wilson, 1982); thus the overall concern of keeping the places clean, well illuminated and in good maintenance conditions can be seen as strategies to discourage vandalism.

Furthermore, a series of other objects are designed to constrain movements, including objects used exclusively for security purposes – gates, concrete blocks or bollard – or integrated with other uses – garden boxes, benches or escalators. In that sense, Place de la République presents security elements in a lower quantity

and with less efficiency (for example, vehicles can enter the square). On the other side, *Gare du Nord* has a multitude of very visible elements exclusive for control – such as the ticket gates or walk-through metal detectors, while in *Forum des Halles* the elements are more integrated with the overall architecture, making use of costumed design and transparent elements.

If we consider that the observed litterbins, designed to have their contents visible are a local-scale manifestation of counterterrorist security, we should not forget that they are also a consequence of a nation-wide decision, based on an instruction of Vigipirate in 1995 (Sévaux, 2003).

In turn, the CCTV is an important element that brings different scales together. Its physical and small-scale manifestation –in the form of different types of cameras –, allows the increase of state surveillance power. This is possible not only by the cameras from *Préfecture de Paris*, but also from private operators, whose images can be accessed by police authorities – not only for counterterrorist purposes, but also on a daily basis, as we saw in Forum des Halles.

While *Place de la République* has a sparse distribution of cameras, *Gare du Nord* and *Forum des Halles* have a dense CCTV network and their central securities are in constant communication with police forces. At both at the train station and the commercial centre, third-party companies manage the CCTV surveillance systems. These transnational security companies, also related to defensive industrial sector, show a remarkable concentration of knowledge, raising questions about their unveiled political and economical power.

This dichotomy can also be seen with actors that are not involved in security a priori. In the larger scale, cleaning staff and SNCF staff are representing national institutional actors (cleaning third-party companies and SNCF itself). Nevertheless, they play a very small-(scale) role in any decision level concerning security, restricting to "surveillance by employees", when looking from the perspective of situational prevention (Clarke, 1997: 20–21). Is remarkable though that its role clearly involves counterterrorism security – such as verifying possible bombs in litterbins and orienting people in case an attack or an attack suspicion.

Their presence is especially visible in the first two case studies. In *Place de la République* "natural surveillance" is more evident, but also is the only case study, where city-scale security actors were seen. The municipal guards and traffic controllers were representing the Municipality of Paris.

In turn, *Préfecture de Paris* is a metropolitan-wide organisation, but, as it has authority over the employed officers from National Police and Gendarmerie and responds directly to the Ministry of Interior, also playing a role as a nationwide actor.

Finally, the clearest manifestation of national authority (and the Vigipirate plan) against terrorism is the heavily armed soldiers, patrolling at all studied places, manifesting the increased military presence in French urban spaces. ∎

Jurisdiction mapping boundaries and its contradictions

The concept of scale highlights connections between objects, physically placed actors, institutional actors, and norms. Nevertheless, where are they acting? Are there any boundaries? The notion of jurisdiction – whose basic question is "who governs where" (Valverde, 2014: 382) – helps to establish a cartography of power in the three cases.

The first approach is to identify these spatial jurisdictions of the counterterrorist apparatus through norms, operational instructions or legislation. For instance, the Vigipirate plan regulates the presence of soldiers in those places – after they are considered as potential targets – and recommends the access control with luggage verification in places where private operators are acting, defining certain security areas – such as in *Forum des Halles*. Anti-terrorist regulations may also oblige the operators of the spaces to install CCTV system, and to develop security plans (*Code de la sécurité intérieure*, 2017).

Secondly, we attempt to map the different involved actors in the space and some of its consequences. In *Place de la République*, RATP exercises jurisdiction over the metro station and therefore higher levels of securitisation are present in the underground spaces, such as denser CCTV system, own security agents and ticket gates. A different territory from the ground floor is then established, with its own rules.

Nevertheless, the involvement of various operators in both *Gare du Nord* and *Forum des Halles* reveals a more complex territory from the point of view of jurisdiction. *Gare du Nord* is especially remarkable for its quantity of involved actors, as trains operators (SNCF, RATP, Eurostar, Thalys), private security agents (Stentorius/ Honeywell, Lancry/ Atalian, Securitas) and service providers (chain stores, cleaning services), producing different zones, which have several overlaps.

But one can rapidly see that this zoning of jurisdictional powers blurs when compared to empiric observations of everyday security. Concerning state security actors, they have a larger area of activity than stated in Vigipirate plan, and soldiers, National Police officers and *gendarmes* have a free access to any area with public access, inclusive the interior of privately controlled areas *Forum des Halles*. At the commercial centre and in *Place de la République* the jurisdiction's extrapolation of RATP security actors could

be observed, as well as the overall presence of SNCF agents in *Gare du Nord*, throughout zones of other operators.

