‘Intangible’ and ‘tangible’ heritage

A topology of culture
in contexts of faith

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“As soon as we have the thing before our eyes, and in our hearts an ear for the word, thinking prospers. Few are experienced enough in the difference between an object of scholarship and a matter thought. (…) He who thinks greatly must err greatly.

We never come to thoughts. They come to us. From such companionship a few perhaps may rise to be journeymen in the craft of thinking. So that one of them, unforeseen, may become a master. (…)

All our hearts courage is the echoing response to the first call of Being which gathers our thinking into the play of the world. (…) What is spoken is never and in no language, what is said.

The oldest of the old follows behind us in our thinking and yet it comes to meet us. That is why thinking holds to the coming of what has been and is remembrance. (…)

But poetry that thinks is in truth the topology of Being. This topology tells Being the whereabouts of its actual presence. Singing and thinking are the stems neighbour to poetry they grow out of Being and reach into its truth.”

Martin Heidegger: The Thinker as Poet

(Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens, 1947)
'Intangible' and 'tangible' heritage – a topology of culture in contexts of faith, was researched, written, reflected upon, revised, criticised, affirmed and finally submitted as a PhD thesis to the Institute of Cultural Geography, at the Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz, in December 2006. The submission was of course merely the very last step of a work, which was prepared throughout a three-year period from 2004 to 2006. My working basis during this time shifted between my office – offered by the Institute of Cultural Geography – at the Johannes Gutenberg University in Mainz, Germany; my temporary office – provided by the School of Canadian Studies, Programme of Heritage Conservation – at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada, where I spent the first half of the year 2006, and my favourite spot in the Umayyad Mosque as well as my lovely little roof-terrace nearby - kindly offered by ‘Um Za-heer’ who like ‘my’ mosque welcomed me with ever-growing gentleness the many times and altogether about eleven months I stayed – in Damascus Syria.

In all three places I had the pleasure of encountering people that became very special to me. I found inspiration from writers, colleagues and friends who provided me insights into their thoughts, their meaning-making processes and their understanding of cultural heritage. My writings have also strongly been influenced by people I never met – and will never meet – but whose legacy in writing provided me with ideas and understanding and who – despite not being connected to the three places of my work – now also have their topoi in my thoughts. I would like to point out two authors in this context, first the late Martin Heidegger, a German philosopher, whose writings gave me much inspiration, although he would very likely dispraise my way of reading his words and my chosen approach to heritage. Despite my high esteem for his philosophical concepts, his fascinating language and his ‘unconcealing’ explanations, I wish to take the opportunity to distance myself from his political orientations and reported anti-Semitic positions. The second is Wilfred Cantwell Smith, a Canadian scholar of comparative religious studies, whose works influenced the conceptual formulation of heritage of faith that became a central subject of my writings. He taught me to encounter people as practitioners of faith rather than members of (a) religion.

Considerations on the subject – the interrelation of tangible and intangible heritage and opportunities of integrated approaches for heritage management – already started in 2003, while I was working for the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM) in Rome and with interest observed the evolution and adoption of the 2003 UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage. Already at this time I had many discussions with colleagues who confirmed the growing relevance of such a study. At
present, almost four years later, I have gained the impression that so many scholars have taken up the subject during the last three years that there remains hardly anything new to say. On the other hand, an integrated approach is far from being achieved and I hope that my writings can contribute to this ongoing process. My German mentor Anton Escher, who encouraged me to leave Rome and take up the project of writing a PhD thesis in Mainz, kept all his initial promises. He was of great assistance in generously providing a comfortable research infrastructure – including financial support for the many trips to Syria – and the encouragement which I needed in the desperate hours of this long-term research. As a scholarship holder of the research training group ‘Space and ritual – function meaning and use of places of sacred intention’ I was supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG) during the first eighteen months of my research. Subsequently the Centre for Intercultural Studies (ZIS) of the Johannes Gutenberg University offered me the position of a coordinator of the research project ‘Norms and values as cultural negotiation products in UNESCO’ which fortunately overlapped in content with my own research aims. By the end of 2005 the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) granted me another scholarship which allowed me to spend a term as visiting scholar at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada and to conduct yet another trip to Damascus to finalise my empirical topological studies. Without the support of these individuals and institutions the research which led to this work would not have been possible; and this assures my gratitude to all of them.

In Mainz, I also took advantage of the discussions I had with students and colleagues in the framework of a graduate course on World Heritage, which I conducted, as well as a field project in Damascus. I want to particularly mention five students, who supported me in doing interviews for this thesis during a two-week period in Damascus and who are responsible for hundreds of pages of interview transcript that I found on my desk after my return from Syria.

In Ottawa, I was supported by my Canadian co-mentor Herb Stovel – also my former boss at ICCROM – who had meanwhile accepted the job of a professor at the heritage conservation programme. Our discussions were extremely helpful during the phase that the structure of my writings was finalised and it was he who – though unintended – made me discover Heidegger in the context of my research. In addition, our many email exchanges forced me to continuously reflect on my approach to heritage and the applicability of my concepts and the fact that he often refused to agree with my point of view urged me to scrutinise my work again and again. Thanks Herb, for these often stimulating, sometimes provoking and occasionally confusing but almost always encouraging reflections.

A crucial and lasting encounter during my stay in Canada was with Julian Smith, a conservation architect and – as I only found out much later – son of the earlier mentioned Wilfred Cantwell Smith. That means, both father and son entirely independently had an immense influence on my research, but I think that the impact of Julian Smith was even more substantial. Although he might not share this perception, I
consider him the inventor of the concept ‘topologies’, which I have merely renarrated as the synthesis of a long lunch conversation in an Indian restaurant in Bank Street. He never talked about topologies – at least not before I proposed the term to him – but about cultural landscapes, which he defined in an unfamiliar and multilayered way. He told me that his interest in cultural landscapes emerged during his time in India where landscapes, that where quite strange to begin with became more and more familiar, a story that fully reflected my experiences in the Umayyad Mosque. I have not referred to his definition in my entire writing, because I wanted to strictly avoid confusions between topologies and the established definitions of cultural landscapes. On the other hand, it so much affected my conceptual approach that I do not want to withhold his thoughts and this might be a good place to give Julian the floor:

“I fundamentally disagree with the definition of cultural landscapes (...) as a geographical terrain that exhibits the interaction of humans and the environment. In my mind that could be a definition of a landscape, but a cultural landscape, I think, partly exists in the mind and therefore is in a sense a mental construct related to a place. It is a sad relationship. I often define a cultural landscape as ideas embedded in place. And the idea is what is cultural about a place and not the landscape. The example I gave to my students is that if you grow up in this country [Canada] and you have a grandmother, who still lives in an old Victorian home, and you go to your grandmother’s house, and you enter, and you see the heavy curtains, and even on a bright sunny day it is a dark room, and it has high ceilings, and she invites you for a tea for which she gets out her silver tea set, and it is very formal, and you have a cube of sugar and a few of her handmade cookies. Then you are part of what I consider a cultural landscape. It is a place and a ritual that come together to create something, that is part of how we construct a sense of place, a sense of memory, a sense of identity.”

Topology is no longer a renamed version of Julian Smith’s cultural landscape but nevertheless, it is the offspring of his thought, shaped and maybe somewhat removed by my later considerations. Due to unusual circumstances we never had the opportunity to discuss in-depth my transformation of his initial ideas, but I hope he will not feel embarrassed for my mentioning his name and my giving him credit.

I wish to thank several colleagues for their respective in-depth reports of the Kazan meeting on Outstanding Universal Value, which I was not able to attend. Kazan was only one of many meetings, but it is symptomatic for the difficulties young researchers face, when engaging in heritage discourses, in particular UNESCO discourses and even more specifically World Heritage discourses. It is a field in which thoughts on conceptual and methodological aspects are often exchanged in closed expert circles, the proceedings or reports of which have just now started to be progressively published. The consequence is that a reflection of earlier processes, policies and decisions in the context of World Heritage is dependant on the memory and availability of the experts who participated in the respective meetings. With the professional leave of many individuals, the knowledge on World Heritage history is slowly, but increasingly disappearing. Michel Batisse and Gérard Bolla have taken an important step in publishing their World Heritage memoirs – in Batisse’s case as we know today just in time. I wish to take this opportunity to plead to all those who are and have been active in the context of the World Heritage Convention – I know that many of
you have fascinating things to say and incredible stories to tell – please make your memories available to future generations as a legacy in the spirit of the World Heritage convention.

My research, too, was dependant on the memories, but also ideas of many I would like to gather under the term ‘heritage professionals’. I refrain from thanking for particular contributions as this would force me to name individuals several times and increases the risk that I forget others whose contribution is difficult to be framed in a ‘category’. I wish to globally express my highest appreciation to all heritage professionals who offered their time for being interviewed or having in-depth conversations on a subject covered in my thesis. Even if few are cited in my writings, many had an influence on my thinking.

Besides gaining information from conversations and archives, I also had the opportunity to participate in several UNESCO meetings and I wish to thank the organisers of the International Conference on the Safeguarding of Tangible and Intangible Cultural Heritage: towards an integrated approach, in October 2004 in Nara, Japan for offering me the opportunity to participate. In the other cases I thank the respective UNESCO secretariats and committee’s for facilitating my participation in the 28th (Suzhou, China, 2004), the 7th extraordinary (Paris, UNESCO headquarters, 2004), the 29th (Durban, South Africa) and the 30th (Vilnius, Lithuania) sessions of the World Heritage Committee, and finally in the 1st session of the Intangible Heritage Committee (Algiers, Algeria, 2006). The last meeting however, was too late to have a substantial influence on my writings, and took place long after the closing date I determined for my theoretical research, August 1st 2006.

My empirical research was conducted during nine stays in Damascus (dated February 29th to April 14th 2004, April 27th to May 8th 2004, June 6th to 14th 2004, August 13th to October 4th 2004, October 28th to November 22nd 2004, February 26th to April 11th 2005, May 12th to 21st 2005, August 8th to November 7th 2005 and September 13th to October 29th 2006, which add to a total of 333 days. But this time would have been entirely meaningless, if I had not met all those who agreed to be interviewed and who narrated their stories of the Umayyad Mosque, who allowed me to share their impressions and experiences, who have indeed welcomed me to participate in a part of their lives, in many cases a spiritual part. I feel sad, that I can’t thank you all by name, but I promised to separate your narratives from any information that makes you clearly identifiable. You gave me the opportunity of discovering yet another Umayyad Mosque so many times and you may be affirmed that the approach of topologies enables me to reflect this unique experience and share it with my readers. I therefore hope that your meanings, your knowledge and your identity are not misrepresented and will be understood through my writings by others who will not have the chance to talk to you. And perhaps this could be a very small gift in exchange, from me who is so deeply indebted to you.
For facilitating interviews with traveller groups from Europe, I wish to also express my gratitude to the German tour organiser ‘Biblisch Reisen’ which supported me in conducting a group interview with 31 participants of their tour to Syria in addition to having several individual conversations with participants of their groups. My thanks shall be extended to other tour guides that spontaneously permitted me to join their visits to the Umayyad Mosque and interview individual participants. I wish to take this opportunity to apologise for the many delays I caused in the daily agendas of traveller groups.

My interviews have been conducted in three languages: English, German and Arabic and with the help of the earlier named students I was able to add Persian, French, Italian and Spanish. To facilitate smooth reading of my topological study and to not prevent access to the narrative structures and meaning contexts by language barriers, I have strictly quoted in English or an English translation of what was said. I am aware that many researchers would condemn this practice as they would consider semantics a crucial aspect of narrative analysis. To a certain extent I agree to this, but I have emphasised other aspects and in some cases, where translation turned out difficult or ambiguous, I have added the original language formulation.

My writings further draw on citations or special terms in foreign languages, some of them based on different alphabets, i.e. Arabic, Hebrew and Greek. All three languages offer scientific transcription systems which draw on a number of special characters to represent particular letters and are often difficult to read for somebody not familiar with the transcription system. I have therefore preferred to transcribe according to what I deemed closest to an English pronunciation – which is in most cases equivalent to standard popular scientific transcriptions. To avoid potentially resulting misconceptions of the originals terms I have added the term in original writing in parentheses, at least at first mentioning. In addition to English I presume knowledge of French and have therefore not provided translations for French citations. Citations from German and Arabic are represented in English translation in the continuous text and in addition are cited in original language in a referencing endnote.

With the submission of this work, I am taking up new responsibilities as a Counsellor for Heritage Management and UNESCO Affairs in the Sector for Culture and National Heritage at the Ministry of Information and Foreign Affairs in the Kingdom of Bahrain. To my utmost delight, this position offers me the opportunity to be responsible for both World Heritage and Intangible Heritage activities of the country and might also offer the possibility to encourage integrated approaches for UNESCO safeguarding initiatives as a participating professional. Moreover, I hope to apply topological analyses to the identification of other heritage expressions and perhaps the experiences gathered will lead me to a critical review of the approach and methodology proposed, in the future.
At this point I wish to conclude my comments and acknowledgements, by thanking everybody who I could not mention and there are two yet to name, but I was not able to put my gratitude to them down in writing. As a substitute I opted for making all my words part of my thanks in dedicating my writing to them.
to my parents
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Prologue: thesis and methodology

“What is created cannot itself come into being without those who preserve it” (Heidegger, 1971b, p. 66) states the German philosopher Martin Heidegger – whose poetic words I used to introduce into this work – in his essay on the origin of the work of art. His subsequent definition of the meaning of preservation has strongly inspired me in the process of writing. It shall therefore – though as yet unexplained – precede my elaborations and will be taken up and into my considerations again later. Heidegger argues that:

“Preserving the work means: standing-within the openness of being that happens in the work. This ‘standing-within’ of preservation, however, is a knowing.” (Heidegger, 1971b, p. 67)

My writing aims to contribute to the knowing of heritage, a standing-within or as I would call it a dwelling in heritage, which is its preservation as a nurturing of rootedness in culture. It is essential to attain this goal from the perspective of a holistic conception of heritage. Therefore my work will emphasise opportunities for recombination – in conceptual and practical terms – of two only recently divided heritage typologies: the so-called ‘intangible’ and ‘tangible’ heritage. In arguing that the mentioned division cannot be maintained when the dynamic construction and reaffirmation processes of heritage are observed, and further that this division is a risk to the preservation of heritage of humankind, I will emphasise that it is important to halt and eventually redirect the progressing divergence of the intangible and tangible heritage fields. This is particularly necessary within the context of the leading international body of standard setting in culture, UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), which is the driving force behind this conceptual separation.

As of the adoption of the Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage (UNESCO, 2003b), which came along with an implicit reduction of the scope of the Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (UNESCO, 1972a) to immovable, tangible aspects – a limitation which was never explicit in its operation – the new division seems to have been firmly established within UNESCO. At the time of writing, the 2003 Convention has already proven well accepted and entered into force in record time, which seems to make my plea for a dwell more problematic. I will not argue that the conventions existing and ratified by a large number of State Parties should be abandoned or revised, as that would be like retreating into a theoretical shell while negating the international reality. Quite the contrary, on the basis of the two conventions, which need to be seen as overlapping and complementary rather than dividing and exclusive, collaboration and re-combination could be initiated and achieved on the level of day-to-day im-
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Implementation of the policy documents. To halt the progressing divergence it is important to encourage collaboration processes between tangible and intangible heritage professionals. I argue that such collaborations could be based on shared conceptual frameworks for the identification and valuation of heritage. The overall objective of my thesis is thus to propose a conceptual framework which enables heritage professionals to revisit cultural heritage in its most holistic understanding and overcome the recently introduced administrational divisions.

The holistic definition of cultural heritage drawn on was drafted by the ‘international community’ of UNESCO in the Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies, a milestone document adopted during the World Conference on Cultural Policies in 1982. Cultural heritage is considered an accumulation of various aspects ranging from the works of artists and architects to “expressions of the people’s spirituality, and the body of values which give meaning to life” (UNESCO, 1982). The definition closes in an enumeration of various characteristics of cultural heritage:

“It includes both tangible and intangible works through which the creativity of that people finds expression: languages, rites, beliefs, historic places and monuments, literature, works of art, archives and libraries.” (UNESCO, 1982, art. 23)

Ironically, the above definition is also the first mention of the two terms intangible and tangible in a UNESCO context which were here solely referred to in order to illustrate the wide range and variety of expressions of cultural heritage and have meanwhile been utilised to fragment this very versatility. In trying to recombine both concepts I will also return to an earlier UNESCO document which preceded the election of the current Director-General Koïchiro Matsuura and the drafting of the 2003 convention, a decision adopted by the Executive Board of UNESCO at its 146th Session in 1995. Under the general UNESCO Strategies the delegates defined an emphasis for the enhancing of heritage and promotion of diversity. It says:

“Stress should be laid, in particular, on the close links that exist between the conservation and protection of tangible and intangible cultural heritage, the need to assemble and provide access to information about them, and the need for scientific description and analysis of them” (UNESCO, 1995a, p. 11).

In the following chapters I describe not simply the close links but rather the impracticality of dividing the pair and contribute to the scientific description and analysis of it. Heritage – both intangible and tangible – will be likewise understood as representations or projection screens of value concepts constructed by human interaction. I argue that although the attributes reflecting the value concepts might differ from intangible to tangible heritage, the construction processes are similar or even identical and can be analysed with joint methodologies. The recognition of threats affecting cultural heritage at the turn of the 21st century has also been revised in support of a combined approach. While at the time of drafting the World Heritage Convention in 1972 a major threat attributed to heritage was the decay of its material representations, a convention of a similar scope drafted today would certainly acknowledge...
that the main threat to all heritage expressions is their semiological degradation. The question how management and prevention of such semiological and conceptual decay can be coordinated in an integrated approach will be accompanying the reader in the following five sections of this book.

Gathering and interpretation of data which lead to the arguments and descriptions presented is methodologically based on a triangulated research approach. According to the triangulation divisions developed by Norman Denzin, I should speak of a between-method methodological triangulation (Denzin, 1978, p. 298). This means that different qualitative research approaches were utilised to analyse the set of data gathered, either to select methods flexibly according to the particular material drawn on for each research question, or to apply several methods to the same set of data to benefit from a broader variety or reconfirmation of analysis results. Tools ranged from text-based content analysis (cf. Krippendorff, 2004), material culture analysis (cf. Hodder, 1994, p 398) and ethnomethodology (cf. Holstein & Gubrium, 1994, p. 264) to phenomenological and semiotic analysis of cultural meaning – not addressing the semantic construction of language but the sign-function of the cultural expressions (Eco, 1976, p. 48, 67; Manning & Cullum-Swan, 1994, p. 468f). In exceptional cases I refrain from interpreting the data gathered in order to “present them in such a manner that the informants speak for themselves” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 21).

In approaching the subject from a constructivist paradigm, I assume a relativist ontology – the existence of constructed multiple realities – as well as a subjective epistemology which considers the observer of cultural processes as the constructor and recipient of understanding (cf. Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, p. 14). As the thesis and research question was always given prevalence to the methods and techniques applied, the latter were modified throughout the research period and vary from section to section. I will hence where necessary provide further information on the particular methodologies used in the course of my elaborations.

Data gathered as the basis of the triangulated analysis combined texts, correspondence and oral discourses – especially in international expert and religious community meetings – a large collection of transcribed qualitative interviews conducted as narrative or experts interviews and in two cases as group discussions comprising up to 30 participants. Field notes and sketches, drafted during months of participant observation (cf. Bernard, 1994, p. 136), further contributed to the analysis of the case study presented as an applied integrated research in the later part of this book.

My work on ‘intangible’ and ‘tangible’ heritage – a topology of culture in contexts of faith, is structured in five main sections. Section One can be described as an introductory reflective, theoretical study on heritage conceptualisation and categorisation processes observed within UNESCO and the academic heritage field. It reflects on a wider textual and oral discourse and discusses not only the established heritage conceptions but also the resulting challenges for the interpretation, administration and preservation of cultural heritage within the respective paradigm.
The discussion of heritage categories highlights the influence of value-concepts, as one of the factors in heritage construction, for the perception and definition of heritage. Values – thoughts, ideas and beliefs that give meaning to human being and that with their implicit commitment to ‘ways of being’ contribute to the complex interaction that constitutes culture (cf. Bruner, 1990, p. 29) – determine other heritage conceptions such as temporal or spatial frameworks. I have for this reason dedicated my second chapter to the discussion of values, despite the fact that the 2003 Convention does not name the term ‘value’ or its plural ‘values’ at all – which surprises me as I think of it as a convention essentially dealing with values and identities of human-kind12 – and the 1972 convention somewhat suffers the term in its crucial and challenging paradox to seek for ‘outstanding universal value’.

Value as a concept is extremely popular in the heritage field and the adoption of the 2003 Convention paralleled a fairly long-term drift towards value-driven approaches in the management of what is now called tangible heritage, taking into account non-material values attributed to the physical substance (cf. esp. Avrami et al., 2000; de la Torre, 2002; Commission des biens culturel du Québec, 2004). Values in both fields can be interpreted as reference points for policy decisions. But despite the constant presence of the expression, heritage professionals are at surprising variance on what value – as well as related terms such as significance or meaning - actually represent.

In the third part I focus on heritage of faith – a general emphasis of this work as heritage of faith seems one of the most obvious examples of overlapping intangible and tangible heritage characteristics – and at the same time is a heritage particularly threatened by semiological degradation. After a brief explanation why the term heritage of faith was preferred to various apparent alternatives such as religious heritage or sacred heritage, I outline and analyse the recognition given to heritage of faith within the UNESCO framework. Here a retrospective, analytical and case-based study discusses on the one hand selected World Heritage Sites which show a strong relation to the faith of people and on the other hand examples of the masterpieces that were proclaimed as the oral and intangible heritage of humanity before the 2003 Convention became operational13. With some thoughts on the possibility to locate faith, I conclude the reflective and retrospective theoretical sections of my thesis and move to the more prospective part of my work, looked at initially from a theoretical and subsequently from an empirical angle.

In Section Four I propose a revised conceptual approach to the identification of heritage which aims to overcome the established heritage typologies, especially the division into intangible and tangible heritage. I call this approach topology, a composite of the Greek notions of topos and logos14. Heritage as a cultural topology is at first understood on a conceptual level, a concept involving themes interlinked with ideas, beliefs and thoughts – and apart from its manifestations in actions, processes, objects or places. The framework shall enable the concerned professional to first identify heritage on a conceptual level and only successively understand how it takes place, its topoi in spatial and temporal terms. Following an in-depth introduction of the con-
ceptual framework topology, I consider its particular challenges as well as methodological opportunities and finally add some thoughts on implications for heritage management policies.

Topology researched, the fifth and final section of my work exemplifies the proposed approach in conducting an empirical topological analysis for a selected case study, the heritage Umayyad Mosque, in Damascus. Values, thoughts and ideas related to the concept Umayyad Mosque were collected from different stakeholder groups, analysed and grouped into conceptual themes. These themes are first theoretically represented in the section and are each subsequently localised, though localisation of some themes is only possible in approximation. Stakeholders consulted ranged from visitors – whether for spiritual, social or touristic purposes – inhabitants of the historic city and more recent quarters of Damascus, responsible and related governmental authorities, international experts concerned with heritage management processes and Syrian expatriates, to representatives of concerned international governmental or non-governmental organisations. Finally, I oppose the heritage Umayyad Mosque as illustrated in the topological analysis to the place or monument Umayyad Mosque as described in conventional statements of significance, and considering the enrichment gained with the proposed tool, I conclude my writing with a plea for typological flexibility in heritage studies.

Heritage as cultural topology is no longer trace or witness of the past and ancient cultural achievements. Heritage – both tangible and intangible – is the continuous definition and re-affirmation of cultural identity, a screening of values, a use of memories of the past, a selective resource for the present (cf. Graham, 2002, p. 1004). The recognition and creation of heritage conceptually defines where it takes place and thereby brings into existence the topoi on which rootedness can be constructed. Such rootedness according to Tuan means that “people have come to identify themselves with a particular locality” (Tuan, 1989, p. 194) which connects them to their ancestors and often to their dreams. Tuan speaks of locality as a place. Cultural topologies frame the locality as a concept dear to our hearts, the basis on which we define ourselves. In this sense cultural topologies define our individual presence in the world and that is our cultural identity. This is one aspect how we ‘stand-within’ heritage, how we dwell in heritage and thereby preserve it and how we can finally know; not only know heritage, but know ourselves in heritage.

Both the conceptual and administrative division of heritage in its so-called intangible and tangible components do not convince me and I would consequently prefer to refrain from using these terminologies. Since however they have been well established in especially UNESCO discourses during the last decade, I don’t see an alternative to referring to these typologies that I have placed at the centre of my book. In effect I eventually made them the title of my work, which I still do not consider an undisputable decision. The first three sections of this book will highlight in detail the paradox and inconsistencies I perceive in these categories. For the moment I restrict myself to pointing out that I do not believe in these typologies in their literal sense and that I would therefore request the reader to read ‘so-called
intangible heritage’ when I say intangible heritage and ‘so-called tangible heritage’ for the apparently antagonistic counterpart.

2 The Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage will in future be referred to with its more common abbreviation as the ‘World Heritage Convention’.

3 The reduction of the scope of the World Heritage Convention to tangible heritage is especially emphasised by Koichi Matsuura, the present Director-General of UNESCO. In his report on the activities of the organisation for the biennium 2002-2003 he writes that the: “UNESCO convention on the safeguarding of the intangible cultural heritage was unanimously adopted in October 2003, thus complementing the World Heritage Convention of 1972, which is for tangible cultural and natural heritage” (UNESCO, 2005h, p. 27).

4 One the one hand, I remain hopeful that at some point in the long-term future a third convention will be drafted by the Member States to UNESCO in order to combine the operational activities of the conceptually outdated World Heritage Convention and the by then perhaps also overcome 2003 Intangible Heritage Convention to one single convention of an integrated approach and methodology to safeguard the world’s heritage. Such a convention would obviously replace and thereby invalidate both other conventions. My writing, on the other hand, is focused on the short-term future and emphasises opportunities to redirect the conceptual separation within the framework of the two UNESCO conventions.

5 The Mexico City Declaration is considered a milestone document for its definition of an extended concept of culture, which overcame the former elite notion towards a more democratic, social and relativistic concept (cf. Bernecker, 2002). Culture which was previously something the diffusion of which had to be promoted among all people for the dignity of man (UNESCO, 2004 [1945]-a, preamble) is then recognised as: “(…) the whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterize a society or social group. It includes not only the arts and letters, but also modes of life, the fundamental rights of human being, value systems, traditions and beliefs.” (UNESCO, 1982, p. 1) It is interesting to note to what extend the definitions for culture and cultural heritage (quoted in the following paragraph) resemble each other.

6 This definition was reaffirmed in the context of a definition for culture in the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity adopted during the 31st session of the General Conference in 2001. “Reaffirming that culture should be regarded as the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group, and that it encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value-systems, traditions and beliefs.” (UNESCO, 2002j, preamble)

7 Interestingly, the World Heritage Convention does not explicitly speak of physical threats and can be read in a much wider sense, like the second paragraph of the preamble: “Noting that the cultural heritage and the natural heritage are increasingly threatened with destruction not only by traditional causes of decay, but also by changing social and economic conditions which aggravate the situation with even more formidable phenomena of damage or destruction.” (UNESCO, 1972a). The Operational Guidelines however focus as early as the first version of 1978 on merely the deterioration and destruction of the heritage properties (cf. UNESCO, 1978b, par. 1) which has since been interpreted in a primarily physical context.

8 Muhammad Arkoun in his brilliant paper of ‘The meaning of cultural conservation in Muslim Societies’ already stated in 1990 that the semiological degradation of the Muslim heritage is so rapid and radical that interventions are more urgent than in other regions of the world (Arkoun, 1990, p. 30).

9 Occasionally the so-called text-based content analysis expands its self-determined scope and could then be referred to as a con-text based or pre-text based content analysis. While in such cases the methodology remains unchanged I tend to include the aspects I read between the lines and above the headline. I will in any case indicate where such subjective additions enter the text-based content analysis.

10 All methods used are considered tools applied to best ‘squeeze’ information out of the material gathered and to best ‘inject’ understanding into the material gathered in order to answer research questions or develop proposals towards solutions. I think that tools do not require reasoning or in-depth description but mentioning. A carpenter might achieve different results when either using a planer or sandpaper to smoothen a surface and a journeyman will perhaps wander along different
paths depending on the roadmap he selects. At the end of the day, the surface will hopefully be smooth and the journeyman will arrive. When journeymen in the craft of thinking arrive they might be asked for the map chosen and then they will name the map, so that others might refer to it as well. They will hardly redraw the map themselves.

11 Egon Guba and Yvonna Lincoln accurately describe the relativist ontology of constructivism in the following way: “Realities are apprehendable in the form of multiple, intangible, mental constructions, socially and experientially based, local and specific in nature (although elements are often shared among many individuals and even across cultures), and dependant for their form and content on the individual persons or groups holding the constructions.” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 110) This assumption does not exclude the possibility of the existence of an absolute singular or pluralistic higher Being whose transcendental reality interacts with the constructed human reality. With presupposing a multiplicity of constructed realities I merely recognise that also the perception of characteristics of such an absolute and the means of communicating or interacting with it, vary within different realities. This could be considered one of the essential reasons for the diversity of human faiths and religious practices.

12 This statement should not be interpreted as saying that the 2003 Convention deals with values in a comparative manner. What it means is that values are an essential factor in the creation of cultural identity and that heritage can only be discussed as a result of its valuation.

13 At the time of writing the listing process under the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage has not yet begun. Not even the selection criteria to be applied for the listing process have been finalised, though they might be discussed by forthcoming meetings of the International Committee to the Convention soon after this work is completed. It is therefore impossible to predict how heritage of faith will be handled in the framework of this new listing process. I think that with regard to the entire lack of information on heritage recognition processes under the 2003 convention, an approximation of approaching intangible heritage of faith might be given by the examples proclaimed as masterpieces. Such an assumption should be legitimate for two different reasons: first, the programme was considered extremely successful and was very present as an inspiring example during the drafting of the convention (cf. UNESCO, 2002h, annex p. 4); and secondly because the 2003 Convention regulates that all masterpieces proclaimed under this programme are to be included into the Representative List of Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity which will be established by the International Committee to the Convention. (cf. UNESCO, 2003b, art. 31). We should however not forget that several essential criteria applied for the masterpiece listing, such as outstanding value or the demonstration that the proposed heritage is massively threatened, were abandoned in the drafting of the 2003 convention.

14 Topology further designates a mathematical discipline as well as a linguistic genre drawn on in semantic analyses. In addition Martin Heidegger used the notion of the ‘topology of Being’ in various of his writings. I will refer to all of these earlier uses of the term but at the same time highlight that I define the term for the heritage field and that – besides cross-references to the established uses – this definition is intended to be comprehensible in abstraction from the others.

15 Despite the initial impression that ‘Umayyad Mosque’ designates a place or even more concrete a building, ‘Umayyad Mosque’ is here referred to as an abstract concept, a heritage theme involving tangible and intangible, movable and immovable as well as rather permanent and very dynamic manifestations. The reasons for the selection of this case study as well as the established heritage perceptions of the ‘place’ will be described in the introduction of Section Five.
Section One: Conceptualising – categorising

Conceptualising and categorising are merely two different ways of abstracting and organising the understanding and construction of the world around us and as part of it, cultural heritage. Since I have formulated as one objective of my work the proposal of a conceptual framework which is intended to enable heritage professionals to understand heritage from a primarily conceptual level independent of established heritage typologies, it seems necessary to embark on this subject with a reflection on conceptualising and categorising processes in the heritage field. What distinguishes a heritage concept from a heritage category? 16

In the construction of knowledge, both conceptualisation and categorisation signify intellectual processes which give meaning to the world man encounters. The creation of concepts is the primal activity when aiming to understand a phenomenon and therefore precedes the establishment of categories. Conceptualising can be defined as an abstraction process of the human mind used to contemplate on phenomena and associate meaning to them. Creating a concept means framing an aspect of thought - putting boundaries around this aspect and designating it with a name – which enables us to refer to this aspect as a new entity.

Heritage itself is a concept when understood as a pre-categorical level of the understanding of phenomena. Beyond that, it is an abstract concept, determined by cognitive faculties which are not primarily based on the reception of pre-determined representations but on creative thinking; a cognitive concept in Kant’s sense. 17 Simply because we can refer to the concept of heritage, heritage as an entity exists. Like most other concepts, the concept of heritage is constantly re-conceptualised, that means its boundaries are continuously adjusted according to new information reflected on.

Although today the international community shares agreement on the necessity of heritage as a concept to enable humankind to attribute meaning to its various phenomena, heritage categories are not unanimously appreciated. The predominant use of categories in especially Western scholarly systems traces back to Greek philosophy, in particular Aristotle’s logical works on categories as discrete entities characterised by properties (Aristotle, 1959, p. 13f). Categorisation follows conceptualisation in systematic learning processes and is such an integral part of elementary education that some scholars even suggest that “the capacity to categorise comes somehow prestructured in our brains in the same way that the structure of the carbon atom came prestructured from the Big Bang.” (Harnad, 2003, p. 3) Though I will definitely refrain from speaking of prestructured brains, it is indeed difficult to imagine academic research without categorisation. “One of the basic human cognitive processes is that of categorising. We categorise objects, and experiences and we categorise people.” (Worchel et al., 1988, p. 73)
Categories, like concepts, define boundaries, not so much to create an entity of reference as to create an entity which can be opposed to and compared with other entities and which can function as a cluster for yet smaller units. While in Aristotle’s writings — and I would add a large part of academic scholarship today — categories prescribed the organisation of knowledge, principles and thereby reasoning, categories in the heritage field additionally have a strong administrational component. Heritage categories can in this regard be considered as an attempt to fragment a holistic concept to facilitate the assignment of increasingly specialised heritage professionals and increasingly detailed discourses.

It is especially this approach of professional specialisation and administrational subdivision that many who have traditionally argued from the edges of the established heritage field and who fortunately are gradually entering its core would like to see abandoned. In particular many representatives of primarily oral cultures and so-called indigenous peoples — some of which prefer to be referred to as first nations (cf. Stevens, 1997, p. 58) — argue that most heritage categories are conceptual paradoxes in their understanding of the world. In the framework of the World Heritage Convention the predominantly Maori delegation from New Zealand has accepted the responsibility to speak on behalf of those who do not share a categorised perception of heritage. With the following statement a member of this delegation raised the issue during the most recent 30th World Heritage Committee session in Vilnius, Lithuania:

“We have concerns that indigenous world views could be set into frameworks that have been designed from primarily other perspectives. The distinction between tangible and intangible qualities for example becomes blurred when viewed though an indigenous lens. The two dimensions are immunised to perspectives that infuse a sense of spirit and connection to animate and inanimate objects and locate all matter along a continuum that includes people and immaterial cultures."

This was by no means the first intervention of a representative from New Zealand on the issue of heritage categorisation and in particular the division focused on in this work, intangible and tangible heritage has attracted their repeated scepticism:

“From the New Zealand perspective, although tangible and intangible heritage can sometimes be severed, in many instances they cannot. For New Zealand, the tangible and intangible link with much of our heritage cannot be severed. This is especially so with cultural landscapes. To suggest otherwise, from the New Zealand perspective, is nonsense. The land and the people, like the relationship between them, are one. This relationship cannot be compartmentalised.”

Unusually for a UNESCO Committee contribution by a State Party, the speech from which I have quoted the above core sentence was rewarded spontaneous applause by an impressive number of attending delegates. Why do these words — implying nothing less than a challenge of the established system and adopted conventions of UNESCO - touch the sentiments and gain acceptance from an international audience? I am tempted to add more words in reaction to and in support of the above statement but I postpone these and will get back to the quotation later, for now to
refocus on the alleged paradox of categorisation. Indigenous people’s challenge to categorisation is not limited to the heritage field, but nevertheless becomes very burdensome here as it is considered to partition cultural identity. A United Nations, Economic and Social Council report on discrimination against indigenous peoples emphasises, that from the viewpoint of many, even categories like arts and sciences or the distinction between creative inspiration and logical analysis hardly make sense (Daes, 1993, par. 21). It summarises:

“Indigenous peoples regard all products of the human mind and heart as interrelated, as flowing from the same source: the relationships between the people and their land, their kinship with other living creatures that share the land, and with the spirit world. Since the ultimate source of knowledge and creativity is the land itself, all of the art and science of a specific people are manifestations of the same underlying relationships, and can be considered as manifestations of the people as a whole.” (Daes, 1993, par. 21)

A recently conducted ICOMOS (International Council on Monuments and Sites) gap analysis report (cf. ICOMOS, 2004b) which proposes three different categorisation systems for heritage covered under the World Heritage Convention and subsequently allocates every World Heritage Site to one of the respective headlines in order to identify underrepresented typologies, must read like a testimony of incompetence to those who feel underrepresented on the conceptual level of their holistic approach. The same can be said for the typologies created for intangible heritage which range from 5 categories mentioned as examples in the convention (UNESCO, 2003b, § 2.2) to about 60 subcategories proposed to a round table of Ministers of Culture entitled ‘Intangible cultural heritage – a mirror of cultural diversity’ held in Istanbul in 2002 (UNESCO, 2002a, p. 5)24. In highlighting the difficulties of some with regard to the established heritage categories, I do not want to convey the mistaken impression that the general agreement on the conceptualisation of heritage is unproblematic. On the contrary, the prior creations of boundaries for the concept – including the strategies for their creation – though unanimously present, are so manifold that we can hardly speak of heritage, without at the same time adding an explication of what the concept heritage is meant to be (cf. Bogaert & Dusar, 2005).

Conceptualisation of phenomena is determined by the respective environment – the so-called common sense knowledge – as well as the context and purpose of conceptualisation. In the academic field – the representatives of which would speak of scientific concepts – heritage conceptualisation is divided between those adhering to essentialist or positivistic views and those assuming a constructivist or post-modernist angle. Positivists trace their concept back to e.g. Alois Riegl who refers to “any tangible, visible or audible work of man of artistic value” which apart from historical values also possesses other value categories, such as age-value which “reveals itself at first glance in the monument’s outmoded appearance” (Riegl, 1996, p. 69, 72). They speak of a heritage defined by its intrinsic qualities, its aura and timeless values. An opposing constructivist approach is well reflected in the recent reports of the GCI (Getty Conservation Institute), which recognise “at the heart of contemporary, criti-
cal research on heritage the notion that cultural heritage is a social construction (…)” (Avrami et al., 2000, p. 6). Regrettably this understanding is entering professional every-day practice very hesitantly. Academic scholars further describe and analyse heritage concepts constructed outside academic institutions, such as heritage as narrative or stories (Jones, 2003, p. 28), as shared or collective knowledge (Graham, 2002, p. 1016), as semiological concepts such as a “(…) system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms (…)” (Geertz, 1973b, p. 89) or as an ‘anything goes’ post-modernist hybrid phenomenon (Fowler, 1989, p. 57). The various topics are considered in more detail in the respective categories I have framed as subchapters of this section. While studying the various heritage categories, an important issue remains the question: Why do we establish such a variety of categories? And do these really facilitate or simplify our discussions about and interactions with regard to what is categorised?

1 Structured, divided, or separated?

One can argue that any structure or division for a complex concept will necessarily simplify the understanding and discussion of the concept. Perhaps this is somehow true, but the understanding will not only be simplified but also reduced in scope and determined by the prescribed structures. Simplification and trivialisation are contiguous. With regard to the speed of the international discussion and communication as well as the resulting establishment of new representations, Lourdes Arizpe defines the risk of cultural trivialisation as a pressing new threat to cultural heritage (cf. Arizpe, 2004). And she characterised the cultural heritage categorisation debate which took place prior to the adoption of the 2003 Convention on the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage with the following cautious words: “The framework of this debate is the question of whether cultures can be reduced to the number of their components.” (Arizpe, 2004, p. 133)

While this quote invites to reflect a bit longer on the Aristotelian question whether culture is indeed more than the sum of its parts (Aristotle, 1928, p. 220 [8.6-1045a]) – and if culture can at all be divided from the wholeness of the human assumed by Aristotle – I add yet another inquiry with regard to the purpose of the apparent partition of the whole: What is the benefit of compartmentalisation?

Within UNESCO discourses one can trace two entirely separate responses to this question. The first is to be found at an administrational level and argues that separation allows for clarified concepts, responsibilities and the application of different methodologies (Aikawa, 2004, p. 139; Smeets, 2004a, p. 144)26. The second however is a rather intricate response that should be given adequate attention. Its exponents argue that categorising or standard-setting in an international organisation like UNESCO fosters an important dialogue on the diverse ideas and shared principles that underlie culture and thus promotes understanding of cultural diversity through
the process itself. Jean-Louis Luxen comments with regard to the development of standard-setting instruments on culture that the “(…) international dialogue, the exchange between professionals and the different cultures of the world produced by the process of formulating principles is improving practice and strengthening doctrine.” (Luxen, 2004b, p. 5)

An open debate is further anticipated to contribute to a diversification of the heritage discipline, which was until recently excessively dominated by “European-American” type academics (cf. Lee, 1999, p. 47). Although the ideas behind such responses are indeed honourable, I doubt that even a pleasantly stimulating process of dialogue and exchange is enough motivation to also approve the final product of a standard-setting procedure that often brings forth: yet another category. Do we really need the drafting of UNESCO regulations – with their latest culmination in the last UNESCO convention in the cultural sector, the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (cf. UNESCO, 2005c) – to continue an active international dialogue on the diversity of culture? And what will encourage a continuing dialogue once a standard-setting instrument – be it a recommendation, charter or convention – has been adopted? If one takes the above innuendos seriously, one could argue that the authors of the 1972 World Heritage Convention were masterminded in establishing its World Heritage listing system, which indeed leads to yet another international cultural heritage policy discussion every year and with that, is almost as effective as the annual addition of a protocol. And that the visionary authors of the 2003 Intangible Heritage Convention copied this clever tool to also keep the more vibrant exchange on intangible heritage and cultural identity alive on a yearly basis. Two conventions to protect and safeguard intercultural heritage dialogue and exchange?

Standard-setting instruments and procedures could in fact nurture important exchange and dialogues if they were not, once adopted, static and categorical in themselves – the more detailed, the more stagnant. This is how Michael F. Brown sees the categorising processes and remarks that in the name of protecting cultural diversity international lawyers “draft protocols that wedge cultural differences into standardised categories.” (Brown, 2004, 59) In a similar approach John Carman speaks of the establishment of legal regulations as “(…) a reductive and homogenizing process so far as the components of heritage are concerned” (Carman, 1996, p. 173). He also considers the operation of listing heritage laws such as the two above named conventions in similar notions:

“The complexity of the entire corpus of heritage law hides its simple three-stage mode of operation, which remains that of selection, categorisation and valuation, although with additional sub-phases contained within it.” (Carman, 1996, p. 174)

If this theory implied that every categorisation led implicitly to a valuation, we could name a third response to my earlier query of seeking benefits in the categories. Unfortunately I am not convinced this automatism could be proven.
To return to the challenge given by categories as structures, divisions or separations, it might be helpful to temporarily lay an exclusive emphasis on the UNESCO categories which have already affected the above discussions: Intangible Heritage and World Heritage\(^\text{29}\), two categories of the UNESCO cultural heritage domain. What I have just written is not entirely correct, as World Heritage expands beyond the cultural heritage domain and includes natural heritage. It may therefore be referred to as an example where categorisation is counteracted by the bringing together of two usually separate categories which through their very combination both reach beyond the established category and promote a rather holistic view. In combining natural and cultural heritage characteristics the World Heritage Convention was trend-setting and innovative. Unfortunately, it was yet too early to also take intangible heritage under its wing, since in 1972 the category of intangible heritage had not yet been created\(^\text{30}\).

Nowadays one can regret that after the conceptual establishment of intangible heritage in the early 1980s we lacked a genius mind to push for a revision or an additional protocol to the 1972 Convention to enable yet another category to be included and expand beyond its own boundaries. It is too late to ascertain whether such an approach would have been acceptable to UNESCO member states at that time\(^\text{31}\), in the first years of this new millennium it was not. Since October 2003 we have two conventions separating cultural and natural immovable heritage from cultural intangible heritage plus a few other categories — such as cultural tangible, movable heritage — ‘conventionally’ uncovered\(^\text{32}\). Besides the formal and legal separation of the heritage definitions the Director-General of UNESCO has divided responsibilities into two detached secretariats to the conventions which for the moment are not engaged in any visible form of collaboration— at least not in official or documented structures\(^\text{33}\).

As intangible heritage progressively appeared on the international stage in the course of the 1980s and 1990s — though yet under a variety of different names, such as traditional culture, popular culture or folklore (cf. UNESCO, 1989) — many wished for stimulating and modernizing impulses to enrich World Heritage discourse\(^\text{34}\). Now we look back to a somewhat different sequence of developments and instead, as Roland Bernecker remarks “as soon as the treaty will enter into force, we will dispose of two separate conventions [each] addressing the same problem from a different angle.” (Bernecker, 2006, 99)\(^\text{35}\)

2 UNESCO heritage typologies

The two vantage points and most dominant UNESCO heritage typologies, World Heritage and Intangible Heritage, are neither a posteriori cognition nor self-explanatory. Their angles and boundaries, like all alternative heritage categories, are social constructions which emerged in the international diplomatic discourses of UNESCO, and which require explication when applied. Both categories further sub-
structure the heritage expressions and manifestations they encompass, into a range of subcategories provided in the respective conventions. At this point of my work it is necessary to introduce the particular definitions drawn on by UNESCO discourses, a difficult task.

The expression ‘World Heritage’ is not defined in the World Heritage Convention (cf. UNESCO, 1972a), which instead aims to define the two domains covered under the same roof: cultural heritage and natural heritage. Remarkably, the convention does not even present an explicit definition of these but merely provides two expansive lists of further categories and subdivisions which “shall be considered” (UNESCO, 1972a, §1, 2) cultural heritage or natural heritage for the purpose of the convention. Given that these lists comprise three paragraphs each, I limit the following quotation to a summary of the enumeration of so-called cultural heritage:

“For the purpose of this Convention, the following shall be considered as ‘cultural heritage’: monuments: architectural works, works of monumental sculpture (…), structures of an archaeological nature, inscriptions, cave dwellings and combinations of features, which are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or sciences; groups of buildings: groups of separate or connected buildings, which, because of their architecture, (…) homogeneity, or their place (…) are of outstanding universal value (…); sites: works of man or the combined works of man and nature, and areas including archaeological sites which are of outstanding universal value from the historical, aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological point of view.” (UNESCO, 1972a, §1)

The combination of cultural heritage and natural heritage is then, oddly, referred to as “part of the world Heritage of mankind” (UNESCO, 1972a, preamble) while a few paragraphs later “such heritage constitutes a world heritage” (UNESCO, 1972a, §6), an imprecision that emphasises the ambiguity (Batisse, 2005, p. 14) of the generally used abbreviation World Heritage. Whether World Heritage now is the whole or the sum of some parts, the innovative combination of the up until 1972 rather opposed concepts of culture and nature cannot be stressed enough and as a matter of fact was a first step towards the world views of indigenous peoples, who emphasise that the dichotomy between culture and nature is not valid as there is nothing that has not been formed or used by their ancestors (cf. Lennon et al., 1999, p. 7).

Despite this tendency, the World Heritage Convention is repeatedly accused for its supposed Eurocentric approach based “on the criteria of ‘monumentality’ and ‘exceptionality’” (Londrés, 2004, p. 167; El Alfy Hundsnurcher, 2006, p. 135), which Dario Gamboni summarised in his provoking statement that:

“On the world level the real success of the idea of world heritage will depend upon the degree to which the universalism born of European Enlightenment comes to be perceived as truly universal, rather than appearing as a new form of colonialism in the cultural face of economic globalization.” (Gamboni, 2001, p. 11)

The more recent Convention on the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage (cf. UNESCO, 2003b) is aimed to balance the monumentality and claim for universal values of the former. Indeed, one immediately recognises some improvement upon
its predecessor, in that it provides a precise definition of its scope and heritage category:

“The ‘intangible cultural heritage’ means the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills – as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith – that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage.” (UNESCO, 2003b, § 1)

If one has expected to encounter a literal interpretation of ‘intangible’ derived from its Latin root of non tangere – untouchable, in a sense of not capable to be touched by our hands – one will certainly be surprised, at least I was as I saw an early draft of the 2003 Convention, by the inclusion of related instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces into the definition. Until carefully reading this definition I was very attracted by an analogy of Philippe Dubé who speaks of intangible heritage as made up of mentefacts as opposed to artefacts (Dubé, 2004, p. 126). Afterwards, I discovered artefacts inside the definition of Intangible Heritage and, on a then alert second look, also all other academic definitions of cultural heritage, including heritage as knowledge and heritage as representation of identity. Merely heritage as narrative seemed to be missing, but the Intangible Heritage Convention also specifies that Intangible Heritage is manifested in among others five domains one of which is “oral traditions and expressions” (UNESCO, 2003b, § 2). Therefore it is firmly integrated, which leads me to the ensuing question: what is not included?

Such inclusiveness also undermines my most profound question in the discussion of intangible cultural heritage, namely whether any form of intangible heritage can be identified that does neither have a physical manifestation nor is required to be located at a particular place. Considering this, is there any heritage that is indeed – in its literal sense – purely intangible? I dare to answer in the negative, in view of the definition quoted above however, my question is irrelevant.

The typology of intangible heritage within UNESCO is far more complex than the frame provided in the Intangible Heritage Convention, as the Intangible Heritage Section of the organisation also encompasses activities on endangered languages and so-called ‘living human treasures’ (cf. UNESCO, 2006a, p. 163, 164), human knowledge, skills or tradition-bearers. At least the second category designating human treasures expands beyond the definition quoted above, and thus provides a response to my earlier query on heritage categories excluded from the definition: human individuals designated as heritage (bearers).

Besides World Heritage and intangible heritage the cultural division of UNESCO coordinates programmes on cultural heritage – focussing on sites and monuments of great cultural or symbolic value (cf. UNESCO, 2006a, p. 165) – and cultural property – which seems to cover monuments and sites as well as objects and artefacts in museums and collections and has, at present, a priority line of action for movable cultural properties (cf. UNESCO, 2006a, 168).
The insinuated dimension of terminological and categorical intricacy is a progressively growing phenomenon in UNESCO. It is the result of a frequent introduction of new typologies – often generated by new programme activities or standard-setting instruments which are placed in opposition to others – combined with a reluctance or inability to abandon earlier established terms, which overlap or sometimes even contradict the new notions. In my considerations of UNESCO typologies I limit the discussion – and I hope at the same time the confusion – to the two categories World Heritage and Intangible Heritage – followed by a glance at what is now called tangible heritage, discussed in the context of the most dominant misconceptions of intangible and non-intangible heritage in UNESCO discourses.

The World Heritage Convention – the most prominent of all UNESCO conventions and therefore referred to as the flagship convention of the organisation (Matsuura, 2003b, 2005, 2006, p. 5) – is still celebrating, but balances on a knife’s edge to soon suffering, its enormous popularity. Her new counterpart, or little sister as some delegations referred to the 2003 Convention during the 7th extraordinary session of the World Heritage Committee, is described as “an instrument as removed as necessary from the Convention of 1972” (Bedjaoui, 2004, p. 151). It might and if the speed of ratifications is a reliable indicator, it will become even more popular. But if popularity at the same times depends on credibility and manageability of the enterprise, then the flagship might easily drift towards a Titanic course, while the Intangible Heritage Convention has yet to prove her seaworthiness.

Apart from these operational aspects of the two heritage typologies and respective conventions, premonitions of yet another apprehension have entered UNESCO heritage disputes. They forecast a threat of a delicate political nature – a North-South splitting of states actively participating in the conventions – and thereby an almost exclusive accumulation of World Heritage or Intangible Heritage activities in specific regions. How realistic are such anxieties? Whether we are indeed heading for a geopolitical dichotomy of World and Intangible Heritage states or not, it is evident that in many places one of the two approaches is more accepted than the other. I would personally like to know whether a no-category approach to cultural heritage in all its facets, or at least an approach strongly interlinking the two opposed categories could help to bridge this potential gap and could be more acceptable on a global level. But any attempt to consider such an option would at least for the moment be highly speculative.

2.1 World Heritage – overcrowded flagship?

Far less speculative is the current appreciation of World Heritage, which became a magnet of media attention to an extent previously unknown within the cultural heritage field. This has not always been the case and when we review its drafting process we see that the notion of ‘world heritage’ and especially its double nature comprising cultural and natural heritage was at times heavily debated. The category clearly
emerged in a North-American context of national park services which intimately link environmental protection to historic sites and was nevertheless brought forth by one mind, Russell Train, a key-figure behind the US struggle for a World Heritage Trust. Michel Batisse in his ‘recollections of a (conventional) marriage’ fabulously describes the troubled waters in 1971, when three different draft conventions were on the table – one prepared by IUCN proposing a foundation with a focus on environmental conservation, a second draft arranged by UNESCO for monuments which by then included ‘works of nature’ and a third proposed by a group of US delegates which combined natural and historic sites and anticipated a world heritage trust and register (Batisse, 2005, p. 26f). The bridge across those troubled waters was eventually designed under the lead of UNESCO in shape of a convention, which indeed managed to include cultural, natural and world heritage into its title, probably the reason for the slightly awkward and lengthy formulation of ‘the world cultural and natural heritage’ (UNESCO, 1972a).

Retrospectively, the US insistence on world heritage in the title (Batisse, 2005, p. 32) was certainly helpful as it created a mutual identity for the partners and furthermore, World Heritage was a phrase not yet occupied in any other context. It also strongly promoted the term heritage at a time that Europe predominantly was referring to cultural properties, and natural heritage – even within UNESCO – was yet unheard of. Michel Batisse in his brief analysis of the term confused me when he referred to heritage as mentioned in the UNESCO Constitution (Batisse, 2005, p. 16), until I discovered a fascinating difference in UNESCO Constitution translations. The French version – which most likely he referred to – speaks of “protection du patrimoine universel” (UNESCO, 2004 [1945]-b, § 1c) which to me seems to somewhat differ from the English “protection of the world’s inheritance” (UNESCO, 2004 [1945]-a, § 1c). The English ‘heritage’ was only introduced into UNESCO terminology five years later, as the 5th General Conference adopted a programme on the preservation of the world’s cultural heritage (UNESCO, 1950, p. 27). The term world’s cultural heritage was then replaced by cultural heritage of mankind two years later (UNESCO, 1952, p. 26), (in 1966 again changed to cultural property, monuments and sites (UNESCO, 1966, p. 61)) and did not reappear until 1972.

Even after the marriage the couple had long lasting difficulties to find adequate housing, being forced to live annually alternating with the bride’s and groom’s parents, represented by Anne Raidl for the Cultural Sector and Bernd van Droste for the Natural Sector, who assumed the responsibilities of organizing the World Heritage statutory meetings and implementing their decisions (von Droste, 2002, p. 9). Bernd von Droste – who became the founding Director of the World Heritage Centre established in 1992 – initially seems to have had more difficult task, as the “Science Sector tended to ignore the World Heritage Convention which was considered as non-scientific, elitist and not development-oriented” (von Droste, 2005, p. 5). The workload however increased more rapidly for the Cultural Sector and the
literal capitulation of those concerned finally lead to the establishment of the World Heritage Centre.

The most prominent procedure arranged for by the Convention is the establishment of a World Heritage List (UNESCO, 1972a, § 11) and its continuous annual repetition keeps policy debates alive and at the same time reaffirms the listing criteria and operational procedures in the face of concrete examples brought forward by the State Parties to the Convention. Since the listing criteria are not an integral part of the Convention but are defined in the Operational Guidelines, they have retained some flexibility and have indeed been continuously revised since 1977 (cf. Titchen, 1995, 1998). While each of the former six cultural criteria – which are now merged into the ten combined criteria for natural and cultural heritage – was changed, especially criterion C (vi) was often subject to intense disputes and is of particular interest for my work, as it touches the sensitive interstice between intangible and tangible51.

The earliest version of criterion C (vi) documents a sincere attempt to acknowledge intangible aspects of the tangible heritage – I refrain from speaking of intangible heritage here – and most interestingly seems to consider these associations or intangible aspects more decisive than the material qualities of the property:

“Therefore each property nominated should: (...) (vi) be most importantly associated with ideas or beliefs, with events or with persons, of outstanding historical importance or significance.” (UNESCO, 1977, § 7)

Only two years later after in-depth discussion of several cases nominated under criterion C (vi)52, the World Heritage Bureau warned of risks for an all-embracing interpretation: “as worded it could lead to an unreasonably large number of nominations” and recommended that “the formulation of this criterion (...) should be critically re-examined.” (UNESCO, 1979c, § 14) Based on a study by Michel Parent and a number of discussion forums (Titchen, 1998, p. 2), the Committee adopted a revised version of the criterion in 1979:

“Each property nominated should therefore: (...) (vi) be directly or tangibly associated with events or with ideas or beliefs of outstanding universal significance (the Committee considered that this criterion should justify inclusion in the List only in exceptional circumstances or in conjunction with other criteria.)” (UNESCO, 1980b, § 18)

With this addition, the Committee implicitly decided that criterion C (vi) is to be considered as not in itself qualifying for outstanding universal value; a black sheep among the nomination criteria – variably treated derogatorily as only limitedly useful or as an historical aberration. In 1997, the Committee gave an even higher level of scrutiny to criterion C (vi) by replacing the ‘or’ of the formulation “(...) should justify inclusion in the List only in exceptional circumstances or in conjunction with other criteria” (UNESCO, 1980b) by an ‘and’: “only in exceptional circumstances and in conjunction with other criteria” (UNESCO, 1998a, § 24)[italics added]53. Finally, the issue was reconsidered during the most recent revision of the Operational Guidelines and – after two decades of increasing restrictions – reinterpreted in an encour-
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aging manner. The ‘exceptional circumstances’ were entirely deleted and the Committee merely retains a softened version of the second condition which now reads: “The Committee considers that this criterion should preferably be used in conjunction with other criteria” (UNESCO, 2005g, § 77)54. Although this reformulation yielded immediate results at the 29th Committee Session in Durban, where the Old Bridge Area and the Old City of Mostar were inscribed according to criterion C (vi) alone (UNESCO, 2005d, p. 141), a complete deletion of the parenthesis might have been a worthy experiment55 and a chance to create a link to the discourses on intangible heritage56.

The latest revision of the nomination criteria and in particular their combination to a mutual set of natural and cultural benchmarks has often been referred to as a milestone in the history of World Heritage. Without trying to limit the potential of a combined set of criteria for the promotion of a holistic approach, I would rather call it a change of layout as the criteria themselves remained similar and the combination of cultural and natural criteria has always been possible57. At the same time, I don’t want to deny the convention its milestones; yet I think they are to be found in other aspects, some of which are well-known as the introduction of cultural landscapes and cultural routes into the sites category, and others that are silently happening in the background like the diffuse acknowledgements that intangible heritage is part of the scope of the convention, and the slow re-definition of outstanding universal value which is still in progress (cf. UNESCO, 2005j)58. Some readers might have paused in the last sentence and wondered how I could dare to include intangible heritage into the scope of the World Heritage Convention, but I argue that it is part of it in the same way that “instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated” (UNESCO, 2003b, § 2) are part of the Intangible Heritage Convention.

When looking at pre-2003 World Heritage documents, both inscriptions and policy debates bear witness to this. Within the policy debates, in particular the regional global strategy meetings, participants highlighted the strong link between intangible and tangible heritage and urged the World Heritage Committee to assume its responsibility towards intangible heritage. For example the second global strategy meeting for the Pacific Islands region in 1999 concludes in its final recommendations:

“The meeting suggested that the World Heritage convention should ensure protection of the intangible heritage, including languages and traditions. The meeting noted that the terms of the convention may need to be expanded to include recognition of the importance of the spiritual elements of heritage” (UNESCO, 1999b, § 2.4).

In a similar fashion, the conclusions of the Regional Expert Meeting on “Cultural Landscapes in Central America” regret that:

“the World Heritage List is mainly focused on tangible heritage. Considering that the associative (“intangible”) is also part of cultural heritage and extremely important for Central America and Mexico, it is necessary to deepen the relation between them and to study the conditions for the inclusion of predominantly associative (“intangible”) cases into the World Heritage List.” (UNESCO, 2000b, p. 19)
And to further add a European perspective, I quote the Chairman of the 25th Session of the World Heritage Committee, Mr. Henrik Lilius, who reminded us in Budapest that all World Heritage Cities are “living examples of the integrated synergy of tangible and intangible heritage” (UNESCO, 2003i, item 9), and that the intangible heritage has been neglected for too long under the clear focus of the Convention on tangible cultural and natural heritage.

Besides general and regional policy debates, justifications of inscriptions put on record by the Committee are sometimes drifting away from their alleged monumental focus. The Jongmyo Shrine in Korea was listed in 1995 as an “outstanding example of a Confucian Royal Shrine (…) which is enhanced by the persistence there of an important element of the intangible cultural heritage in form of traditional ritual practices and forms” (UNESCO, 1996, p. 49), or Mount Emei Scenic Area including Leshan Giant Buddha Scenic Area as a place underlining the “importance of the link between the tangible and the intangible, the natural and the cultural” (UNESCO, 1997, p. 62). A last, rather strange, example is Chanchan Archaeological Zone in Peru for which the Committee requested the State Party to “reclaim and secure the site’s intangible zone” (UNESCO, 1994c, p. 27)⁵⁹.

A far more visible milestone that needs to be highlighted in the framework of an intangible and tangible heritage discussion related to World Heritage is the inclusion of the cultural landscape category⁶⁰ – combined works of nature and men – into the Operational Guidelines of 1994, adopted in December 1992 (Rössler, 2002, p. 30). In particular one of its three typologies, the associative cultural landscape, seems to parallel the criterion (vi) debate with a definition based on associations:

“The final category is the associative cultural landscape. The inscription of such landscapes on the World Heritage List is justifiable by virtue of the powerful religious, artistic or cultural associations of the natural element rather than material cultural evidence, which may be insignificant or even absent.” (UNESCO, 1994b, § 39)

According to this definition, associated cultural landscapes conjoin a triangle of natural, cultural and spiritual heritage. Spiritual heritage is not a word I would habitually use in this context, had not Dawson Munjeri written about an equilateral heritage triangle of cultural, natural and spiritual heritage. He, however, transfers this triangle to be the constitution of Intangible Heritage and expresses his aspiration that “this new convention will be amplified to recognise the intangible natural heritage” (Munjeri, 2004b, p. 18)⁶¹.

Cultural routes followed a decade after cultural landscapes and were only included in the latest revision of the Operational Guidelines of 2005. Their case differs from cultural landscapes in that whereas in the landscape definition associations would be recognised even in absence of cultural material structures, cultural routes require a tangible component. They are nevertheless interesting for my discussion as the tangible component is not the part being valued:
“A heritage route is composed of tangible elements of which the cultural significance comes from exchanges and a multi-dimensional dialogue across countries or regions, and that illustrate the interaction of movement, along the route, in space and time.” (UNESCO, 2005g)

What is valued are dialogues and exchanges that manifest themselves in tangible places and I have increasing difficulties in understanding the conceptual differences of both associated cultural landscapes and cultural routes in the World Heritage Convention and cultural spaces – proposed to be defined as a physical or symbolic space in which people meet to share or exchange cultural practices or ideas (UNESCO, 2002d, p. 4) – in the Intangible Heritage Convention. I just anticipated one particular example, but one of the future challenges of the two conventions is the blurry transition between their responsibilities and the question how issues that fall into the gap will be dealt with.

At the same time the World Heritage Convention faces several other challenges on its own, for instance its sheer size, its immense popularity and – to some extent related to the two - its lack of rigour and loss of credibility. The rapidly growing size of the World Heritage List is not merely a statistical problem of representativity – as studies on World Heritage distribution carried out in the framework of the Global Strategy suggest – but first of all a management dilemma. The Global Strategy – a study launched since 1994 to revise conceptual approaches and general methodologies of the convention in order to facilitate an improved coverage of a holistic range of natural and cultural heritage expressions on the World Heritage List (cf. UNESCO, 1995b, p 42f) – in fact subtly contributes to the ongoing growth, which is intended, as stated in its starting objectives:

“In 1972 the idea of cultural heritage had been to a very large extent embodied in and confined to architectural monuments. Since that time however, the history of art and architecture, archaeology, anthropology and ethnology no longer concentrated on single monuments in isolation but rather on considering cultural groupings that were complex and multidimensional and demonstrated in spatial terms the social structures, ways of life, beliefs, [and] systems of knowledge (…). Therefore, it was appropriate to set aside the idea of a rigid and restricted World Heritage List and instead to take into account all possibilities for extending and enriching it by means of new types of property whose value might become apparent as knowledge and ideas developed.” (UNESCO, 1994a, p. 2-3)

In trying to gain better representativity and at the same time control the number of new nominations, the World Heritage Committee has opted for the paradoxical approach of limiting the number of nominations of each State Party, in its Cairns (UNESCO, 2001c) and Suzhou-Cairns decisions (UNESCO, 2004b). On the short-term this might help to control the overall size, but even the concessions for natural heritage and so-called underrepresented categories will hardly help to achieve a well-balanced list. Neither do they improve the expertise or economic potential in states that still have much potential to bring forward, nor do they restrict the excellence-syndrome driven ranking-mania (cf. Kemp, 2005) of most European States.

The authors of the convention had thought about a hundred sites (von Droste, 2002; Bolla, 2005, p. 78) before the list would be closed. At present the edge of thousand is
merely a few years ahead, while the World Heritage Centre has probably discreetly started negotiations for capitulation considering the small size of their task force and the overpowering workload. Idea finding missions to curb the process become more prominent, but what can be done? Gérard Bolla proposes to “group together certain properties which are geographically or culturally similar” (Bolla, 2005, p. 94) which seems more a statistical than an administrative solution. Others, often behind closed doors, argue for a fixed ceiling and a – at least temporary – respite focused on monitoring and preservation management without consideration of new nomination proposals. Italy has also proposed that the so-called overrepresented State Parties – though Italy rejects this term (UNESCO, 2004a, p. 31) – should be required to support the preparation of nomination files from State Parties lacking financial or professional capacities if they wish to propose further nominations. I think another solution could be a rigorous reconsideration of sites already on the list including the dismissal of those that no longer meet the OUV they were listed for; admittedly a politically sensitive proposal. But considering that the credibility of all other entries is at stake, retaining highly problematic cases out of diplomatic caution seems irresponsible. It is often argued that the World Heritage Convention is a sunshine convention with no sanctions foreseen (von Droste, 2002, p. 10). However, there is one sanction, though not explicitly mentioned in the convention, i.e. the deletion of a World Heritage Property from the List, and regular use of this sanction could effectively contribute to rendering the World Heritage List better manageable, more balanced and more credible. Maybe it is time to begin applying this sanction?

A last challenge that was already mentioned earlier is the challenge to develop or deliberately reject a demarcation towards the Intangible Heritage Convention. Heritage professionals traditionally originating from two different fields, architects, archaeologist, a few urban planners and art historians on the one hand, anthropologists, ethnologists, musicologists and a few linguists and dramatologists on the other hand, approach a common subject with different methodologies.

This could be a chance for very stimulating cooperation but currently subtle fear and defensive reactions dominate both fields. Many World Heritage specialists perceive the Intangible Heritage Convention as an undesired challenge. It is fascinating that this seems to resemble the reaction of the Natural Science Section and the Cultural Heritage Division of UNESCO, when requested to cooperate on a new World Heritage convention in the early 1970s. Michel Batisse retrospectively comments that they were “highly defensive of their autonomy and shied away from sharing work with another sector” (Batisse, 2005, p. 21) and Bolla speaks of the various specialists, “often exaggeratedly attached to ‘their’ projects and apprehensive of being ‘invaded’ by other programmes” (Bolla, 2005, p. 68). Attitudes of defending one’s autonomy, limitation of research access to potential opponents and self-centred expertise can also be observed in academic institutions, where they destroy potential cooperation that could produce mutual benefits and ground-breaking findings. Perhaps the professionals behind the two UNESCO conventions run the risk of falling into comparable
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behaviour patterns, if they consider the two conventions as competing with one another. But is this really the case?

2.2 Intangible Heritage versus

The possibly provocative headline ‘Intangible Heritage versus’ implicitly infers that the Intangible Heritage Convention was created to compete with the World Heritage Convention. It might be hard to find an intangible or tangible heritage expert explicitly formulating such an opinion, but at least one position is not far off, in that it is seen as “a corrective to the World Heritage List” (Kurin, 2004b, p. 69). Accounts of the drafting process often give the impression that the Intangible Heritage Convention was considered as opposing to the World Heritage Convention, like the description of Kono Toshiyuki:

“During the negotiations of the ICH Convention, criticism against the elitism of the WH Convention was so often raised that even the word ‘list’ was hated by most of the delegations.” (Toshiyuki, 2004, p. 41)

In introducing intangible heritage as referred to in the framework of the 2003 convention, I am confined to focussing on the definition and scope developed during the drafting process – including a few critical words on both process and product – and an outlook on future challenges. The Intangible Heritage Convention entered into force on April 20th 2006 and the first General Assembly of State Parties took place between 27 and 29 of June 2006 in which the first Intergovernmental Committee to the Convention was elected. The Committee will for the first time convene in Algiers in November 2006 in order to start developing a draft of the Operational Directives to the Convention including the Intangible Heritage selection criteria and accreditation of advisory organisations (UNESCO, 2006e, item 7a). The draft shall then be presented to the second ordinary session of the General Assembly of State Parties which will be convened in late 2007 or 2008, after which – provided that Operational Directives are adopted – the establishment of the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity (UNESCO, 2003b, § 16) could commence. But like the World Heritage Convention, the Intangible Heritage Convention should not be reduced to its future listing activities, as I will demonstrate in the course of a brief retrospective analysis of its compilation.

Intangible heritage activities in UNESCO started with the adoption of the 1989 Recommendation on the Safeguarding of Traditional Culture and Folklore, which was defined as “the totality of tradition-based creations of a cultural community (…) as they reflect its cultural or social identity (…). Its forms are, among others, language, literature, music, dance, games, mythology, rituals, customs, handicrafts, architecture and other arts.” (UNESCO, 1989) In 1992 Federico Mayor, then Director-General of UNESCO, established a new programme “Intangible Cultural Heritage” (Aikawa, 2004, 139). Its first activity was the “establishment of a system of ‘living cultural
properties’ (living human treasures)” (UNESCO, 1993a, p. 23). At the same time UNESCO also convened an international consultation on new perspectives for the established programme, which presented 5 pilot projects.

The General Conference in 1997 stressed that intangible heritage should be given highest priority in the cultural field (Aikawa, 2001, p. 16) and in focus of attention Noriko Aikawa, by then Director of the Intangible Heritage Section - began preparations for the ‘Proclamations of Masterpieces of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity’. While State Parties were in the process of preparing their files of candidature for the first proclamation (UNESCO, 1999a, p. 17), the Centre of Folklife and Cultural Heritage of the Smithsonian Institution organised a conference entitled ‘A Global Assessment of the 1989 Recommendation on the Safeguarding of Traditional Culture and Folklore: Local empowerment and international cooperation’ (cf. Seitel et al., 2001). The conference considered a variety of activities to promote the safeguarding of intangible heritage and regretted that Member States showed little interest in the 1989 recommendation, possibly because it did neither provide a specific mandate to UNESCO nor any explanation on how it should be implemented (cf. Aikawa, 2001, p. 13; Blake, 2001, p. 265).

Conference participants recommended to governments that they should request UNESCO to conduct a study on the feasibility of adopting a new normative instrument (Blake, 2002, p. v). This request was presented to the 30th UNESCO General Conference in late 1999, which commissioned to “carry out a preliminary study on the advisability of regulating internationally, through a new standard-setting instrument, the protection of traditional culture and folklore” (UNESCO, 1999c, p. 63). Events paralleled. Aside from intense UNESCO/WIPO consultations of intangible heritage and property rights (cf. Wendland, 2004), there was considerable interest in the first call for candidatures of the masterpiece programme and finally a G8 communiqué took place in Okinawa where the G8 leaders expressed that they “welcome efforts already made to preserve tangible heritage and call for further efforts toward the preservation and promotion of intangible heritage” (G8, 2000, § 40).

The report, prepared by Janet Blake, was presented to Member States in 2001 (Blake, 2002). It is a mystery in itself. While the 93 pages report is very critical towards the “false category” of intangible heritage (Blake, 2002, p. 8) thoroughly discusses its interrelation with the World Heritage Convention and at one point even proposes that it is “worth considering whether the operation of a new standard-setting instrument (...) could also be overseen by the World Heritage Centre” (Blake, 2002, p. 77), its 3 page executive summary proposes to address the safeguarding of intangible cultural heritage by means of a convention sui generis (cf. Blake, 2002, p. vii). The 31st session of the General Conference in 2001 pursued the proposal to prepare a new UNESCO convention and invited the Director-General to present a progress report and a preliminary draft to the 32nd session of the General Conference in 2003 (UNESCO, 2001b, p. 67).
At that point, for incomprehensible reasons, the negotiations, drafting meetings and State Party consultations were rushed through in only 16 months so that a final draft version was presented to the 32nd General Conference and, as we know, adopted. No less than 3 expert meetings (UNESCO, 2002g, 2002d), 4 sessions of intergovernmental expert meetings (assisted by intersessional working groups) (UNESCO, 2002i, 2003h, 2003e), one round-table of Ministers of Culture (UNESCO, 2002a) and a circular letter to receive draft amendments by UNESCO Member States (UNESCO, 2003d, 2003a) were organised during these 16 months; a truly intangible masterpiece of coordination. Particularly interesting is the level of terminological confusion and misconception that becomes evident in the general comments and draft amendments proposed by State Parties in early 2003.

The general comments (UNESCO, 2003d) assemble several critical voices, many of which highlight serious concerns with regard to the pace at which drafts were developed, the tricky interrelation of the new project with the World Heritage Convention and the inherent risk of a growing dichotomy between ‘intangible’ and ‘tangible’ as well as the extreme difficulties of defining the new category. To highlight these points I restrict myself – for the following three paragraphs – to quoting the words of those Member States that did not yet ratify the 2003 convention:

“Australia has serious reservations about the process by which the preliminary draft convention was prepared, (…) the pace at which the draft convention has been developed; the absence of agreed international standards in the identification, (…) of the intangible heritage (…) [and] the lack of adequate definitions. (…) Canada takes the position that the current (…) draft of the convention has been undertaken without sufficient consideration and debate among Member States. (…) Canada [also] regrets the almost complete absence of observers from communities representing Aboriginal peoples (…). [Sweden thinks] the content should be carefully prepared and remaining ambiguities should be sorted out. It was such an approach that the EU countries had in mind when stating in their joint declaration that ‘the process should not be rushed’.” (UNESCO, 2003d, p. 3, 15, 50)

“[Norway does] not comment on the text as such, as we expect the next draft version to be substantially altered (…). Furthermore we must take into account the indisputable connection between intangible and tangible cultural heritage. (…) Accordingly the best solution would have been to create one convention on cultural heritage, for instance by revising and strengthening the World Heritage Convention. (…) [Barbados feels] there should be convergence between the World Heritage Convention and this new instrument rather than overlapping, which might provide for the built-in obsolescence of one instrument over the other.” (UNESCO, 2003d, p. 40, 11)

“In the view of the US delegation, the issue of the definition of intangible cultural heritage must be addressed and resolved before there is any further discussion on the nature of the instrument that should be adopted; (…) it was premature to propose that a new binding treaty, and in particular the text of the first preliminary convention referred to above, provide the solution to the yet-to-be-determined problem. (…) For Lebanon, the first logical defect is this: if we read the (…) definition (…) “For the purpose of this Convention, the ‘intangible cultural heritage’ means … (things recognized by) … as their intangible heritage”. What more are we to understand from this definition than that something is part of the intangible cultural heritage if it is decided as being part of the intangible cultural heritage?” (UNESCO, 2002f, p. 25, 33)
The above paragraphs reflect some positions in the intense debate, which were passionately opposed by those Member States supporting the preliminary drafts. Kono Toshiyuki reports of this debate that “at the first intergovernmental meeting, all European countries except the Netherlands explicitly opposed the idea to make such a convention, thus the meeting almost collapsed.” (Toshiyuki, 2004, p. 39) An additional document compiling 1352 amendments to the draft convention – 155 of which relate to the definition of the term – provides an even more diverse spectrum of possible approaches. On the basis of these amendments two further sessions of intergovernmental experts (assisted by intersessional working groups) had to consolidate a final draft within by then 5 months. The third and last intergovernmental expert meeting held in June 2003 adopted most points – with the exception of the funding mechanism and the representative list – by consensus and a preliminary draft to be discussed during the General Conference (UNESCO, 2003f) was sent to all Member States on July 18th. The list and the funding mechanism were left to be finalised by the cultural commission or the plenum of the General Conference.

During the General Conference the debate was less intense than some had wished or feared for and the Commission IV adopted the draft by acclamation. (cf. Matsuura, 2003b, p. 2) In the plenum session on October 17th finally no Member State voted against, some nations abstained84, a few left the room. And thereby the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage was adopted.

Since October 2003 the Intangible Heritage Section of UNESCO – assigned to establish the secretariat to the convention – has implemented a remarkable amount of activities related to the promotion and operationalisation of the Convention. Besides encouraging more than 50 Member States to ratify the convention, several programmatic activities such as promotion of national legislations on intangible heritage and two international expert meetings (UNESCO, 2005i, 2006d) were organised. With the upcoming first meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee, informal preparation groups drafting initial ideas for the so-called Operational Directives are in full swing. And indeed, the Operational Directives will be crucial for the future fate of the convention.

With the decision to “incorporate in the Representative List (...) the items reclaimed ‘Masterpieces of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity’ before the entry into force of the convention” (UNESCO, 2003b, § 31.1), the General Conference has already provided a direction for selection criteria to be established. Even though it is specified that the cooperation of these items “shall in no way prejudge the criteria for future inscriptions” (UNESCO, 2003b, § 31.2), the General Assembly of State Parties to the Convention will most likely try to avoid that the first 90 cultural expressions and spaces on the Representative List do not conform to the selection criteria.

Until these Operational Directives – including selection criteria and identification of advisory organisations – are established, informed criticism, diffuse scepticism and perhaps exaggerated expectations challenge the convention on its way into force.
Among the informed critics is Richard Kurin, one of the long-standing supporters of a new standard-setting instrument and organiser of the 1999 Smithsonian conference. He describes two sensitive points in his ‘critical appraisal’ of the new convention. The first relates to its exaggerated results envisioned — “ensuring the viability of the intangible cultural heritage” (UNESCO, 2003b) which he considers impossible:

“No cultural intervention can ‘ensure’ such an outcome. Culture changes and evolves. Practices of the past are discarded when they cease to be functionally useful or symbolically meaningful to a community. UNESCO and Member States need not guarantee through financial or symbolic rewards the survival of those customs and practices, beliefs and traditions that the community itself wants to discard.”

Kurin’s second criticism is directed towards its predominant focus on inventorying, which he considers problematic in that it ‘tangibilises’ inventoried items (Kurin, 2004b, p. 75). Another challenge, prevalent in both criticism and scepticism, relates to the demarcation towards neighbouring conventions on tangible heritage, especially the World Heritage Convention. Here the forthcoming two years of intensive discussions and the adoption of the Operational Directives, presumably in 2008, (UNESCO, 2006e, item 7a) are a good chance to define a clear position in face of the terminological and categorical confusion. This would necessitate the definition of the relation of intangible heritage to what tangible heritage professionals describe as intangible associations of monuments, places and objects, as well as a detailed identification of the interrelation of the two conventions. To achieve such clarification, it is indispensable for those active in the framework of the Intangible Heritage Convention to understand what heritage professionals outside their circles refer to, when speaking about intangible heritage and at the same time to overcome their restriction of tangible heritage to static, physical monuments. A first insight to the multiplicity of ideas as well as misgivings is collected in the following chapter.

2.3 The intangible – non-intangible debate

Intangible Heritage – opposed to World Heritage – encounters difficulties relating to the fact that the category was not created by the Convention but already existed in various heritage contexts. These contexts attribute a wide range of meanings to intangible heritage, ranging from constructs similar to the definition in the Intangible Heritage Convention (J. G. Smith, 2000; ICOMOS, 2005b, § 3.5) to intangible heritage as a synonym for values (Decarolis, 2000), as tantamount to culture in general, or as a paraphrase for spiritual associations (Petzet, 2004), memories or narratives associated to the land. Confusion is preordained, when one further considers all professional biases and meta-languages prevalent in the heritage field, or as Anthony Giddens states “appropriateness of the term derives from the double process of translation and interpretation which is involved” (Giddens, 1984, p. 284) and which in his theory varies according to the professional approach.
Similarities and differences in the definition of the categories are not necessarily reflected in identical or differing terms used. It might help to illustrate this by a concrete example of the definition of heritage or rather cultural heritage categories. In the earlier chapter on World Heritage I have already quoted a description of the focus of World Heritage, developed in the framework of the Global Strategy analysis:

“The idea of cultural heritage (…) is [that of] cultural groupings (…) which demonstrate in spatial terms the social structures, ways of life, beliefs, systems of knowledge, and representations of different past and present cultures in the entire world.” (UNESCO, 1994a, p. 2)

When we compare this definition with the intangible heritage definition in the 2003 Convention, and the definition of culture given in the Mexico-City Declaration in 1982 the puniness of terminological difference becomes obvious:

“The ‘intangible cultural heritage’ means practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills – as well as (…) artefacts and cultural spaces associated – that communities (…) recognize as part of their cultural heritage.” (UNESCO, 2003b, § 2)

“Culture may now be said to be the whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterize a society or social group. It includes (…) modes of life, (…) value systems, traditions and beliefs.” (UNESCO, 1982, preamble)

After comparing the three above citations I can only identify one major difference, the level of terminological conceptualisation. I would therefore summarise that according to the above definitions tangible heritage is the spatial representation of culture while intangible heritage is the behavioural representation of culture, which may require non-intangible tools or locations to facilitate the behavioural representation. Culture in both cases is a pre-representational concept, the source made understandable via the two different forms of representation or manifestation. I leave the question unanswered, whether this simplified delineation could prove consistent. In professional debates however, both categories of the dichotomy are often reduced to far less than a spatial or behavioural representation of culture. And it is indeed easier to explain the interrelation of the two, if the respective ‘other’ is reduced to a sub-category of the category focused on.

