## Contents

**Acknowledgments**  
*page xi*

**Prologue: Thomas Wolfe and the Third Reich**  
xiii

**Introduction: Defining the German Problem**  
1  
   - Relevance of Public and Elite Opinion  
   - Enemy Images and the Culture of War  
   - Probing the Complexities of the Third Reich  

**PART ONE: PRELUDE TO WAR**

1. **Memories of World War I: Franklin D. Roosevelt and Germany**  
   17  
   - Germany in American Popular and Elite Imagination Before World War I  
   17  
   - A Patrician's View of Germany: Roosevelt's Early Expertise Reconsidered  
   21  
   - Preparing for the First War Against Germany  
   26  
   - Propaganda and Atrocities  
   29  
   - Different Lessons: Wilsonian Peacemaking and Its Discontents  
   35  
   - Interwar Revisionism of "Internationalists" and "Isolationists"  
   38

2. **News from the New Germany: Conflicting Interpretations, Contested Meanings, 1933–1940**  
   41  
   - The Basis: Journalistic Reporting  
   42  
   - Edgar A. Mowrer: Nazism as Collective Religion  
   46  
   - John Gunther: Psychopathology of a Dictatorship  
   47  
   - William L. Shirer: The Germans Are Behind Hitler  
   50  
   - Dorothy Thompson: Nazism Is a Disease with More Than Germanic Roots  
   52  
   - Persecution: "Not an Exclusively Jewish Problem"  
   57  
   - Sympathetic Views: Anticommunist, Anti-Roosevelt, Antiwar Voices  
   60  
   - What Americans Thought  
   68

3. **The Prospect of War, 1933–1941**  
   78  
   - Nazi Germany in the President's Sources  
   78  
   - From Disease and Gangsters to the Irreconcilable Contrast  
   87
Conspiracies: The Threat of Domestic Subversion 93
The Great Debate and the “Unbelievable” Nazi Blueprint 96

PART TWO: MOBILIZING THE AMERICAN HOME FRONT, 1942-1943

4 “The Principal Battleground of This War Is American Public Opinion” 105
Public Opinion Analysts at Work 105
Liberal Propaganda Versus Domestic Unity 112
Roosevelt’s Post–Pearl Harbor Statements 116
North Africa 1942: Military Action as Morale Booster 120
Unconditional Surrender as a War Aim 125

5 The Office of War Information: “Explaining Nazism to the American People Is No Easy Assignment” 131
The Strategy of Truth and Its Challenges 132
Further Probes into Images of Nazi Germany 134
The Rejection of “Racial” War 140
“Explain What Nazism Would Mean in Terms of Everyday American Life” 144
Consequences of the Strategy of Identification with the Germans 150

6 Why We Fight: The Nature of the Enemy Seen Differently 156
Why We Fight: The Movie 157
Geopolitics and the Nazi Plan for World Conquest 162
Public Opinion Begins to Shift 165
The State Department Weighs in on Nazi Ideology 168
Henry Wallace: The Götterdämmerung Has Come for Odin and His Crew 171

PART THREE: THE PUBLIC DEBATE ON GERMANY, 1942-1945

7 Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde: Germans and Nazis 177
“The Most Labyrinthine Issue of Our Time” 178
Mr. Hyde, the Automaton 180
Valhalla in Transition: Are the Germans Behind Hitler? 184
Sympathy with Germans or Their Victims? 188
Beyond Belief: The Murder of the Jews 193
Nazi Youth: A Time Bomb 197
What to Do with Germany? A National Debate 204
If the American People Made the Peace 211

8 The German Disease and Nazism as Gangsterism 217
The Attraction of Psychological Approaches 217
The Paranoid Trend in German History 223
The Sociopsychological Precariousness of the Lower Middle Class 226
The Teutonic Family Drama 227
Official Support for the Therapeutic Approach 230
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nazism as Gangsterism</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hitler Gang and the Conspiracy Against Humanity</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 German Peculiarities: Vansittartianism in the American Wartime</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Vansittart</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vansittartism in the American Debate</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who Supports Hitler?</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emil Ludwig: A Vansittartian with Access to the President</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany's Special Path on Screen</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Containing the Monsters in Time and Space</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART FOUR: THE GOVERNMENTAL DEBATE ON POSTWAR PLANS, 1943-1945</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 What Do You Do with People Like That?</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hitchcock's <em>Lifeboat</em>: A Parable</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflicting Postwar Plans: OSS Academics and the Larger Picture</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The State Department's Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitating Germany like a Delinquent Youth</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Case for Dismemberment</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Public Critique of the State Department</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 How to Prevent World War III?</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Handbook Controversy</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The &quot;Agrarization&quot; Myth</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morgenthau as Vansittartian: No Carthage</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Expert on Germany?</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contemporary Origins of the Legend</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stimson and Morgenthau</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roosevelt's Stance</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 The Enemy in Defeat: German-American Encounters at &quot;Zero Hour&quot;</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparing for the Postwar Situation</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIs and Germans</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Encounters</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Padover's Experiment</td>
<td>329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Views of America's Role in Germany</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>