These contradictions can still be seen as part of the jurisdiction, as Valverde herself explains:

Jurisdiction is not just the determination of the 'who' of governance, the determination of the correct sovereign. Jurisdictional games also determine what spaces, persons and/or issues are to be governed by any one authority. And perhaps most importantly, in determining the who and the what of governance, the game of jurisdiction ends up quietly determining the how of governance, the qualitative element (2014: 388).

In that sense, certain spaces – where overlapping zones and informal jurisdictions were visible – become key points to unveil more details about the existing power relations. Then, the connection area between metro and RER lines in *Gare du Nord* reveals the authority from SNCF over other operators in the train station. In the same way, the observations at Patio Pina Bausch in *Forum des Halles* unveil hidden norms and orderings.

However, it was through the gaze of the relation between *people* where significant traces of these "jurisdictional games" were encountered, which opens the possibility to discuss agency in security context. Looking at police officers instead of National Police or *gendarmes* rather *Gendarmerie*, new relations were encountered. The unclear division of attributions between both agents in *Gare du Nord* opens up a discussion about the boundaries of their functional jurisdictions and possible levels of cooperation. Similarly, the existence of an informal market at the train station in presence of security agents, as well the security agents' personal decisions during bags verification at *Forum des Halles* reveals the limitations or failures in both general and counterterrorist security.

In an inverted logic, the absent actors – as homeless or informal sellers – in certain spaces indicate the increased levels of control. In places like *Patio Pina Bausch* and the Eurostar area after the check-in, the access control is also used as counterterrorist security reinforcement, once it reduces the vulnerabilities of the area by reducing the number of social groups, which helps to identify alien activities and actors.

Therefore, the agency of involved actors is, then, an important element to unveil informal jurisdictions and invisible spatial configurations. Looking at these operational and functional dynamics, the discussion might go beyond the panoptic understanding of surveillance, to include also elements of governance (see Haggerty, 2006: 20–22). ∎

Time and temporality in security measures

'*How is the security applied*' is a question that must be answered not only through static elements, but also through dynamic parameters, as the previous examples demonstrate.

For this reason, Valverde calls the attention to the different aspects involving time, considering historical aspects, time-framed actions and the intrinsic intention of security measures (oriented to the past or to the future) (Valverde, 2009, 2014).

In a historical perspective, the presence of soldiers in *Gare du Nord* before the attacks (Simon, 2013) and the overall presence of adapted litterbins shows that this long-term implementation of counterterrorist measures is coherent with the systematic reinforcements of Vigipirate plan, as described in the chapter 2.

Time also played a role in the everyday manifestations of security. Weekly patterns such as in *Forum des Halles* and *Place de la République* determine the increase (to complete absence) of security personnel and rigorousness during bags verification. Daily routines have a similar effect, adding the fact that increased opening times of stores, and restaurants helps to keep certain activities and movement in places where "natural surveillance" is possible. On the other side, *Forum des Halles*, *Gare du Nord* and the metro station at *Place de la République* have themselves opening times, closing the spaces routinely with the necessary means.

The understanding that temporal measures have spatial consequences becomes fundamental to unveil important security elements. This is especially remarkable at *Place de la République*, where, in comparison to the other cases, there are much less visible security elements. The fact that the security can be radically reinforced and the metro station can be closed in case of manifestations shows an invisible layer of security present in the city.

On the other direction, certain measures can be seen as provisory in a first moment, but, because its long-term presence in the space, they converted themselves to a permanent measure. This is the case of the walk-through metal detectors and baggage scan-machine at the *grand lignes'* platforms in *Gare du Nord*.

Finally, time can be perceived in the measures' intentions. As Valverde exemplifies: "The criminal law and other instruments for punishing wrongs try to ascertain past events [...]. Risk management, by contrast, [...] is oriented to the future, to prevention" (Valverde, 2009: 154–155). In that sense, most of the physical manifestations related to situational prevention/defensive spaces or the mitigation of vulnerabilities against terrorist attacks have a preventive character, towards the "future".

The CCTV cameras, on the other side, have the main feature to show past events, when the possible offence is already done (or started), mainly for investigative purposes (even though has a preventive discourse). I would differentiate, then, measures towards the "present", made to repress or punish infractions or crimes that are on course. While the dense CCTV cameras in *Forum des Halles* might have been used for this purpose, the most relevant examples are the punitive means from police forces in *Place de la République* during protests, such as tear gas and rubber balls grenade. ∎

Potentiality of a repressive system

Combining the wide notion of Valverde's temporality with the concept of disposition from Eastling, temporary or intangible measures can be *activated* according to a demand. This possibility of variation of intensity, similar to the Rigouste's idea of rheostat, can be potentially applied into the whole system of counterterrorist security.