Tangible heritage as a sub-category of intangible heritage can be found in the writing of Mounir Bouchenaki, who speaks of a “symbiotic relationship between the tangible and the intangible”. (Bouchenaki, 2004) His symbiosis, however, is expressed in the fact that “intangible heritage should be regarded as the larger framework within which tangible heritage takes on shape (…)” and is based on the idea that “tangible cultural heritage, be it a monument, a historic city or a landscape, is easy to catalogue, (…) intangible heritage on the other hand consists of processes and practices and accordingly requires a different safeguarding approach and methodology to the tangible heritage.” (Bouchenaki, 2004, p. 3) On the other hand we can find tangible heritage experts – like the international museum expert meeting in Oegstgeest – declaring that “every artefact embodies intangible cultural heritage” (“Museums and Intangible Heritage", 2004).
Since the two terms exist, they have been used to create an opposition, which is only marginally relevant to many, “devoid of social meaning” (Byrne, 2006) as Sarah Byrne terms it or obscuring the complex interdependencies of cultural expressions (Hufford, 1994, p. 2). It is very relevant on the other hand for administrative purposes, since the terms are affixed to conventions and staff positions. It is interesting to look at the terminology and its demarcations in two comparable contexts: inside UNESCO where the categories bear structural consequences and outside UNESCO where they are rather considered a recent categorical scheme for an enlarged definition of cultural heritage.

Within UNESCO, World Heritage – “the bastion of tangible heritage” (Munjeri, 2004b, p. 16) is separated from the intangible heritage, not only in terms of conventions but also in the structure of the organisation’s secretariat. At least two official attempts to encourage collaboration between intangible and tangible heritage professionals in the wider context of UNESCO – the expert conference ‘Safeguarding of tangible and intangible heritage: towards an integrated approach and a World Heritage Committee discussion entitled ‘Co-operation and coordination between the UNESCO Conventions on heritage’ – failed miserably.

The international conference ‘(…) towards an integrated approach’ which brought together professionals from both the intangible and tangible heritage sector in Nara in 2004, particularly suffered the fact that some intangible heritage representatives insisted on the impossibility of common approaches. The keynote speech by Chérif Khaznadar who aimed to provide an overview of the safeguarding of intangible cultural heritage made the point that “the gulf between these two heritages is as immense as that which separates life from death” (Khaznadar, 2004, p. 3) and concluded with the French saying “à chacun son métier et les vaches seront bien gardées”. Apart from the so-called Yamato declaration – a document that hardly anybody has referred to since – an outcome worth mentioning is the realisation that tangible and intangible heritage professionals have very different understandings of terminology and therefore difficulties to communicate. When describing her impressions of the meeting, Kristal Buckley summarised: “As a group, we struggled at times to find an appropriate and commonly understood language to support the conversation.” (Buckley, 2004, p. 2)

The World Heritage Committee discussion on opportunities for cooperation between UNESCO heritage conventions was similarly conditioned by terminological misconceptions and a certain amount of anger that, instead of coordinating the scope of conventions during their drafting phases, delegations were now confronted with two separate conventions and the task to coordinate their activities. Several State Parties considered the discussion premature and suggested to postpone it until the 2003 Convention was operational and had developed its Operational Directives. The delegate of Benin used the metaphor of a family dispute to catch the spirit of the discussion. He framed it as UNESCO, the father, has a grown-up son of thirty years age (the World Heritage Convention), and now a new baby. The yet unmarried son –
until recently the centre of his father’s attention, is now struggling with diffuse fear and jealousy but he should not threaten the existence of the baby simple because it exists. The consent of the discussion was, in this sense, that the baby should grow up and become articulate, or without this metaphor, that the Committee is not willing to comply with a Convention which is not yet operational but encourages further discussion after its entry into force.

Outside the UNESCO context, discussions are less tense but sometimes also less informed about the respective ‘other’ category. While for intangible heritage disciplines the tangible is hardly more than a medium, for the others, intangible heritage is often reduced to values and associations of objects and places. The drafting process of the 2003 Convention made the term intangible heritage fashionable and has inspired a multitude of professional meetings in the tangible heritage sector which picked up the topic: for example the ICOMOS General Assembly in 2003 on ‘place, memory, meaning – preserving intangible values in monuments and sites’ or the ICOM (International Council of Museums) General Conference in 2004 on ‘museums and intangible heritage’. Both meetings were equally addressed by keynote speakers aiming to introduce the new UNESCO Convention’s category of intangible heritage, and at the same time reminding the professionals gathered of their limited competencies in this aspect of cultural heritage (Bouchenaki, 2004; Kurin, 2004a).

A variety of conceptions of ‘intangible heritage’ were articulated during these events. Participants of the ICOMOS General Assembly had immense difficulties to overcome the notion of intangible heritage as values and associations of monuments and sites. In fact, the notion of intangible values has opened a meta-discourse in the tangible heritage field, which was considerably backed by the rather clumsy title of the ICOMOS General Assembly “preserving intangible values” (ICOMOS, 2003b). Without anticipating the discussion on values in the following section of this book, the irony of the formulation intangible values lies in the lack of a logical antonym which would be tangible values. Values considered mental constructs hardly exist tangibly; they can only be attributed to something tangible. What tangible heritage professionals might try to express is that while some values appear readable to them from the material characteristics, other characteristics cannot be identified through the object and are then referred to as intangible values. For example by Michael Petzet who reminds us “not to forget intangible values in our efforts for an adequate management” (Petzet, 2004, p. 3) or Marilyn Truscott when pointing out that “intangible values, in particular, are not static.” (Truscott, 2003) These intangible values may develop a mystic character as they are “very difficult to define” (English & Lee, 2004, p. 23) or may even belong to “the domain of the inexplicable” (Campos, 2004, p. 1), but are in any case widely removed from what would be described as intangible heritage by anybody involved in this sector.

Immediate results of this apparent misconception become obvious when the rapporteurs of the General Assembly’s scientific symposiums refer to the 2003 Convention as having “important implications for ICOMOS because it does not foreground the
integration of tangible with intangible heritage with regard to place, even though as-
sociations in the form of objects and places are inevitable” (Goncalves et al., 2004); or in Jean-Louis Luxen’s paper which states that “intangible heritage must be made incarnate in tangible manifestations, in visible signs, if it is to be conserved.” (Luxen, 2004a)

Such comments at times seem to cause outrage among intangible heritage specialists who only recognise the ‘narrowing’ of their complex task rather than the underlying different definition of intangible heritage as the value system underlying material cultural manifestations. On the other hand statements that World Heritage monuments “do not only have fixed location, they are also always there, independently of the presence of human beings” (Smeets, 2004a, p. 146) or that “in the 1972 Convention the material heritage is fixed and located in a time and space” (Baghli, 2004, p. 15) cause equal aggression among tangible heritage professionals. Since they conceptualise both tangible and intangible heritage, as social constructions which constantly require re-affirmation by those who attribute the values, the simplistic reduction of tangible heritage to its physical substance is unacceptable to many.

Much communication and – to achieve this – exchange of terminological categories and heritage concepts is still needed between “two sides of the same coin” (Munjeri, 2004a). Perhaps academic institutions could assist here and contribute to the improvement of communication by providing research on the different heritage conceptions and categories as well as their methodological implications. At the same time, even academic heritage studies often experience comparable terminological and conceptual difficulties and present an equal degree of typological confusion. Perhaps this very fact could be considered a challenge to review both, academic and non-academic discourses and to develop a generally applicable terminology?

### 3. Academic heritage typologies

The following brief review of academic heritage typologies is not to be seen as opposing to UNESCO categories but should help to put these into a wider theoretical perspective, which is influenced by conceptual rather than operational questions. ‘Academic typologies’ for this purpose does not mean an exclusive focus on material produced in academic institutions but rather a consideration of categories which derive from philosophical or theoretical discourses. Needless to say that these typologies are subject to constant theoretical exchange with typologies produced in other contexts, such as UNESCO, which become the objects of academic study. Intangible and tangible heritage in its UNESCO context for example provided the theme of the annual heritage seminar of the University of Cambridge in 2006 ‘Intangible-tangible cultural heritage: a sustainable dichotomy?’ (Cambridge heritage seminar, 2006) and some universities have already introduced programmes on “World Heritage Studies” or institutes for “tangible and intangible cultural heritage.”
Academic heritage typologies often derive from the conceptualisation of the object or rather the thing – thing in its sense framed by Heidegger as the “what stands forth” (Heidegger, 1971e, p. 168) – in the different theoretical frameworks of academic disciplines. Different academic disciplines approach the thing ‘heritage’ – whether subject or object – from a wide range of theoretical and methodological biases. Traditionally the subject or artefact heritage has been central to the endeavours of archaeologists and art or architecture historians (Gosden & Marshall, 1999, p. 169), which for many years constituted the classic heritage field, framed and referred to by them rather as the cultural property field. Only later, cultural heritage became an object of interest in various other disciplines as Philip Hubbard describes for the case of a “sociologically-informed body of work that has been referred to as heritage studies” (Hubbard, 1993, p. 361) or of geographers, although David Lowenthal speaks of their contribution as “meagre and belated involvement.” (Lowenthal, 1979, p. 550) On a different stream and under different conceptions, heritage had for a long time been the focus of the academic disciplines anthropology and ethnology, which were only recognised as part of a common discourse after the shift of the heritage concept towards being a source of cultural identity (cf. Graham et al., 2000, p. 40) rather than a trace of the past. This shift still marks the difference between two academic typologies and has not yet been followed by all professionals involved.

The following chapters introduce three academic heritage typologies – emphasising on typologies for cultural heritage – which derive from different disciplinary backgrounds: a positivist heritage category focusing at traces from the past, a constructivist approach to heritage looking at dynamic processes of social interaction, and a semiological perspective considering heritage as symbol, sign and reference of understanding. Other authors would select different categorisation models. John Tunbridge and Gregory Ashworth for example speak of five categories, which they designate as relict from the past, – this would most likely correspond to my positivistic typology – objects of memory, cultural products, cultural concepts of the environment and heritage as cultural industry (cf. Tunbridge & Ashworth, 1996). However, most of the categories derived from conceptual entities cannot be clearly distinguished from one another and as if to prove this, even the three categories described below overlap. Disciplines with traditionally positivistic approaches nowadays tend to progressively include semiological aspects which at the same time influence some researchers analysing on the basis of constructivist paradigms.

The three typologies I framed for this work are structured according to research questions the respective scholars would attempt to address. An archaeologist or art historian seeking for the objective truth of the past in heritage by analysing a stone’s surface would most likely ask: ‘What does the thing tell us?’ He will devote himself to scientific chemical or geophysical analysis and would refer to the subject of study in categories derived from its physical, visible or audible characteristics: an artefact, monument, town or piece of music. Whether he is aware of the fact or not, he conducts his research and documentation on the basis of a positivistic approach, which –
interestingly – seems the more acceptable the more ancient a thing is considered to be (Burman, 2001, p. 13).

A sociologist or human geographer might instead approach a thing in asking ‘What processes did construct this thing?’ or ‘For whom does this thing exist?’ She would refer to it as construct, representation, manifestation or process and base her general understanding of the creation of the thing on constructivist theories. A last group of scholars – possibly anthropologists, ethnologists or even linguists - might neither be interested in the process of creation nor the thing itself but instead ask for its meaning: ‘what does the thing signify and to whom?’ They probably would have sought information from both of their colleagues and then referred to the thing as knowledge, narrative, memory, meaning-bearer or sign, a central concept in semiology (cf. Seboek, 1994).

Many heritage professionals – especially in the tangible heritage field – tend to argue for a pragmatic approach to heritage studies, conservation and management in which philosophical issues are secondary or even largely irrelevant. By saying so, they have already made an implicit choice towards a positivistic perspective, which conceptually divorces theory from practice. And in responding to these, I agree with Michael Shanks and Christopher Tilley, that such a claim “in itself, can only be defended or refuted on an informed philosophical basis.” (Shanks & Tilley, 1992, p. 33)

3.1 Artefacts, genuine traces from the past

Positivistic ontology – “assuming an objective external reality upon which inquiry can converge” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 111) – is predominantly but not exclusively applied in studies of tangible heritage. Some professionals describe this quest for genuine traces of the past as antiquated, like Andrzej Tomaszewski – a former Director-General of ICCROM – who complains that “there is a great gulf between European humanities and conservation, which remains intellectually backward in its obsession with material substance (…)” (Tomaszewski, 2004). Especially conservation professionals are often criticised for their positivistic approach in that “the aim of modern conservation is often the preservation of the genuine historic material [and] it relies a great deal on modern science” (Jokilehto, 1999, p. 21). In relying on science with its main methods documentation, diagnosis and scientific analysis, conservation is thoroughly founded on the ultimate reliability of scientific knowledge. On this basis, they are accused of considering heritage as an ‘objective’ document of history, and – as some believe - “this assumption leads preservationists to act as if everyone agrees on what is historically significant and therefore worthy of protection.” (Downer et al., 1994, p. 39)

Attempts at explaining the reason for the alleged conservators’ focus on substance range from their disciplinary bias, the fact that most philosophical standard works and manifests of their field are based on equally positivistic theories, or the simple
phenomenon that “conservators are principally aware of their objects in the visual domain and, therefore, the nature of visual perception affects how a conservator sees and understands their object.” (Caple, 2000, p. 2) Conservators are not the only professional group struggling to deal with an object bias, but archaeologists, too, study objects on the basis of consensus that they identify the past through the traces it left behind, which are easy to be discovered, surveyed, and – by scientific means - analysed and interpreted. But this conception of an observed past is highly problematic (cf. Lowenthal, 1986). “It is based on commodified spatial time, archaeology is conceived as observation of objects of the past separate from the viewer, a past locked into its own time.” (Shanks & Tilley, 1992, p. 22) And at present archaeologists and also art historians are even more engaged in factual descriptions and categorisations than conservation or heritage professionals.

Despite claims that heritage professionals applying positivistic – or systematic essentialist – theories are working with outdated tools, the notion of heritage as a store of cultural characteristics and objects which physically capture and embody cultural identity, in an interconnected world undergoing increasingly rapid change, is gaining new popularity (Keller, 1999). Is this desire for change-reluctant physical traces part of the success of the World Heritage Convention? In any case, the World Heritage Convention and its accompanying Recommendation are desperately positivistic, in speaking of “works of great intrinsic value” (UNESCO, 1972d, § 5) or seeking for sites of “outstanding universal value” (UNESCO, 1972a, § 1), which shall be protected “in accordance with modern scientific methods” (UNESCO, 1972a, preamble). Participants in intangible heritage discussion circles are right, when pointing at the European bias and the elitist tone of such documents. However, within the last three decades of operational practice the World Heritage system has slowly and steadily moved away from perceiving monuments and sites as carriers of eternal values and is now on its way to completely abandoning the classical canon. At the time of writing the convention in 1972, there was probably little need to discuss the validity of intrinsic significance, but by now, the classical canon of ‘official’ status heritage displaying the wealth and prestige of a given culture (cf. Bogaert & Dusar, 2005) is under heavy attack.

Outside the World Heritage framework, this is still less common, as many heritage identification systems demonstrate, when their “professional body decides on the basis of its claimed knowledge what is worth either preserving or excavating.” (Shanks & Tilley, 1992, p. 24) Such decisions are then followed by subsequent notification of the public and introduction of non-professionals to the heritage identified which they are henceforth supposed to find meaningful and valuable. Often professionals in such correctly termed elitist and top-down systems share the regret, that the general public is unaware of or even disinterested in their precious heritage resources (cf. Ramos & Duganne, 2000) or simply lack the level of education which would enable them to understand it (cf. M. Serageldin, 2000, p. 52).
As opposed to the above described elitist circles and their privileged access to heritage one can observe a growing debate on conflicting heritage conceptions, even heritage contestation and heritage dissonance (cf. Tunbridge & Ashworth, 1996), a “discordance or lack of agreement and consistency as to the meaning of heritage” (Graham et al., 2000, p. 24). And in the forefront of such debates, a “postmodernist tendency to reduce cultural heritage to simply a social construction, runs up against the widely held understanding that heritage is in fact imbued with some universal intrinsic qualities” (Avrami et al., 2000, p. 7) or represents a genuine witness of a historical past.

### 3.2 Cultural representations as social constructions

Culture, when viewed from a constructivist paradigm, is an accumulation of processes, not merely a collection of objects, places or traditions. The constructivist will not concern himself with heritage items or particular ideas or meanings of these, but with an overall reality which is socially constructed (P. L. Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p. 15), and with common sense knowledge. “It is precisely this ‘knowledge’ that constitutes the fabric of meanings without which no society could exist.” (P. L. Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p. 27) The object of heritage studies according to this paradigm is therefore neither the thing nor the values or meaning attributed to it – these would rather be captured in a semiological approach – but the mental multiple realities of knowledge that create cultural representations and cultural identity.

Objective traces of the past have no place in the assumption of multiple realities and from this viewpoint “heritage does not engage directly with the study of the past” (Graham, 2002, p. 1004). Instead heritage is a selective and highly relativistic construction of the past or better, a contemporary use of the past to define a particular present. When David Brett speaks of history as a verb rather than an abstract noun: “we history” (Brett, 1996, p. 4) he concludes that the history we make is a form of self-definition. In this sense the constructivist would describe the ‘we heritage’ as the emphasis of study. The cultural artefact, place or tradition is a product of this activity, so to speak the manifestation of ‘heritaging’, “a medium through which identity, power, and society are produced and reproduced” (Avrami et al., 2000, p. 6). The cultural identity as a part of its representation is negotiated and involves a consensus on shared knowledge and values of ‘us’ and the ‘other’. (cf. Low & Altman, 1992, p. 11)

Identity creation processes are an important means of rootedness in that they strengthen local pride and the definition of community. Cultural identity – source of the individual presence in the world and objective of ‘dwelling’ in heritage – provides meaning patterns, not only for heritage but for the very struggle for understanding of our position in society. Cultural representations – into which identity is projected – are continuously negotiated social facts and as such they are active and passive (S. M. Pearce, 2000), they influence thinking processes and are influenced by
they. Conservation, in a constructivist view, is yet another process that – far from
the word’s literal meaning – influences, alters and recreates its product, cultural heri-
tage. And especially when conservation attempts to address the materiality of heri-
tage, the professionals involved create a very distinct heritage, very often solely for
themselves. An alternative is offered in the GCI report on values and heritage con-
servation: “To conserve in a way that is relevant to our own society in our own mo-
ment, we must understand (...) how the process of (...) constructing cultural signifi-
cance can be enhanced.” (Avrami et al., 2000, p. 10)\(^\text{121}\)

Significance constructions, including their associated realities, are alterable and highly
dependent on those contributing to its constant modification or reaffirmation. Such
reaffirmation processes do not differ for intangible or tangible heritage as the repre-
sentations or manifestations in both cases are purely projection screens or transmit-
ters of the construction processes. Heritage professionals have to identify whose
construction they are aiming to preserve or safeguard, since in most cases heritage
involves multiple, often conflicting attributions. To understand significance, heritage
professionals “must elucidate the process of meaning construction” (Schwandt, 1994,
p. 118) and determine what function the process fulfils in which group of society and
for all kinds of heritage expressions. Heritage professionals applying positivistic
methodologies, from a constructivist view open cultural heritage to appropriation (cf.
Waitt, 2000, p. 836). It is such appropriation that Setha M. Low refers to when writ-
ing about processes of cultural hegemony caused by “the myriad of professionals
who are (...) trained within an academic paradigm and ethos that privileges ‘main-
stream’ middle-class ideas about place and group” (Low, 1994, p. 68) and who judge
which group’s inscription is considered valid.

The choice of heritage significance is a choice of a highly opinionated nature which
has consequences for the involved social processes and differing meaning construc-
tions. Whenever heritage professionals attempt to preserve or safeguard, they inevi-
tably also destroy meaning unless they achieve the impossible, to embrace and
equally promote all constructions “negotiated dialogically between all of the partici-
pants active in the setting and all of the social worlds they represent.” (Moore, 2000,
p. 17) In order to conciliate their safeguarding approaches the majority of preserva-
tion professionals have opted for a median between positivist occupation with the
object and a constructivist obsession for processes. They emphasise the element that
appears to connect the two and refer to it as meaning or value\(^\text{122}\). While for the con-
structivist meaning is simply another negotiation, for most heritage professionals
meaning is the understanding of the product of a social construction, defined in a
reflective process in which the heritage functions as a meaning-bearer or sign. Al-
though the heritage field rarely theorises this value-based approach, it seems concep-
tually embedded in semiology, the study of signs as the objectivations of social con-
3.3 Narrative and knowledge – reference systems

Semiological theory of heritage construction cannot be separated from observation of, or participation in heritage expressions. It ties observer and observed or performer and performed into a holistic whole, which cannot be reduced to the one or other aspect. This means, that the approach is neither primarily concerned with the object in a positivistic sense nor with social processes as were constructivists – although the two remain the focus of study – but with the meaning and knowledge heritage transmits and its function as sign or symbol. Heritage studies in this context endeavour to reconstruct or deconstruct the implications of meaning through study of the interrelation – the making of meaning – between process and product.

Such processes are the core domain of semiology, the study of the construction, transmission and understanding of meaning, or as Marcel Danesi frames it “a study of the distinct meanings that are generated through the various systems of everyday life” (Danesi, 1999, p. 17). Semiotists in fact often claim that culture and as part of it cultural heritage is nothing else but a system of structured significations (Eco, 1976, p. 22), and therefore must be studied as either semiological phenomena or activities. The discipline of semiology is in itself divided into two different conceptual approaches, how to best analyse meaning, Ferdinand de Saussure’s sign based dyadic approach, and Charles Sanders Peirce’s rather process-focused triadic relations of semiosis. Besides these two, Umberto Eco’s general semiotic theory (Eco, 1976, p. 3) in which he opposes to categorise signs, might be well applicable to the heritage field in the way Eco applies it to what he calls cultural units, a framework into which I would subsume heritage. Eco states that semiosis is the continuous circularity of signification – the parallel attribution and revelation of meaning (understanding) – and cultural units are its meaning-bearers, “the semiotic postulate required in order to justify the very fact that society does equate codes with codes, sign-vehicles with meanings, expressions with contents.” (Eco, 1976, p. 72) It is particularly this phenomenon, the fact that we equal the expression – the dynamic or static sign – with the content – the meaning and knowledge – that gives heritage a special place in the construction of cultural identity in that it reveals the reference of our selves. Heritage becomes a reference system for both, signification and its understanding, which is often referred to as knowledge or narrative.

Heritage as knowledge and narrative is the above described recently incorporated field of heritage studies that has been investigated by the disciplines of anthropology and ethnology. Clifford Geertz emphasises this aspect in his ‘culture as text’ theories and defines culture as a semiotic reference system: “an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes towards life.” (Geertz, 1973b, p. 89) To define heritage as text or narrative should not be misunderstood as a simplification. It does not solely refer to heritage as story-telling or traditional oral cultures (cf. ICOMOS,
2005b) but to all aspects of heritage as reference systems, the meaning of which is framed in thoughts which are just another kind of semiosis.

The most striking examples of the semiotic aspects of heritage can indeed be found in contexts primarily described by anthropologists, such as traditional local cultures. Australian indigenous peoples for example, refer to those who preserve their heritage as custodians. Custodians can either be persons who look after objects and places, or individuals who tell the stories and perform the ceremonies linked to them (Australian Heritage Commission, 2002, p. 4) and factually they do not differentiate between the two. Place and story, object and performance combine to an overall texture which frames the meaning of heritage. A comparable description is given by Alan S. Downer et al. for the Navajos, who reports:

“People chose to tell us about certain places because those places have stories about them that contribute to their power. In fact, the common statement ‘A story goes with that place’ seems to be almost a gloss for ‘The place has special power.’” (Downer et al., 1994, p. 47)

Artefacts and cultural expressions as signifiers or symbolic reference systems are not only a phenomenon of indigenous societies. On the contrary, all heritage is cultural reference. Regrettably it is often in the tragic moments of heritage studies that heritage symbolism appears most obvious, in the moment of intentional heritage destruction. Whether I refer to a bridge in Mostar, a Buddha statue in Bamiyan, or the Berlin Wall – I have deliberately placed three entirely different contexts and purposes of destruction next to each other – what is destroyed is never solely a material object or a social process, but the stimulus of a narrative, a symbol of cultural identity (cf. Jokilehto, 1999, p. 16). Intangible heritage is hardly ever destroyed in such striking manner, but many prohibitions of intangible heritage, for example of religious practices, such as the wearing of headscarves, are aimed not at the practice but at its signification.

Heritage in a semiological framework can be safeguarded on two different levels: firstly as a sign – the object or practice that functions as a signifier of meaning – or secondly as a narrative – the explication and knowledge of the meaning. The first option is an approach that is progressively established in the heritage field when trying to protect the value, significance or meaning of an object or performance rather than the object itself. However, it still comes along with the idea that a modification of the material of the object or content of the practice entails a change of meaning (cf. Gosden & Marshall, 1999, p. 170). An alternative could be to envisage safeguarding the narrative or knowledge of meaning. To preserve knowledge of meaning as an interdependency of representation (meaning-bearer) and constructor (meaning-giver) would require safeguarding identities as much as places or practices.

The tangible heritage field is – despite value-based approaches to conservation – still far from considering cultural identity construction and signification as something that has to be more directly addressed in conservation efforts. In the intangible heritage field on the other hand such ideas are mentioned. Candidature files for the proclama-
tion of masterpieces of the oral and intangible heritage had to demonstrate the proposed heritage’s “role as a means of affirming the cultural identity of the peoples and cultural communities” and “its importance as a source of inspiration” (UNESCO, 2001a, p. 28). In addition to this semiological analysis required, the candidature files had to document the endeavoured protection, addressing the “protection of the custodians of the tradition” (UNESCO, 2001a, p. 9), the value-constructors. It can be suspected, that comparable notions will appear in the Operational Directives of the 2003 Convention, while in the tangible heritage field the creators of value, knowledge and identity are not very likely to be soon ‘integrated’ into ‘integrated conservation’. One could agree with Berger and Luckmann that this discrepancy is probably a result of the higher degree of possible detachability in case of material objects:

“Signs and sign systems are all characterized by ‘detachability,’ but they can be differentiated in terms of the degree to which they may be detached from face-to-face situations. Thus a dance is evidently less detached than a material artefact signifying the same subjective meaning.” (P. L. Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p. 51)

Post-modern tangible heritage professionals claim that conservation no longer means saving physical remains but “what we are conserving, ultimately, are the values of heritage” (Mason & Avrami, 2002, p. 25). At the same time they speak of stakeholders – to be consulted – but not of creators and maintainers to be addressed. What exactly is meant by values-based in the heritage field? Can heritage values indeed be preserved, without first and foremost giving attention to the meaning-making processes? Is value conservation at all about heritage objects or processes or simply about us, our identity, our present, our future and our values?

16 The terms category and typology are used interchangeable with each other. I prefer typology in the later part of my work as a result of its parallel structure to topology. However, this chapter focuses on processes of constructing concepts and typologies and I regret the absence of a verb that could be used to describe the construction of typologies as conceptualising does for concepts and categorising for categories. Typologizing does not exist, according to my knowledge, and instead of creating yet another term I restrict myself to the use of categorising as the process of creating typologies.

17 According to the conceptualisation of concepts introduced by Immanuel Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason, heritage is to be understood as a concept in that it is not merely based on a perceiving of sensual impressions (receptivity for impressions) but on the human capacity to gain knowledge through the abstraction of representations (spontaneity in the production of concepts). In further elaborating on his a posteriori and a priori division of cognitive understanding Kant highlights the crucial role of concepts in our creation of knowledge: “Intuition and concepts therefore constitute the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without an intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without concepts can yield knowledge. (…) Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. It is, therefore, just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is, to bring them under concepts.” (Kant, 1974 [1787], p. 97, 98 - Norman Kemp Smith translation)

18 Many of these heritage specialisations offered in academic institutions are alarmingly positivistic categories that often refer to either the heritage substance or earlier established academic disciplines and classic heritage categories. The training of objects conservators in Germany (note objects: clas-
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...ical movable heritage category) is a subject I am particularly familiar with, as I underwent one of these training courses myself. Object conservation students are required to specialise not in rather abstract categories as one could imagine for example ‘modern collections’, ‘archaeological findings’, ‘religious items’ and ‘scriptural evidence’ but on material properties such as ‘wooden objects’, ‘textiles’, ‘paper’, ‘wall-paintings’ and ‘paintings’ (the latter two are completely different categories as one is painted on stone, the other on canvas – and probably the question who would need to deal with a small painting on a slate could cause a major professional conflict), ‘ceramics’, ‘metals’ and many more. It is obvious that if one indeed considers semiological degradation to be a main threat for heritage, such specialisations will rarely contribute to a meaningful preservation, as Muhammad Arkoun has also pointed out: “Before considering restoration and conservation in its technical or historical aspects, we need to elaborate an adequate terminology in the perspective of cultural semiology [the science dealing with signs as fundamental elements of all cultural systems].” (Arkoun, 1990, p. 26)

I sincerely hope that they and other representatives promoting a holistic heritage perception will consider my writings to be a contribution to their valuable mission, despite the fact that this writing emerges in a Western scholarly context. At the same time I want to explicitly distance myself from any politically motivated actions that are combined to the promotion of a holistic heritage and are expressed in questioning the legitimacy of the adopted 2003 convention. As stated before the existence of all adopted UNESCO conventions is the basis of this work and I am not trying to call these into question. I rather see my work as following a request of one of the most tragic World Heritage Committee decisions ever made, the disapproval of the establishment of WHIPCOE, a proposed World Heritage Indigenous Peoples Council of Experts. Following a petition submitted by a forum of indigenous peoples gathered during the 24th session of the Committee in Cairns Australia (cf. Forum of Indigenous Peoples, 2000), the expert council was proposed to the Committee during its 25th gathering in Helsinki the following year. After raising a number of legal issues especially with regard to the definition of the term ‘indigenous peoples’, the Committee “did not approve the establishment of WHIPCOE as a consultative body to the Committee or as a network to report to the Committee. The Committee did not provide funding for a second meeting to discuss WHIPCOE (…). However, the Committee encouraged professional research and exchange of views on the subject.” (UNESCO, 2001e, p. 57) In the light of this decision it is even more important that individual delegations aim to represent the voices that might have emerged out of this Council. And in the light of this decision researchers should see their responsibility in bringing alternative ideas into World Heritage discourses.

Oral contribution of the delegation of New Zealand during the 30th Session of the World Heritage Committee in Vilnius, Lithuania, 13th of July 2006, on the item discussing the outcomes of the Kazan meeting on the concept of outstanding universal value. Despite the fact that I tried my best to capture the exact wording of the contribution my stenographic abilities are limited and misrepresentations of any kind in this statement are unintentional and entirely my fault.

Oral contribution of the delegation of New Zealand during the 7th extraordinary session of the World Heritage Committee in the UNESCO Headquarters in Paris, 8th of December 2004. I am grateful to the delegation of New Zealand for providing me a copy of their statement in writing.

This leads me to the unpleasant question whether my distinction between concepts and categories (which is not genuinely mine as already Immanuel Kant has placed his categories – based on an Aristotelian approach – in opposition to his cognitive concepts (Kant, 1974 [1787], p. 145)) would also be considered a typically Western product that negates the realities of life.

The report refers to only one of the three frameworks as a categorical approach, the so-called typological framework based on categories. The remaining two, are called chronological-regional framework and thematic framework. The typological framework is closest to what could be called an orthodox approach, dividing heritage phenomena into archaeological heritage, historic buildings, urban and rural settlements, cultural landscapes etc. (ICOMOS, 2004b, p. 15). The chronological-regional framework is related to historic entities defined for perceived cultural regions, such as Europe: Rome and Roman Empire, Byzantine Empire, Eastern Medieval Europe, Renaissance, Age of Reason and several others before, in between and after. Finally the thematic framework, probably the most innovative of the three, lists categories based on the relationship between people and matter or the land and reads for example: human coexistence with the land, movements of peoples, branches of knowledge or spiritual responses (ICOMOS, 2004b, p. 17).
The subcategories proposed here are attributed to four of the five categories included into the 2003 Convention: oral expressions, performing arts, social practices and knowledge and practices about nature. Subcategories include specifics such as “seasonal ceremonies, gender-specific social practices, practices related to hunting, (...) cosmologies, navigational knowledge, prophecies and oracles (...) and textile knowledge and arts.” (UNESCO, 2002a, p. 5)

It is indeed interesting that it seems impossible to present a discourse without introducing not only a conceptualisation of the core subject but also a categorisation of the aspects covered intending to guide readers through the discourse identified. Since I still assume a relativist ontology – especially with regard to my own reality – I acknowledge that the categorisation merely reflects my interpretation of heritage discussions and not a given structure in academic discourse.

Since I am writing this work to develop the argument that intangible and tangible heritage can and have to be analysed with shared methodologies it is obvious that I cannot possibly agree with the necessity of categories for the purpose of methodological separation.

It is indeed striking that many personal accounts on the drafting processes of both the 2003 (Intangible Heritage) and the 2005 (Cultural Diversity) Conventions highlight the strong impression that the intercultural debates and exchanges and especially the accordances and confederacies achieved made on them. It actually seems they put these aspects into the core of their descriptions, and made me wonder whether the process is indeed given more credit than the product. Roland Bernecker for example speaks of a miracle when referring to a sudden consensus reached by the European Union for the negotiations on the 2005 Convention and later of the pleasure observing how the delegations grew ever closer (Bernecker, 2006, p. 106); or Dawson Munjeri who compares the initial negotiations for the 2003 Convention with the Battle of Armageddon and finally concludes with the marriage of good and evil (Munjeri, 2004b, p. 18) – or was it tangible and intangible?

At least, if one assumes that the authors envisaged such annual Committee listing procedures which is not so clear from the text of the convention, that merely states that the World Heritage Committee shall on the basis of inventories submitted “establish, keep up to date and publish, under the title “World Heritage List,” a list of properties (...) which it considers as having outstanding universal value in terms of such criteria as it shall have established. An updated list shall be distributed at least every two years.” (UNESCO, 1972a, § 11.2)

My reader has surely noticed that I have just shifted my focus from intangible and tangible heritage as mentioned in the title of this work to Intangible Heritage (with capital letters) and World Heritage. And so far I have left him or her without any definition of the terms intangible and tangible heritage and have apparently taken for granted that everybody knows what I am writing about. I am aware that this is not the case. I am currently trying to reflect the international discourse in which hardly anybody combines the use of both terms with a definition although if one explicitly seeks for definitions it is obvious that experts are referring to extremely different concepts of both terms, especially that of intangible heritage (see also endnote 1). To shed light on the issue, a variety of definitions is quoted in the following subchapter. For the time being, whenever I refer to Intangible Heritage with capital letters I speak of intangible heritage as defined in the 2003 UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage (cf. UNESCO, 2003b) and accordingly World Heritage as defined in the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (UNESCO, 1972a). And for those who do not know UNESCO conventions by heart, both definitions are also introduced in the following subchapter.

There are different accounts on whether the authors of the World Heritage Convention considered intangible heritage while drafting the convention or not. Michel Batisse in 2005 describes, that the selection of immovable material properties excluded “other material and immaterial goods of undoubtedly equal universal value – scientific knowledge, paintings, sculptures, literary and musical masterpieces. This limitation is inevitable, but it makes the name of the convention somewhat ambiguous.” (Batisse, 2005, p. 14) Unfortunately Batisse does not elaborate on why it was inevitable to define World Heritage as immovable material properties but it seems that this was the only possibility to create a cultural heritage concept somewhat similar to the natural heritage sites and features.

Herb Stovel retrospectively regrets that authors had not taken intangible aspects into the 1972 convention: “If we had been wise enough and able to look far enough forward in time, instead of having a convention for tangible heritage (The World Heritage Convention) and a Convention for Intangible Heritage, we would have been able to anticipate and recognise the inseparable and neces-
sary links between the two. However, (...) although we were wise enough to put nature and culture together, we weren’t wise enough to include the intangible, and we have only come to deal with this much later.” (Stovel, 2004b, p. 130)

31 An observation of World Heritage discussions with regard to the reformulation of the cultural criterion VI (cf. Titchen, 1998) which started in 1979 (UNESCO, 1979c, item 35) and its subsequent underrating by limitation to exceptional cases, gives the impression that an inclusion of Intangible Heritage as an additional protocol might not have been possible at any point in World Heritage history.

32 Rieks Smeets indeed goes so far as to reduce UNESCO’s heritage activities in a bipolar manner: “In UNESCO’s approach a main distinction is made, within the domain of tangible heritage, between cultural and natural heritage, which then as a whole is opposed to intangible heritage.” (Smeets, 2004a, p. 144)

33 Several members of the World Heritage Committee as well as staff members of the UNESCO World Heritage Centre remarked in discussions during the most recent Committee Session in Vilnius, Lithuania, that they considered the lack of visitors from the Intangible Heritage Division of UNESCO striking, especially considering that the 2003 Convention was just in the process of developing its Operational Directives and that the experts involved could probably benefit from experiences made with the new Operational Guidelines of the World Heritage Convention.

34 On the one hand it could be argued that the introduction of the heritage category ‘cultural landscapes’ into the World Heritage Convention or rather its Operational Guidelines is the result of impulses given by intangible heritage discussions. On the other hand, the introduction of cultural landscapes also addressed conceptual difficulties that prevailed within the World Heritage field, such as the recognition that many cultural achievements are strongly interconnected with their natural setting although this might not be of outstanding universal value, and apart from focusing on individual monuments and sites, characterise larger regions (cf. Fowler, 2003).

35 It seems that the English formulation “we will dispose of two separate conventions” does not entirely reflect what the original German text of Bernecker intended to say. He spoke of “zu tun haben mit” which would be more neutrally reflected in the translation: “we will have to deal with two separate conventions, which address the same problem from reverse sides.”

36 The counterpart enumeration for natural heritage reads: “natural features consisting of physical and biological formations or groups of such formations, which are of outstanding universal value from the aesthetic or scientific point of view; geological and physiographical formations and precisely delineated areas which constitute the habitat of threatened species of animals and plants of outstanding universal value from the point of view of science or conservation; natural sites or precisely delineated natural areas of outstanding universal value from the point of view of science, conservation or natural beauty.” (UNESCO, 1972a, § 2)

37 The later recognition of mixed sites as sites, combining outstanding universal value according to natural and cultural criteria, and finally the revision of the nomination criteria in the latest Operational Guidelines (cf. UNESCO, 2005g) which abandoned the division into culture and nature in favour of a combined set of criteria, can be seen as further small steps toward a holistic representation of heritage.

38 ‘The Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage will henceforth be referred to as the Intangible Heritage Convention.

39 The often criticised limitation to heritage of outstanding universal value needs to be seen in the context of a second standard-setting instrument that was adopted parallel to the World Heritage Convention, the Recommendation concerning the Protection, at National Level, of the Cultural and Natural Heritage (cf. UNESCO, 1972d). It is indeed true that the World Heritage Convention solely covers exceptional, even universally exceptional heritage, while the recommendation is addressed at all other heritage of local or regional significance. While the recommendation’s definition of cultural and natural heritage remains identical, it contains an additional, very precise article which states that “The cultural and natural heritage should be considered in its entirety as a homogenous whole, comprising not only works of great intrinsic value, but also more modest items that have, with the passage of time, acquired cultural or natural value.” Despite its obstructively positivistic approach to the valuation of heritage this specification gives eloquent evidence that the World Heritage Convention is only one of two counterparts. Criticism towards its ‘exceptionality’ can only be
raised in ignorance of the counterpart instrument applying to the non-exceptional, which unfortunately is widespread as very few know of the existence of this recommendation.

40 In the light of my earlier statement that international standard-setting instruments become increasingly stagnant with a higher degree of precision, I am not entirely sure that this ‘advancement’ will in the long-term justify my spontaneous positive reception.

41 Rieks Smeets argues in his article Intangible Cultural Heritage and its link to Tangible Heritage and Natural Heritage that such exists as “many, if not most, manifestations of the intangible cultural heritage do not depend for their enactment on a specific building or, for that matter, a specific place in the open air.” (Smeets, 2004a, p. 146) However, with this he solely argues that most intangible heritage manifestations do not require a particular location. Objects connected or – in a strict sense – even human bodies performing the cultural expressions are tangible, and I think that a lack of defined location does not prove intangibility. I would not even agree with a lack of location as I would identify such intangible heritage expressions as clearly located, either located in an associated object or tool, or located in a human body.

42 This is remarkable as the Intangible Heritage Convention is often referred to as the convention dealing with practitioners or heritage-bearers. But the definition does clearly not include practitioners but emphasises practices and products as well as their heritage expressions.

43 Despite the identical notion and similar description, cultural heritage is not limited to cultural heritage as defined by the World Heritage Convention.

44 The comparison with the Titanic is flawed, as an iceberg that the flagship could drive against is not in sight. The potential danger rather lies with the 5000 additional passengers impatiently waiting at the next landing and eager to start their embarkation as soon as possible.

45 The foreshadows were regrettably evoked by the Director-General of UNESCO himself, who in his speech at the first proclamation of masterpieces for the oral and intangible heritage of humanity introduced the heritage North-South division: “When I myself chaired the World Heritage Committee, just before being appointed to head the Organisation, I was nevertheless very conscious of an imbalance. This had to do with the geographical distribution of Sites on the World Heritage List, which was more broadly representative of the ‘North’. That imbalance in fact reflected a weakness in our system, which, being exclusively concerned with protecting the tangible heritage, overlooked the intangible heritage and thus left out a great many cultural features that are nevertheless fundamental in a map of cultural diversity, often belonging to cultures of the ‘South’. There was no way UNESCO could really do its job of preserving cultural diversity without giving equal attention to its two basic ingredients, namely the tangible and the intangible heritage.” (Matsuura, 2001, p. 1)

46 Roland Bernecker also postpones his speculations stating that “Later statistics will prove if we are going to dispose of two distinct lists alongside the division of “North” and “South”, and if State Parties with a relatively high number of items on one list will be underrepresented on the other. For a modern concept of cultural heritage and for the purposes of intercultural dialogue, this would constitute a genuine challenge.” (Bernecker, 2006, p. 99)

47 Intuitively, I would have introduced Russell Train as the founding father of the World Heritage category but since he distanced himself from that attribution (Train, 2003, p. 37) I merely call him a key-figure, though I believe this is an underestimation.

48 Michel Batisse and Gerald Bolla (Batisse & Bolla, 2003, 2005) have indeed described the drafting history of the World Heritage Convention in such an enlightening manner, that I will refrain from summarizing their words without being able to contribute any new insight myself. Even if I would desire to rummage the UNESCO archives, I could hardly be able to contribute anything new, as the entire archives of UNESCO covering the prior 1972 period seem to have been destroyed by fire (Batisse, 2005, p. 13).

An even larger framework of the intellectual and administrative origins of World Heritage has been researched and amply described by Sarah Titchen in her PhD thesis for the Australian National University, which has unfortunately never been published. She traces the origins back to the League of Nations and the earliest international heritage discourses in Rome 1931 and Madrid 1934 and subsequently recapitulates all debates leading to and evolving after the adoption of the World Heritage Convention until 1994, an impressive chronicle of World Heritage history (Titchen, 1995).
A brief summary of historical initiatives leading to the adoption of the World Heritage Convention is also included in the PhD thesis of Alessandra Borchi submitted in 2002 to the Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali Guido Carli (Borchi, 2002).

It was a difficult decision to grant UNESCO authority on this convention as many natural heritage representatives doubted the organisation could provide the adequate expertise (Batisse, 2005, p. 27f).

By that time the size of the list and the workload of its organisation and administration had steadily grown and the system was close to collapse for a first time – it is now again close to collapsing as I will argue later. Bernd van Droste describes that he and Anne Raidl in 1991 were ‘no longer able to cope with the tasks at hand’ (von Droste, 2002, p. 8) and attributes Anne Raidl’s resignation to this seemingly hopeless situation.

The numerous changes of other criteria are documented in the historic versions of the Operational Guidelines. Some of them were narrowed or specified during the course of application, for example criterion (iii) which from its original version in 1977 “be unique, extremely rare or of great antiquity” (UNESCO, 1977, § 7) was restricted in 1980 to ancient phenomena which “bear a unique or at least exceptional testimony to a civilisation which has disappeared” (UNESCO, 1980b, § 18) and later on extended to existing cultural traditions in 1993: “bear a unique or at least exceptional testimony to a cultural tradition or to a civilisation which is living or which has disappeared” (UNESCO, 1992, § 24). Other criteria were transformed to more relativistic formulations, such as criterion (ii) which initially started with “have exerted considerable influence, over a span of time or within a cultural area (…)” (UNESCO, 1978b, § 7) and in the latest version reads: “exhibit an important interchange of human values, over a span of time or within a cultural area (…)” (UNESCO, 2005g, § 77).

Within the first two nomination cycles the Committee listed 5 sites that were nominated solely under the cultural criterion (vi). These are the Island of Gorée (Senegal) and L’Anse aux Meadows National Historic Site (Canada) in 1978 (UNESCO, 1978a) as well as Auschwitz Concentration Camp (Poland), Forts and Castles, Volta Greater Accra, Central and Western Regions (Ghana) and the Independence Hall (United States) in 1979 (UNESCO, 1979b). It was however in particular the discussion of the nomination of Edison National Historic Site (77) that drew attention to the difficulties of using this criterion (UNESCO, 1979c). The documentary material states: “Although inscription of this property on the list had been recommended by ICOMOS under criterion (vi) relating to cultural property, examination of this nomination had brought to light the difficulty of applying that criterion. In fact, the Bureau considered that its present wording could lead to an inordinate number of nominations. The decision on this nomination was consequently deferred pending revision of criterion (vi) which seemed necessary.” (UNESCO, 1979a, p. 6)

Sarah Titchen in her summary on the revisions of cultural criterion (vi) concludes that factually from that point onwards “the inscription of a property solely on the basis of its associations with events or living traditions, (...) is impossible. However, it is possible to inscribe a property solely on the basis of the other five cultural criteria.” Considering this inequality of criteria she states that it “raises the question of whether all six of the cultural criteria are equal or not.” (Titchen, 1998, p. 3) Joseph King also asserts that with this addition the Committee ensured that “the site in question would already qualify for the World Heritage List, even without the inclusion of this criterion.” (King, 2000, p. 3) On the basis of the fact that thereby criterion (vi) was not set at an equal level with the others, he suggested to think about the “need to remove criterion vi completely from consideration for the inscription of sites.” (King, 2000, p. 4)

It is hard to judge whether this dilution is a result of the influences of the discussions and initiatives on intangible heritage within UNESCO. However, it was obvious during the discussions that led to the revision, that many State Parties which define much of their cultural heritage on the basis of association and living traditions – especially African States (see also endnote 56) – supported the complete deletion of the text in parenthesis.

Especially when we keep in mind, that it has never been proven that an unrestricted criterion (vi) might create a large number of potential nominations, and that the number of nominations has in the meantime been limited by other means, such as the Cairns Decision (UNESCO, 2001c, VI) or the Cairns-Suzhou Decision (UNESCO, 2004b, item 13). Why, under these circumstances, should one still restrict a State Party wishing to use its single annual try for a site that particularly qualifies under criterion (vi)?
The expert meeting on Authenticity and Integrity in an African Context had already outlined such a possibility and highlighted the potential of criterion (vi) to interlink tangible and intangible heritage aspects in their final recommendations: “In considering criterion (vi) it was pointed out that cultural heritage can exist in spiritual forms in its own right with the absence of any tangible evidence at a particular site. Physical remains could be insignificant, which is often the case in sacred sites. There could be cases where the absence of tangible evidence would not allow the inclusion in the List, although they may be of outstanding universal value.” ("Recommendations of the expert meeting on authenticity and integrity in an African context", 2000, p. 171)

So-called mixed sites – sites combining cultural and natural criteria – were inscribed as early as 1979 with Tikal National Park in Guatemala.

Reference to the discussions on outstanding universal value is made in Section Three, chapter 2.1 Faith and universality – a contradiction?

Apart from Committee justifications, one finds a variety of publications on individual World Heritage Sites that highlight the importance of intangible heritage for the valuation, understanding, management planning or preservation of the site. Examples are the case of Robben Island (cf. Deacon, 2004a) or San Gimignano in Tuscany (cf. Kovacs, 2004).

A large amount of high quality publications is available that describes in-depth the drafting and introduction of the cultural landscape category into the World Heritage Convention. I will refrain from summarizing these texts and simply introduce the concept in as much detail as is necessitated by my following line of arguments. For further information on the topic of cultural landscapes, I recommend the collection of essays edited by Bernd van Droste, Harald Plachter and Mechtilde Rössler (von Droste et al., 1995) the numerous other contributions by Mechtilde Rössler (Rössler, 1995, 1998, 2001) and the two cultural landscape issues of the World Heritage Papers Series (Cultural landscapes: the challenges of conservation, 2002; Fowler, 2003).

Unfortunately Dawson Munjeri leaves the reader of his article in doubt about what he imagines natural intangible heritage to be.

Rieks Smeets in his contribution at the Okinawa International Forum 2004 offers an alternative definition: “Cultural spaces are not defined in the text of the Convention itself but may be understood as man-made or natural settings that are indispensable for the enactment of manifestations of the intangible cultural heritage.” (Smeets, 2004a, p. 145)

Reading this statement I always wondered why the World Heritage Convention was not opened to intangible heritage as an incorporation of a new heritage type that perfectly fitted the description of interests and promotion of a better representativity. This question will be discussed in more detail in chapter 2.2 Intangible Heritage versus.

I consider this approach paradoxical as it seems to contradict the idea of a better geographical balance. Each state nominating one site a year can at best mean that dominance of ‘northern’ states will remain but with the overall increasing number will appear less drastic on percentage diagrams. The system can only be effective if almost all State Parties to the convention propose a site each year, as then the pre-selection process related to the sites per year quota would gain control (UNESCO, 2004b) and pre-selection of the under-represented states to be discussed by the Committee would take place. But such a pre-selection would by no means be an easy process. It is currently attributed to the World Heritage Centre, which is supposed to identify sites of underrepresented categories once the number of proposals exceeds 45. The criteria of such selection however remain vague (cf. endnote 65).

One suggestion to State Parties to the convention which fear the overarching dominance of European historic cities and cathedrals would be to submit a complete (even if accidentally or intentionally chanceless) nomination file of an underrepresented heritage category on an annual basis. If every other African and Pacific State Party to the Convention submit such a nomination for only two consecutive years, the Committee would probably discuss very few European nominations (only those representing less represented categories) and at a fast pace enter the long since necessary debate on categories, their boundaries, philosophy and approach in order to define how heritage can be conceptualised and categorised on a global basis.

Chile has expressed a similar point of view (though they did not consider my suggestion of submitting a large amount of nomination proposals) in its comments on the Cairns decision. The Chilean delegate therein believes, that “the limit of 1 site not only fails to contribute to the essential objec-
tive, that is, seeking to improve the representativeness of the List, but is counterproductive in terms that its effect is exactly the opposite to the one attempted.” (UNESCO, 2004a, p. 15) Chile reasons that this regulation perpetuates the regional unbalance and does not encourage the proposal of underrepresented categories.

Underrepresented categories - which shall be preferred to other nominations (“(…) to encourage a growth of under-represented categories and geographical coverage” (UNESCO, 2004b, p. 10)) - are an extremely problematic term as long as the World Heritage Committee does not create a framework of categories on the basis of which the representation or under-representation can be judged. According to the ICOMOS gap analysis for example religious heritage is strongly overrepresented (ICOMOS, 2004b, p. 21), which would have to be applied for example to the nomination of the Bahai Holy Places in Haifa and the Western Galilee although cultural expressions of Bahai background are not at all represented on the World Heritage List and the ICOMOS report does not even mention Bahai as a religious group unless one decides to group it into the miscellaneous column designated “ancient and indigenous beliefs” (ICOMOS, 2004b, p. 35). This topic will be discussed in more detail in Section Three under 2.3 The alleged overrepresentation of places of faith.

The representative of Italy expressed this view in the working group meeting on Global Strategy during the 28th Session of the World Heritage Committee in Suzhou in 2004. The general approach of improving the capacity for the preparation of nomination files in under-represented regions is also introduced in Italy’s written comments on the Cairns decision, but here it is not considered obligatorily combined to new nomination procedures (UNESCO, 2004a, p. 32)

67 OUV is the established abbreviation for Outstanding Universal Value.

So far, not a single site has been de-listed which sheds light on the lack of rigour in ensuring the protection of the world natural and cultural heritage. On the other hand, one could argue that a de-listing would be a final capitulation, a confession of incapability by the Committee. But the effect and prevalence of each aspect most likely needs to be decided in a case-by-case approach. The current practice of the Committee is not satisfactory. It keeps legal experts busy to conduct legal examinations of Committee procedures bearing funny titles like “Legal opinion on the question of whether the Committee can defer the decision to inscribe new properties of a State Party failing to submit reports to the World Heritage Committee on the state of conservation of properties under threat” (UNESCO, 2006f) – which of course it could – and at the same time retain the danger-listed sites concerned on the list, although State Parties have not corresponded to report requests for several consecutive years.

This fact became particularly obvious to participants of the international conference “The Safeguarding of Tangible and Intangible Heritage: towards an integrated approach” in Nara in 2004 that I will refer to mainly in subchapter 2.3 The intangible – non-intangible debate.

Richard Kurin adds that the World Heritage Convention was considered too limited as it “generally excluded the cultures of many states, particularly those in the southern hemisphere, because they lacked monuments and sites.” (Kurin, 2004b, p. 69)

Although the chronology of the drafting process has been described in few recent articles, I would like to reiterate elements of the development that I consider important for my categorical analysis. More detailed information on the drafting chronology can be found in an edition of Museum International of 2004, especially the contributions by Noriko Aikawa (Aikawa, 2004), Richard Kurin (Kurin, 2004b), Wend Wendland (Wendland, 2004) and Ricks Smeets (Smeets, 2004b) as well as the unpublished master thesis of Simine Khaladjadeh (Khaladjad, 2005). In the context of my summary I will intentionally completely disregard the negotiation with WIPO and considerations related to property right questions that took place during the drafting of the Convention. For readers interested in this particular aspect, I recommend, besides the article by Wendland (Wendland, 2006), the reflections of MacDonald from the Australian Copyright Council (McDonald, 1997).

The Intergovernmental Committee was elected according to UNESCO regions and consists of the following State Parties: Belgium, Turkey, Hungary, Estonia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Mexico, Brazil, Peru, China, Japan, India, Vietnam, Nigeria, Senegal, Gabon, Algeria, and United Arab Emirates. (cf. UNESCO, 2006e). However, since the number of Member States for which the convention enters into force will have increased to 50 by August 30th 2006, an extraordinary General Assembly
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will be convened on November 9th, 2006, which will elect an additional 6 State Parties to the Committee. (UNESCO, 2006c, item 5).

73 Mounir Bouchenaki deviates from this description in stating that “it was only in 1982 that UNESCO (…) created a special ‘Section for the Non-Tangible Heritage’” (Bouchenaki, 2004, p. 1) but since he later describes this establishment as a result of the 1989 Recommendation on the Protection of Traditional Culture and Folklore, I assume the earlier 1982 is simply a typo, especially since there is no evidence of such a section in the respective UNESCO biennial programme.


75 The report is particularly critical towards the use of the term ‘intangible’. Janet Blake states that “In this way, a new dichotomy between the ‘tangible’ (material) and ‘intangible’ elements of cultural heritage has developed that superficially appears attractive. (…) It is, however, a false category in the sense that all material elements of cultural heritage have important intangible values associated with them that are the reason for their protection. Furthermore, it is a distinction, that is unacceptable to many indigenous and local cultures that are the holders of the cultural traditions that fall into this category of ‘intangible heritage’ since it does not reflect their holistic view of culture and heritage” (Blake, 2002, p. 8) After continuing her line of arguments with regard to the term, she finally concludes that “Given that ‘intangible’ is an extremely difficult concept to grasp and suggests a subject matter for protection that defies identifying legal measures for this, it is probably better avoided.” (Blake, 2002, p 9) In order to avoid the opposition with ‘tangible’ heritage Janet Blake suggests to develop some new phraseology that “employs the terms ‘traditional’, ‘oral’, ‘popular’ and/or ‘living’” in some formulation, while her preference tends to “oral and traditional cultural heritage.” (Blake, 2002, p. 9)

76 Janet Blake writes that the „inclusion of intangible cultural heritage within the framework of UNESCO’s 1972 Convention was originally considered at the time of its development, but was dropped before the final version of the text.” (Blake, 2002, p. 72) Unfortunately, she does not provide reference for this statement nor does she mention to which of the three draft conventions she refers. Her continuation however is interesting: “This idea still has some attractions in view of the formal mechanisms for protection that already exist under the Convention and the responsibility it would place on State Parties to value and protect intangible heritage located on their territories.” On the other hand she emphasises that the current definition of cultural heritage in the World Heritage Convention would hardly accommodate intangible heritage, and that the benchmark of outstanding universal value could also create difficulties. The inclusion of intangible heritage into the convention would further require a new set of nomination criteria. For these reasons she concludes that “it would prove difficult to draft an Additional Protocol to the 1972 Convention (…) since this would require redrafting core parts of the existing convention (…) and a revised convention could be binding only to those States that become Parties to it. This could lead to the very unsatisfactory situation where some State Parties were Parties to the 1972 Convention and others to the revised Convention.” (Blake, 2002, p. 73) In contrast to this is the description of Riels Smeets who interprets the motivations for a distinct convention differently: “The main reason (…) were not the technical and administrational difficulties that one would have had to surmount in order to reformulate large parts of the 1972 Convention and getting them accepted but rather the deeply felt understanding that in spite of links and interdependencies there are major and fundamental differences between tangible and intangible.” (Smeets, 2004a, p. 145)

77 Roland Bernecker highlights that „the project of this new convention was privileged by the strong support of M. Matsuura, UNESCO’s Director-General from Japan.” (Bernecker, 2006, p. 98)

78 The 74 Ministers of Culture convened in Istanbul opted to emphasise their preference for a holistic perception of cultural heritage in stating in their final communiqué that “an all-encompassing approach to cultural heritage should prevail, taking into account the dynamic link between the tangible and the intangible heritage and their close interaction.” (Third Round Table of Minister of Culture, 2002, § 2)
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79 At many points during these 16 months the principles of the new convention, its drafting on the model of the 1972 convention and the terrific speed of negotiation was debated vehemently, so during the 164th Session of the Executive Board (UNESCO, 2002c; Aikawa, 2004). The Executive Board in particular decided that the issue could no longer be discussed in selectively convened expert circles but would need to be approached in intergovernmental (category II) expert meetings (UNESCO, 2002c, p. 17).

80 When reading the various comments it is important to know that the definition of intangible cultural heritage included in the preliminary draft send to the Member States of UNESCO was already very similar to the definition of the adopted convention. It states: “For the purpose of this Convention, the ‘intangible cultural heritage’ means the practices and representations – together with their necessary knowledge, skills, instruments, objects and artefacts and places – that are recognised by communities and individuals as their intangible cultural heritage (…).” (UNESCO, 2002f, § 2)

81 As outlined in the preface the material and data collection for my writing was per definition finalised on August 1st 2006. Ratifications, approvals or acceptances submitted after this date are therefore not considered in my statement.

82 The Lebanese statement further continues that “the experts who drafted these definitions were faced with a gigantic task, and it cannot be denied that they have tackled it with intellectual honesty; but in their concern to leave nothing out they have on occasion sacrificed consistency and opened the door to a horde of quandaries.” (UNESCO, 2002f, p. 34)

83 Criticism here varies from expressing that the definition resembles the definition of ‘culture’ in general (Iceland), various voices that point out that ‘intangible heritage’ is defined as ‘intangible heritage’ (Lebanon, Barbados, Uganda, St. Lucia) or that its definition is too broad (Australia, Canada) or too specific in listing particular expressions (Germany, Sweden, United States, Portugal). (UNESCO, 2002b)

84 Richard Kurin observed that among others Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, Switzerland and the United States abstained. (Kurin, 2004b, p. 66) According to the General Conference Proceedings, 8 nations abstained but unfortunately the three other states have to remain undetermined (UNESCO, 2003g, p. 537).

85 According to the election results 120 states voted for the convention while 8 state parties abstained (UNESCO, 2003g, p. 537). Interestingly, UNESCO has an overall number of 191 Member States and plenums on the last day of a General Conference are usually pretty well filled. The question why the missing 63 states were not in the room during the vote or did not participate in the voting is rather interesting. I have information from delegates of two Member States – who prefer to remain unnamed – that they followed the order of their respective ministries to leave the room at the time of voting.

86 The benchmark formulated in the 2006/2007 biennium programme adopted by the General Conference in October 2005 was 20 additional ratifications, which has been transcended after a mere quarter of the biennium with 31 additional ratifications by August 1st 2006 (UNESCO, 2006a, p. 164).

87 At the same time it is to be expected that criteria such as uniqueness, outstanding value or excellence in manifestation that were determinant for the masterpieces programme will not be incorporated into the selection criteria for the 2003 convention.

88 As the Director of the Centre for Folklife and Cultural Heritage of the Smithsonian Institution in Washington D.C. Richard Kurin was the local counterpart for the organisation of the event and delivered one of its opening speeches (Kurin, 2001).

89 With this statement Kurin acknowledges the immense threat that semiological degradation poses to intangible heritage and concludes that it is not possible to intervene against this loss of symbolical value and meaning to local communities. I have identified an identical threat for all other categories of heritage earlier, but I would like to strongly contradict the stated impossibility of reducing this semiological degradation. Nevertheless, I fully concur that the means proposed by the Intangible Heritage Convention to achieve a reduction – mainly identification, documentation and research – are not very promising.

90 This aspect is discussed in the fourth section of my work under the headline 3.3 The paradox of documentation.
Section One: Conceptualising – categorising

91 An identical challenge was identified for the World Heritage Convention in that it needs to find ways and means to define or deliberately reject demarcations towards the Intangible Heritage Convention and explore future potentials of cooperation.

92 For the purpose of this discussion of the difficulties that the terminological dichotomy of intangible and tangible heritage raises in heritage discussions, I will temporarily accept the equation of World Heritage as tangible heritage.

93 I personally think that though one can designate tangible heritage as more spatial or intangible as more behavioural representations of value concepts that constitute culture, the simplification cannot prove consistent in their clear separation. I would therefore – as I argue in later parts of my work – prefer to speak of a gradual scale on which cultural heritage is considered as having a certain percentage of tangible and a certain percentage of intangible characteristics. Such a scaled interpretation of all cultural representation further explains why intangible heritage includes artefact and spaces in its definition, while tangible heritage can hardly be separated from its use or associations.

94 Since the break-up and restructuring of the cultural heritage division by the end of 2005, the intangible – tangible dichotomy has been consolidated. The tangible heritage section was abandoned and most of its staff shifted to the World Heritage Centre which now – with the exception of museums – combines all tangible heritage activities in the headquarters administration. Activities with regard to tangible heritage of merely regional or local value shall in the future be administrated from UNESCO’s many field offices. In opposition to the World Heritage Centre, the Intangible Heritage Section was enlarged to bundle all activities related to primarily intangible cultural expressions.

95 I agree that my formulation is very strong and the conclusion documents and decisions of both discussion forums do not reflect miserable failure. I had the chance to attend both meetings and considering the prior expectations and taking into account the meetings extremely tense and aggressive atmosphere, I think the ‘failed’ is an honest judgement, which can, of course, be diplomatically replaced by ‘have been a first step on a very long road’.

96 This formulation by members of the World Heritage Committee implied that they would have preferred an opportunity for discussion before the new Convention was finalised in order to potentially outline the interrelation of the two conventions in the more recent standard-setting instrument.

97 It is of course highly contradictory to on the one hand complain about not having been involved in the drafting of the new convention and on the other hand request that any discussion be postponed until the Operational Directives for the Convention are also finalised.

98 The debate of the World Heritage Committee was particularly heated because the draft decision presented proposed a potential adjustment of the Operational Guidelines of the World Heritage Convention towards the new convention. Paragraph 5 of the original draft decision reads: “Further invites the Director-General to continue to stimulate intellectual debate and reflection concerning the interconnectedness between the intangible and tangible cultural heritage, with a view, inter alia, to eventually proposing a revision of the Operational Guidelines under the 1972 Convention, in the light of the forthcoming entry into force of the 2003 Convention.” (UNESCO, 2004c) This paragraph was deleted from the draft decision at request of an overwhelming majority of Committee Members.

99 The possibility of recognizing values through the material substance of an object will be questioned throughout the following subchapters and the next section. I personally feel that such positivistic approach to heritage has to be considered outdated.

100 Only in the light of such an interpretation of ‘intangible heritage’ it is explicable why the President of ICOMOS, Michael Petzet, in his keynote lecture insists that ICOMOS would be an appropriate advisory organisation to the 2003 Convention. In referring to article 9 of the convention which provides for the accreditation of non-governmental organisations with recognised competence in the field of intangible cultural heritage (UNESCO, 2003b), he states that “ICOMOS believes to have this competence as it has been active for decades as advisory body to the World Heritage Convention.” (Petzet, 2004, p. 3)

101 Even Michael Petzet in contradiction to his more often pronounced descriptions of intrinsic values of monuments at some point of his presentation in Victoria Falls describes that “as an idea that
took shape, the monument is in any case more than a tangible ‘object’ consisting of a certain material.” (Petzet, 2004, p. 1)

102 In the recent Cambridge Heritage Seminar on ‘Intangible-Tangible Cultural Heritage: A sustainable dichotomy?’ Emma Waterton presented the theory that the whole range of misunderstandings, including the fact that no leading European country had yet ratified the convention (meanwhile France has submitted a ratification) and the dichotomy created between ‘us’ and ‘them’ or North and South is a problem of terminology and discourse. Her final suggestion to overcome the unpleasant situation is to “perhaps sponsor a course for communication that moves beyond the ‘problems of discourse’” (Waterton, 2006)

103 In addition to the two sides of the same coin, Dawson Munjeri creates the metaphor of body and soul: “No one could boldly assert that the soul (the intangible) can exist without the body (the tangible).” (Munjeri, 2004a) This metaphor was later taken up by Ricks Smeets who provoked the inseparability of soul and body: “Patients, who deeply feel that body and mind are one, still know when to look for mental assistance, when to go to a dentist, and when to ask for mental and physical assistance at the same time.” (Smeets, 2004a, p. 144)

104 After the first experiment to establish an international master course in World Heritage Studies at the Brandenburg University of Technology, Germany in 1999 turned out to be very successful, further programmes have meanwhile been established at the University College Dublin, Ireland and latest in 2004 at the University of Tsukuba, Japan (UNESCO, 2006h).

105 An institute for intangible and tangible heritage with a sub-programme on World Heritage has just been established at the University of Paderborn in Germany.

106 “As soon as we have the thing before our eyes, and in our hearts and ear for the word, thinking prospers.” were the introductory words of Heidegger’s poem placed on the first page of my writing. The thing is what enables us to think (a second part is the information that connects the social context implied in the word plus the curiosity and interest to question its existence in our hearts); it stands-forth and thereby is a first reference to the world. For Heidegger to stand forth has two different aspects: “First, standing forth has the sense of stemming from somewhere, whether this be a process of self-making or of being made by another. Secondly, standing forth has the sense of the made thing’s standing forth into the unconcealedness of what is already present.” (Heidegger, 1971e) Thing therefore frames the ‘object’ of reference, before it is even conceptualised as an object. The German Ding (thing) becomes Gegenstand, the English translation for which necessarily needs to incorporate a conceptual dimension and then ranges from object, subject, item or matter to artefact. Yet here, it shall be used pre-conceptualised as thing. This is without question a severe simplification of Heidegger’s consideration of the concept of ‘thing’ but the interested reader may consult Heidegger’s work: Die Frage nach dem Ding, which considers all aspects of the ‘thing’ and discusses its context in Kant’s critiques (cf. Heidegger, 1962).

107 Cultural identity is the focus of attention in the recommendation of the Safeguarding of traditional Culture and Folklore, which states that “folklore forms part of the universal heritage of humanity and that it is a powerful means to bring together different peoples and social groups and of asserting their cultural identity.” (UNESCO, 1989, preamble) From a tangible heritage side the concept of cultural identity was firmly integrated in e.g. the Nara Document on Authenticity which stresses that “All cultures and societies are rooted in the particular forms and means of tangible and intangible expression which constitute their heritage, and these should be respected.” (Nara Document on Authenticity, 1995)

108 A positivistic approach to heritage is further characterised by the quest for the knowledge on how things really are, with research aiming to define the ‘true’ state of affairs based on immutable natural laws applied e.g. in natural sciences. The researcher applies a dualist and objectivist epistemology in which “the investigator and the investigated ‘object’ are assumed to be independent entities, and the investigator to be capable of studying the object without influencing it or being influenced by it.” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 110)

109 The citation contributes even further to the purpose of my work in that he continues: “(…) intellectually backward in its obsession with material substance and unable to undertake the task of a balanced protection of both material and non-material heritage” (Tomaszewski, 2004, p 3)

110 Joseph Tainter and John Lucas in their study on the epistemology of the significance concept highlight the implications of a positivistic approach in heritage studies: “The empiricist-positivist
perspective on the foundations of knowledge has a fundamental implication concerning the nature of the physical universe. If meaning and knowledge are given solely by sense experience, the source of both must rest in the phenomenon being observed. The qualities of physical phenomena that give rise to meaning must therefore be intrinsic, and the knowledge to be derived must be immutable.” (Tainter & Lucas, 1983, p. 712)

111 Positivistic attitude towards cultural heritage identification could certainly be presented in more positive – or I would say more euphemistic – words and citations. But since I did already distance myself in my selection of constructivist ontology as explained in the prologue of this work, I don’t see a necessity to describe the paradox search for intrinsic values in objects in more neutral terms. Nevertheless I feel that I have the duty to highlight that the negative perspective taken is my own perspective which is – as I hope to point out in this chapter – not shared by everybody in the heritage field.

112 Here reference is often made to the early Italian master in restoration theory, Cesare Brandi, whose first axiom, “by which the material form of the work of art is the only object of restoration” is based on the message of the object and its genuine reflection of the artists work (Brandi, 1996, p. 231) Besides Brandi, one could easily add John Ruskin (cf. Ruskin, 1890), Alois Riegl (cf. Riegl, 1903) or William Morris in the line of mentors who – although they like Brandi accepted the general idea of associated meaning or value – sought for the qualities of the object as readable in the object itself.

113 Often conventions or international charters and documents are drafted in an atmosphere in which some theoretical assumptions are totally evident to all participants. Herb Stovel describes such an example when referring to the drafting of the Venice charter, during which there appeared to be little need to discuss the concept of authenticity. He writes: “for the most part, those involved in writing the document came from a fairly homogenous western world, with a European background, and saw little need to discuss intuitively shared concepts like authenticity.” (Stovel, 1995a, p. 153) The same is true not only for the drafting of the World Heritage Convention but also for the Intangible Cultural Heritage Convention, and we will most likely ask in a few decades how some of the concepts applied could have been so evidently valid to the UNESCO delegates. I could for example imagine that the identified need “to build greater awareness, especially among the younger generations, of the importance of the intangible cultural heritage” (UNESCO, 2003b, preamble) will not only be questioned, but eventually seen as an active and altering intervention into the independent evolvement of heritage in all its diversity.

114 Bogaert and Dusar consider what they term the classical canon as a still relatively stable “limited assembly of ‘classic’ and ‘immortal’ cultural utterances from the cultural tradition” (Bogaert & Dusar, 2005)

115 Praiseworthy exceptions can be found in the Anglophone post-colonial (?) world of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States where heritage identification systems encourage the development of heritage significance statements via long-term community participation processes. It seems community participation is easiest promoted in countries where different groups have hardly anything in common in their perception and construction of heritage and where the formulation of mutually agreed on principles has ultimately failed – whether intended or unintended.

116 Even the organisation UNESCO has to be described as such an elitist top-down system. Christina Kreps has a point when stating that “one of the main challenges to enacting the purposes and principles behind the [2003] Convention will be overcoming its internal contradictions and paradoxical position as the offspring of UNESCO – an inherently top-down, expert-driven institution. (Kreps, 2005, p. 7)

117 Heritage professionals tend to reduce the social processes analyzed by constructivist researchers to the attribution or construction of attributed values and meanings. William Lipe gives a good example of describing heritage construction reduced on value construction: “Value is not inherent in any cultural item or properties received from the past, at least not in the same sense as, say, size or colour or hardness. Value is learned about or discovered in these phenomena by humans, and thus depends on the particular cultural, intellectual, historical, and psychological frames of reference held by the particular individuals or groups involved.” (Lipe, 1984, p. 2)

118 Many scholars who explored the mechanisms of constructing identity agree to the overwhelming power of yet another socially constructed phenomenon called culture, as is most simply expressed
by Anita Shah when stating: “Culture shapes the way we think, (…) the words and the material culture we use. Culture constitutes the materials out of which we build our identities (…). It is like a lens through which we perceive the world.” (Shah, 2000, p. 108)

From a constructivist paradigm the success of the World Heritage Convention can be explained through the process of identity construction. Lourdes Arizpe describes that the convention is about “people with local pride, then, who want to share their pride with others; and once others give this recognition, it adds to the value of the site. So the pride of a few becomes the pride of all.” (Arizpe, 2000, p. 32) Nele Bogaert and Wouter Dusar describe this identity confirmation in heritage an ever-more important process in our post-modern era as “distinct cultural identity should be able to encourage the integration of foreigners” (Bogaert & Dusar, 2005), and indeed it seems a distinct cultural identity is of assistance to encounter differing entities as enrichment of understanding and knowledge rather than as threat.

The identity creation process is indeed part of the dwelling in heritage which I describe in the introduction of topologies in Section Four, chapter 2.2 Topology – construction of a concept.

The authors conclude that only a model based on a set of theories can help to enhance the process of such understanding. “Taking as its starting point the broad perspective of conservation and its varied spheres of activity, the model would, in effect, present a theory for describing (though not predicting) how heritage is created, how heritage is given meaning, how and why it is contested, and how societies shape heritage and are shaped by it.” (Avrami et al., 2000, p. 10, 11)

A detailed discussion and definition of the terms significance, meaning and value is to be found in the introduction of Section Two, and its chapter 1.1 Value, significance, meaning. Until then the three designations can be read as synonyms, bearing in mind that value can also take verbal character.

Sign and symbol are often used synonymously in heritage studies but they have different connotations in semiology. Sign, the basic concept of semiology was defined by Charles Sanders Peirce as “something which stands to somebody for something” (Peirce, 1931-1958, vol. 2, p. 228) and later as “something by knowing which we know something more” (Peirce, 1931-1958, vol. 8, p. 332). Although there is no agreed-on definition in the field of semiology there is some agreement that sign is a discrete unit of meaning. Eco describes sign in one of his many definitions as the constantly interrogated locus for the semiotic process (Eco, 1984, p. 45) The term symbol is no less problematic. While Ernst Cassirer refers to ‘symbolic forms’ as mental conceptions in signs and images (“Ausdruck eines ‘Geistigen’ durch sinnliche ‘Zeichen’”) (Cassirer, 1994, p. 174), Peirce sees symbol as a category of signs, and refers to signs “that will be interpreted as denoting the object in consequence of habit” as symbols. (Peirce, 1931-1958, vol. 4, p. 531) For the purpose of this thesis however, the difference between sign and symbol shall not be elaborated on, and both words are used to define similar notions.

The terms semiology and semiotics are used interchangeably as they refer to the same academic discipline which has in recent years more often been called semiotics but was earlier designated as semiology by Ferdinand de Saussure. (Saussure, 1972, p. 33)

Umberto Eco offers a far more fascinating definition of semiotics, which is illustrative but perhaps confusing for the context of heritage studies: “Semiotics is concerned with everything that can be taken as a sign. A sign is everything that can be taken as significantly substituting for something else. This something else does not necessarily have to exist or to actually be somewhere at the moment in which a sign stands in for it. Thus semiotics is in principle the discipline studying everything which can be used in order to lie. If something cannot be used to tell a lie, conversely it cannot be used to tell the truth: it cannot in fact be used to tell at all.” (Eco, 1976, p. 7)

Semiotic phenomenon refers to signs as meaning-bearers while a study of culture as a semiotic activity would focus on the sign interpretation and meaning-making.

Saussure, thinking primarily in the framework of linguistic studies, defines the object of interest, the sign, as a unity of signifier and signification, the signifier being the representation and the signification the attributed value or meaning (Saussure, 1972, p. 99). This approach would help heritage professionals who adhere to a positivist paradigm to continue focusing on the object or expression as a sign (symbol) which is reference and as such conveys a meaning to the observer, which is if not an inherent part of it, at least identifiable and not dependent on the enquirer.
128 Charles Sanders Peirce like Saussure speaks of signs but leaves Saussure’s structuralist and object oriented context and instead frames his semiosis as something close to a negotiation process. Sign for Peirce is something extremely general close to a designating factor of what I initially described as a concept and semiosis is the process of meaning-making, the understanding of the world (Peirce, 1931-1958, vol. 2, p. 12f). But to avoid confusion, I have to highlight that Peirce sees a difference between sign and concept. While concept for him is a form of representation, sign essentially involves communication, for example communicating a representation, i.e. the concept. The very definition and existence of sign according to Peirce always implies a process of what he calls unlimited semiosis, that the sign stands for something which it produces and modifies (cf. Eco, 1976, p. 69) but at the same time is produced and modified itself. This process is triadic in combining three elements, the object (that which the sign stands for), its representamen or meaning (that which it conveys) and its interpretant (the idea to which it gives rise and thereby the knowledge it stimulates) (Peirce, 1931-1958, vol. 1, p. 339) The location of semiosis – if such exists – is the human mind and Peirce eventually dares to equal mental processes and semiosis.

129 The concepts of knowledge and narrative are discussed in more detail in Section Four, 2.1 Logos and topos. Within the framework of this chapter, knowledge shall be understood as according to the definition of Roderik Chisholm, as a reflection upon the one’s own state of mind, which brings internal justification in believing – knowing – a certain thing (cf. Chisholm, 1989, p. 9). Narrative could be framed as a thought – or word – construct providing explication about a being-related experience, understanding or belief. The analogy of heritage and knowledge is most obvious in the Republic of Palau, where individuals are recognised heritage ‘national treasures’ because of their knowledge – the official title is repositories of knowledge – of Palau’s tradition. (Lorne, 1999, p. 36)
More than a century ago, in 1903 Alois Riegł coined the phrase “the modern cult of monuments” (Riegł, 1903) referring to the increased interest in the preservation of artistic and historic monuments in German-speaking Europe at his time. If Riegł had followed my writing on tangible and intangible heritage, he probably would have commented on the conceptual dilemma of conservation decisions in view of conflicting value attributions. ‘Of course’, I can hear him saying, “a monument’s treatment in accordance with age value (…) ultimately comes into conflict with present day value” (Riegł, 1996, p. 77) But I doubt that he would have understood my questions with regard to the role of cultural identity and value attribution or signification processes in conservation. I think he rather would have insisted that “this contemporary value must, however, be excluded from the definition of the ‘monument’” (Riegł, 1996, p. 72) And with this approach his phrase ‘cult of monuments’ just terms it correctly.

In the 1970s Yi-Fu Tuan refers to the same subject, the preservation of historic buildings and the establishment of museums as “the cult of the past” (Tuan, 1989). He elaborates that this cult of the past has little in common with cultural rootedness¹³⁰, as it reflects a habit of mind opposed to perceiving things as rooted or sacred, well illustrated by the museum which “consists wholly of displaced objects” (Tuan, 1989, p. 194). Two decades later another geographer, David Lowenthal, pronounces that “the world rejoices in a newly popular faith: the cult of heritage” (Lowenthal, 1998, p. 1). According to Lowenthal the cult of heritage is expressed in people’s worship of the past and their predominant “quests for enshrined symbols of identity” (Lowenthal, 1998, p. 1).

And yet another decade later, looking at an intensified professional discussion, a celebrated global quest for ‘outstanding universal values’, a drift towards ‘values-based conservation’ and a newest UNESCO convention stipulating the protection of cultural expressions “because they convey identities, values and meanings” (UNESCO, 2005c, preamble), I proclaim a new era: the post-modern cult¹³¹ of values¹³². Regrettably, I am not the first to find values superseding heritage or the past as the new centre of attention in the heritage field, but others have framed it in different words, for example Dawson Munjeri:

“I here point [out] that at the heart of it all is the issue of Values: our understanding of them; what to make of them; what to ascribe to them; all this determines the policies, strategies and practices’ that either save or condemn our cultural heritage.” (Munjeri, 2004c)

I do not want to say that the cult of values replaces Lowenthal’s ‘quest for enshrined symbols of identity’, on the contrary, in placing values at the heart of this quest, the notion of heritage is progressively pinnacled to being a symbol of identity. While in 1972 authors of the World Heritage Convention considered it their duty to ensure
the “transmission to future generations of the cultural and natural heritage” (UNESCO, 1972a, § 4), nowadays “conservation is about handing on what we value to future generations” (Clark, 2001, p. 12) Heritage is more and more about us than about history and instead of seeking for credible or authentic representations of an objective or constructed past, opinions differ most notably about who ‘we’ actually are, ‘what’ and ‘how’ we value and how subjective or objective our values are.

