

Contents

Preface	9
Introduction	11
Chapter I: Monads as Basic Individuals	15
I. We distinguish the claim that monads are basic individuals from the claim that the model for monad is mind.	15
II. A monad is always perceiving.	15
III. To perceive is to express the universe. Perception and identity.	17
IV. <i>Contra</i> Strawson, Leibniz's finite monad is embodied in spatio-temporal relations.	18
V. Leibniz distinguishes three levels of reality: the monads, the aggregates of those monads, and the appearances of those monads as phenomena.	20
VI. The active and passive characteristics of finite monads.	21
VII. The active and passive characteristics of aggregates of monads.	23
VIII. The active and passive characteristics of phenomena. Body is an aggregation of coexisting monads which appears in a spatio-temporal continuum.	26
IX. Leibniz admits that a Berkeleyan world, however unlikely, is possible. The question of the identity of indiscernibles.	30
Chapter II: Complete Individual Notions	32
I. Each substance has a complete concept which is an exhaustive account of that substance's characteristics. Is that account a description in universal terms only?	32

II.	Clarity about concepts requires clarity about propositions. The science of simple intelligence and the science of vision.	33
III.	Leibniz's preference for intensionality. In a true proposition the predicate concept is included in the subject concept. The pivotal distinction between full and complete concepts. Complete concepts must include particular terms.	36
IV.	The compatibility of Leibniz's claim that the complete concepts of substances must include particular terms with his contention that each individual substance is an <i>infima species</i> .	40
V.	The inclusion of particular terms within complete concepts seems to render the identity of indiscernibles trivial at best. But that issue is tied to the question of how the individual consciousness expresses or represents the world. That leads in turn to questions on the role of body in Leibniz's account of the relations among individual substances.	43

Chapter III: Body 44

I.	<i>Contra</i> Strawson, Leibniz thinks that in actuality body is an essential aspect of the finite monad's experience. But Leibniz allows the possibility of a finite monad's being deprived of its body, and hence his assertion of the actuality of body may seem merely gratuitous.	44
II.	The distinction between disembodied and un bodied monads. Disembodiment as a possibility is no more actual, attractive, or systematically frustrating for Leibniz than it is for Strawson.	46
III.	Leibniz maintains the possibility of an un bodied world, but he rejects the possibility of a finite monad deprived of the <i>function</i> of body. The function of body is to enable the finite monad to stand in <i>relation</i> to the world.	48
IV.	The controverted question of Leibniz and relations.	51

Chapter IV: Relations 53

I.	A. Russell's criticism of Leibniz's doctrine on relations.	55
	B. Parkinson's criticism of Leibniz's doctrine on relations.	56
II.	A. Leibniz maintains the distinction between possibility and compossibility.	60
	B. If that distinction is to hold, then irreducible relations must necessarily obtain among individual substances.	61

III. Leibniz's thesis that irreducible relations prevail among individual substances does not violate his logic.	62
A. Whether a proposition is relational is not simply a syntactical question.	63
B. Leibniz's syntactical transformations are efforts to secure "arguments in form", but they are not intended to eliminate relations or relational concepts.	63
C. 1. Against Russell's criticism.	65
2. Against Parkinson's criticism.	67
IV. A. Strawson explicitly denies that Leibniz maintains the distinction between possibility and compossibility.	70
B. Strawson explicitly denies Leibniz the irreducible relations which characterize a single common world.	70
C. <i>Contra</i> Strawson.	71

Chapter V: Public Space and Private Worlds 72

I. According to Strawson, all that is real for Leibniz are the monads and their perceptions, among which there are certain correspondences. <i>Contra</i> Strawson, Leibniz holds that in actuality there are objective correlatives for well-founded phenomena, and those correlatives are compound substances.	73
II. According to Strawson, space is internal to the monad. <i>Contra</i> Strawson, Leibniz holds that in actuality space is also an expression of a relational reality existing outside the monad.	74
III. According to Strawson, for Leibniz there are private spaces but no public space: the views of the monads correspond to each other, but there is nothing of which they are views. <i>Contra</i> Strawson, Leibniz holds that the correspondences among the monads are grounded in their having the <i>same</i> objective correlatives for their well-founded phenomena. For Leibniz, finite monads must appear to each other as bodied in a common spatio-temporal world.	76

Chapter VI: Individuation 81

I. The Challenge of Chessboard Symmetry. Strawson's chessboard is inadequate as a model for Leibniz, but the difficulties raised by a symmetrical universe remain.	81
--	----

II. The Identity of Indiscernibles	83
A. The identity of indiscernibles is for Leibniz a metaphysical rather than an epistemological principle.	83
B. There are different versions of the identity of indiscernibles.	84
1. Leibniz makes the principle necessarily rather than contingently true.	85
2. The different versions of necessity. Leibniz relies on complete rather than full concepts.	86
III. Leibniz's Version of the Identity of Indiscernibles. It is <i>drawn from</i> his prior doctrine on substances and their complete concepts.	89
A. Identity real and personal. The dominant monad which confers real identity is the same dominant monad which confers personal identity.	90
B. Basic Particulars	92
1. No two monads can have indiscernible perceptions of the same objective correlative. Perception essentially bonds and supposes an internal unity of consciousness and an external diversity of objective correlatives.	93
2. Unbodied consciousnesses fail as basic particulars because of their exclusive reliance on the internal alone, abstractly separated from the external. Leibniz's anecdote of the two globes as a response to the problem of identity in a symmetrical world.	93
3. Material atoms fail as basic particulars because of their exclusive reliance on the external alone, abstractly separated from the internal.	96
C. The epistemological criteria for identification provide at best a kind of moral certainty. But the identity of indiscernibles remains for Leibniz a metaphysically true principle.	97
Chapter VII: Alternatives that are as Unhistorical and as Unnecessary as they are Unappealing.	100
Envoi	101
Notes	104
Bibliography	113
Index	118