Starting with the tools studied in chapter 2, the state of emergency, a self-declared temporary measure, increases the power of the executive branch and police forces. In turn, the change of levels from Vigipirate plan can reinforce access control or increase the military presence. These tools allow making faster decisions on security and consulting less or none other regulatory bodies.

In this sense, the notion of "temporality" is deformed when we see the tendency of reinforced security measures becoming permanent, visible by the sequence of extensions of the state of emergency and changes of the levels' structure on the Vigipirate plan. On the other side, "time" is relevant because of the increased speed of measures' application. Counterterrorist measures can be applied rapidly, intensively and with little regulation.

In this context, I argue then that reinforced security measures have the *potentiality* to be used for other purposes than terrorism; and, therefore, I understand here *potentiality* of a repressive system as the capability of reinforced counterterrorist security measures to be rapidly applied out from their original purposes.

If we look back to Valverde's definitions applied in the case studies, the time is visibly important in *Place de la République*, where temporary measures of control were applied in the manifestation against COP21 and *could have been applied* in the observed manifestation on 10 June. Furthermore, as we have seen that *Place de la République* closed the station in the case of larger protests, this would also be possible in the other cases studies. Effectively, *Gare du Nord* was evacuated after security concerns in 9 May 2017 (Rawlinson, 2017). So, SNCF and RATP are key actors on this process and their communication with governmental-administrative actors can define the extension of the state of control.

Besides time, this potentiality can be seen in the observed security manifestation related to scale and jurisdiction. In that sense, the presence of multinational security companies, involved also in defensive-military issues, is remarkable, having great concentration of knowledge and power by the use of CCTV. Conversely, the police forces and soldiers' territorial jurisdiction has almost no borders – including electronic surveillance systems –, and reiterates the concentration of power by the executive branch.

Looking back to the object scale, the communication's apparatus of the train network can help to rapidly activate exceptional security measures. While the printed sign and Vigipirate's logos are demanding collective engagement for vigilance, the digital displays and loudspeakers can stop giving general information, in order to alert and introduce specific defensive instructions. In fact, this was observed on 19 June, when, after an attempt of attack, the metro station *Champs-Élysées Clémenceau* was closed and alerts were being transmitted in all other stations.

Therefore, the combination of the objects, actors, norms and legislations allows the security system to accelerate the implementation of its repressive measures. And, as they can be used for other purposes, it constitutes a potentially repressive system.

While the case studies' plural results open further enquires, this reflection brings confluent elements together in order to instigate to what extent invisible elements of the security apparatus have influence on the physical shape of the city, and how the existing tangible elements in the urban spaces have already a potentiality of repression, although still not activated. ∎

12 Final words

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Although the focus on surveillance and control, this work does not intend to be Orwellian. Beyond the manifestations of police force and violence, the case studies should also serve to reflect how people react to security and to what extent there are resistance to urban militarisation process. If, during the protests in *Place de la République* there is the installation of a large repressive security apparatus, during the everyday life it still shows how a public space can still hold its public character, where people with different interests deals with the other, creating a sense of tolerance (and maybe desire) from otherness.

We can also see in the empirical work that there is by no means a "perfectly designed space […] the hygienically pure space, free of surprises, ambivalence and conflict" (Bauman, 1999: 183). Zygmunt Bauman argues that, to move towards a society with less control and more freedom, we should rethink the notion of chaos and disorder. The "creative chaos" (with a completely different intention from Harvey's "creative destruction") might be a tool to think the friction between order and chaos, control and freedom, and understand it as a sphere of negotiation:

> The ostensible disorder (which is a disorder primarily, perhaps solely, by administrative ruling—as a derivative of the ambition to total control) is in fact a specific form of equilibrium—an equilibrium which is perpetually created and reformed through intermittent frictions and negotiations, in the course of which the autonomous actions of free agents are simultaneously the source of initiative, the moving force and the evaluating authority (Bauman, 1999: 183).

Additionally, considering also the plural manifestations of resilience throughout France after the attacks, reinforcing the desire of living together – and living in the city –, I borrow here the notion of "negotiation of hope" from Jeremy Till, which he uses to discuss the future in participatory planning process (2009), to suggest a "negotiation of trust", where we can think collectively on the present conflicts, and deal with suspicious and fear in a form that we can reconceptualise otherness and trust. ∎

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"No, it's not for the
romantics, it's for the skeptics.
Paris is for the skeptics."

"Não, não é para os
românticos, é para os céticos.
Paris é para os céticos."

(De Oliveira, 2016: 47)