In 2002 Randall Mason writes that “the notion that the values of cultural heritage are subjective and mutable is taken for granted in many academic circles today, although this notion is still debated in the conservation field.” (Mason & Avrami, 2002, p. 21) Four years later this debate is still ongoing – perhaps even enhancing – and conservation professionals only slowly apprehend the far-reaching consequences of acknowledging the subjectivity of values. It includes the subjectivity of heritage and thereby not only negates all established scientific methods to assess the (objective) qualities of heritage but also radically questions their role as experts and their professional competence. In the course of this debate the heritage field has entered a most fascinating (and self-preserving) dynamic that allows for the centring of values without at the same time necessarily affirming their subjectivity133.

This dynamic is called “values-based conservation” (Mason, 2002, p. 5), “value-based management” (Mason, 2002, p. 27), “value-based assessment of cultural heritage” (Satterfield, 2002, p. 77) or “significance-driven approach” (Stovel, 1997)134. Despite the sustained debate on the questions outlined above, the heritage field – including both intangible and tangible heritage professionals – now seems to unanimously agree on the “articulation of heritage values (often called ‘cultural significance’) as a reference point” (Mason, 2002, p. 5) for identification, safeguarding and conservation of heritage expressions. Accidentally, the term reference point beautifully reminds of cultural heritage as a reference system and invites to contemplate about values as the individual impulses in the large nervous system of culture; but unfortunately this is hardly implied. Reference point rather means that the first step of any recognition of or intervention to heritage is value identification, or in other words the sequence of decisions and actions is: “understand significance, develop policy, manage in accordance with policy” (Truscott & Young, 2000). One difficulty however remains: as long as the heritage field further postpones the review of the nature of values and remains in disagreement on what values are and how they affect heritage, such identifications will hardly be a shared reference, neither as point nor as system.

1 Values and their identification

Randal Masan and Erica Avrami in their essay on heritage values and challenges in conservation planning refer to values as “the ‘lingua franca’ to organise research and practice in this subjective, political terrain”. (Mason & Avrami, 2002, p. 15) Would that not imply that values are widely understood and ably communicated about and
that, as benchmarks for the ‘subjective terrain’, they provide some objective stability? Fortunately the authors anticipated such questions and responded in the following sentence: “Clarifying what is meant when we speak of values is a necessary first step in the explanation of values in conservation”. (Mason & Avrami, 2002, p. 15) Such clarification is not easy as the heritage field is at considerable variance on the possible meanings of values or its seeming synonym significance, a characteristic which the field shares with almost all other disciplines in the humanities and social sciences. Philosophers distinguish three different traditions in the conceptualisation of values – each again split into several subgroups – which correspond to the perceptions of those concerned with heritage (some of them undoubtedly philosophers as well) to an amazingly high degree:

“The theory of value has three main traditions: subjectivism, which holds that the only valuable goods are subjective states of sentient beings; objectivism, which claims that while values must be human-related, they exist independently of us; and Neo-Kantian rationalism, which suggests that value is postulated on the basis of practical reason.” (Thomas, 1998, p. 581)

After considering positivistic and constructivist paradigms in the heritage field, one can easily imagine how the three above traditions are expressed but it might be illustrative to consider some examples. The tangible heritage field is traditionally an objectivist field, based on textual monuments as the Venice Charter which desires people to become “more conscious of the unity of human values” and proposes to achieve this via preservation and restoration which not only “reveal the aesthetic and historic value of the monument” but do so “without ever distorting its meaning.” (The Venice Charter, 1964, preamble, § 9, 15) The Mexico City Declaration stresses the strong impact of values on human beings but remains objectivist:

“Every people therefore has a right and duty to defend and preserve its cultural heritage, since societies recognize themselves through the values in which we find a source of creative inspiration.” (UNESCO, 1982, § 24)

The cultural or subjectivist turn was achieved in 1994 and anchored in the Nara Document of Authenticity in which Herb Stovel, Raymond Lemaire and others framed the cultural dependency of value attributions:

“Conservation of cultural heritage in all its forms and historical periods is rooted in the values attributed to heritage. (…) All judgements about values attributed to heritage (…) may differ from culture to culture and even within the same culture. It is therefore not possible to base judgements of value (…) on fixed criteria.” (Nara Document on Authenticity, 1995, § 9, 11)

Highlighting the cultural dependency was important, because the authors wanted to explicitly ensure that “professional judgements remained open to different perceptions of values, to different conceptions of ‘appropriate’ treatment in relation to value, in different cultural settings, in different heritage contexts.” (Stovel, 1995b, p. xxxvi). This view is even more explicitly formulated in recent years, for example by Joseph King who states that “Values by their nature are subjective and can change
over time” (King, 2005, p. 3). The third tradition, described as Neo-Kantian rationalism can be found primarily in justifications of management plans for heritage sites. The focus of such value statements does not lie in the heritage itself, nor the people who attribute values, but with the heritage’s benefit in achieving another goal which is considered valuable. A rationalist value statement would e.g. argue that a site is to be preserved for the benefits it provides to local employment as a result of tourism or as a didactic tool for education. Timothy Darvill who names this approach ‘functional value arguments’ describes: rationalists “define values more in terms of the number of linkages rather than their social significance or relationship to underlying philosophies. Thus ideas of value for education, for research, for tourism, or as an economic resource often come to the fore (…)” (Darvill, 1994, p. 55)

In addition to an enhancing exchange on the theory of values within and between these groups, the heritage field has also produced several working definitions of value. These definitions – as opposed to a large number of philosophical, mathematical or economical definitions that could be quoted – were written for the heritage field and are in most cases helpful for heritage considerations. I personally like the bipartite definition of Randall Mason and Erica Avrami for the noun ‘value’ as it smartly combines a subjectivist and the objectivist points of view:

“First, and perhaps most often, value refers to morals, principles or ethics – ideas that serve as guides to action. (…) Second, value refers to the characteristic of things or objects. In this sense, one can speak of values as the qualities of places (sites, buildings, artefacts, and landscapes) we refer to as heritage.” (Mason & Avrami, 2002, p. 15)

Although the elegant combination of both perspectives makes this definition agreeable to everybody, it also causes difficulties, as meaningful communication requires a specification whether one is speaking about the first or the second concept named. Most heritage professionals, including the authors of the definition, focus on the second alternative provided, which again leaves the option to seek for values ‘out there’, expressed in characteristics of objects to be identified. I prefer to focus on the first option as it is values in form of ideas that create the values attributed to heritage and, though both are important, their relevance for heritage construction seems successively. To avoid further confusion, I henceforth refer to the second alternative, the qualities of heritage, as significance, while for the first definition, morals and ideas, I will draw on a value definition proposed by Timothy Darvill:

“Value means different things to different people, but in this paper attention is directed (…) towards sociological interpretations – sets of broadly-constituted, socially-determined assumptions, beliefs and knowledge-sets which may be termed ‘value systems’. Values in this sense (…) represent fundamental and inescapable constituents of social action, socially conditioned, unevenly distributed, and differentially ranked standards, ideals and understandings by which individuals and communities define goals, select courses of action, and judge themselves and others.” (Darvill, 1994, p. 52)

Such division and preference to focus on the first concept finds few supporters in the heritage field. Jean-Louis Luxen for example points out, that the “quest for the
‘message’ of cultural properties requires us to identify the ethical values, social customs, beliefs or myths of which physical heritage is the sign, the expression, in space and time.” (Luxen, 2004a, p. 1) Nevertheless it seems to be a minority view that values – ideas, thoughts, knowledge-sets etc. – need to be identified prior to value (read significance) identification\textsuperscript{140}. More often, significance assessment is undertaken according to value typologies or categories in which these value aspects are constricted to social or spiritual values, two categories among many. To better estimate the potentials and limitations of the various tools developed to assess heritage values, produce statements of significance or analyse the meaning of cultural expressions, it might be helpful to look at the details of some established frameworks.

1.1 Value, significance, meaning

Conceptual linkages between value, significance and meaning as expressed in value or significance evaluation systems are manifold and often puzzling to a reader unfamiliar with the particular system. On the other hand, could it perhaps be possible to identify basic conformities that seem to be shared among all systems and which can function as references for the discussion of detailed conceptual distinctions? For example all heritage systems refer to the term values in one of the ways given in the above two-part definition\textsuperscript{141}.

Significance – the most consistently used term – refers to the expression of values in heritage qualities or even more broadly, significance is “the term that the conservation community has used to encapsulate the multiple values ascribed” (Avrami et al., 2000, p. 7) to cultural heritage expressions. Because of its rather consistent use, significance can often help to comprehend how values are understood, especially in cases where significance and values are used interchangeably. If, for example, the Burra Charter states that “the term cultural significance is synonymous with heritage significance and cultural heritage value” (The Burra Charter, 1999, § 1.2), it can legitimately be assumed that ‘values’ is used according to the second alternative, to refer to the qualities of heritage. Where on the other hand authors insist “that ‘value’ and ‘importance/significance’ are not the same thing because they refer to two distinct, but connected, spheres of meaning” (Darvill, 2005, p. 22) then it is most likely that values are considered as framed in the first alternative.

Meaning often refers to the understanding an individual or group gains through the interpretation of heritage values as expressed in heritage significance. It is the meaning which links heritage to the construction of cultural identity as David Lowenthal implies when stating: “The more heritage is valued, the more its possession and meaning are disputed” (Lowenthal, 2000, p. 18) In the US National Park Service the phrase ‘cultural meaning’ has furthermore served to designate human related significance to a place in particular – as opposed to environmental or historic significance (Crespi, 1987). Here at the latest it becomes obvious, that it is precarious to speak of basic conformities in the three concepts, an impression that will be confirmed by
more detailed looks at the definitions provided by selected national and international institutions.

Value assessment for places in Australia is firmly rooted in the Burra Charter (cf. Taylor, 1999, p. 51), a native Australian tool developed by ICOMOS Australia, which underwent major revisions and is now a comprehensive document with clear definitions. It defines all three terms, values, significance and meaning, though values are more indirectly defined through their equation with significance. On the basis of the Burra Charter, the first product to achieve in a heritage management process is a statement of significance, “expressing simply why the place is of value but not restating the physical or documentary evidence.” (Australia ICOMOS, 1988, 3.4) Like most other systems, the Australians emphasise certain value categories which are already included in the definition of cultural significance:

“Cultural significance means aesthetic, historic, scientific, social or spiritual value for past, present and future generations.” (The Burra Charter, 1999)

Value typologies are indeed an interesting phenomenon, as all cultural significance assessment methodologies are aided by specified value categories or criteria. “The use of a well tried set of criteria is also recommended” (Walton, 1999) because “a typology of heritage values would be an effective guide to characterisation (...) in which all parties' values can be discussed.” (Mason, 2002, p. 9) The idea is that stakeholders not familiar with heritage terminology might have difficulties to articulate their values and that by offering a typology – a framework that breaks heritage values down into several subcategories – participants in the assessment process would be enabled to easier communicate their heritage values. I have to express my doubts at this point and underline that all categories offered will never encompass the whole range of values that could possibly be attributed to one particular heritage expression. Presented typologies might help people articulate some value concepts – those clearly fitting into the respective categories – but at the same time aggravate reluctances to articulate values not fitting into the scheme. This means that heritage professionals, entering a participatory value assessment process with a set of value typologies have already pre-selected the value types they expect to hear.

The immense variety of value categories offered in academic and non-academic writings in the heritage field, illustrates that any attempt to categorise all values is determined to fail. Categories in use, range from age value, historical value, commemorative value, use value, newness value (all Riegl, 1903), economic value, aesthetic value, associative-symbolic value, informational value (Lipe, 1984, p. 3), option value, non-use value, existence value, bequest value (Nanda et al., 2001), cultural value, educational and academic value, resource value, recreational value (English Heritage, 1997), symbolic value, ecological value, humanistic and moralistic value, altruistic value (Satterfield, 2002) to intrinsic value, rarity value, group value, amenity value (Darvill, 2005), therapeutic value, peace value and spiritual value (Harmon, 2004), access value (R. W. B. Carter & Bramley, 2002), socio-cultural value, religious value,
market value, artistic value, political value, craft or work-related value (Mason, 2002) and certainly many others. As a matter of course all specifications can also be combined with significance, but this rarely happens since significance is primarily considered to be a synthesis of values.146

Back in the Australian context, the Burra Charter also defines meaning as denoting “what a place signifies, indicates, evokes or expresses.” (The Burra Charter, 1999, 1.16) An explanation adds that meaning can only relate to “intangible aspects such as symbolic qualities and memories” (Ibid.) Meaning is thereby defined as the values and messages people perceive in a reflective process of understanding when encountering the heritage expression. The opposed category, intangible aspects people actively ascribe (therefore identical to social, cultural or symbolic values) are referred to as associations and are tersely defined as “the special connections that exist between people and a place.”

The very elaborate definition of terms is followed by equally sophisticated instructions for data gathering, stakeholder consultation and establishment of the statement of significance. For indigenous heritage places the Australian Heritage Commission produces additional guidelines highlighting the importance of precautionary approaches and sensitizing heritage professionals to particular schemes of indigenous value expressions and consultation processes (Australian Heritage Commission, 2002); an ambition, which is not limited to places only. Equally refined guidelines have been produced by the Heritage Collection Council for museum objects, one of the rare documents in the tangible heritage field where the term ‘values’ is consistently replaced by ‘significance’ (Heritage Collection Council, 2001). And finally, these approaches are further transferred to natural heritage in the implementation of the World Heritage Convention for which “Australia suggests that natural and cultural values form a conceptual continuum” (Lennon et al., 1999, p. 12) Policies for intangible heritage are combined to tangible heritage initiatives and their development has according to Marilyn Truscott “helped to foster greater dialogue between the various departments responsible for heritage” (Truscott in: Deacon, 2004b, p. 63)

Australia is not the only country with such advanced tools for heritage professionals but – if one believes in significance statements on the basis of value categories – it is probably one of the best places to learn policy drafting. But also Canada and New Zealand have established similar systems. Standards and guidelines for the conservation of historic places in Canada, recently published by Parks Canada, the organisation responsible for heritage designations on the national level,147 define heritage values by adapting the Burra Charter definition of cultural significance as a definition of heritage values.148 According to these guidelines, the first step in advance of any further consideration on heritage planning is the identification of heritage values and character defining elements, i.e. the attributes through which value is expressed. “The essence of these elements is usually captured in a ‘statement of significance’ or equivalent document.” (Parks Canada, 2003, p. 6) These statements are mostly prepared by the responsible heritage agency, advised by a board of outside experts and,
in the context of Parks Canada, focus on national values, though sufficient flexibility allows for the inclusion of ‘other values’:

“In order to accommodate the other values – coming at us from stakeholders – that don’t have anything to do with the national significance identified by this board, we call those ‘other values’. We include them in the commemorative integrity statement, and we make commitments to protect those other values.” (Cameron et al., 2001, p. 15) Like in Australia, the Canadian system actively encourages the participation of aboriginal people in the value identification processes (Cameron, 2003, p. 123) and also foresees periodic reviews of statements to add values and accommodate value changes. In many other states – I can speak for Germany and several Arab States – statements of significance are not required in heritage planning processes, nor do the legal regulations encourage participatory processes for value assessment. Heritage descriptions are in most cases prepared by experts in the respective authorities and are limited to a detailed documentation of the physical substance, age and aesthetic features. Rarely, they also include considerations of use and function. The unfamiliarity with heritage significance statements is interestingly recognizable in World Heritage nominations by the respective State Parties. Several even recent nomination files show that the required justification for inscription, which includes a statement of outstanding universal value (UNESCO, 2005g, § 132), caused the authors some discomfort and some of them merely reiterated the physical and historical features already explained in the description of the property.

While in the Intangible Heritage Convention the term values is not named – intangible heritage experts agreed that ‘cultural significance’ might be most appropriate (UNESCO, 2003e, p. 5) but even this expression is not used in the final version of the convention – the World Heritage Convention is focused on outstanding universal value(s)152. It does not explicitly introduce value categories, though they are hidden in the cultural heritage definition: “which are of outstanding universal value from the historical, aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological point of view” (UNESCO, 1972a, § 1). The interest in the cultural dependency of ‘universal’ values has steadily grown since the Nara Document was adopted (cf. Nara Document on Authenticity, 1995) and recent conferences such as the ‘Linking universal and local values’ conference in Amsterdam (de Merode et al., 2003) attempt to keep alive the discussion.

A disadvantage of the World Heritage convention is its inflexibility with regard to possible value changes. In order to adjust the significance statement initially proposed, a state party faces endeavours which are almost as extensive as for a new nomination: “where a state party wishes to have the property inscribed under additional or different criteria other than those used for original inscription, it shall submit this request as if it were a new nomination.” (UNESCO, 2005g, § 166) Or does the claim for universality in the World Heritage Convention require universally readable, timeless values, which never change and are documented in significance statements for eternity?
1.2 Intrinsic or attributed – static or dynamic

One might be tempted to ask, why I waste time and effort to deal with the quite rhetorical question on static, timeless and intrinsic values at a time when practically everybody agrees that values are attributed and dynamic. I need to defend myself by demonstrating that this is unfortunately not the case as a selective review of heritage publications from the new millennium has demonstrated. Or, at least it is not the case for tangible heritage. The intangible heritage field has left notions like intrinsic value or static qualities behind and agrees that “intangible cultural heritage constantly develops and renews itself, and the same goes for its appreciation and acceptance.” (Matsuura, 2004) But unfortunately, intangible heritage experts also continue to decry tangible heritage as timeless and static.

“A long tradition in cultural thought”, we learn from David Thorsby, “sees the true value of a work of art, for example, as lying in intrinsic qualities of aesthetic, artistic or broader cultural worth that it possesses.” (Throsby, 2000, p. 28) Mason and Avrami add that “significance is conceived as a static and timeless assessment of values. (...) It fixes meaning of a site, mostly according to expert assessments” (Mason & Avrami, 2002).

To involve more outsiders into the World Heritage field, it is recommended to promote “awareness raising of both, the extrinsic and intrinsic value of World Heritage” (Munjeri, 2003, p. 76) or to make a World Heritage site more visible and accessible to the public “without compromising the intrinsic values” of it (Smook, 2003, p. 127). And finally Bernd von Droste notes:

“The critical issue remains to ensure that the World Heritage and its values are passed on to future generations so that an understanding and appreciation will be renewed based on its intrinsic values.” (von Droste, 2002)

None of the above authors defines what intrinsic values are, but a definition borrowed from a philosophical context is unspecific enough to be well applied to the heritage field:

“The intrinsic value of something is said to be the value that that thing has ‘in itself,’ or ‘for its own sake,’ or ‘as such,’ or ‘in its own right.’” (Zimmerman, 2004)

The only official UNESCO document speaking of intrinsic values is the 1972 Recommendation on cultural and natural heritage. In naming intrinsic value this recommendation refers to World Heritage as opposed to the more modest heritage which the instrument comprises: “not only works of great intrinsic value, but also more modest items that have, with the passage of time, acquired cultural or natural value.” (UNESCO, 1972d, § 5) The conceptual change within UNESCO in the following three decades is extraordinary, in that the 2001 Declaration on Cultural Diversity aims to preserve cultural diversity “as a living, and thus renewable treasure that must not be perceived as being unchanging heritage but as a process guaranteeing the sur-
vival of humanity.” (UNESCO, 2002j, preface) The dynamic characteristics of values attributed also to tangible heritage had been highlighted much earlier and are efficiently summarised by Herb Stovel who reminds us that “it is important to be aware that heritage values are not intrinsic to the heritage: heritage speaks through the values we give to it.” (Stovel, 1995a)

In recent discussions on heritage values, for example the Kazan meeting on Outstanding Universal Value in 2005, World Heritage professionals reached mutual agreement on both the lack of inherence and stability of heritage values. On behalf of ICOMOS Susan Denyer clarified that “value is not something that monuments, groups of buildings or sites possess intrinsically; [but that] all value is given by people as an acknowledgement of worth” (ICOMOS, 2005a, p. 9) and Joseph King on behalf of ICCROM added that these values “are subjective and change over time” (King, 2005). But aside from discussing the dynamic and attributed characteristics of values, participants of the Kazan Meeting had to decide whether values can be universal and if so, how their universality could be defined (UNESCO, 2004b, p. 13). And that was, as it turned out, a fairly difficult task.

### 1.3 Universality and representativity

With the question whether values can be universal or representative we return from the above general discussion of values and concepts of valuation into the core of the tangible and intangible heritage debate of UNESCO. Because among others, it is this very notion, the alleged universality of values, that disunites the Intangible Heritage Convention and the World Heritage Convention. Or, more correctly, it is the notion of ‘Outstanding Universal Value’ in the World Heritage Convention that the authors of the Intangible Heritage Convention considered a hegemonic paradox. At the same time many recent approaches to redefine OUV in the world heritage context have moved the concept precariously close to the term representativity as used in the intangible heritage field.

While Jokilehto connected UNESCO’s recent emphasis on cultural diversity as a fundamental aspect of our heritage to “confusion about what should be intended by outstanding universal value in the context of the World Heritage Convention” (Jokilehto, 2004, p. 1), historic sources prove that the phrase was first critically debated before the adoption of the convention. What is even more striking is that the consolidated draft debated by a special committee of government experts in April 1972 did not even contain the phrase ‘outstanding universal value’ but spoke of cultural and natural heritage of ‘exceptional universal interest’ (UNESCO, 1972e, § 1). It was a draft amendment by the UK delegation that requested to substitute ‘universal interest’ by ‘outstanding universal value’ (UNESCO, 1972c). And it was accepted against the explicit protest of some other delegations, such as Nigeria which requested to delete ‘universal’ and merely leave ‘exceptional interest’ (UNESCO, 1972b). One can question nowadays whether or not this was a wise move.
Despite including the phrase OUV, the World Heritage Convention does not offer a definition (cf. Cleere, 2001, p. 24). Michel Batisse, who was already quoted earlier as a member of the editorial team, rather confusingly explicates that it is ‘universal properties of outstanding value’ which constitute universal value (Batisse, 2005, p. 14). In order to find a more helpful and practicable definition experts have met periodically from as early as 1976 until most recently in 2005159 – every time with the same task: to reflect on the concept of OUV to “better enable State Parties to identify (…) properties of potential outstanding universal value” (UNESCO, 2004b, § 13). In the earliest Operational Guidelines of 1977 an explication was included:

“The definition of ‘universal’ in the phrase ‘outstanding universal value’ requires comment. Some properties may not be recognised by all people, everywhere, to be of great importance and significance. Opinions may vary from one culture or period to another. As far as cultural property is concerned, the term ‘universal’ must be interpreted as referring to a property which is highly representative of the culture of which it forms part.” (UNESCO, 1977, § 6)

Neither the comment nor the implicit practice of interpretation were retained after the following revision in 1980 (UNESCO, 2005b, p. 3). The next intense discussion of the concept took place during the Global Strategy expert meeting in 1998 and is in its report summarised in the words of Sharon Sullivan who chaired the working group on OUV: “the working group did not find a solution to the question ‘What is outstanding universal value?’ as it encompasses all the diversity and differences in the world.” (UNESCO, 1998b, p. 13)160 It was only during the last revision of the Operational Guidelines in 2005 that a new definition of OUV was included:

“Outstanding universal value means cultural and/or natural significance which is so exceptional as to transcend national boundaries and to be of common importance for present and future generations of all humanity.” (UNESCO, 2005g, § 49)

But this definition does still not mark the end of a long-lasting discussion161. Although almost everybody involved in World Heritage is content with the definition given in the Operational Guidelines for the moment, various proposals for alternative definitions or different conceptual application are raised.162 Most of them start from a shared doubt that values of common importance for all humanity as expressed in the current definition exist. Joseph King remarks, for example, that “there is no site that would have the same meaning for all people in all parts of the world” (King, 2005), and Christopher Young explained that “there are very few things which have affected the whole of humanity in one, probably the last period in which that happened was the Palaeolithic.”163 The logical consequence is a more relativistic concept of universality as was proposed to me by Michael Turner, who reminds us of an earlier discussion on cultural categories and the Aristotelian question whether culture is more than the sum of its parts164. Based on his understanding of Baruch de Spinoza’s concept of universality, Michael Turner proposed to consider outstanding universal value the synthesis of the diversity of all cultural values165 or as he writes on behalf of Israel in the comments on the Cairns Decision, that OUV links “the idea of universality (…) to a universal theme reflecting the eternal aspirations and vicissi-
tudes of the human condition, with life and death, progress and prosperity, war and peace, beauty and horror of violence.” (UNESCO, 2004a, p. 31) A similar approach was also chosen by Joseph King of ICCROM who suggested in Kazan that when thinking of OUV we must rather try to represent the richness and diversity of all cultures, which he relates to an overall narrative: “Outstanding Universal Value becomes the importance that we give a site in telling the overall story of mankind as represented by the diversity of its cultures.” (King, 2005, p. 3)166

But with such definitions or also the earliest definition drafted in 1977, World Heritage experts have framed a similar if not identical concept to what Intangible Heritage professionals refer to as ‘representative’ of the wide range of divers cultural expressions. Authors of the Intangible Heritage Convention have decided to deliberately reject any benchmark like outstanding or exceptional as applied in the masterpiece selections, in which “the proposed cultural space or form of cultural expression should demonstrate its outstanding value in accordance with the selection criteria” (UNESCO, 2001a, p. 19) The discussions leading towards the 2003 convention raised concerns with regard to such terminology at an early point, including the term ‘masterpieces’ which was considered “to create a hierarchy of cultures incompatible with the nature of oral heritage.” (Blake, 2002, p. 46) Janet Blake further highlighted the “conceptual difficulty in valuing intangible heritage as ‘universal heritage’ in view of its role in the construction of identity of a specific people or group in opposition to other identities.” (Blake, 2002, p. 12)167

The 2003 convention lists on the basis of representativity: “In order to ensure better visibility (…) and awareness of its significance, and to encourage dialogue with respect to cultural diversity, the Committee (…) shall establish, keep up to date and publish a Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity.” (UNESCO, 2003b, § 16) Even if Richard Kurin argues the term ‘exemplary’ might have been more appropriate than ‘representative’ (cf. Kurin, 2004b, p. 71), both options seem to express exactly what Joseph King meant with his approach of trying to represent the richness and diversity of all culture and the significance we give something in telling the overall story of humankind. Is outstanding universal value as understood today simply representativity of cultural diversity?

I would be tempted to answer affirmatively if there wasn’t the additional terminological confusion that representativity has a different connotation in the World Heritage context (cf. Aikawa, 2004, p. 141), where it stands for a quest for numerical equality, geographical balance or proportional presentation (UNESCO, 2004a, p. 24). Nevertheless this implies that for both conventions representativity is desired, an ambition that in the case of the World Heritage Convention is seemingly undermined by its exposed geographic imbalances (cf. Luxen, 2004b, p. 6).

At the same time the term ‘representative’ is likely to turn into another minefield of terminological misunderstandings between tangible and intangible heritage professionals. While the former understand it as the renunciation of the hegemonic quest
for universality in order to include a larger variety of knowledge systems, the latter understand representative to mean a far lower benchmark that gathers heritage of lower quality. Many World Heritage professionals would agree with Christopher Young, that if representative were to be applied to the World Heritage selection, “you would end up with an awful lot more sites on the list”\textsuperscript{168}. Bernd von Droste even compares it to the situation with the parallel World Heritage and the Man and Biosphere Reserve (MAB programme) initiatives for natural heritage, where World Heritage lists the unique and universal and the MAB programme the regionally representative (von Droste, 2005, p. 5). With this comparison in mind, it will be interesting to see whether in the future ICOMOS will suggest to sites which fail to demonstrate OUV but have so-called intangible associations to submit a candidature under the 2003 convention in the same manner that IUCN has already suggested to several nominations to better try to gain recognition under the MAB or geoparks programmes\textsuperscript{169}.

It is with the intention of eradicating such thoughts that Koïchiro Matsuura also envisages an opening of the World Heritage Convention towards the requirements of recognizing the world’s cultural diversity, which according to him is a policy priority closely linked not only to the diverse cultural identities of peoples in the world but to the identity of UNESCO:

“(…) we give universality its true face, that of pluralism, reflecting the world as it really is, one in its diversity, we may hope that this new-found universality is the outcome of a determination – or at least a hope – that multilateralism will find within UNESCO its fullest meaning, which would bestow upon us immense responsibilities and fill me with pride.” (Matsuura, 2003a, p. 9)

### 2 Heritage and value – an evolutionary perspective

Although terms like universality, pluralism or diversity can be equally applied to both heritage and values, heritage cannot simply be reduced to its significance, or the synthesis of its values. Values are certainly an important and determining factor in heritage construction, but without social interaction, generation and transmission of knowledge as well as spatial and temporal frameworks in which such processes can take place, values would simply remain values.

The complex processes of heritage construction and reaffirmation – the evolution of heritage – is best described as a circular or even cyclical process (cf. Darvill, 2005, p. 25). If such cycles were to be illustrated with keywords indicating individual stages of the process I would probably speak of values – significance – meaning – identity – heritage – knowledge – legitimation – values and so on, imagined as a circular structure\textsuperscript{170}. I will not start with the ‘values’ stage when elucidating the circular structure – simply to emphasise its circularity – but with knowledge. If we consider our heritage construction cycle as a symbolic universe according to Berger and Luckmann, then
knowledge or rather the objectivation, sedimentation and accumulation of knowledge – which is all subsumed under the keyword – is the crystallisation of the symbolic universe (P. L. Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p. 97). Knowledge – internally justified belief as a result of reflection on a certain thing – in combination with the following two stations, legitimation and values, identifies a sub-process of heritage construction, which we can call value definition. Legitimation, the binding element of this sub-process, forms the basis of value judgements by ascribing cognitive validity to the objectivated meanings gathered as knowledge. “In other words, ‘knowledge’ precedes ‘values’ in the legitimation” (P. L. Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p. 94) and value is the outcome of knowledge validation. The knowing, which as we learned from Heidegger is the preservation, reaches its ultimate fulfilment in legitimation in that it creates yet another symbolic universe, yet another heritage creation or affirmation cycle. A brochure published by English Heritage, ‘Power of place’, points out that because knowledge is never static, our interpretations of heritage “are constantly being tested and refined” (English Heritage, 2000, p. 36) and speaks of knowledge as the first precondition.

Values emerge from preconceptions or better pre-knowledge, a temporarily validated state of mind which, often unconsciously, formulates its standards: values. Since our knowledge constantly increases, the need of temporal frameworks is essential, as values and everything they are attributed to can never be identical at two different states of knowledge or – which is the same – two different moments. Values are negotiated in social interaction; a second keyword hidden behind the term values. The term ‘values’ does not only signify the existence of values but the process of creating, negotiating and validating these values, not only against the legitimated pre-knowledge but also against the individual social surroundings. Social validation requires an exchange of values between individuals, which is facilitated by signifiers. Objects, processes and expressions, on which values are projected form the spatial dimension of heritage construction and function as reference-systems in the narratives that aim to convey values. This is one of the functions heritage fulfils in the process. Therefore, despite the circular structure proposed, one should also imagine direct links between values and heritage, significance and heritage as well as meaning and heritage which attribute the three stages to their temporal and spatial frameworks. According to earlier definitions the synthesis of values attributed to one particular representation can be called significance (cf. Avrami et al., 2000) which in a reflective process reveals meaning.

Meaning explains the connection of values (or significance) and the cultural representations and expressions in form of narratives. Here our circular path forks in that meaning either immediately provides information for the generation of new knowledge – and thereby closes a smaller circle – or contributes to the formation of identity, as a result of the earlier processes. In the first case, the relation between meaning and knowledge is the process of understanding which “bridges the gap between subject and object (...) as an intellectual or cognitive action” (Darvill, 2005, p. 24). In the
second, identity is constituted, as Jensen describes it: “not an inner kernel of things, but a function of relations.” (Jensen, 2000, p. 43) Identity – like values – requires projection screens, not simply as a signifier but rather as an anchor for the preservation (knowing) of identity-constituting narratives. This is the second function of heritage, which here legitimately steps into the circle. Heritage functions as the projection screen, the expression and representation or as Mason and Avrami term it, the “conduits for evolving notions of identity” (Mason & Avrami, 2002, p. 21). And I think it is also this aspect that Susan Pearce describes when writing that “cultural heritage is cognitively constructed as an external expression of identity” (S. M. Pearce, 2000)\(^{176}\).

In the process of projecting not only values but also identity, heritage does not merely remain a representation but becomes part of this identity. David Lowenthal has highlighted that “we mainly value heritage as our own, not anyone else's – and not like anyone else's.” (Lowenthal, 2000, p. 21) Tunbridge and Ashworth confirm that “all heritage is someone's heritage and therefore logically not someone else's” (Tunbridge & Ashworth, 1996). Heritage facilitates the locating of oneself, of identity – the dwelling in heritage – and thereby creates knowledge of both, the self and the other. Probably it is this self-location process which the promoters of the Intangible Heritage Convention try to capture in describing heritage as bearing “witness to the creative genius of communities (...) handed down, for the most part orally, through the generations and provides its depository community (...) with a feeling of identity and continuity.” (UNESCO, 2004e)

The circular – or cross-linked circular – system closes; heritage generates knowledge, knowledge legitimated will function as a basis for value establishment and so on. It is fascinating that this circle somehow resembles the hermeneutic circles of continuous interpretation and understanding as developed by Martin Heidegger and carefully enhanced by Hans-Georg Gadamer (cf. Gadamer, 1989)\(^{177}\). To analyse and describe heritage it is now important to bring to mind, that heritage professionals usually don’t observe the cycle from outside as just exercised, but look at heritage from within the cycle, with pre-knowledge, values, meanings and understandings. This is not even special for heritage professionals. All research is value-generated and all research results are constructed in a similar, cyclical manner, including this work which also continuously creates and verifies new cycles.

In result, the description or analysis of heritage with an exclusive focus on the element of heritage is inadequate. Heritage identification needs to move beyond this stage and consider the whole cycle of heritage evolution, value generation, identity formation, understanding and knowing and the projection of all these aspects onto tangible and intangible expressions. The only combining element, facilitating understanding of all these factors, are narratives that we use to explain our values, identity, heritage and knowledge. It is narratives that make the cycle allegeable. And it is via narratives that we share the different stages of the cycle, that we share heritage. I therefore propose that heritage professionals acknowledge that they are simply just another kind of ‘storytellers’ and with their stories try to preserve their heritage (cf.
Unfortunately, heritage professional are not the best story-tellers. Their stories are often retrospective and analytical and thereby slightly detached from the present cultural identities involved. In addition, they try to tell either all stories or the only right story, an almost desperate eccentricity of a profession that “tends to attract careful, precise people who try very hard to do the ‘right’ thing.” (Wain, 2004, p. 3) Since a ‘right’ analysis of the cycle or a complete identification of all related stories or even a comprehensive statement of significance are simply not possible, heritage professionals turn back to the ‘tangible’, to the projection screen, which appears to be the most accessible part of the cycle.

And with the absolute of right and wrong the heritage evolution cycle requires us to dismiss several other absolutes discussed earlier, among them intangibility and tangibility. Heritage created as a projection of values and an expression of identity can never be solely tangible or exclusively intangible. Intangible and tangible rather have to be seen as the two extremes of a gradual scale. While some heritage expressions might be more tangible and others less tangible, all expressions lie between these extremes. Neither the conservation of physical substance nor the safeguarding of performances and practices via documentation can be preservation in the sense of standing-within, dwelling or knowing heritage. Such preservation solely emphasises the continuation of the cycle with its constant re-creation or re-affirmation of all elements through knowing and thinking.

In such an approach to preservation, all elements of the cycle become equally vulnerable as the loss of any stage might interrupt or at least severely disturb the cycle. Such interruptions could be understood as semiological degradation. To counteract such disruption preservation shares a mutual aim with hermeneutic phenomenology which is to preserve or to reveal “a totality of meanings in all its relations” (Gadamer, 1989, p. 471). For hermeneutic phenomenology Wilcke describes that a shift of focus is necessary in that “the aim is not to understand individual people, but to understand that about which they speak” (Wilcke, 2002) For the case of heritage we could take up a comparable stance: the aim is not first and foremost to understand heritage expressions but to understand the narratives they tell us and the narratives that create and sustain them.

This presents a manifold collection of new challenges to heritage professionals. I illustrate some by considering one particular kind of heritage expressions in more detail in the following section of my work: heritage of faith. Heritage of faith is not only particularly threatened by semiological degradation, it also exemplifies the inter-relation of intangible and tangible aspects as well as the necessity to understand meaning, value, knowledge and identity in a broader framework. Is that possible within the present benchmarks provided by heritage evaluation systems? Let us see.
Despite denying a monuments contribution to rootedness in culture, Tuan recognizes and amply describes its sign character in the generation and visualization of memory: “By remembering, philosophers pointed out, man could escape the purely momentary sensations, the nothingness that lay in wait for him between moments of existence. And what better aid to memory than the tangible evidences of the past – old furniture, old buildings, and museum collections?” (Tuan, 1989, p. 194).

I hope that my readers do not take my proclamation so seriously that they question what exactly I mean speaking of the ‘cult’ of values. I think that most definitions of ‘cult’ would suffice to make the point that the object of desire has shifted from monuments, to the past, to heritage and present to values and meaning. The definition of Emile Durkheim for example: “In reality cult (…) is a system of rites (…) that fulfill the need which the believer feels of strengthening and reaffirming, at regular intervals of time, the bond which unites him to the sacred beings upon which he depends” (Durkheim, 1954, p. 63), would perfectly fit if we simply replace ‘sacred beings’ by ‘cultural identity’. It is demonstrated in later sections of my work that such replacement can be considered legitimate.

Many active scholars in cultural studies would strongly oppose my proclamation of a postmodern cult of values, mainly because they would consider the combination of the phrase ‘postmodern’ with the mentioning of ‘values’ inappropriate. The argument would be that postmodernism is rather a phenomenon of a loss of values then a focus on values. David Throsby has contributed the following point of view: “In the post-modern period of the last two or three decades, powerful new methodologies from sociology, linguistics, psychoanalysis, and elsewhere have challenged and displaced the traditional ideals that harmony and regularity are at the core of value, situating these ideas in an expanded, shifting, and heterogeneous interpretation of value in which relativism replaces absolutism (…). Yet it can be suggested that postmodernism, while focusing attention on an expanded view of value, does not say much about value itself (…). Because of the uncertainties thus introduced, many writers today refer to a “crisis of value” in contemporary cultural theory.” (Throsby, 2000, p. 28)

Randall Mason and Erica Avrami confirm my personal experience, in writing that most professionals working in the conservation field “are quite comfortable figuring out how to conserve something (technical questions, mostly concerning physical conditions), but we are just beginning to look more seriously for answers to the questions of what and why.” (Mason & Avrami, 2002, p. 15)

I have to admit, that the emphasis on the value-basis of conservation decisions causes me some unease. Despite the term meanwhile being so popular that hardly anybody would admit that his conservation decisions are not values-based, I always ask myself how conservation decisions were made before this phrase was invented merely two decades ago. Where they not values-based? And if not, what else but our values were they based on?

The World Heritage Committee, in its 6th extraordinary session dedicated to the revision of the Operational Guidelines and the discussion of policy matters, outlined the confusion and inconsistency in the application of some central terms. It explicitly noted in its decision records, that the revised version of the Operational Guidelines shall “define and be consistent in the use of the terms: (…) ‘outstanding universal value’, ‘criteria’, ‘values’, ‘attributes’, ‘qualities’ and ‘characteristics’.” (UNESCO, 2003c, 1.6) While ‘outstanding universal value’ has indeed been defined (and will be discussed in chapter 1.3 Universality and representativity), most other concepts mentioned – including values – remain undefined in the World Heritage context (cf. UNESCO, 2005g).

Earlier in my life I wrote an academic thesis on concepts of authenticity in the context of global conservation strategies. For this I studied the Nara Document intensively and did not find it very helpful. It took me a few more years to realize that it is not the Nara Document but the concept of authenticity that I don’t find helpful. The Nara Document, however, in its introduction of culturally relative approaches to conservation and the perception of values, is a milestone document in the heritage field and cannot be underestimated in its general impact. I add some clarification to my difficulties with the concept of authenticity in Section Four, chapter 2.3 Topology – opportunities and challenges.

In another publication from the same year Randall Mason summarizes this bipolar definition in slightly different words but on the same conceptual basis: “Values is most often used in one of two senses: first, as morals, principles, or other ideas that serve as guides to action (individual and collective); and second, in reference to the qualities and characteristics seen in things, in particular the
positive characteristics (actual and potential).” (Mason, 2002, p. 5) He adds an explanation that this division corresponds to the division of ‘held’ and ‘assigned’ values which is utilised in the environmental conservation field.

One could probably describe the first value concept as the values that create the heritage, while the second value concept reflects the creation of the first. Or, if one tries to avoid the term to be specified, it is V¹, moral and ethical principles, that contributes to the knowledge and narratives we create to appreciate heritage and link it our cultural identities. To refer to heritage as a reference system for this identity we point to V² to illustrate the particular characteristics of importance.

I am aware that this is an arbitrary selection, which does not necessarily correspond to common usage of the terms, although I assume most would agree that significance could not replace the first alternative of the value definition. Often heritage values and heritage significance are used interchangeably, while some authors and charters stipulate a difference between values and significance. These are looked into in the following subchapter, 1.1 Value, significance, meaning.

Despite being among a minority I strongly believe in the importance of an approach to heritage identification that is focused on mental concepts rather than heritage expressions. This premise is not elaborated upon at this point, but provides the basis for the evolutionary discussion of heritage values: 2 Heritage and value – an evolutionary perspective, at the end of this section. The assumption will further be the starting point for the development of the conceptual approach called topologies which is introduced in Section Four of this book.

A singular exception are the few professionals who interpret value in solely monetary terms – not to be confused with referring to economic heritage value as one among many value categories. Value in monetary terms is presented by Richard Ready and Ståle Navrud in their book on methods for valuing culture heritage. It is in the context of cultural heritage – I cannot highlight this strong enough with regard to the definition that follows – that they offer the following definition: “Value (…) is defined as either (1) the amount of money the potential consumer would be willing to pay to get the good (willingness to pay WTP) or (2) the amount of money the owner of the good would have to be paid in order to induce him or her to part with it.” (Navrud & Ready, 2002, p. 10) Following this definition the authors offer very elaborate methods and formulas by which such heritage value can be calculated. A similar approach can be found in a paper of Lipp, who considers monuments according to their exchange capacity for other economic goods. (Lipp, 2001) I want to take the opportunity to explicitly distance myself from monetary value calculations for cultural heritage and I will not pursue such value approaches in my considerations.

Australian heritage professionals deliberately abandoned terms like site or monument and instead opted for the more flexible expression place. “Place means site area, land, landscape, building or other work, group of buildings or other works, and may include components, contents, spaces and views.” (The Burra Charter, 1999, 1.1)

ICOMOS International has not adopted the Burra Charter arguing that it was developed for a particularly Australian context, which does not suit the needs of other states or the international heritage community. On the other hand, in the meantime several non-Australian heritage administrations have incorporated elements or definitions of the Burra charter into their national guidelines, among them Parks Canada and English Heritage. Maybe it would be worthwhile to discuss the adequacy of the Burra Charter as a document for an international heritage community once again, after its most recent revision?

The five value groups are each defined in the Significance Guidelines supplement to the Burra Charter. Summarised, aesthetic value includes all aspects that are sensory perceptions, such as scale, colour, texture etc; historic value is identified if the place has influenced (or has been influenced by) a historic figure, event etc.; scientific value is the estimated degree to which the place could contribute to future substantial information; and last but not least social and spiritual values embrace the qualities for which a place has become focus of spiritual, national, cultural and other sentiments (Australia ICOMOS, 1988, 2.1 - 2.6).

Value categories proposed by the following authors cited are not reproduced completely. The authors will only be cited for those value typologies which had not been named yet. In any case should the impression be avoided that authors restrict their presentation to the categories mentioned before their name.
Section Two: The post-modern cult of values

146 The listed value categories could certainly be organised in different levels according to their specificity. One could for example argue that bequest value is a subcategory of economic value or that some are rather synonymous such as group value and identity value, which again could both be considered social values. On the other hand, if the categories are really intended to stimulate value identification, the more the better. A participant of a value assessment process who listens to a heritage professional talking about social and cultural value might not have the idea that his craft or work-related values are supposed to be included.

147 As a federal state the responsibility for heritage is mainly referred to the federal states but is also regulated on provincial level (for more information on the distribution of responsibilities of the various Canadian heritage administrations see (R. J. Pearce, 1989). The system is well comparable to the German Denkmalpflege (monument preservation) system, which however entirely lacks the national level. In the German context the lack of any kind of national institutions for heritage administration causes severe difficulties in coordination of international activities, for example World Heritage Listing processes, as the decision on a nomination to be brought forward or the adjustment of the tentative list requires a meeting of representatives of the 18 individual monument preservation agencies (or Ministers of Culture).

148 In the Parks Canada definition the terms ‘values’ and ‘significance’ have been switched so that heritage values (instead of significance) are defined as: “the aesthetic, historic, scientific, cultural, social or spiritual importance or significance [instead of values] for past, present or future generations.” (Parks Canada, 2003, p. 2)

149 Significance statements prepared solely by experts without the involvement of a wider public have to be seen as extremely problematic in the sense that – as discussed earlier – experts tend to create their own heritage on the basis of very specific values (cf. Tainter & Lucas, 1983, p. 710).

150 I refrain from naming particular examples here, especially because the files of sites that have been refused World Heritage Status are not publicly accessible. The nomination documentations of World Heritage sites inscribed on the list can be consulted at the World Heritage Documentation Centre, located in the ICOMOS Secretariat, Rue de la Fédération in Paris. Susan Denyer on behalf of ICOMOS confirms the general observation in describing that “one of the difficulties [of nominations] seems to be in separating what a property is (the description) from why it is significant (the statement of outstanding universal value). Often the reasons given for Outstanding Universal Value are not evaluations of qualities but statements of facts connected to what can be seen in the properties.” (ICOMOS, 2005a, p. 13)

151 The proclamation of masterpieces of the oral and intangible heritage of humanity on the other hand makes ample use of the term. Masterpieces are defined as “a cultural manifestation of exceptional value, defying any rules and not measurable by an external yardstick” and justifications of candidates are required to “demonstrate its outstanding value in accordance with the selection criteria” (UNESCO, 2001a, p. 13, 19)

152 Values and universality as claimed by the World Heritage Convention are discussed in the separate chapter 1.3 Universality and representativity of this section.

153 The delegation of Canada, which is currently a member to the World Heritage Committee, has highlighted during a Periodic Reporting presentation for North America delivered at the 29th Session of the World Heritage Committee in Durban, that approximately half of the significance statements of Canadian sites listed as World Heritage require to be adjusted. The presenter, Christina Cameron, pointed at the laborious administrative procedures foreseen for such modifications and expressed her concerns with regard to the work load of the Committee in dealing with a large amount of significance adjustments to be brought up in the future.

154 Examples of such depreciation were considered in Section One, chapter 2.3 The intangible – non-intangible debate.

155 In the case of Randall Mason and Erica Avrami this statement has to be considered a criticism of a seemingly prevalent opinion rather than their own perception. In their general scepticism towards statements of significance which they indeed consider static tools, they point at the fact that the statements are only static because the individuals writing them convey the impression that the values described are static.
Joseph King referred to the idea of intrinsic value as something professionals used in the past. “Where we may at one time have talked about the intrinsic nature of site or monument, we now realise that different people and different groups will assign different values to the heritage.” (King, 2005)

Rieks Smeets describes that “the term was considered discriminatory for other elements of the intangible cultural heritage that are (...) equally crucial for the identity of groups and communities. This is also the reason why, after heated debate, it was decided to speak of a Representative List rather than, for instance, about a list of outstanding items of the intangible cultural heritage, or of masterpieces.” (Smeets, 2004a, p. 144)

It is fascinating to imagine how this seemingly small change of words might have influenced the World Heritage system during the last thirty years. Would the list already be much larger if the Committee had been asked to select sites of ‘exceptional interest’ rather than OUV [Outstanding Universal Value]. Would we now have equally lengthy debates to define what exceptional interest means and how the term could be applied? These questions will never be answered, but since the current struggle with OUV is clearly documented to be a legacy of the United Kingdom, maybe one should request the United Kingdom to host one of the next in the line of seemingly ceaseless meetings trying to resolve the conceptual paradox.

The recommendations of the expert meeting on outstanding universal value which took place in Kazan, Russian Federation in April 2005 were again discussed for a few hours during the 30th meeting of the World Heritage Committee in 2006. During this discussion it was acknowledged that even further debate is required and the World Heritage Centre was requested to prepare two comprehensive compendia summarizing how the phrase in combination with the criteria had been interpreted in past Committee decisions. (cf. UNESCO, 2006c, p. 165) The debate on outstanding universal value is therefore still ongoing and even the current definition in the Operational Guidelines has to be considered provisional.

Sharon Sullivan adds to this statement that indeed “each site has some uniqueness” (UNESCO, 19998b) which somehow implies that each site has some kind of outstanding universal value. That this approach did not please State Parties seeking for guidelines how to apply benchmarks in nomination processes is rather obvious.

The Committee is not in agreement whether a new or more detailed definition for outstanding universal value is needed. Some delegations are very reluctant to agree on any definition (including the one currently inserted in the Operational Guidelines) arguing that any specification could counteract the continuous development of understanding of the term. Whereas other State Parties opt for an intense and continued discussion aiming to create a better definition, but these did not yet agree whether such discussion should be considered an academic, philosophical or pragmatic exercise and whether it should therefore be discussed by scholars, experts or in an intergovernmental Committee.

I had the opportunity to conduct several expert interviews during the World Heritage Committee meetings in Paris, Suzhou and Durban in which I collected some World Heritage voices and ideas on the possible interpretation of outstanding universal value. These interviews – although not all individuals that participated are quoted – have certainly strongly influenced the views expressed in this chapter. With regard to the discussion on outstanding universal value I would like to express my particular gratitude to Christopher Young (United Kingdom), Michael Turner (Israel), Jukka Jokilehto (ICOMOS), Alexander Gillespie (New Zealand) and Kunio Sato (Japan), who each spent ample time to discuss and analyse the concept with me during the 29th Committee Session in Durban in 2005. I further wish to extend my appreciation to Mechthild Rössler (UNESCO) and Joseph King (ICCROM) who informed me about many additional details of the Kazan Meeting which did not find expression in the meeting records.

The comment by Christopher Young is quoted from an interview he offered me on the 12th of July 2005 during the World Heritage Committee meeting in Durban, South Africa.

The discussion referred to commenced in Section One, chapter 1 Structured, divided, or separated?

This comment is quoted from an interview I conducted with Michael Turner in July 2005. Probably still inspired by my talk with him, I wrote an article on the concept of outstanding universal value shortly after the Committee meeting in Durban in which I presented a very similar position
arguing that OUV is nothing else than the synthesis of all expressions of cultural diversity. “It means that in a literal but also holistic sense only the sum of its parts, the compilation of the vast entirety of heritage values can indeed be called universal.” (Rudolf, 2006, p. 114)

166 Joseph King adds that since values change over time as does our perception of values the best we can do is to communicate to future generations why we decided for the selection of sites we put on the World Heritage List. (King, 2005, p. 5) I wish to continue this thought in that it is indeed the list, and not only the heritage inscribed on it, that we pass on to future generations and that at one point the documentation of the list will serve as a testimony illustrating how we in the late twentieth century thought our cultural identity was expressed.

167 The consequence drawn from these difficulties with the term universal was not to abandon it completely but to limit it to the universal responsibility of safeguarding heritage rather than relating it to heritage values (cf. Blake, 2002, p. 75). The same recommendation was made by one of the intergovernmental meetings: “the formulation ‘common heritage of humanity’ should clearly be avoided … In other words, the universality should not be applied to the IH itself but to the justification for its safeguarding.” (UNESCO, 2002e, p. 8)

168 This citation also emerges from an interview conducted on July 12th 2005. This fear of a run on the list is remarkable. Since most experts agree that outstanding universal value in a literal sense does not exist, representativity already seems to be the basis of current judgement. It is therefore questionable whether a change of terms in the guidelines would indeed make so much difference in the process and would as suggested attract a major amount of additional nomination proposals.

169 The Pitons Management Area on Saint Lucia, inscribed on the World Heritage List in 2004 did not demonstrate outstanding universal value according to the IUCN evaluation. However, it was suggested that it “has some affinities with UNESCO MAB-Biosphere Reserves.” (IUCN, 2004, p. 76). For the Baltic Klint in Estonia, proposed for inscription in 2006, IUCN after evaluating the outstanding universal value negatively, proposed to submit the file for consideration under the UNESCO geoparks programme (IUCN, 2006, p. 40).

170 I will deliberately refrain from drawing a figure of such circular structure as I think it shall only function as an initial frame helping to understand the processes. I would not want to see such figure extracted and quoted as a ‘value-heritage construction process’ as it shall only be seen as an exemplification of how such a process could take place. The stations identified can furthermore be skipped or rearranged at any time.

171 At the same time the symbolic universe is constructed by social objectivations so that the objectivation, sedimentation and accumulation of knowledge are impulses of value generation and therefore not the seeming goal (crystallisation) but also the starting point of the cycle. Berger and Luckmann define symbolic universes as “bodies of theoretical tradition that integrate different provinces of meaning and encompass the institutional order in a symbolic totality. (…) The symbolic universe is conceived of as the matrix of all socially objectivated and subjectively real meanings (…) seen as events taking place within the universe. (…) The symbolic universe is, of course, constructed by means of social objectivations. Yet its meaning-bestowing capacity far exceeds the domain of social life, so that the individual may ‘locate’ himself within it even in his most solitary experiences.” (P. L. Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p. 95, 96) The approach described in ‘locating’ oneself in the symbolic universe heritage is probably comparable to what I termed ‘dwelling’ in heritage inspired by Heidegger’s ‘standing-within’ heritage, all of which is further discussed in Section Four of this work.

172 The preliminary definition of knowledge which is partly quoted here was introduced in Section One, chapter 3.3 Narrative and knowledge – reference systems, please refer especially to endnote 129.


174 This process, which in Heidegger’s thoughts is termed the visualisation (Anschauung) of values, is one of the derivates of understanding processes. (Heidegger, 1960, p. 147)

175 The interrelation of the three phases value, significance and meaning was discussed at length in chapter 1.1 Value, significance, meaning and shall not be repeated here.
176 Susan Pearce in continuing also describes how heritage contributes to close the circle and generate knowledge, values, identity, heritage and so on. In her words: “Its activeness lies in its influence: once particular elements are established as heritage, they exercise power; they have life on their own that affects people’s minds and that consequently affects their choices. Heritage becomes a representation of beliefs about self and community which nest in with other related belief systems to create a holistic structure that ramifies through all areas – politics, economics, use of resources – where social life touches us as individuals. Heritage is (…) a selective construction of individual and cooperate identity.” (S. M. Pearce, 2000, p. 59)

177 The hermeneutical cycle was introduced to replace earlier linear models of inductive understanding. Gadamer himself explains it in the following way: “Whenever someone wants to understand a text, he always formulates a projection. He projects before him a meaning of the whole as soon as the initial meaning is indicated. (…) In working out such a preliminary projection – which is of course, continually revised, there is a further penetration into the meaning – consists the understanding of what is there.” (Gadamer, 1990, p. 236)
“Not long ago many educated people assumed that in the next few centuries religion would gradually disappear, to be replaced by a scientific philosophy, a secular and sociological ethic and an existential aesthetics. How dated this view now seems!” (Turner, 1991, p. 83)

Social scientists, but also society at large have left behind the modern quest for absolute objectivity, rationality, and pure reason, and have entered a post-modern era of increasing acceptance, but also interest in or even promotion of, cultural and with it spiritual diversity and identity. Such spiritual aspects of cultural identity are often referred to according to yet another categorical system, so-called religions. Religions, as entities of identity-construction also create heritage, which is then referred to as a particular heritage type named spiritual or religious heritage. Such grouping is more widely used for tangible than for intangible heritage frameworks. While ICOMOS for tangible heritage speaks of religious properties under which it groups “any form of property with religious or spiritual associations: churches, monasteries, shrines, sanctuaries, mosques, synagogues, temples, sacred landscapes, sacred groves (…) etc.” (ICOMOS, 2004b, p. 55), intangible heritage frameworks group expressions of religious identity according to their modes, such as social practices, rituals or knowledge (UNESCO, 2003b).

This disparity evokes the impression that the tangible heritage field considers religious heritage in some way different from other heritage – otherwise a church or mosque could simply be grouped as historic buildings whereas the intangible heritage field does not emphasise any relevant distinction, a sacred dance is just another dance and a religious ceremony just another festive event. Is religious heritage or heritage of faith a meaningful category?

Many authors who support a distinctive typology of religious heritage argue that these expressions are particularly difficult to analyse and understand. The access to knowledge required to comprehend the expressions seems restricted to insiders and so consequently Oleg Grabar asks: “Can the significance of still-used religious buildings only be fully grasped by those who worship them?” (Grabar, 1988, p. 27) Although few people could perhaps be considered to actually worship religious heritage while most rather worship that for which it functions as a signifier, the question is valid: can only those value the heritage expression who know what it signifies? My response is yes, only those can value it. But this is actually the case for every kind of heritage and nothing special for expressions in contexts of faiths. Oleg Grabar reaches a different answer in stating that “certain values attached to religious monuments are peculiar to them alone” (Grabar, 1988, p. 27). He argues that their peculiarity lies in their lack of openness to interpretation from differing religious contexts as opposed to, for example, aesthetic values which can be equally valued by every-
body regardless of his religious beliefs (cf. Grabar, 1988). Despite the fact that I don’t see the easy mutual access to the projection of aesthetic values he described, I think that heritage which is considered an expression and representation of cultural identities and their underlying value constructions, simply cannot be understandable for individuals who do not understand the world constructed by this cultural identity and its particular knowledge. Whether the identity is based on religious connotations or not seems marginal.

But there is indeed a small difference between heritage of faith and other heritage in the heritage construction cycle. However, this does not imply that the difference legitimates the separation of a religious heritage category. The difference lies in the legitimation of knowledge towards a definition of values, or rather in the inexplicability of the legitimation of knowledge. In the context of faith the cycle is characterised by continuous interaction between meaning and knowledge prior to explicit legitimation as usually required by the cycle. Legitimation is replaced or at least paralleled by truth or better the search for truth. Whereas before, the cycle was restricted to knowledge as a basis of a constant reaffirmation of values and identity in a process which primarily created conceptions about self and the other, now truth refers to a level beyond this dichotomy; at least for faiths with metaphysical conceptions. Nevertheless even this remains a definition of self and the other, just on a different level as Pöggeler illustrates:

“If man knows himself to be a mortal, if he comes to know truth as the unavailable mystery which only at times opens up, then for him, truth becomes the expanse of the holy and the divine – those who are wholly other than man yet address him and ‘need’ him” (Pöggeler, 1986)

Heidegger distinguishes the difference of knowledge and truth in the system by designating two different kinds of narrative structures. Himself inspired by a phrase ‘poetically man dwells’ from a poem of Hölderlin, he differentiates poetical speaking from speaking proper to thinking, in that the poet names the holy, while the thinker utters being (cf. Heidegger, 1971g, 1971c). It results in a narrative of the thinker as opposed to a narrative of the poet. A similar terminology is drawn on by Mohammad Arkoun, who reflects the emotional, metaphysical and spiritual function of heritage in that it “enhances the transcendental experience described as poetic, religious, absolute, divine, or sacred. It is a permanent force for the emancipation of the human condition from its limitations” (Arkoun, 1990, p. 29) But this still doesn’t make heritage of faith a separate entity or typology but rather the expression of a construction cycle with shifting limits of knowledge.

In view of this, why do I base not only this section but also my entire writing on the seemingly illegitimate category heritage of faith? I would argue that I have chosen this particular focus for my selection of case studies – which I do not explicitly consider a category – in speculation of the reader’s increased awareness for the importance of narratives combined with a perhaps stronger interest in the processes underlying the value and identity projection which becomes manifest as heritage. The
problematic aspects of the visual approach of heritage professionals (cf. Caple, 2000) are even more obvious than usual. In addition, I assume that the category ‘religious heritage’ is so well recognised in the heritage field that hardly anybody would have questioned its legitimation in the framework of my writing, and my deliberate refusal to support my own selection in conceptual terms, offers the opportunity to illustrate the resemblance of heritage in all cultural contexts. This however, opposes current practices in the heritage field, or at least in some groups of heritage professionals which gather to focus on a certain religion or a small number of selected religions.

Heritage separatism can be observed on various levels and is promoted by many international bodies. In 1980 for example UNESCO patronised an international symposium on the conservation of Islamic heritage in Lahore Pakistan. The predominantly Muslim experts gathered concluded in a statement of principles that considering the peculiarity of Islamic heritage “Islamic scholar and specialists should be consulted” (UNESCO, 1980a, p. 23) in the process of analysis. The statement also emphasises that the preservation of this heritage is primarily “the general duty of Muslims (...) in order to understand their due place in God’s creation” (UNESCO, 1980a, p. 21) rather than a universal responsibility of an international community. The Cultural Heritage Committee of the Council of Europe has launched heritage discussions among “experts from the Christian (catholic, orthodox and protestant), Jewish and Muslim religions” (Council of Europe, 1998) and has adopted a recommendation for Europe on the ‘management of cathedrals and other religious buildings in use’ which rests upon the perception that “religious communities have very different attitudes to their physical heritage” (Council of Europe, 2000, p. 347)

Very few authors on the other hand structure so-called religious heritage according to expressions of common themes rather than religious communities. One example is Gamini Wijesuriya who when talking about characteristics of sacred mountains prior to describing their perception in various religions, listed common metaphysical themes related to sacred mountains: centres of cosmos, symbols of gods, homes of god, locations of paradise, sources of fertility, places of ancestor spirits, places of inspiration, revelation, transformation and others (Wijesuriya, 2001, p. 54f). It is this conceptual approach of differing narratives but common themes that I have in mind when speaking of heritage of faith rather than religious heritage. But perhaps a closer look at various possible notations provides further clarification.

1 Faith or religion, belief or belonging
– not merely terminology

Several terms designating more or less what I refer to as heritage of faith can be identified in heritage discourses about for example living religious heritage (Stovel et al., 2005) or ceremonial heritage (Daes, 1993). The most widespread attribute used to characterise this particular kind of heritage is sacred, which can be found in a variety
of expressions ranging from sacred sites to sacred art (Moses, 1995, 1998). In spite of this prevalence I prefer not to speak of sacred heritage. The term sacred is linked to three connotations, that seem to contradict the approach taken in this work. First, it suggests an intrinsic quality of heritage expressions: “Even those of us who have lost the sense of the sacred, however feel something of the presence of the sacred when they go to those places” (Nasr, 2001), which would lie outside my constructivist ontology and the heritage construction cycle. Its second comprehension is apartness, dived by Rudolf Otto in four aspects called the ‘numinous’ (divine, incomprehensible), the ‘tremendum’ (uncanny, awe-inspiring), the ‘majestas’ (majestic), and the ‘mysterium’ (the very different) (Otto, 1991 [1963], p. 13f) or framed by Tuan as the “sense of restriction: an area stands apart and has limited access because it pertains to the gods” (Tuan, 1978, p. 84). This meaning stands in tradition of the Hebrew root k-d-sh (שדּקּ) which can also be found in other Semitic languages, which primarily implies the characteristic of being separated from profane life (Levine, 1973, p. 989). The last statement has already anticipated the third problematic aspect of the term sacred: its implicit dichotomy sacred – profane. This dichotomy however is not evident in many religious traditions in which life cannot be separated from a sacred realm or in the conception of “the generally sacred nature of the earth – a belief shared in its broadest sense by many creeds” (Karaim, 2003, p. 34).

A similar dichotomic opposition is identified by Ismail Serageldin in spiritual versus material, which he thinks leads to needless stereotypes (I. Serageldin, 1992, p. 3). I rather associate spiritual with physical, but in any case this term is dropped to avoid confusion with the category referred to as ‘spiritual values’ in the heritage field and to prevent a possible equation of spiritual and intangible heritage, as I require a term encompassing both tangible and intangible expressions of faith.

The next obvious choice seems religious heritage. The word religion can only be applied when accompanied by a precise definition, as it underwent, both historically and at present, too many different meanings. Wilfred Cantwell Smith summarises, that historically religion referred in the Enlightenment sense to various systems of what people believed, in a Catholic sense to what they ritually practised or according to Schleiermacher to what they inwardly felt. (W. C. Smith, 1991 [1962], p. 46) For the present he identifies the dominance of four, or rather three aspects of meaning, one of which comprises two slightly different conceptions. These are religion as personal piety, religion as a generic summation, and religions as systems of beliefs and practice which can either be approached as an ideal system or as an empirical system (cf. W. C. Smith, 1991 [1962], p. 49). It is particularly the systems of belief, religions in plural, referred to by names and inevitably ideal rather than empiric systems, that I fear might be read into the term religion or even religious. And it could then be understood in a separatist manner – as meetings of heritage professionals already took place – looking at religious heritage of the religions Islam, Buddhism or Hinduism, etc. Such use, we can find when reading Samuel Huntington who informs us that the twentieth century has “reinforced the differences among religions” (Huntington,
1996, p. 64) or Bassam Tibi who considers religions those parts of cultural fragmentation and identity which are easiest politicised and then prevent intercultural dialogue (Tibi, 2001, p. 180). I believe even the possibility of associating such conceptions needs to be avoided when considering expression of local cultural identity. Thus I entirely agree with the proposition of Wilfred Cantwell Smith:

“I suggest that the term ‘religion’ is confusing, unnecessary, and distorting (...). I have become strongly convinced that the vitality of personal faith, on the one hand, and, one the other hand (quite separately), progress in understanding – even at the academic level – of the traditions of other people throughout history and throughout the world, are both seriously blocked by our attempt to conceptualize what is involved in each case in terms of (a) religion.” (W. C. Smith, 1991 [1962], p. 50)

What possible terminology remains? W.C. Smith proposes faith which seems an acceptable alternative although the plural faiths still cannot be completely avoided. On the other hand faith does neither offer verb nor adjective and requires the somewhat circuitous formulation heritage of faith. But it expresses something relevant to heritage construction in that it is not a generic entity but rather a quality of identity an active participation in transcendence, a deliberate inclusion of transcendence in the legitimation of knowledge. Or as W.C. Smith defines: “Faith, then, is a personal quality of which we see many sorts of expressions.” (W. C. Smith, 1991 [1962])

Heritage of faith is the representation of narratives inspired by faith. While the narratives introduce to faith and the cultural identity at its base, the meaning of heritage of faith is at the same time, always, at least partly, a personal response. Although I have described faith as a personal quality of being, it is not a given quality – no one has faith who has not been educated to it (W. C. Smith, 1991 [1962], p. 189). Faith can be projected on objects or places as well as be practiced or acted, then often called ritual. Ritual is intangible heritage of faith and interestingly Emile Durkheim in his analysis of rites emphasises their cyclical nature and identity construction:

“The essential thing is that men are assembled, that sentiments are felt in common and expressed in common acts; but the particular nature of these sentiments and acts is something relatively secondary and contingent. (...) before all, rites are means by which the social group reaffirms itself periodically.” (Durkheim, 1954, p. 387)

While the specific action might seem insignificant or the object or place might appear arbitrary, they nevertheless function as signifiers and as such reflect and transport the meaning and knowledge of the narratives of faith. Sometimes however heritage of faith can become a source of conflict, for example when the narratives are considered too irrational by outsiders or the expressions are also valued in a different context. Such is often the case when heritage of faith becomes recognised by international organisations, for example under the two UNESCO conventions. The difficulty is obvious: state parties who ratified the conventions rarely represent the communities or individual who give meaning to heritage of faith in its construction (cf. Rössler, 2001, p. 29) Yet it is state parties in an intergovernmental system who are supposed to consider the significance these expressions have.
2 UNESCO World Heritage of faith

International bodies sometimes have a different perspective on heritage of faith. Although recent UNESCO policy documents particularly highlight the contribution of expressions of faith to the construction of local identity (cf. UNESCO, 2005c), the contents of narratives of faith are rather sensitive and delicate in intergovernmental decisions. Heritage of faith is rarely valued in context of its meaning or identity but according to the sensuously perceivable effects and activities it produces (cf. Huber, 1973, p. 276). This means heritage of faith is considered significant for its aesthetical or historical qualities rather than its underlying narratives. Such staying on safe ground however causes absurdities at later stages, which are described in the following subchapters.

Staying on safe ground means that in many cases values of faith, or what Mechtild Rössler refers to as sacred values “have not been recognised under the World Heritage Convention” (Rössler, 2001, p. 29). This does not mean that expressions of faith in buildings, sites or places are not inscribed on the World Heritage List but that the inscription is often based on statements of OUV, which do not at all or not explicitly consider the narratives of faith that construct the heritage value. Some might argue the reason is the lack of universality of the narratives of faith. Whether this is true or not, the consequence is that management priority for World Heritage Sites is defined by the OUV identified and if heritage of faith is listed solely for its aesthetic qualities future management priority will be directed at these.

As mentioned above, none of the 10 World Heritage inscription criteria refers explicitly to expressions of faith. When searching for value recognition related to faith one would nevertheless most likely seek for criterion (vi), which refers to “associations with living traditions, with ideas, or with beliefs” (UNESCO, 2005g, § 77). But very often heritage that appears to have relation to narratives of faith is not listed under this very criterion. Is it really diplomatic precaution by the Committee, lack of awareness on behalf of the State Parties or a result of the high level of scrutiny and with it undue burden placed on criterion (vi) during the last two decades (cf. King, 2000)?

Heritage of faith was already considered problematic during the drafting of the convention and Gérard Bolla in his retrospection remembers that sensitive controversies were often “directed at particularly sensitive cultural properties, given the history of civilizations and religions” (Bolla, 2005, p. 77). He recalls that the crucial formulation “(...) the State Parties to this Convention recognize that such heritage constitutes a World Heritage for whose protection it is the duty of the international community as a whole to co-operate” (UNESCO, 1972a, § 6) emerged out of one of these controversial debates (Bolla, 2005, p. 87). Likewise after the adoption of the convention, inscriptions of heritage of faith have led to some controversies. Bernd von Droste recalls that “the Aboriginal community massively protested in front of our meeting
facilities – the famous Sydney Opera house – against the inscription of Kakadu on the World Heritage List” (von Droste, 2002, p. 5) in 1981 – which nevertheless was inscribed inside the meeting room. Herb Stovel calls to mind a tense debate of the World Heritage Committee in Carthage in 1991, questioning whether a site was Arabic or Islamic (Stovel, 2003). And when focusing on state of conservation discussions or reviewing monitoring missions one can find endless conflicts and misunderstandings between local religious communities and expert expectations of proper management of the ‘World Heritage Values’.

The ICOMOS World Heritage List analysis identified 234 religious properties up to 2004 plus additional 21 symbolic sites (ICOMOS, 2004b, p. 64) as cultural properties to which we have to add an undefined number of natural sites. For both cases, natural and cultural sites, the explicit references to faith in World Heritage value statements are far less. On the contrary, religious terminology is applied in ambiguous ways. Not only is heritage listing called a ‘newly popular faith’ by David Lowenthal but also Michel Parent is quoted to have formulated the heritage valuation task as the “need to ‘sacralise the essential’.” (Arkoun, 1990, p. 31) Despite the controversial term ‘to sacralise’ chosen, Arkoun points out that identifying the essential, especially in the context of heritage of faith, is not an easy assignment. And further he validly inquires: “And if we succeed in identifying it, how to persuade Muslims that there is some aspect essential in a Buddhist temple or a Christian church? Or how to persuade a Sikh, a Buddhist, or a Christian to respect buildings which are not relevant to their faith?” (Arkoun, 1990, p. 31) Would not the World Heritage Convention be the right tool to overcome such barriers as part of its quest for universal values?

2.1 Faith and universality – a contradiction?

The World Heritage Committee is obliged to inscribe outstanding properties of universal value on a list or as the current Operational Guidelines specify properties of “common importance for present and future generations of all humanity” (UNESCO, 2005g, § 49). I had already agreed earlier with several authors that such claim of equal importance for all humanity is a conceptual paradox and I think it is ever more for the case of heritage of faith. If one takes the aim of UNESCO’s cultural activities described by Amadou-Mahtar M’Bow as “to strengthen the spirit of tolerance and universality which are its raison d’être” (M’Bow, 1986, p. 99), then universality cannot be understood as phrased in the Operational Guidelines but needs to be redefined in order to go along with tolerance and the promotion of cultural diversity.

Solely because the World Heritage Convention is nowadays understood to protect the diversity of cultural and natural properties, universal values cannot mean cultural universals in the sense of “cultural forms and contents which, irrespective of historical connections, appear or may appear in any culture” (Stagl, 2000, p. 29). But only cultural universals can be of equal significance to all humankind. It remains question-
able why the current Operational Guidelines contain such unconvincing explication, especially after in 1998 World Heritage experts had already done so much better, defining that OUV “should be interpreted as an outstanding response (...) in relation to culture in human creativity and resulting in cultural diversity.” (UNESCO, 1998b, p. 15) This comes close to the earlier proposed definition of OUV as a synthesis of the narratives that reflect the overall history and cultural diversity of humankind. And this synthesis seems to be the only conception that heritage of faith would fit into as universal and also be acceptable as of universal value. With acceptability, I mean that although representatives of religious traditions frequently claim exclusiveness in having the right way to knowledge, truth, salvation or whatever other goal, they could nevertheless acknowledge that all other ‘mislead’ religious traditions have also made their respective contribution to the overall evolution of human society.

And this definition – indeed the most practical – has already been applied by the World Heritage Committee since its earliest listing decisions. One most obviously recognises such interpretation of universality in listing decisions I would refer to as dark world heritage: the former Nazi-German concentration camp of Auschwitz, the Island of Gorée or Robben Island. These sites are exceptional entries\(^{199}\) which – like all others – cannot be of equal value to humankind but they have their place on the list, as symbols of major historic events contributing to the overall story of humanity. With this dark side of heritage the Committee acknowledges a human history “full of cases where languages have been forbidden, where attachment to certain political symbols meant jail or death, where religious practices and beliefs were hidden or abandoned, where dress-codes and even length of hair were, and still are, fixed by rules set by those in power” (Arizpe et al., 2000, p. 27).\(^{200}\) Are narratives of faith that contribute to the story of humankind less universal than narratives of political oppression and slavery? Probably not, but in most cases they are less historic, often ongoing, and symbols of ongoing political oppression are as sensitive in the framework of an international organisations as symbols of faith.

“We must learn to grasp what we cannot embrace” proposes Clifford Geertz who at the same time admits “the difficulty in this is enormous, as it has always been” (Geertz, 1985). It almost seems he is talking to the World Heritage Committee when he adds that “it is in this, strengthening the power of our imaginations to grasp what is in front of us, that uses of diversity, and of the study of diversity, lie.” (Geertz, 1985, p. 274) Following Geertz, I suggest that the World Heritage Convention can only reflect universal values when the significance of proposals identifies the full range of diversity symbolised. Heritage of faith without reference to its function as a symbol to evoke meanings which “thus relate an ontology and a cosmology” (Geertz, 1973a, p. 127) to aesthetic expressions, cannot be considered of ‘outstanding universal value’. Heritage solely qualifies as universal if the complete narrative is conveyed and therefore intellectually graspable outside its immediate context of faith – unless the narratives and thereby the value expressions contain secret elements. In cases where sites are associated with secret knowledge it might be preferable not to enter...
them on the World Heritage List. Protest from communities as took place in Sydney in 1981 might be an indication for the presence of secret knowledge. Alternatively, the existence of secret knowledge could be named explicitly in the significance statement. Such mentioning would then allow considering the secret narratives as part of the overall significance as well as promoting their safeguarding within the framework of their secrecy.

In all other cases as Claude Lévi-Strauss is quoted to have said: “diversity is less a function of the isolation of groups, than of the relationships which unite them” (Arizpe et al., 2000, p. 27). Communication and understanding of the variety of narratives linked to the world’s cultural and natural heritage could be among the aims for seeking universal values. When aiming at active communication and understanding – rather than merely passive recognition of values – the nomination proposals in particular lack one element: ample information. The subsequent review of World Heritage nomination proposals with presumed association to faith illustrates this very short-coming.

2.2 Cathedrals and sacred forests

Statements in this chapter of my writings are based on a comprehensive retrospective analysis of 25 nomination proposals to the World Heritage List, which were inscribed between 1978 and 2004 and which suggest strong elements of, or associations to heritage of faith. The analysis focused on the research question how narratives of faith are represented in the nomination dossiers and if they are considered relevant inputs to management strategies. Results are disillusioning. Most nomination proposals are descriptive or remain at a level that some would call scientific; solely describing the physical features of the proposed property. Faith, if mentioned, is stated to be contained in or associated to the site but its narratives are neither described nor explained. The general lack of information on narratives of faith increases the existent difficulties to grasp the particular significance of expressions of faith.

If, for example, the State Party of Nepal informs the international heritage community that the significance of the seven monument groups in Kathmandu Valley has the “roots of their history buried deep in the legends of the Kathmandu Valley” (Thapa, 1979, p. 33) on the second to last page of a dossier that had spend 33 pages describing the architectural and urban fabric without any reference to legends of the valley. What are we supposed to understand of its so-called spiritual value? And this is not an isolated case. For the rock-hewn churches of Lalibela it is explained to us, that this unique conglomeration of churches is the result of “Lalibela’s remarkable history as the nucleus of the ‘New Jerusalem’,” or the association “with the Queen of Shaba and King Solomon” (Wolde, 1978, p. 5). But here, too, the Ethiopian authors do not deem it necessary to elaborate on what the connection to King Solomon and the Queen of Shaba is (some delegates would probably also prefer to be told who
these two are) or what Lalibela as the ‘new Jerusalem’ means and where this connection derived from. And – of course – why this is of importance to people today?

Out of the 25 dossiers studied in-depth, 15 sites were described as sacred and 13 were referred to as major centres of local, regional or global pilgrimage. Only four dossiers attempted to explain why the site was considered sacred and merely two provided information why people might want to travel there in contexts of faith. The other 11 nomination dossiers remained content with the plain statement. In these cases the reader has to be satisfied with the information that “the sacred city of Anuradhapura is still a major centre of pilgrimage, and is visited by hundreds of thousands of pilgrims” (Laduwahetty, 1981, p. 16) or that Anglicans throughout the world took Canterbury “as their spiritual home and [it is] to Canterbury that some 2.3 million visitors come every year to worship” (Historic Buildings and Monuments Commission, 1986). Why people make the effort of these spiritual journeys remains – in these two and many other cases – pure speculation. A simple question results: If neither the nomination dossier nor the management system take into consideration why people take these sites as destinations for pilgrimage, how then can these places be preserved as active centres of worship?

The same can be said of the alleged sacredness of sites. Statements claiming that a site is a goal to “the spiritual devotion of all communities throughout the world” (The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 1980, p. 3) as stated for Jerusalem or even more absurd, that a site is “so deeply imbued with faith as to become sacred for the whole of humanity” (ICOMOS, 1985, p. 1) as attributed to Santiago de Compostela, simply do not assist in grasping the conception of sacredness for these places; especially if no further details follow. And they will to an even lesser extent help professionals develop a management system to preserve this very sacredness.

World Heritage nomination dossiers of heritage associated to faith can also provide readers with a fair amount of curious and even political sensitivities. This can for example be said of the ICOMOS evaluation of the nomination proposal for the old city of Jerusalem, proposed by Jordan, which diplomatically states, that although “the list justifying the request for inclusion begins only in 335 [BC] with a Christian monument consecrated by Constantine: the church of the Holy Sepulchre (…) the protection must take into account, in as far as possible, the whole of the archaeological and monumental heritage.” (ICOMOS, 1981, p. 1) The nomination of the temple of Confucius submitted by the State Party of China sometimes reads more like a Confucian missionary compendium than like a nomination file: “If the mankind want to exist in the 21st century, they must trace back to 2500 years to draw on the wisdom of Confucianism.” (Xianglin, 1993) Similarly, if we carefully read the formulation under which Itsukushima Shinto Shrine was nominated by Japan according to criterion (vi), we wonder whether it was not Shintoism as a whole that was listed World Heritage:
“Criterion (vi): Shintoism is a religion that centres on polytheistic nature worship, the origin of which goes back to primitive times. Over its long history it has developed into a religion which became unique in the world, adopting continental influences to combine with its own indigenous traditions. Japanese spiritual life is deeply rooted in this religion. (…)” (Atsuko & Hiroshi, 1995, p. 1)

The nomination dossier of Vadi Qadisha submitted by the State Party of Lebanon attempts to convince its readers, that an inclusion in the World Heritage List is justifiable, with the somewhat bizarre argument that the site bears the same level of religious importance as other sites already inscribed: “La Vallée de la Qadisha représente donc une valeur universelle exceptionnelle, aussi importante que (…) le désert d’Egypte ou le Mont-Athos” (Asmar, 1997, p. 18)

Less amusing are other examples. Some dossiers of heritage with presumed associations of faith do not refer at all to its present religious significance or narratives of faith. During my study of nomination files I was left with the strong impression that neither the Ensemble of the Trinity Sergius Lavra in Sergiev Posad, Russian Federation, nor churches of Chiloé in Bolivia, nor Pueblo de Taos in the United States have any spiritual value to their inhabitants or users. And somehow, I can hardly believe that. The opposite case is presented in sites like Jongmyo Shrine in the Republic of Korea, which is not listed under criterion (vi) but curiously under criterion (iv) as an “outstanding example of the Confucian royal ancestral shrine (…) which is enhanced by the persistence there of an important element of the intangible cultural heritage in the form of traditional ritual practices and forms”. (ICOMOS, 1995, p. 68)

As mentioned above, four nomination dossiers did in parts provide ample explanation of why a site is sacred and these should be studied more closely to facilitate future benefit from these – I would say – best cases. When looking at the four, we easily gain the impression that the ability to express narratives of faith is a regional phenomenon, not necessarily of the regions usually considered full of heritage expertise by the World Heritage Committee. The four are: Tsodilo in Botswana, Matobo Hills in Zimbabwe, Uluru-Kata Tjuta National Park in Australia and Tongariro National Park in New Zealand. The first association that came to my mind when viewing this list was that perhaps primarily oral cultures – or communities with a particular colonial history – have more profound expertise in conveying narratives of faith to listeners outside their tradition of faith. Such expertise is almost entirely lacking in Central Europe, where heritage for centuries was not narrated but simply recognised. And yet, it is this expertise that is desperately needed in the World Heritage field: to explain a site’s meaning to others.

The four files have different approaches of conveying the respective narratives of faith but share a mutual approach of describing features which are of severe importance to the places but invisible to the non-initiated viewer. And all approaches deviate considerably from what is usually called description of property. In the nomination of Uluru-Kata Tjuta we learn that “The spiritual relationship with the land directs both everyday life and all ceremonial and religious activity” (Australian National
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Parks and Wildlife Service, 1986, p. 22). But in addition to this general statement, which may be found likewise in many other dossiers, the reader is also informed about the reason for this relationship and about how it affects present everyday life:

“The outstanding universal value of the park is established by the huge monoliths of Uluru and Kata Tjuta, combined with the unique pattern of traditional land management and its basis in the oral narratives of ancestral beings of the Tjukurpa. (...) The Tjukurpa is an outstanding example of the indigenous Australian philosophy often referred to in English as the ‘Dreaming’. Anangu prefer that the term ‘Dreaming’ not be used since it implies events that are unreal, untrue or imaginary. During this time heroic beings travelled, singly or in groups, shaping the landscapes as they foraged, camped and interacted with one another, and performing prototypical ceremonies and establishing the laws of social conduct. Ceremonies must be, and are, performed according to the procedures established by the ancestors.” (Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service, 1986, p. 24)

It would be exaggerated to expect the nomination dossier to explain in depth all ceremonies and customs derived from the Tjukurpa; nevertheless some examples are provided. Most essential for the nomination file are two core statements which concern the relation between the key narratives and the landscape as well as the management of Uluru-Kata Tjuta. I would encourage transferring the first statement to all properties on the World Heritage List:

“To write that the landscape is ‘associated with’ the narratives, songs and art of the Tjukurpa, although accurate from a Western perspective, does not fully elucidate Anangu belief systems. For Anungu the landscape is the narratives, songs and the art of the Tjukurpa.” (Australian Heritage Commission, 2002, p. 51)

The term ‘associated with’ is hardly appropriate for any heritage narrative and in particular narratives of faith. In almost every cultural context the narrative is the heritage expression and the expression is only fully comprehensible through the narrative. The second important aspect is that the site is managed according to the Tjukurpa, and since several aspects of the narrative are considered secret knowledge for which “Anangu have asked that details are not disclosed in this nomination” (ICOMOS, 1994, p. 100), local initiates are indispensable for the management team. Particularly interesting is the ICOMOS evaluation of this nomination. The expert writing on behalf of ICOMOS was apparently so impressed by the narratives disclosed that substantial parts of the Tjukurpa descriptions were reproduced in the ICOMOS evaluation which finally noted that the dossier “is also worthy of commendation for its management system and policy, which is based on the perceptions and practices of the traditional owners of the land.” (ICOMOS, 1994, p. 104)

ICOMOS evaluators do not always react so favourably to narratives of faith as can be seen in the case of Tsodilo where the evaluation entirely focused on physical landscape characteristics and rock art. In addition the formulation proposed for listing under criterion (vi) by Botswana was reduced to one of ICOMOS’ static standard phrases “immense symbolic and religious significance”. (ICOMOS, 2001, p. 61) Compared to what was proposed by the State Party, to nominate Tsodilo as the home of all living creatures, at least the “home of the spirits of each animal, bird,
insect and plant that has been created” (Mogami, 2000, p. 34), this seems quite a re-
duction. The contrary is illustrated in the case of the Matobo Hills, in which the
ICOMOS evaluator is prepared to describe Matobo “as a sacred place – the seat of
God (Mwari/Mwali), the home of ancestral spirits, and the focus of rituals and cere-
monies linked to rain, harvest, disease and appeasement of spirits” (ICOMOS, 2003a,
p. 132). And in this evaluation ICOMOS explicitly, and according to my knowledge
for the first time, identified the “atrophying of interest in traditional beliefs”
(ICOMOS, 2003a, p. 135) as a major threat to the conservation of the property.
Such acknowledgement is indeed remarkable, as ICOMOS frequently demonstrates
difficulties with the evaluation of religious properties, most notably when nominated
under criterion (vi).

Obviously criterion (vi) referring to ideas and beliefs associated to heritage is not easy
to evaluate – especially when outstanding universal value is to be confirmed. It nev-
ertheless has to be considered important that this criterion is listed to allow consid-
eration of narratives of faith in the management of World Heritage Sites. In this con-
text it is puzzling that when analysing solely the two consecutive years 2003/2004,
we already find four cases in which ICOMOS proposed heritage of faith for World
Heritage inscription and explicitly refused criterion (vi) as nominated by the respec-
tive State Parties. In all four cases: the Tomb of Askia in Mali, the medieval monu-
ments in Kosovo (initially inscribed as Decani Monastery), the mausoleum of Khoja
Ahmad Yasawi in Kazakhstan and the wooden churches of Southern Little Poland,
ICOMOS either “does not consider this criterion relevant” (ICOMOS, 2004a, p.
123) or “does not consider this justification sufficient” (ICOMOS, 2003a, p. 65). In
the context of the particular cases the scrutiny applied appears strangely obsessive:

“The nomination stresses the link between the tomb [of Askia] and local ceremonies and
rituals connected with worship, marriages and death and the perpetuation of ancient animist
traditions. It would however be difficult to justify this association as being of outstanding
universal value” (ICOMOS, 2004a, p. 12)

“Even though the churches obviously have continued fulfilling their liturgical and cult func-
tion for several centuries, ICOMOS does not consider this to be sufficient for applying this
criterion.” (ICOMOS, 2003a, p. 131)

These cases convey the impression that it is difficult to understand how ICOMOS
defines its benchmarks for the application of criterion (vi) and unfortunately policy
documents providing guidelines do not exist. I personally wonder, why – since an
inscription was supported in general – criterion (vi) had to be refused in these par-
ticular cases. Were the decisions indeed a result of the special scrutiny demanded for
this criterion? Or perhaps even a result of the impression that there are already too
many World Heritage Sites of faith on the list?
2.3 The alleged overrepresentation of places of faith

The overrepresentation of heritage of faith or in the Committee’s words “religious buildings” was first ascertained by the Global Strategy expert meeting which gathered at UNESCO in June 1994. The meeting with regard to a number of discernable gaps on the World Heritage List concluded that:

“(…) religious buildings were over-represented in relation to other types of property; [and that] Christianity was over-represented in relation to other religions and beliefs.” (UNESCO, 1994a, p. 3)

It is fascinating, how often this statement has been quoted since, and that – according to my knowledge – nobody has ever dared to contradict this over-simplification. Even a decade later Dawson Munjeri is convinced that “religious buildings (cathedrals etc.) were overrepresented” (Munjeri, 2004a, p. 16) and Sophia Labadi equally uncritical reiterates the above statement in her review of the Global Strategy (Labadi, 2005, p. 90). In fact, cathedrals – often French but sometimes also more general European cathedrals – symbolised the phenomenon of imbalance and over-representation in many World Heritage debates. And at some points cathedrals even became symbols for literally all difficulties in the conception of outstanding universal value, colonial history and cultural diversity in the World Heritage Committee, as the following contribution of the ambassador of India in the discussion of the recommendations of the Kazan expert meeting at the 29th Committee session illustrates:

“When we talk about outstanding universal value, I can look at a cathedral and – because I am conditioned – I see that it is of outstanding universal value. And I might look at some site in India, but because I wasn’t conditioned, because I had an English education, I will not even be able to understand the value of my home culture. And this is what cultural diversity is all about.”

And despite these political connotations, cathedrals are often drawn on as an illustration for the entire lack of benchmarks with regard to the assessment of over- or under-representation. Herb Stovel, when noting that numerical results cannot always answer the questions ‘how many are too many’ or ‘how few are too few’, notes that “if we know there are seven French cathedrals on the List, we might have a feeling that this is too many, but who could ever say how many there should be and by what means of analysis?” (Stovel, 2003, p. 1) And the State Party of Norway adds that “we must be brave enough to for instance ask: How many European cathedrals are of outstanding universal value?” (UNESCO, 2004a, p. 41)

The ICOMOS gap report of 2004 has chosen a numerical analysis and counted World Heritage properties according to three different typological systems. It is particularly interesting that the report itself negates its own methodology – which is only one of the many absurdities of the ICOMOS gap analysis – in stating that “whether or not some types or categories of monuments and sites are ‘over’ or ‘under-represented’, and whether or not there are ‘gaps’ cannot be based simply on nu-
merical analysis” (ICOMOS, 2004b, p. 8). But the report lacks the consequence of providing an alternative, perhaps a qualitative analysis. Instead, all three frameworks of categories identify over- and under-representation in defining the percentage of sites attributed to the categories created. Unfortunately – even within the quantitative framework – these results are very questionable.

Two of the systems, the typological and the thematic framework, establish categories for what I refer to as heritage of faith: ‘religious properties’ in the typological framework and ‘spiritual responses’ in the thematic framework. The difference between the two approaches is inarticulate212. The study concludes that while religious properties are overrepresented with 234 of analysed 866 sites (ICOMOS, 2004b, p. 19) which amounts to 27% of all properties, only 13% of the World Heritage Sites analysed represent spiritual responses (ICOMOS, 2004b, p. 30). This confusing variance results from attributing twenty-three sacred settlements and mountains to sites213 rather than spiritual responses and all pilgrimage places to the category ‘movement of people’ (ICOMOS, 2004b, p. 34-36).

I am convinced that one could in equal measure demonstrate that heritage of faith is far less represented, if instead of considering the seemingly obvious connection to faith of many churches, temples etc., we were to judge a possible connection to faith from the description and justification of outstanding universal value. Doing so for French cathedrals demonstrates, that out of all French cathedrals – which are in fact nine, if one counts the cathedrals listed as part of historic centres and without counting a considerable amount of additional churches and abbeys – not even one is inscribed as being of value as an expression of faith. All French cathedrals are listed for their architectural, aesthetic and other qualities, and in cases where criterion (vi) is applied it refers to historic events, such as the coronation of monarchs in the cathedral of Reims (ICOMOS, 1990, p. 9). Can we in that case truly count these monuments as religious properties or spiritual responses?

While I feel it doesn’t matter whether they can or cannot be counted – the resulting number would in no case have value for cultural diversity discussions – it seems that the world heritage field suffers severe terminological confusions within this analysis of heritage of faith. The typological framework of the ICOMOS gap analysis differentiates religious and symbolic properties, the latter is defined as “inscribed because of associations with beliefs” while the earlier is “associated with religious or spiritual values” (ICOMOS, 2004b, p. 15)214 In Sophia Labadi’s recent review of the Global Strategy we read, only a few pages after she introduces the over-representation of “religious buildings, in particular Christian ones, in comparison with other types of heritage” (Labadi, 2005, p. 90), that the restriction of criterion (vi) “excluded underrepresented categories of heritage, such as intangible heritage sites of outstanding universal value for symbolic or sacred reasons, to be included on the World Heritage List” (Labadi, 2005, p. 95)215. Why religious heritage is overrepresented and heritage of sacred values is underrepresented remains a mystery to me that might be solved in the forthcoming extended and completed version of the ICOMOS gap analysis.216
With regard to the alleged over-representation, there remains one remarkable comparative aspect. When we study the list of the Proclamation of Masterpieces of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity, almost every cultural expression listed can be considered as an expression of identity in the context of faith. Why did nobody ever have the idea to speak of an over-representation of heritage of faith in this context?

3 UNESCO Intangible Heritage of faith

To consider intangible heritage of faith within a UNESCO framework is not entirely comparable to World Heritage of faith, as it is impaired by the lack of a longstanding listing or recognition tradition, which could provide data for such an analysis. When we nevertheless aim to draw a comparison between the two, the only possibility seems to refer to the selection of ninety so-called masterpieces that have been proclaimed by the Director-General of UNESCO as the oral and intangible heritage of humanity, in three subsequent proclamations between 2001 and 2005. Such comparison however needs to be done with some caution. The justification and conditions for the proclamation of masterpieces will most likely differ from the supposed selection criteria to be established under the 2003 Convention. The examples considered in the next chapters thus deviate – not necessarily in their scope but in their justification – from the opposition of the two UNESCO conventions of 1972 and 2003 so far emphasised.

The masterpiece programme illustrates several difficulties which parallel earlier discussions on World Heritage, in particular the required proof of an expression’s “outstanding value as a masterpiece of the human creative genius” (UNESCO, 2001a, § 22) as well as demonstrated ‘excellence’ in its manifestation. According to these criteria the masterpiece programme, like the World Heritage Convention, is based on qualitative judgements of the value of a particular expression of faith. Unlike the intergovernmental Committee of the World Heritage Convention, masterpieces were selected by international experts, nominated as jury members by the Director-General. Judgements thus made in individual expert capacity were probably less subjected to political sensitivities with regard to valuation of expressions of faith, but at the same time involved a couple of new challenges.

Particularly with regard to the recognition of intangible heritage as expressions of faith, the pivotal position of experts in valuation and safeguarding processes and their dominance in policy establishment must be considered problematic. I have already asked at earlier stages of my writing how heritage expertise can be legitimated when heritage is considered as expressions and manifestations of cultural identity. How can anybody be an expert on anybody else’s identity construction? Nevertheless, UNESCO’s intangible heritage programmes strongly depend on bodies of experts, and programmatic activities of the secretariat of the 2003 Convention were
marked by two major expert meetings since the adoption of the convention. The conclusions and recommendations drafted by the participants of these meetings equally commence with “We, the experts attending (…)” (UNESCO, 2005i, p. 36, 2006d, p. 17) and in the later call on “relevant bodies worldwide to develop the necessary expertise (…) to assist in the safeguarding of the ICH [Intangible Cultural Heritage]” (UNESCO, 2006d, p. 20). But in both meeting reports we fail to find further information on what exactly constitutes expertise for the safeguarding of expressions of cultural identity. Such lack of clarity might cause difficulties in the identification of future representatives to the intergovernmental Committee of the 2003 Convention for which “State Members (…) shall choose as their representatives persons who are qualified in the various fields of intangible heritage” (UNESCO, 2003b, § 6.7). Earlier drafting meetings of the convention legitimately “emphasised the role of the practitioners and custodians as experts on the intangible cultural heritage” (UNESCO, 2003e, p. 4) which made me wonder whether we would also find practitioners on the Committee. But I assume they would rather be invited as “persons, with recognised competence in the various fields of the intangible heritage, in order to consult them on specific matters” (UNESCO, 2003b, § 8.4) while the judgement on best practices and representative examples will be taken by academic scholars, high governmental officials and diplomats. And for the moment we have to wait curiously to see what criteria and benchmarks are to be established to facilitate such judgements.

As opposed to the World Heritage Listing process, the narratives underlying expressions of faith are far more likely to be exposed in the recognition of intangible heritage. In the masterpiece programme the disclosure was encouraged in the required documentation of the expression’s “role as a means of affirming the cultural identity” and “its value as a unique testimony of a cultural tradition” (UNESCO, 2001a). And, as is shown below, narratives are not only present in every candidature file – although in various levels of scrutiny and detail –, they also seem to better cover abstract aspects such as knowledge, truth and transcendence. This might result from a better understanding of the interdependency of knowledge and value concepts, their sources of verification and the transformed actions and expressions as described in the heritage creation cycle. Rick Smeets refers to these aspects of intangible heritage as being literally embodied:

“The depository of the knowledge required for enacting and recreating intangible cultural heritage elements (…) are located in the human mind, and the main means of expression (…) is the human body.” (Smeets, 2004a)

Considering the more apparent connection between knowledge, identity and heritage manifestation, we could expect that the recognition of intangible heritage of faith is also – at least when compared to tangible heritage – far more dependent on the recognition of the values of faith which contributed to its construction. Some authors even suggest that the perceivable heritage manifestations, the steps of the dance, the melody of the song etc., are rather irrelevant, and that their significance primarily lies
in the relations of knowledge and value we express while performing them (Laenen, 1989, p. 93).

Despite the strong relation of heritage expressions and narratives of faith in many masterpieces and presumably many items on the future representative intangible cultural heritage list, there is not a single reference to religion, faith, sacredness or spirituality in both the policy documents of the masterpiece programme and the 2003 Convention. Although it was at no moment proposed to include ‘religion’ in the definition of intangible heritage, several State Parties made clear that they would strongly contradict any such proposal if it was to be raised:

“Concerning the possible inclusion of religion in the definition of intangible cultural heritage, Japan is of the view that religion is an issue rooted within the minds of individuals, and hence does not appropriately lend itself to protection under this convention (…). For some States, the inclusion of religion in the definition might give rise to constitutional difficulty in terms of the separation of religion and state. For these reasons, the scope of protection of this convention should not extend to religion.” (UNESCO, 2003a, p. 19)

Probably the second, juridical reason given is more relevant to many states since rootedness in the mind of individuals seems to be a strong characteristic of all kinds of heritage expressions and can hardly disqualify for the context of a new convention. But in addition concerns were raised that a selective promotion and safeguarding of expressions of faith could become a dangerous ideological tool, on both national and global levels. Jensen describes that in the case of tangible heritage, professionals were able to limit its influence as a dangerous ideological tool, if necessary by defining it as merely material objects (cf. Jensen, 2000, p. 38). Such reduction will be less applicable to the safeguarding of intangible heritage which according to Jean-Loup Amselle might “in fact lead to implementing a real process of production of tradition” (Amselle, 2004, p. 86) and thereby a strengthening of narratives of faith in the context of safeguarding their expressions. Some scholars raised concerns that strengthening of narratives of faith could mean to accelerate gaps between different traditions of faith. On the other hand, circulating narratives of faith is an integral part of the promotion of rootedness in culture – which is, what safeguarding is all about. In fact, the subtle fear of strengthening faith is at the same time the very pride of fostering identity – in culture and faith as well as in heritage and place.

### 3.1 Placed – intangible heritage earthbound

“Is it an essential human need to place oneself in time and to develop a cultural identity?” asks Marc Laenen in his reflection on heritage and cultural identity. His question made me think whether one would not rather place oneself in spatial rather than in temporal terms, as such choice offers greater variety for differentiation. This question is equally discussed for heritage, where tangible heritage allegedly is permanent in time and space (cf. Smeets, 2004a, p. 147) while intangible heritage is said to be both spatially and temporally dynamic. Although some professionals define this dif-
ference as the core distinction between tangible and intangible heritage, I will later argue that both concepts, spatial and temporal detachedness of intangible heritage, are counterproductive in heritage identification. Intangible heritage is as much rooted in time and place as tangible heritage, although its individual expressions do not require particular physical places. For this reason the identification of particular places in which heritage expressions are manifested might be irritating as it suggests the conditional interconnectedness of place and expression.

Since the above sentences combined the concepts of space, place and a so-called physical place I think it is time for an explication of how the terms are used in the context of my writings. Space is seen as an abstract category, which provides the mere potential of something to come into existence by ‘taking place’. This definition aligns closely with Tuan’s thoughts, who stated that “‘Space’ is more abstract than ‘place’. What begins as undifferentiated space becomes place as we get to know it better and endow it with value.” (Tuan, 1989, p. 6) Space in this sense is not merely there – it is the created potentiality allowing something to come into existence. Place, described by Tuan as the focus of value, localises our thoughts and knowledge in providing a focal point for our identities. Yet to do this, place has to be constructed, it has to be named, attributed meaning, and filled with function, and it has to become the localisation of a concept. Aristotle was convinced that “whatever exists, exists ‘somewhere’ (that is to say ‘in some place’ in contrast to things which are ‘nowhere’ because they are not existent.” (Aristotle, 1963, p. 277) He is usually interpreted as having thought about place as the occupation of space, nevertheless his statement is convincing when we consider place as the constructed location of meaning. Indeed, we can hardly grasp something that cannot be attributed a particular conceptual place in the world. It is our understanding of the world that confers meaning to place and localises ideas, beliefs and their expressions in such places. A place – physical or not – is therefore understood as a human construction in the way summarised by Smith: “Human beings are not placed, they bring place into being” (J. Z. Smith, 1987, p. 28), which provides a reference point for our identity.

Such conception however does not require place as a physical location. To be in the world does not solely mean to be in a particular place, but to be localised in conceptual terms, to take place. For identifying masterpieces in the framework of the UNESCO programme however, place is primarily considered a physical location; probably a compulsive approach for an intergovernmental organisation recognizing heritage in the framework of nation states and their territories. At least this is what one assumes when reading the standard model for candidature files which requests the identification of “geographic location of the form of the cultural expressions (…) [and] location of the community concerned (please attach map)” (UNESCO, 2001a, p. 19). I earlier referred to a conceptual paradox with regard to Sophia Labadi’s ‘intangible heritage sites’ (Labadi, 2005) but the recognition of a particular geographic location of intangible heritage expressions draws very near this phrase. And indeed, the UNESCO guide for the masterpiece programme explicitly formulates its objec-
tive as: “to evaluate and list oral and intangible heritage sites in the world” (UNESCO, 2001a, p. 4 - italics added).

At the same time many heritage expressions of the programme are recognised as cultural spaces, by definition a “temporal or physical space” (UNESCO, 2001a). The aspect of temporality of spaces is taken up in a more detailed definition of the regulations concerning the proclamation of masterpieces:

“Cultural space shall be taken to mean a place in which popular and traditional cultural activities are concentrated, but also a time generally characterised by a certain periodicity (…) or by an event. Finally this temporal or physical space should owe its existence to the cultural activities that have traditionally taken place there.” (UNESCO, 2001a)

The place described here – physical, temporal, or I would add even conceptual – is not a geographic location but, as expressed in the claim for periodicity, a permanent reference, a fixed point in the seemingly ever-changing course of the world, an identity anchor. The anchor of identity provides us a visualised connection to a metaphor used by Aristotle when explaining that it is the alleged permanence that makes us refer to place as a reference point. If place is not considered permanent it cannot qualify as such for the localisation of ourselves. Aristotle’s image is that of a boat floating down the river and my own introductory sentence – this sentence – already proves his point:

“(…) and if we look for stability in ‘place’, then the river as a permanent and stable whole, rather than the flowing water in it at the moment, will be the boat’s site. Thus whatever is fixed (…) we take our reckoning from, will be the place.” (Aristotle, 1963, p. 315)

In a similar manner we find the masterpieces listed by UNESCO to be places, not only geographically – and thereby somehow earthbound – but also temporally and conceptually. They are placed in aspects considered more permanent than the beliefs and thoughts constructing the expressions, and thereby provide a sense of what we call continuity or tradition.

### 3.2 Ritual dances and sacred knowledge

Not every masterpiece is rooted in what would primarily be considered place, although they are all documented with their geographical location. When studying the candidature files we find masterpieces rooted in faith (Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts, 2002, p. 29) such as Vedic chanting or rooted in a spiritual sphere of communication with deities (Bhutan, 2004, p. 38) as stated for the Drametse Nga Cham mask dance, performed in Bhutan. Geographic locations nevertheless had to be provided in the candidature dossiers to demonstrate responsibility for safeguarding along national borders of Member States to UNESCO.

The following text-based content analysis has taken into account seven candidature files to the proclamation of masterpieces representing the various categories of in-
tangible heritage – although it is sometimes difficult to attribute a particular category when expressions seem to combine aspects of several categories\(^{232}\) – all three proclamation cycles and different geographic regions. Compared to the earlier World Heritage nomination file analysis narratives of faith are not only included in the candidature files for masterpiece listing, they often take very prominent positions in these dossiers. In all seven cases narratives of faith are explicitly named as the source of heritage construction.

In some cases, such as the Vedic Chanting, it is the narrative of faith which is proposed as intangible cultural heritage, or at least the boundaries between the narratives constructing and the narratives expressing the identity are difficult to distinguish. The oral traditions, the Vedas, cannot be conceptually divided from their recitation:

“The Hindi religious tradition considers the Veda as the prime source of its heritage and culture. As the basic scripture of the Hindus, it is revered as supreme knowledge and accorded the highest place in their lives since time immemorial. The word ‘veda’ deriving from the Sanskrit word ‘vid’ which means ‘knowledge’ – the hymns of the Veda are considered by traditional scholars as ‘revealed’ (sruti) literature, not derived from a particular faith or scripture, but believed to have come into being through, the collective wisdom of sages and seers with extraordinary powers, and this is the reason of the unique authority and influences of the Indian cultural tradition.” (Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts, 2002, p. 10)

Through this special status, the Vedas are not only expressions of values and identity, they function as sources of truth to legitimate the values and knowledge and interact in various stages of a heritage construction cycle. A similar case is also evident for the Drametse Nga Cham, a mask dance performed during the Drametse Festival in Bhutan, which is not just a dance, but an active participation in transcendence:

“The Drametse Ngacham of Drametse is not just a physical dance for entertainment but rather a didactic way to impart the sacred teachings of Buddha in the form of dance. (...) Since every aspect of self is intrinsically pure, the gesture and spirituality involved in Drametse Ngacham in general is a method to re-connect ourselves to our own nature. (...) A constant spiritual contact is established with the audience through visualization of the deities by the dancers. As a result telepathic spiritual energy is received by the audience.” (Bhutan, 2004, p. 33)

At times, it is indeed surprising in what detail and clarity these dossiers submitted to an international body describe issues such as the transmission of spiritual energy, presence of or communication with deities, and others. In some cases the state parties – perhaps out of reluctance to simply state such narratives of faith – pass the floor to the local practitioners, like in the case of the Indonesian Kris, where the majority of the candidature dossier consists of interview transcripts of individuals describing their narratives of the Kris. The Kris, a kind of dagger of high artistic quality, is consequently not proposed as traditional craftsmanship or social practice but as an oral tradition. Mystical occult phenomena and mystical matters connected to the Kris – “mystic or occult refers to all phenomena which cannot be detected by the senses and cannot be explained rationally” (Swasono, 2004, p. 21) – are the very core of this candidature, supported by local voices:
“Of course the kris cannot be compared with weapons such as knives. (…) Why do I say this? It is because making a kris is not as easy as making a knife. You can make a knife out of tinplate, but the kris must be made from selected iron. An empu must not only make a beautiful creation in terms of practical and technical considerations, but must also give added magical or spiritual value, or exalted values which give sacred weight or spiritual significance.” (Swasono, 2004, p. 75)

More impressive than the narratives of faith, is the description of values and significance. In opposition to the practice of World Heritage listing, values are not only focused on local present-day communities – with the exception of the dossier of Vedic chanting – but also resist the temptation of value categorisation. Values are named in abstract, concrete or metaphorical descriptions and therefore are by far more accessible and comprehensible than the plain categories provided in many World Heritage nomination files: aesthetic values, artistic values etc. For the cultural space Sosso-Bala in Guinea, value is described in moral concepts: “Ces valeurs sont: le sens d’honneur et la dignité, le respect de la parole donnée, le patriotisme, la solidarité et la tolérance” (République de Guinée, 2001, p. 5). And significance is no longer an abstract concept; it evolves out of concerned communities and is experienced and described by them, as shown in the example of Drametse:

“The most important aspect of the festival is the satisfaction that the audience, who are informed about the spirituality involved in the dance, receive after seeing the dance. They go back home seeming more blessed and purified for the rest of the year.” (Bhutan, 2004, p. 37)

With recognition of heritage significance as the affirmation of values and commitments towards ways of being, cultural identity as a heritage construction factor but also as something being reaffirmed by the heritage expression is ever more prominent. All dossiers studied outline the identity affirmation of the proposed expressions. The coded language of the Gule Wamkule constitutes a strong source of group identity among those initiated (cf. Malawi, 2005, p. 28), the magic and medicine of the Andean cosmovision of Kallawaya is the basis of identity definition of the Kallawaya ethnic group (cf. Alvarez Plata, 2002, p 20), and the cultural space of Sosso-Bala is what the practitioners “considèrent comme symbole de leur identité et de leur cohésion” (République de Guinée, 2001, p. 3).

In comparison to World Heritage nomination dossiers, we can conclude that the masterpiece candidature dossiers are in general more articulate with regard to narratives of faith. They also focus on the values of heritage expressions as interpreted and constructed in the framework of local identities, which appeared impossible in most World Heritage nomination files, where emphasis was given to an alleged global significance, trying to prove outstanding universal value. One expected difference however, could not be confirmed from the file analysis: varying positions towards the concept of authenticity. In the context of the drafting and policy development of the 2003 convention and in early attempts to initiate collaboration between tangible and intangible heritage professionals it was pointed out that “experts in the field of intangible heritage avoid using the notion of authenticity as used in (…) the 1972 conven-
tion” (UNESCO, 2006g, p. 222). Such position is – despite heavy debates during the drafting of the document – reflected in the Yamato declaration:

“(…) further considering that intangible heritage is constantly recreated, the term ‘authenticity’ as applied to tangible cultural heritage is not relevant when identifying and safeguarding intangible cultural heritage.” (Yamato Declaration, 2006, § 8)

Authors of the dossiers for the proclamation of masterpieces, on the other hand, did not consider the term unsuitable but rather followed the interpretation tangible heritage professionals supported during the Yamato Declaration discussions, that authenticity was primarily the quality of “being rooted in history and continuity” (UNESCO, 2006g, p. 222). Yet others provided justification for an authenticity that can well be compared with the notion used in a World Heritage context. The mystery play of Elche in Spain for example is described as “unique in that it has been enacted with little or no interruption since the mid fifteenth century” (Malm, 2001, p. 5), or Vedic chanting has preserved “the utmost purity of its chanting technique, without the infiltration or corruption or even the slightest change/variation” (Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts, 2002). The Indonesian Kris candidature dossier even confronts the reader with the concept of material authenticity, although not measured against a historic reference point: “Authentic krises are made only from various kinds of iron, steel and meteorite, not from other materials (…) [but] the authenticity of kris cannot be measured against the first kris or master copy” (Swasono, 2004, p. 34). And finally the dossier of the Drametse dance in Bhutan names the loss of authenticity as the major threat to this particular intangible heritage expression:

“The immediate risk to the Drametse Ngacham, more than the losing of dedicated dancers is the distortion of the art and departure from its originality. (…) This dance being a very sacred one, its sanctity and people’s faith in it basically rely on the maintenance of its originality. (…) Therefore its survival essentially means the maintenance of its sacred character through preserving and conserving its authenticity.” (Bhutan, 2004, p. 42)

One last thing which caught my curiosity was the predominance of male activities among the case studies chosen for my analysis. In fact out of the seven heritage expressions focused on, three were exclusively and one more predominantly male activities while a fifth, the Indonesian Kris, is also a mainly male object. Even if the dossier explicitly states “les femmes ne sont pas exclues des rituels et des activités religieuses et médicale” (Alvarez Plata, 2002, p. 20) like in Kallawaya, we learn later on that the exclusively male healers bear the ritual and medical knowledge, while women care for pregnant women and children and weave textiles decorating the ceremonies (UNESCO, 2005a). I thought that it might be worth questioning whether this apparent inequality fits into the proclamation’s requirement of compatibility “with the ideals described in the Preamble of the Founding Act of UNESCO, especially the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations in 1948 (…)” (UNESCO, 2001a, p. 10).
3.3 Human rights and acts of faith – value disqualified

What does compatibility of intangible heritage with universally accepted human right standards – whatever this is – require? Michael Brown in his considerations on heritage as property suggests that it might be better to refrain from asking or discussing this question. His main concern for suggesting this is that it would raise yet another discussion on the universal applicability of the so-called universal human-rights: “Once human-rights thinking wades into waters as muddy as ‘culture’, ‘heritage’ and ‘knowledge’, we face the possibility that the legitimacy of all human-rights standards might be undermined.” (Brown, 2004, p. 58) I nevertheless think it is important to discuss the above standard as the 2003 Convention names the compatibility with human rights at an even more prominent place than the masterpiece programme ever did: it is part of the definition of intangible cultural heritage.

“For the purpose of this Convention, consideration will be given solely to such intangible cultural heritage as is compatible with existing international human right instruments, as well as with requirements of mutual respect among communities, groups and individuals, and of sustainable development.” (UNESCO, 2003b, § 2.1)

I don’t even think it would be critical as at the same time of questioning how this definition can be applied with regard to individual heritage expression, to also discuss whether the 1948 human rights declaration can still be called a universal instrument. It is even characteristic that the text of the 2003 Convention carefully avoids the wording ‘universal human rights’ and refrains from quoting any particular document, which retains the opportunity to refer to newly drafted human rights documents in the future. And even major international achievements should be periodically questioned for a healthy discussion process. I just want to draw the reader’s attention to one formulation in the constitution of UNESCO in this context: “State Parties to this Constitution believing in (…) in the unrestricted pursuit of objective truth, (…)” (UNESCO, 2004 [1945]-a, preamble)238

Does intangible heritage represent objective truth? From a community perspective it probably does, and this is the important level of interpretation as the Convention is focused on heritage that “communities, groups and in some cases individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage” (UNESCO, 2003b). These communities would perhaps also consider their heritage expressions to respect international human rights. But would an intergovernmental Committee agree? Can we imagine intangible heritage incompatible with international human rights standards? Some authors can, for example Richard Kurin who asks: “Is female genital mutilation a legitimate part of intangible cultural heritage to be recognised by the convention or not? Is a religion that includes Brahmins, but excludes non-Brahmins disqualified as intangible cultural heritage because of its discriminatory quality?” (Kurin, 2004b, p. 70)239 I would like to add another kind of question: How do define the benchmark of compatibility with human rights accords?
In the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights especially the first clause of article 27 seems of interest to the Intangible Heritage Convention: “Everyone has the right to freely participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefit.” (UN, 1948, § 27) This article – only slightly problematic to some heritage expressions – has to be read along with article 2 of the declaration according to which: “everyone is entitled to all rights and freedoms set forth in this declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property birth or other status (...)” (UN, 1948, § 2). Depending on the interpretation of the interaction between these articles one could indeed assume that traditions with alleged gender inequality – that means traditions that are exclusively or predominantly carried out by participants of one sex – could be problematic. Most likely, however, that would be true for many, perhaps even a majority of intangible heritage traditions. The question of benchmarks is tricky and will depend on the scrutiny applied to the assessment of compatibility.

Extreme cases are obvious, as many intangible heritage professionals agree: “Obviously UNESCO does not want to safeguard intangible cultural heritage that advocates apartheid, mutilation of women, or severely harms other groups or individuals by any other means.” (van Zanten, 2004, p. 38) But what about heritage that requires initiation to be seen? Some national laws already consider limitation of heritage access as discriminatory. Brown reports that “in the United States requests that collections be closed to women or members of specific ethnic groups have been rejected on the grounds that such practices violate state and federal laws prohibiting discrimination.” (Brown, 2004) At the same time we have sites like the male-only peninsula of Mount Athos inscribed on the World Heritage List, to be preserved – paradoxically - as heritage of “mankind as a whole” (UNESCO, 1972a, preamble). I personally – in terms of human rights – hardly see a difference between a ritual that may only be practiced, an oral tradition that may only be pronounced, or a peninsula that may only be accessed by men.

An open discussion on compatibility with human rights by the Intergovernmental Committee to the 2003 Convention would probably be a sensitive affair and will most likely be avoided until a very precarious expression is brought forth. A certain difficulty can also be seen in the mutual respect clause, considering that many heritage expressions through their affirmation of identity clearly separate self and other. And sometimes the very identity of groups “relies on their victory or defeat by others”. (Kurin, 2004b, p. 70) I am curious to see how the Committee will interpret this compatibility and deal with the various challenges implied in its forthcoming sessions.
4 Faith takes place

Up to this point we can summarise that heritage is constructed as a manifestation of values, thoughts, knowledge and in the particular case studies discussed also faith, all expressed through narratives. The place heritage takes in this construction is the conceptual localisation of all these aspects which constitutes a focal point for our identities. In seeking places of permanence we desire for continuity, for rootedness in culture and localisations that provides firmness to our identity. These can be found in both tangible and intangible heritage expressions, but the places referred to as locations of identity are primarily conceptual rather than spatial focal points.

The concept of place in this context needs to be explicitly separated from its apparent complement ‘space’ to reflect the various conceptual possibilities of being rooted. “It has been a persistent claim of the humanist geographers that place is best understood as the locus of meaning” (J. Z. Smith, 1987, p. 28). Locus of meaning is the location in which something takes place, but it is not necessarily at the same time defined spatially – a fact so far rarely acknowledged among the just quoted professionals. When Seta M. Low refers to place as “space that has been given meaning through personal, group or cultural processes” (Low & Altman, 1992, p. 5), she suggests to think of place as a particular physical location to which meaning has been attributed. But her successive explication that “a community or even a nation is a tangible and definable place” (Low & Altman, 1992, p. 5) illustrates her bias towards a conceptual thought of locus, the locus of identity.

Brian Graham also frames locus when elaborating on the difficulties in distinguishing location and place: “Theory has often confused spatial location and place as an arena of meaning. We have to remember that these are not necessarily bounded places – although they can be – but hybrid places, occupied by overlapping and fragmented identities and social groups (...)” (Graham, 2002, p. 1016) Localizing or placing heritage and thereby identity does not require space – which on the contrary turns out a confusing element in this context – but locus or the Greek equivalent of the Latin term: topos, the localisation of meaning.

It is important, to be aware of the wide range of conceptual places that can function as reference systems, as significations of localised meaning – in the following referred to as topoi. Heritage itself, whether intangible or tangible, is a localisation of meaning and the heritage manifestation in that sense is the topos or place. But faith can also be a significant topos for the localisation of identity in that it provides cultural rootedness and sense of belonging. Faith therefore, conceptually, is place.

Heritage as an expression of faith requires faith to become manifest in place. To take place also for faith means to be localised conceptually or to have a topos. Generally, to take place is the process of coming into being or of coming into existence. Nothing can exist without a conceptual localisation, as we cannot grasp something not having its conceptual place. My earlier thoughts on categorisation and conceptualisa-
focused on the necessity of localising and structuring our perception and comprehension in order to create knowledge and understanding, most notably in the academic field. The topos of something (its topic is derived from the term) enables orientation and the phrase ‘I can’t place it’ refers to a lack of conceptualisation or memory (cf. J. Z. Smith, 1987, p 28).

We require placing the world around us and faith assists us in placing the ultimately placeless. It takes place itself in providing the topoi for concepts otherwise incomprehensible; it is indeed the very topos of the inexplicable. And finally, we place ourselves in the world in attributing conceptual locations and topoi to our identity, in cultural and social terms. We not only take place, we take our place.

The above described may sound obvious, but finding, taking and keeping one’s place is not a self-determined or self-evident process. Only reliability in the continuity of the places provides security and allows us to, in Heidegger’s words: dwell; dwell in place and thereby dwell in our identities, dwell in culture, dwell in faith and also dwell in heritage. His dwelling is the standing-within or resting-within our topoi, our locations of meaning, that make up our existence. “ich bin, du bist mean: I dwell, you dwell” (Heidegger, 1971a, p. 147). Resting-within is not a static but, as the continuous modification and reaffirmation of identity, faith or heritage illustrate, a dynamic process. Heidegger specifies: “it is at any rate not an opposite that excludes motion from itself but rather includes it. Only what is in motion can rest.” (Heidegger, 1971b, p. 48)

Heritage (of faith) combines topoi as the locations of our cultural identities and social traditions. It merges the locations of the invisible or even inexplicable with the continuity of the evident and combines them in the earlier described cycle of recreation and reaffirmation. Our constant reaffirmation of the taking place of heritage – which is its preservation – however, is Heidegger’s dwelling, dwelling in heritage. Both dwelling in heritage and dwelling in faith facilitates anchorage of human existence.

In the introduction of this work, I have freely quoted Heidegger as saying that preservation means to stand-within or to rest-within heritage linked to the quotation: “this ‘standing-within’ of preservation, however, is a knowing.” (Heidegger, 1971b, p. 67) Heidegger’s conception of knowing is not the mere information about something, but the ability to dwell in it, the ability to take ones place: “he who truly knows what is, knows what he wills to do in the midst of what is.” (Heidegger, 1971b, p. 67)

The following section of my work is dedicated to the understanding of how we can learn to dwell and learn to know our own and others places.

As the headline of this section and my brief introduction in the prologue already indicated I prefer to speak of heritage of faith rather than religious or spiritual heritage. The reasoning for such terminology and its envisaged advantages are substantiated in the following subchapter. Within this introduction of the section and until further specification my reader might kindly consider the various expressions of religious, spiritual or sacred heritage as varying specification of a common theme without trying to differentiate between them.
To provide the impression that tangible heritage professionals generally separate religious heritage from other heritage expressions would probably be an improper oversimplification. The World Heritage nomination criteria indeed also group mosques and churches under the same criteria applying for any other architectural expression, none of which in any way considers religious aspects in particular – unless one considers the expression ‘belief’ in criterion (vi) to designate an explicit religious connotation (UNESCO, 2005g, § 77). Nevertheless we can observe a more frequent emphasis of the distinctness of religious heritage expressions in the tangible heritage field, which is mostly reasoned with the particular non-physical characteristics attached to such heritage expressions (cf. Petzet, 2004).

Perhaps it should be added here, that identification with a certain faith is certainly a form of cultural identity construction which also projects its values and identity onto objects, places and practices.

Truth is certainly another term which requires an explicit definition. Since truth is only used as a goal of formulating the metaphysical legitimation of knowledge and, particularly in the context of understanding heritage of faiths, traditional conceptions of truth are not considered applicable. For example Aristotle’s definition of truth as conformance of judgement and object (cf. Aristoteles & Kirwan, 1993, G) or Immanuel Kant’s truth as conformance of cognition and object (Gegenstand) (cf. Kant, 1974 [1787], p. 102) will not be of help. Heidegger’s truth as openness (entdeckt-sein) brings us closer, especially when he underlines the arbitrariness of this definition (Heidegger, 1960). But it is not entirely arbitrary. It goes back to the idea of truth as ‘a higher order of reality’ already formulated by Plato and which was strictly negated by Aristotle (cf. Aristotle, 1963). This shall for the moment provide an ample basis until in later sections Heidegger’s elaborations on truth in the context of logos and standing-within are considered.

Otto Pöggeler who tries to explain this distinction states that “the thinker utters being, which is to say that he discusses the utterance of Being of beings through the truth of Being, in order to direct man to the history of truth by means of questioning” (Pöggeler, 1986, p. 247), in other words, a scholarly or rather a contemplative – as opposed to a creative – approach of identifying and investigating a metaphysical phenomenon expressed in the world. But with this restriction the thinker as opposed to the poet cannot construct a metaphysical system, and could therefore not internally legitimate the cycle, but requires external objectivation.

This recommendation is a considerable disappointment in that it acknowledges the particular vulnerability of religious buildings merely “because of their size, richness, antiquity and tourist frequen- quentation.” (Council of Europe, 2000, p. 347) After highlighting the conservation professionals’ predominant role in the preservation of these buildings, religious communities – which allegedly have this different and strange conceptions and some of which even consider their buildings as sacred – are then advised as to how they should treat their heritage buildings: “Religious communities should for their part on their long tradition of love of beauty and fine craftsmanship, music, welcome to pilgrims, hospitality, inaugurate a new form of tourism, based on understanding of spirituality and the role that intangible values have in the cultural heritage.” (Council of Europe, 2000, p. 348)

It is illustrated in the large amount of publications available that the term sacred is well estab- lished in the heritage field. Sacred is combined to various aspects and categories, a few are listed as examples: sacred heritage (Dalibard, 1989), sacred landscapes (Rössler, 2001), sacred sites (Dongoske et al., 1994; L’Homme, 1998; Shackley, 2001) or sacred mountains (UNESCO, 2001d).

For the purpose of my arguments sacred is used interchangeably with the terms ‘holy’ and ‘sanctified’. I will not refer to either of these terms as I feel they contain the same disadvantages that are illustrated for the term sacred.

The intrinsic sacredness of an object or place has been phrased by Mircea Eliade as hierophany, the manifestation of the sacred. Eliade describes that any object will become something other and stops being itself as soon as sacredness is manifested. He elaborates this idea for the example of a stone or a tree. Both stone and tree do not remain stone or tree but turn into something very different because they are hierophanies and thereby they are the sacred itself. (Eliade, 1959, p. 10) A similar setting apart also happens to places and even time, once sacredness is combined to these concepts. The sacred place transforms into the centre or in Eliade’s words: “every consecrated space coincides with the centre of the world, just as the time of any ritual coincides with the mystical time of the ‘beginning’.” (Eliade, 1996, p. 197)
The dichotomy can hardly be better characterised than in the words of Emile Durkheim: “there is nothing left with which to characterise the sacred in its relation to the profane except their heterogeneity. However, this heterogeneity is sufficient (…) because it is very particular: it is absolute. In all the history of human thought there exists no other example of two categories of things so profoundly differentiated or so radically opposed to one another.” (Durkheim, 1996, p. 189)

The term religious heritage for sites of First Nations contexts is strictly avoided in the United States of America, where such sites are rather designated as sacred. The reason for this seemingly arbitrary selection is that a designation of places as religious “would have automatically excluded them for consideration in the listing Register of Historic Places” (Downer et al., 1994, p. 47).

And as a native German speaker I also consider translation difficulties as there is no equivalent for faith in my language. Like the Anglophone world makes an elaborate distinction between ‘to believe in’ and ‘to believe that’ to provide a verbal equivalent for faith, in German the term can only be approximated as a combination of belief (Glauben) and trust (Vertrauen). Or one could add that faith is belief with a connotation of transcendence. While one can believe that a national team will win the world cup, to have faith in the national team would rather be something for die hard soccer devotees.

Catherine Bell in her analysis of Emile Durkheim summarises that he describes “ritual as the means by which collective beliefs and ideals are simultaneously generated, experienced and affirmed as real by the community” (Bell, 1996, p. 22). This threefold parallel aspects of constructing, experiencing (valuing) and identity-affirming in the heritage construction cycle indeed confirm ritual as predominantly intangible heritage.

This argument is explicitly considered and discussed in the following subchapter 2.1 Faith and universality – a contradiction?

The Operational Guidelines to the World Heritage Convention regulate this clearly: “At the time of the inscription of a property on the World Heritage List, the Committee adopts a statement of Outstanding Universal Value (…) which will be the key reference for the future effective protection and management of the property.” (UNESCO, 2005g, § 51)

The evolution of criterion (vi) was already briefly discussed in chapter 2.1 World Heritage – overcrowded flagship? Background information on the present formulation is also provided in two related endnotes, 52 and 53. It shall nevertheless be added here that the two earliest versions of this criterion included a direct reference to religious and spiritual associations. The earliest ICOMOS proposal itself based on the US National Park Service heritage selection criteria which was discussed in the Morges Meeting in 1976 suggested the selection of: “Properties associated with and essential to the understanding of, globally significant persons, events, religions or philosophies” (Titchen, 1995, p. 119). I am almost grateful that this suggestion was not included in the Operational Guidelines, as I can vividly imagine the World Heritage Committee discussing which religions or philosophies are globally significant and which aren’t. But even the second version discussed by the World Heritage Committee which met at the UNESCO headquarters in June 1977 explicitly referred to heritage of faith and furthermore listed concrete examples: “The property should be most importantly associated with persons, events, philosophies or religions of outstanding historical significance; for example, monuments such as the church of Nativity in Bethlehem, a group of buildings such as the holy places in Mecca and Medina or a site such as Cape Kennedy, the launching pad for man’s first voyage to the moon.” (Titchen, 1998, p. 4) It is interesting to note that neither of the three examples given in the criterion proposal has yet been proposed for listing on the World Heritage list, though all three would probably qualify, even under the finally adopted criteria and their continuous revisions.

Michael Petzet in his presentation to the 14th general Assembly of ICOMOS in Victoria Falls highlights that also European monuments that are often considered classic and static contain narratives of faith and provides the example of cathedrals: “If we look, for instance, at such exemplary monuments as one of the French cathedrals: for some colleagues it might be a classical example of ‘tangible heritage’; however, in reality it is an image of heaven, a place of worship that has been used for centuries, a site of important historic events, therefore all in all it has a mostly intangible dimension.” (Petzet, 2004) But when we now look at the example given, in the World Heritage framework the result is confusing. France has 3 cathedrals listed as single monuments on the World Heritage List: Chartres Cathedral, Amiens Cathedral and Bourges Cathedral. None of the three is
listed according to criterion (vi), which means none of these three buildings is recognised to have associations with living traditions, ideas or beliefs by the World Heritage Committee.

Laurent Lévi-Strauss on behalf of the Cultural Division of UNESCO states that “We have unfortunately, a long list of sacred places that have been irreparably damaged by the use of concrete, the replacement of original sculpted elements by new ones, and the inappropriate use of adornment, such as marble. It is here that we encounter one of the major difficulties in preserving authenticity in historic buildings, because sacred places are also living places in which people worship.” (Lévi-Strauss, 2001, p. 380)

I have refrained from recalculating myself to provide an updated version until 2006. The selection of sites considered religious properties is completely arbitrary and it might even be difficult to come up with the same number of religious properties when counting through the list twice. The issue of arbitrary selection is broached in chapter 2.2 Cathedrals and sacred forests when the criteria for the selection of case studies are introduced.

The Delos initiative, recently established by IUCN/WCPA emphasises the analysis of sacred natural sites and will hopefully in the future contribute to the valuation and management of natural heritage sites of faith (Papayannis & Mallarach, 2003).

A reformulation of universality was also one of the conclusions reached by the GCI project on values and heritage conservation. The authors stated, pointing at the UNESCO World Heritage List, that “universality warrants closer critical attention. There is a great deal of evidence to suggest that local, place- and community bound values (i.e., those not, by definition, universally valued) are a more important impulse behind conservation. Cultural relativism (and more generally, the post-modern questioning of canons in every corner of culture and society) demands that the conservation field explore what universality is, why it is so influential, and what role it should play in conservation decisions – in particular, through determinations of cultural significance.” (Avrami et al., 2000, p. 69)

On occasion of the nomination of the former Nazi-German concentration camp in Auschwitz the Committee commented on the inscription decision, stating: “The Committee decided to enter Auschwitz concentration camp on the List as a unique site and to restrict the inscription of other sites of a similar nature” (UNESCO, 1979b, p. 12). In complete contrast the Committee expressed its explicit congratulations after the inscription of Robben Island: “Many members of the Committee expressed their pleasure and emotion and congratulated South Africa for having proposed this site which symbolises the fight against oppression, the victory of democracy as well as the process of national reconciliation.” (UNESCO, 2000a)

It is fascinating that the adolescents gathered at the International World Heritage Youth Forum in Karlskrona, Sweden in 2001, recommended to UNESCO and the World Heritage Committee the inscription of more sites reflecting these aspects of humanity: “This memory of the dark side of man’s history and the suffering of the victims is recognised in very few World Heritage sites. In order to make people aware of the evil we are capable of inflicting on each other we make the following recommendation: that UNESCO seek ways and means of encouraging the establishment of more sites of memory to honour the victims and to teach humankind that there is a dark side within all of us.” (World Heritage Youth Forum, 2001)

Case studies for the text-based content analysis which did neither consider photographs nor maps or other visual documentation of the nomination files, were selected according to a set of criteria. I intended to select one site per annual nomination cycle which amounts to 25 sites for the period between 1978 and 2004 (Vatican City was nominated in two years 1980 and 1984). Such selection was considered helpful to analyse possible changes in presentation of nominations throughout the last three decades of nomination practice. I selected cultural sites from various geographic regions to achieve a great variety of cultural contexts attempting to select for each larger region files from different decades. The selection was restricted to cultural or mixed sites but not to properties listed under one particular criterion. All sites chosen conveyed the impression of being expressions of faith according to the brief introductory texts of the World Heritage Centre web presentation. The final compilation of files studied, comprised the following World Heritage Sites (listed chronologically according to their year of inscription): Rock-hewn churches, Lalibela (no. 18), Ethiopia, 1978 (Wolde, 1978); Kathmandu Valley (no. 121), Nepal, 1979 (Thapa, 1979); The properties of the Holy See in that city enjoining extraterritorial rights and San Paolo fuori le Mura and Vatican City (no. 286rev), Holy See, 1980 & 1984 (Frana, 2004); The old city of Jerusalem and its walls (no. 106).
107, proposed by Jordan, 1981 (The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 1980); the sacred city of
Anuradhapura (no. 200), Sri Lanka, 1982 (Laduwahetty, 1981), Rila Monastery (no. 216), Bulgaria,
1983 (Berbenliev, 1982); Santiago de Compostela (Old Town), (no. 347), Spain, 1985 (Gil, 1984);
Old city of Sana’a (no. 385), Yemen, 1986 (Yemen Arab Republic, 1985); Uluru-Kata Tjuta Na-
tional Park (no. 447rev), Australia, 1987 (Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service, 1986);
Canterbury Cathedral, St. Augustine’s Abbey and St. Martin’s Church (no. 496), United Kingdom,
1988 (Historic Buildings and Monuments Commission, 1986); Natural and cultural sanctuary of the
Bandiagara Escarpement (no. 516), Mali, 1989 (Diálo, 1979); Tongariro National Park (no. 421rev),
New Zealand, 1990 & 1993 (Government of New Zealand, 1993); Jesuit missions of the Chiquitos,
Bolivia (no. 529), Bolivia 1990 (Ballivian, 1989); Borobudur Temple Compounds (no. 592), Indo-
nesia, 1991 (Sastrapradja, 1990); Pueblos de Taos (no. 492rev), United States of America, 1992
(Horn, 1987); Architectural Ensemble of the Trinity Lavra in Sergiev Posad (no. 657), Russian Fed-
eration, 1993 (Nikitina, 1992); Temple and cemetery of Confucius and the Kong family mansion in
Qufu (no. 704), China, 1994 (Xianglin, 1993); Jongmyo Shrine (no. 738), Republic of Korea, 1995
(Min-sup, 1994); Istukushima Shinto Shrine (no. 776) Japan, 1996 (Asuko & Hiroshi, 1995); Quadí
Qadisha (the holy valley) and the forest of the cedars of God (horsh arz al-rab) (no. 850), Lebanon,
1997 (Asmar, 1997); Sukur cultural landscape (no. 938), Nigeria, 1999 (Gella, 1998); Churches of
Chiloé (no. 971), Chile, 2000; Tsodilo (no. 1021), Botswana, 2001 (Mogami, 2000); Matobo Hills
(no. 306rev), Zimbabwe, 2003 (Mumbengegwi, 2002); Koutammakou, the land of the
Batammaribba (no. 1140), Togo, 2004 (Klassou, 2003).

The remaining sites not described as sacred or pilgrimage centres were nevertheless referred to as
sites of religious importance or spiritual associations, otherwise they would not have been selected
for this study.

I am not entirely sure that Jongmyo Shrine was indeed nominated under criterion (iv). The State
Party Korea had in the nomination dossier requested to list Jongmyo Shrine under the criteria (ii)
and (vi). ICOMOS in its evaluation proposes inscription under criterion (iv) with a text that fits as
much under (iv) as it would under (vi) and raises the question whether criterion (iv) was indeed in-
tended or is a typographic mistake intended to mean criterion (vi).

The arrogance with which some State Parties assume to be world centres of heritage expertise is
stunning and became particularly obvious during the discussions on the Cairns Decision in which it
was generally deplored that some regions lack the financial means and professional expertise to
present adequate nomination files. The State Party of Italy in its comments to the Cairns Decision
suggested, that “the most effective contribution to the solution of the problem of under-
representation in the List may come from appropriate training, assistance and capacity building, so
as to enable under-represented countries to acquire the skill (…) necessary to (…) presenting a suc-
cessful nomination” (UNESCO, 2004a). And of course “Italy is prepared to consider (…) the de-
velopment of a specific project aimed at the training of world heritage experts of the less-
represented countries” (UNESCO, 2004a, p. 32).

Three of these four sites required two nomination dossiers to receive acknowledgement of their
cultural qualities. Both Uluru-Kata Tjuta and Tongariro were initially nominated as natural sites
and had their cultural criteria added at a later date. In the case of Matobo the initially mixed nomination
of 1983 was evaluated negatively by IUCN which postponed the nomination endeavour until the
re-presentation of the file as a cultural landscape in 2002.

I have to highlight that the current format of World Heritage Nomination proposals does not
encourage the description of narratives. Although in the case of cultural properties, the description
is supposed to contain “whatever elements make the property culturally significant” (UNESCO,
2005g, annex 5, p. 139), the following listing of elements primarily refers to the standards: architec-
tural style, date of construction etc.

One of the key narratives is that of Python Woman, which shall be reproduced here as an example
of the meticulous presentation: “A group of ancestral Kuniya (Python Beings) lived on the
southern face of Uluru. One particular important figure was Python Woman, who brought her eggs
to Uluru and placed them at Kuniya Piti, at the eastern end of the monolith, where they became
boulders that are still charged with the Kuniya’s creative power. The Pythons were attacked by a
revenge of Liru (poisonous Snake Warriors), who killed young Kuniya Man. The south face of
Uluru is pitted with the marks of spears thrown in the attack. The Woman Python approached her
Liru nephew’s killer, performing the ritual dance of anger and dropping a handful of dust in an at-
tempt to dispel her aggression before twice striking the Liru with her digging stick. Both blows
made cracks on the face of Uluru and, despite her attempts to dispel her anger, the second one killed Liru.” (Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service, 1986, p. 45)

208 The evaluator refers to concerns raised by the elders he met during the evaluation mission: “Concern was expressed to the evaluator by elders that younger people did not show much interest in learning and carrying on the traditions.” (ICOMOS, 2003a, p. 135)

209 Oral contribution of the State Party of India during the debate on the recommendations of the Kazan Expert Meeting on Outstanding Universal Value, at the 29th Session of the World Heritage Committee in Durban 2005. I have reproduced the statement according to my personal stenographic records of the oral contribution. The summary record of the meetings represents the contribution in the following wording: “Certain categories of heritage and geographical regions were underrepresented as a result of colonialism and therefore it was acceptable that only certain types of cultural heritage were considered to be of universal value.” (UNESCO, 2005k, p. 33)

210 Obviously, the French cultural authorities would not share the feeling that seven cathedrals nominated by one State Party to the Convention are an exaggeration. Best proof for this is the current tentative list of France which includes an additional three cathedrals desired to be listed in the foreseeable future.

211 For explication of the three systems, please refer to endnote 23.

212 Both frameworks are sub-structured according to religions (in plural), i.e. groups of shared faiths that are treated as conceptual entities. Despite the fact that I consider such grouping highly problematic in general – because it suggests that the groups named are indeed homogenous – the particular grouping selected by ICOMOS raises several additional questions and was severely criticised by the World Heritage Committee. For the example of spiritual responses the authors list: “A. ancient and indigenous belief systems B. Hinduism and related religions C. Buddhism D. Confucianism, Taoism, Shintoism etc. E. Judaism F. Christianity G. Islam” (ICOMOS, 2004b, p. 17) In a later graphic presentation, the category Christianity is further divided into “Protestantism, Evangelisation, Latin Christianity, Eastern Orthodoxy and Early Christian Church” (ICOMOS, 2004b, p. 35). In opposition to this specificity for Christianity, all other categories remain without substructures, including the thirty-five sites identified as ‘ancient or indigenous beliefs’. The conclusion for the category of religious properties is almost identical to that of spiritual responses – with the exception of the calculated percentage of representation. It reads: “Analysis of the religious properties on the World Heritage List and Tentative Lists shows that a high proportion of these are cathedrals, churches and monastic establishments associated with the Christian religion. Concerning the other major world religions, such as Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism and Judaism, there is a strong case for thematic studies of the monuments of these religions to be carried out, indicating criteria for their selection and evaluation.” (ICOMOS, 2004b, p. 42)

213 Sites – a subcategory of expressions of creativity – does not fit properly into a thematic framework and once again raises doubts on the construction of the thematic framework which seems to differ only slightly from the typological framework. A real thematic framework would require rather abstract, conceptual categories under which expressions of creativity could be divided. The framework introduced in the ICOMOS report can only be seen as a very tentative step in this direction.

214 Although one can assume that in this division ‘belief’ is understood as a philosophical concept which does not involve transcendence, the separation of the two categories is not explained in the report and therefore remains rather confusing.

215 Unfortunately Labadi does not provide an explication what an „intangible heritage site” is supposed to be. Since the phrase itself seems to contain an irresolvable conceptual paradox, I better refrain from conjecturing what could have been meant.

216 Both ICOMOS and IUCN were requested to revise, continue and complete their respective gap analysis reports and expand them to the analysis of the tentative lists. The Committee in particular decided during its 28th Session in Suzhou, China in 2004 that it “Requests IUCN and ICOMOS to complete their analyses of the Tentative Lists, work on the gaps in the World Heritage List with due consideration to all State Parties and regions of the world and continue their thematic studies” (UNESCO, 2004b, p. 12).
In highlighting the deviation I do not try to argue that the masterpieces listed are not intangible heritage in the framework of UNESCO, which indeed they are. As outlined in endnote 13, the inclusion of the masterpieces into the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity by regulation of article 31 of the 2003 convention (UNESCO, 2003b, § 31) also strongly suggests that the scope and method of identification are very similar. The criteria for inclusion in the proclamation programme and under the yet to be created lists, however, might differ.

The criteria for the selection of the jury members as included in the first annex of the Guide for the presentation of candidature files to the masterpiece proclamation does not explain the composition of Jury members. The guidelines suggest that the jury members ensure a balance “between creative workers and experts” (UNESCO, 2001a, p. 27). However, it is hard to tell whether the considerable number of jury members of diplomatic background is counted into one of these roles. UNESCO provides on its website some information on the individuals which constituted the jury, a mélange of UNESCO ambassadors, prominent personalities and academic scholars in the wider field of intangible cultural heritage.

This is supported by the fact that representatives of member states presenting the candidature files were not invited to the jury meetings: “The representatives of the Member States do not attend the meeting of the Jury” (UNESCO, 2001a, p. 11) and NGO’s present were not permitted to intercede in the discussions but solely allowed to provide additional information upon request by one of the jury members.

Please refer back to endnote 149 which considers processes of heritage creation in expert circles.

The first expert meeting was held in Paris from 17th to 18th of March 2005 and focused on ‘Inventorying Intangible Cultural Heritage’ (UNESCO, 2005), and a second, arranged in cooperation with the Asia/Pacific Cultural Centre for UNESCO took place in March 2006 in Tokyo, Japan (UNESCO, 2006d). It focused on ‘Community involvement in safeguarding Intangible Cultural Heritage: towards the implementation of the 2003 Convention’.

The report of the second expert meeting on community involvement conveys the impression that the central quality of an expert for the safeguarding of intangible cultural heritage is the ability to communicate, in particular to communicate the significance given to an expression of cultural identity to outsiders of a particular community structure. The experts gathered requested, that materials submitted to the Representative List of the 2003 convention shall be compiled with “involvement of relevant communities, groups and, where appropriate individuals in all phases of the process of documenting ICH, [and] description by the community of the significance of the ICH with support, where appropriate, from other relevant parties.” (UNESCO, 2006d, p. 19) I assume that other relevant parties involve so-called experts but it remains unclear how such ability to understand and represent local significance is achieved and what the often-requested better training for the safeguarding of ICH should involve.

Although the first intergovernmental meeting of the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage took place after my defined deadline for the inclusion of further materials, I wish to include the information, that during this meeting the relation of diplomats to so-called experts was 2:1 or 16 diplomats and 8 experts.

Details on this discussion were introduced in the last paragraphs of chapter 2.3 The intangible – non-intangible debate in the first section.

Space as a potentiality is phrased when we make space for something, which means we provide for something to exist in a systematic order in which it will take place. Spaciousness taken abstractly therefore is often equalled with the potential of intellectual enlargement and spiritual freedom. When Heidegger speaks of the openness of being he implies the capacity of this spaciousness, the potential for understanding and dwelling.

Löw simplifies Aristotle’s abstract conceptions of space – which are actually fourfold – to the essence of an absolutistic container space or tank, a space of defined physical boundaries separated from an outer non-space.

Further thoughts on the construction of place in the process of localizing cultural identity and meaning are introduced in chapter 4 in this section and the discussion of topos in Section Four, chapter 2.1 Logos and topos.
The location of identity in place – both as a physical location or a symbolic concept – has been studied intensely by disciplines such as geography, sociology and anthropology. We find various terms attributed to the phenomenon, for example topophilia as introduced by Tuan (Tuan, 1974), place attachment by Setha M. Low and Irwin Altman (Low & Altman, 1992), place identity as in the case of Cliff Hague and Paul Jenkins (Hague & Jenkins, 2005) or sense of place as preferred by Kevin Lynch (Lynch, 1976). Sense of place at some point has become very popular in North American cultural heritage institutions and was officially introduced into Canadian heritage terminology (Canada, 1999).

Physical location or, as mentioned above physical place, shall be taken in this work as referring to a place as a defined portion of the earth’s surface, mainly designated by geographical coordinates and documented in various mapping systems. Physical places are embodied with meaning in the same way as conceptual places but can be described in measurements and defined by equally physical boundaries.

In this definition, various kinds of ritualised behaviours and celebrations – when being defined by an aspect of periodicity can be regarded as cultural spaces. Not only regular celebrations of narratives of faith such as Christmas or Aid al-Fitr need to be considered places, also the first day of school, or even Sunday mornings and lunch breaks are to be conceptualised as place.

Selection criteria for the case studies analysed parallel to those applied for the case studies selected from the World Heritage List for analysis in chapter 2.2 Cathedrals and sacred forests, compare endnote 201. Since one case study per year would have been too little for an initiative that only consisted of three annual cycles, I have selected 2 proclamations of 2001, two proclamations of 2003 and three out of the 42 proclaimed in 2005. The seven intangible heritage expressions selected represent each of the following heritage categories recognised under the programme: cultural spaces, traditional knowledge, performing arts, oral traditions, rituals and festivals, traditional craftsmanship, and social practices. The selection comprises ‘The cultural space of Sosso-Bala in Nyagassola’, Guinea, 2001 (République de Guinée, 2001); ‘The mystery play of Elche’, Spain, 2001 (Malm, 2001); ‘The Andean cosmovision of the Kallawaya’, Bolivia, 2003 (Alvarez Plata, 2002); ‘The tradition of Vedic chanting’, India, 2003 (Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts, 2003); ‘The mask dance of the drums from Drametse’, Bhutan, 2005 (Bhutan, 2004); ‘Indonesian Kris’, Indonesia, 2005 (Swasono, 2004) and ‘Gule Wamkulu’, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia, 2005, (Malawi, 2005). In considering whether these case studies qualify as heritage of faith, I followed the brief introductory descriptions published by UNESCO, in which all selected expressions were described as sacred except for the Indonesian Kris, which was named an object of “rich spirituality and mythology” (UNESCO, 2005), and Gule Wamkulu, which was not explicitly considered sacred but a “secret cult and ritual dance” (UNESCO, 2005). I understood the two quoted designations as most likely expressing a relation to narratives of faith.

Allocation to the different categories is aggravated by the fact that the presentation of categories changed between the proclamation of 2003 and 2005. The first two proclamations are presented according to 6 typologies for intangible heritage: cultural spaces, traditional knowledge, oral traditions, performing arts, traditional music, and rituals and festivals (cf. UNESCO, 2004d). The proclamation of 2005 dismissed traditional knowledge and traditional music, which are now replaced by three new typologies: social practices, festive events and traditional craftsmanship (UNESCO, 2005l). Some expressions are presented under two or more categories on the UNESCO webpage for the proclamation of masterpieces.

Although universality of expressions is a concept not supported by the masterpiece programme, the dossier of Vedic Chanting argues that the significance of the heritage expression is not limited to the local level but universal, even universal in expanding beyond concepts such as space and time. In the words of the authors of the dossier this is explained in the following way: “Vedic language has a depth and dimension that has universal application, transcending limitations of space and time.” (Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts, 2002, p. 29)

The particularly active partaking of the attendants in the creation and legitimation of values and cultural identity is explicitly named in the candidature dossier: “besides much other positive energy being established under the serene atmosphere of the festival, the festival serves as a platform for the people to commit themselves to Buddhist values and practices.” (Bhutan, 2004, p. 38)

The discussion tends to focus on different interpretations of terminology rather than the concept of authenticity. Authenticity is deemed inappropriate by intangible heritage professionals because
the term is strongly influenced by the outdated World Heritage concept of authenticity in material, design, workmanship and setting (cf. Feilden & Jokilehto, 1998). If we, however, consider authenticity as historical continuity and rootedness, intangible heritage professionals might join in considering this aspect of heritage important. In Nara they opposed a use of the term for the meaning it conveys as true versus false or something to be measured against a fixed reference point: “On the contrary, we find that historical continuity (transmitted from generation to generation) is among the most important distinctive features of intangible cultural heritage together with the fact that intangible cultural heritage is constantly recreated (living). The intangible heritage experts further remarked that the notion of authenticity was not applicable to intangible heritage, as the idea of good versus bad, or false versus true manifestations of such heritage does not find support in the ways communities themselves relate to their heritage. By considering certain manifestations as authentic, it would imply that other manifestations are not authentic. The problem then arises as to who has the authority to decide what is authentic or not.” (UNESCO, 2006g, p. 222)

236 Rieks Smeets in his publication on the link between intangible and tangible heritage puts this somewhat global position into perspective: “(…) authenticity in relation to intangible cultural heritage is a moot point; the future will tell whether it is a useful notion in the context of the safeguarding of that part of our heritage. We know that it cannot mean ‘historically correct’ as intangible cultural heritage by definition is evolving.” (Smeets, 2004a, p. 147)

237 Authenticity and lack of authenticity of the kris is further elaborated on in the dossier: “The difference between an authentic kris and a cheap or imitation kris is as follows: Authentic krises are manufactured one by one using traditional forging techniques including prayer and ritual, with a high artistic quality, especially in the dhapur (for the blade) and pamor (damascene pattern of metal lamination) (…). On the other hand, cheap or imitation krises, including their accessories, are mass produced from cheap materials such as scrap cut out tinplate, cast brass or aluminium (not forged), with a sheath and handle made from cheap timber pendhok (…).” (Swasono, 2004, p. 34)

238 I do not want to be understood as saying that the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN, 1948) or the 1945 Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO, 2004 [1945]-a) are outdated or require urgent revision. My point is rather that a periodical discussion of standards set forth in such documents assists better understanding and encourages redefinition processes that might be necessary according to changed perceptions of cultural identity and processes. Such reinterpretation might often be possible on the basis of the historic texts given.

239 Kurin continues his questions also asking “Is a musical tradition where only men play instruments and only women sing inequitable, and thus contrary to human rights accords?” (Kurin, 2004b, p. 70)

240 This article of the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights was reiterated in a slightly different wording in the 2001 UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity: “(…) and all persons have the right to participate in the cultural life of their choice and conduct their own cultural practices, subject to respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.” (UNESCO, 2002j, § 5)

241 In a similar manner Richard Kurin underlines that “understandably, UNESCO does not want to support or encourage practices inimical to human rights such as slavery, infanticide, or torture.” (Kurin, 2004b, p. 70)

242 At this point one could argue that the Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage does not include a reference that World Heritage Listing has to be compatible with human rights standards.

243 The term topos takes a central position in the following section of my writing. It is defined as the locus of meaning, in other words the localisation of the meaning of a concept. Such localisation is therefore also conceptual and not necessarily a physical location. For further explication of the term topos and its use for the development of the concept topology please refer to Section Four, chapter 2.1 Logos and topos.

244 All three terms, the English place, the Latin locus and the Greek topos are considered equivalents in the context of my argument: they all designate a localisation of meaning. I have generally given preference to the Greek connotation as it appeared to have the least number of standardised meaning attributions in the professional contexts related to the theme of my work. Place is often assumed to solely designate a physical location. Kenneth R. Olwig frames the difficulties with the
term in his article on landscape as contested topos of place: “the meaning of place is (...) ‘tensive’. There is a certain tension in the usage of the concept of place. On the one hand, it can be reduced to the ‘geographer’s’ concept of space. On the other hand, (...) it is a special ensemble with a history and meaning, incarnating the experiences and aspirations of a people.” (Olwig, 2001, p. 93)

Locus to many suggests a more conceptual level. In the heritage field, however, the term locus is often connected to the phrase ‘genius loci’ which suggests that value and meaning is embodied, or at least embedded, in place. Since my approach presumes the diametrical opposite, that place merely facilitates the signification and comprehension of meaning – which has to be passed on by other means – and allows for participation in meaning-making, I prefer to introduce the term topos.

245 Faith is place as much as heritage is place or home is place. Smith illustrates this abstraction in discussing the term home: “Home is not, from such a point of view, best understood as the place-where-I was-born or the place-where-I live. Home is the place where memories are housed.” (J. Z. Smith, 1987, p. 29)

246 Please compare Section One: conceptualising – categorising.
Proposing an integrated approach for the identification, preservation and management of cultural heritage is neither a new idea nor an innovative undertaking. Other authors have made equal claims before, among them Michael Turnpenny who has dedicated a paper to calling for an “integrated and inclusive heritage-management practice and a recognition of the contribution of recent research into constructs of cultural heritage” (Turnpenny, 2004, p. 295f) or Herb Stovel who argued for the conceptual combination of preservation activities for intangible and tangible heritage on the basis of their common goal “to preserve human memory” (Stovel, 2004b, p. 130). At the same time it is not an easy endeavour, considering that earlier meetings that brought together professionals of the intangible and tangible heritage fields to discuss starting points for an integrated approach, have entirely failed to provide us with visions of how integration could be promoted and achieved (cf. UNESCO, 2006g). The title of this section – towards an integrated approach – has also served earlier as the title of one of the meetings described above and perhaps I should therefore add an addition to my heading: ‘towards an integrated approach – another attempt’.

My following considerations emphasise offering a redefined conceptual approach that could serve as a starting point for the development of shared visions and which could stimulate discussions among professionals in the future. My elaborations attempt to look at heritage from a pre-categorical angle, which requires consciously avoiding all biases dictated by heritage divisions and professional disciplines. This also includes negating the existence of categories dividing heritage into intangible and tangible expressions. The importance of a pre-categorical approach is substantiated in the following subchapter, which provides information on the advantages of abandoning heritage typologies in the process of its identification.

The succeeding chapters explore opportunities for developing a heritage identification framework which likewise accommodates intangible and tangible heritage expressions. For this, I frame heritage on a conceptual level, based on the meaning it conveys rather than its observable expressions and manifestations. It has been argued before that heritage comes into existence because a concept takes place (takes topos) and through this very process conveys meaning, meaning which then contributes to identity formation. In this section I corroborate that it is this meaning which has to be the core element and the focus of attention when trying to understand heritage. Shah seems to support this view in her thoughts towards an understanding of culture: “To learn to look into (...) culture rather than to look at it we first have to understand (...) the message behind the surface, the emotion hidden between the lines, the philosophies expressed in its symbols” (Shah, 2000, p. 110).
I will not argue that the meaning of heritage is more important than are heritage expressions, but that understanding of the expressions is not possible when attempted in separation from understanding the construction cycle that produces, reaffirms and requires the respective heritage expression. To read and understand the cycle however, it is not sufficient to analyse and document the expressions, the significations of cultural narratives. Understanding of meanings rather requires the analysis of the entire heritage construction cycle and its constituting elements, including values, knowledge, faith and identity.

Once again, this argument is not new and has been articulated by professionals, who found themselves confronted with heritage significance statements which did clearly not reflect the significance that people attributed locally. ICOMOS for example underlined that action is needed to improve the reflection of the interrelation of values, significance and cultural identities in World Heritage nomination files (cf. ICOMOS, 2004b, p. 45). And Turnpenny raises a similar point in requesting that heritage identification criteria require reference to the particularities of meaning-making in a local context (cf. Turnpenny, 2004, p. 297). With regard to our two UNESCO conventions, this need is less evident for the Intangible Heritage Convention than for World Heritage, a fact supporting the assumption that intangible heritage professionals seem better prepared to identify and elucidate heritage meaning. The World Heritage system often trusts in the scientific ‘truths’ provided by experts, a practice that has long been criticised as mere legitimisation of structures of power by postmodernist and poststructuralist thinkers and which therefore could be considered a relic of paternalism in heritage evaluation. Heritage as part of culture is nowadays understood as the contrary of expert truth, as something contested, shaped and re-shaped by narratives. Bruner describes this in his ‘acts of meaning’: “To be in a viable culture is to be bound in a set of connecting stories, connecting even though the stories may not represent a consensus.” (Bruner, 1990, p. 96) Is the intangible heritage field better prepared to accommodate the contested truths of heritage meaning? And if so, what can tangible heritage professionals learn from their colleagues?

After analysing World Heritage significance statements, Labadi concludes with the request to revise the static format of the nomination dossiers and give more attention to community participation and value explication (cf. Labadi, 2005, p. 99). A revision according to her suggestions would approximate the world heritage format to the masterpiece proclamation format and might indeed help slightly to improve the situation. I think however, that the entire approach towards world heritage property descriptions requires revision, not solely the nomination format. World Heritage consists of monuments, groups of buildings and sites, by definition, but this does not mean that we can understand their meaning by looking at merely the visual expressions. The same is true for intangible heritage expressions, be it a dance, a song, or a religious festival. All expressions of heritage, intangible and tangible, share one important aspect: as heritage expressions they are basically and essentially incomplete and incomprehensible. They only become meaningful in conjunction with the some-
thing expressed, conveyed or signified; and it is this something – I prefer not to say
behind but at the origin of the heritage expression – that requires to be identified.
This something I call the idea, which is the conceptual origin of the cycle – the logos.

Certain aspects of the idea of a heritage concept are already given consideration in
heritage descriptions and identifications, but the process in most of these cases is
expression-bound. Expression-bound means that experts study the heritage expres-
sions and successively try to get to the bottom of their meanings: “the meanings (…) [which] unfold in stories, myths, rituals and in naming.” (Sheldrake, 2001, p. 6)254 I
propose an inverted approach: to study the ideas, the conceptual formation of the
heritage construction cycle, and only subsequently identify how the meanings are
localised. To do so does not only require negating established heritage categories, but
also denying the existence of a heritage expression as so far perceived. This approach
is what I refer to as topological analysis, which is introduced in more detail in the
second subchapter of this section.

1 New typologies or beyond typologies

“Usually we see the world through a pattern of concepts that we have inherited” (W.
C. Smith, 1991 [1962], p. 193) Smith ponders on the dynamics of categorisation:

“Sometimes these windows need cleaning; so much so that almost we may be seeing the
windows that we have constructed rather than the world outside. Sometimes too on thought-
ful examination we may come to recognise that by rearranging the windows as well as by
cleaning them we could get a better view of the real world beyond. Certainly we may be
grateful to our ancestors who have built these windows through which we see. Without them
we should still be walled up within the confines of our immediate experience or that of our
small circle – as their ancestors before them had been. Yet it is not impious of us to ask oc-
casionally whether we might not see better by enlarging a window here or there, or even by
replacing it with new ones of different shape.” (W. C. Smith, 1991 [1962], p. 193)

Typologies and concepts are not given structures but human constructs that serve
human needs. This is also true for typologies in the heritage field and earlier chapters
of my writing have illustrated my perception that our current windows require urgent
cleaning. I have described indigenous peoples’ challenge to categorisations in the
heritage field, especially the dichotomies of tangible and intangible but also cultural
and natural heritage.255 Beyond an indigenous viewpoint my explications demon-
strated that especially the division of intangible and tangible heritage cannot be main-
tained when observing the dynamic construction and reaffirmation processes of heri-
tage and further, that this division is a risk to the preservation of heritage as a holistic
treasure of humankind. Its actual threat to heritage results from the artificial separa-
tion of mutual concepts and shared meanings present in the construction of both so-
called intangible and tangible heritage expressions. Fortunately, I am not alone in
reiterating this risk256 and others like Sarah Byrne have been equally explicit: “I argue
that it is counterproductive to approach the intangible and tangible aspects (…) sepa-
rately and that to fully appreciate the social meaning (…) it is the interplay between these elements that warrants our attention” (Byrne, 2006)²⁵⁷. Mounir Bouchenaki speaks of the two as partners in sharing a mutual purpose: they “both carry meaning and the embedded memory of humanity” (Bouchenaki, 2004, p. 4). I prefer to rephrase this statement and instead of ‘carry meaning’ formulate: both, intangible and tangible heritage, are the visible expressions and thereby signifiers of meaning, cultural memory and cultural identity.

Preservation activities intended to maintain heritage meaning and cultural identity, but divided into two professional disciplines, two legal frameworks and two administrative responsibilities in dependence on the respective visual expression and spatial manifestation, are stuck in a conceptual paradox. If we bear in mind the heritage construction processes considered, as cyclical interactions of values, significance, meaning, identity, knowledge and their legitimation, then the heritage expression – heritage – is merely one of several factors that contribute to the constant affirmation of knowledge and identity. As stated above, heritage expressions in themselves are incomplete and incomprehensible.²⁵⁸ To preserve them merely as heritage expressions, the stones of a monument, the steps of a dance and the words of an oral tradition, is to create a cultural artefact devoid of meaning and identity. We rather need to preserve the processes that constantly recreate and maintain the expressions; we need to preserve all elements of the cycle.

Some colleagues might nevertheless argue that typological separation into intangible and tangible expressions is legitimate, since the aim of heritage preservation is not a perpetuation of the construction cycle but safeguarding of the recognised expressions. I strongly disagree with such points of view and the explicit objective underlying the UNESCO constitution, cultural conventions and their preservation activities – to strengthen cultural identity and to promote cultural diversity (UNESCO, 2004e, 2004 [1945]-a, preamble, 2005c) – supports my argument that heritage expressions have to be considered as vehicles or, as I formulated earlier, projection screens of ideas and not merely as aesthetic, artistic or historic expressions. Mason and Avrami also warn that “if we focus on, or try to conserve the material itself, without its contexts (…) conservation becomes merely a self-serving interest of conservation professionals instead of a robust, meaningful struggle with representing memory and identity that is conservation’s central social function.” (Mason & Avrami, 2002, p. 25) But how can we revise heritage typologies to preserve heritage expressions as part of their ideas and construction cycles?

De la Torre and Mason who discussed the same question emphasised the effectiveness of typologies in heritage identification in that they “constitute a first-order research tool, ordering and organizing knowledge so that research builds on itself – it keeps practitioners from having to continually reinvent the wheel.” (de la Torre & Mason, 2002, p. 9) They acknowledge that perhaps no typology “will be appropriate for all sites or situations” but nevertheless actively try to provide a typology as an “attempt to create a common starting point from which a modified typology can be
constructed in a variety of heritage planning situations” (de la Torre & Mason, 2002, p. 9). Such modification according to particular cases would still require the invention of many small wheels, but also for other reasons the conceptual framework and new typology proposed by the GCI research project remains unconvincing. Many innovations proposed by the project point into the right direction, for example to identify heritage “by analysing what stories are being told” and “by adopting a number of quite different perspectives (epistemologies) and, it follows, methodologies”. However, the objective of the exercise – to obtain more meaningful statements of significance – constrains. Significance statements – at least for tangible heritage and thereby for the GCI project – emerge in legal or administrative frameworks which require proof of significant, important, exceptional or even outstanding and universal expressions, but are rarely prepared to accommodate significance expressed in the interrelation of expression and identity or expression and knowledge. Furthermore such statements, as soon as formulated, statically attribute significance to heritage expressions, for the purpose of long-term planning; an approach which seems to “contradict basic anthropological theory and experience” (Tainter & Lucas, 1983, p. 714).

Unfortunately, statements of significance are very often considered proofs of a scientifically confirmed heritage value, and “through presenting these assessments as scientific or objective, the opportunity for integrating subjective and non-expert community values is hindered (...)” (Turnpenny, 2004, p. 298). Turnpenny concludes that the production of significance statements “does not, therefore, necessarily represent the way ‘non-experts’ think about places or objects.” (Turnpenny, 2004, p. 298) I am convinced that one of the reasons for the observed gaps between expert statements and local perception are expert biases resulting from their reliance on heritage typologies. What de la Torre and Mason positively termed a first-order research tool turns out to be a preconditioning and inflexible matrix which homogenises not only research epistemology and methodology but the established heritage significance. How can we ensure an open, flexible and unbiased approach to the identification of heritage expressions?

I can hardly imagine a revised typological framework which at the same time guides the researcher along prestructured lines and enables him to remain flexible enough to become aware of all particularities of a heritage expression. Consequently I propose an approach beyond typological frameworks which is based on the study of a heritage expression and construction cycle as an entirely new phenomenon and its manifestation, with tools consisting of merely a white sheet of paper and an open, curious mind. Does this mean that the researcher – as de la Torre and Mason suggest – has to reinvent the wheel a hundred times?

If we consider heritage as valuable because of its uniqueness and acknowledge that in each case the interrelation of an idea, values, knowledge and expressions is a unique construct, then each case requires an individual approach. I am aware that it is a small step from on the one hand a meaningful inquiry based on the perception that every
heritage expression has its own story to tell; on the other hand running the risk of dissolving into solipsism and retreating from disciplinary frameworks and exchanges. Yet, the task of heritage identification cannot be a testing of typological characteristics; it is to discover and describe the conceptual ideas of heritage.

I don’t want to say that all heritage assessment frameworks and historic structure reports ever established must be abandoned, but heritage professionals need to be aware that all tools at hand are designed to serve a purpose. In most cases, the purpose is to simplify a multitude of information pieces according to what is required for standard heritage identification schemes. Such schemes pre-select supposedly important from supposedly superfluous information and unavoidably lead to results earlier defined as homogenised heritage significance. In analysing heritage according to a set of typologies we create heritage that finds expression solely in the set of typologies applied, while we disregard and thereby destroy heritage characteristics that lie beyond our classification capacities.

If, for example, we aim to identify historic cities and our framework provides us with the typology medina,263 we will find Marrakesh, Damascus, Sana’a and Isfahan and in each of these cases all required characteristics that qualify our cities as heritage expressions of a so-called medina. The four cities are indeed worth heritage recognition – and in all four cases they are inscribed on the UNESCO list as World Heritage Cities – but they are valuable for their very differences in the framework of a common theme rather than their shared features. The typological framework ‘medina’, however, will not enable us to identify these very differences. And categories that could assist in identifying these individual characteristics can only emerge in the context of each respective city.

Identifying heritage beyond typologies can be compared to identifying an individual human being. Of course, as of hearing of a person for the first time – or perhaps even seeing a photograph – we have already made up our image and have formed some conception of this person. Indeed, we do not only categorise heritage, but also people. The physical characteristics – particularly prominent for tangible heritage – provide us with some first orientation: white, blonde, female, around fifty and slightly bold. More intangible expressions, her smooth voice, her typing speed, her femininity and her seemingly never-ending repertoire of German folktales already give us a clearer impression. But there is more to explore about this individual, and the same is true for heritage. To understand who she is we would certainly request talking to her and most likely also talking to people who intimately know her.265 I wish to propose the same for heritage: we need to listen to its narratives and to the narratives of those who intimately know it. These narratives already link the various elements of the construction cycle and are in themselves what heritage professionals are painstakingly trying to create: significance statements. They are significance statements which can succeed without claiming to be scientific or objective, on the contrary: “the measure of the ‘truth’ is judged not by conventional scientific standards of validity and reliability but by the power of stories to evoke the vividness of lived experience (...) the
degree to which the narrative (...) generates empathy (...)” (R. J. Berger & Quinney, 2005, p. 9)

Recognizing and representing heritage narratives is the basis of my topological studies which are introduced in the following chapters. Encouraging people to tell their heritage stories is at the same time a first unbiased and effective activity of heritage preservation. Ronald J. Berger and Richard Quinney describe the preserving characteristics of story-telling: “Stories are ways not merely of telling others about ourselves but of constructing our identities, of finding purpose and meaning in our lives” (R. J. Berger & Quinney, 2005, p. 5)²⁶⁶. Memorisation and presentation of narratives reaffirms heritage construction and the typologies used to present the stories to us might be appropriate typologies to present our evaluation to others. Sure enough our informants would not call them typologies, and maybe heritage themes or aspects might be a more felicitous choice of terms, even for the analytical context of heritage identification.

Intangible heritage is often said to be more “associated with the desire to empower local people in relation to their experiences.” (J. G. Smith, 2000, p. 58) And indeed, intangible heritage professionals – largely from academic disciplines of the humanities and social sciences – are more familiar with narrative inquiry and better prepared to listen and to give weight and attention to the heritage narratives and processes of heritage construction. To many tangible heritage experts trained in architecture, archaeology or urban planning a narrative turn towards a focus on ideas and concepts of identity is a considerable challenge. Yet, it is an important step which enables the heritage field to understand its responsibility of preserving a holistic heritage - beyond typologies – and thereby enables the dwelling in heritage that is preservation.

2 Topology in lieu of typology

Approaching heritage beyond typologies does not imply working without guiding conceptual approaches or methodologies. On the contrary, I intend to replace heritage and value typologies by an alternative conceptual approach, developed to guide heritage identification and valuation. The name of this conceptual approach solely requires the exchange of one letter, of the former, ‘y’ towards ‘o’, typology towards topology²⁶⁷. The similarity of the two is incidental. Topology was selected as a compound of two important aspects contributing to heritage construction, topos (τόπος) and logos (λόγος)²⁶⁸, and not merely to confuse my readers or stimulate increased accuracy in reading.

Although the term topology has never been used in the discourses of heritage studies, it is well-known in other disciplines, first of all mathematics, where it constitutes a discipline in itself – in actual fact two disciplines, that of general topology (cf. Engelking, 1989) and algebraic topology (cf. Switzer, 1975; cf. James, 1995) – but also in philosophy. Despite these uses, the yet undesigned status in heritage studies
and almost all of its neighbouring disciplines – anthropology, sociology, human geography, art history, architecture, archaeology etc. – is a clear advantage, providing that my signification does not need to compete with other established connotations of the term. For this very reason, the two separate morphemes of the composite, topos (τόπος) and logos (λόγος), also promise less terminological confusion than many other phrases used to refer to similar concepts, such as ‘cultural landscape’, ‘place’ or ‘text’ as used by Clifford Geertz in his writing-culture considerations (Geertz, 1973a). But also the connotations of the term in farther fields should not be contradicting the intended use. Perhaps it is important therefore to briefly look into the established uses of topology.

In mathematics topology can most generally be described as “the study of the notions of limit and continuity.” (Dixmier, 1984, p. ix) It was established as a counterpart or rather as a backlash to geometry – topology being concerned with abstract space while geometry was primarily based on Euclidean space at the time of distinction (cf. Engelking, 1989, p. 19)269. Like geometry, topology studies characteristics of spatial surfaces whereby as Weeks simplifies it, “a surface’s geometry consist of those properties that do change when the surface is deformed, (…) the aspect of a surface’s nature that is unaffected by deformation is called the topology of the surface” (Weeks, 2002, p. 26)270. Though this might sound rather detached from heritage studies we find some common vocabulary, such as the oppositions of local versus global and intrinsic versus extrinsic characteristics. “The terms ‘local’ and ‘global’ are used most often in the phrases ‘local geometry’ and ‘global topology’.” (Weeks, 2002, p. 40)271 Although relations between the mathematical topologies and a concept for heritage studies might be a bit farfetched, we can at least note that there is no obvious contradiction between the two and that both are concerned with abstractions and the overcoming of constraints provided by Euclidean space.

In philosophy the concept of topology has been used by only one author, no longer a stranger in the context of my writing: the German scholar Martin Heidegger. Heidegger, who speaks of a topology of Being, seems to have used the term only twice in his entire writings. Regardless of its rare use, it became the object of much speculation in Heidegger scholarship and some authors have even proposed that the phrase might be one of the most central parts of his legacy272. In order to understand what Heidegger’s topology of Being (Topologie des Seyns) stands for, it is inevitable to also explore the second term of the phrase: Being, with capital B. Being is the central object of Heidegger’s approach to metaphysics, it is what is needed to let being be or in his words “The Being of being reveals itself as the ground that gives itself ground and accounts for itself.” (Heidegger, 1969, p. 57)273 In his later writings Heidegger has also equated Being with the unconcealment (truth) of Being, according to Mark Okrent “the clearing or opening in which Being, in the first sense as presence, occurs.” (Okrent, 2005) Apart from the poem which leads into my work, Heidegger mentions topology another time in a dialogue with Ernst Jünger in which he claims that the topography of metaphysics should be overcome by a topology, a step be-
yond the metaphysical occupation with Being (cf. Pöggeler, 1986, p. 107). Pöggeler summarises all of Heidegger’s publications during his last decades as “fragments of a topology of Being” which he describes as “Heidegger’s attempt at founding ontology in a fundamental ontology, of overcoming metaphysics in a metaphysics of metaphysics” (Pöggeler, 1972, p. 108). He also attempts to define Heidegger’s topology in considering the two separate morphemes of the compound, as a thinking giving wholly to the present one single great discussion (Erörterung) (cf. Pöggeler, 1986, p. 250).

Digressing form Heidegger for the moment – his conception of topology is considered again later – and also disregarding the more familiar concept of mathematics, it is time to introduce the components and conception of topology for heritage studies or for a sociology of knowledge. Julian Smith has kindly pointed the direction from the one to the other: “It is only when individuals and communities begin to warp the Euclidean geometry of space into the non-Euclidean geometry of their shared experiences that an accurate picture begins to emerge of a sense of place and a sense of identity.” (J. Smith, 2006, p. 67)

### 2.1 Logos and topos

Both morphemes of the compound topology derive from ancient Greek, where the respective nouns topos (τόπος) and logos (λόγος) have very similar structures. The far less complex and less controversially interpreted term of the two is topos, which although it can be translated in a variety of meanings, always seems to designate a location, a placing of something. It is – in opposition to its counterpart logos – never used as a subject of action but as an object providing a condition, characteristic or framework; that is a place.

According to the massive Liddell & Scott Greek-English Lexicon such location or place can be divided in two main lines of interpretation, first a physical place – the geographical position of something – and secondly a conceptual place (cf. Liddell et al., 1968, p. 1806). Proposed translations falling into the first group range from place, region, geographical position, site, place, room to part of the body or position on the zodiac. The conceptual place is expressed in further options such as element (in rhetoric), department or sub-division, topic, sphere, occasion and opportunity (all translations Liddell et al., 1968, p. 1806). In Greek philosophy, at least in the writings of Platon, topos appears frequently with either connotation. According to his commentator Syrianus, Plato distinguished four concepts of topos: physical space, matter, imagination and higher intellectual conception (Syrianus, 1902, p. 186 [p. 1092a21]).

The very rare uses of topos in heritage studies are referring exclusively to sites, with the exception of Olwig whose use of topos is not entirely clear. He somewhat tautologically speaks of the topos of place, explaining that topos in Greek literally derives from common place: “In this essay, landscape is regarded as a contested, tense,
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topos of place, community and self in both the literal and figurative sense of topos.” (Olwig, 2001, p. 94) From the context of his use of topos however, I assume that he intends to designate the location of a conception of meaning, which is very much in line with the interpretation I wish to propose. Regarding the construction of the concept of topology, topos will be considered in an open, almost Platonic sense, as the location – either physical or conceptual – of meaning, in other words topos will stand for the concept that was earlier called place (cf. Section Three, 4 Faith takes place).

The meaning of logos is somewhat more complicated and this seems to have a long-standing tradition. Looking back at the two formative Greek philosophers Aristotle and Plato, Heidegger observes that “the concept of logos has many meanings in Plato and Aristotle, indeed in such a way that these meanings diverge without a basic meaning positively taking the lead.” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 28) For Heidegger however, this is neither a weakness of the authors nor of the concept but a positive consequence of the principle of logos itself, which for him is best translated as speech. We should not be disturbed by rather limited interpretations of speech as for Heidegger speech means “to make manifest” or “letting something be seen” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 29). The range of interpretations this ‘speech’ has to combine is immense, at least when we follow the several pages of concepts listed in Liddell & Scott.

The authors of the Greek-English lexicon identify nine fields of meaning, each of which comes along with several possibilities of translation and specification. I cite merely a selection of terms listed under the concepts three to nine, which will be marked in Roman numerals according to the original edition. Logos therein means “III explanation, plea, pretext, ground, statement of a theory, argument, discourse, reflection, rule, principle, thesis, reason, definition, function, generative principle in organisms, IV inward debate of the soul, idea, scientific knowledge, theory, abstract reasoning, creative reasoning, V narrative, fable, legend, story, VI verbal expression or utterance, talk, expression, tradition, rumour, discussion, debate, dialogue, VII divine utterance, miracle, proverb, assertion, VIII thing spoken of, subject matter, subject, question, secret, IX utterance, expression, speech, and finally language, lyric and poetry” (Liddell et al., 1968, p. 1057-9); a variety that seems to offer more confusion than clarification.

The most prominent use of the term logos is probably its central role in the Christian Greek Scriptures, especially the beginning of the Gospel of John “εν αρχη ην ο λογος και ο λογος ην προς τον θεον και θεος ην ο λογος” (Aland & Nestle, 2004, emphasis added), which is familiar to many in its translation as ‘word’, as in the King James standard translation: “In the beginning was the word, and the word was with God, and the word was God” (The Holy Bible, 1984, John 1,1). The very widespread translation of logos as ‘the word’ is all the more surprising, as word has never been one of the ancient interpretations of logos and even nowadays is rarely listed in common dictionaries. The additional early Christian equation of Jesus (Christ) and logos – often very much to the resentment of Christian fundamental theologians attacked as a hellenisation of Christianity (Verweyen, 2005, p. 26) – determined later interpretations of the concept.
In pre-Christian times, the thinker par excellence of logos was Heraclitus, for whom logos was “the word of all words” (De Gennaro, 2001, p. 234). It is his fragment number 50 which receives particular attention in this context: “ονομ έμον, αλλα τον λόγου ακούσαντας ομολογειν σοφόν εστιν εν πάντα ειναι “ (Diels, 1909, frg. 50), and in the context of which logos is translated in an equal variety ranging from for example report to meaning. Report was preferred by Kahn in his ample study of Heraclitus, who translates: “It is wise, listening not to me but to the report (logos), to agree that all things are one” (Kahn & Heraclitus, 2001, p. 130) or sense as framed by De Gennaro: “Did they not listen to me but to the sense (logos), then it is wise to state in that sense, everything is one.” (De Gennaro, 2001, p. 234 translated from German)

Heidegger too read Heraclitus and published a lecture series of no less than four hundred pages on his fragments, which also give much attention to the fragment quoted above. He pointed out that the Greek meaning of the term was – as can be deduced from both its etymological root and ancient use – probably far detached from the predominantly attributed ‘language’ or ‘speech’ of his time (Heidegger & Frings, 1979, p. 215). I have no intention of reproducing Heidegger's reception of Heraclitus in its very complexity, but confine myself to two interesting aspects. Firstly, Heidegger’s translation of the above fragment is worth reading, although he refuses to translate the term logos: “From the harkingly hearing of the λόγος, derives the knowledge, which consists in stating the same with the saying of the λόγος: one is everything.” (Heidegger & Frings, 1979, p. 251, translated from German)

Secondly, Heidegger considers the interrelation of appearance (εἴδος), idea (ιδέα) and speech (λόγος), which to him are closely connected. Both eidos and logos are somehow identical in the meaning of ‘letting something – based on idea – be seen,’ one in visible, the other in conceptual terms.

The last consideration which leads Heidegger into a discussion of logic, shall lead us to a formulation of logos for the framework of my writings. I will take advantage also of the openness of the term and speak of logos drawing on Heidegger's ‘letting something be seen’, as the principle of creative action that appears, the idea that becomes manifest, the initial concept that is visualised in heritage. All three core terms of these expressions principle, idea and concept are at the same time well established translations of logos.

2.2 Topology – construction of a concept

The concept of topology in heritage studies aims to combine the two aspects defined above, logos as the appearing principle of creativity, or more simply as the manifesting idea and topos, as the localisation of meaning. How can these two be combined and how can their combination assist in heritage identification?

It is important to remember the two different aspects of the compound topology although at first glance it seems impossible to separate them and indeed, in heritage,
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topos and logos are closely intertwined. Nevertheless I attempt to conceptually separate them in the process of heritage identification in order to direct the focus away from visible manifestations of heritage. Topos can be a physical place if an idea is clearly manifested at a particular geographic location. In a majority of cases this may not be possible and topos needs to be considered as an abstract location in the sense that Michel Foucault speaks of the locations of utopias and heterotopias (Foucault, 1984, p. 47) or Mikhail Bakhtin spoke of a location of chronotopes (cf. Bakhtin et al., 1994, p. 180).

Logos on the other hand is still somewhat complex in its definition and could be simplified for the practical purpose of heritage identification as an idea that provides meaning. Combined with topos, the location of meaning, heritage is then an idea which creates meaning to take place, or – once again shortened – heritage is ideas taking place. In that sense heritage is logos manifesting in topos, or more precise in its plural, heritage is logoi manifesting in topoi.

The combination of the two describes the poles of a heritage construction cycle. Logos can be considered to be the motor of the cycle which both initiates and provides the impulses for a continuing construction and reaffirmation. It is therefore the logos that safeguarding activities should be addressed at. And topos primarily localises two elements of the cycle, heritage expression and identity – in some cases the heritage expression and topos can be identical – but in doing so also provides rootedness for the entire process. The other elements of the cycle, knowledge and its legitimation, values and meaning are stimulated by both logos and topos. The central term that remains in the cycle is meaning to which values and knowledge can be subsumed. At least this is a prominent position in social psychology as Menezes and Campos describe in their study on the process of value-meaning-construction: “the construction of values can be conceived essentially as a meaning-making process” (Menezes & Campos, 1997, p. 55). A similar statement is subsequently also provided for knowledge when the authors consider the “basic assumption (...) that human knowing is a process of ‘meaning making’ by which personal experiences are ordered and organised.” (Menezes & Campos, 1997, p. 58)

If we consider the cycle as a process of meaning-making which thinks and conceptualises logos to become manifest, then not only the two poles but also their connecting element, meaning, must be focussed on and must be considered heritage not only as logos manifesting in topos but as the interrelation of the three. This is an important aspect for heritage identification, because the ‘object’ we aim to identify is no longer an expression or a process but an interrelation of different concepts and processes and of at least three elements identified, idea, meaning-making and location. How can these three aspects be analyzed and described?

In order to answer this question we need to deal first with the subordinated aspect of how somebody not participating in the construction cycle can get to know and understand the aspects of the process, since understanding is an essential prerequisite
for analysis and description. Herbert Blumer in his theories on social interactionism
gave highest priority to such understanding: “The contemplation that people act on
the basis of the meanings of their objects has profound implications. It signifies im-
m ediately that if the scholar wishes to understand the action of people it is necessary
for him to see their objects as they see them” (Blumer, 1986, p. 51). Similar as-
sumptions have already been made in the heritage field, specifically that the only way
to identify heritage expressions is “through the knowledge of the people who give
them meaning in the first place.” (Evans et al., 2001, p. 55)

To understand the knowledge construction and meaning making of heritage and see
it with the eyes of those who localise their identity in it, it will help to actively partici-
pate in the heritage construction process. Some colleagues might now retort that by
actively engaging in heritage construction processes one will also actively influence
the heritage expression. This objection is entirely correct, but the desired product,
an often published identification and description of heritage and in many cases its
particular significance, is likely to have a far greater impact than the participation of
an individual. Heritage identification and evaluation simply cannot be envisaged
without affecting the heritage itself, but we may choose whether this affect should be
one of communication or of stipulation.

We always run the risk of negating some heritage aspects or excluding people, as
Graham warns: “the creation of any heritage actively or potentially disinherits or ex-
cludes those who do not subscribe to, or are not embraced within the terms of
meaning attending that heritage.” (Graham, 2002, p. 1005) Therefore, an important
aim in the process should be to ensure that our understanding reflects as many voices
and corresponds to as many understandings as possible. As observers, we may be
outside of a community concerned, but at the moment we show interest we enter a
relationship and – as was already said above – by merely asking about heritage sig-
ificance we create it. In identifying heritage we participate in its construction and in
most cases the very description produced, constructs new heritage, neither ours nor
that of the ones we have asked but what we perceived and understood the heritage of
others to be.

To enter meaningful communication is the most difficult task of heritage identifica-
tion and it is the only key to our understanding of logos and topos. Only open com-
munication will enable a heritage researcher to access his most important information
source, the only element containing and combing both logos and topos: narratives.
Narratives are not merely elements of heritage construction cycles, they are the
thread connecting the cycle, the element through which heritage is communicated
and therefore possible. It is the task of heritage professionals to renarrate the stories
transmitted in the in-depths conversations they engaged in. When contributing to
heritage identification in the framework of UNESCO or other international standard
documents, the assignment should be to convert these stories from local narratives
of identity to global narratives of understanding. This is the aim of topological anal-
ysis, to articulate the interrelation of logos, meaning-making and topos, in a way that
explains local knowledge and identity by means comprehensible in a larger context, to articulate the narratives, or – as Lofland suggests – the meanings: “Some of the most important meanings employed in a setting may be unrecognised as such by the participants. One of the key jobs of the analyst is to articulate such (…)” (Lofland & Lofland, 1984, p. 74).

I suggest that the best method to analyse and retell the narrative is to focus on topology, the combination of logos and topos. This means that the heritage construction and all its constituent parts can be recognised when trying to describe its construction process from the initial creative concept (logos), the knowledge, values and meaning derived therefrom to its localisation (topos) and designation as heritage. Once these elements and especially logos as the initiating and pertaining aspect are described, future management policies can be oriented towards the safeguarding of these very conceptual aspects constituting the heritage expression. In this context safeguarding has to be considered a social activity rather than technical assistance.

Identifying the logos and the topos of heritage as described above may not sound too difficult – and indeed it is not an unsolvable task – but we have to be careful not to simplify the process and get trapped in the widespread misconception that a single heritage expression can be described in its (one) significance, consisting of a logos, a meaning-making process, a construction cycle and a topos where it is localised. The most characteristic element of heritage is its multiplicity of meanings and what might be commonly referred to as a heritage expression is already a simplified synthesis of a variety of heritage themes around a common concept. Nasser visualises this aspect in talking about layers; meaning of heritage is “layer upon layer of a nexus of interactions between society, its beliefs and social activities, and the environment, which shape and inform [its] complex genesis (…)” (Nasser, 2003, p. 77).

We can also visualise topologies as layers. The basic idea of topological analysis is to approach heritage not as an expression but as a concept. For example the Indonesian Kris discussed above is no longer an object but a concept expressed in narratives. The same would also be applied to allegedly ‘tangible’ sites, for example the rock-hewn churches in Lalibela, which are to be considered in terms of an overall concept and not as stone structures. This general concept for the purpose of the analysis is a synthesis of various themes. Themes are to be identified by reviewing the collected heritage narratives, the particular aspects considered to be important by different people and the personal impressions documented throughout this process. A heritage concept can have few or numerous themes; in rare cases a very predominant theme can be exclusive. Each theme is a heritage topology in that it consists of logos, meaning-making process and topos and therefore each heritage is a synthesis of topologies, a synthesis of layers of meaning. Each theme or topology can be treated, described and analysed as a separate entity although very often the construction cycles of different themes are interlinked or topoi overlap. The identifying characteristic of a separate theme is the assumption of an individual logos. A chronological process for the identification of heritage as a synthesis of topologies would conse-
quently commence with an initial formulation of the heritage concept to be researched, a formulation which is theoretical, i.e. arbitrarily defined (Setzung).

Subsequently the analyst would conduct an ample qualitative research and gather the variety of narratives related to the heritage concept, including those deriving from his own perceptions. The narratives may point at particular themes and initial ideas referred to as core aspects in the construction of the particular heritage. After confirming the individual themes on the basis of their logoi, the deriving meaning making processes, the dependant knowledge, values and concepts of identity and finally the localisation of these aspects are to be identified and described. The analysis of deriving topoi or heritage expressions might at this point require technical assistance by professionals familiar with particular heritage aspects. A description of all these elements provides the heritage researcher with the raw material for the creation of a new description, at the same time a new narrative and the identification of a heritage theme. Once a variety of themes has been described separately it will become clear that some themes support one another, while others oppose or even threaten each other. Some themes may be shared among many, while others are the constructions of individuals or small groups. Policy drafting for heritage management is always a selection of themes to be safeguarded at the expense of others. The more themes we identify and document, the better informed our policy decisions can be taken. Better informed policy decisions can be a first advantage of topological analysis, but there are more.

2.3 Topology – opportunities and challenges

Better informed policy decisions are not only the result of the broader range of information collected and provided but also of the more meaningful exchange between heritage professionals, those who are referred to as tradition-bearers or meaning-givers and the general public. Meaningful exchange, facilitated by active listening (cf. Mauthner & Doucet, 1998) on the part of the heritage professional, has often been prevented in cases where the heritage professional aimed to inform the public of the particular scientific, artistic, historic or aesthetic values of a heritage resource. Setha M. Low points at the origin of the dilemma, i.e. that heritage professionals “participate in a process of professional socialisation that provides a common language, set of symbols, value structure, and code of rituals and taboos. The public does not share this perceptual system but, instead, holds images and preferences that are embedded in its own beliefs, customs, and values.” (Low, 2002, p. 35) In topological analyses heritage professionals need to become active listeners, which requires adopting the perceptual system of their narrators and, when subsequently retelling the narratives, a careful familiarisation of the initial informants with the professional terminology introduced into their heritage descriptions. At the same time the process of listening and renarrating strengthens the various narrations, raises awareness and increases interest in participation in the planning process. These aspects are empha-
sised as a necessity for a successful conservation policy: “When communities are helped to develop their own sense of what matters for them, and why, the results can (...) act as a catalyst for further private (...) investment.” (English Heritage, 2000, p. 10) The authors of the English Heritage brochure ‘Power of Place’ stress the importance of giving attention to the powerless and excluded, those who want to help defining their heritage but who are often prevented to do so, and then “their personal heritage does not appear to be taken into account by those who take decisions.” (English Heritage, 2000, p. 23) Allowing for a variety of meanings, topological analyses will be open to both core and marginalised narratives and thereby also avoid top-down mystification or fabrication of heritage. This aspect was raised by the Celebrating Mountains conference which took place in Jindabyne, Australia in 2002 and which formulated the claim that “real stories – indigenous and non-indigenous – need to be told, not myths and fabricated heritage” (Australia ICOMOS, 2002, p. 9) of experts.

This aspect, however, also poses a certain risk. Instead of creating mystified heritage, the in-depth description of heritage construction cycles might be perceived as demystification through over-interpretation. If such is feared for a particular heritage the meaning, value and identity construction of which has not yet been made available to public access – a fact that would certainly also be obvious in a reluctance of informants – it should be considered to not make the heritage description available to the wider public – in some cases even the local community or other informants.

In addition, researchers have to keep in mind that the topologies described are an assessment of the situation at a certain point in time and are likely to change due to the dynamic nature of heritage construction. In view of this, topological analyses may be outdated after a certain period and might require revision with every update of management policies. Since topological analyses are present-day assessments, the concept of authenticity as predominantly outlined in the heritage field cannot be applied in the process of heritage evaluation. At least, the analysis lacks means to provide data which would be required to compare the present-day heritage construction processes and narratives identified with those of earlier times. Authenticity in the sense of historic continuity could therefore only be assessed if topological studies are conducted over an extended period. On the other hand it is important to analyse whether the meaning-givers consider their heritage authentic in the sense of genuine and credible. Here the researcher cannot assess the authenticity of the expression but should consider the perceived authenticity in the context of identity construction and knowledge. However, it is doubtful that such perceived authenticity would qualify in the context of heritage assessment, especially when authenticity has to be demonstrated like in the context of the World Heritage Convention.

While topologies do not lend themselves to analysis of authenticity, which is often considered a positive quality of heritage, they allow gaining insight into two rather negative aspects: discontinuity and structures of power and dominance. The discourses of power and dominance – which Foucault refers to as processes of appro-
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appropriation of discourses (Foucault, 1972p. 68) – are discernable in the social constitution of shared narratives. The origination of values, knowledge and identity can be deducted from the narrative transmission structures. Harvey, who highlights the human tendency to adopt values from those we consider authorities, hints at the social implications of shared narratives analysed: “Collectively, we tend to lack reassuring support of a moral tradition that we can call our own. We tend, therefore, to be ‘value parasites’, drawing our values from association with other dominant interests in society.” (Harvey, 1993, p. 26) In this sense structures of power are not necessarily negative but reveal dependencies in heritage construction which provide important information on who to involve in decision-making processes.

The second aspect, discontinuity, may not only be cognizable in the multiplicity of heritage constructions associated to a shared concept, but also in the very structure of the narratives, which are often syntheses of in the first place disconnected aspects. This is different to most available heritage descriptions, which “usually resist discontinuity. By working through themes and contexts, heritage bodies try to unify disparate pasts” (J. G. Smith, 2000, p. 60). The described multiplicity of topologies in contrast should be able to reflect rather than overcome discontinuity.

Considerable opening of the heritage field towards the social sciences implied in the topological approach also bears opportunities for new stimuli, regarded as necessary by several heritage scholars, for example the GCI report: “Still largely regarded as a technical rather than a social endeavour, conservation has failed to attract significant input from the social sciences.” (Avrami et al., 2000, p. 9) In addition the approach responds to other recommendations formulated by the GCI reports or expert conferences, like the Conference on intangible heritage held by the Smithsonian Institute in June 1999. Bouchenaki summarises the experts’ recommendations: “The conference underlined the need to place emphasis on tradition-bearers rather than scholars” which a focus on narratives instead of expressions can by far better facilitate, and he continues: “It also highlighted the need to be more inclusive, encompassing not only artistic products such as tales, songs and so forth, but also knowledge and values enabling their production, the creative processes that bring the products into existence and the modes of interaction by which these products are received and acknowledged.” (Bouchenaki, 2004, p. 1) In short, the conference requested to consider heritage as a synthesis of topologies. But topologies are not the final solution for all constraints in heritage study and I don’t want to be understood as trying to present them as the only vital key.

Perhaps it is time to consider some crucial aspects that my introduction of topologies left unmentioned and that might still cause severe difficulties in a heritage identification process. I have spoken of ‘narrators’ or ‘valuers’, which others called ‘tradition-bearers,’ but I did not provide any information on how these ‘narrators’ are to be identified. And in fact, I am not able to provide an answer to this particular challenge, at least I cannot come up with a general rule on how to get ‘the right’ informants. It will depend on each individual heritage expression, the communities or
individuals constructing it and the identity, values and knowledge derived therefrom, who might be the best to approach. Certainly this intricacy will be most evident at the very beginning of a research process and the more one knows about a heritage expression, the more individuals have to be added to the list of people to talk to. Most likely the difficulty will shift to determining the closure of this list which in most cases depends on the constraints of the research endeavour and hardly ever on the running out of possibilities.

Topological analyses are open to all kinds of heritage expressions, concepts and localisations. After I read Mason who states that no method could ever be universally applicable: “it is a truism that the same approach will not work in all places, in all cultural contexts, for all kinds of heritage – it must be adaptable and variable” (Mason, 2002, p. 16)²⁹⁵, I kept trying to imagine an exception that could not be considered in the framework of topologies. Perhaps Mason is thinking of something far more concrete when speaking about methods while topological analyses just outline a general tendency. Its central aspect is the need to shift paradigms towards a constructivist understanding of heritage and towards narrative inquiries on the basis of conceptions derived from semiology and phenomenology.

The remaining question concerns the professional disciplines best suited to support such approaches and the particular methodologies drawn on to conduct the analysis. Uffe Juul Jensen supports professional diversity and public education to safeguard cultural diversity: “It should be a public concern, yet experts as diverse as anthropologists, historians, museologists, psychologists, and philosophers should enlighten the public about various viewpoints (…)” (Jensen, 2000, p. 40) I think that professionals from the listed fields should also train heritage specialists with backgrounds in architecture, archaeology, urban planning, art history and others in methodologies and techniques of narrative inquiry and theories of heritage construction.

### 3 Methodology of topological studies

The heritage field, especially the tangible heritage field is not only concerned with the preservation of tradition, sometimes it is itself very traditional, and especially pleas for change or in the worst case modernisation – the word a threat in itself – are often perceived as menaces to the experts’ professional status. On the other hand, most professionals are aware that their technical discipline based on an object-focus is in need of review and perhaps supplementation. In this tricky situation, the proposal for a major shift in paradigms combined with an involvement of ‘new’ professional disciplines, does not primarily require strong and convincing arguments but a sensitive and cautious presentation. Cautious is probably not an apt description for my writing, but I try to offer more detailed impressions for the proposed alternative to the established approaches.
Research in the cultural heritage field – both tangible and intangible – is traditionally influenced by cultural materialism, an anthropological research paradigm that is based on the premise that human behaviour is an individual reaction to objective phenomena (cf. Harris, 1997). It is to be grouped with the positivistic paradigms discussed in Section One of my writings and explains the strong reliance on scientifically proven data:

“Cultural materialism shares with other scientific strategies an epistemology which seeks to restrict fields of inquiry to events, entities, and relationships that are knowable by means of explicit, logico-empirical, inductive-deductive, quantifiable public procedures or ‘operations’ subject to replication by independent observers.” (Harris, 1976, p. 329)

This approach requires to be questioned, since heritage studies often have to extend their research beyond the observable and quantifiable, which as was argued above in many cases is merely the sign or expression, for example in the Islamic context. “Contemporary writers on Islamic architecture (…) have pointed out that architectural forms and shapes are generally of little importance in transmitting and confirming the tenets of Islamic religion, except secondarily in ways as facilitating the separation of sexes and family.” (Riley, 1992, p. 26) Consequently several authors have raised criticism with regard to the prevalent approaches and reiterated the need to shift paradigms and venture into new areas. David Lowenthal reflects on the “widespread feeling that heritage stewardship has gone too far. It is criticised for cloaking unsavoury practices, for disempowering the lay public, and for failing to address urgent issues.” (Lowenthal, 2000, p. 19) Gamboni, who does not provide a more optimistic view, criticises in particular World Heritage practices:

“However, we have come to recognise that designating something as heritage is a critical act, leaving no object untransformed. This reality gives great weight to the author and to the criteria of this selection, particularly when there exist competing authorities about, and definitions of, a given heritage. In this sense, the concept of world heritage suffers from the fact that it amplifies an idea originating in the West and tends to require an attitude toward material culture that is also distinctly Western in origin (…)” (Gamboni, 2001, p. 9)

In view of this criticism raised – which had already been stated in other words in earlier sections of the work – the intangible heritage experts deemed it necessary to generally “employ a different methodology to the intangible cultural heritage than to the tangible cultural heritage” (Aikawa, 2004, p. 139). It is interesting that not one author writing in the context of intangible heritage proposed that these methodologies might also be an interesting even if only supplementary tool for tangible heritage studies. That at least would have been a possible option, considering that narrative inquiry is nothing new in the identification of intangible heritage and that experts for this heritage seem in general seem more willing to apply interdisciplinary approaches. Strangely, the requests for increased methodological multidisciplinarity mostly emerge in the tangible heritage context, where several experts: “reach the same basic conclusion regarding future research: the formulation and testing of some kind of toolbox approach – well ‘integrated’ (…) across disciplinary lines as well as value
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types – is the next, urgent step to be taken.” (Mason, 2002, p. 16) Perhaps the topological analysis proposed could be considered an interdisciplinary tool for future research which may also facilitate a recombination of the disparate concepts of intangible and tangible heritage. But the idea of topologies is not new, the concept is merely a combination of existing theories and approaches in philosophy and the social sciences and methodological proposals will also be based on tools already available. Innovative aspects of the concept are solely its name, its combination of seemingly distinct elements and its application to the identification of heritage, or better all heritage. So far however, topologies are just an abstract idea for which I did not yet discuss methodological implications\(^{298}\), pragmatic results or consequences for heritage management. This shall be done in the remaining part of my work, first theoretically and later on the basis of empirical topological research.

We continue where we adjourned the consideration of academic approaches to cultural heritage in Section One and now shift from ontological and epistemological to methodological considerations. Principally assuming a constructivist paradigm, I consider narrative\(^{299}\) and cognitive research approaches\(^{300}\) best suited to analyse the interrelation of construction and expression, further drawing on phenomenological and semiological theories. The following subchapters focus on the professional disciplines involved in heritage studies with focus on their respective potentials for topological analysis, assisting concepts that could be drawn on from phenomenology and semiology, some thoughts on documentation and mapping in the process of heritage identification and finally new questions arising in the context of heritage management.

3.1 Archaeology to social psychology – a round trip

“Clearly, the skills needed by [heritage] professionals to work with people and communities in this type of engagement are much more akin to community development than they are to material conservation. You have to specialise in diplomacy, local history, and psychology more than you do in glass, wood or metal.” (Kurin, 2004a, p. 8)

Diplomacy and psychology are hardly elements of a university curriculum in architectural conservation or heritage studies, and they also rarely appear in course books of ethnography, human geography or musicology students. Since I agree with Richard Kurin on their crucial importance, I believe that this should change in order to equip heritage professionals with the skills to conduct integrated heritage analyses. And in addition, thoroughness and interdisciplinarity seem to advance as key-terms to professional involvement in heritage studies. Like almost everything in my writing, this is not my idea but in this case has already been stated by the experts that wrote the World Heritage Convention and its accompanying recommendations in 1972: “Any work required should be preceded and accompanied by such thorough studies as its importance may necessitate. Such studies should be carried out in cooperation with or by specialists in all related fields.” (UNESCO, 1972d, § 20)\(^{301}\) Professional disci-
plines involved in heritage identification are already manifold and if we look beyond the intangible and tangible heritage divide, the collection is quite impressive. During one of the few meetings which combined specialists on intangible and tangible heritage, the Nara meeting towards an integrated approach in 2004, UNESCO gathered an impressive range of disciplines: anthropology, ancient languages, applied arts, archaeology, architecture, architectural conservation, civil engineering, classics, cultural studies, drama or dramatology, epistemology, ethnology, ethno-musicology, fine arts, folklore studies, geography, history, international relations, law, linguistics, museum studies, musicology, oral traditions, political sciences, social psychology, sociology, tourism studies and urban planning (cf. UNESCO, 2006g). Considering this inspiring range, the results of the meeting are even more disappointing, but on the other hand we can assume that this range offers all expertise required. We don’t need different or ‘new’ professionals, we simply need to foster a more intense exchange among those already gathered under the broad heading of heritage professionals.

To reach this, the first crucial step is to acknowledge that all these disciplines are indeed concerned with the study of cultural heritage, or as I prefer to call it: heritage studies. To speak of ‘newcomers’ to the field – like Randall Mason does: “In recent decades, the concept of what is heritage has evolved and expanded, and new groups have joined the specialists in its identification” (de la Torre & Mason, 2002, p. 3) – requires the assumption that one’s own discipline was always a core of heritage studies, while others studied folklore, music, oral traditions etc., which where not explicitly heritage; a very egocentric and dangerous approach, yet not alien to archaeologists or architectural conservators. The two professional disciplines I named in the headline of this chapter, archaeology and social psychology are intended to represent the whole range between them. As the two disciplines at the extreme ends of the heritage spectrum, one with an almost exclusive focus on objects, the other equally exclusively concerned with meaning-making processes, they can also symbolise the ideal counterparts for topological analysis.

Archaeologists are often perceived to be unduly concerned with stones at the expense of contemporary ambitions and needs. Shanks and Tilley– themselves archaeologists – describe it in the following words: “The archaeologist is devoted to the embalmed relics deafeningly silent yet sacred in their meaninglessness, devoted to the preserved past.” (Shanks & Tilley, 1992, p. 7) Their resulting claim however is as radical as their description: “to dismantle the (...) theoretical structure, the architecture of discourse erected in the name of a conserved past, not in order to smash and discard the contents, but in order to rescue them, reinscribe their meaning.” (Shanks & Tilley, 1992, p. 7) I would suggest that the process desired in their statement is already underway, perhaps not as far-reaching as claimed, but constant, in archaeology’s self reflection about the construction of heritage and the production of stories by the discipline. The rising awareness of this creation and selection of narratives is documented by Fowler in his ‘approaches to archaeology’: “Granted, however, that interpretation is an act of conceptual creation and not merely one of reporting self-
evident truth, the problem is not so much of perceiving a meaning as of choosing one or more from several meanings, for evidence is almost always ambiguous (…)" (Fowler, 1977, p. 142). But also Shanks and Tilley observe the rapprochement and in a later part of their writing describe it with scrutiny:

“Meaning is established by constructing configurations out of successions of events, by producing constellations of concepts, which cannot avoid an act of narration, of ‘story telling’. This of necessity involves a narrator. We experience archaeology-history as ‘storytelling’, as a series of texts, texts which are simultaneously analytical and expressive. (…) We are not defending traditional historical narrative. The narrative we propose is analytical and retrospective, it views the past form the present.” (Shanks & Tilley, 1992, p. 19)

The narratives produced by archaeologists are characteristically not traditional, but ‘modernisations’ and redefinitions of heritage understanding. But this is also valid for other heritage disciplines which in a similar manner create stories that provide new interpretations to the phenomena the discipline is concerned with. Fowler reminds us that “the interpretation favoured will to a large extent depend on the questions asked” (Fowler, 1977, p. 142), and indeed the various methodologies applied by the professional disciplines mainly derive from the differences in research questions asked. While an anthropologist might question what a particular heritage expression means to a local community, and a sociologists inquires which processes of social interaction lead to its construction and reaffirmation, an archaeologist would rather want to know what the heritage expression teaches us about its initial producers, and when exactly it was produced. Archaeologists would rarely ask what their objects of research – the archaeological remains – signify nowadays and to whom. Especially since archaeologists would consider it their duty to define this signification, because the narrators who could provide ‘the real story’ are no more available.

Most disciplines are specialised in certain heritage aspects. For heritage topoi which are manifested in particular physical places for example, one can resort to the cultural geographic tradition “of trying to understand the meanings and processes of place – their material and symbolic qualities – as well as the range of peoples and social relations that continuously define and create social and spatial contexts.” (Adams et al., 2001, p. xiv) If the place is a city, urban planners and urban conservators would also want to be involved. For heritage expressions considered autarkic of social construction but rather determining the social behaviour towards it, environmental psychology, a discipline that has “attracted researchers from such diverse areas as social psychology, architecture, urban planning, engineering, anthropology and sociology” (Worchel et al., 1988, p. 230), might be the right choice. It has brought forth theories such as Barker’s behaviour settings which became very popular after Kevin Lynch introduced them into heritage planning: “Roger Barker’s concept of ‘behaviour settings’ – locations in which a physical setting and a repetitive pattern of behaviour are consistently related to each other – is for the designer perhaps the most useful way of analyzing an inhabited area.” (Lynch, 1976, p. 170). Or the hardly distinguishable human ecology, under the roof of which the opposing concept of action-settings was
developed by the German-writing human geographer Peter Weichhart, who sees intended human action as the determining factor that shapes the environment (Weichhart, 2003, p. 31). Others, like Downer et al. propose the involvement of ethnographers for heritage that involves traditional history: “dealing with places important in traditional history raises some issues that preservationists do not usually face, namely reliance on ethnographers and ethnographic primary data collection.” (Downer et al., 1994) I could certainly cite a different author for each other discipline claiming its involvement in heritage identification accompanied by yet another one arguing that this discipline is unsuitable. Sometimes both aspects are combined in the same paper, like in Hubbards considerations on behavioural research which deem the involvement of architects and planners indispensable for urban heritage studies and at the same time highlight their insensitivity to human concerns: “Although the attitudes of architects and planners are probably now more sensitive to the mood of public opinion than at any time in the last fifty years, there are still indications that planning remains insensitive to public interest.” (Hubbard, 1993, p. 370)

Nowadays – since no discipline seems to be adequate to address the complex and layered aspects of cultural heritage on its own, interdisciplinarity is the key. Interdisciplinary programmes on heritage studies, or even world heritage studies, spring up like mushrooms and struggle with the rush at them. In the context of my plea for conceptual flexibility this is a promising evolution as interdisciplinary work encourages exploring other ways of knowing and other conceptions of truth. Julian Smith supports this view: “In the universities, interdisciplinary programs are suddenly in favour, as are partnerships between pure and applied research and between professional and academic inquiry. More significantly, there is a real exploration of other ‘ways of knowing’ – a realisation that there are worldviews other than the European (...)” (J. Smith, 1997, p. 2).

Interdisciplinary training offers new opportunities. Not only the opportunity to train heritage professionals equipped with technical skills, methodological knowledge and social competence but also the chance to give these heritage professionals a cross-disciplinary professional identity; an important step to overcome professional hegemonies. This again will facilitate the approach to heritage in teams, combining (a) person(s) who document(s) what I call topologies and (an)other specialist(s) with regard to the particular heritage expression, for example an archaeologist, geologist or architectural conservator for the rock-hewn churches in Lalibela or a musicologist or linguist for Vedic chanting. Topological analyses do not require skills of a particular discipline but the skill of becoming part of the dwellers in heritage, active listening, trans-cultural empathy and reflective narrating.

### 3.2 Phenomenology and semiology

Topological analyses are in a broader sense based on cognitive and narrative inquiry or in other words, inquiries of the adscription or attribution of meaning and its re-
reflection or embedding in narrative accounts. Both narrative and cognitive inquiries have been framed by a variety of methodologies in different disciplines. Denzin distinguishes two general orientations towards narrative inquiry, which are either termed analytic and storied approach (cf. R. J. Berger & Quinney, 2005, p. 9) or are slightly confusingly contrasted as analysis of narrative and narrative analysis (Denzin, 1997, p. 233). While the analytic or ‘analysis of narrative’ approach is somewhat positivistic and tries to apply analytic patterns – for example derived from psychoanalysis – to narratives gathered, the storied or ‘narrative analysis’ approach is “theoretically minimalist, seeking meaning in the stories themselves and encouraging the listeners/readers active engagement with the material” (R. J. Berger & Quinney, 2005). Denzin summarises that “analysis of narrative moves from stories to common elements, and narrative analysis moves from elements to stories.” (Denzin, 1997, p. 235)

The storied approach of narrative analysis is more likely to lend itself to heritage studies, which are comparable in approach to analyses of contemporary anthropology and feminism, in which narratives are also analysed by framing the description as a shared production of the narrator’s experience and the inquirer’s understanding (cf. Manning & Cullum-Swan, 1994, p. 465).

Data gathering techniques for the topological analysis depend on the particular heritage concept approached. In general, triangulated techniques, i.e. the combination of different methods, supports a greater variety of data which assists in the identification of an increased diversity of themes. Setha M. Low proposes to combine semi-structured, expert and focused interviews in triangulation for heritage studies (Low, 2002, p. 35). I would however suggest conducting open and narrative instead of semi-structured and focused interviews, to avoid interviewing experts until a late stage of the research and to combine the interviews with participant observation in all cases where heritage is constructed in observable manifestations and actions. In-depth conversations often depend on mutual respect and trust of the conversation partners and on active listening of the researcher. For heritage concepts which obviously manifest in particular spatial extensions, the assembling of cognitive maps might be a helpful supplement to facilitate the understanding of spatial and structural perception of heritage expressions.

The process of narrative analysis and description of topologies can draw on stimuli from phenomenology and semiology. Ideas derived from phenomenology might assist in analysing logos, inquires after the reasons for the existence of meaning, and semiology can guide towards topos in exploring where meaning is represented and located. I wish to clarify that I do not intend to propose applying a method phenomenology or semiology as described by any particular scholar, but rather build on general conceptions discussed by various writers and applied in the respective methodologies. I do not imply that the two, phenomenology and semiology, share mutual conceptions – although we shall identify some parallels later – but at first sight, semiology seemingly “questions and objects many of the cherished assumptions on which
phenomenology rests” (Chang, 1987, p. 312), especially with regard to aspects of transcendental phenomenology.

Phenomenology has been applied in many approaches to social sciences, from sociology, where Berger and Luckmann recommended its use: “The method we consider best suited to clarify the foundations of knowledge in everyday life is that of phenomenological analysis, a purely descriptive method, and, as such ‘empirical’ but not ‘scientific’ – as we understand the nature of empirical sciences” (P. L. Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p. 20) up to human geography, where authors like Tuan (cf. Tuan, 1989) or Relph (cf. Relph, 1976b) – especially in his ‘phenomenological foundations of geography’ (Relph, 1976a) – derived their humanistic concepts of place from phenomenological approaches (cf. Johnston, 2005, p. 582). To seek inspiration for heritage studies, we may want to disregard such applications and focus on the philosophical sources and assumptions of phenomenology.

The most commonly acknowledged founding father of phenomenological method in philosophy is Edmund Husserl (Husserl, 1980, 1992), although few scholars trace it back to Husserl’s mentor Franz Brentano and his ‘psychology from an empirical standpoint’ (Brentano et al., 1973), such as Baumgartner et al. who argue that: “in fact, the term ‘phenomenology’ was reintroduced into what is nowadays known as philosophy of mind, by Franz Brentano” (W. Baumgartner, 1996, p. 25). I will focus with the majority on Husserl, who is often quoted to define the method: “Phenomenology, as defined by Edmund Husserl, is a ‘philosophical science’ concerned with understanding (…) laws that govern the spiritual and psychological workings of humans.” (Adams et al., 2001, p. xv) The formulation of ‘philosophical science’ was coined by Heidegger who defined: “Phenomenology is the caption of the method of ontology, i.e. of scientific philosophy.” (Heidegger, 2005, p. 27, translated from German) But Husserl himself spoke in similar terms, when he attempted a definition: “Phenomenology: this denotes a science (…) and above all denotes a method and an attitude of mind, the specifically philosophical attitude of mind, the specifically philosophical method” (Husserl, 1964, p. 19). His phenomenology therefore seeks essences, again in his words “essences, within which the science of the essence of cognition takes place.” (Husserl, 1964, p. 1)

Heidegger, who derives his phenomenology of being from Husserl’s initial ideas, distinguishes three separate processes applied in the phenomenological method: reduction, construction and destruction. Reduction, the first process, stands for the attempt to reduce being to its understanding (cf. Heidegger, 2005, p. 29). It is an abstraction of the expression or narrative towards its meaning, during which all structural aspects are disregarded. Derrida points us at an easy misconception with regard to the scope of meaning in this reduction, which might appear as an expansion:

“It is true, that at first the phenomenological extension of the concept of ‘meaning’ appears much wider, much less determined. All experience is the experience of meaning (…). Everything that appears to consciousness in general, is meaning. Meaning is the phenomenality of the phenomenon.” (Derrida, 1981, p. 30)
The following construction attempts the explication of this meaning. It constructs a description which frames the logos and the context of meaning affirmation. The third process of destruction requires eliminating all biases and traditional influences and preconceptions from this description (cf. Heidegger, 2005, p. 29). I will not propose applying this third step for topological analyses, as I consider it impossible to consciously eliminate all biases and take the required neutral and unbiased view. It is nevertheless important to identify biases and preconceptions to limit their influence on the research description.

The focus on reduction and construction of the essence, the meaning of an expression or process, is substantiated by the concept of intentionality. Intentionality is mental directedness towards meaning, which Heidegger phrased as ‘to care for’, Sorge. Intentionality is not merely acting with intention or referring to acts of consciousness but “it becomes the condition for the possibility of all being and at the same time it shows the meaning of being” (E. Baumgartner, 1996, p. 45). This intentionality frames the continuous interdependency of signifier and meaning, in our case the heritage expression and construction cycle. The essence of meaning of the cycle is the originating idea, the logos, and phenomenology aims to describe it.

The phenomenological processes of reduction and construction can stimulate the analysis of heritage narratives towards an identification of logos, the initial concept and intentionality of heritage meaning. In the process of analysis it means to focus on a central concept that explains the meaningful combination of knowledge, values, meaning and identity in the heritage concept. Once we have an idea of what this generative principle could be, the challenge is to describe it, meaningful and comprehensible to others who do not participate in the heritage concept, in other words to (re)construct it. In the process of identifying and localizing this concept, we also construct the topology, in combining phenomenology and semiology and centring both to a unity of meaning. This process is elegantly coined by Derrida who describes that “it’s presence, meaning, or essence of meaning is conceivable outside this interweaving as soon as the phenomenologist, like the semiotician, allegedly refers to a pure unity, a rigorously identifiable aspect of meaning or of the signified.” (Derrida, 1981, p. 31) Jacques Derrida obviously doubts the existence or at least the potential to identify what he calls ‘pure unity of meaning’ and which he takes as an underlying absolute. For heritage construction processes however, this question is not relevant as the underlying concept, the initial idea cannot be taken as absolute but as subject to preconceptions and significations. This fact requires considering the ‘essence’ of meaning-giving in its signification, i.e. its localisation, and derived from it, its expression, yet another sign on the next level of a semiological hierarchy.

The origins and general theories of semiology in heritage studies have been introduced in the first section of my work. We have considered heritage expressions as signs and remembered that “a sign is something that represents or stands for something in the mind of someone. A sign is composed in the first instance of an expression such as a word, sound, symbol and a content, or something that is seen as com-
plementing the meaning of the expression.” (Manning & Cullum-Swan, 1994, p. 466)

The signs are principally incomprehensible and incomplete and require both an interpretant and a meaning context. Heritage expressions, as significations of knowledge, meaning, values and identity, as has been stated above, therefore remain incomplete and incomprehensible without their meaning context. Disregarding the question whether there is an essence of meaning or a generating principle, semiological analysis localises the meaning-context in signs. For topological analyses, the narratives represent the sign–interpretant relationship. The topos of logos is then the location, i.e. the sign. The interdependence of topos and logos is expressed in the continuous (re)construction and (re)affirmation of the sign-meaning relationship. This topos-logos relationship is the central source of identity formation and the conceptual place of dwelling in heritage. Identity is not only in the example of heritage but quite general an important and constituting factor of semiological relationships, as “typically, these connections are shared and collective, and provide an important source of the ideas, rules, practices, codes, and recipe knowledge called ‘culture’.” (Manning & Cullum-Swan, 1994)

The phenomenological ‘pure essence of meaning’ of heritage is the unity of sign and signified, the idea at the intersection of active meaning construction and passive meaning perception. If this unity is framed we have defined a topology, and subsequently, “the relationship between meaning and sign or between the signified and the signifier, then becomes one of exteriority.” (Derrida, 1981, p. 32) The heritage expression as sign is the exteriorisation of the theme and its meaning context, the topology. The combined methodology of phenomenological and semiological analysis seems best suited to describe the conceptual, cyclical and constitutive processes of heritage signification. I would even support a more sophisticated conceptual link between the two, something like a semiotic phenomenology.

Fortunately, I am not the first to desire such a link and can refer to Chang who proposes a ‘semiotic phenomenology’ to approach questions of culture and identity in a post-modern context, a context of our semiotic predicament. Chang thinks that “we should actively enter the semiotic flow of current social forces, trace its distinctive pattern of dissemination, and map its topological configuration as a historically concrete and effective regime of semiosis” (Chang, 1987, p. 311). This is what topological analysis aims to describe and in that sense topological analysis – for the context of heritage – is the semiotic turn of phenomenology that also Chang requests for his approach: “If phenomenology (…) does not want to lose the descriptive efficacy from which most of phenomenology’s philosophical value can be drawn, it must make its timely semiotic turn to open itself to a new set of cultural objects/signs that otherwise would remain unexamined and whose initial exploration a descriptive phenomenology is best equipped to undertake.” (Chang, 1987, p. 312)
3.3 The paradox of documentation

As a product of descriptive analysis topologies fulfil two main functions, they identify heritage – or better multiple heritage meanings – and they describe – or better renarrate – heritage outside its local context to increase understanding of diversity in cultural expressions. But there is a challenge in this identification and description, which results from our earlier cognition, that heritage can no longer be considered as an object or process but has to be seen as a dynamic relationship of various interrelated aspects. Smith adumbrates the issue: “In general, objects are relatively static and relationships are relatively dynamic, so the question of understanding relationships tends to challenge many of our assumptions, beginning with understanding and documentation.” (J. Smith, 2006, p. 68)

Documentation of cultural heritage however seems a general paradox, at least if it is intended to contribute to activities such as safeguarding, preservation or maintenance. The paradox of documentation is actually a paradox of the apparent opposition of dynamic relationships and patronising safeguarding. The antagonism is already expressed in the various terms chosen to describe the aim of heritage identification, to ‘safeguard’ – to watch over (guard) and ensure its inviolacy or integrity – or to maintain – from *manc tenere* (Latin) to ‘hold in the hand’ (cf. Weekley, 1967). The theme is to shelter heritage from danger; but what danger? The 2003 convention names “processes of globalisation and social transformation” as posing “grave threats of deterioration, disappearance and destruction of the intangible cultural heritage” (UNESCO, 2003b, preamble). But how can we attempt to counteract influences of social transformation in order to promote social dynamic relationships? And what in this context is the benefit of documentation?

Documentation seems particularly paradox for intangible heritage which is somehow ‘tangibilised’ in the process. In the UNESCO framework however, for example in Bouchenaki’s threefold approach to safeguarding heritage “translating intangible heritage into ‘materiality’;” (Bouchenaki, 2004, p. 4) is an important safeguarding activity: “Safeguarding intangible heritage calls for its ‘translation’ from oral form into some form of materiality, e.g. archives, inventories, museums and audio or film records.” (Bouchenaki, 2004, p. 4) But also scholars in the academic field underline this necessity, like Jack Goody who argues that “the process of safeguarding the intangible then necessarily involves making a tangible record of that heritage” (Goody, 2004, p. 91). And in the framework of mutual agreement of the academic field and heritage specialists in national institutions, the 2003 Convention is written in the same spirit and emphasises documentation as one of the primary means of safeguarding, which is defined as “Measures aimed at the viability of the heritage, including the identification, documentation [and] research (…)”, (UNESCO, 2003b, § 2.2) If one wishes to provocatively question these measures envisaged, one can point at the risks these aspects bear to the heritage expression. Identification for example – as was pointed out before – involves a risk of biasing, in acknowledging certain heritage meanings at
the expense of others, documentation could be misused to support stagnation in giving preference to the interpretation of a particular point in time and finally, extensive research might be feared on a local level, as it could disclose far more than desired, of the local identity relationships to an international public.

I realised with great concerns that the masterpiece programme illustrates a first step to operationalise the paradox of documentation. For instance the programme guidelines define the “creation of identification and recording systems (collection, cataloguing, transcription) [and] promotion of the creation of a standard typology for the oral and intangible heritage” (UNESCO, 2001a, § 13, a, ii-iii) as priority safeguarding activities. After having argued in earlier sections, that typologies solely contribute to the homogenisation and standardisation of heritage, I am afraid I must observe that the intangible heritage field apparently is attempting to repeat the mistakes of its tangible counterpart. The guidelines further name the “creation of museums or of oral and intangible heritage section in existing museums” (UNESCO, 2001a, § 13, b, iii) a conservation activity. Khaznadar responds to this that “intangible heritage has no place in a museum; if it is put there, that means it is dead.” (Khaznadar, 2004, p. 5)

Equally diverse as with regard to the role of museums are the positions towards the documentary material requested for the candidature dossiers. Candidature dossiers according to the guidelines comprise “a written part which should follow the standard candidature entry form (…), including a protection and revitalisation action plan” (UNESCO, 2001a, § 14, a) as well as documentation such as photographs, maps and video-tapes, for the last proclamation in 2005 of at least 2 hours length. To some, the requirement of these elements illustrates that preserving via documentation means ‘freezing’. Michael Petzet argues that according to his perception “Intangible heritage (…) can only be preserved under the present circumstances if it is at least recorded in writing and pictures. If it were then so-to-speak ‘frozen’ by protective regulations, certain contradictions to the development of living cultures, which cannot simply be ‘preserved’, could arise.” (Petzet, 2004, p. 2) Others like Bedjaoui go even further and state that intangible heritage eludes legal regulations: “Intangible cultural heritage, living heritage par excellence, cannot be controlled, frozen and finally trapped in a legal mould that would eliminate its vitality and flexibility.” (Bedjaoui, 2004, p. 153)

But perhaps not every legal regulation or documentation ‘freezes’ and ‘eliminates vitality’. At least this is Smeets’ contraposition to the two above cited voices:

“Time and again one can read that documentation implies making the intangible tangible; this, however, is not a happy way of saying things. Documentation means that one discrete enactment of an intangible item, or series of them, is put down on paper, or on another, for instance, audiovisual bearer. If the element lives, it will continue to develop and its documentation will have historical value.” (Smeets, 2004a, p. 148)

To describe documentation to be of merely historical value, outdated already the day after it was completed – or perhaps before completion – is a convincing approach to
the dynamic relationships that constitute our heritage. Nevertheless, one important question arises from Smeets’ argumentation: If documentation in most cases is indeed primarily of historical value, why is it considered a priority safeguarding activity?

Experiences of heritage professionals have also sadly demonstrated that documentation accounts can be far more influential than anticipated. Goody has experienced this in regard to oral expressions:

“The written version tends to become accepted as the orthodox, even though it can claim no ontological status as having anything but accidental primacy. Soon, but not immediately, performers will start reading the text instead of reciting it. Or alternatively they recite a version of the written text they have learnt by heart (…) the very fact of it being written down and learned by heart (or even read) means that the variability and continuous creativity of the oral original will soon be lost. (…). In conserving the oral heritage by recording it in permanent form we are changing its nature and its character in the community.” (Goody, 2004)

Does the requirement of documentation imply that the 2003 UNESCO Convention promotes the transition of the remaining societies that are based on oral traditions towards written traditions? Wouldn’t that rather be a reduction of cultural diversity? Some countries with elaborate legislation systems on intangible heritage, for example the Republic of Korea, have reported on perceived difficulties arising from the need of documentation: “Although revision and modification of the law have been repeated to resolve them, the problems that remain include: (…) the standardisation and fixation of art forms (…)” (Jongsung, 2004, p. 187)

Standardisation is primarily a consequence of categorisation processes in the context of which heritage expressions are described in the framework of typologies (cf. Section One). While searching for the familiar, heritage professionals will retrieve the familiar in various expressions which can then be documented on the basis of comparable experiences gained in other cases. How can this be avoided? If we attempt to communicate heritage across a local context in order to raise awareness and promote understanding for cultural diversity, we need to record, write and document, and thereby inevitably inscribe the oral, determine the dynamic and globalise the local. There is no particular difference between intangible and tangible heritage in this respect, although intangible heritage seems slightly more vulnerable to the affects of these standardisations as it frequently has higher dynamics and flexibility of adjustment than tangible heritage. But in fact the historic photograph of a monument which illustrates an allegedly more ‘authentic’ and therefore more desirable appearance is highly comparable to a recorded song which increasingly wins recognition as the orthodox version. In both cases we witness the effects of document-biased Eurocentric systems – as UNESCO and many other heritage organisations are – in which professionals place greater value on files than on living expressions. I therefore think that in the first place, we have to safeguard both intangible and tangible heritage expressions from the negative influences of professional appropriation and patronisation within the heritage field.
The paradox of documentation for safeguarding heritage for the promotion of cultural diversity finally derives from yet another paradox internal to the promotion of cultural diversity. To oppose the impacts of globalisation by means of promoting cultural diversity, by heritage documentation and listing in the framework of an international organisation is like fighting a patient’s headache by cutting into his finger. It works in the very first moment. UNESCO conventions aiming to safeguard heritage and with it cultural diversity promote global exercise of influence on the very remains that might not yet be affected by globalisation: heritage expressions of local identity. Documentation, inventorying and listing can be understood as the standardised global tools in this process.

In order to avoid standardisation of heritage it is important to emphasise its multiplicity in any attempt of documentation and to describe its divers, contradictory and overlapping meanings and layers. In professional practice however research required to describe such multiplicity may be limited by financial constraints, and the expert meeting on inventorying intangible heritage has already stated that “it goes without saying that it is physically and financially unfeasible to provide detailed information even in a medium term about all of the ICH present (…)” (UNESCO, 2005i, p. 43). If the consequence is that heritage expressions are ‘roughly’ documented, such documentation might indeed promote standardisation rather than cultural diversity. With the exclusive aim to promote cultural diversity I would in this case plead for no documentation instead of superficial documentation.

3.4 Located or mapped?

With the concept of topos in topological analysis I included a determination of the location of heritage in my analytical approach. Location however, as was pointed out above, can be conceptual as well as spatial and its means of description strongly depend on the kind of location that can be associated with a certain heritage concept. It is therefore a misconception to assume that while the logoi of heritage are to be described, the topoi of heritage could be mapped for purposes of documentation.

For many heritage concepts mapping of topoi – in a conventional sense – will not be possible due to the lack of a related physical place. Where cartographic mapping of physical heritage localisations is possible, it is equally problematic as the above discussed heritage documentations in words and images, in presenting a static one-time view of a dynamic relationship in constant flux. Heritage must again be considered a dynamic relationship and not an object which challenges our concept of mapping and spatial representation. Smith outlines this ambiguity:

“Whereas objects are usefully recorded and understood within the framework of systems, such as GIS, relationships require a more fluid approach to recording. If we look at the urban landscape in particular, an emphasis on how landscape is experienced rather than how it is observed leads to a kind of cognitive mapping that is meaningful only when the grid be-
comes distorted, when the reality of experience begins to shape the reality of observation.”
(J. Smith, 2006, p. 68)

In addition, heritage is a multilayered synthesis of several topologies and mapping a heritage concept requires superimposing several maps until all layers are reflected. In some cases such superimposition might be an enlightening exercise while in others the maps of single topologies would already be highly questionable. For heritage professionals it is important to comprehend which topoi can be represented in spatial terms and which can’t; a very difficult exercise in a field where visual documentation is still so dominant and essential. Particularly in the tangible heritage field, “mapping is already a basic methodology (…), as part of the assessment of the physical conditions of the heritage being studied.” (Mason, 2002, p. 21) This implies that documentation or description of a tangible heritage site without cartographic material, such as city maps, ground-plans and sections, or management plans without cartographic illustration of visitor-flows and property alignments are simply considered incomplete.

In the framework of UNESCO activities, ‘geographic maps’ are required for world heritage nominations as well as the candidature dossiers for the proclamation of masterpieces of oral and intangible heritage. Aside from the geographical coordinates to the nearest second, the nomination format for World Heritage requires, a topographic map which shows the entire property, a location map showing the property located in the State Party and plans as well as specifically prepared maps of the property (UNESCO, 2005g, annex 5, 1d-e). The standard model of candidatures for the masterpiece proclamations is less specific and simply requires naming the “Geographic location of the form of cultural expression or cultural space; [and the] location of the community concerned (please attach map)” (UNESCO, 2001a, p. 19). And finally, also the 2003 Convention did not get around spatial terminology, a requirement when a territorially bound Member State is made responsible to “ensure the safeguarding of intangible cultural heritage present on its territory.” (UNESCO, 2003b, § 11a) As long as UNESCO, an organisation consisting of state parties which are in the first place spatial entities, approaches heritage safeguarding, this paradox can hardly be avoided, even if Smeets correctly underlines that sometimes intangible heritage manifestations “take place at a specific time or in a specific place; however, more often no specific location is needed for the enactment of elements of the intangible cultural heritage.” (Smeets, 2004a, p. 145)

In some cases the endeavour to map heritage expressions trespasses even their visible manifestation and then becomes highly problematic, e.g. when Mason claims that “some sort of mapping of the values invested in specific (…) elements and characteristics is an important reference” (Mason, 2002, p. 24). Or at least it is highly problematic if mapping is understood as an illustration of physical location, as it is in the case of Mason who specifies: “At the least, all types of value identified in the value assessments should be ‘mapped’ onto the site; all the main physical elements of the site could be linked with specific types of values.” (Mason, 2002, p. 24) While the
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physical link of embedded values described by Mason – which entirely contradicts his usually constructivist approach – has to be considered inadequate, the word ‘map’ as such could possibly be used, for example when referring to heritage representations in cognitive maps. The term cognitive map is often used synonymously with mental maps, but in order to highlight that cognitive maps do not require spatial connotations, the two concepts should be clearly separated. Somewhat reluctantly because of my discontentment with many of his other definitions, especially his depiction of culture as a durable template, I quote Peter Haggett who provides us with definitions of both terms in a glossary:

“**cognitive map** An interpretative framework of the world which, it is argued, exists in the human mind and affects actions and decisions as well as knowledge structures (...). **mental maps** The psychological images of places and regions as held by individuals or groups (...).” (Haggett, 2001, p. 780, 789)

In other words, while mental maps describe the products of a particular method of social analysis, used and described by for example Gould (cf. Gould & White, 1986), which requests participants to draw places, cities or landscapes as perceived, cognitive maps reflect the structural organisation of knowledge, moral and ethical conceptions such as values and faith etc. that is an overall image of personality. A similar definition is published by Laszlo who describes that “human cognitive maps accumulate an increasingly rich array of representations that, taken as a whole, portray a person’s entire cultural experience. (...) [it] includes not only society’s conventional patterns of behaviour, but its moral values, aesthetic preferences, and spiritual aspirations.” (Laszlo, 1996, p. 38) Cognitive maps, like cultural heritage are ever-changing, and indeed, cultural heritage is part of an individual's or a community's cognitive map. The term map seems confusing, because it suggests visual representation as Kitchin, too, has remarked in his writings: “as such the term ‘cognitive map’ does not imply that an individual has a cartographic or any type of map ‘in the head’, because the word ‘map’ is simply a convenient label to summarise the information encoded in a person’s cognitive representation.” (Kitchin & Blades, 2002, p. 2) Laszlo even goes further in his metaphoric ‘topological’ description and equals map and world construction: “Like the two apparent sides of a Möbius strip, realities and the maps that project them are one and the same thing. This is a rolling process in which map and reality are transferred into each other.” (Laszlo, 1996) One particular form of such a process is heritage construction, where heritage concepts and heritage expressions are cyclically transferred into each other.

The technique of mental maps could also be applied to topological analysis, albeit with utmost care when used in intercultural contexts. On the other hand, an attempt to illustrate the cognitive maps that are involved in heritage construction – which would mean the structure of the elements of the construction cycle – would be a very ambitious and probably not impossible undertaking. Such a ‘map’ would not only illustrate the conceptual location of logos but of all elements of the heritage construction cycle and define their interrelation in abstract spatial terms. I imagine
that visualisations of this structural relationship could be extremely helpful in understanding the context of each heritage topology, but nevertheless they would also – like descriptions and photographs, document a particular one-time state of a dynamic relationship and be either considered outdated and of merely historic value, or contribute to the creation of heritage of this visual representation at the expense of dynamic modifications of the illustrated structure. It would then fulfil a function that geographical maps fulfil as well, which is that of not only trying to picture a perceived reality, but also producing the structures they illustrate and projecting them into the world. And different maps create different layers, as we have seen for the projection of heritage.

### 3.5 Layered management for layered heritage

Heritage identifications which derive from topological analysis describe heritage concepts and their various related themes, the individual topologies. These topologies can be imagined as layers which are all related to the same concept or sometimes even to the same physical place, but they highlight different aspects, have different extensions and boundaries and quite often oppose or compete with each other. Management or safeguarding for heritage concepts requires an initial and important decision, that is which of the topologies identified are to be given attention and priority.

The answer to this question is probably the most difficult part of the heritage identification, safeguarding and management process as it involves the underlying questions ‘why to preserve this heritage expression?’ and ‘for whom?’. Greene also struggles with the difficulties of prioritizing heritage meanings at the expense of others and suggests that a single answer to the above questions is not enough:

“Behind this dilemma lies a more fundamental and problematic question: “Why preserve?” Some regard the answer as self-evident, but others have to be persuaded. To this question an economic planner may reply, ‘Because cultural tourism brings in hard currency from abroad’. A political leader may respond, ‘To reinforce national identity’. A university archaeologist, ‘For purposes of future research’. None of these alone is sufficient reason to preserve cultural resources.” (Greene, 1999, p. 54)\(^3\)

But what is sufficient reason? In the course of my writing I have often reiterated that the promotion of cultural diversity and identity is the central aim of heritage preservation. Perhaps asking which aspects and themes are most influential in contributing to identity formation or are most particular and thereby contribute to global diversity, might be a legitimate approach. On the other hand, how could these two aspects possibly be measured? In case of World Heritage, or in the future intangible heritage included on the representative UNESCO list, prioritisation should be comparatively easy, as the dossiers submitted for nomination identify the particular outstanding universal values or the specific importance for identity constitution. But what if the heritage professional feels that statements in the nomination documents are long outdated, contradictory to the results of topological analysis, entirely focused on one
of many topologies or themselves biased and promoting interests of power rather than diversity? How can heritage professionals counteract misappropriation of heritage concepts or suppression of heritage themes?

Some of us may still consider heritage the focus of a cultural sphere, often at the margins of political agendas. But this is, perhaps unfortunately, no longer the case, as nowadays identity formation is a highly sensitive issue and certainly a factor of alliances and power structures in modern multicultural societies. This includes the processes of meaning-giving and meaning-affirmation as in heritage constitution. Lofland reminds us that “meanings are devices by means of which advantaged people defend and legitimate their privileged circumstances and the less advantaged accommodate themselves to their disadvantaged positions – that is, meanings are self-serving.” (Lofland & Lofland, 1984, p. 75)

Often heritage professionals are participants in a system of dominance and subjection, and may not be able to prioritise according to their own judgement. But since heritage as knowledge, cultural representation and social resource is continuously negotiated they have the freedom to strengthen the promotion of identity and diversity as far as possible in the specific political, social and intellectual circumstances. “Thus, key questions include why a particular interpretation of heritage is promoted, whose interests are advanced or retarded, and in what kind of milieu was it conceived and communicated?” (Graham, 2002, p. 1007) This also includes an awareness of the heritage professionals own interests which equally should not dominate the decision-making process, that is to be taken in the interest of society at large, whatever this means and implies.

Power structures influencing heritage decision-making are often linked to possession and control. “Only a heritage that is clearly ours is worth protecting” as Lowenthal quotes an unknown heritage critic or “If we don’t tell the story or control the telling, then it is no longer about us.” (Lowenthal, 1998, p. 22) Even in the twenty-first century the comments quoted above may be applied in governmental frameworks. Since all nominations submitted to UNESCO convention activities and lists derive, pass through and are submitted by governments, often at their highest cultural authority level, these documents are very likely to also reflect national interests and promote national identities. National identity however rarely corresponds with local identity and might often not be relevant when focusing on a wider definition of cultural diversity. Therefore heritage professionals, on the basis of topological analyses, should participate in the continuous negotiation of heritage and its prioritisation and, if necessary, give the margin topologies a voice, and by renarrating their stories, point out that they are as special as the others. Heritage management and safeguarding can only take place in promoting the meaning of one at the expense of the meaning of another. We always safeguard and destroy at the same time and only if we are aware of what was given up in order to maintain something else, we have made an informed and hopefully meaningful decision. Whether others would agree is yet another question.
To offer my readers a more concrete impression of what such decisions could involve and how delicate they will be in almost every case, I transfer my considerations to a long-due different level, an empirical topological study of a particular heritage concept: the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, Syria.

247 One of this meetings which failed due to terminological difficulties and a lack of creativity in finding shared conceptual approaches that could have served as a basis for an integrated vision, the international conference on the safeguarding of tangible and intangible heritage: towards and integrated approach, which took place in Nara, Japan in October 2004 was already discussed in Section One, chapter 2.3 The intangible – non-intangible debate.

248 It seems that the discussion of and search for an integrated approach is not likely to stop in the near future but will rather be intensified. I am aware of several meetings planned for the upcoming year 2007 which aim at addressing the interrelations of the two UNESCO conventions and their professional practices from several different angles. One of these conferences for example is just being organised by the University of Montreal, namely Christina Cameron, and is to take place in March 2007 under the title 'Tangible and intangible heritage: two UNESCO conventions'. Two of the four sessions will be dedicated to the discussion of integrated approaches and I hope that the forthcoming meetings will be more constructive than those convened earlier.

249 Cultural and other individual biases that can also be conditioned by professional frameworks have to be excluded from this list, as avoiding them is impossible. Instead of pretending to approach heritage in a culturally undetermined manner it might be more helpful to simply acknowledge a researcher’s background and identity.

250 Finally, also the topos of heritage is not a novel idea, although it has not yet been referred to under this name. Nevertheless the location of meaning of heritage has been discussed for almost two decades, for example by Muhammad Arkoun who calls it mental space: “We have to visualize mental space as well, if we want to understand all the delicate mental mechanisms and collective forces operating in conservation as a cultural activity.” (Arkoun, 1990, p. 26) He proposed to approach heritage with a “new cognitive attitude introduced by Semiology” (Arkoun, 1990, p. 27), which is more or less what I also suggest in the following chapters.

251 I assume that the identification processes for the 2003 Convention will rather resemble the masterpiece proclamation candidature files – or be an even more community based approach – than the static world heritage dossiers which often aim to define the ‘scientifically legitimised correct meaning of the heritage expression’.

252 Bolla in his retrospection on the World Heritage Convention even lauded the influence of IUCN scientific methods on the focus of ICOMOS for cultural heritage, which he now considers far more scientific: “One of the fall outs I noticed, from the culture-nature marriage, has been that the scientific working methods of IUCN, as regards the evaluation of sites, has definitely influenced the working methods of ICOMOS; and this can be considered as an improvement (…)” (Bolla, 2005, p. 93)

253 The required presentation of the expression’s “roots in a cultural tradition or the cultural history of the community concerned (…) its role as a means of affirming the cultural identity of the peoples and cultural communities (…) its importance as a source of inspiration and intercultural exchanges [as well as] its contemporary cultural and social role in the community concerned” (UNESCO, 2001a, p. 12) encouraged the experts writing the candidature files to base their significance statements – at least in some cases or to a certain extent – on community explications rather than expert opinion. Some of the files incorporating community voices are discussed in Section Three, chapter 3.2 Ritual dances and sacred knowledge.

254 Sheldrake further discusses means of understanding heritage or – as he formulates – the understanding of place: “A place is the result of relationships and actions, conceptions of physical attributes. (…)” (Sheldrake, 2001, p. 12) His thoughts are inspiring and convincing with the exception that he takes the place (or heritage) for given as the starting point for further inquiry instead of considering it as the result and expression of the various layers he identifies.

255 Please refer to the discussion of these challenges in Section One: conceptualising – categorising.
256 In the World Heritage framework Lennon et al. have even argued for a holistic approach to cultural and natural heritage, drawing on very similar reasons: “Rather than reinforcing the division into separate categories and accepting the partition of the cultural and natural values as the basis for conservation actions whereby one set of values is emphasised over another (…) a holistic approach examining all values is a wise basis on which to proceed because it enables transparency in the evolution process so as to arrive at a considered, if not mutually accepted, decision on management action.” (Lennon et al., 1999, p. 4)

257 Sarah Byrne also highlights that when dealing with the distinction of intangible and tangible heritage “it is essential that this dichotomy is clearly recognised as the methodological construct it is, largely devoid of any real social meaning.” (Byrne, 2006)

258 The authors of the Getty report on ‘Assessing the values of cultural heritage’ state the same fact for heritage sites: “One cannot fully understand a site without understanding its contexts, which, perforce, extend beyond the site itself both literally and conceptually.” (Mason, 2002, p. 14)

259 The Getty Conservation Institute report discussed here was written for tangible heritage and the discussion of significance statements, including their opportunities and limitations is a topic that is more likely to concern the tangible heritage field.

260 Tainter and Lucas while studying the legal regulations on heritage significance consider that “it is difficult to understand how the writers of such regulations could have expected a smoothly working historic preservation system to emerge from such a vague and tautological language.” (Tainter & Lucas, 1983, p. 710)

261 Heritage specialists at English Heritage have observed the same phenomenon. “It is all too easy to allow a gap grow between public understanding and awareness of the historic environment on the one hand, and the occasionally more specialist concerns and priorities of those responsible for managing it. We need to avoid this by helping professional conservationists to reflect the concerns and values of the rest of the society, and at the same time helping everyone to appreciate from a scientific or academic perspective why a particular heritage asset is important from a national viewpoint.” (English Heritage, 1997) Tainter and Lucas are reluctant to confirm the phenomenon but agree that the public perceives this gap between professionals and non-professionals: “There is a widespread perception that archaeologists are overly zealous in their insistence on protecting sites whose value non-archaeologists do not understand.” (Tainter & Lucas, 1983, p. 710)

262 Experts are biased first and foremost by their professional disciplines and training (cf. Section One, chapter 3. Academic heritage typologies) but they are also subject to the preconditioning influences of heritage typologies which seem to facilitate their work. Especially the influence of value typologies that was discussed in Section Three, chapter 1.1 Value, significance, meaning, intended to help people articulate their heritage values, is questionable. In the quoted chapter I expressed my strong doubts whether presented typologies might help anybody to articulate values, ideas or concepts and my following topological studies illustrate that several ideas partaking in heritage construction cannot be easily categorised into the standard heritage or value typologies.

263 Medina, the Arabic word for city, has become the well-established typology for a seemingly homogenous style of traditional cities throughout the Middle East, Maghreb, the Arabian Peninsula and expanding into Central Asia. Name equivalents are Islamic city or Arabic city. Medina mainly refers to a concept established by the early fathers of heritage identification under French colonial rule, Jean Sauvaget for the Middle East (Sauvaget, 1994) and Georges and William Marçais for the Maghreb and the Iberian Peninsula (Marçais, 1955). Most recently in 1974 Dale F. Eikelman has pointed out in his article ‘Is there an Islamic city?’ (Eickelman, 1974, p. 293) that most characteristics attributed to the Islamic city are not in the first place urban features but can also be found in rural settings and villages. The typology medina – like most heritage typologies – must nowadays be considered a colonial and Eurocentric product which disregards as many characteristics of the respective cities as it combines. For a critical review on traditional constructions of the ‘medina’ including an analysis of core images which contribute to such constructions I recommend the article ‘Construction of the public sphere of the Middle Eastern medina’ by Anton Escher (Escher, 2001).

264 The historic quarters of cities situated in the Maghreb and Middle Eastern region are indeed good examples for the difficulties of homogenisation processes initiated by heritage typologies. International – predominantly European – investors seeking for a Medina that suits all traditional stereotypes, invest in the respective historic quarters and conduct rehabilitation projects which create
what they desire, standardised familiar ‘orient’ (cf. Escher & Petermann, 2003), artificial heritage – and indeed homogeneous heritage – that could equally be placed into all four examples mentioned. The particular characteristics of each of the cities, the stories and neighbourhood structures that strongly distinguish Damascus from Marrakesh are at the same time in a rapid process of disappearance.

Here we could draw on the rather detached comparison of selection procedures in staff recruitment. Written ‘significance statements’ of the applicants provide the employer with an initial impression based on a typological framework. However, an increasing number of recruitment profiles are based on personal aspects – an interrelation of manifold human characteristics – which are hardly perceivable in the standardised formats of application files. For this reasons employers prefer to talk to the applicants and often employ for a limited period only – a probation period – to be in a position to better judge the qualities of the future employee. Personal conversations reveal that applicants with very similar CVs might have very different qualities and vice versa that individuals with very different backgrounds are equally qualified and capable. But it is the individual narratives and combinations of all elements (of an identity construction cycle?) that contribute to the final assessment of the applicant.

Although some analysts in especially social sciences seem to make a distinction between stories and narratives (cf. Manning & Cullum-Swan, 1994), I will use the two terms more or less synonymously. I tend to prefer narrative to designate the transmitted layers of meaning supporting an idea and story as a means to transmit one particular aspect of meaning-giving. This differentiation however is not always consequently followed.

Even for the Greek roots serving to construct the compound the exchange of merely one letter is sufficient. However this one letter leads to another root, meaning and word, which provides the first part. It describes a change from typos (τυπός) which describes a category, to topos (τόπος) which designates – in its widest sense – a location.

For a discussion on the meanings and designations of both terms, please refer to the following subchapter: 2.1 Logos and topos.

One could see a parallel – even if far-reached – for heritage studies in considering that topologies are concerned with the abstract characteristics rather than the physical evidence of the heritage expressions and their particular properties. I mean to say, even if the link is inappropriate, topologies are a tool for heritage managers concerned with the abstract characteristics of heritage, like the individual who presented conservation planning for Hereford cathedral: “Hereford Cathedral’s history is much older in human terms than any of the building’s fabric, and my first responsibility is the care of that community. I need to protect the life of cathedral organists and masons, singers and librarians, schoolteachers, archivists, and vergers, and to emphasise that heritage resides in the pattern of their lives, in their liturgies, in their scholarship, in their singing. All those things have to be understood by the person who is to help develop and manage the change of heritage.” (Clark, 2001, p. 7)

Despite topology’s limitless flexibility with regard to deformation, disruptions or destructions destroy topologies. Also in GIS systems (geographical information systems) the term is applied to those aspects of a database that survive geometric distortion of objects: “such aspects include adjacency and connectivity between objects and the distinction between points, lines and areas.” (‘topology’ in Johnston, 2005)

Weeks also provides examples which assist to visualise this difference: “For example, a flat torus and a doughnut surface have the same global topology, but different local geometries. A flat torus and a plane, on the other hand, have the same local geometry but different global topologies.” (Weeks, 2002, p. 40)

However, as Sheenan highlights, there still seems to be some uncertainty on Heidegger’s central concept: “Well into its seventh decade Heidegger scholarship (…) has yet to reach a firm consensus on what Heidegger’s main topic was “ (Sheehan, 2005, p. 193)

In the course of his writings Heidegger gets more concrete towards the end of his argument: “Metaphysics thinks of the Being of beings both in the ground-giving unity of what is most general, what is indifferently valid everywhere, and also in the unity of the all that accounts for the general, that is, of the All-Highest.” (Heidegger, 1969)
Pöggeler writes, “Therefore a thinking given wholly to such discussion could perhaps be called ‘topology’. In this case topology means a saying (legein) of the region or site (topos) of the truth, a determination of the region which unfolds as places of gathering, and gathering-together (logos) of guiding terms (topoi) of European thought and in this way a gathering of the basic terms of one’s own thinking. (...) Topological thinking tries to achieve something very simple: it calls our attention to presumptions hidden in concepts we use, it seeks to speak language meditatively by asking us to keep in mind that speaking as we do, namely from our site, we get incorporated in the coming-to-pass of truth.” (Pöggeler, 1986, p. 250)

Heritage Studies can be subsumed under a sociology of knowledge, which according to Berger and Luckmann is inquiry and scholarship “concerned with the analysis of the social construction of reality” (P. L. Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p. 15)

Unfortunately I have never had the opportunity to study classic or modern Greek, but with the help of a selection of dictionaries and philosophical discourses it seems possible to approach the origins of the two very complex terms before attributing new connotations for heritage studies.

These two possible explications were quoted from Heidegger’s rather early Being and Time (Sein und Zeit) from 1926. In his later writings he interprets the term in more complex ways and attributes further meanings deriving primarily from his study of the pre-Socratian Heraklit and later Greek philosophers. His explication in Being and Time nevertheless provides the advantage of visualising how several abstract and seemingly detached terms can be subsumed under his interpretation of speech: “And because the function of logos lies in letting something be seen straightforwardly, in letting beings be apprehended, logos can mean reason. Moreover, because logos is used in the sense not only of legien but also of legomenon – what is pointed to as such, and because the latter is nothing other but the hypokeimenon – what always already lies present at the basis of all relevant speech and discussion; for these reasons logos qua legomenon means ground, ratio. Finally, because logos as legomenon can also mean what is addressed, as something that has become visible in its relation to something else, in its ‘relatedness,’ logos acquires the meaning of relation and relationship.” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 30).

In the German original it reads: “Haben sie nicht mich, sondern den Sinn vernommen, so ist es weise, dem Sinn gemäß zu sagen, alles sei eins.” (De Gennaro, 2001, p. 234)

The German original translated for this quotation reads: “Aus dem horchsamen Hören auf den λόγος ist das Wissen, das darin besteht, mit dem λόγος das Gleiches sagend zu sagen: Eins ist alles.” (Heidegger & Frings, 1979, p. 251)

Heidegger explains: “In a sense εἰδός and λόγος mean the same. In other words: the λόγος framed by mentioning and stating is conceptualised in regard to the ιδέα, the λόγος taken as statement is the concept of λογος, which ranges within the compass of thinking, which thinks the existing out of ideas, i.e. metaphysical. The λόγος that logic thinks of is thought metaphysically. Logic is metaphysics of λογος.” (Heidegger & Frings, 1979, p. 254, translated from the German) Since translating Heidegger is a somewhat ambitious task, the German original shall be cited as well: “In gewisser Weise meinen so εἰдός und λόγος das Selbe. Mit anderen Worten: der als Ansprechen und Aussagen gefaßte λογος ist im Hinblick auf die ιδεα begriffen; der λογος als Aussage genommen ist diejenige Auffassung des λογος, die sich im Umkreis des Denkens bewegt, das das Seiende aus den Ideen denkt, d.h. metaphysisch. Der λογος, den die Logik denkt, ist metaphysisch gedacht. Die Logik ist die Metaphysik des λογος.”

When considering the six principles of heterotopias formulated by Foucault, that first, every culture establishes heterotopias, that these are in a process of continuous dynamic modification and reaffirmation, that thirdly heterotopias combine several conceptual places at one geographical place, that they are often attached to certain (also historic) periods, that their accessibility may be restricted and finally that heterotopias are somewhat different and encompass the other (cf. Foucault, 1984); then it can be assumed that many heritage topologies could at the same time be considered as heterotopias.

Chronotope according to Bakhtin is “the spatio-temporal matrix which shapes any narrative text.” (Bakhtin et al., 1994, p. 246)

Blumer has further highlighted the social construction of the heritage construction cycle and in particular the strong influence human interaction has on the affirmation of meaning. In his words...
“the meaning of a thing for a person grows out of ways in which the other persons act towards the person with regard to the thing” (Blumer, 1986, p. 4) With thing or object Blumer not merely refers to objects in the sense of material properties but to every aspect that can be pointed at or can be designated by naming it.

284 Participation in heritage, and the attempt to identify heritage for purposes of documentation has to be considered participation, actively contributes to the heritage construction. Sheldrake refers to the same phenomenon in the construction of place: “Each person effectively reshapes place by making his or her own story a thread in the meaning of the place and also has to come to terms with the many layers of story that already exist in a given location” (Sheldrake, 2001, p. 16)

283 This fact was also recognised in the candidature dossier which already presented the Kris as a narrative and theme rather than an object. In this sense the Kris – which was probably for this reason the first that came to my mind as an example – was already presented in a conceptual approach that is very similar to a topological analysis, cf. Section Three, 3.2 Ritual dances and sacred knowledge.

286 Setha M. Low refers to the multiplicity of meanings in heritage not as layers but as a cultural mosaic describing that heritage – or in her focus of consideration place – “is never singular but made up of a cultural mosaic on a multiplicity of histories, voices and peoples.” (Low, 1994, p. 71)

287 She further highlights that this situation can easily cause conflicts that require professional mediation: “Conflict may arise when two cultures compete for control over (…) preservation decisions. In such situation, the methodological and conceptual skills of someone trained in ethnosemantics or other anthropological and linguistic methodologies are useful to resolve the cultural conflict.” (Low, 2002, p. 35) Topological analyses can help to predict conflicts of control or competing use and might assist the heritage professional to develop conflict mediation strategies before such conflicts arise.

288 Lowenthal describes how this concern was raised during the Second World Congress on Heritage Preservation and Interpretation, although I am not sure the participants were referring to the same concept of over-interpretation. “(…) delegates’ concern was not limited to threats to the physical fabric. They were equally dismayed at the loss of immediacy and ambience at heritage sites owing to (…) over-interpretation.” (Lowenthal, 1989) Over-interpretation rather than demystification could also refer to the disturbance caused by a large amount of interpretation aids at a particular site. But the conceptual threat of over-interpretation, of a complete disclosure or ‘unconcealedness’ to use Heidegger’s term, is indeed a risk that heritage analysts should be aware of and prevent if necessary. Not every heritage topology should and can be documented for public purposes.

289 This implies that topological analyses are not only initially time-consuming but also require regular updates which produce long-term expenses. I therefore have to add at this point, that in terms of working hours topological analyses will by far exceed the common time-frames, which makes heritage studies with the proposed approach very costly. On the other hand, it could be envisaged that the enormous degree of involvement increases voluntary contributions in financial or personal means which successively reduce the conservation or safeguarding expenses.

290 While I was preparing this work I had long email exchanges and communications with Herb Stovel, one of my PhD mentors. As the author of the Nara Document on Authenticity (cf. Nara Document on Authenticity, 1995) and the suggestions to its follow-up currently attached as annex four to the Operational Guidelines of the World Heritage Convention (cf. UNESCO, 2005g, annex 4) as well as several publications on this topic (cf. Stovel, 1995b, 2001; Stovel & Incerti Medici, 2001; Stovel, 2004a), he is one of the strongest supporters of the concept of authenticity and its central place in heritage studies. Our exchanges either concluded in the mere agreement that we disagree or do not understand the other’s approach or in misunderstandings of what aspects of heritage the concept of authenticity is to be applied to. While I was always tempted to enter discussions on the possible applicability of the concept to values, themes, identity and knowledge, Herb Stovel reiterated the priority function of heritage attributes or, in new terms, information sources. His concept of authenticity arises from a pragmatic approach, which is aimed at decision-making for conservation and he considers the heritage expressions and their – what he calls – attributes the only aspect conservation activities can be addressed to. In his words: “my attitude to authenticity derives from my pragmatic approach and the many times I have had to make decisions about conserving something on historic sites. You can't conserve values per se, not as a site architect or site manager. You can only 'treat' (this means: alter, add to, remove, adjust, modify, retain etc.) what is physically tangible or at least discernible. So you have to focus on the attributes through which the
values are expressed or carried. These can be physical such as the material. They can be partly physical and partly conceptual such as design. (…)” (Herb Stovel, personal email dated 09/08/2006). This may be true from the position of an architect or urban planner; however, such approach leaves out any opportunity to address safeguarding strategies at a conceptual level or to consider the maintenance of the heritage construction cycle an aim of conservation. I believe heritage professionals can do more than alter, add to, adjust etc. We can encourage, stimulate, inspire, provide confidence or pride, financial support or training and several other aspects yet unnamed. I have not yet reached a clear position on how a concept of authenticity could apply to such safeguarding activities. I only know that if heritage expressions are understood as significations, as signs of the narratives they convey, then the authenticity of the narratives would be far more important than the authenticity of the heritage expressions and their attributes in transmitting historical continuity.

For Jennifer Garton Smith discontinuity is a general characteristic of narratives: “Everyday stories reconstruct the twists and turns of disconnected events and, if compiled, would reveal discontinuous stories of overlapping events retold.” (J. G. Smith, 2000, p. 60)

The report also refers to the immediate consequences of this separation from non-technical disciplines: “(…) despite emerging policies that promote value-driven approaches in conservation management, there is still a limited body of knowledge regarding how cultural significance might best be assessed and reassessed as part of a public and enduring conservation process.” (Avrami et al., 2000, p. 9)

For example the claim quoted to have been formulated by Lourdes Arizpe who “suggests that, for all conservation decision making, one must look at who is valorising cultural heritage and why. ‘Governments value it in one way, elite national groups another, different from local populations, academics, or business people. To know what is the best strategy to preserve cultural heritage, we need to understand what each of these groups thinks and the relationship between these different groups.’ (…)” (Avrami et al., 2000, p. 10)

The correct name of the conference was: A global assessment of the 1989 Recommendation on the Safeguarding of Traditional Culture and Folklore: Local empowerment and international cooperation (cf. Seitel et al., 2001), which is often regarded as the initiation meeting of the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (UNESCO, 2003b), cf. Section One, 2.2 Intangible Heritage versus.

The same idea was expressed by Jensen who states that “some would claim that it is impossible in a secularised post-modern world to achieve any consensus or to formulate any standards for assessing ways of selecting, constructing, or presenting cultural heritage.” (Jensen, 2000, p. 40)

The distinction of emic and etic data sets and operations whereby etic data is considered as directly observable while emic is the meaning-making of the individual with regard to his actions, derives from this paradigm. Harris describes that while “the locus of emic events lies in the actor’s mind, (…) the locus of etic events lies in the behaviour stream.” (Harris, 1976, p. 340) In defining the characteristics of emic and etic units in the later part of his paper, Harris in addition defines that etic units are “cross-culturally valid” while emic units are “culturally specific, applied to one language or culture at a time.” (Harris, 1976, p. 341) I personally don’t find the emic / etic dichotomy useful or applicable for the context of heritage studies since I can hardly imagine how the two aspects could be separated. In addition, the etic approach requires generating an objective description of the observable aspects, which in its claim for ‘objectivity’ should be generally doubted. Problematic is also the concept of culture respectively separate cultures described in the above citation to which etics universally apply. When reading these definitions I indeed wonder why the terms had not yet been discovered for the context of the World Heritage Convention, where they would be extremely convenient: etic data ‘objectively’ describing the outstanding universal values and emic data the additional stuff that matters to the locals. Nevertheless the two conceptions are gaining increasing popularity in the heritage field (cf. Munjeri, 2004b).

For example Maria de la Torre and Randall Mason in the GCI report on assessing values of cultural heritage: “As conservation professionals, we are familiar and comfortable with the assessment methods used by traditional heritage experts. However, to identify and measure ‘social’ values, we must venture into new areas.” (de la Torre & Mason, 2002)
Specifically the methodologies could enable heritage professionals to shift paradigms in taking up a different stance towards heritage. Richard Kurin speaking for cultural heritage in museum contexts thinks that a revision of approaches will be a difficult task: “Museum workers are not really trained for such an effort, and, to be clear, scholars in fields such as anthropology, folklore, and ethnomusicology would have grave misgivings about how to do this in an intellectually satisfactory way. The methodological challenge is also sociological.” (Kurin, 2004a, p. 7)

Narrative inquiry is a specifically multidisciplinary endeavour and it is not surprising, that the first volume of the new series ‘Studies across disciplines in the humanities and social sciences’ is dedicated to ‘The travelling concept of narrative’ (Hyvärinen et al., 2006)

According to Setha M. Low “cognitive approaches include both the study of cognition as a mental process – often reflected in language – and cognition as a set of categories that structure perception through the attribution of meaning.” (Low, 2002, p. 31) Low discusses above all observational, phenomenological and ethno-semantic approaches which all have their respective advantages. The rapid ethnographic assessment procedures she proposes in the last part of her paper cannot be considered an adequate methodology for heritage identification, although certain elements contributing to its cognition process have to be supported. The ‘rapiddness’ of the approach however, which is already reflected in its title cannot do justice to the complex nature of cultural heritage processes and also the mapping activities proposed are questionable (cf. 3.4 Located or mapped?)

The only difficulty in this claim is that the importance of the particular heritage expression needs to be decided on before the studies ‘as its importance may necessitate’ can be carried out. This seems to be a reverse approach considering that heritage considered not important will not be given a chance to prove its importance through in-depth study.

Peter Fowler suggests that archaeologists have to think very hard about their attitude towards their source material: “The discipline of archaeology does indeed require a continuous flow of new information: that is its life-blood, by which it shapes our changing appreciations of the past. But the assumption that new data must come mainly, or can come only, from excavation is an assumption to be questioned.” (Fowler, 1977, p. 189)

Roger Barker who would not group himself with environmental psychology, as I did, but rather with what he calls ecological psychology, developed a theory which assumes that human behaviour is determined by a respective physical environment. He defines particular places as ‘behaviour-settings’ and assumes that independently of the acting individual, definable behaviour-patterns will be linked to this place. (cf. Barker, 1968, p. 18f) Barker would for example define a supermarket a behaviour-setting and argue that the behaviour-patterns: taking a shopping cart, taking products out of shelves and laying them into the cart, queuing at the cashiers etc., are determined by the setting and would not in the same way take place in a gym or a bus station.

Weichhart in opposition to Barker places the acting individuals into the centre of his theory. He would argue that a supermarket does not determine the behaviour of its visitors but that the supermarket was constructed in its very organisation, shape, and location according to the need of those whose intention it is to get their groceries in the most convenient fashion. “Individual subjects rather frequent particular contexts with the explicit aim to conduct specific actions and to thereby achieve specific goals.” In the German original: “Subjekte suchen vielmehr bestimmte Kontextbedingungen mit der ausdrücklichen Absicht auf, dort ganz bestimmte Handlungen durchzuführen, um dadurch spezifische Ziele zu verwirklichen” (Weichhart, 2003, p. 33).

The most recent announcement to establish an interdisciplinary programme in World Heritage studies was published in November 2006 by the University of California, which adds one more to those already in place, cf. endnote 104.

While phenomenology could be considered a rather cognitive approach, semiological aspects can be considered under both headings, narrative and cognitive. In any case the differences are often blurred in applied research and I will also not insist to strictly separate one term form the other.

The techniques selected for data gathering in the topological study of the Umayyad Mosque in Section Five, are introduced in chapter ‘2 A topological heritage analysis’ of that section.
Berger and Luckmann provide further explanation on their understanding of the phenomenological method: “A detailed phenomenological analysis would uncover the various layers of experience, and the different structures of meaning involved in, say, being bitten by a dog, remembering having been bitten by a dog, having a phobia about all dogs, and so forth. What interests us here is the common intentional character of all consciousness.” (P. L. Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p. 21) In the course of this chapter the term of intentionality in the context of the phenomenological analysis is introduced in more detail.

Heidegger elaborates further in explicating the aims of ontology: “In ontology being should be captured and understood through the phenomenological method. In that we realise, that phenomenology nowadays became vital, but that what it searches and wants, was existent from the beginnings of occidental philosophy.” (Heidegger, 2005, p. 28, translated from German) In the German original the two passages were written in the following wording: “Phänomenologie ist der Titel für die Methode der Ontologie, d.h. der wissenschaftlichen Philosophie. (…) In der Ontologie soll auf dem Wege der phänomenologischen Methode das Sein erfasst und begriffen werden, wobei wir bemerken, dass Phänomenologie zwar heute lebendig geworden ist, aber dass das, was sie sucht und will, schon von Anfang an in der abendländischen Philosophie lebendig war.” (Heidegger, 2005, p. 27, 28)

With the introduction of this method, this science of philosophy, Husserl intended nothing less than the creation of a new foundation of occidental philosophy and a reformulation of philosophy to clearly and absolutely distinguish it from the natural sciences: “In the sphere of ordinary inquiry one science can radically build upon another, and the one can serve the other as a model of method even though to a limited extent determined by the nature of the areas of inquiry in question. But philosophy lies in a wholly new dimension. It needs an entirely new point of departure and an entirely new method distinguishing it in principle from any other ‘natural’ science.” (Husserl, 1964, p. 19)

Heidegger’s phenomenology of being is an existential phenomenology. His later writings are also referred to as an approach of radical phenomenology (cf. Sallis, 1978)

Wilcke describes Heidegger’s phenomenological reduction as “a process (…) in which all beliefs, assumptions and pre-conceived notions regarding the phenomena to be studied are identified, made explicit, and then set aside and bracketed.” (Wilcke, 2002, p. 2) This aspect is important in both Heidegger’s and Husserl’s theory, but I believe, it is rather framed in the third methodological aspect, that of destruction.

Baumgartner would probably support this theory which is close to her considerations: “The meaning of intentionality is communication with the world and this communication can happen either by means of getting impressions passively or by means of constituting the objects in an active manner.” (E. Baumgartner, 1996, p. 45) Both directions are evident in the heritage construction cycle, the heritage expression is constructed by constitution of the various elements of the cycle but at the same time functions as a signifier and therefore — in a passive sense — knowledge, values and identities are constituted through the signification.

This risk was also considered by the expert meeting on inventorying intangible cultural heritage, which took place in Paris in March 2005. The report concludes that “this may be the reason for being careful when providing detailed information about ICH elements in easily accessible inventories. When detailed information is provided about, for instance, traditional medicinal knowledge or about exact locations and preparation of materials associated with ICH elements, or when recordings or musical and oral traditions are linked to inventories, outsiders may easily use and commercialize such information unless there is proper legal protection.” (UNESCO, 2005i, p. 43)

At the same time I relaxed after noting that the expert meeting on inventorying quoted above (cf. endnote 316) no longer mentioned the idea of standardised typologies for intangible heritage.

According to my perception the heritage protection and revitalisation action plan is the worst component of the candidature files, as it encourages planning and describing inventive measures or as the guidelines state, actions to be taken. The potential to not take measures at all seems to be eliminated by insisting on an action plan being part of the candidature file. One could argue that the management plans required for World Heritage Listings are a similar tool — which is true — but management somehow encompasses mere observation while ‘action plans’ and ‘revitalisation’ straightforwardly suggest activities.
Section Four: Towards an integrated approach

319 Rieks Smeets further continues to explicate the necessity of documentation: “documentation is important; it may be necessary for research, it contributes to the memory of a group or community, which is especially important if the element in question is threatened in its continued existence. Finally, when the transmission of intangible cultural heritage is in danger, due to sharp changes in social conditions, documentation may be instrumental in finding new ways of transmission.” (Smeets, 2004a, p. 148)

320 We can observe tragic case studies in the masterpiece programme as well, where in the process of proclamations expressions have been essentially changed. For example the Jama’ al Fna in Morocco, which according to a governmentally developed management plan, became documented, regulated and standardised. Unfortunately, in this case the dynamism of the place was an essence, a logos, which has been destroyed in the name of safeguarding.

321 Mason underlines his request for value mapping by describing the benefits deriving from such documentation: “The benefits of this step would be twofold: firstly, simply, a clear delineation of how each of the values identified for the site is expressed, embodied, or otherwise represented in the materials of the site (ranging in scale from artefacts to buildings to landscapes); secondly, key ‘complexes’ of (material) resources and (immaterial) values can be identified.” (Mason, 2002) I consider these arguments inappropriate as they suggest that heritage values and physical heritage expressions are constantly interlinked in a spatially locatable manner.

322 Peter Haggett in his global synthesis lauds and summarises the framing of culture of the Berkeley School which stated that “culture describes patterns of learned human behaviour that form a durable template by which ideas and images can be transferred from one generation to another or from one group to another.” (Haggett, 2001, p. 206)

323 The risks of applying the technique of mental maps in different regions of the world were described by Rob Kitchin in his book on cognitive mapping research: “The danger, in relation to research on cross-cultural comparisons, is that results may differ not because of differences in knowledge or cognitive processes but because of cultural familiarity with the media of data collection.” (Kitchin & Freundschuh, 2000, p. 257)

324 I have not tried to create illustrations for cognitive maps in the context of this work and I doubt that anybody but the holder could visualise the interrelation of all elements that participate in heritage construction in cartographic format. The attempt to do so would rather be a challenge for the discipline of psychology than that of heritage studies and might require yet another research project. In any case, I fear my empiric investigations have not yet been detailed enough to attempt an illustration of one of my informants cognitive heritage maps. Therefore I prefer to pass this endeavour to other researchers who wish to respond to the challenge of cartographically documenting the cognitive maps of heritage construction in the future.

325 Greene further regrets that in view of the difficulties of prioritisation, there are no standard procedures one could rely on: “(…) there are no standard answers to the questions ‘What sites?’, ‘Which public?’, ‘Who decides?’, and ‘Who pays?’ There is not even a set sequence in which the questions must be posed.” (Greene, 1999)
Section Five: Topology researched –
the Umayyad Mosque

Following the above elaborations on the new conceptual approach to cultural topologies and the discussion of their advantages in the identification of heritage significance and policy planning for heritage management, topologies have yet to be demonstrated practicable in their project-based application. The last section of my work therefore presents the results of an empirical topological analysis of one particular heritage expression, the so-called Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, Syria. In a comparative approach, the description of the various heritage themes, or topologies related to the heritage concept are opposed to a summary of a few conventional heritage identifications.

The particular heritage concept selected, the Umayyad Mosque, is traditionally conceived as a spatial concept, a place or architectural construction in a primarily Islamic religious setting. Here, however, according to the principles of topological heritage analysis, the concept Umayyad Mosque is initially abstracted and delocalised in order to identify its conceptual significance and themes and to successively re-locate the taking place of the initiating ideas and narratives described. I favoured the selection of the Umayyad Mosque concept for my envisaged empirical investigations for a variety of reasons: The complex has a long tradition as the central mosque not only of the capital but of the historic and modern state of Syria and is of supra-regional importance in both religious and monumental terms. Such importance suggested that most individuals questioned in my empirical investigations would have some relation to and conception of the heritage Umayyad Mosque.

In summary, besides being a place for prayer for the predominantly Sunni population, the mosque complex is a pilgrimage destination for believers of different faiths, especially Shi'a Muslims and Christians. It is also a major tourist destination for travellers in and to Syria, “the most striking historical structure of the city – a marvellous landmark and one of the most interesting edifices of the Muslim world” (Salloum, 2006, p. 52), famous for its architectural plan and mosaics of dazzling artistic quality. But interestingly, most of these aspects initially significant for me are not relevant for the individual topologies identified, as will be obvious in the course of the topology descriptions in the following subchapters.

Finally, the mosque complex is one of the earliest religious places recognised by UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee as part of the Historic City of Damascus (nominated in 1979; WHS 20). In this capacity the concept is of particular interest for the purpose of this research, as it is nominated according to the criteria (v) and (vi) and hence is presumably associated to intangible expressions, which are aimed to be captured. At present, the significance of the place, including its World Heritage
significance, or intangible expressions taking place in its precincts unfortunately remain unidentified – in both the nomination proposal and in the UNESCO documentation files. In this respect I hope that the analysis conducted will not only serve as an illustration of the epistemology and methodology of the concept topology, but also constitute an updated information resource for the understanding of the World Heritage Site ‘ancient city of Damascus’ and especially its geographic as well as spiritual centre, the Umayyad Mosque.

In the framework of this topological analysis, the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus can not be considered representative of other religious places or architectural structures – firstly, because I am strongly convinced that no religious place or concept can ever be representative of others and secondly, because topological analyses are non-transferable and non-comparable. They require specific and intense research of one heritage concept and provide knowledge and meaning solely for the very concept investigated. Nevertheless, the description of heritage concepts derived from this empirical study might help to facilitate more attentive approaches to heritage identification in other religious contexts or even encourage heritage professionals to apply the methodology proposed in identifying the topology of culture constructed by other heritage concepts, tangible, intangible and those – luckily – yet uncategorised.

1 The Umayyad Mosque –
a conventional heritage introduction

The Umayyad Mosque of Damascus is designated by a large variety of names. These range from transcriptions of the Arabic terms used, such as Djama’al-Umawi (جامع الأموي, Umayyad congregational mosque), often with the addition al-kabir (ال الكبير, the great), and Masdjid bani umaya (مسجد بني أمية, mosque founded by the Umayyads) to the Great Mosque of Damascus or Djama’al-Walid (جامع الوليد) after Caliph Walid, its documented founder (ar-Rihawi, 1996, p. 20). All of these designations refer to the same particular physical place, an architectural complex more or less framed by outer massive stone walls, which are remains of an ancient temple and are referred to as the temple peribolos (περιβολος) in archaeological writings (cf. Wulzinger & Watzinger, 1924, p. 146).

In conventional heritage identifications this place – the architectural structures, decorative elements and open spaces enclosed by the outer wall surroundings – is considered first and foremost an historical document, a place of the past, a witness of history, a location of gathered memory illustrating the footprints of our ancestors through several millennia. Even the contemporary function of the mosque, according to the conventional descriptions available, is still primarily identified by this relationship between the building and its history and traditions as narrated by the architectural structures. A function that can best be described as that of a monument in the most classical sense of the term.
I have called the attempt to summarise introductions to the Umayyad Mosque a conventional heritage introduction and therein refer to descriptions as they can be found in compilations on Islamic architecture (cf. ar-Rihawi, 1999), mosque buildings (cf. Kuban, 1974) books on the ancient city of Damascus (Keenan, 2000) or travel guidebooks to Syria and Damascus (cf. Burns, 1999; cf. T. Carter et al., 2004). It is not very difficult to summarise descriptions for such differing purposes in a few paragraphs, because they all follow an identical pattern comprising four major elements. The first element is an acknowledgement of the rich history of the place, especially its religious multiplicity. In a second section emphasis is given to the construction of the latest architectural structure, the mosque of Walid ibn al-Malik (وليد ابن الملك) very often illustrated by some of the many legends and narratives connected to this process. The building process is in most cases followed by an account of the disasters, savages and destructions the building experienced throughout the centuries. And finally, descriptions of the Umayyad Mosque conclude in a fourth part elaborating on particular elements such as furnishings or architectural details which a visitor to the place is supposed to give special attention to. Even the two books exclusively concerned with the Umayyad Mosque complex, written by the Syrian authors Afif Bahnassi and Abd-ul-Qadir ar-Rihawi, are principally structured according to these standard elements (cf. Bahnassi, 1989; cf. ar-Rihawi, 1996). The following compressed portrayal extracted from several descriptions of the Umayyad Mosque, including that of the World Heritage nomination file of the Ancient City of Damascus accordingly is also based on this standard fourfold structure. It is further intended to reflect the prevalent quest for superlatives and outstanding features that is typical for many of the consulted descriptions. A poem attributed to al-Idrisi provides an account of the longstanding tradition of such superlatives:

“In Damascus there is a mosque that has no equal in the world, not one with such fine proportion, nor one so solidly constructed, nor one vaulted so securely, nor one more marvelously laid out, nor one so admirably decorated in gold mosaics and diverse designs, with enamelled tiles and polished marbles.” (al-Idrisi, 1154 cited in Bahnassi, 1989)

Very little has changed in the more recent praises of the Umayyad Mosque, “one of the most magnificent buildings of Islam, and certainly the most important religious structure in all Syria” (T. Carter et al., 2004, p. 86). Perhaps such wording is still encouraged by the explicit desire of al-Walid to build a mosque which would excel over all other temples and churches, documented in his famous citation: “I want to build a mosque, the likes of which have never been built before nor will be equalled afterwards” (ar-Rihawi, 1977, p. 160). Equally exquisite are the objects of comparison, both within and outside the Islamic context: “In terms of architectural splendour it ranks with Jerusalem’s Dome of the Rocks, while in sanctity it is second only to the holy mosques of Mecca and Medina” (T. Carter et al., 2004, p. 86)333. Haase who expands his view beyond the Islamic world, sees the mosque equalled perhaps by the cathedral of St. Peters in Rome or the church of Hagia Sophia in Istanbul (Haase, 2000, p. 218).
Most descriptions, despite naming the place a mosque, begin by mentioning that it has not always been associated to the worship of the one God of Islam, mostly called Allah, but rather preceded the formation of the Muslim tradition by millennia. “The great Umayyad Mosque is the whole religious history of Damascus told in stone” (Keenan, 2000). Itself a document of cultural continuity as well as dynamics and lively encounter of religious traditions (cf. Haase, 2000, p. 218), the site encompasses the history of religions in that it has been “marked by sacred enclosures as far back as the second millennium BC” (Burns, 1999, p. 79). In the continuous succession of religious functions – “it was constructed within the walls of the Roman temple of Jupiter, part of which had previously been used as a Christian church; the Roman temple had, in turn been built on the site of an Aramean temple” (Keenan, 2000, p. 21)334 – special emphasis is given to the transition of the church into its (for the time being) final purpose as the central mosque of the Syrian capital. All authors at some point highlight that in the transitional period the building was shared among Christians and Muslims – a fact used to contradict the alleged violent arrival of Islam and idealised as an historic example of peaceful coexistence of Christianity and Islam under Muslim reign: “a deal was worked out by which the Christians and Muslims shared the sacred space: on entering the basilica by the Christian gate, Muslims turned to the right to pray in their mosque of the companions” (Keenan, 2000, p. 22). But obviously, this coexistence was to be terminated at the time when al-Walid decided to construct his unique architectural legacy, which he commenced according to an account of Ibn al-Faqih cited by Bahnassi, with the following words addressed to the Christian authorities: “We wish to expand our mosque into your church and we will give you another location for your church wherever you desire” (Ibn al-Faqih cited in Bahnassi, 1989).335 Wulzinger reports according to the Arab historian Yahya ibn Yahya that al-Walid finally offered four large churches as a compensation for the relinquishment of the site.

The exact dates of the beginning and completion of al-Walid’s construction are uncertain, a result of contradictory reports by the historic narrators. Despite this fact, all authors of conventional heritage introductions make an obvious effort to provide their readers with precise construction dates. Mawlawi gives us the earliest dating, when he writes that “the great Ommayad Mosque was built (…) in the year 704 A.D. during the prosperous era of the Ommayad empire by Caliph al-Walid ibn Abdul Malik” (Mawlawi, 1997, p. 729). Burns presents the more prevalent opinion that “the work was commissioned in 708 and construction finished in 714-5, the year of al-Walid’s death.” (Burns, 1999) Bahnassi, who strongly supports the start of the project in 708 for which he refers to several historic sources, dates the completion in a later year after al-Walid’s death:

“Al-Walid began the construction project in 86 H. (708 A.D.) according to al-Ilmawi. Further evidence substantiating these dates of construction comes from Qudama Ibn Ja’afar, who died in [2]33 H. (948 A.D.). He stated: In the great mosque is the qibla and beyond the minaret is some writing engraved on a marble slab near the ceiling which states: ‘This is what the Prince of Believers ordered to be build in the year 86 H.’ (Bahnassi, 1989, p. 47)
The completion date given by Bahnassi is 100 H which is one year after the death of al-Walid in 99 H (Bahnassi, 1989, p. 47). A completion of the project by Sulayman, al-Walid’s brother, is also confirmed by Wulzinger and Watzinger who date it between 96 and 99 H (Wulzinger & Watzinger, 1924). The construction process itself is documented, on the one hand in many technical details regarding size and materials and on the other hand in legends and anecdotes which often highlight the simple-mindedness or lack of experience of the Caliph with regard to building constructions.

One anecdote narrates that the Caliph requested the architect to complete the central dome – called the dome of the eagle – of gold instead of brick stones. Wulzinger and Watzinger summarise the report of an unnamed author according to which the master builder contradicted the request of the Caliph and was consequently flogged. After the Caliph had later been presented the weighty golden bricks of immense financial value, he renounced from his ambition and recompensed the master architect for the temporal disgrace experienced (cf. Wulzinger & Watzinger, 1924, p. 130). A variety of legends is given for the recruitment of the construction workers of which between 200 and 12,000 allegedly were sent by the Byzantine Emperor (Wulzinger & Watzinger, 1924; Flood, 2000). Others speak of additional “craftsmen coming not only from the Byzantine Empire but from Persia, India and North Africa as well” (Keenan, 2000, p. 27).

The often-changing fate of the Umayyad Mosque continued after the completion of al-Walid’s project. No less than 5 earthquakes and 6 major fires destroying various parts of the building and its decoration have been documented between 748 and 1893 (cf. Mawlawi, 1997, p. 731). The amount of disasters is so impressive to most authors that they elaborate on the enduring qualities of the building, Bahnassi even dedicates a complete chapter to ‘Catastrophes withstood by the Great Mosque’ (Bahnassi, 1989, p. 77). All authors are in agreement that the complex endured these threats in a surprisingly good condition: “the mosque survived the intervening 1200 years with surprising integrity in spite of successive invasions, Mongol sackings and the ravages of earthquakes and fires” (Burns, 1999, p. 81).

In the final sections of the conventional heritage introductions, individual elements are listed in no particular order. In the guidebooks and architectural descriptions the division is visitor oriented and structures the mosque complex into spatial sub-patterns, such as courtyard or prayer hall and their decorative and architectural elements. Special emphasis is always given to the mosaics of the arcades and the southern façade of the courtyard, which have also been studied at length in monographic works, which document their iconographical sources and interpretations (cf. Finster, 1972; Flood, 2000). The three remaining minarets arranged like a north-pointed triangle at the outer walls of the complex are later additions to the mosque of al-Walid. Burns dates the Western Tower (مئذنة الغربية, mazanat-ul-gharbiye) the youngest, a Mameluke construction of 1488 and the earlier Minaret of Jesus (مئذنة عيسى, mazanat Isa) and of the Bride (مئذنةعروسة, mazanat al-arus) buildings to the mid-thirteenth and late twelfth century (Burns, 1999, p. 83). In fact, all decorative elements of the court-
yard and the surrounding halls and arcades (cf. to illustration 1 of the appendix, which locates the various elements on a ground plan of the mosque) are later additions to the earlier architectural structure. The most prominent sights in the courtyard are nowadays the treasury (الخزنة, kubbat-ul-khaznah or بيت الحائط, bayt-ul-hal) in the north-western corner of the courtyard, an early Abbasid building with mosaics dating back to the 14th century (Burns, 1999, p. 82), and the eastern dome, the Dome of the Clock (الساعة, constructed by al-Fadl ibn Saleh in 780 (Bahnassi, 1989, p. 104). According to Ibn ‘Asakir a third dome, constructed in 979 covered a water fountain in the centre of the courtyard. Bahnassi however notes that the last remains of this structure were removed in the 1960s (Bahnassi, 1989, p. 105) and at present we find a replaced ablution fountain with a wooden roof structure that was constructed in the early 1990s.

In the prayer hall or sanctuary (الحرام, al-haram) objects of interest are the minbar (منبر) – a stair structure, often referred to as a pulpit, from which the sermon of the Friday prayer (خطبة, khutba) is delivered – and the four prayer niches (محراب, maharib, singular: محراب, mihrab) spread along the southern qibla-wall (قبلة), the southern wall of the prayer hall directed towards Mecca. Dating is not provided for these elements but Rihawi lists several internal decorative elements that have to be considered either Seljuk and Mamluk (ar-Rihawi, 1996, p. 34) and solely Bahnassi introduces the attribution of the four maharib to the four Sunni fiqh (فقه, law schools) (Bahnassi, 1989, p. 113).

One last element introduced in the descriptions of the haram is the tomb of the head of prophet Yahya (يحيى النبي), mostly referred to by his Christian name John the Baptist. The location of the alleged burial is “commemorated by the extravagant marble monument to the east of the transept. The monument is late Ottoman, having been constructed in place of a wooden mausoleum destroyed in the fire of 1893.” (Burns, 1999, p. 84). Only one author, Ross Burns, also mentions a second burial place, located in an annex attached to the so-called Mashhad al-Hussayn (مشهد الحسين), the north-eastern hall of the mosque complex. “Legend has it that the head of Husayn was brought here from Karbala and placed in a niche, with the aim of ridiculing Husayn and the supporters of Ali.” (Burns, 1999, p. 83) Instead of this location reference is rather made to a third burial place located outside the outer walls of the mosque complex, the mausoleum of Salah ad-Din Ayyubi (صلاح الدين), Saladin who died in Damascus in 1193. The separate building was “restored with funds made available by Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany who visited Damascus in 1898” (T. Carter et al., 2004, p. 88). It is difficult to define whether this building is an integral part of the here introduced heritage site Umayyad Mosque – there is no obvious historic connection between the two structures – but since the majority of descriptions combine the two, we have to assume an at least perceived connection. It is also shown in the following analysis that two topologies extend to the northern surroundings of the mosque complex.
2 A topological heritage analysis

The above condensed conventional heritage introductions provide readers with manifold historical details, architectural descriptions as well as functional explication of elements of the mosque complex. However, I reproach the authors for not disclosing and often probably not being aware of the significance the Umayyad Mosque has for many of its visitors and value-givers; supposedly for all those who are not themselves historians, architects and art historians. The age of the stones and the name of the founder might help to understand the historical setting of the physical place. Understanding of the conceptual place Umayyad Mosque and its identity-creating concept, its narratives of faith and self and its signs and symbols of social signification require a different approach to be captured in writing. These aspects – I believe – document the Umayyad Mosque’s individual, outstanding and universal values in that they in their combination are the source of identity formation. The narratives, most of which can neither solely be localised in or related to intangible, nor to tangible elements, construct the heritage Umayyad Mosque. And only the knowledge of the various logoi, the deriving meaning-giving processes and construction cycles and their taking place in heritage, facilitate an informed management of the narratives and the identities that dwell in these heritage topologies.

The following subchapters introduce thirteen topologies, thirteen individual themes, that construct the heritage concept Umayyad Mosque and which have been identified on the bases of empirical studies. The empirical investigations comprised direct and participant observation in the mosque complex, as well as qualitative semi-structured and narrative interviews with visitors to the place and other individuals who suggested some kind of relation to the Umayyad Mosque. The selection of interview partners unfortunately was unintentionally, but unavoidably focussed on a female perspective of the Umayyad Mosque, mainly a result of the gender separation in the Muslim society and the difficulties I encountered in trying to interview Muslim male visitors. Among the non-Muslim groups questioned this gender bias is negligible. The findings were recorded as field notes and interview transcripts and were continuously interpreted and grouped according to common themes, drawing inspiration from the methods of phenomenology and semiology. The reduction and construction strategies promoted by phenomenological method assisted the creative identification of topologies. Empirical investigations explicitly aimed to delocalise the place and seek its narratives and mental representations, presented according to themes. The process required to achieve this is similar to what Smith frames as the ritualisation of place, which I understand according to his description as the shifting of intentionality from physical place towards conceptual rootedness. He describes this process in the context of pilgrimages:

“In each case the individual is asked first to ‘call to mind the narrative’ (…) and second, to make a ‘mental representation of the place’. Here all has been transferred to inner space. All
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that remains (...) is an image, the narrative and a temporal sequence.” (J. Z. Smith, 1987, p. 117)

It is important that we, from this point onwards, disassociate ourselves from the classical perception of the Umayyad Mosque as a building or architectural complex located in the centre of the historic city of Damascus, as it was described in the conventional heritage analysis above. For the purpose of our topological analysis ‘Umayyad Mosque’ remains purely an abstract concept, a compilation of themes, ideas and thoughts that constitute the significance of the concept. If we nevertheless associate nothing but the historic stone walls and their decorative elements, this only proves that we have been successfully trapped by the conventional heritage descriptions. But there is much more to value and discover in the concept Umayyad Mosque, as a large variety of users and value-givers was willing to convey for this analysis.

Being trapped by conventional descriptions however shall not be understood to mean that my interview partners, who primarily valued their concepts ‘Umayyad Mosque’ for entirely different reasons than the physical building structure, did not at the same time appreciate its architectural features. On the contrary much appreciation was expressed in many of the interviews, for example by Zuhaira who moved to the nearby quarter of ‘Imara a few years ago: “So when I went to the place I was just overwhelmed by the building. There was so much light. I remember it was Zuhr (ظهِر) time and it was a bright day and I was expecting something smaller.”348 The various expressions of being impressed, astounded or overwhelmed by the architecture hardly relate to its age or historical embedding but to what was often called a special atmosphere or its vast openness. For Samira it is one of her favourite spots in Damascus for “with the light and the wind and the glittering mosaics and the silence, there is just this very special atmosphere I can hardly describe, but it makes me shiver whenever I enter the courtyard.”349 The special atmosphere will reappear in many of the thirteen selected topologies presented below. These thirteen however are not a complete representation but could be expanded to many further topologies such as ‘classroom – religious law and conduct’, ‘aid prayers’, ‘tarawih (تراویح) and lailat-ul-qadr’ (ليلة القدر).

For the purpose of presenting the general opportunities of applying the concept of topologies to heritage studies, I have limited the following descriptions to topologies which largely avoid repetitious elements, and I have – with the exception of 2.10 “Grab your food first – ramadan charity” – refrained from presenting topologies that are restricted to particular times of the year or holidays. Since most topologies are individual constructions, which are not dependant on each other I have not tried to interconnect them or to describe shared elements. Each topology will be approached as an unbiased new theme – as far as the reduction of bias is possible for any researcher – that contributes to the overall concept: Umayyad Mosque.

Each description of a topology commences with a narrative, a re-narration of a heritage story. These narratives, printed in Italics, are not exactly interview quotations but are strongly inspired by conversations I had, interviews I conducted and in a few
cases complemented by books and articles I read. They are my words, but pretend to speak as somebody else who is participating in the respective heritage topology. These narratives are my attempt to represent what I considered the initial concepts, the logoi, the themes and the identity foundations of the heritage construction. They represent what I understood and thought my informants were trying to convey. I have often represented female voices in these re-narrations, which is yet another result of my predominantly female interview partners. At the same time – of course – I have also personally experienced the Umayyad Mosque from a female perspective and my participation in several of the topologies was strongly determined by my own gender role. It therefore requires much more speculation and personal input from my side, to re-narrate an imaginative male speaker.

In addition to my re-narrations, which may perhaps fail to convey the underlying ideas, conventional academic descriptions follow, which will introduce into the individual topologies in probably more familiar ways. And the citations included in these parts are like everywhere else in my writings, purely the words of my interviewees or writings by the authors quoted.

### 2.1 Faith and duty – performance of prayers

*Every morning, I wake up when the first recitations start, even before the azan. The whole city is silent, just the word of Allah spreads out from the minaret of the bride. Since my husband died two years ago, I have to encourage myself to leave my cozy bed, dress and conduct my ablutions. It is just a two minute walk to the mosque, because all streets are empty and often I am among the first arriving. But it never takes long until the other women follow. This is so special about the Umayyad Mosque, that we always have a real row of women, not just one or two in a side chamber, but we are many, shoulder to shoulder, even at fadjr time. And there, we are really part of the prayer, we can see the men, see the imam, we are in the same place, physically and spiritually. We take part. This is how it should be according to the tradition of our prophet – may Allah bless him and grant him peace. We are welcome to the lecture afterwards and when I still went with my husband, it was me insisting that we stayed. I am always sad when I cannot go, because for me the Umayyad Mosque is the best start of the day, and when I return home, our neighbour’s bakery is already open and I get warm bread, prepare breakfast and then wake my two daughters and we have breakfast before they go to school and university. I love to pray there, because I feel I am part of something that is much stronger and greater than myself. I feel part of the community in Allah, that is what we call our Umma and I can feel its continuity. But I only go in the morning. During daytime the Umayyad Mosque is entirely different. But for the hour between fadjr and sunrise it is my home, my source of strength and faith for the day that follows. It is the place where I feel close to Allah and where he looks at me – I think – in his infinite kindness.*

Without having conducted any kind of quantitative analysis of visitor numbers and purposes, I dare to say that the topology I have called ‘faith and duty – performance of prayers’ is the most dominant theme associated with the concept Umayyad Mosque. It is at the same time the most difficult theme to localise since it constitutes itself in a variety of expressions. In this topology, the concept Umayyad Mosque is
certainly not a physical place, but a complex assistant and facilitator of one of the duties of faith in Allah, the performance of the obligatory and voluntary ritual prayers. With this facilitation the concept Umayyad Mosque actively contributes to the performance of individual faith and becomes part of individual religious identity. And indeed, the mosque a Muslim usually prays in is one of the conceptual centres of his life. It determines not only the social contacts and networks established therein but often also the interpretations of faith and religious law followed. It is an important anchor of group identity.

Facilitation of prayers reaches from aspects like being a reminder of this duty to the ritual preparation, guidance of prayer, to the provision of a gathering place. The performance of prayers in this sense starts with the announcement of the prayer time by the muezzin (مُؤذن) who performs the azan (أذان), the call for prayer. I was surprised to learn that for many people living in the centre of Damascus, the azan is probably the most important aspect of the Umayyad Mosque. It is a steady reminder five times a day, chanted at a volume which reaches far beyond the boundaries of the ancient city. With such scope the physical localisation of the reminder of prayers equals the range of sound wave propagation unless the call becomes inaudible. This implies that an apparently insignificant reduction of volume in sound transmission could exclude participants of the topology who live at the outer edges of the historic city or extra muros. So does Iman, who lives in ‘Aiba, and who, because she prefers to pray at Djama’a at-tawba only visits the Umayyad Mosque about twice or three times a year. She explains:

“My days are structured by the calls for prayer and I always follow the one of the masdjid bani umaya. I often wake up from the recitations before the fadjr call, sometimes before my alarm clock rings, and in ramadan I break my fast according the bani umaya call, it’s on the TV, you know?”

Zuhaira, too, adds: “because we live so close, we can hear the azan from the Djama’a al-Umawi and for us this azan is full of tradition.” The azan of the Umayyad Mosque is indeed easily recognizable as it is different from any other azan in Syria and probably the whole Islamic world, in that it is a polyphonic chanting of the praises of Allah and the invitation to prayer. Keenan reports on the long-standing tradition of this polyphonic call: “According to Ibn Battuta (...) there were seventy muezzins to chant the call for prayer (to this day, the call for prayer from the Umayyad mosque is a harmony of several voices together).” (Keenan, 2000, p. 27) The Syrian tour guide of an English-speaking group explained that at present “at least four muezzins perform the call together. Each of them follows one of the four law schools that are represented in this mosque, like in the four prayer niches as I have explained earlier.” Observations conducted in the western section of the prayer hall from which the room of the muezzin is visible, confirm that – except for the morning call to fadjr prayer – a minimum of 5 men call for prayer. One of them acts as a precentor while the others echo the call performed.
Those who follow the call and its invitation “(...) gather for the prayer, gather for salvation (...)”356 within the following twenty minutes357 come to the prayer hall of the Umayyad Mosque consciously aware of their purpose: the communal performances of the obligatory prayers. Although this purpose was very often expressed in my interviews in the way that Ahmad said: “Why I go there? To pray of course, why else should I go there at four o’clock in the morning?”358 Muslim ritual prayers are not restricted to one particular place. There are hundreds of mosques in the centre of Damascus and about a couple of dozen in walking distance of the Umayyad Mosque, a fact, which encourages questioning why people come specifically to pray there.

Most responses to this question are identical to the responses I received in asking the same question to visitors of other mosques359. Reasons usually are the close location and convenient walk from the visitor’s house, shop or office, the appreciation of the imam and often in particular his voice during recitation, the social relationships with other visitors of that mosque and the mere habit of meeting them daily or even the traditional tie of the family with that mosque. But some, primarily my female interview partners expressed reasons more particularly related to the Umayyad Mosque, supported by three of their husbands, I was able to talk to in the framework of such interviews. Mahmud, the husband of ‘Aisha, for example confirmed: “I go to the Masdjid al-Umawi, because ‘Aisha wants to go there and there is no other place I could take her for salat-ul-sabah [صلاة الصباح, morning prayer]. If she does not join me, I sometimes also pray in masdjid al-qaimariya [مسجد القمارية, Mosque in Qaimariya Street] or in ramadan I like to go to Djama’a al-Iman [جامع الأمان, Congregational Mosque of Faith], which is the one of al-Buti.” ‘Aisha explains to me in detail why she prefers to visit the Umayyad Mosque and in that explication echoes many other female voices I heard, though in sometimes less articulate manner:

“Yes, many other mosques do have areas for women, but few of them have women coming for morning prayers. I often joined Mahmoud to other places before we moved here, just to be sitting in a dark and small room on my own. Once, in a small mosque in Salihiyeh, I can’t remember the name, they even did not turn on the loudspeakers and I missed the prayer because I didn’t hear the imam. There [in the Umayyad Mosque] I am much more part of the prayer, which is probably due to how it is set up and that we sit in the same place as the men. I mean, of course there is some separation and we are not supposed to go to the front, but we sit in the same room. And I find that better than to separate men and women into two separate rooms. In a separate room you are not really part of the prayer, perhaps spiritually but not physically. But for me to first engage in the physical enables the spiritual too. So, for me it is important to be part of the prayer and I feel my prayer there is more valuable, spiritually. And even if one day no other woman would come, I am still part of a congregational prayer and not sitting in a little basement room alone.”360

Several other women expressed the same appreciation for being part of the communal prayer and named this as one of the reasons why they wanted to go to the Umayyad Mosque. A female visitor from Iraq who I briefly talked to during her visit to the mosque361 probably offered the most enthusiastic comment: “You know, I feel so moved. It is like we are standing in the row immediately behind the men. This feels like being in Mecca – I have never experienced being so much part of the prayers
outside Mecca.” Su’ad, an English national studying Sharia in Damascus explained why the Umayyad Mosque represents religious authenticity to her:

“In the time of our prophet – salla Allahu alayhi wa salam [صلى الله عليه وسلم], blessing for the prophet] – women were not excluded from the mosques like today. Today as a woman it is difficult to be part of the worship if you are constrained to a covered back corner of the room, and I think that many of the small mosques that refuse women to enter because they do not have separate places for them, are against the idea of Islam. In the prophet’s time, men prayed in the front and women in the back and that is what I still find in the Umayyad Mosque.”

In the context of these female priorities for prayer in the Umayyad Mosque one could conclude that a particular topos of the female topology ‘faith and duty – performance of prayer’ is conditioned by vicinity and visibility of the men’s congregation and localised in this very proximity. But also for the men gathered the logos and topos are by no means determined by the architectural structures.

The logos, the initiating principle, could be framed as the desire to find proximity to Allah as part of a congregation of faithful. As an act of communication between the individual as member of the group and the divine, the topos of prayer is according to the participants descriptions located in the heart and mind of the individual as well as in the solidarity and equality of the community gathered.

If taking a more spatial perspective – the logos is localised in the rows that the faithful create in parallel lines to the qibla wall. Mahmoud describes this rootedness of prayer: “when my shoulders touch the shoulders of the men right and left of me and I hear the voice of the imam and I fold my hands in front of my chest, then I have found the place and peace I need for prayer. But this does not need the Umayyad Mosque; it could be in the centre of the roundabout at Umayyeen Square or anywhere else.”

But it seems that in the Umayyad Mosque more people gather than in other places and somehow the size of the group performing the standardised pattern of the ritual prayer also contributes to the overall experience. During the prayer the individual’s localisation is once again determined by sound – the imam’s recitation – and the human body, which is not only part of a row but also describes three horizontal levels in standing, bowing and prostrating on the floor. The topos is the synchronic movement of human bodies, and therefore lies in the gathered bodies participating. It symbolises mutual equality of the faithful and gradual submission to Allah and can neither spatially nor contextually be separated from these ideas.

The particular spot where participants line up to pray is often decided spontaneously and is rarely influenced by the maharib attributed to the four law schools. Some of my interview partners told me of men who would exclusively pray in front of their’ mihrab, for example Samira who mentioned: “And people gather in front of their mihrabs for the prayers. My teacher for example is Maliki [ المالكي] and he always gathers at this mihrab at the eastern end”. The majority of my interview partners however explicitly distanced themselves from such an orientation. ‘Aisha responded to my question regarding the maharib: “No, I don’t care about the fiqh schools of the mi-
hrabs, I mainly pray in the back or close to the fountain.” Like ‘Aisha, many have
their preferred spots in the prayer hall which they direct themselves to after entering
the mosque for especially the individual prayers. Samira prefers the little women
maqṣūra (مقصورة, enclosure) at the eastern end of the prayer hall and Mahmoud tries
to occupy a place to the immediate right of the minbar. But when the imam chants
the iqamat-ul-salat [إقامة الصلاة, the second call just before the commencing of the
congregational prayer] everybody takes the next available place in the row, regardless
of its location. (cf. illustrations 2 and 3)

A special occasion to visit the Umayyad Mosque is the weekly djuma’a prayer (صلاة
الجمعة) on Friday noon. Zahir explains that his adherence to the sunna [سنة, tradition] of the prophet leads him there every Friday:

“Yes, I go every Friday. It is the central mosque and therefore it is the purpose of that place
to bring people together for djuma’a. And in Muhammad’s tradition the central mosque only
is the place you would go. The Friday prayers were traditionally gathered at the central
mosque of the city. So I can’t pray my djuma’a anywhere else apart from the Umayyad
Mosque.”

Women again join to this destination, which is one of the very few mosques allowing
women to enter for djuma’a prayer and according to my knowledge the only Sunni
mosque inside the ancient city walls open to female attendants. However, the
gathered female group of those coming here for lack of other opportunities to pray
djuma’a and those merely accompanying their husbands for whom the prayer is con-
sidered obligatory, was described as very annoying by some of my interview partners.
Su’ad indignantly describes the situation: “When I go for djuma’a prayer, I get quite
annoyed at the people, especially the women and the noise they make. I really won-
der why they go there, just to talk to the women next to them or to listen to the
khutba? I don’t know, I think if they just want to have a chat they should better stay
at home.” Zahir confirmed that he, too – and many others he claims to know – is
infuriated about the noise and especially the children shrieking in the women’s sec-
tion. His suggestion for improving the situation is however to “not allow women to
enter for djuma’a prayer. They can stay in the courtyard or maybe in the mashhad
where the other tarawih prayer takes place [which is mashhad al-Hussayn].”

Such complaints are not limited to the Friday prayers. Iman does not like to pray in
the Umayyad Mosque at all because for her it is too crowded, restless and noisy: “I
find it really hard to concentrate when there are kids running across in front of you
and there are many people walking next to you and they talk or just say hello and I
do find it very hard to pray, even in ramadan, when I mainly went there.”

The enormous disturbance caused to some visitors as a result of women talk and
children’s clamour, once more emphasizes the internal localisation of the prayers that
requires silence to dwell in the sound of recitation and to internalise purpose and
performance. In this sense, the Umayyad Mosque is not a location or site for the
topology ‘faith and duty – performance of prayers’, but first of all a facilitator. In this
context the architectural complex is merely an interchangeable setting, although, Tareq, a student of architecture, might be correct in insisting that: “an architecture like that of the Umayyad Mosque which makes you feel humble, strongly supports the spiritual atmosphere required for prayer.”

2.2 Be blessed – visiting the prophets

“Yes, there he is our prophet Yahya, peace be with him. How amazing to be here. Come closer, you have to touch the metal bars and the marble columns. Rub them or better kiss them and ask for his blessings and wish him peace. And do not forget to recite al-fatihah for him, at least once, but better four times, from all the four sides of the shrine. He will certainly be your intercessor on the day of judgement. Now you have the chance to show him respect and kiss his tomb. Did you make an invocation? You have to, this place is so blessed. Can’t you feel its power? Can’t you feel how it draws you? Formulate your wishes in this blessed atmosphere and seek Allah’s mercy. Take as much baraka as you can get. Do you see? I brought this image of my son and two-hundred liras. I will insert them into the slot here and because of my alms Yahya will notice my son and he will be blessed also. And I brought candies, would you mind helping me to distribute them, to share the baraka with the others? And – just wait a second – could you take a photograph of me in front of Yahya’s shrine?

Another purpose of visiting the mosque in the context of Muslim faith constructs a topology, which can be spatially defined in more precision – ‘be blessed – visiting the prophets’. The phrase ‘prophets’ in this case refers to an-nabi Yahya [نبي يحيى, the prophet John], an-nabi Hud [نبي هوود, the prophet Enoch] and al-Khidr [الخضر, the green man] although not all Muslims consider the last a prophet. The places of these three men, in the tradition of Islam referred to as makan [مكان, plural amkina – the place(s) of presence] are travelled to and visited to receive Allah’s blessing through the individuals he had granted a special position during their lifetimes. In popular Sunni belief and in Tasawwuf (التصوف) and Shi’i Islamic tradition, tombs of important people of religious history such as prophets, ahl-il-bayt [أهله البيت, members of the family of prophet Muhammad] and for the Sunni also al-sahaba [الصحابه, companions of the prophet Muhammad] or in addition former shuyukh [شيوخ, which is the title of the master of a Sufi order], contain baraka [بركة]. Baraka is considered a blessing or even sanctification, which is transmitted by physical proximity to such places or persons, in the best case by touching them. “(...) il est porteur de baraka. On se rend en pèlerinage auprès de lui pour en recueillir la baraka” (Mayeur-Jaouen, 2000, p. 147). This belief was emphatically supported by some of my interview partners, ‘Aisha for example, who professed: “I believe that Allah - subhanahu wa ta’ala [صلى الله عليه وسلم, praised and exhausted is he] – puts baraka in certain places, and in certain people. I have no doubt in this. I have very strongly experienced this in several places.”

Such belief is not without contradiction and many Islamic scholars would probably consider it if not heretic then at least misguided. They base their arguments on a hadith collected by al-Bukhari, which quotes Muhammad:
“The Prophet (...) raised his head and said ‘Those are the people who, whenever a pious man dies amongst them, they make a place of worship at his grave (...). Those are the worst creatures in the sight of Allah.’” (al-Bukhari, 1979, vol. 3, p. 238)

According to many scholars graves are rather the opposite of depositories of Allah’s blessing: they are highly impure. Traditions explicitly prohibit performing prayers next to tombs or at graveyards (Ibn Maga, [Kitab al-Djanaiz, Bab lxix, No. 425] vol. 3, p. 238) and some scholars even advise better not to visit graves at all (cf. Tan, 1997, p. 10). Despite such orthodox interpretations, a very lively tomb-visiting cult is observable in the Muslim tradition, not solely at Yahya’s mausoleum in the Umayyad mosque but at many other graves of prophets, and the combination of three amkina makes the Umayyad Mosque very attractive for such visits.

While Yahya – or at least his head – is supposed to be buried inside the mosque, the other two, Hud and al-Khidr merely visited the location and according to popular belief during their presence left baraka behind and are still associated with the particular places. None of the three traditions is confirmed and the alleged burial place of Yahya has never been investigated for archaeological evidence – probably in order to not cause embarrassment for many in case of lack of such. Ja’far, who works in a shop situated very close to the Umayyad Mosque comments that “it does not really matter whether the head is there or not. People believe and trust it is there and that the place contains baraka. It is their faith, which will guide them and if they feel something, why should somebody destroy this experience by scientifically disproving the particular location.”

In contrast to the traditions which relate Hud and al-Khidr to the place, the burial of the head of prophet Yahya is amply documented by early historians and was acknowledged before the initial completion of the mosque. One of the most vivid descriptions is the discovery of the reliquary of St. John as narrated by Abd al-Basid and Ya’qubi (cf.Wulzinger & Watzinger, 1924, p. 152) which Keenan provides in translated excerpts and which is at present the most widespread oral tradition related to the tomb of Yahya. No less than four of my interview partners recounted slightly varying versions of this discovery narrative:

“The Prophet (...) raised his head and said ‘Those are the people who, whenever a pious man dies amongst them, they make a place of worship at his grave (...). Those are the worst creatures in the sight of Allah.’” (al-Bukhari, 1979, vol. 3, p. 238)

“During the construction of the mosque, according to Ya’qubi, workmen found a case in the foundations and called for al-Walid to come and see. By night the Khalif descended thereinto and, behold it was a beautiful chapel … and within lay a chest, inside of which was a basket, on which was written: “This is the head, of the son of Zacharias.” Al-Walid ordered the basket to be buried under one of the pillars. Ya’qubi finishes with a nice gruesome touch: ‘At the time the head was laid here Zaid (the overseer) stated that he saw the same and that the hair and flesh thereon had nowise suffered decay.’” (Keenan, 2000, p. 27)

The very location of this pillar is nowadays commemorated by the construction described as an extravagant marble monument earlier (cf. Burns, 1999, p. 84). Brass barred green glass windows offer a view on a sarcophagus covered with textiles and surrounded by a collection of liturgical objects and donations collected on the floor. Visitors touch and rub the brass bars (cf. to illustration 4 in the appendix) and con-
secutively wipe the collected baraka onto their faces, chests and bodies. Many recite do’a (دعاء) oriented towards the grave; others circumambulate the shrine and recite blessings for the prophet. Su’ad summarised her feelings towards the makan: “For me the area around the makan of Saidna Yahya is very special and I like to sit there and I know this place is very special and it extends to the whole mosque. My heart feels his presence.”

Every morning a group of followers of a Tasawwuf tariqa (طريقة) gather next to the shrine for ritual recitation and supplication. The wife of one of the leaders assured me in a brief talk one morning, that this group gathers in the Umayyad Mosque in order to visit Yahya and that they drive there from all parts of the city, in her case from Shaikh Muhi-d-din (شیخ محي الدين). During the afternoon hours old men, so-called wali (ولى, blessed men) sit next to it and are frequented for clarification of religious questions and recital of invocations.

Very close to the mausoleum of the prophet Yahya are both other amkina, in each case indicated by inscriptions in the qibla-wall. Contrary to the early traces of the narratives of the tomb of Yahya, the association of Hud and al-Khidr to the place has no historical evidence before late Ottoman time and the inscriptions seem to have been inserted only during the reconstruction after the devastating fire in 1893.

While Yahya’s tomb is a popular destination, very few of my interviewees knew about the makan of Hud or al-Khidr. Those who knew however, where convinced of their baraka and their spiritual importance. ‘Aisha explained to me that to the west of the tomb of Yahya “it is the makan of al-Khidr, the green man. There is a sign on the wall saying that he passed by there.” She elaborated that places of his presence are of importance because he never died and there is no tomb that one could visit:

“He is not buried because he is still alive. Ilyas, Isa and al-Khidr, these three prophets, Allah – salla wa tala’a – took them to the heavens, so they are still around us and they are not like our prophet Muhammad. He died but these three prophets did not go through the feeling of death. I believe that they are still attached to the places they have been to during their earthly life and visiting their places we can still feel their presence.”

Ja’far summarised the oral traditions of al-Khidr and Hud. According to him, visitors in the 19th century saw an old man sitting at a particular spot in the Umayyad Mosque who had immense knowledge, inspiration and mystical abilities. They referred to him as al-Khidr and after his disappearance the persuasive power of the legend grew steadily and eventually, an inscription was inserted in the reconstructed wall. Also the association with Hud according to Ja’far is “an ottoman invention. They thought that because the mosque had already been a temple in Aramaic times, and that was the time of nabi Hud, it is likely that he would have also prayed in the temple. It is confirmed that he lived in Damascus.” During my observations however, I saw very few individuals who sojourned at the makan of Hud to make a do’a or pronounce a blessing. I therefore concluded that Hud is either the least popular of the three prophets or that his makan is considered the least credible. The three amkina are in a very restricted area of the haram, all located in the southernmost nave along the qibla
wall, to the east and west of the mihrab of the companions of the prophet or in the case of Yahya around the columns located behind the mihrab. The topos of this topology can be exactly localised in the shrine and the two inscriptions as well as their immediate surroundings. At the same time these topoi are not the complete localisation. The taking-place of the topology also encompasses the connection of these places to the divine, which can be imagined as an infinite vertical extension of the described physical locations. ‘Be blessed – visiting the prophets’ is a topology, which ideally illustrates an inseparable link of narratives of faith and a particular location created by these narratives. Without the narratives and the values, hopes and aspirations constructed thereby, the amkina would be non-existent. Both shrine and the inscriptions become meaningless if deprived of the trust in the prophet’s presence and their baraka, whether through loss of the legends or continuous orthodox interventions against popular faith. The logos or perpetuating principle can therefore be described as the desire to affiliate with the presence of individuals blessed by Allah and the trust that baraka can be derived from the places of their presence.

The Umayyad Mosque houses three additional amkina of historical figures who lived after the time of the prophet Muhammad and can therefore not be regarded as prophets. One of these amkina, another shrine supposed to house the head of Hussayn, the grandson of the last prophet, will be considered in the following subchapter. The other two shall be mentioned here, although I was not able to observe any particular visitor attention towards these places. The first of the two remaining amkina is the room where the great theologian and philosopher al-Ghazali is said to have spent years of seclusion – supposed to be located in either a first floor chamber in the minaret of Qayt Bay or a ground floor chamber in the north-western corner (as indicated in illustration 1). Although both are not open to the public and no traces of al-Ghazali (الغزالي) are visible in the mosque, official guides to the mosque include this information in their tours. Su’ad remembers her guided tour through the mosque: “He told us about al-Ghazali, the great Sufi and accomplished scholar of the 12th century and the room in the mosque that he used to study in. I asked if we could see this room but he said it is mamnu’a [ممنوع, prohibited] and that we would need to get a permission to visit it.”385 The second place to be mentioned is a prayer niche in which Sa’id al-Abideen (سید العابدين) is supposed to have prayed. It is located in the eastern mashhad al-Hussayn where it is utterly overshadowed by the manifold activities related to the neighbouring shrine of Imam al-Hussayn ibn Ali (امام الحسين ابن علي ابن طالب). Panels with supplication prayers dedicated to Hussayn, which are fixed to the wooden structure of the niche, seem to even physically underline this fact.

2.3 Imam al-Hussayn – mourning and aspiration

This place bears dreadful history and I am relieved to leave it again. I am still shaken to the core and I have cried, wept, both at his tomb and before while being reminded of his suffering. Ya Imam al-Hussayn, son of Imam Ali Abu Talib and Fatimah az-Zubair, legitimate successor of our
prophet Muhammad, carrier of the secrets of the Qur'an and greatest martyr of all times, how much did you suffer? When I entered the mosque, I could still see your head pierced on a spear and I could hear the bani umaya cursing you and your family, the holy abl-ul bayt; if they only knew who you are. How can they have been so misguided, so destructive, so cruel? For me, this mosque is a symbol of the power of Shaytan, a symbol of the cutting of a branch of the tree of Islam that could have blossomed, a symbol of ripping the last finger off my hand. Ya Hussayn, heart of the believers, o could I be among your companions.

While some visitors come to see the shrine of Yahya, the dominant stream of pilgrims is directed towards a small mausoleum at the eastern edge of the mosque, located in an annex to the eastern arcades of the courtyard: the shrine of imam al-Hussayn. Unfortunately this site, special primarily to Shi'a Muslims, symbolises one of the most tragic moments in Islamic history, the exhibition of the defeat of imam al-Hussayn and his companions at Karbala and the cursing and disgracing of their, or rather part of their, dead bodies, which took place in the Umayyad Mosque. The number of Iranian pilgrims to Damascus is steadily increasing, “some estimates exceed a million a year” (Slackman, 2006), and there are also Shi'i groups from Iraq and the Gulf States. Only five years ago Keenan spoke of far less Shi'i visitors, which she observed from a Western outsider perspective:

“These days, Damascus receives between one and two hundred thousand Iranian pilgrims each year on a different mission. Mostly women, they bustle through the narrow lanes of the old city in their all enveloping chadors to visit (…) the sanctuary of Hussein (…) at the Umayyad Mosque.” (Keenan, 2000, p. 21)

The Shi'i pilgrims arriving would not refer to their coming as pilgrimage but as ziyara (زیارة), a visit to honour the visited. “The main purpose of our visit is to honour the deceased” explains Ali from Hamadan in Iran. And indeed the entire visit is a ritual perambulation towards the destination, the shrine of imam al-Hussayn. But the ziyara is much more than a visit of a shrine. It is a time-travel back to the darkest moments of Muslim history and these very moments, are commemorated with grief, mentally re-enacted and re-experienced through wailing chants and ritual self-beating, especially of chests and shoulders. Hassan from Bahrain explains: “It is because we cannot do anything, we wish to be among the companions and fight, but the only thing we can be part of nowadays is the suffering. So we want to be in the battle of Karbala by being part of the suffering and the desperation of that moment.” Zainab from Hamadan in Iran confirms that even women share this perception: “This place is a very sad place. We are here to honour imam al-Hussayn. We memorise his martyrdom and the battle of Karbala. He was killed there by the Caliph Yazid and he suffered a lot. (…) We try to feel that and we feel his suffering.” Another old woman of an Iranian group from Tehran, not able to express her feelings in words, gestured her response, which Silvana Becher – a student of Law and Middle Eastern Studies who helped me conducting interviews in Persian – described as: “she indicated streams with her spread fingers on her cheeks and parallel to that pulled down her lower eyelids, shook her head and finally lowered her head”.

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Preceding the visit of the shrine, the visitor groups commemorate the events of Karbala by re-narrating the story, often in melodic chants recited by specially trained reciters or theologians. A female English-speaking visitor, who I encountered at the nearby shrine of Saida Ruqiyya, passed me a leaflet, which contains a translation of part of the narrative recited to commemorate the events:

“[It was] during the reign of the ruler Yazid, son of Mu’awiya, who was infamous and very well known of his moral decay, low-lived dishonesty and sinful lifeway, besides cruelty against those who were of such nobility as to not conceal their deny and disapproval of his misdeeds, offence and oppression which he was ever committing. And he worked at, to torture them ruthlessly and extinguish them. Since his first days of reign, and knowing implicitly that Imam Al-Hussain was the rightful Caliph (successor of the prophet) as notified by the prophet himself, his major concern was to get rid of Imam al-Hussain (...). After giving Imam al-Hussain and his followers a lot of trouble in Mecca, they were forced to make for a faraway place in Iraq, called Kerbala, where on the tenth of Muharram AH 61 / AD 680, and after a siege for three days in severe conditions, deprived of water completely in the hot desert, Imam al-Hussain with seventy-two of his most faithful followers who never wanted to abandon him, were driven to confront death and forced to battle against Yazid’s army of about thirty thousand well-quipped men. (...) Yazid’s men then savagely cut off the heads of the martyrs, mounted them on spears and took captive the women and ladies that were in accompany with Imam al-Hussein and his followers (...)” (Mosque of Sa’ida Roqal’ya, 2004)

This sad procession of deprived head towards Damascus, the centre of power of the Umayyad dynasty and the capital of Yazid or more precisely, towards the Umayyad Mosque or the structure in its place by that time, the symbolic centre of the empire, where the heads were exhibited on piles. Later on – according to the narratives – the head of Hussayn was kept in a niche in the wall of the side-hall nowadays called mashhad al-Hussayn. This niche, now richly decorated in silver is still visible and enables visitors to physically participate in the historic events by placing their heads into the niche (cf. to illustration 6), which everybody tries to do for a few moments prior to entering the shrine.

The shrine, located at the backside of the wall of the niche is venerated by recitation of invocations, prayers and blessings for Hussayn (cf. to illustration 7), but also by rubbing – with hands, clothes and other brought items – and kissing the brass ornaments. Visitors – almost without exception – cry, bemoan and wail over their imam (cf. to illustration 5), and the atmosphere produced by this intense expression of mourning and distress is indeed very special, even to visitors not participating in the construction of this topology. For those participating however, it is the moment in which past and present desperation about Hussayn’s death and joy about his presence merge in a transcendental participation in history of faith. In the terms introduced in this work it means that logos – self abandonment for Imam al-Hussayn – and topos – spatially the Umayyad Mosque in 680 AD, bodily the pain and suffering of the battle of Karbala – merge into a heritage topology that bridges a mere twelve hundred years and enables visitors to encounter martyrs and their mourning families.

And somehow, unfortunately, aspects of the historic tragedy are transferred into the present or at least, the mutual sharing of the Mosque complex between the predomin-
nantly Sunni Syrian visitors and the primarily Shi‘i Iranian pilgrims poses some challenges. As long as the Shi‘i groups remain in the mashhad al-Hussayn and the shrine, everybody is pleased with these visitors who bring economic benefit to the historic centre. But these spaces are too small and at many times of the day – especially during the morning and noon hours – the groups have to move into the haram to find adequate seating space for the recitation of the narratives of Karbala. And this they do with between twenty-five and sixty people, a reciter with a microphone and two potable loudspeakers. Both the recitation and the noisy wailing and rhythmic beating onto chests and shoulders are factors of disturbance to other visitors who desire silence for reflection or prayer. This situation becomes particularly sensitive when the recitations performed, collide with the times of the congregational prayers conducted in the haram, but it seems that arrangements have been found between the mosque administration and many of the Iranian group guides in order to avoid such incidents.391 (cf. illustrations 8 and 9)

Apart from the noise, the intense wailing often causes bewilderment among the other visitors, who are not able to relate to the feelings experienced. Samira392 articulated her uneasiness in the presence of the Shi‘i groups: “

“I don’t know how I feel when I find somebody crying next to a grave. I simply can’t understand why they feel like that. What makes them cry like that over somebody they have never met? (…) I do not know if I am lacking something for not feeling the same way, but I just cannot reach that point. And especially at Hussayn in the Umayyad Mosque, people get really, really weird. I would be interested to talk to them and ask: What do you feel? And why do you cry like that? It does not really disturb me but I feel very uncomfortable because I feel maybe I am lacking something, lacking love for not being able to feel the same way.”

A comparable uneasiness combined even with subtle fear was expressed by many Western visitors who observed the Shi‘i groups in their ritual action. Perhaps Martin has best summarised the elements and concerns of this subtle fear:

“I always thought I am open and I respect everything but there is something that persistently bothers me, yes, I want to say distresses me: this intense wailing of this group. With the pre-wailer who again and again incited and pushed the sentiments and they cried and somehow – I felt that was really uncanny. This mass of emotion really scared me.”393

Subtle fear and lack of understanding can easily generate further conflicts. And the current situation of careful separation between the Iranian and other visitors, which results in factually no communication or meaningful interaction between the different groups, is perhaps further contributing to a slow and steady construction of distrust and separation. Asked whether he thinks that others might find their wailing scary, Hassan responds: “Scary, no, but maybe sad. In Turkey somebody said to me that he feels sorry for us, because it must be very difficult to cry so often, when we do our ziyarat.” He continued to explain that the other person had the impression, they would cry because it belonged to the ritual and so everybody would force him or herself to shed tears. For Hassan, this is an outsider’s misconception: “I don’t cry because of a ritual or group pressure or whatever. I don’t need to cry, if I don’t feel
like. But once I come close to a tomb of ahl-ul-bayt, I am forced to mourn. It is my faith, my heart that cries out of me, as if my heart wants to burst.” This feeling however seems difficult to convey to others, and perhaps especially because it is so difficult to convey, the current situation cries out for better communication.

2.4 Saint John’s Cathedral – regretfully

The Umayyad Mosque? You mean the Cathedral of St. John the Baptist. Yes, it is our earliest church in Damascus, but at the moment it is used by the Muslims as a mosque and they call it the Mosque of the Umayyads. But in our faith it will always remain St. John’s. Did you know that his holiness Father John Paul II, visited the cathedral five years ago? And he said a prayer at the holy shrine of St. John’s head. And they were really excited that the pope would enter a mosque, but they didn’t understand that he went there to see the cathedral of Damascus and the crania of St. John. Did you see the Greek inscription above the door? It reads ‘Your kingdom Jesus Christ is an everlasting kingdom and your reign endures all generations’, and St. John will prove that to be true.

The location of the building Umayyad Mosque in the centre of the historic city of Damascus has a longstanding religious tradition, which was introduced earlier in the conventional heritage analysis and which is – at least partly – also relevant for this topology. Already the first temple was important enough to be mentioned in the bible, in the second book of Kings, which describes King Ahaz who was so impressed by the altar located in the temple at Damascus, that he ordered his own priests to fabricate a copy thereof (The Holy Bible, 1984, 2nd Kings, 16, 10). Centuries later the temple became the cathedral of St. John the Baptist as Keenan explains “When Christianity was proclaimed the official religion of the region and the Byzantine Empire came into being, the inner part of the Jupiter temple, the cella was adopted into the Christian church of St. John the Baptist and a great carved stone gateway was opened in the south wall.” (Keenan, 2000, p. 22)

While Brigid Keenan speaks of St. John’s Cathedral in the past tense only, for many inhabitants of Damascus who describe themselves as members of one of the various Christian communities, St. John’s Cathedral remains present and is simply subject to some disturbing intermediate appropriation by the dominant Muslim community. “It is a cathedral this mosque, it still remains a church” Yaqub tries to convince us, and also Gregorios explains that: “the oldest church of Damascus is St. John the Baptist, the Umayyad Mosque, (...) the cathedral of the bishop of Damascus”. Simon from the Roman Catholic Church equally confirms “when they built this mosque, they built us a church. Now (...) this mosque is like a church.”

The different Christian communities of Damascus who mutually construct this topology – based on the conception of a Christian belonging to the core in the centre of the city, in fact a Christian city, a place of Christian identity – are in disagreement on whether the head of John the Baptist is really buried there. While for some like Gregorios, it is out of the question that the tomb of St. John the Baptist and the denotation after him could simply be a legend “It’s true. That is history. It’s a fact of
Section Five: Topology researched – the Umayyad Mosque

history. (...) We have a temple in the centre of the mosque”, others don’t worry much about its authenticity, such as Simon: “yes, he might be there (...) but they are not hundred percent sure. This is a tradition; they just have to believe it.” Yaqub – and according to him also several unnamed scholars – thinks that the designation St. John as well as the grave do not refer to St. John the Baptist but to another church father carrying the same name: “It is the tomb of a church father, whether John the Baptist or the Evangelist or the Damascene – the great theologian of the 7th century – it doesn’t matter to us. This mosque has a tomb and the tomb belongs to us, who it is does not matter.”

For many others however, legends and myths nurture the conviction that John the Baptist must be buried in this very spot. One of these legends was retold by Yaqub and takes place at some undefined point in history, when Muslim rulers wanted to open the tomb to prove or disprove its authenticity. Every time they opened the ground, he narrates, streams of blood flew out and each time they became scared and immediately closed it again. And eventually all agree that even if John the Baptist were not buried there – to some almost a heretic idea – St. John’s Cathedral would still remain a place of Christianity, at least in the hearts of Syrian Christians. And, there are other non-ambiguous significations. A high Christian official, to who I refer as Hanania explained to us: “You find some Christian inscriptions until now, (...) because they don’t read Greek (...) it is there until now. On one door of the mosque it is written ‘New kingdom of Jesus Christ, is the kingdom forever’ [laughs]; in the mosque! Now they know what it means, but now it is too late to destroy it.”

The relation of the place to Christian tradition, and in particular Christian tradition in Syria, was renewed and underlined by the visit of the late pope John Paul II to St. John’s cathedral, on his visiting schedule called the Umayyad Mosque. Worldwide the visit was perceived as an important step of the Vatican towards interreligious dialogue, as here in the Washington Post:

“Damascus, Syria, May 6: John Paul II, respectfully removing his shoes, today became the first pope to enter a mosque. (...) The pope’s visit to the Umayyad mosque served as a recognition that the two religions share some ideas and prophets, even as they differ on theological issues such as the divinity of Christ and the nature of the Koran. (...) The pope stopped for a minute of contemplation before a tomb reputedly housing the head of John the Baptist. In deference to Muslim sensitivities, he said no formal prayer inside the worship area. The pope shook hands with Kuftaro in the building’s courtyard, which is ringed by elaborate mosaics depicting heaven and has a minaret where some Muslims believe Jesus will make his second coming. “For all the times that Muslims and Christians have offended one another, we need to seek forgiveness,” the pope said before dozens of Syrian Christian and Islamic leaders and scholars. No pope had ever stepped into a mosque. During a trip to Jerusalem last year, John Paul did not enter the al-Aqsa mosque, the third-holiest Islamic shrine, when he visited the Noble Sanctuary.” (Schneider, 2001, p. A 11)

For the Christians in Damascus however the pope’s visit was much more than a step towards interreligious dialogue, it was a reaffirmation that the mosque is truly a Christian place of worship, and his minute of silence at the tomb of the John the Baptist is considered to have ultimately proven that. Yaqub recalls: “And he went to
the tomb and he put his hand – you see like that – (...) and he prayed and stayed there for a minute and prayed inwardly and with him the mufti and the officials and the ministers, they all had to wait. And also Hanania is confident to know the true reason for his visit: “No, he did not go for religious dialogue. Because it was the cathedral of Damascus; because there is the cranium, the head of John the Baptist.” And especially the pope’s reluctance to visit al-Aqsa mosque a year earlier, is utilised to reason his disinterest in visiting mosques. Simon enthusiasti\cally memorises his visit:

“And then as the pope visited the mosque here in Damascus, fantastic, so fantastic. (...) His visit had many meanings. The visit of (...) St. John (...) is an important appreciation of the place. For sure (...) It is not sure if St. John was buried there, it is not important for the people thinking about St. John, of course the place is important. And of course the visit of the pope gave it yet another meaning, and that is the tradition: people visit the place, pray in the place, for us the root is important.”

Despite the example given by the pope some members of the Christian communities are not convinced that the tomb of St. John is a place to pray at, at least not under the current circumstances. Like Simon, who is almost confused about our proposal: “Christians? No I don’t think they go to pray, they go to visit but not to pray”, or Gregorios who thinks in similar terms: “The only Christian, who prayed there, was the pope.” But Hanania immediately disproves these two conceptions by admitting his personal practices: “Of course, I go to the mosque once a year to do my prayers at the shrine, on St. John’s day. With all my dresses of course, yes everybody knows then, who I am.”

Others are far more reluctant than Hanania and although they go to St. John’s shrine to pray would refrain from wearing liturgical clothes, showing the cross, praying aloud or arriving in groups. Being questioned whether such actions are forbidden Gregorios clarifies: “No, no, nothing, it is not forbidden there. But we don’t want to provoke and although we often refer to it as St. John’s Cathedral we cannot ignore that it is a mosque.” Others do not even go because they are convinced that as long as the shrine is located in a mosque, they are not really welcome. In the meantime they shift their attention and leave the veneration of St. John the Baptist to the Western Christian visitors that will not miss to see the Umayyad Mosque. Simon informs us that the central figure of Christian Identity in Damascus is no longer St. John: “We go more to visit St. Ananias and St. Paul, they are more important to us than St. John.” Hanania confirms: “(...) the speciality of Damascus is St. Paul, it’s very important. Everybody knows who St. Paul is. The road to Damascus is known to every Christian in the world.” And while for the international Christian visitors coming on pilgrimage to the locations of St. Paul, the tomb of John the Baptist, too, remains a must-go\textsuperscript{104}, for the Christians in Damascus the topos Umayyad Mosque is best expressed in its being a non-place, a temporary misappropriation of St. John’s Cathedral. Truly it has been the location of Christian tradition and Christian identity since long ago and for long to come.
Section Five: Topology researched – the Umayyad Mosque

2.5 Freedom – the largest playground

Yes, I love it. The courtyard is huge, huge, huge … We can run and scream and play tag and do splash fights in the fountain. And then there is the climbing wagon, but unfortunately it’s for boys only, but the small one inside, the climbing well is for us also. And the carpets, you can jump on them. Or run as fast as you can and then throw yourself over. I tried to count how many somersaults you have to turn to get from one side to the other, but I never managed – Mom stopped me or I got too exhausted before I could reach the end. And I love feeding the pigeons, and playing with them. It’s so much fun, this guy sometimes gives me the bird seeds and then all the pigeons come and they fly on my head and my arms and I get scared and throw the seeds away. And then they all gather around the seeds. And when I then run into the flock, they get really scared and fly away into all directions and scream almost like I screamed before. Oh, Mom’s coming back. No, I don’t want to go, not now, later … just another minute.

Children’s perception of the Umayyad Mosque is dominated by one logos only: freedom or rather the pleasure of freedom. And indeed they probably find the largest and maybe safest playground of the city, although it would of course never be designated as such. The freedom of shrieking kids running through the courtyard (cf. illustration 10) is at the same time the freedom of their parents and especially mothers. With the impossibility of leaving the complex – guards at all doors would stop young children trying to leave and inquire about their parents – mothers feel enabled to let their offspring stroll and caper freely and find some time for themselves.

I was astonished that all interviewed mothers, who regularly visit the Umayyad Mosque, admitted preferring this location because they did not need to continuously guard their children. ‘Aisha describes her appreciation of this unique opportunity:

“I go almost every day because of the boys, you know they love the place, I just take them to the courtyard. They can run and play and there are other children they know. And then they are busy and I can do my prayers and do not have to worry about them because there are so many taking care of the children and they can’t leave the mosque. Now, every day, when the boys come home from school in the afternoon around five a clock, instead of going home directly, we go that way and then they play. You know because it is a great place and my house is very small. So there they can run around for fifteen or twenty minutes and then I take them home. And also (…) [Mahmoud] takes them there again in the evening. That is why we wanted to live in this area. We like the opportunity.”

‘Aisha is not the only interviewee who confirmed these advantages to me. Zuhaira and also ‘Amina expressed identical views. ‘Amina even referred to the Umayyad Mosque as the masjid al-ummahat [the mosque of mothers] and explained that only because of the children situation offered in this place, she was enabled to participate in the tarawih prayers in ramadan:

“I did not pray tarawih anymore after I had given birth to (…) [Wissam], because I could not take the baby to the mosque. And then with (…) [Nasr] it became even worse. A friend, she has two daughters, told me that she went to the Umayyad Mosque.”

She further explained that – despite the generally supportive situation – during ramadan it was even easier because a group of women had organised a kind of tarawih
nursery. They come every day bringing their children and the menstruating women among them – who are not able to participate in the ritual prayers – would remain in the courtyard and watch the group of children while the others are able to join the prayers free of concerns about their kids. A real relief for ‘Amina:

“Even at home my prayers are affected by (…) [Nasr’s] crying or (…) [Wissam’s] noise or dropping things. Here I know somebody will look after them as I will look after the others for a few days, when I cannot join the prayers.”

Even outside prayer times, the courtyard and then also the prayer hall become a romping paradise for children. Soft carpets to jump and fall on, glassy marble to run and glide, the ablution (trick) fountain in the middle to splash in and a historic well or vehicle as climbing scaffolds (cf. illustration 11) – the complete equipment of a proper playground, even including pigeons to run after (without ever catching them). Children are so dominant at some times of the day that even European visitors entirely unfamiliar with mosque activities observe that this is a special place for children. So did Rita, a German group traveller: “Some people give me the impression they only came here to let their children play, but indeed the children very much counteract the conservative religious atmosphere.”

As always, one man’s meat is another man’s poison and so the ideal situation for mothers turns out to be a nightmare for many seeking silence and respite in prayers. Like Samira when she visited the tarawih prayers in the Umayyad Mosque and felt disturbed by the children’s noise intruding from the courtyard: “Sometimes I want to tell these women: Can’t you just tell your children that they are in a mosque and teach them how to respect this place?”

Where exactly does the topology ‘freedom – the largest playground’ take place? Its spatial boundaries seem to be defined by the outer walls of the mosque complex to which the children are physically restricted. But mostly, it takes place in their fantasy. Only in their world the courtyard becomes a battlefield, an ice sheet and a football stadium, and the Dome of the Clocks is suddenly the princess’ chamber waiting for the prince to rescue and marry her. It is further located in the calmness of their mothers and the new horizon of participation in activities of faith it opens to them. The playground and its associated arrangements are neither an architectural feature nor a simple narrative; they are a social institution, a female social institution.

2.6 The Umayyad Mosque Museum

We were in the National Museum this morning and after a lunch snack we came here through Hamidiye Souk and then we are on our way to the Folklore Museum and later the Straight Street where St. Paul converted and I think there is some church as well. And tomorrow we leave to Krak des Chevalier and then go to Lebanon. We have about half an hour for the mosque, but that’s okay, I mean, there is not so much to see, is there? The courtyard is quite amazing, especially the mosaics but inside, there is only carpets, no decoration, no place you could stop and I didn’t feel too comfort-
able in there, so I’m happy to be back in the courtyard. Luckily we came with our guide and he gave us some explanations about the history and the mosaics and the Umayyads, because there is no information available here. They are not well prepared for tourists. And I think it’s awkward that they request you to take off your shoes in the courtyard. In the mosque itself okay, but in the courtyard, where the pigeons shit on the floor and we have to step in with our socks? And these grey coats are terrible; I feel like a crow. I think this is a kind of discrimination of women. Let us get out of here; I want to get rid of this foul smelling piece of fabric.

Initially, the name of this topology might be confusing, as ‘the Umayyad Mosque Museum’ could also refer to the small one room ‘museum’ located in the eastern hall the so-called mashhad Abu Bakr. This room – closed to the public since more than a decade – is said to contain a few precious historic manuscripts and historic carpets that were taken out of the prayer hall in order to preserve them. But since this museum can only be accessed by a hand of employees of the mosque and perhaps the ministry of awqaf, it constitutes a topology of very few people and will not be considered in the context of my writings. The topology which I called ‘Umayyad Mosque Museum’, is constructed my many visitors to the mosque, not only, but primarily travellers from European countries and from the Persian Gulf. Myra Shackley regrets the lack of visitor surveys for historic sites in Syria and provides estimates derived from her inquiries: “inquiries suggested that the majority of European visitors are French and German, with some Italians, British and a range of other nationalities. Another major category of visitors (…) are Arabs from Gulf States who (…) also visit sites of Islamic significance such as the (…) Omayid Mosque.” (Shackley, 2000, p. 161)

The Umayyad Mosque is a must-see for any traveller to Damascus (cf. Shackley, 2000, p. 161), a sight-seeing hotspot and a standard element of any tour itinerary to Syria, as a comparison of travel offers or guide-books immediately confirms. The experience of the Umayyad Mosque as an historic site or even museum is partly constructed by the visitors and especially their tour guides, but also provided for by the mosque administration, i.e. the Ministry of Awqaf, Department of the Umayyad Mosque, which opted to enforce a structural separation between mosque visitors and museum visitors. The separation is implemented by denying entry to so-defined tourists through any entrance but Bab al-‘Imara, and to enter through this gate the visitors have to acquire an admission ticket in a cashier office, located outside the mosque complex in the tomb of Saladin. In the cashier office female visitors are also provided with grey cloaks to cover themselves appropriately for the mosque visit (cf. illustration 12), and male visitors wearing shorts are sometimes given cloths to cover their legs. This procedure is experienced as very unpleasant especially by female visitors. Wiebke, a Dutch group visitor complained to me, that she felt discriminated. She said that she knew she was going to a mosque, and because it was not the first mosque she visited, she had brought a scarf and was wearing long sleeves. But it was not enough, she also had to wear this – in her words – ugly grey frock.
A second difficulty accrues during the selection process of individual travellers at the other entrances. Guards employed by the mosque are supposed to tell apart Muslim male visitors from non-Muslim male visitors and to inspect the appropriateness of women clothing while they enter the mosque. For women they seem to have standard rules: neither hair nor neck should be visible and no tight clothes between waist and knees, but for male visitors their judgement of Islamic features in outward appearance often fails. Farid, a Muslim traveller from South Africa was furious when entering the cashier’s office: “This is the first time I was refused to enter a mosque in my entire life. A mosque should be an open place of worship for everybody, you can not judge the visitors purpose and then charge them fees.” Heidi from Switzerland made similar observations: “As I tried to enter there were two Muslim girls behind me and the guard sent us back and they were confused, they thought he only sent me, but they had to go, too, not only tourists, they paid as well.” At the same time, other Muslim visitors who enter for sight-seeing purposes easily pass through due to adequate appearance, like Hannah when she visited the Umayyad Mosque for the first time:

“When I came the first time, with two of my friends, we were doing that kind of tourist stuff, sight-seeing. So when we went to the Umayyad Mosque it was not to pray but rather to see the place. So, we entered through the main gate and (...) we just looked around and we saw the grave and the prayer hall but we did not pray. We just walked around.”

Despite this principal inequity in the selection process, the tourist entry situation has yet another adverse effect, in that the assumptions and expectations with regard to the mosque visit are subtly changed. If one has paid an entrance fee and received a ticket, the place is obviously a historic site or museum and no longer a public place of worship. At least this is what many visitors conceptualise during the few meters walk between the cashier’s office and the ‘tourist entrance’ gate. Nevertheless, female visitors remain more frequently aware of the religious connotations of the historic site they visit – which they assume is the reason for the nasty costume they have to wear – than male visitors, who simply buy their entrance ticket and look forward to visiting the site museum. Howard, a Canadian traveller explained to me that he felt one shouldn’t sell tickets to a church or mosque. These tickets would tell everybody: welcome to Umayyad Mosque museum, we are happy to accommodate you as a sight-seer, feel free to do whatever you want.

The general approach towards the mosque as a site is supported by the guides, who all follow a – probably officially proposed – standard pattern which comprises 5 explication stops. With the exception of the introduction of the tomb of St. John the Baptist, the information provided presents the buildings architectural history and two iconographic interpretations of the mosaics. The stations of this tour are less interesting than the lack of information given. For example the entire eastern wing, with the hall and tomb of Hussayn simply does not exist in these tours. Several participants of a Christian travel group I had long discussions with, spoke of de-sacralisation: “For me it was a tourist place: I know it is a mosque, but rather de-sacralised. I felt like in
the Cathedral of Cologne, that place is also completely overtaken by all the tourists”. One participant even thought, he observed that this atmosphere was also caused by the Muslim visitors “Why should the Muslims behave differently than the gagging crowd that visits St. Peter in Rome?” but later constricts his opinion: “But here it is still somewhat better. The people that come to photograph St. Peters are tourists, but here most of the Muslim visitors still seem to be faithful people.” With such comments however, my Christian traveller group was already a welcome exception, as most visitors did not concern themselves at all with the people on the site, or – if so – implicitly perceived the local visitors as part of the ‘museum exhibition’, a favoured photo-shot. Unless, like in the case of Ebba from Denmark they are forced to expand their initial perceptions:

“I was just sitting there looking at the other women and then this woman came and she gestured an invitation to join, like this, and she said ‘Come join us’. In English, so she knew I am foreigner and I wear this grey thing, it’s obvious. She pointed to the row they were just forming. So I said: No, I am not Muslim, but she smiled and said: ‘No problem, everybody can pray here. Just join us and pray in your way’.

Until that moment, Ebba reflected later when talking to me, she had seen these women as almost an exotic ‘performance’ on the historic site, until she understood they were more or less like her, also visitors even if coming for a different reason. Rarely European visitors will be confronted with Ebba’s situation as only very few sit down in the prayer hall. To most, the prayer hall is a place that makes them feel uneasy, perhaps because it confronts and challenges their assumption and expectations of the museum. Rita might have expressed an unconscious feeling shared with many others when she explained:

“I like the architecture of the court and I was fascinated by the mosaics. But as we went into the mosque I suddenly felt out of place. I had the feeling we are disturbing here, these people came here for a different purpose, and this is not a museum. I was glad that the guide went through quite fast and that we were given time to explore the mosque ourselves. I immediately returned to the courtyard.”

Leaving the prayer hall as soon as possible is not an unusual phenomenon for foreign visitors, and one can observe groups accelerating their walking speed on the way out (cf. illustration 14). For few, the sudden contrast between the courtyard and the prayer hall is so confusing, that they are no longer sure this area is covered by their entrance tickets. Two female students who helped conducting my interviews with foreign travellers were once questioned by a young Swiss woman: “I don’t really understand how it works, are we allowed to also enter the prayer hall?” Few Europeans might provide such justification for the extraordinary kindness and hospitality that Syrian Muslim visitors show towards the ‘museum guests’. Despite their sometimes unusual dress (cf. illustration 15), their clinging to guidebooks and cameras (cf. illustration 13), photographing and often disturbingly walking around in the prayer hall, Europeans are always welcome to the mosque. And even if they cross in front of individuals praying – which is believed to invalidate the prayers – they are forgiven
quite soon, as Mahmoud explains: “They don’t know and they don’t walk there on purpose, I mean, they don’t intend to invalidate your prayer. It is the guide’s fault because they don’t tell them.”417 'Aisha in support of her husband adds:

“I think it is important that the mosque is open to foreigners, so they don’t get the impression that Islam is something isolated and that Muslims don’t want to have them in. Then we have to accept that they walk around (...) come on, how do you want to avoid that? Do you want to place separating poles with strings, so that they have to follow given pathways?”

And non-Muslim visitors, if they are open for contact will always find people who are happy to converse and to exchange their points of view, particularly with regard to Islam and the allegedly sad Western image of it. Such conversations would indeed be desirable as they could help to expand the current logos of the topology ‘Umayyad Mosque museum’ which is diffusely related to sight-seeing and also its topoi, often restricted to an immediate transferral of guide-book or human guide information to a particular spot of interest. It must be mentioned here that both topos and logos of this topology are not easy to define, because in contrast to the earlier described topologies, the Umayyad Mosque museum is not an actively constructed but more often a passively perceived topology418. More specifically, it is constructed by a small group of ‘explicators’ and experienced by a larger group of participants or consumers. The logos projected to the visitors: ‘highlight’, results in a desire to see the must-see, Damascus seems incomplete without ‘having done’ the Umayyad Mosque. The visitors however, do rarely demonstrate a self-driven desire to see, but focus on what they are presented by their guides or guide-books. Only a small minority shows active curiosity and explores aspects beyond this standard pattern. The topoi therefore are not so much the sites, the ‘hot-spots’ in the mosque complex, but the structural pattern of the guiding explications, that construct these foci of attention.

Once a visitor actively roams away from these topoi, the entire topology is at risk. For example communication with Muslim visitors who are participants of the earlier described topology ‘faith and duty – performance of prayers’ massively threatens both logos and topos and thereby the very existence of the topology ‘Umayyad Mosque museum’. And interaction of the two groups would certainly not support the preservation of this topology; but according to my perception the benefit of preserving the ‘Umayyad Mosque Museum’ is at least questionable.

2.7 Tranquillity – keep and restore calm

I come to my shop early in the morning, at least three days a week because the deliveries come early, and I don’t want them to lie on the street. Then after zuhr, there are almost no costumers. It is too hot; people stay at home and come later. So I can have some rest. My neighbour sleeps in his shop, on the counter. But my shop is too small; there is hardly space for my stool. Nobody minds you having a nap in the Umawi and I don’t lie right in front of the qibla. I take a quiet corner where I don’t disturb anybody. And have some rest, just half an hour or an hour or sometimes more.
Can you imagine having a public place of silence and rest which allows you to have a nap during lunch break just around the corner of your office? The merchants of the central souk [سوق, market] of Damascus have exactly this: the Umayyad Mosque. The topology I called ‘tranquillity – keep and restore calm’ combines two different aspects, physical and spiritual regeneration. Physical recreation attempts can easily be observed especially after the zuhr [noon] prayer when quite a number of mostly men lie in several corners of the mosque and have a nap (cf. illustrations 16 and 17). Two groups are dominant among these visitors, first of all merchants of the nearby souk who come to have a snooze during the quiet early afternoon hours and secondly, though far less, women who arrive in small groups and who mostly seem to be visitors coming from outside the city – probably recovering from an exhausting daytrip to run errands (cf. illustration 16).

While the men usually arrive for zuhr prayer and sleep afterwards, the groups of women enter at various times and often also enjoy their lunches on the precincts of the mosque. The food they have brought along is arranged on a small tablecloth, sandwiches are distributed among the children (cf. illustration 19); tea and cold refreshments appear out of various plastic bags until the collection gathered in the centre of the small group looks like a complete meal. Efforts undertaken by the mosque administration to prevent such behaviour including new signs posted at all doors explicitly prohibiting eating inside the mosque had little affect. ‘Umar, one of the guards employed by the ministry of ‘awqaf complained: “It is terrible. They do not only disturb others who may fast or might be forced to pray hungry, they also leave all their rubbish behind and when they are gone, the place is full of crumbs and other leftovers.” Many European Muslim visitors, like Samira, detest such lunching: “They are sitting there with a matt on the floor having a picnic in the courtyard. I think somehow you can’t do that. It is as if the whole message of this place being for God was not there.”

Sleeping on the other hand is not prohibited, except during the obligatory congregational prayers. To sleep then however is hardly possible as a guard ensures with support of a stick, which he heavily beats against pillars and the floor that even the last person who sought rest is awake and ready to prepare for prayer. Spatial topoi of these individual recoveries are all silent corners the complex has to offer, predominantly the arcades of the courtyards, which offer shadow and cool air during the summer months or the areas surrounding the columns in the prayer hall which guard off cold and wind during the winter. They are usually restricted to the early afternoon hours, or in the month of ramadan extended to the late afternoon hours, until just before sunset. The generating principle of this topology is the desire for rest, silence, a nap and recreation for a busy afternoon and evening to come or – in other cases – for a long way back home.

Spiritual aspects of recovery escape the above named spatial and temporal localisation and are prevalent during all times that the mosque is silent or, as my interviewees describe it, peaceful. The topos then is rather the mental state of the visitor who
finds peace, than a particular area of the mosque offering peace. For ‘Aisha the courtyard can be like the sanatoria people go to in Europe: “It is my sanatorium. Whenever I come there in the early afternoon hours it is peaceful and quiet. I can still remember what I felt the first time, I felt – ma sha’Allah – this place has peace.”422 Being asked to describe her recreation visits in more detail she elaborates: “Walking in is as if you pass a barrier, and you just leave the world behind. As if you enter another world. I sometimes feel I am leaving what was behind me.” Others, like Rabi’a, prefer the evening hours, especially during winter, to find peace in the courtyard and the surrounding arcades:

“Whenever I pass through the courtyard just after maghreb it really makes me feel I just want to keep sitting there. It has a kind of peace, a kind of spiritual stimulation. I don’t know how and what it is, but you can feel it, you can just feel it when you sit in there. And you can just sit and it is nice to have a place to do that.”423

Such internal peace and most other aspects of the topology ‘tranquillity – keep and restore calm’ are threatened by other topologies, for example the children’s playground and the social meeting place described in the following subchapter. It is obvious that during summer and ramadan the courtyard is everything but a place of silence after maghreb prayer. The topoi are therefore not only dependent on the vastness of the courtyard and perhaps also its architectural characteristics, but primarily on the absence of other in this instance disturbing activities. It can be concluded that this topology can only take place in the silence and quietude offered by the containment of the practices and behaviours related to other themes.

2.8 Piazza – sitting, chatting, flirting

Of course I am interested to talk to him. Every girl would be and it is so exciting when he tells me I am beautiful or that he missed me and dreamed of me. But to invite him to my home, I mean, not a man. And I cannot meet him on the streets or in a coffee shop, what if somebody sees us? It is about honour. I have to take care of my reputation. I want to find a good husband some day. That means, there is not much choice, the Umayyad Mosque is one of the rare places to see each other. I go with my sister or my aunt and when she prays I pretend that I can’t or that I did pray already and disappear into the courtyard. Or sometimes I join them and then try to stay longer. Five, ten minutes is all that we have to see each other, but yesterday he gave me a mobile phone, and now we can talk.

In diametrical opposition to the calmness and recovery the place offers during early afternoon hours or the cold winter months, it becomes a lively social centre during the warm summer evenings, when families and friends gather there to sit and chat or promenade up and down the courtyard. Like an Italian piazza after sunset when suddenly all social activities are transferred to the streets, the courtyard of the Umayyad Mosque becomes more and more crowded after the maghreb prayer. People sit along the step separating the arcades from the central courtyard or the little plinth of the Dome of the Clocks.
Section Five: Topology researched – the Umayyad Mosque

During my observations of this topology, I experienced difficulties in trying to understand the motivations and meaning-contexts of the numerous different activities and I fear I will have to leave many facets of this topology unmentioned or unexplained. However, two groups stand out among the visitors of the courtyard, parents who are at the same time taking advantage of the freedom of their children and the little time gained to talk to each other. And secondly, young couples who arrange their dates in the Umayyad Mosque. Initially, I was not entirely sure whether these dates were indeed arranged or happened by chance until Haytham confirmed my assumptions: lovers make their appointment in the Umayyad Mosque and even consider it one of the flirting top-spots of the city.

“I had two dates in the courtyard of the djama’a al-umawi and in both cases the girls asked me to meet them in this location. (...) No, I did not find it unusual. It is a good place to meet. It is dark, it has some privacy and the girl does not need to go to a coffee shop or a park but can go to a mosque. There is nothing reprehensible in going to the mosque.”

Also Mahmoud told me that he knew some friends who would visit the Umayyad Mosque to look out for girls. “It is difficult to meet pious women unless they are part of your family. If you are not fond of arranged marriages, the best places to find a religious girl are the mosque or the university library.” I was not surprised when ‘Aisha later told me – outside a formal interview situation – that she had met Mahmoud in a mosque, though it was not the Umayyad Mosque. The Umayyad Mosque with its lack of separation between male and female zones and the large ‘neutral’ courtyard seems an ideal place to observe and approach.

While the young couples with arranged appointments try to hide behind the columns of the arcades or put their head together pretending to study or discuss a – often religious – book, and those still searching or waiting to be found are cat-walking or sitting in the centre of the courtyard (cf. illustration 20). After two have found each other, they usually restrict themselves to a closer look and the exchange of phone numbers to then better get to know each other by phone or in rare cases have a little promenade together. Even for those not looking for a partner but for ordinary social contacts, the courtyard is a very promising location and Su’ad admitted that some of her Syrian social contacts had been established in the Umayyad Mosque or been mediated by people she met there: “Yes, if you are open you can meet very interesting people of all levels of education and wealth. It is a place for socializing.”

I have to personally confirm this statement considering the many interesting people that have approached me and talked to me during my sometimes lengthy observations. Samira shares my experiences:

“Yes, it happens quite often that people stop and try to talk to me, especially when I sit with a friend and we speak English. Then they come and want to start a conversation. ‘Min aina anti?’ [Where are you from?] and things like that. It does not happen in other mosques like this, just in the Umayyad Mosque. Maybe because the Umayyad Mosque encourages sitting down for a longer time? And the atmosphere makes you feel relaxed and I think that just means that people talk more freely.”

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While for the young lovers and couples it might be important to keep the romantic atmosphere of the courtyard with its minimalist lighting which allows for dark corners, the piazza-like meeting place for all other social interactions will probably remain well-established as long as the Umayyad Mosque remains the open centre of the busy and lively souk of Damascus. It will always primarily be a social place for visitors from outside the city centre as unsurprisingly this central location seems to have a special attraction to visitors from the suburbs or the countryside. Many people I spoke to in the evening indeed came from outer districts of the rif [ريف, countryside] Damascus and I had the impression that promenading in the courtyard of the Umayyad Mosque gave them the feeling of participating in the centre, watching and being seen, being part of the social life of the city where it always took and still takes place: in Umayyad Mosque\(^{430}\). This has not changed since at least the 12\(^{th}\) century as Simarski concludes after studying the reports of Ibn Jubayr: “The mosque courtyard (…) was a lively centre of social life. ‘There is always a concourse of townspeople, coming to meet and converse pleasurably every evening,’ said Ibn Jubayr. ‘You may see them coming and going from east to west, walking and talking.’” (Simarski, 1991, p. 23)

2.9 Smoking room – unveiled

Are you crazy, a photograph? No, look I am smoking; I am not wearing my headscarf and you want to take a photograph. The reason I am here is that I don’t want people to see me. If I wouldn’t mind I could smoke on the street. Do you think this is my favourite spot to have tea and a cigarette? In a bathroom next to the toilets, where other women do their ablution? Certainly not. But is there any other place to go to? Tell me! Come, sit with us, have some tea, but put your camera away. Do you smoke? Here have a cigarette. You can smoke here, nobody will see you.

I was quite surprised when I entered the women hammam [حمام, bath, also used to designate toilets and washrooms] for the first time, because what I saw was not at all, what I had expected. The six ablution taps and respective stone stools were unused; in contrast the elevated plain behind, partly covered with carpets housed what looked to me like a lively party of a dozen of women having tea and – at least some of them – cigarettes. The oldest, apparently responsible for the tea-stove, was actually smoking hubble-bubble. I was perplexed, which obviously amused the group, but did not prevent them to invite me to sit down and also have a glass of tea.

This first afternoon, I still thought I had entered a spontaneous meeting of several friends and it took me a second and third visit at the right time of day to realise that the ‘smoking room – unveiled’ is everything but spontaneous and probably the tea stove and the hubble-bubble should have indicated that much earlier. Unfortunately, the women constructing this topology were so concerned that somebody they knew could find out about their smoking harbour, that I was not able to find a volunteer for my interviews. I therefore had to limit my inquiry to many informal talks and funny conversations in the washroom. Interestingly, the supposed purpose of the
hammam throughout my many visits remained partly non-functional as for example the toilets adjacent to the washroom without any explication by the woman responsible were kept closed. And women, coming there looking for toilets, were sent away and directed to the public lavatories just outside Bab az-Ziyada.

The ‘smoking-room’ is a hiding place, the only strictly female place in the mosque and therefore the location of woman issues and women needs: headscarves are taken off, are rearranged, corrected, clothes are changed and make-ups refreshed. As a hiding place it also offers the opportunity to smoke cigarettes, an option that can only be fully understood if one knows how disreputable it would be for a woman to smoke on the street. I indeed had never seen local women smoking on the street, but Haytham’s explication helped me to understand its very negative connotations:

“(…) it makes sense because they have no other place to smoke, because women cannot smoke in public, like on the street or in a restaurant. And if they don’t know anybody in the old city they have nowhere to go. (…) No, smoking is really bad, we say: all women that smoke in the street are bannat al-huwa [بنات الهوا], floozies. If my sisters would smoke on the street, I’d really get mad at them.”

Only in the hammam, women find the privacy to light a cigarette and it appeared to me that at certain times during the afternoon small groups of women meet to do exactly this. Two young women told me they are working in shops in Hamidiyye Souk nearby and that they are scared their bosses could see them smoking. But the female hammam is safe, one of them told me with a big smile under her heavy make-up, ‘he cannot come here and I just went to the mosque’.

The topology ‘smoking room – unveiled’ is based on a conception of honour and reputation that was already present in the context of flirting and dating as described in the last topology. Because cultural conventions determine that it is inappropriate for women to meet men or smoke in public, women create their opportunities to circumnavigate such conventions and – as in our case – redefine places in the framework offered by the cultural conventions and adapt these to their needs. The topos of the desire to smoke, but in a reputable manner is then the separated women’s room, even if it is only the washroom.33 The generating idea of this topology, solicitude regarding reputation and perceived state of decency, is a heritage element at risk, as many young women have already decided to disregard these cultural conventions that seem outdated or meaningless to them. Nowadays one can therefore observe a young liberal generation of women smoking in the many new café shops and restaurants in the historic city while the more traditional still hide in the ‘Umayyad Mosque smoking room’. How long will it last? We don’t know.

2.10 Grab your food first – ramadan charity

I have my breakfast in the Umayyad Mosque and some of my friends come also. Not every day, because sometimes my colleagues invite me to their house to have breakfast with their families. I think.
because they know I often go to the mosque and they feel sorry. But I don’t come here because I cannot afford food. Sure, going to a restaurant every day is too expensive, but outside ramadan I also have to buy my sandwich. It is more because I don’t want to have my breakfast alone. All my colleagues go home to their wives or relatives but my family lives far away. Outside ramadan we eat together in the company but in ramadan they all leave before maghreb. So I feel I want to go somewhere as well. Meeting a few other guys from my village in the Umayyad mosque is a good option. I leave with the others and we meet in the mosque and queue till we are let into the courtyard. But the food is not really good, it is always cold and after fasting all day you feel you want to eat something warm. But at least it’s enough and after all you get a feeling of it being ramadan.

‘Grab your food first – ramadan charity’ is probably the most recent topology, which was only (re?)established in 2005. It is a noteworthy example of a new meaning-making process that has been added to the heritage concept Umayyad Mosque and although it has been constructed only recently, it is very dominant during the month of ramadan. During my first year of ramadan observation for this work in 2004, the Umayyad Mosque was literally deserted at maghreb time and I remember that the imam’s recitation of the maghreb prayer was inaudible for the two or three women present because the loudspeakers were not even switched on. In 2005 everything was different. Several hundred people gathered in the prayer hall well before maghreb and by the time the doors to the courtyard were opened, the level of noise and aggression combined with several physical offences within the male crowd pressing towards the gates and the guards, too few to cope with the situation, gave an entirely different impression. It felt like being in an overcrowded station where everybody wants to get on the same train or like being in a place where something limited is being distributed for free. The latter is close to the explication of the origin of this turmoil; something is indeed distributed for free, yet there is always enough for everybody: food and drink to break the ramadan fast.

The mosque administration or the Ministry of Awqaf as the responsible agency of the Syrian Arab Republic, had decided to offer free food for breaking the fast in ramadan to all those who could not afford to buy a meal. It is not the first mosque to make this offer and other mosques in Damascus even run soup kitchens throughout the year. But it is now certainly the largest food provision to the poor which is at the same time the most publicly known, through its TV broadcasting every night.

The food itself is provided in the courtyard, where dots painted on the marble floor indicate the location for provision of one food unit which is measured for four adults. 14 times 14 dots on each side of the courtyard then provide for more than 1500 people which come every evening. When after asr prayer [salat-ul-asr, afternoon prayer] the aliments are brought in by vehicles (cf. illustration 21 and 22) and are distributed by volunteers, the courtyard is closed to the public, including the wash- and smoking rooms as well as the shrine of Imam al-Hussayn. The hungry and delayed visitors for asr prayer can still enter the prayer hall through Bab az-Ziyada and those who come for breakfast are requested to wait in the eastern part of the hall until the courtyard is opened again, about half an hour before sunset. After in 2005 the combination of a waiting hungry crowd and suddenly opened gates resulted in
violence and major chaos, in 2006 waiting areas and queue separation lines where provided, which organised the ‘come first get first’ lines (cf. illustration 23). Despite this safer and fairer arrangement for queues, many local visitors are unhappy to see the haram as a waiting hall. Feraz, a friend who one day accompanied me to my observations of the breakfast preparations, articulated his first impression: “Look, they keep people waiting like you’d put chicken in a cage. I don’t think this is right in a mosque.” The three lines divided into women, single children and men, are then – one after the other, i.e. first women, then children and finally men – let into the courtyard through the easternmost gate. In the courtyard the guests are requested to sit down at the next available line of food provisions, and only when 4 people have sat down at each of the 14 food spots, a line of soldiers securing the whole scene will move on and give access to the following line (cf. illustration 24).

The gradual filling of the courtyard viewed from a bird eye’s perspective is broadcast live in the Syrian television, every ramadan evening starting with the opening of the gates half an hour before maghreb until about a quarter of an hour after performance of the azan. A whole city – if not a whole country – watches the Umayyad Mosque or as the television calls it masjid bani umayya – in front of prepared meals – impatiently waiting for the signal to start eating. 360° pans show the arcades of the courtyard, and a second camera positioned on the minaret of the bride shifts between the mosque – and its gradually filling courtyard - and other, often symbolic, buildings in distant parts of the city zoomed in. A third camera positioned on a dolly in the centre of the courtyard (cf. illustration 25) focuses on the performance, i.e. Quran recitation, azan and do’a afterwards (cf. illustration 26) as well as details of the breakfast scene (cf. illustration 27). The images and the performances follow an identical pattern every day and obviously aim at a high recall potential, which points us at the logos of this ramadan theme: national identity creation linked to a Muslim symbol, the Umayyad Mosque. Or at least, this is the logos of the producers. In 2004 and earlier years, the maghreb azan was also broadcast on the Syrian television but with diverse locations. A different mosque, a different setting, a different azan every day in contrast to the current Umayyad Mosque hegemony, promoted a rather decentralised religious and local identity, based on diversity and pluralism.

Despite the celebrated representation of mosque and charity breakfast on television, the initiative is surprisingly ill-reputed and not appreciated in large parts of the Damascus society. In fact, it became one of the key topics of ramadan gossip, i.e. all disrespectful criticism towards others raised during this month – pointing at people who don’t fast, don’t pray, don’t care and smoke on the streets etc. – is now oddly enough attributed to those having breakfast in the Umayyad Mosque. And although nobody would ever go there, everybody knows what is going on. Zahir, a friend of my host family told me to be careful when I bade farewell on my way to the Umayyad Mosque breakfast: “Be careful, the people that go there are rude and have no manners. They start eating as soon as they can grab a portion of food and they smoke in the mosque even before maghreb.” Despite carefully looking out for these and all
other purported inappropriate behaviours, I cannot confirm most of the accusations formulated, except one: that people come, eat and leave without participating in a congregational prayer, which indeed seems to be the case for many. At the same time, this does not surprise me, because the entire performance and TV production does not leave space for maghreb prayers. Breakfast in the Umayyad Mosque is a charity event that presents a new national image to a wider audience, it is a social event of meeting and breaking the fast together, but it is clearly not a spiritual event that would promote participation in worship, at least not in its current mode of production. In this topology, like in the earlier described Umayyad Mosque museum, we once again face a splitting of topological construction into one group actively producing a logos and its taking place, here the authorities that promote the Umayyad Mosque by combining the concepts of charity and national identity and a second group that rather passively experiences the topology and thereby contributes to its construction, which combines both the recipients of the breakfast and the wider public acting as a critical audience, a phenomenon which also accompanies us into the next topology.

2.11 Monumental – representation of power

Well, I would not use such strong words as identity production, control of the symbolic or even representation of power. I would say we are strengthening national identity and encouraging support for our rulers by convincing the general public of our high ethical, moral, social and political aims. To do so, we tie in with the outstanding moral and ethical standards of the early Muslim communities, which spread and established Islam and the traditions of freedom and social equity they established. The Umayyad Mosque is a symbol of this spirit of Islam as a basis for justice and social reign and we wish our actions and policies to be understood and interpreted in this context. To remind the Syrian society of these enduring principles, we present the Umayyad Mosque as what it always was, the centre of the city and country, the symbolic seat of the ruler and the constant reminder of the ruler’s basis of justification. Allahu ma’ana. [Allah is with us].

The rather abstract logos constructed in the topology ‘monumental – representation of power’ is almost part of national policy. It conceptualises the Umayyad Mosque as the symbolic centre of power, the centre of national identity, the symbol of continuity in Islamic tradition and thereby the basis of religious legitimation. The central mosque as the place of reign is a traditional Islamic phenomenon resulting from times in which “governmental authority was (...) rendered legitimate only by having a religious basis.” (Arkoun, 1994, p. 272) At present time its communal and political character is sometimes utilised as either a refuge or a platform for propaganda. Often the symbolic aspect of this traditional centre of power is integrated into modern governmental legitimation, a process that the former Director-General of UNESCO, Frederico Mayor, cautions us about in highlighting the immense risks involved: “We do not realise that control of the symbolic has always been the most effective weapon of those in power – and the greatest threat to freedom and creativity.” (Mayor, 1992, p. 2)
The Umayyad Mosque has since its construction always signified the glory of the ruling dynasty. Keenan describes that one of the early Umayyad Caliphs was even afraid that the impression of the building was too stately to conform to the Islamic principle of modesty so that he considered reducing its decoration.

“According to Yaqub, what changed the Caliph’s mind was a conversation overheard in the mosque between two ambassadors of the Greeks. One said to the other ‘I had told the assemblies of all people of Byzantium that the Arabs and their power would remain but a brief space. But now, when I see what they have built, I know that for surety their dominion will reach the lengths of day.” (Keenan, 2000, p. 27)

To maintain the symbol of enduring dominion and to relate it to their successive reigns, several rulers throughout the centuries have added to, restored, reconstructed after disasters and simply beautified the Umayyad Mosque; have added their stamp onto the building. And this legacy transmitted from earliest Islamic time was continued also by the latest president of the Syrian Arab Republic, Hafez al-Assad, who sponsored a major and prestigious renovation of the Umayyad Mosque complex. Visitors are reminded of his generosity by panels inserted in the outside wall as well as close to the main entrance of the haram (cf. illustration 28), one of which appraisingly reads: ‘Ordered by the one with the correct opinion, with creative ideas and with deep insights, the president of the faithful, Hafez al-Assad [translation from Arabic]’. Foreign visitors, who are not able to read Arabic can find comparable information on their printed entrance tickets: “In the resolution no. 36 on 6/10/1991 the faithful President Hafez AL-ASSAD decreed that the great Umayyad mosque at Damascus be restored & improved. It has always been an Arab & Islamic art treasure of civilisation & a bright gem of Damascus.” (Syrian Arab Republic, 2004) The completion of the renovation, “a subject of hot debate at that time” (Keenan, 2000, p. 37) was celebrated with an opening ceremony dedicated to the sponsor and his achievements:

“The Syrian President Hafez al-Assad personally ordered the renovation process to be carried out, financing it from special presidency resources, and was there on the opening day inaugurating the newly renovated mosque. (…) The whole mosque was dismantled: stone by stone and column by column. The task was enormous and the challenges were incredible. But the spirit of the Omayad inspired the huge task force, and the miracle was achieved. Here stands this great monument rejuvenated and renovated: an eternal witness of the spirit of Damascus.” (Renovating the Omayyad Mosque”, 2002)

Strong criticism with regard to the measures and renovation concepts applied which was especially raised by UNESCO (UNESCO, 1997, par. VII, 55) and discussed in the World Heritage Committee, did not change the general approach chosen in Syria. The renovation was clearly based on the perception that the Umayyad Mosque is a symbolic rather than a historic monument and that its beautification increases representational function. I totally agree with Flood who regrets in his work on the Umayyad Mosque that he was not able “to tackle the fascinating but complex issue of how (…) the mosque and its decoration have been restored, remodelled, and reinterpreted by a succession of post-Umayyad Syrian rulers, right down to the present
The very last renovation of the Umayyad Mosque facilitated reinterpretations which in particular relate to its public and representational use. Two of the four halls for example were given new functions, the former ablution hall in mashhad al-Umar was changed into a reception hall for VIP visitors with seating and a water fountain (cf. illustration 29) and Mashhad al-Uthman on the opposite side of Bab al-Barid was also converted for representational purposes and is kept strictly closed to public access. It seems to be reserved for presidential visits since the only two times I saw the interior of the room was during the TV broadcasts of the visits of the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to the Umayyad Mosque for Aid al-Fitr prayers in 2004 and 2006. Aid al-Fitr prayer with attendance of the president are staged for public view and require an almost half empty prayer hall with carefully selected guests on the very day that every inhabitant of Damascus is obliged to go to the mosque. During the television production it is particularly one element of the aid-al fitr prayers production that takes up the symbolism of the mosque as the representation of power and the intended merging of religious and political authorisation. At the end of the khutba [sermon] delivered from the minbar, the president gives a visible signal to a high military representative who salutes him – his back turned to the qibla wall – and then picks up a parcel which he carries onto the minbar. On the top of the minbar the representative of the president then donates a gown to the khatib [พลาด, person delivering the khutba] as an expression of honour. The khatib is indeed honoured by this gesture, but its localization is worth considering. Allegorically, the president went up the minbar and therefore provided his gift in the traditional position of the Muslim ruler, creating a moment where both religious and governmental authorities share this symbolic position.

Other important holidays are also celebrated with ‘national’ participation and almost naturally on the prophet’s birthday in 2005 there were hundreds of small Syrian flags printed with the expression Allahu ma’na (المعلوم, Allah is with us) distributed all over and decorating the mosque. Official state visitors are guided through the Umayyad Mosque and finally, nationally celebrated funeral prayers, like the prayer for Shaikh Muhammad Kifaru, the Grand Mufti of Syria on the 2nd of September 2004 (cf. illustrations 30 and 31) are constructed as national representations with less restricted access, but still hierarchical seating order and official speeches in the splendid atmosphere of the Umayyad Mosque.

It is difficult to estimate how this topology is valued and interpreted by its wider participants, its visitors and viewers on the television screen. Many of my interview partners, for example, did not consider Syrian flags or presidential visits to a mosque as something symbolic or unusual, as for them self-evidently the mosque is already an important symbol of the Syrian Arab Republic. The approach of referring to the Umayyad Mosque’s traditional signification, as a semiological support for modern governmental legitimacy and the parallel creation of a new national identity are in that sense wisely constructed and quite successful and are very likely to carry further long-term fruits in public perception.
2.12 The Centre – longing for home

When I think about Syria, I think of my mother and my sisters and brother and my nieces and nephews and my family’s house and the small alley in which it is located and the grocery store at the corner and the mosque, the Umayyad Mosque. Here in England, I often feel alone and lonely, especially during the cold winter months, and then for me the historic quarter and my neighbours who I used to meet in the mosque recall a sense of community and familiarity, a sense of belonging and home. It is not so much the place – I mean like the mosque for example – which is home, but what the images remind me of. I think of the light that the bright midday sun causes when shadows flicker in our courtyard, the smells like the spice market I walk through on my way home. But the strongest felt absence is the azan, the call for prayer from the Umayyad Mosque, the constant reminder of being where I belong, home.

The topology ‘the centre – longing for home’ is unusual in at least two aspects when compared to the topologies described earlier. It is the first topology which is not constructed in the context of visits to the building and it is not an original construction but rather a cognitive reproduction of many aspects we have already identified in other topologies. The longing for home takes place in the dreams, memories and feelings of Syrian or Damascene expatriates, who live all over the world and to whom the Umayyad Mosque is a strong symbolic reminder of home.

In web blogs of Syrian expatriates, for example, the Umayyad Mosque is regularly mentioned and becomes an object of longing at a far distance but close to the hearts of Syrian Muslims all over the world, particularly in ramadan. At the same time these blogs prove how thoroughly some topologies are internalised. The pseudonym ‘permalink’ describes his feelings during the first days of ramadan on the damascene-blog:

“I miss being around the iftar table with my family a few minutes before the adhan, our eyes glued to the TV as verses of the Qur’an are recited impatiently waiting for Sadaq Allah-u al-azeem (God said the truth) that concludes the Quranic recitation before a TV presenter finally announces: ‘Dear visitors, now it is time for the sunset adhan according to the local time of Damascus and its suburbs’.” (permalink, 2005)

Within hours several other Syrians share their feeling for the mosque with permalink like Ghalia, who immediately agrees that his description reflected her longing: “yeap … one of the things I miss here is the adhan, I just heard it on syr satellite (ch) from the omayad mosque. It was lovely … I almost cried.” (Ghalia, 2005) In several living-rooms of Syrian families all over the world we can admire photographs of the Umayyad Mosque, most frequently its courtyard, and perhaps this topology also helps us to understand why a visitor to Syria is immediately welcomed by images and paintings of the Umayyad Mosque at the airport, which is certainly intended as a national symbol but also as a clear ‘welcome home’.

Regardless of current residence, length of stay and even affiliation of faith, the Umayyad Mosque is part of the memories of Syria, for my friends in Germany and Canada as much as for Syrian expatriate authors, like Rafiq Shami who places scenes
of his culinary exploration ‘Damascus – taste of a city’ in the Umayyad Mosque (cf. Fadel & Schami, 2003). Perhaps this topology is even best described in the words of the Syrian authors and poets who have written far from home like Nizar Qabbani who in his love poem for his home and place of origin Damascus dedicated a complete stanza to the memory of the Umayyad Mosque:

“I return to Damascus riding on the back of clouds (...) I return to the womb in which I was formed, to the first book I read in it, to the first woman who taught me the geography of love (...) I enter the courtyard of the Umayyad Mosque, And greet everyone in it, Corner to corner, Tile to tile, Dove to dove, I wander in the gardens of Kufi script, And pluck beautiful flowers of God’s words, And hear with my eye the voice of the mosaics, And the music of agate prayer beads, A state of revelation and rapture overtakes me (...), And les Halles in Paris, Is no compensation for the Friday market, And the pigeons in San Marco in Venice, Are no more blessed than the doves in the Umayyad Mosque.” (Qabbani, 2005, par 3, 5)

With the increasing community of Syrian expatriates and the promotion of the centre, the Umayyad Mosque as the symbol of national identity, this topology is well established, safeguarded and transmitted. Perhaps in the near future the ramadan maghreb azan will not only be impatiently expected by Syrian families based in Damascus but also –adjusted to the time of the overseas residences – on the Syrian satellite programmes in for example Stockholm, Wellington and Antigua. At least if the Syrian regime is interested in expanding the national identity creation to their expatriate nationals and bind them to their origin and home, such broadcasts – considering the strength of emotional identification – should be envisaged in national policies.

### 2.13 Architectural prototype – curricula must

On the next slide we see the Umayyad Mosque at Damascus, Syria, earliest courtyard mosque right after the mosque of the Prophet Muhammad in Medina – nowadays Saudi-Arabia; built in the early 8th century. Like in the few years older al-Aqsa Mosque, we again have a transept and a cupola in the centre of the prayer hall – but please note al-Aqsa is not a courtyard mosque and the type ‘courtyard’ prevailed in the following centuries. In the ground plan you see the arcades surrounding the courtyard and the tripartite prayer hall that became the prototype for many later famous mosques of the Middle East and North Africa, like – next slide – here the great mosque of Qairouan, 836, and here – next slide – the mosque of al-Hakim in Cairo, 990-1013. We find further examples in Spain, here Cordoba, the great mosque or here – next slide – as you can see with different proportions and a rather small courtyard the great mosque in Algiers or similar – next slide – the Kutubiya in Marrakesh.

The last topology to be described in the context of my work is also primarily constructed outside the physical mosque complex and the modern Syrian state. It is present in many countries of the world and manifests in architecture, books, speeches and images. It might be the most well-known topology outside the Muslim community, the study and reproduction of the Umayyad Mosque as an architectural prototype present not only in university lecture halls for students of architecture but also in the context of contemporary mosque design. This topology – primarily con-
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constructed by architects and architectural or art historians – which merely through its professional constitution is closely linked to the tangible heritage sector – is primarily concerned with matters of design, form and proportions as well as their tradition, authenticity and reproduction. The enormous and long-lasting influence the construction of the Umayyad Mosque had for Islamic architecture and urban planning in the Middle East, is accurately summarised by Flood, who describes that “the construction of the Damascus mosque not only irrevocably altered the urban landscape of the city, inscribing upon it a permanent affirmation of Muslim hegemony, but by giving the Syrian congregational mosque its definitive form it also transformed the subsequent history of the mosque in general.” (Flood, 2000, p. 14)

In the context of architectural history in the Islamic region, the Umayyad mosque is exceptional for at least two reasons. Most importantly it is the earliest mosque which is still in use, the oldest mosque in the world that still demonstrates most architectural features of the time of its initial construction. It is indeed still an Umayyad mosque: “While the mosque’s dimensions and almost all its elements of construction have been taken from earlier buildings, no completed part of Roman or Christian architecture has remained and, in spite of numerous repairs over the years, what is visible is, in all features but ceilings, the Umayyad building.” (Grabar, 1973, p. 105)

The second unique feature to be mentioned is its function as a prototype for mosque architecture, not only in Syria but all over the world. As the earliest mosque building which represented Muslim sovereignty and power it was reproduced in many other cities and regions to reflect this signification. Retrospectively, the building represents the first important stage of development of a distinctive Islamic architecture, although it was not constructed as a per se Islamic monument but developed on the basis of preceding architectural structures. Kuban highlights its watershed character:

“During the reign of al-Walid the Great Mosque of Damascus was built in A.D. 706-714/5 which is the oldest mosque still in use in its original shape. One of the most discussed of the Umayyad mosques, it represents the early stage in the development of Islamic architecture. In it we find the first monumental expression of the Muslim ritual.” (Kuban, 1974, p. 14)

The Umayyad Mosque can be found in every publication concerned with the history of Islamic architecture – in many cases as the first or at least the first in-depth discussed example – and students of architecture all over the world have discussed its ground plan in at least one of their lectures on early architectural history. It would certainly be redundant to consider all available publications and I prefer to focus on demonstrating that not only the complete mosque but also its individual elements became models of the following centuries. Flood tries to underline this model character in an article which highlights “how tenuous the visual links between an archetypal building and its copies may be”, in exploring the whole range of quotations from the Umayyad Mosque: “From Umayyad Spain to Seljuq Iran, it seems that the architectural forms associated with the Great Mosque of Damascus were replicated and, through their incorporation in regional idioms, profoundly influenced the formal evolution of the mosque.” (Flood, 1997, p. 57) This evolution and with it this
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topology are not so much demonstrated by the descriptions and discussions of the Umayyad Mosque in the respective literature, but rather by the writings on other mosques throughout the Muslim empires which over and over again refer to the Umayyad Mosque as the initial prototype, inspiration or ideal. When focusing on individual elements, we can observe the ground plan and its general proportions reinterpreted all over the Ottoman Empire and especially in the prestigious mosques in north-western Turkey, for example the two great mosques of the Ottoman capitals in Bursa and Edirne. In her analysis of these two prominent mosques of the subsequent Ottoman capitals, Necipoglu clearly identifies this resemblance and states that “the plan of the Umayyad Great Mosque in Damascus (which had already influenced the Artuqid mosques of south-east Anatolia) is reinterpreted.” (Necipoglu, 1994, p. 152)

The most distinctive characteristic of the ground plan are the naves and the transept or so-called axial nave: “In the mosque of Damascus three naves that are parallel to the back or qiblah wall are cut in the centre by a single nave, perpendicular to the wall. This has been called an axial nave and in a variety of ways occurs in a fairly large number of early mosques.” (Grabar, 1973, p. 117)447 Even the famous al-Azhar mosque in Cairo illustrates the structure of naves and axial naves in both its original structure and first extension of the prayer hall later added to “the original hypostyle construction, which like the Great Mosque of Damascus is distinguished by a transept leading to a central Mihrab.” (Meinecke-Berg, 1987, p. 223)448

The dome which dominates the central, axial nave in Damascus is another element copied in later mosque buildings, for example in the great Seljuk mosques in Silvan and Mardin or later in Ayyubid mosques like Sultan Baybar in Cairo. “As Herzfeld noted, those domed mosques with wide courtyards and aisles parallel to the qibla wall were largely inspired by the Umayyad Great Mosque in Damascus (…)” (Necipoglu, 1994). Finally, the courtyard with its richly decorated arcades with ornaments and mosaics has impressed and inspired rulers and architects for several centuries. Art historians for example suggest that the well-known system of double-tired arcades that enlarges the majestic prayer hall of the Great Mosque in Cordoba in its idea “is probably taken from the arcades of the Great Mosque at Damascus” (Fernández-Puertas, 1994, p. 101). And Oleg Grabar points out that the famous ornaments, too, in their “sturdily harmonious arrangement, possibly inspired by Byzantine palace façades (…) were followed in a number of mosques that were directly influenced by it.” (Grabar, 1973, p. 108)

After many topologies with an emphasis on intangible qualities and characteristics of the Umayyad Mosque complex, this logos, reproduction and study of the model of Islamic architecture which represents the ideal Muslim monument, is often related to or often takes place in tangible manifestations. Its topoi can either be found in the architectural structure of the Umayyad Mosque or, more often, in other mosques to be studied as quotations. While architectural studies and art historical research focus on the scientific context of this logos, contemporary mosque design still incorporates
the concept as representation of the symbolic form and its associated or attributed meanings.

This topology further includes the immense appreciation of not only architects and art historians but also of other professions concerned with historic buildings for the structural remains of the Umayyad Mosque as they are present and accessible in the centre of Damascus. As “the oldest extant mosque” (Kuban, 1994, p. 80), the earliest remaining Muslim building for worship, it carries a superlative for all those that find value in the age of stones. However, the professionals who construct this topology and who are at the same time often concerned with the preservation of the complex may want to keep in mind that my description of this topology did not refer to a single local voice. Such absence is intended and has its reason, as for the local users and Muslim visitors this superlative seems of very little, and if at all then of symbolic interest.

3 Heritage Umayyad Mosque – revisited

The heritage topologies of the heritage concept Umayyad Mosque described above have illustrated that an allegedly tangible heritage site can hardly be reduced to the values attributed to its physical substance. On the contrary, the variety of identity constructions, value attribution and knowledge conception identified underlines the need to approach every heritage concept by means of an individual non-standardised analysis. If we recall the various themes and try to focus on the respective roles the Umayyad Mosque is attributed in the context of these themes, only one of thirteen, the ‘Umayyad Mosque museum’ conceptualises the concept as a heritage site. And this heritage site seems to be primarily constructed by foreigners or by the local industries aiming to attract foreigners for economic gains, but does not contribute to the reflection of cultural diversity and local identity.

Other themes approach the Umayyad Mosque in the role of an assistant, facilitator or transmitter for the performance of religious duties or the search for proximity to Allah. Some topologies further conceptualise the facilitation of travel or displacement, a travel to another, often utopian – or more specifically both dystopian and eutopian – place, be it temporal to encounter martyrs in the late 7th centuries, fantastic, to imaginary princesses living in chambers under the courtyard domes or mental, to a perceived place of unlimited peace and quietude; the heritage concept assists in replacing our state of presence in place. Two further roles are those of a social platform, again with the character of a facilitator of social exchange, social encounters or social practices; and last but not least it constitutes a symbol, for home, for power, for governmental legitimation or for religious identity and even here the concept Umayyad Mosque is a facilitator of conveying these concepts and thereby offers anchor or reference point for identity formation.
The utilisation of the concept as a facilitator of the achievement of desires needs and dreams in the lives of individuals and groups, this knowing of how to interconnect a heritage concept and personal action is dwelling in heritage. The continuation of this integration of heritage into personal seeking of the fulfilment of desires is the first and foremost means of heritage preservation. We are back to where we began with Heidegger and his citation that “what is created cannot come itself into being without those who preserve it” (Heidegger, 1971a, p. 66). It is the creative redefinition and use of the heritage concept that continuously constructs it, makes it valuable and ensures its continued being, not as a value in itself but as a means of making life more meaningful. I assume this aspect of preserving heritage by utilizing heritage as a facilitator and meaning-giver requires further explanation, as the concept seems entirely unfamiliar to those concerned with monumental or tangible heritage.

Topological analysis with the emphasised identification of heritage logos suggests that heritage is not an end in itself but valued and appreciated as part of a process, in almost all cases aimed beyond the heritage concept. In the case of the Umayyad Mosque, the perpetuating principles for construction of the topologies were desires aimed at worship, security, pleasure, participation, fulfilment or acknowledgement. These ambitions and the creative actions towards their achievement or satisfactions are the initial concepts of heritage construction that were described as logoi. We have identified the desire to find proximity to the divine as part of a congregation, the desire to participate in transcendental history of faith, or the desire for spiritual and physical recreation. We have further observed heritage-bearers constructing topologies in longing for home, in wanting to keep reputation and a state of decency, in wishing to affiliate with the presence of prophets or trying to gain symbolic legitimation, all of which are achieved by utilising the Umayyad Mosque.

A heritage site – as defined in a tangible heritage context – is supposed to be valued for its particular qualities such as architectural, artistic, aesthetic, historic, or cultural attributes or characteristics. These qualities are certainly also valued for the benefits they bring in human life contexts, but these benefits – such as history documentation, edifying illustration, educating exhibition or enjoyable perception of beauty – are stimuli to an experience but not tools towards an achievement. It is this difference of stimulus versus tool – or exposition versus facilitation – and not of tangible versus intangible, which divides static from dynamic expressions of heritage. While the static or expositing expressions can eventually also be used as significations of value or identity concepts, it is the dynamic expressions and meanings of heritage, the tools and means to perform human actions, which are integral to the dwelling, home and identity of men.

The following subchapters elaborate on this difference and the dependant processes of significance demonstration and identity affirmation. Initially the topologies of the concept Umayyad Mosque, especially the topoi in which the identified logoi find their expression, are discussed in the framework of UNESCO typologies with the implicit question whether the Umayyad Mosque is well-categorised as a monument.
on the World Heritage List. Subsequently the logos – topos relationships are considered in the larger context of heritage construction cycles while taking into account also the distinction of actively and passively constructed topologies that we encountered in at least three of the thirteen topologies. In the last and concluding chapter of this section, a statement of significance developed on the basis of the conventional heritage introduction is contrasted with the synthesis statement of the analysed heritage topologies. I have opted for replacing the term statement of significance in this context by statement of identity, to support my conclusive thesis that it is neither value attribution nor significance cognition or knowledge legitimation, but identity affirmation that enables dwelling in and personal knowledge of heritage.

3.1 The case in UNESCO typologies

When analysing the construction of the heritage concept Umayyad Mosque, I have deliberately applied a pre-categorical approach, which on the basis of empirical studies identified heritage themes – and derived topologies – according to narratives. In result the topological analysis so far deliberately neglected UNESCO conceptions, definitions and categories of heritage that had been discussed in earlier parts of my writing, especially the two categories that served as the main heading of my writing, intangible and tangible heritage. Although I have earlier positioned myself critically with regard to the seemingly absolute dichotomy of intangible and tangible heritage, I nevertheless wish to relate the topologies identified to the UNESCO categories considered earlier. The guiding question in such a relation is whether the heritage themes I have spontaneously designated as heritage on the basis of narrative elements, would also be considered heritage in the framework of the two operational UNESCO heritage conventions, the World Heritage Convention (UNESCO, 1972a) and the Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage (UNESCO, 2003b).

The fact that the architectural complex Umayyad Mosque is already part of the World Heritage Site ‘Ancient City of Damascus’, suggests that at least some of the topologies identified are covered by the world heritage definitions. On review of these definitions it seems most likely to consider the Umayyad Mosque topologies under monument, rather than group of buildings or sites. Within the categories listed as examples of monuments “architectural works (…) which are of outstanding universal value from the point of history, art or science” (UNESCO, 1972a, § 1) seems to best correspond to the architectural structure of the complex. And indeed, the topology called ‘architectural prototype’ immediately lends itself for attribution to this definition and in addition is unique, outstanding and perhaps also reflects what might be intended as universal in being the first, oldest and best preserved of its kind; an architectural monument in superlatives for the convention of superlatives. We might also associate the Umayyad mosque museum, which somehow is derived from these particular architectural qualities. On the other hand, the ‘Umayyad Mosque museum’ is a construction that is based on the experience of the potential and actual
architectural structure and does not highlight architectural attributes in the context of history, art or science. Outstanding history is further represented in the shrines of Imam al-Hussayn and Yahya but it will definitely be difficult to prove how the architectural structures related document the particular outstanding events in history that could be considered. It seems that when solely focussing on the definition of monuments, we remain with the ‘architectural prototype’ as the only topology qualifying as heritage under the World Heritage Convention.

A scrutinizing look at the criteria under which the ‘Ancient City of Damascus’ is listed, might guide us toward additional criteria-topology interrelations. The urban settlement is listed under criteria (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (vi), two of which, criterion (ii) recognizing “an important interchange of human values (…) on developments in architecture” and (iv) considering “an outstanding example of a type of building (…) which illustrates (a) significant stage(s) in human history” (UNESCO, 2005g, § 77) immediately recommit to the ‘architectural prototype’. Considering criterion (i), “a masterpiece of human creative genius” I could well think of the ‘smoking room’ or the ‘playground’ as topologies created by human creative genii – though exceptionality might be far-fetched. But in the context of the World Heritage Convention such creative genius needs to find its expression in the architectural structures which for cases of apparent alternative usage cannot possibly be the case. If we turn to (iii), an “exceptional testimony to a cultural tradition” (UNESCO, 2005g, § 77) we face a similar problem as well, in that we think of several topologies being exceptional cultural traditions – such as the prayers, pilgrimage to the prophets or Imam al-Hussayn, social activities in the mosque etc. – but the architectural evidence of these might not suffice for proof of exceptionality.

By casting doubts on the interrelation of topology and architectural structure, I do not mean to question whether the structure and its particular elements could be judged exceptional – an assessment which shall be left to the World Heritage Committee and its regularly changing unwritten criteria – but whether the topologies identified indeed are taking place in the architectural structure. This does most often not seem to be the case. If we recall the topoi in which according to the informants and heritage-constructors the topologies take place, for example the prayer in the heart and mind of the individual, the rows of men and synchronic movement of human bodies, the proximity of the congregation and the audibility of the azan, then this cannot be considered heritage under the definition of architectural works of outstanding universal value. Many other topoi identified raise similar difficulties and this fact becomes most evident with regard to criterion (vi), “be associated with events or living traditions, with ideas or with beliefs of outstanding universal significance” (UNESCO, 2005g, § 77) for which several topologies could qualify if they were taking place in the physical structure of the mosque complex. In fact, four other topologies could be discussed as perhaps taking place in the physical location in the context of criterion (vi) but only if we revise the initial categorical selection and consider the Umayyad Mosque a site, and not an architectural structure. These are the ‘blessings
of the prophets’ which are physically related to the tomb of Yahya as a site or location, similarly the ‘mourning for Imam al-Hussayn’ which is taking place in the historic event at the site and in an even earlier history ‘St. John Cathedral’ has its root for still site-related construction, although the contemporary topology rather takes place in its displacement. Finally the piazza is dependant on the site as an open place, a symbolic but also geographical centre in the historic city. Further consideration of these four topologies as cultural heritage according to the World Heritage Convention would – as stipulated by the restrictions in application of criterion (vi) – require that the site Umayyad Mosque and not the architectural structure Umayyad Mosque is already of outstanding universal value. And here, at the latest, the inclusive attempt seems to fail and we are once again left with a world heritage architectural structure that represents a prototype and the earliest extant example of Islamic mosque construction.

Does the lack of architectural or physical topoi for the other topologies suggest that they – although derived from a heritage concept that carries the name of a building – rather fit in the context of the Intangible Heritage Convention? We recall that intangible cultural heritage was defined as “the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills – as well as instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith – that communities, groups and in some cases individuals recognise as part of their cultural heritage.” (UNESCO, 2003b, § 1) Although practices, representations, expressions and even knowledge seem to far better reflect the themes of most topologies than any definition under the World Heritage roof, the characterisation given presents a new difficulty: the expressions have to be explicitly recognised as heritage by the practitioners, which requires that the groups concerned give meaning to the abstract concept heritage. Unfortunately – as was stated before – the convention seems to define heritage as heritage and therefore even leaves it to our imagination what heritage is and how the recognition of heritage can be confirmed.

Perhaps as long as we lack strategies for such confirmations, we can at first commence with an inverted approach of excluding topologies that would certainly not suit the above definition, such as the ‘architectural prototype’, the ‘Umayyad Mosque museum’ or ‘St John Cathedral’. Further specifications of the continued definition that such expressions need to be “transmitted from generation to generation” and require to be “constantly recreated by communities and groups in response to their environment (…) and their history” (UNESCO, 2003b, § 1) also excludes the smoking-room for which generational continuity cannot yet be proven as well as the very recent topology ‘ramadan charity’. Finally, intangible heritage according to the Member States of UNESCO provides its practitioners “with a sense of identity, thus promoting respect for cultural diversity and human creativity” (UNESCO, 2003b, § 1). While the sense of identity is somewhat questionable for the governmentally initiated topology ‘representation of power’, the mutual respect or respect for cultural diversity again disqualifies ‘St. John Cathedral’. In the framework of this definition we remain with seven topologies: prayer, ritual visits to the two shrines, playground,
recreation, piazza and longing for home that could potentially be considered intangible heritage, although the latest seems to lack a derived practice or expression.

Could any of the six remaining really be considered intangible heritage within the categories proposed or even be included into the representative list? Muslim prayer without doubt is an intangible heritage expression, a ritual with regard to the domains listed in article 2 of the convention (UNESCO, 2003b, § 2). But could it be considered representative in its association with the location Umayyad Mosque? Perhaps one could argue that through the significant combination of male and female worshippers in the same prayer hall, which is in addition – as an associated artefact - the earliest prayer hall still existing, the example could be considered of long-standing continuity. But whether this would qualify as representative can hardly be judged, until the Operational Directives to the Convention provide better guidance on how this term is to be understood. The same can be stated for visiting the shrines of the prophets or Imam al-Hussayn, which – in both cases – can be considered social practices and rituals in the framework of the convention, but which are by no means limited to the Umayyad mosque and are perhaps more strongly connected to local identity in other places, such as the tomb of the prophet in Medina or the shrine of Imam al-Hussayn in Karbala. The topology of the children’s playground in a mosque can only become so dominant in a country that does not provide adequate public playgrounds for children or childcare institutions for mothers’ release. While the topology outlines the urgent need for both, it might perhaps be considered heritage neither by the mothers nor in the framework of this international convention. Two topologies persevere, ‘tranquillity – keep and restore calm’ and ‘Piazza – sitting, chatting, flirting’, two social practices which can indeed be considered intangible cultural heritage. And both have their respective historic roots and descriptions. We might not be able to reach a final conclusion on these two plus one topologies that might be suitable: socializing and recreation and the earlier discussed prayers. While in the context of the masterpiece programme the heritage concept Umayyad Mosque could have been suggested as a cultural space, “defined as a place which brings together a concentration of popular and traditional cultural activities” (UNESCO, 2001a, § 7), which could have acknowledged several topologies at the same time, the new convention requires to focus on a particular expression, representation or tradition to then successively also recognise the associated space. This not only makes recognition very unlikely for any of the topologies identified above, it also poses a risk to all heritage concepts and themes which combine a multi-layered variety of heritage expressions and representations and which may not be prepared to emphasise one at the expense of the others.

After this brief analysis of topologies identified and their relation to heritage definitions in the context of UNESCO, I summarise that expressions of five topologies may be considered intangible cultural heritage according to the 2003 Convention – though probably none would be well-placed on the representative list – and that one topology the ‘architectural prototype’ qualifies as cultural heritage according to the
World Heritage Convention and would most likely justify listing on the World Heritage List. Does this result imply that the other seven topologies cannot be considered heritage expressions? Or does it mean that according to a UNESCO point of view the ‘architectural prototype’ is to be given exclusive priority in safeguarding activities? In theory probably not, as we would be referred to the 1972 recommendations (cf. UNESCO, 1972d), which aim at preserving all cultural heritage aspects that are not of outstanding universal value but of local and national importance and in the context of the 2003 Convention one would probably also aim to preserve the largest possible variety of (the five) heritage expressions. In practice however, heritage management more or less exclusively addresses those qualities listed in statements of significance, inscribed, inventoried or documented in the framework of the conventions and especially their lists. This is equally true for national heritage lists, inventories and registers, where heritage preservation does not address expressions, which obviously don’t fall under the heritage definitions formulated.

Here, at the latest, the dilemma becomes blatantly obvious. Heritage expressions are legitimately preserved if they can be identified according to definitions and criteria formulated for heritage identification. The definitions and criteria, however, are a product of a particular point in time and while the perception, recognition and valuation of heritage – like heritage itself – dynamically evolves, the definitions and criteria are often legally determined and difficult to revise. This is true in particular for criteria and definitions that have been ratified by State Parties on the basis of an international and legally binding instrument and perhaps here we have uncovered an important constraint of conventions for heritage preservation. They are an extremely inflexible long-term and global tool for expressions of a highly dynamic and local character. The consequence has already been considered above; it is a slow but constant process towards heritage globalisation and heritage homogenisation.

If we now return to the thirteen heritage topologies identified – which I still dare to call heritage topologies – and reconsider them outside the definitions provided in the two UNESCO conventions, we obtain an entirely different assessment and also different priorities for heritage safeguarding. This last review shall be guided by the sole aim at promoting and protecting the diversity of cultural expressions of humankind; and this is or was in a sense the intention of both conventions.

3.2 Heritage – emergence and obtrusion

What then is heritage, if even the definitions of the leading organisation in cultural policies, UNESCO, seem too unclear or restricted? What conception of heritage can we base our judgements on? And how can we define heritage significance? At the very beginning of this work, on page 2 of the prologue, I have stated that the definition of cultural heritage drawn on for my writings is defined in the Mexico-City Declaration on Cultural Policies (UNESCO, 1982). Instead of turning away from definitions produced in the context of UNESCO, I wish to reiterate this definition which
is based on the widest possible concept of culture. Perhaps I should cite it a second time, this time in combination with the concept of culture\textsuperscript{464} on which it is based:

“Culture may now be said to be the whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterize a society or social group. (…) it is culture that gives man the ability to reflect upon himself. It is culture that makes us specifically human (…) endowed with a critical judgement and a sense of moral commitment. It is through culture that we discern values and make choices. It is through culture that man expresses himself, becomes aware of himself, recognizes his incompleteness, questions his own achievements, seeks untiringly for new meanings and creates works through which he transcends his limitations.” (UNESCO, 1982, preamble)

These works and all representations of the processes of man as an expression of culture as described here are to be considered cultural heritage. Such heritage according to the Mexico-City Declaration “includes both tangible and intangible works\textsuperscript{465} through which the creativity of that people finds expression: languages, rites, beliefs, historic places and monuments, literature, works of art (…)” (UNESCO, 1982, § 23).

In addition to this definition I wish to also recall the heritage construction cycle defined earlier and described in more detail in Section Two, chapter 2 Heritage and value – an evolutionary perspective. This cycle conceptualised heritage construction as a synthesis of the gaining of knowledge, its legitimation, its transmission into values, the expression of values as significance and their integration in meaning-making processes on the basis of narratives which affirm and define identities and their expressions, heritage, as a basis for knowledge generation etc. Furthermore, we had also defined following the words of Heidegger that preservation of heritage is a knowing of and dwelling in heritage. This dwelling in, in the course of my work was explained in two different but not contradictory ways: firstly, as the localisation of identity in heritage – in which heritage can be understood as the facilitator of self-localisation\textsuperscript{466} – and secondly, as the active and creative utilisation of heritage to the fulfilment of aims and desires in life\textsuperscript{467}.

Based on these three elements, the definition of cultural heritage as drafted in Mexico-City, the heritage construction cycle and the idea of dwelling in heritage, I reach a first preliminary conclusion, which is already present in the Mexico-City Declaration in highlighting that it is heritage “through which creativity of that people finds expression” and also that cultural heritage enables people to defend their sovereignty and independence and affirm cultural identity (UNESCO, 1982, § 25). My conclusion is that heritage is always actively (re)created, (re)affirmed and (re)constructed and cannot be constructed out of the position of a passive consumer. It follows that it is the process of active construction, meaning-giving and utilisation that designates heritage as heritage.

If we – this first preliminary conclusion in mind – return to the heritage topologies identified above, then at least three topologies we encountered, which were described as combinations of active and creative constructions – or rather productions – by a small group and the passive or participatory construction of those who experience
the expression, raise further questions. Can these topologies still be referred to as heritage, especially as the heritage of those who merely participate or – in other words – only engage in passive construction? In order to answer this question, it is helpful to focus not merely on the logos and topos of the topologies, as I have done so far, but to investigate the complete heritage construction cycle and compare the discrepancies of processes in active and passive heritage construction. Based on two examples out of the thirteen topologies, one actively and the other both actively and passively constructed, I try to highlight these particular differences. For this comparison I have selected ‘faith and duty - performance of prayer’ as an actively constructed and ‘monumental – representation of power’ as the ambivalent, actively and passively constructed topology. Both are comparable in their historic continuity in that they derive from traditions that trace back into the late 7th and early 8th century.

The comparison of three heritage construction cycles, first the two actively produced followed by the more passively constructed, in each case begins with the logoi identified as the initial and recreating concept from which via the knowledge gained, values derived, significance expressed etc. we arrive at identity formation and heritage expression, and through retracing the complete cycle we again reach the identified topos. The starting and ending points – logos and topos – are given less attention in this analysis as the focus is directed towards the other elements of the cycle.

The desire of the believers to find proximity to Allah as part of a congregation of faithful (logos) encourages worshippers to gather in the Umayyad Mosque at five different times of each day. Allah loves obedience (knowledge) which is best expressed in the five daily prayers (knowledge) which Muhammad has taught in each detail for the benefit of the Muslim community (legitimation). The regular attendance of a large number of other worshipers which perform the same ritual further legitimates this knowledge and provides self-affirmation to the congregation gathered. The performance of prayers is a duty of highest priority, paramount to most other duties in life (value) and it is better if performed in a congregation (value). The gathering of the community in the mosque at the particular times indicated (significance) provides its individual members with the sense of being part of the community of believers who worship Allah in the right way and who communicate with him and demonstrate their obedience (identity). To belong to those who prostrate to Allah and obey his commandments is an important aspect of the individuals lives (identity), an aspect, which is expressed in their diligence in gathering for prayer and performing the synchronic movements and recitations guided by the imam (heritage expression). The bodily movements which have been handed down by the prophet Muhammad who also taught the importance of prayers continue as do the recitations of the Quran that constitute the prayers and both are transmitted from generation to generation (heritage). The expressions of this tradition are recognizable in the heart and mind of those participating in the active communication with Allah, as expressed in the rows of believers formed and their bodily synchronic movements and recitations (topoi) which reassure the importance of this tradition on a daily basis.
The Syrian national government does its best to assist the Syrian people and wishes to be perceived as the most recent structure of rulers based on the moral and ethical standards of Islam. It wishes the Syrian society to understand and support this governmental identity (logos). Ruling structures are traditionally considered more legitimate and more supportable if they are based on principles of justice and equity in Islam (knowledge) and at the same time are tolerant towards all non-Islamic minorities as the earliest rulers of Islam, the four caliphs, were (knowledge). The Umayyad mosque is a place of national and Muslim identity (knowledge) and the symbolic character of the place can be utilised for governmental support (legitimation). It is important to strengthen the right perception of and promote identification with the governmental representatives (values) which are expressed in symbols of power and tradition (signification). Since the Umayyad Mosque is a place of strong historical ties and local identity, the identification with the modern rulers will be consolidated if a trustworthy and convincing permanent link between the place and the rulers can be established (meaning). The population therefore should identify with the building as well as with their governance which is associated to these structures (identity-production). The perception is supposed to be: we are reigned by men who care about our Muslim rules and who see themselves as the successors of the Muslim caliphs who reigned in the same centre of power (identity-production). The symbolic links between place and reign are expressed in the renovation and beautification of the building (heritage production) which now houses two official reception halls, as well as the symbolic imprint of the president’s name in panels (heritage production), presentation of the rulers visits to the mosque in television broadcasts and strong governmental support for other activities in the place (heritage production). The produced expressions are at the same time the topoi, such as the panels, the renovated building structures and the television broadcasts.

The Syrian government seems to care about the society’s traditions as well as ethical and moral values (knowledge). Why else – if not for these values – should the president privately sponsor the conservation of the Umayyad Mosque and perform his personal Aid prayers there, visible to everybody in Syria (legitimation). By this he positions himself as part of the Muslim congregation which on an equal basis involves rulers and ruled (value). One can trust a government as long as it defines its limits, rules and legitimation in the tradition of the earliest Muslim rulers, the caliphs (value). And that this is the case seems to become obvious in the many other supportive measures for the mosque, not only in ramadan (significance), but also for other festive events, e.g. the birthday of the prophet (significance). It seems the government also is trying to use the symbolic meaning of the building for promotion purposes (meaning?). It can be considered good that they do something but one will nevertheless continue to use the building for its traditional purposes and judge one’s rulers according to their actions (?). And here our circle fails to become a circle as the meaning-giving is already rather a reason-giving (or even reason-searching?) and identity creation and affirmation seems not at all involved in this passively constructed topology. In consequence, no heritage expression or self-generated knowledge is produced by the valuers and
meaning- or reason-givers. The circle is dependent on permanent input from outsiders to the community and meaning-giving structures concerned and the expression described cannot be considered an expression of local identity. The same is also true for the first cyclical description of this topology which produced rather than affirmed meaning, identity and heritage, but in this case not for the producers but for a larger audience.

Heritage creation for others (third parties) is nothing unusual; we find the same approach in the Umayyad Mosque museum or in almost any museum in the world which presents the heritage of a few to many. All participants of such topologies including the tourists in the Umayyad Mosque, the visitors of the ramadan breakfast and the viewers of the presidential prayers on television lack to perform the crucial step of identity creation based on what they are presented with and therefore do not initiate a complete heritage construction cycle. Consideration of such heritage can be very fascinating in educational contexts, but meaningful preservation is necessarily dependant on active (re)creators and (re)constructors. If we aim to preserve the cultural diversity of humankind, heritage which is not an expression of local identity and therefore an ongoing heritage construction should not be placed at the centre of our attention and maybe should not even carry the designation heritage.

The above considerations here lead us to a second preliminary conclusion on the characteristics of heritage as an expression of cultural diversity: It is the active construction, creative utilisation, self-initiated valuation and especially identity formation or reaffirmation that defines cultural heritage and that reflects and communicates the local to the global. It is this local identity that through its expression in heritage can be communicated to the global, which the Mexico-City Declaration sees as the universal in diversity, framed in a definition that seems to combine the aim of our two conventions:

“The universal cannot be postulated in the abstract by any single culture: it emerges from the experience of all the world’s peoples and each affirms its own identity. Cultural identity and cultural diversity are inseparable.” (UNESCO, 1982, § 5)

We understand that the cultural diversity as an expression of cultural identities in its very multiplicity describes the universal. The universal is being, human action and its initiating concept that creates being. To define the expressions of being as expressions of identity, statements of significance might be a too narrow focus to grasp the essential. I therefore wish to propose a shift in heritage identification, a major shift as it might seem, expressed in a minor shift in wording: a re-orientation from statements of significance to statements of identity.

### 3.3 Just another statement of significance?

What difference could a statement of identity make? If, as considered above, diversity and identity are thought of as inseparable, then the safeguarding of identity is a
pre-condition to the safeguarding of cultural diversity. Heritage preservation can only contribute to the aim of protecting cultural diversity if defined as a means of identity preservation. While identity progressively moves into the centre of our attention and the heritage construction cycle, a deficit of my earlier elaborations now becomes more conspicuous. While every other term in the context of the cycle was defined, identity was, although briefly discussed, not defined but rather omitted\(^4\) The reason for this is that a more-detailed consideration of identity at that point would have revealed that the cycle presented is an abstract oversimplification of a heritage construction process in which heritage and identity cannot be conceptualised as elements of the cycle but somehow have to be seen as concepts accompanying every element of the cycle as an inward belonging (identity) and an outward expression (heritage).

What is identity? As a part or company of a cyclical construction process\(^4\), identity itself is a continuous, never-static and never-complete product of yet another process, the process of identification or self-identification. According to Stuart Hall identification is “a construction, a process never completed – always ‘in process’. (…) Though not without its determinate conditions of existence, including the material and symbolic resources required to sustain it, identification is in the end conditional, lodged in contingency” (Hall, 1996, p. 2)\(^2\). Hall elaborates that identities are not outward expressions like heritage but primarily concepts of self-localisation – identity is the state of dwelling – within a meaning-making context:

> “Identities are therefore constituted within, not outside representation. They relate to the intervention of tradition as much as to tradition itself, which they oblige us to read not as an endless reiteration but as ‘the changing same’ (…) not the so-called return to roots but the coming-to-terms with our ‘routes’. They arise from the narrativisation of the self (…).” (Hall, 1996, p. 4)

Since I have already employed Heideggerian terminology in stating that identity as self-localisation is dwelling, I should perhaps also draw on his definition of identity, which even moves a step further in being more holistic and all-encompassing than Hall or my earlier approaches. To Heidegger, identity is a concept of selfsameness, present in the correlation of being and thinking. The question regarding the nature of identity involves the question of the belonging of being. Heidegger writes:

> “Now it appears: being together with thinking belongs to an identity, the essence of which derives from the letting belong together which we call the happening (Ereignis). The essence of identity is a belonging (Eigentum) of happening.” (Heidegger, 2006, p. 48, translated from the German)\(^4\)

The happening (Ereignis) is what the Mexico-City declaration termed the universal and its expressions which are produced by the interdependence of being and thinking as present in identity. The taking place of identity or rather its place of origin (Ort der Wesensherkunft der Identität) according to Heidegger is the topology (cf. Heidegger, 2006, p. 48). Such taking place can be approached in the context of identity statements for topologies which are proposed in the following comparison of a statement of significance and a statement of identity for the Umayyad Mosque.
Statements of significance should in theory be available in heritage registers in Syria or in the World Heritage nomination dossier in the World Heritage archives. But the early dossier of the ancient city Damascus does not include a statement of significance and the Umayyad Mosque is merely listed along with other monuments as an architectural monument of the city. In lack of an existing statement of significance I have drafted what I would consider a ‘typical’ statement of significance combining a summary of the conventional analysis with extracts of the topological analysis, focusing on topologies in which the significance of the heritage expression was very evident.

Statement of significance:

The architectural complex Umayyad Mosque was built between approximately 709 and 715 AD following the order by Caliph al-Walid, ruler of the early Umayyad dynasty. It is the earliest mosque preserved in its original ground plan and the oldest building of Muslim worship which is still used as a mosque. The ground plan of the mosque, especially through its relation to the surrounding street network of the historic city, demonstrates that it was built on the precincts of an earlier temple and Greek inscriptions in some parts of the complex bear witness to the latest preceding structure, the church of St. John, who is said to be buried in the present prayer hall. The mosque, already in the first years after completion of the construction, became famous for its architectural elements and proportions, especially the arcaded courtyard and the tripartite prayer hall with an axial nave, which served as a prototype for mosques throughout the Islamic empire. Mosaics of high artistic quality – which initially embellished the entire mosque – still remain at the northern façade and in the arcades of the courtyard. The illustrations, unusually figurative for an Islamic context, are interpreted as either idealised depictions of the city and its river oasis or imaginary motives of paradise. Especially the northern façade mosaics were partly damaged during the last fire in 1893 and now include areas in which the themes were reconstructed according to historic photographs.

According to legends established already before the completion of the Umayyad construction, the head of the prophet Yahya (John the Baptist in Christian tradition) is said to be buried in the complex and his shrine is a lively pilgrimage destination. Aside from welcoming pilgrims and tourists – which are allowed to enter all public areas of the building, the complex is mainly used as a mosque and the five daily Muslim prayers are performed in congregation in the prayer hall. In recent times the government has promoted the complex as a visitor attraction and a symbol of national identity. Summarised, the Umayyad Mosque complex is a unique example of early Islamic architecture which still remains readable in its original architectural structures.

The above statement of significance should ideally be followed by many statements of identity, in the best possible case one or even more for each topology, written from a narrator’s perspective by those who participate in the process of identity construction. The collection of statements could finally – in a second step – be summa-
rised by a researcher or scholar in order to provide a brief overview of the variety of identity expressions that may be relevant for heritage identification. I pretend to perform this step of creating a summary although statements of identity were not available in written format but only as subliminal or explicit expressions stated during the interviews conducted.

Statement of Identity

The concept Umayyad Mosque is an integral part of the identity of worshipers who gather in the mosque complex for their ritual prayers and thereby continue a centuries old tradition in the footprints of the earliest Muslim believers in the 7th century. As the traditional facilitator of congregational prayers, the Umayyad Mosque symbolises divine presence – participating in a congregational prayer means participating in a communication with Allah – and especially the azan serves the inhabitants of the centre of Damascus as a steady reminder of Muslim values, duties and identity. The spatial continuity of the location, since the first Muslims who prayed here, and the continuing, if not steadily increasing size of the community gathered, reaffirm this sense of identity. The Umayyad Mosque further is a symbolic centre of social activities, and information exchange; it is the place where information goes public, where the city exchanges with the outskirts and the rural areas and this tradition – despite the introduction of newspapers and television – has endured for centuries. Social contacts are established and one meets friends and perhaps future spouses and through this process the mosque becomes a matter of personal social identity: we met in the Umayyad Mosque.

The Umayyad Mosque is further associated to the concept of recreation, spiritual and physical recovery which can be experienced when aiming for silence and reflection. As such it assists in walking the path toward faith. Especially mothers seem to embrace the mosque as their mosque since communal social circles guard children and offer mothers the opportunity of undisturbed prayers. This social activity of mutual support of the other’s condition of worship develops a strong sense of identity among these women. Umayyad Mosque as a symbol of identity reappears as both visualisation of home in images and an abstract concept of home and belonging in Syrian communities all over the world. It is a symbol of national identity as much as of local and religious identity, a fact that is progressively promoted and utilised by the Syrian governmental authorities. As a centre of pilgrimage it also attracts believers from other regions who visit the tomb of Yahya (John the Baptist in Christian tradition) in search of blessing or the shrine of Imam al-Hussayn (third legitimate imam in Shi’a Islam) to mourn the battle of Karbala and honour the imam through their presence. Participation in pilgrimage as a communal journey of faith also develops identity bonds between associate travellers, self and place. Finally, the Umayyad Mosque is and always was one of the four places holy to Muslims (along with the holy districts of Mecca, Medina and al-Quds (Jerusalem)) and as such it will always remain a centre of worship to the only one God of Islam.
Obviously, a statement of identity presents a different range of information than a statement of significance. While a significance-focus is object based and in line with the classical approach of architectural conservation, the identity-focus considers the concept as a place of action and eventually self-localisation, a topos or even a topology. A knowing or a dwelling in heritage, as self-localisation in, and active utilisation of a concept seems better expressed in the statement of identity than in a statement of significance. While the statement of significance points at the history and tradition of the concept, the statement of identity assumes history and tradition as foundations or aspects of the present and future not of value for themselves – as in the first variant – but important for the constitution of modern society and the reaffirmation of identities. This fact was described in the above citation from Hall who said that identity formation with regard to tradition is that of a “changing same, not the so-called return to the roots but the coming-to-terms with our ‘routes’.” (Hall, 1996, p. 4) Identity creation is never backwards but always created in view of the future. Heritage as an expression of local identity is not about history but about a desired fixed point, a desire to hold onto something in an ever-faster changing world. Heritage is about our conceptual places, about taking place and being placed as the constant interposition, placement, between past and future. In this context, two verses of Heidegger’s introductory poem ‘the thinker as poet’ might now shed light on heritage constructions.

“The oldest of the old follows behind us in our thinking and yet it comes to meet us. That is why thinking holds to the coming of what has been and is remembrance. (Heidegger, 1971f)

Where thinking and being belong together, they constitute identity. Where thinking and being, gathered in identity dwell in place, they construct heritage. Where thinking and being are united, they dwell in themselves. This would be the universal topology or as Heidegger calls it unconcealedness or truth. But what is truth?

326 The Umayyad Mosque is also known under a variety of different names, which are briefly mentioned in the beginning of chapter 1 of this section: The Umayyad Mosque – a conventional heritage introduction, please confer to the endnotes 329 and 330 of this section.

327 The modern state of Syria is the Syrian Arab Republic, which declared independence in 1946, while the historic state of Syria refers to the Bilad as-Sham, a regional administration district of the Ottoman empire that spread across what today is Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.

328 And indeed I did not encounter a single individual throughout the three years of my continued empirical research who did not have any conception of the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus. Even interview partners who had never been to the physical complex or even to Syria, were able to express some idea or meaning they connected to their imagination of the concept.

329 The designation Masdjid bani al-Umawi al kabi r is the most prominent in present-day Syria, strongly promoted by the Syrian television and especially its ramadan broadcasts of the maghreb azan (the call for prayer which officially ends the daytime of ramadan and therefore the fasting period) from the courtyard of the mosque.

330 Spelling variations of the term Umayyad – which is not an Arabic literal transcription but an approximation of the Arabic umawi or umaya – are as manifold as the combinations it is used in.
Ommayad (Mawlawi, 1997) and Omayyad (Bahnassi, 1989) are just two variations of spelling that I prefer. In earlier writings on the mosque complex I decided to refer to it by the transcription of its most common name in Arabic, Djama’a al-Umawi, but since this work is addressed to a rather non-Arabic speaking international heritage community, I have opted to use the more readable phrase ‘Umayyad Mosque’ throughout my work.

The Umayyad Mosque is part of the World Heritage Site: ‘Ancient city of Damascus’ (WHC 20), which was inscribed by the World Heritage Committee in 1979 (UNESCO, 1979b). Like many other nomination proposals of the early inscription cycles the nomination file is unfortunately very meagre in that it compiles merely a few pages of historical data and entirely lacks any convincing justification of outstanding universal value, documented management system or illustrating maps. The statement of outstanding universal value remains on the general level of statements such as “The old city represents a richly endowed heritage as regards its cultural property and possibilities for tourism and economic activity.” (Syrian Arab Republic, 1978, p. 4) While the ICOMOS evaluators clearly acknowledged the outstanding value of the ancient city of Damascus they noted that the nomination file was not yet sufficient: “Everyone agrees on the importance, the quality, the value of Damascus and its old town. But the dossier requires a concise analysis of the archaeological elements, the types of human settlements and statistics on the kinds of human settlements with their individual characteristics” (ICOMOS et al., 1979). The Umayyad Mosque is described in one single paragraph of the description of the property but not referred to in the statement of OUV. Even when carefully studying the nomination file one cannot find any evidence on the particular significance of the complex, which might have necessitated the World Heritage listing.

Sanctity is a very difficult concept that might better not be applied for places in Islam. Undoubtedly the mosques of Mecca (مُسْجِد ﺍﻟْﺣُرَام) and Medina are considered holy (مَقْدِس), but to attribute sanctity to any other place, such as the Umayyad Mosque, remains controversial. Although orthodox Islam such as the Wahhabi (وَهَابِي) authorities strictly object the concept of sanctity or sacredness, many Muslims assume some kind of divine presence in objects, places and times. Places and objects believed to be sacred then contain baraka, a blessing, according to popular faith transferable at physical encounter (cf. Eliade, 1959). At the same time Shiite authors, for example Seyyed Hussein Nasr, underline the sacredness of Islamic religious architecture: “The sacred architecture of Islam par excellence is the mosque, which is itself but the ‘recreation’ and ‘recapitulation’ of the harmony, order and peace of nature which God chose as the Muslims’ enduring house for worship.” (Nasr, 1990, p. 37) Other authors such as Renard (cf. Renard, 1996, p. 44) and Bianca present mosques as explicitly not sacred: “The mosque is not sacred in itself nor does it contain sacred objects of liturgical importance.” (Bianca, 2000, p. 100)

Carter et al. continue in stating that “it possesses a history unequalled by all three” (T. Carter et al., 2004, p. 86), a comment that emphasises the enormous importance attributed to the subsequent historical uses of the complex but is probably unacceptable to most Muslims, who consider the history of the mosques at Mecca and Medina so immediately linked to the life of the prophet that it could hardly be equalled by any later structure.

Most authors agree that the probably earliest structure at this location was a temple dedicated to Haddad, “the storm, fertility and rain god of the Arameans” (Bahnassi, 1989, p. 29) She is often considered analogous to the Roman god Venus. The earliest structures remaining at present time however, seem to date back only the successive structure of a temple devoted to Jupiter, one element of which is the remaining peribolos as the outer wall of the mosque complex. This outer wall is the continuous element of all earlier structures, “a continuous element, maintained through the conversion of an antique temple into a church and a church into a mosque is the outer surrounding wall” (Wulzinger & Watzinger, 1924, p. 124 [translation from the German original])

Historians report that the Christian refusal to relinquish their church led al-Walid to forcefully destroy parts of it, according to some descriptions the basis of the tower which is now the Minaret of the Bride (Keenan, 2000), in which a Christian hermit was residing. According to other accounts he merely expelled the hermit and destroyed the central altar with the help of an axe (Wulzinger & Watzinger, 1924).

The current state of preservation of the Dome of the Eagle is one of the unclear aspects of architectural study of the Umayyad Mosque. Although Wulzinger and Watzinger insist that “the dome outlasted despite all fires, even the one of 1893, but has then received a very plain appearance during a recent renovation” (Wulzinger & Watzinger, 1924, p. 130 [translation of the German origi-
nal), it appears to be a far younger structure than al-Walid’s construction. Such theory find support of Bahnassi who gives account that “The Dome of the Eagle was renewed in 475 H. (1075 A.D.) in the time of Nizam al-Mulk (...). Salahaddin later restored two parts of the dome in 575 H. Then in 597 H. (1200 A.D.), the Dome of the Eagle was cracked by a severe earthquake and one source reported that parts of it fell. It was repaired and supported by wooden pegs. In 1893, it was destroyed by fire and it was reconstructed in the same manner as the original (Bahnassi, 1989, p. 104). And Mawlawi, too, reports that the original Dome collapsed as the result of an earthquake in 1198 CE and that its reconstruction was again destroyed by the severe earthquake of 1759 CE (Mawlawi, 1997, p. 731).

Also Carter et al. note that “while the mosque has been ravaged by invading Mongols, rocked by earthquakes and gutted by fire, what remains is impressive” (T. Carter et al., 2004, p. 87).

Traditionally interpreted as an imaginary representation of the city of Damascus, the discussion of the iconography of the mosaics was reopened by Barbara Finster, who proposed to read them as the illustration of paradise according to its Quranic descriptions. (cf. Finster, 1972) I will not elaborate on the contents or interpretations of the mosaics as their reading does not seem to be relevant to any of the topologies described hereafter.

The minbar has a liturgical rather than decorative function as the location of the khatib (الخطيب, the person performing the khutba – the Friday sermon) according to the Islamic traditions. Wensinck describes that “The conditions of the validity of the sermons are the following: The khatib must be in a state of ritual purity, his dress must be in accord with the descriptions; he must pronounce the two khutbas standing and sit between them. (...) It is commendable for the khatib to be on a pulpit or an elevated place” (Wensinck, 1986, p. 74) It has become tradition nowadays that the two highest steps of a minbar are not accessed and that the khatib will lecture from the third highest level. This behaviour traces back to the tradition of the first two caliphs, Abu Bakr and Umar who did not dare to climb to the highest level of the merely three-stage minbar of Muhammad: “Out of respect, Abu Bakr, the first caliph occupied the intermediate step and Umar modestly used the lowest” (Dickie, 1978, p. 37). This modesty of Umar is still followed.

It is very unusual for the Umayyad mosque to have four maharib. In most mosques we find one mihrab, which is the centre of the haram and the place the imam positions to direct the ritual prayers. The tradition of mihrab traces back to the prophet Muhammad who indicated the direction of prayer by a strikingly placed stone or a stick stuck into the floor (Daoulatli, 1988, p. 77).

The qibla wall serves to provide visitors to the prayer hall easy orientation and indicates the direction to which the ritual prayers are to be performed: Mecca. It is oriented orthogonally to the direction (Frisman, 1994, p. 21) and contains the mihrab or in the case of the Umayyad Mosque several maharib. Often further orientation is provided by mihrab niche designs or directed geometrical patterns in the carpets of the mosque (cf. Fehervari, 1990, p. 14).

The attribution of the fiqh schools to the maharib is indicated in illustration 1 of the appendix but will also be further considered in the first of the topologies described, 2.1 Faith and duty – performance of prayers.

This place is of utmost importance to Shi‘i Muslims to whom Hussayn is the third Imam, the legitimate successor of the prophet Muhammad. The site is part of the overall narrative of Hussayn’s martyrdom in the battle of Karbala and will be considered in more detail in the analysis of the Shi‘i dominated topology of Hussayn 2.3 Imam al-Hussayn – mourning and aspiration.

The mausoleum however is not included in the ground plan illustrating the elements of the Umayyad Mosque (cf. to illustration 1 of the annex). I have preferred to limit this illustration to the historic boundaries of the complex – the outer walls of the peribolos – with the sole exception of structures that are attached to and accessible through these walls.

I was personally astounded how few of my interview partners knew the approximate date of the building’s construction or its founder and how few actually cared or desired to know it. It turned out to be relevant for just three of the following thirteen heritage topologies and in my interviews primarily the Shi‘i pilgrims were aware of both construction date and the caliph initiating the construction.

I was able to talk to some Muslim male users of the mosque by arranging interview appointments with their wives at home and then – taking the chance of evening appointments – was often able to
benefit from their presence during the interview. However I only conducted two interviews with Syrian Muslim males without the presence of other persons.

At the request of some of my interview partners, names are generally changed unless persons spoke in an official capacity. The first names I have used to designate my interview partners are nevertheless consistent for the same person and indicate the tradition of faith the person wishes to be attributed to, and if possible the origin of the individual. For example Uthman would rather indicate a Sunni Muslim while Ali would most likely be a Shia Muslim and Christoph most probably a Christian visitor from a German speaking country, while Paolo suggests a Christian Italian. The description offered in addition to the names, however, always reproduces the information given by the individuals; according to requests of the respective persons in a more or less detailed fashion.

The interview with Zuhaira was conducted in April 2005 in the kitchen of her house in ‘Imara, while she was preparing a late lunch for her children. The initial contact with Zuhaira was established in the courtyard of the Umayyad Mosque where we happened to sit next to each other one early April afternoon of the same year. The interview was conducted in Arabic.

Samira is a British national Muslim living in Damascus for two years to study Arabic and Sharia. I interviewed her in May 2005 while having a fruit juice in one of the new restaurants in the old city, which was very empty during the early afternoon hours. The discussion took place in the English language.

Tarawih is a special evening prayer performed by Sunni Muslims in ramadan, during which they perform additional 20 Raka’a (ritual prayer cycles consisting of a recitation of the Quran, a bow and two prostrations). Lailat-ul-Qadr is one night at the end of the month of ramadan – the tradition describes it as one of the odd nights of the last ten days of ramadan – which is considered very special and usually spent awake in prayers and recitations. Many mosques remain open throughout this night and offer special devotional programmes.

Since at several religious holidays and throughout the month of ramadan the azan is also broadcast in Syrian radio and television channels, the spatial outreach of the azan is considerable even beyond the boundaries of the historic city of Damascus.

Such reduction of transmission volume is in fact requested by some of the new European inhabitants in the historic city of Damascus.

Iman, who I met during Fadjr prayer at Djama’a at-tawba is not a regular visitor to the Umayyad Mosque. The interview with her was conducted during Ramadan (October 2005) in the courtyard of her house in presence of her husband and between one and three of her children. Her oldest daughter Khadisha also actively participated in the interview discussions. The interview was conducted in an almost amusing language mixture of English and Arabic and is here presented in its English approximation.

Despite a certain amount of research which also extended to other states I was not able to locate another mosque in which the azan was chanted in harmony by a group of muezzins.

Tour guide explication during the visit of an English non-Muslim traveller group to the Umayyad Mosque on the 24th of March 2005, ca. 12.30pm, during the azan for the zuhr prayer.

In the azan of Shi’a mosques we also hear the addition “gather for the best of all works”.

The time interval between the performance of the azan and the beginning of the collective prayer amounts to twenty minutes with the exception of the maghreb prayer (صلاة المغرب, the sunset prayer), where the prayer is commenced after five minutes only.

Ahmad is a friend of ‘Aisha’s husband, another interview partner living in Qaimariya, who I met during a ramadan breakfast I was invited to in October 2005 at ‘Aisha’s house. After ‘Aisha reported on my research interest and the interview I had done with her, Ahmad informed me that he went to the Umayyad Mosque almost every morning and kindly offered to also answer some of my questions, which he did in English language during the continuation of the meal. ‘Aisha who lived just a few houses away from the family I lived with, became a very good friend during my research stay and offered me many valuable contacts. Her good English language skills also helped to facilitate our several in-depth interviews.
359 I have expanded my investigations to three other historic mosques, one of which is also located intro muros in the historic city, Masjid Sinan Basha, and two in historic quarters at walking distance extra muros, Djama’a at-tawba in ‘Aiba and Djama’a al-Ward in Sarouja.

360 This citation is from the first interview I conducted with ‘Aisha in the kitchen of her house in Qaimariya in late February 2005. All our interviews were conducted in English thanks to her immense language skills. ‘Aisha, who is married and has two children, is a part-time student of Islamic Law at Damascus University.

361 I met this Iraqi woman during her one-time visit to the Umayyad Mosque just after ‘Asr prayer on the 14th of May 2005. I did not conduct a formal interview but since I was just dictating some impressions to my digital recorder, my 10 minutes conversation with her was also recorded. The conversation was held in Arabic.

362 The interview with Su’ad was conducted in October 2005, in the early afternoon of a day of Ramadan in the courtyard of the Umayyad Mosque. I had met Su’ad because she lived in the same house as Samira and Samira kindly arranged our meeting knowing that Su’ad was very fond of my object of study.

363 During my second interview with ‘Aisha in March 2005, her husband Mahmoud returned home after about half an hour of the interview. He sat down with us and while drinking tea contributed to the answers of my questions. Mahmoud grew up partly in Canada, where a part of his family still resides.

364 The Islamic tradition following the teachings of Muhammad as transmitted by his companions, Sunna, is according to incongruent interpretations of the usul [أصول, sources] explained in the framework of four major law schools, mazahib (مذاهب). Every mazhab (مذهب) carries the name of its founder, so for example Hanifyyah (هنية) for the school following the interpretations of Abu Hanifah (most prevalent in the Middle East and Turkey). Centred in the Eastern Islamic countries such as India and Malaysia is the mazhab of al-shafi’i, Shafi’iya (شامیة), while the teachings of Malik ibn Anas, Malikiyya (مكلیة), are most popular in North Africa and finally the interpretations of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (حنابی), which are well-established on the Arabian peninsula (cf. Roberts, 1971 [1925], p. 119).

365 Quotation from the above-mentioned interview conducted in May 2005, please refer to endnote number 349.

366 This comment derives from the second interview conversation I had with ‘Aisha, which took place in March 2005 in her home, refer to footnote 363.

367 ‘Amina who lives in Muhadjdjirin (ممجیرین) but visits the Umayyad Mosque for tarawih (ترويرح) prayers because of her children (refer to chapter 2.5 Freedom – the largest playground) reports that she often has to adjust her place in the course of the 27 congregational raka’a (رکعت) prayed: ‘I go the Umayyad Mosque because nobody minds bringing children there during tarawih. (…) I usually come late and then find a place close to the door in one of the rows in the very back. But since I stay for all the twenty ruku’ (رکع) and women praying in front of me leave earlier, it is my duty to move forward to keep the lines without break. Sometimes by the end of the prayers I find myself in the first row, just behind the men’s part.” The interview with ‘Amina was conducted in ramadan (رمان) 2005 (Oktober) where I met her during one of the tarawih prayers and she invited me for iftar (إفطار, the fast-breaking breakfast) to her house the very next day.

368 Other special prayers such as tarawih during ramadan, the particular prayers for the aid holidays, sun and moon eclipses and other events will not be considered here as they are temporally restricted and do not contribute to the continuous significance of the concept Umayyad Mosque.

369 Zahir is a friend of a family I lived with for a while in Qaimariya. Since Zahir is yet unmarried and lives in Masakin Bursa, he often joined our Friday family breakfasts to walk from the house in Qaimariya to the mosque directly. I never conducted a formal interview with him and the above quote derives from the notes I have taken after one of these breakfasts during which I had the chance to discuss his reasons for attending the djuma’ prayer in the Umayyad Mosque.

370 A second mosque, the masjid Sa’ida Ruqqayya (السيدة رقية) is also open to women on all occasions – even during the ‘aid prayer when even the Umayyad Mosque closes its doors to women, but this mosque is run under Shi’i law tradition.
During the salat-ul-djuma’a women are restricted to the very eastern part of the prayer hall, comprising about half of the space between the eastern mashhad and the mausoleum of prophet Yahya (or St. John the Baptist). The northern nave of the prayer hall (the area between the northern wall towards the inner courtyard and the first row of columns) is at this very time reserved for men, including the two maqsurat located to the right and left of the former central door.

I interviewed Su’ad in October 2005, please refer to endnote number 362.

The quotation is from the interview with Iman, conducted in her house in ‘Ayba in October 2005 and has been partly translated into English, compare endnote 353.

Tareq is the brother of the husband of a friend of a Syrian friend of mine who is living in Mezzeh. I was introduced to him during a dinner invitation in October 2006 and as a student of architecture he was very interested in my research. After a brief introduction he insisted that the impressive architecture of the Umayyad Mosque causes a feeling of humbleness, which is a perfect preparation for individual and congregational prayers. With regard to this aspect he reminded me that I could not entirely disregard the architectural setting, when describing the qualities of prayer. I agree with his position in so far as the impressive experience of the architecture is considerable when visiting the place for the first time or only a few times a year. For those faithful coming for the obligatory prayer up to five times daily the architectural surroundings are – according to my perception – subject to familiarisation and habituation. My conversation with Tareq was not recorded and the above sentence is cited from my notes written down immediately after the meeting.

It is the striving for proximity to the makan which gives the physical location of this setting a particular importance as the spiritual endeavour can only be achieved by being at one specific location and architectural element of the mosque complex.

‘Aisha presented this explication in my third and last interview with her. It was conducted in the back of her friend’s car on the way to a family outing for Friday afternoon. Her husband Mahmoud who sat in the front of the car sometimes participated in the discussion, as did Ahmad, driver and owner of the car. The interview took place on August 26th 2005.

Hadith are orally transmitted traditions of sayings and judgements by the prophet Muhammad, which have been collected in several voluminous works. The most well-known hadith collections of the Sunni tradition are those of al-Bukhari and Muslim as well as Abu Dawud, al-Tirmidhi, al-Nasai und Ibn Madja.

Ja’far was recommended to me by Mahmoud, the husband of ‘Aisha, as a very knowledgeable person with regard to the Umayyad Mosque. This turned out to be a very good suggestion and I visited Ja’far in his job on a morning of Ramadan 2006 to seek particular information on the legends and narratives associated to the presence of Hud and al-Khidr. But the discussion my investigations started off raised many other interesting issues as well. The interview was conducted in English.

Do’a is the name of Islamic prayers, which are not subject to the ritual standard of raka’a – the standardised sequence of standing, bowing and prostrating, which is usually to be followed. It could probably be best translated as supplication prayer.

The interview with Su’ad was conducted in October 2005 in the courtyard of the Umayyad Mosque, please refer to endnote 362 for further information.

Tariqa – which is the Arabic word for way or path – in the context of tasawwuf designates the particular path towards enlightenment adopted by one master or order. Followers of the same tariqa are usually referred to as members of the same order.

Whether it is also the very proximity of the tomb that contributes to the special status of these men could not be confirmed, but my interviewee Hannah was impressed after finding out how steady their positioning was: “So I asked him for how long he had been sitting there and he said for thirty years. I was quite shocked. Can you imagine he had been sitting there for thirty years?” Hannah is a British Muslim studying Arabic in Damascus. She temporarily lived in the same house I did which provided us with several occasions to discuss the Umayyad mosque. I conducted one formal interview with her in May 2005 seated in the lovely atmosphere of the roof terrace of our house with a view of the skyline of Damascus and the Umayyad Mosque.
Some of my interview partners shared this opinion on the basis that no traveller or historian visiting the mosque before 1893 mentioned the two prophets or their relation to the building.

This statement was recorded during a rather informal initial conversation with ‘Aisha, which I now refer to as the first interview. It took place in ‘Aisha’s house in late February 2005. For more information of ‘Aisha please refer to endnotes 358 and 363.

For information on the interview with Su’ad please refer to endnote 362. I also tried to get to see the room but it remained closed and I did not even manage to find out how to get a permission to see it. Visitors are definitely not encouraged to make the effort and at some point I had the feeling that visitors to the room are extremely unwelcome.

According to the latest information I received from Damascus during the process of writing (on November 29th 2006) the mashhad al-Hussayn including the access to the shrine of Imam al-Hussayn was closed for public access due to renovation works. It has not yet been possible to receive detailed information on the nature of the renovation works and the duration of the complete closure.

Keenan is convinced that these pilgrims are all heading for the wrong place because according to her knowledge the head of Hussayn is buried in Cairo: “It is said, that Hussein’s head is buried in this sanctuary, but in fact, it is in the mosque that bears his name in Cairo. It was probably kept in the Umayyad Mosque for a time after his death, so giving raise to this belief.” (Keenan, 2000, p. 21)

Ali was interviewed by Silvana Becher who spoke to several participants of his travel group. He is from Hamadan in Iran and visited the Umayyad Mosque on the 6th of September 2005. The interview was conducted in Persian.

Hassan lives in Bahrain and was preparing his ziyara to Damascus while I was involved in a heritage project on the island. He was so kind to answer many of my questions and due to his fluent English, he was of great assistance in widening my understanding of the visitor groups I found most difficult to access for language reasons. The interview was conducted on July 5th 2006.

Zainab is another visitor from Hamadan (cf, endnote 388) who Silvana Becher interviewed on September 7th 2005 during her visit to the Umayyad Mosque.

Unless one side wishes to provoke the other, as happened in my presence on Saturday, 26th of March 2005 during salat-ul-sabah. Several large groups of Shi’i pilgrims entered the haram before the prayer time and after the Imam of the Umayyad Mosque had started the recitation of the congregational morning prayer, a Shi’i individual commenced a second, parallel congregational prayer according to Ja’afari fiqh.

Please refer to endnote 349 for further information on the interview with Samira.

Martin was participant of a group interview, conducted in a hall of Semiramis Hotel with the entire group of the German travel agency and organiser ‘Biblisch Reisen’ (which means biblical journeys). The agency in particular addresses travellers of a Christian background, who wish to see Christian aspects in the country of their destination. The group interview with 31 participants was conducted on the 26th of April 2005. I am deeply indebted to Damian Lazarek, the guide and organiser of the tour as well as the office of Biblisch Reisen which granted enthusiastic support to my research.

Yaquib is a member of the Syrian Aramaic Church and was interviewed by Alexander Vey and Gregor Anger on the 8th of September 2005 on the precincts of the Syrian Aramaic church in Bab Touma, Damascus.

Gregorios is a member of the Greek-Orthodox Church and was also interviewed by Alexander Vey and Gregor Anger on the 8th of September 2005. The interview was conducted in English language in the office of the interviewee.

Many authors would doubt that this statement can be considered appropriate with regard to the building substance as it is not solidly confirmed that the present mosque indeed contains elements of the earlier church – though it surely contains stones of the temple of Jupiter that had also been used in the church construction. Keenan writes with regard to this dispute: “Scholars have argued about whether al-Walid converted the Christian church into a mosque or whether he pulled it down and began again; opinion nowadays is, that he built the mosque from scratch within the walls of the Roman temple.” (Keenan, 2000, p. 25)
Simon was interviewed in English, once again by my two helpful interview assistants, Alexander Vey and Gregor Anger in the Franciscan Convent in Bab Touma on the 5th of September 2005. He is a member of the Roman-Catholic community in Damascus.

Hanania – who will hopefully be honoured by the name I have attributed to him (Hanania is Arabic for St. Ananias) – is a senior church official who was interviewed by Alexander Vey and Gregor Anger in the quarter of Bab Touma on the 7th of September 2005. The interview was conducted in English.

Keenan describes the same architectural elements and offers us a slightly differing translation: “The entrance [of St. John’s cathedral] is now half buried in the ground, but its brave inscription – which reads somewhat ironically today – is still there proclaiming in Greek: Thy kingdom o Christ is an everlasting kingdom and thy dominion endureth throughout all generations.” (Keenan, 2000, p. 22)

For details on the interview with Yaqub, please refer to endnote 394.

Hanania was interviewed by two students who assisted me in my empirical research in the framework of a study project, please refer to endnote 398. In addition to his thoughts on the true reason of the pope’s visit he also told us the strategy that he had used to convert this visit into an opportunity of publicity and dialogue with regard to the Syrian officials: “Now we can use this visit to explain what happens in Damascus. And when the pope came here, I said to the president: we have a chance. The pope is like a window, open the window, and don’t close the window. Everybody can see what happens in Syria through the pope.

The speech John Paul II gave during his visit to the Umayyad Mosque provides a different impression. Although he spoke of the tradition of the building and the importance of the tomb of John the Baptist, interreligious dialogue was a second emphasis in his address to a partly Muslim audience. The following excerpts are quoted from his script as published by the Vatican: “We are meeting close to what both Christians and Muslims regard as the tomb of John the Baptist, known as Yahya in the Muslim tradition. The son of Zechariah is a figure of prime importance in the history of Christianity, for he was the Precursor who prepared the way for Christ. John’s life, wholly dedicated to God, was crowned by martyrdom. May his witness enlighten all who venerate his memory here, so that they – and we too – may understand that life’s great task is to seek God’s truth and justice. The fact that we are meeting in this renowned place of prayer reminds us that man is a spiritual being, called to acknowledge and respect the absolute priority of God in all things. (…) Both Muslims and Christians praise their places of prayer, as oases where they meet the All Merciful God on the journey to eternal life, and where they meet their brothers and sisters in the bond of religion. (…) I truly hope that our meeting today in the Umayyad Mosque will signal our determination to advance interreligious dialogue between the Catholic Church and Islam.” (Pope John Paul II, 2001)

Some details on the interview with Simon are provided in endnote 397.

The increasing popularity of pilgrimages to Damascus by especially European Christians was underlined by Gregorios who confirmed: “Yes, it is still a centre of pilgrimage (…) especially for Christians but also tourists, they say they are travelling on biblical journeys and on the footprints of St. Paul. And they come and visit the Umayyad Mosque, not as a cultural but as a pilgrimage site for St. John the Baptist.”

Since the names of my interview partners have been changed to ensure their anonymity I also had to change the direct name references within interview quotations. Here ‘Aisha referred to her husband, who I had earlier called Mahmoud, refer to endnote 363.

Tarawih is a lengthy prayer performed every evening during the month of Ramadan, see also endnote 350.

For details of the interview with ‘Amina, please refer to endnote 367.

I met Rita when she was taking a rest in the courtyard after a guided group tour through the mosque complex on the 12th of March 2005. I asked whether she would be willing to share her impressions of the visit and a brief interview was conducted in German.

For more information on the interview with Samira please refer to endnote 349.
Wiebke who was travelling with a Dutch tour group spoke to me – she actually approached me – during her visit to the Umayyad Mosque. Assuming that I was a Syrian visitor she came to me while I was sitting in the courtyard and observed her tour group and inquired – in English – where she could buy a bottle of water in the immediate vicinity of the mosque. I accompanied her to the next shop offering bottled water and on the way we talked about her impressions. Because of her initiation of our talk, the conversation was not recorded and I have tried to capture her responses from memory later on.

I met Farid during this scene in the cashier’s office where I was apparently queuing but mainly studying the interaction of cashier and international visitors. After his far longer complaint – of course he did not need to buy an entrance ticket – I joined him into the mosque and talked to him briefly in the courtyard. Our conversation was in English and took place on August 26th 2005. Neither our conversation nor the little scene in the cashier’s office were recorded. I quoted his words from my records which I wrote down from memory a few minutes after the conversation.

Heidi, a student from Switzerland who travelled in Syria and Jordan on her own, spent several hours in the courtyard of the Umayyad Mosque on September 29th 2005 during which I approached her and talked to her for almost an hour. We spoke German mainly, sometimes mixed with English.

Please refer to endnote 382 for further information on the interview situation and personal background of Hannah.

I talked to Howard after he had been refused entry at Bab al-Barid and was grumbling and walking towards the other entrance. We talked until he had bought the ticket, got rid of all guides who offered their services between the ticket office and the gate to the mosque and finally entered the mosque through Bab al-‘Imara. Howard was an individual traveller from Toronto, Canada and our conversation took place on the 2nd of March 2005. It was not recorded and is therefore presented in my words.

A group of the tour organiser ‘Biblisch Reisen’, please refer to endnote 393.

I saw Ebba while I was sitting in the prayer hall and also had the chance to observe the incident that she described to me later. I talked to her about five minutes after she had been approached by the other women and tried to capture her story. She kindly shared all her confusion during our conversation in English.

For details on the interviews with Mahmoud, please refer to endnote 363.

This aspect leads to further considerations with regard to the application of topologies for heritage identification. It is discussed in more detail in chapter 3.2 Heritage – emergence and obtrusion.

I was not able to interview one of the ‘sleepers’ as I intended, to inquire about their visiting intention. I was however able to discreetly follow some of them after they woke up and I observed two men opening shops in the Hamidiyye souk area, one returning to work at Midhat Basha area and two others went to leave by public transport from Shari’a ath-Thawra. I assume that the last two were visitors from outside Damascus who came for merchandise in the morning and after a healthy nap now were returning to their respective villages.

‘Umar is employed as a guard, where he mostly is responsible for the prayer hall and sometimes watches Bab az-Ziyada. Since it was extremely difficult for me to approach the personnel of the mosque, I talked to Umar with the help of a Syrian friend, Feraz, who kindly acted as a translator and thereby enabled me to approach the exclusively male employees. The brief interview was conducted on the 16th of August 2005.

It is particularly interesting that Samira who grew up in England expresses a rather westernised conception of a mosque as being the house of God. I observed similar connotations among other Muslim conversational partners who had been raised or lived in Europe. For further details on the interview with Samira, please refer to endnote 349.

This quotation is from the first interview conducted with ‘Aisha which took place in February 2005. For more information about the interviewee please refer to endnotes 358 and 363.

Rabi’a is a young woman that moved form outside the historic city to Qaimariya, the neighbourhood of the Umayyad Mosque. She is a follower of a Tasawwuf Tariqa (Naqshbandiyya) and strongly believes that Isa will descend from one of the minarets of the Umayyad Mosque, which
Section Five: Topology researched – the Umayyad Mosque

according to her perception will happen in the near future. I have met Rabi’a through ‘Aisha who
introduced me to her almost neighbour. Rabi’a lives with her husband and is currently expecting
her first child. I believe she would greatly appreciate that I am referring to her using the name of
one of her guiding figures: Rabi’a ash-shamiya, who is buried just a few steps from Rabi’a’s house.

424 In their case this topology is combined with the topology described in chapter 2.5 Freedom – the
largest playground.

425 Haytham used to work as a receptionist in a hotel, which is predominantly frequented by Western
backpacker tourists. The interview with him was conducted in late August 2004 in English. Hay-
tham is not originally from Damascus but feels strongly connected to the city and especially the
Umayyad Mosque, which he considers the central symbol of the city.

426 The interview with Mahmoud was part of the second interview with ‘Ais ha that he attended.
Please refer also to endnote number 363.

427 It indeed happened to me, after I had been doing my observations in the prayer hall for quite
some time – and thereby probably gave the impression that I was looking for somebody – that I
was approached by young men – either in the courtyard or when leaving the mosque – who wanted
to have a chat or my phone number. However, different from those who approach foreign women
during the daytime, these men immediately lost interest when they realised that I was a foreigner.

428 Due to the difficult moral situation of dating in Syria many young couples establish intense rela-
tions on the phone, which do not require physical contact and therefore are a convenient way to
get to know more about the other person. In result, the exchange of phone numbers became al-
most a sport. I have observed and experienced many incidents where women walking in the streets,
driving in one of the service busses, or doing their shopping somewhere are again suddenly con-
fronted with a piece of paper pressed into their hands and a big smile while the deliverer often dis-
appears as quickly as he had appeared on the spot. One very beautiful girl I met in the Umayyad
Mosque (and who strictly wears headscarf) told me in a brief conversation – during which she re-
ceived a new phone-number – that sometimes after a day in the souk she returns home with no less
than five new phone numbers.

429 For more details on the interview with Su’ad please refer to endnote 362.

430 I would compare this behaviour to visitor behaviour in other central cities which also have their
distinctive spots to allegedly experience the spirit of the city. Although I had never done empirical
studies on the examples that come to my mind, I could imagine that many visitors to Paris would
walk along Champs Élysées at night or visitors to Rome around Piazza Navona, which in both
cases are most probably not a favourite evening spot for inhabitants of either of these cities.

431 For information on the interview with Haytham, please refer to endnote 425.

432 I have observed similar situations in motorway re-

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444 Feraz is a long time friend in Damascus who wo-

445 Once a friend of my landladys mentioned that whenever she saw an image of the Umayyad
Mosque on television now, she would need to eat something, even if just a snack, but obviously her
mind had so profoundly stored the connection between the Umayyad Mosque and the desire for
food that its image resulted in appetite.
I spoke to the associate producer during the live production on the 24th day of Ramadan – himself a Christian – who was obviously bored by these repetitive procedures. He admitted that it was not his favourite production, since there were strictly defined standard patterns and no space for variations and he honestly wondered that people still watched the same stuff again and again every day. ‘Off record’ he even suggested that one could simply broadcast the production of the first days again and again and very few people would notice.

This governmentally controlled aspect is resumed in the following subchapter where I focus on this and other aspects of nationally guided representation and identity formation with regard to the Umayyad Mosque.

For the recipients it would rather be the opportunity of a communal breakfast or for some a free meal. The fact that two different approaches are combined in the construction of this theme leads to the questions whether the topology ‘Grab your food first – Ramadan charity’ is indeed one or rather an interrelation of two topologies. This question is further discussed in chapter 3.2 Heritage – emergence and obstruction.

I did not conduct formal interviews with Zahir, but since he was a regular visitor in the house I lived in, the one or other comment was recorded in my personal notebook. Please also compare endnote 369.

It is an often reiterated misconception of seemingly European origin that mosques were sacred places or places reserved for worship and thereby separated from the political and other secular spheres. To consider the status of mosques in early Islam we have to recall that the separation of sacred and secular is not applicable for a tradition that aims to encompass all aspects of life. Martin Frishman describes this with regard to mosques: “With the secular and sacred thus wedded together and expressed by means of a unified and prescribed behavioural doctrine, the role of the mosque differs from that of a church in that there is no need for some activities to be classified as ‘secular’ and excluded from the building for that reason. From the earliest times the mosque has always been a religious and social centre for a community, as well as – in the case of congregational mosques – providing a platform for political pronouncements at midday prayers on Fridays.” (Frishman, 1994. p. 32).

Arkoun describes that the mosque “is regarded as belonging to all members of a Muslim society. The protection which it provides for all those within its walls has been exploited by some for various overtly political ends.” (Arkoun, 1994, p. 271)

Stefan Weber describes this in the ICOMOS Heritage at Risk Report 2001/2002: “Of course, all these undertakings were not done in order to demolish the monument, but to give it a ‘nicer’ appearance. The historical monument itself was considered less important than its historical image, and had to be polished up. The stones do not have an intrinsic historical value, but are secondary to the idea of the monument to which they belong.” (Weber, 2002)

In the context of this topology this would be a fascinating analysis which would require yet another comprehensive study of all available documents in the archives in Damascus.

These two occasions took place on the 13th of November 2004 and the 24th of October 2006.

As highlighted before the list of thirteen topologies is by no means complete and several further themes could be added under the heritage concept Umayyad Mosque.

After an ample comparison of all early mosques illustrating such axial naves, Grabar concludes that the Umayyad Mosque was indeed the earliest prototype and reference for later constructions: “The axial nave appears first in the great constructions of Walid I and its best preserved example is in Damascus.” (Grabar, 1973)

A hypostyle mosque or hypostyle hall in architectural terminology refers to “a hall or other large space over which the roof is supported by rows of columns (…)” (Fleming et al., 1999, p. 276)

It is almost always applicable to so-called intangible heritage expressions as long as they contribute to local identity creation but this aspect and the resulting thought that solely intangible heritage
contributes to the preservation of cultural diversity is considered in chapter 3.2 Heritage – emergence and obtrusion.

430 The UNESCO Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage includes two separate articles which define cultural and natural heritage respectively. The definition of cultural heritage is structured into three subcategories (cf. Section One, chapter 2 UNESCO heritage typologies), namely monuments, groups of buildings and sites (cf. UNESCO, 1972a, § 1).

431 As part of the ancient city of Damascus the Umayyad Mosque is currently listed as a group of buildings or respectively as one building within a group of buildings and not as a monument. However, when considering its potential individual heritage qualities in the framework of the World Heritage Convention, the category of monuments seems most appropriate.

432 The criterion includes the restriction that “The Committee considers that this criterion should preferably be used in conjunction with other criteria.” (UNESCO, 2005g, § 77)

433 I have entirely disregarded criterion (v) which is – paradoxically – the only criterion that the ancient city of Damascus is not inscribed for. I have written paradoxically as I would assume that “an outstanding example of a traditional human settlement (…) which is representative for a culture” (UNESCO, 2005g, § 77) describes exactly what the ancient city of Damascus is all about. The omission of this criterion can be explained in either the historic development of criteria as in 1978, when the historic city of Damascus was proposed for inscription on the World Heritage List, it still had a considerably different wording: “be a characteristic example of a significant style of architecture, method of construction or form of town-planning or traditional human settlement that is fragile by nature or has become vulnerable under the impact of irreversible socio-cultural or economic change” (UNESCO, 1978b, § 7) or is a simple mistake. The nomination dossiers indicated a desired inscription according to criterion (v) but not (iv) (Syrian Arab Republic, 1978) and the report of the third session of the World Heritage Committee does not indicate the criteria the site is listed for (UNESCO, 1979b). The webpage of the World Heritage Centre of UNESCO currently publishes a listing under criterion (iv) instead of (v) the basis for which remains unclear. With regard to the heritage typologies identified however, it can be stated that no topology of the concept Umayyad Mosque seems to fall under the description.

434 Please confer to Section One, chapter 2.2 Intangible Heritage versus for a discussion of weaknesses in the definition of intangible cultural heritage.

435 I could for example well imagine that participants of topologies like ‘faith and duty – performance of prayers’ or ‘Be blessed visiting the prophets’ would speak of age-old traditions that constitute their religious identity, but I fear they might consider the term heritage, with the association it raises, inappropriate.

436 The three topologies are excluded under the premise that conceptions that primarily relate to an historical state of a physical location, architectural structure or building cannot be considered practices or active expressions and representations in the framework of the convention. In the case of St. John’s Cathedral the knowledge aspect is still actively constructed but its expression in predominantly the designation of a place might not be sufficient.

437 If the Syrian Arab Republic would propose to list Muslim Prayer in the Umayyad Mosque as a representative example of Muslim prayer in general the confusion among many other Muslim States who could raise equal claims is quite predictable and some states – for example Saudi-Arabia – who seem to define themselves as the core of the ‘original’ Muslim tradition might even be offended. It might therefore be extremely difficult to ever consider Muslim prayer under the convention as the implicit need for localisation seems unacceptable to many.

438 Tangible heritage experts and intangible heritage experts without an explicit wish to refrain from applying World Heritage terminology would probably call this exceptional historic continuity ‘authenticity’ in use and function. In this exceptional case, we further have a number of historic descriptions from earliest Islamic times that document the ritual of Muslim Prayer in immense detail and that still serve as the basis for its proper performance. Such historic source might indeed enable us to speak of ‘authenticity’ for an intangible heritage on the basis of the early written documentations available.

439 The tomb of the prophet Muhammad is located in the Prophet’s Mosque (مسجد النبي, masjid al nabawi) in Medina Saudi-Arabia. Since Muhammad is the last and most venerated prophet in Islam
it could be assumed that his tomb illustrates the most elaborated form of visiting activities to tombs of prophet’s. This is unfortunately not the case as the Saudi-Arabian government tries to actively reduce veneration at his tomb, which is considered an unorthodox expression of Islam which shall in no case be supported.

The shrine of Imam al-Hussayn in Karbala in which he is said to be buried next to the battle-ground – despite the apparent transportation of his head – has to be regarded the world centre of veneration of Imam al-Hussayn but also of remembering and participation in the battle of Karbala. If a spatial location were required to designate a representative example of such tradition it would more likely be in Iraq than in Syria.

I would indeed suggest to the Syrian authorities who are responsible for the management of the Umayyad Mosque and the campaign to promote its representational status, to institutionalise this spontaneous topology by for example providing an organised nursery in the mosque which offers women the opportunity to drop their children and go for an undisturbed prayer, attend the lectures in the afternoon or participate in tarawih.

For the case of the piazza the historian Ibn Jubayr was already cited in the respective chapter (cf. 2.8 Piazza – sitting, chatting, flirting), while for the desired recreation we have many hints given in a workshop on Muslim recreational and tourist complexes as part of the conference on Architectural transformations in the Islamic World which took place in Amman, Jordan in 1980. Lari, in one of the presentations highlights the continuity in the Islamic concept of recreation and its relation to places of worship: “As defined today, recreation ends to mean self-indulgent amusement. However, the history of Islam suggests a different connotation. Recreation was taken in the literal sense to signify ‘re-create,’ to refresh or rejuvenate oneself mentally and physically. Traditionally it has meant a journey into self-knowledge, removing oneself for spiritual transformation by retiring into a saint’s khangah or zawiya.” (Lari & Lari, 1980, p. 57)

These five topologies are described in chapters 2.1 Faith and duty – performance of prayers, 2.2 Be blessed – visiting the prophets, 2.3 Imam al-Hussayn – mourning and aspiration, 2.7 Tranquillity – keep and restore calm, and 2.8 Piazza – sitting, chatting, flirting.

The first part of this definition of culture has also been cited before and compared to the definition for intangible cultural heritage (cf. Section One, chapter 2.3 The intangible – non-intangible debate).

I am not entirely content with the word ‘works’ selected for this definition. I would probably prefer works to be replaced by aspects. On the other hand it already becomes obvious in the examples given (language, rites etc.) that ‘works’ is not really intended to mean something which is a product of labour but rather an expression of human action.

These five topologies are described in chapters 2.1 Faith and duty – performance of prayers, 2.2 Be blessed – visiting the prophets, 2.3 Imam al-Hussayn – mourning and aspiration, 2.7 Tranquillity – keep and restore calm, and 2.8 Piazza – sitting, chatting, flirting.

O r r a t h e r p a r t a n d p a r c e l o f m a n y c y c l i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n p r o c e s s e s such as self-construction, knowledge construction, reality construction and many other processes one could think of.

Before considering the procedural character of identification Hall provides his readers with the most predominant conception of identity in habitual use of the term: “In common sense language
identification is constructed on the back of recognition of some common origin or shared characteristics with another person or group, or with an ideal, and with the natural closure of solidarity and allegiance established on this foundation.” (Hall, 1996, p. 2) His later specification do not contradict this common sense explanation but specify that what was called recognition is itself part of a reality construction and representation process.

474 Since at the time of writing I was unable to gain access to the English translation of Heidegger’s ‘Identity and Difference’ which has been published by Harper and Row, I apologise for presenting my – probably insufficient translation – in combination with the German original. Heidegger writes: “Jetzt zeigt sich: Sein gehört mit dem Denken in eine Identität, deren Wesen aus jenem Zusammengehörenlassen stammt, das wir Ereignis nennen. Das Wesen der Identität ist ein Eigentum des Er-eignisses.” (Heidegger, 2006, p. 48)
Conclusions: A plea for typological flexibility

After I have just – at the end of my last section – raised one of the most fundamental questions possible, the question regarding the character or nature of truth, how can I dare to call this final chapter ‘conclusions’? Indeed, I should be hesitant to apply this demanding term, as I will not be able to conclude on any of the issues and challenges raised in the course of my writing. Therefore I – once again – join Wilfred Cantwell Smith in his hesitation with regard to this category of academic writing:

“This closing section of our study I have ventured to entitle ‘conclusion’. Yet I trust that no one will take this too seriously. In intellectual formulation in these matters not only can there not be, but emphatically there must not be, any final conclusion.” (W. C. Smith, 1991 [1962], p. 199)

Whereas Smith speaks about history of faith, I transfer his statement to the context of heritage studies, which demands that there cannot be conclusions, as all of my earlier arguments with regard to the cyclical nature of heritage construction and the constant reaffirmation of identities should have illustrated. Perhaps a transfer is not even necessary, as heritage studies are interlinked with the history of faith in that heritage of faith can hardly be comprehended devoid of the historical influences of traditions of faith.

I try to escape the dilemma by offering conclusions in the same manner I wish heritage to be approached: not as statements but as ongoing narrations which narrate aspects of the overall story of being and therefore cannot reach a conclusion as long as being continues. My conclusion is a plea that might or might not influence the progress of these narrations. My plea – if primarily addressed to heritage professionals – is to abandon the frameworks of categorization that confine heritage disciplines, to further abandon the disciplines and redefine heritage studies as an open interdisciplinary field based on trans-disciplinary professional identities. My plea – if predominantly addressed to diplomats acting in the field of UNESCO conventions on heritage – is to redefine their claims of the universal towards a synthesis of the variety of cultural expressions on the basis of narratives of local identity that contribute to the overall story of mankind in order to bring to a halt the ongoing processes of heritage standardization and homogenization. My plea – if addressed to researchers and academic scholars – is to further develop a semiotic phenomenology to be applied to heritage analyses and to approach the cyclical processes of heritage construction as cultural semiosis. Finally, my plea – addressed to everybody who had the interest and patience to read my elaborations – is to actively participate in dwelling in our heritage, to self-consciously guard our cultural self-localisations, to actively utilise our heritage conceptions and to nurture rootedness in culture by sharing our narratives with others as our personal contributions to an intercultural and intergenera-
Conclusions: a plea for typological flexibility

This exchange could enable us, while at the same time preserving our individual cultural identities, to dwell together in a multi-faceted and multi-layered topology of culture.

How do I support and substantiate my pleas? After I have already refused to provide the core element of a conclusion chapter, i.e. to close the discussion, I should perhaps consider some other standard elements: e.g. to return to key terms, to summarize the sections and to tie them together. Doing this could indeed assist in providing clarification to some questions still existing, but cannot and insistently should not satisfy all questions, as a lack of questions would prevent heritage to reach into its truth, as stated in the poem preceding my writing. According to Heidegger, one “way in which truth becomes is the thinker’s questioning, which, as the thinking of Being, names Being in its question-worthiness.” (Heidegger, 1971d, p. 62) Such questioning needs to pass beyond categories and typologies, beyond conventions and correctness, to seek understanding, disclosure, which can be found – also – in heritage. Heritage, in its innumerable variety of narratives of identity, can answer more questions than those about colour, proportions and stones. As the overall story of being, it conceals the manifold wisdoms of life that can be told, unconcealed, in narratives of identity.

The first section illustrated that heritage typologies instead of supporting and facilitating heritage preservation and administration easily lead to an exclusion of heritage aspects or a separation of shared conceptual ideas. I suggested to turn away from the idea of cultural heritage as a product of cultural groupings and to resolve the exclusive dichotomy of intangible and tangible heritage by conceptualizing the two as extremes on a gradual scale. Intangible and tangible heritage are equally rooted in time and place as products of a present momentum. A recent UNESCO focus towards the preservation of intangible heritage, instead of providing long-due new impulses to the heritage typologies already existing – and with this contributing to their replacement by more holistic concepts – unfortunately happened to finalize in yet another, opposing, typology. The separation of the two typologies intangible and tangible heritage thereby enforced must be perceived as a threat to the preservation of the heritage of mankind, as it divides mutually shared meanings and disrupts identities constructed in combined processes. The increasing typological as well as terminological intricacy of heritage in the framework of both UNESCO instruments is almost incomprehensible to outside observers. While the Operational Directives of the Intangible Heritage Convention – currently in the process of being drafted – still may serve to clarify terminology, they could also creatively find means to avoid the excellence-driven listing-mania, which the World Heritage system has become a victim of.

Terminological ambiguities and confusions are also common in academic heritage studies, which are still in a tedious process of negating the official Eurocentric canon of cultural heritage as displaying wealth and prestige of a given culture. As part of this process, the academic focus towards the object of safeguarding has shifted from material objects to their signification and meaning and most recently to narratives and oral traditions, aiming at the safeguarding of identities. The central aspect of
identity in heritage analysis also has made its way into UNESCO discourses, at least into the drafting group for the Operational Directives to the 2003 Convention where one of the ten listing criteria for the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity proposed for discussion by the Committee requires that “State Parties should give proof that elements proposed for listing provide the community or group concerned with a sense of identity, based on shared experience and collective memory” (UNESCO, 2006b, p. 3). Such proof giving would require that dossiers renarrate the narratives of local identity, indeed a contribution to un concealing identity and enlightening cultural understanding. And a step towards heritage reaching its truth, as un concealedness is openness, and is truth – not only on the level of a terminological modification (Heidegger, 1989, p. 338).

In the second section I proclaimed the post-modern ‘cult of values’ to point at the current preoccupation with values in the heritage field, which I, as I have argued in the course of later sections, would like to see replaced by a global (or post-post-modern) ‘cult of identity’. Values were defined as assumptions, beliefs and knowledge sets which represent moral, ethical and other constituents of social action and which assist in decision-making. Knowledge of values is unlike awareness of truth, otherwise it could not guide decision-making, as “every decision, however, bases itself on something not mastered, something concealed, confusing; else it would never be a decision.” (Heidegger, 1971b) The expression of values in heritage is captured in so-called statements of significance, written summaries of heritage values as identified by experts who tend to affix meaning to a heritage expression. Meaning derives from values through a process of reflective understanding and requires narrative structures to be transmitted. It is an essential condition of heritage which remains incomplete and incomprehensible when merely observed outside its meaning-giving context. Starting with values, significance and meaning, I identified further elements of the heritage construction cycle, which like a hermeneutic circle illustrates the continuum of interpretation, understanding, (re)affirmation and (re)construction. And again, it is narratives that like a thread connect the elements of the cycle and enable us to understand the process of heritage construction, which could also be referred to as heritage semiosis. Semiosis, as a process of creating meaningfulness is yet another step towards naming being and truth. “Semiosis explains itself by itself; its continuous circularity is the normal condition of signification (...). To call this condition a ‘desperate’ one is to refuse the human way of signifying, a way that has proved itself fruitful insofar as only through it cultural history developed.” (Eco, 1976, p. 71)

In Section Three, I emphasized heritage of faith as a representation of narratives of faith. It was argued that the context of heritage of faith presents particular difficulties in conveying heritage understanding, as the legitimation of knowledge and values founded in faith often seem inexplicable to non-believers. Perhaps for this very reason narratives of faith are in most cases not reflected in the framework of UNESCO heritage designations, especially not in statements of Outstanding Universal Value for World Heritage listing. However, there are few exceptions of nomination files which
disclose narratives of faith. The expertise and capacity for such disclosures – an expertise urgently required in the World Heritage field – is best developed in Sub-Saharan Africa and Australia/Pacific, perhaps to the surprise of many traditionally Eurocentric World Heritage experts. However, in some cases, in which authorities subtly fear that the desire to strengthen rootedness in culture could lead to an unintended strengthening of fundamental positions in faith, the inclusion of narratives of faith is objected to for political reasons.

Heritage was considered a hybrid place – place understood as the conceptual localisation of thoughts and understanding – constructed by social action and occupied by overlapping and fragmented identities. Place is further understood as biased by Smith who states that “human beings are not placed, they bring place into being” (J. Z. Smith, 1987, p. 28), although Heidegger would remind us that both statements can be correct – human beings are placed and they bring place into being – and that the first only proves the latter. As place, heritage offers us to dwell in it; to dwell which means to be in it, like Heidegger derives from the German _ich bin, du bist_ as I dwell, you dwell, we are in heritage. Heritage, as localisation of ‘us’ functions not only as a legitimation of knowledge and values, but also as a source of truth. It enables us to more originally appreciate and empower identity and conceive heritage as happening (_Ereignis_ ) (cf. Heidegger, 1989, p. 338).

In Section Four I proposed a redefined conceptual approach: topologies, which I intended to serve as a starting point for the development of shared visions among intangible and tangible heritage professionals or at least to stimulate discussions within and hopefully also among the two fields. Topological analyses approach heritage from a pre-categorical perspective – which negates all existing heritage and value typologies – and encourages involvement of multi-disciplinary analysts, to avoid professional biases, which naturally can hardly be suppressed. The analyst’s focus shifts from heritage expressions towards ideas or concepts of heritage, which are defined as logos, following Heidegger’s definition of ‘letting something be seen’, the initiating ideas of heritage construction. These concepts are localised in place, topos, which again in this context overcomes the restrictions of place dictated by Euclidian space and geometry. Summarized and simplified, heritage is approached as ideas taking place or as logos manifested in topoi.

Skills required for topological analysis are no longer expert knowledge of particular heritage typologies, materials, techniques, expressions or constructions, but active listening, trans-cultural empathy and ability to meaningfully renarrate expressions of identity. Inspired by the consideration of Chang (cf. Chang, 1987) I proposed to elaborate on a semiotic phenomenology for heritage analysis, which allows to map the topological configuration of culture as a process of semiosis. Topological maps or conceptions and their combination into a topology of culture define our individual presence in the world and can assist us in understanding heritage and its reaching into truth. They can assist in relocating human being in the sense of relocating his position in being (cf. Heidegger, 1989, p. 338).
In Section Five, I conducted a topological analysis for the heritage concept Umayyad Mosque and described thirteen topologies as examples of themes identified in the process of narrative and cognitive analysis. Many of the topologies turned out to be not only self-localisations but actively utilised facilitators for the attainment of aims and desires. People indeed dwell in the heritage concept, and the topological analysis verified that it is particularly the process of cultural identity formation – as a place of the individual presence in the world – that enables this dwelling in heritage.

At the same time I realized that several of the heritage topologies identified would not have been considered heritage in the framework of either of the UNESCO conventions. While conventional heritage analysis approaches considered the Umayyad Mosque as an architectural structure, expression or manifestation, the narrative approach used discovered its power as a facilitator of identity expressions. Consequently, I proposed to emphasize identity formation processes and to replace the object and value-based ‘statements of significance’ by ‘statements of identity’ which summarize the narratives localized in a heritage concept. I closed the section with two ‘preliminary conclusions’ which in the context of this chapter might better be termed hypotheses as a basis for further reflection. I suggested that heritage is always actively (re)created, (re)affirmed and (re)constructed and cannot be created from the position of a passive consumer. This led to the second hypothesis, that it is specifically this active construction, the creative utilization, self-initiated valuation and eventually identity formation that enables to communicate the local to the global, that enables heritage to reach into its truth. And again, we are left with the question of truth, i.e. how heritage can reach into its truth.

To respond, we should perhaps return to Berger and Quinney and their definition of truth for narrative analysis: “the measure of ‘truth’ is judged not by conventional standards of validity and reliability but by the power of stories to evoke the vividness of lived experience (…) the degree to which the narratives generate empathy” (R. J. Berger & Quinney, 2005, p. 9). Their approach to truth in the case of heritage would indeed facilitate preservation in addressing the most central threat identified: semiological and conceptual degradation. The conception of truth is not far from Heidegger’s who bases his examples on the wholeness of ‘letting be seen’, a wholeness which also evokes empathy and understanding:

“How can we take care of the wholeness, the power of narratives to evoke the vividness of lived experience, how can we preserve the power of narratives of identity? An approach of rigorous non-intervention might assist narratives to remain uninfluenced and to unfold and change freely. Most likely, however, non-intervention would support and strengthen structures of political and economical power and promote the
narratives of those who are best-equipped to diffuse their interpretations. How then, can we preserve the still powerful but disempowered narratives of local identity? According to my opinion, a contribution of utmost importance is to not impose globally defined values, categories or typologies, but to preserve narratives of identity and their heritage expressions on the basis of their individual local typologies and valuation frameworks. These do not need to be defined by experts, as typologies are always there; they are present where groups or communities conceptualize themselves and their expressions of identity.

If we return to the citation of the World Heritage Committee delegation from New Zealand quoted in the introductory chapters of my work, we now realize that it is exactly this message that the delegation was trying to bring across: “We have concerns that indigenous world views could be set into frameworks that have been designed from primarily other perspectives.” We have also heard that for indigenous people the distinction of logical analysis and creative inspiration hardly makes sense (Daes, 1993, par. 21). Why then, should such distinction be meaningful for the identification of their heritage? Both logic and inspiration can be combined when considering heritage as a product of intentionality, the originating condition of all being which shows the meaning of being and the mental directedness towards meaning or, in Heidegger’s terms, the ‘care for’ meaning. If we, based on this taking care and the above named generation of empathy, reach an understanding of local identity, then heritage reaches into its truth. Truth then is the unconcealedness of identity, the self-unfolding of being and the unfolding of things through their given meaning. And truth flourishes in the awareness that meaning is borne.

Heritage preservation, assisting heritage to reach into its truth, is a permanent reconstruction. Not a reconstruction of heritage expressions but a reconstruction of the narratives of identity and a reconstruction of the awareness that meaning is borne(e).
In the prologue of this work my thesis began with reference to a statement by Heidegger which was said to have inspired my entire writing. So shall this epilogue:

“Preserving the work means: standing within the openness of being that happens in the work. This ‘standing-within’ of preservation, however, is a knowing.” (Heidegger, 1971b, p. 67)

Preserving heritage – as a standing within, as knowing of heritage – was defined as the constant reconstruction and recreation of narratives of identity and the awareness that meaning is borne. (Re)Creation has to be understood as a continuous ever renewed creation in the sense of Plato’s poiesis (ποιησις). “All [ποιησις, poiesis] creation or passage of non-being into being is poetry (...) and the processes of all art are creative; and the masters of all art are poets.” (Plato, 2004, p. 24) The permanent reconstruction of narratives of identity therefore is preservation and a continuous (re)creation in the process of cyclical construction at the same time. And this (re)creation is the preservation that Heidegger probably spoke of when stating “What is created cannot itself come into being without those who preserve it” (Heidegger, 1971b, p. 66), a continued poiesis of heritage. “The preservers of a work belong to its createdness with an essentiality equal to that of the creators.” (Ibid., p. 71)

Poiesis is action that originates from the concept of intentionality which is a result of what Heidegger refers to as poetic thinking. He opposes poetic thinking to thinking of being by which he is thinking of logical thinking, and thereby seemingly confirms the distinction between logical analysis and creative inspiration. But he insists that the two approaches cannot be imagined in separation and support each other in existence: “The thinker pronounces being. The poet utters the holy” and that they “look most alike in the care of the word” (Heidegger, 1976, p. 312). The creation of logos arises from poetic thinking and heritage construction initiated by logos is poiesis. As the product of poiesis, like arts, music and technology, heritage, too, is poetry.

I have taken ample space to explain my position and my understanding of Heidegger’s ‘preservation’ in the context of cultural heritage typologies, UNESCO discourses, narratives of identity and the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus. Heidegger explained his statement in a few sentences; more abstract and, indisputably, more carefully worded, but he – according to my understanding – raises very similar issues. I will here take the opportunity to offer my readers a second explanation, a second opinion on the preservation of heritage as poetry, and I have taken the liberty of replacing every ‘the work’ in Heidegger’s elaborations, like in his initial “preserving the work means (...)”, by what he – according to his later explanations – is referring to when stating ‘the work’, i.e. the product of poetic thinking and creation, the product
of poiesis: poetry, or heritage. “All art, as the letting happen of the advent of the truth of what is, is, as such, essentially poetry. The nature of art, on which both the art work and the artists depend, is the setting-into-work of truth.” (Heidegger, 1971b, p. 72) I will replace ‘the work’ by ‘poetry’ and my readers may be requested to subsume, or – if so desired – to read heritage.

“This ‘standing within’ of preservation, however, is a knowing. Yet knowing does not consist in mere information and notions about something. He, who truly knows what is, knows what he wills to do in the midst of what is. (…) Knowing that remains a willing, and willing that remains a knowing, is the existing human being’s entrance into and compliance with the unconcealedness of Being. (…) Willing is the sober resolution of that self-transcendence which exposes itself to the openness of beings as it is set into [poetry] (…). Preserving [poetry], as knowing, is a sober standing-within the extraordinary awesomeness of the truth that is happening in [poetry].

This knowledge, which as a willing makes its home in [poetry]’s truth and only thus remains a knowing, does not deprive [poetry] of its independence, does not drag it into the sphere of mere experience, and does not degrade it to the role of a stimulator of experience. Preserving [poetry] does not reduce people to their private experiences, but brings them into affiliation with the truth happening in [poetry]. Thus it grounds being for and with one another as the historical standing-out of human existence in reference to unconcealedness. Most of all, knowledge in the manner of preserving is far removed from that merely aestheticizing connoisseurship of [poetry]’s formal aspects, its qualities and charms. (…)

The proper way to preserve [poetry] is cocreated and prescribed only and exclusively by [poetry]. Preserving occurs at different levels of knowledge, with always differing degrees of scope, constancy and lucidity. (…) In [poetry], the happening of truth is at work and, indeed at work according to the manner of [poetry] (…) as setting-into-[poetry] of truth. Setting into [poetry], however, also means: the bringing of [poetry]-being into movement and happening [Ereignis]. This happens as preservation.” (Heidegger, 1971b, p. 67f)

Poetry that thinks, which refers to products of poiesis that are not merely things but capable of thinking – capable to participate in the processes of ‘letting-lie-before-us’ to ‘taking-to-heart’: cultural communities and cultural identities. Identities are – in truth – the topology of being. They define the presence of being as well as its place, with their heart’s courage, their speech and their remembrance.

The conceptualization of heritage as poetry might cause confusion with regard to my plea for a holistic concept of heritage, as it seems to necessarily exclude the typology of natural heritage. Indeed, I have not given much attention to natural heritage in the course of my work. But perhaps an extended definition of poiesis as offered to us by Heidegger can accommodate an even wider concept of heritage construction than the product ‘poetry’ seems to conceptualize in the first place. That means, a concept of heritage that might be able to take up Dawson Munjeri’s yet unspecified desire to combine intangible and tangible cultural as well as intangible and tangible natural heritage. Martin Heidegger defines poiesis simply as bringing-forth:

“‘It is of utmost importance that we think about bringing-forth in its full scope and at the same time in the sense in which the Greeks thought it. Not only handcraft manufacture, not only artistic and poetical bringing into appearance and concrete imagery, is a bringing-forth, poiesis. Physis also, the arising of something from out of itself, is a bringing-forth, poiesis. Physis is indeed poiesis in the highest sense. For what presences by means of physis has the bursting-open belonging to bringing-forth, e.g., the bursting of a blossom into bloom (…).”’ (Heidegger, 1977, p. 10)
Physis as poiesis could perhaps be interpreted as intangible natural heritage and Halliburton in his interpretations on ‘Poetic Thinking’ tends to support this view: “Such a theory allows for poetry requiring poets (…) but also (so to speak) a poetry without poets – the blooming of a blossom, the coming of a butterfly from a cocoon, the plummeting of a waterfall when the snow begins to melt.” (Halliburton, 1981, p. 144)

Considering this holistic approach to heritage as poetry – which I hope somebody else will want to explore further – I feel I may have deprived my readers of better understanding by omitting the final stance, when citing Heidegger’s poem ‘The Thinker as Poet’. On the other hand, his concluding words are certainly suitable to close my work (poetry) at this point:

Forest spread
Brooks plunge
Rocks persist
Mist diffuses
Meadows wait
Springs well
Winds dwell
Blessing muses

Marin Heidegger: The Thinker as Poet

(Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens, 1947)
Sobald wir die Sache vor Augen und im Herzen
das Gehör auf das Wort haben, glückt das Denken.

Wenn sind erfahren genug im Unterschied zwischen einem
Gegenstand der Wissenschaften und einer Sache des Denkens. (…)  
Wer groß denkt, muß groß irren.

Wir kommen nie zu Gedanken. Sie kommen zu uns.
Aus solcher Geselligkeit erstünden einige vielleicht
zu Gesellen im Handwerk des Denkens.
Damit unvermutet einer aus ihnen Meister werde. (…)  

Aller Mut des Gemüts ist der Widerklang
auf die Anmutung des Seyns,
die unser Denken in das Spiel der Welt versammelt. (…) 
Nie ist das Gesprochenen und in keiner Sprache das gesagte.

Das Älteste des Alten kommt in unserem Denken
hinter uns her und doch auf uns zu.
Darum hält sich das Denken an die Ankunft des Gewesenen
und ist Andenken. (…)  

Aber das denkende Dichten ist in Wahrheit die Topologie des Seyns.
Sie sagt diesem die Ortschaft seines Wesens.
Singen und Denken sind die nachbarlichen Stämme des Dichtens.
Sie entwachsen dem Seyn und reichen in seine Wahrheit.

Wälder lagern  
Bäche stürzen  
Felsen dauern  
Regen rinnt.

Fluren warten  
Brunnen quellen  
Winde wohnen  
Segen sinnt.

Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens, 1947
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### Appendix

#### Table of cited individual interviews

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<td>26/08/05</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Lives in Qaimariya and became a good friend in the course of my research, three interviews which all took place in her house</td>
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<td>12/03/05</td>
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<td>26/08/05</td>
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<td>‘Ali</td>
<td>IR</td>
<td>Traveller from Hamadan, Iran, interview conducted by Silvana Becher</td>
<td>06/09/05</td>
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<td>Member of the Greek-Orthodox Church, interview conducted by Gregor Anger and Alexander Vey</td>
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*Note: Languages indicated are the languages in which the interviews were conducted.*
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