

University of Konstanz
Department of Politics and Management

Bachelor Thesis (PO 2004)

**The emergence of European Union Peacekeeping:
Analysing institutions and interests of Member states**

– September 2008 –

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“As we have seen with our common currency, Europe is capable of translating ambition into reality”

Javier Solana 2002: 113

I would like to use this opportunity to thank Professor Dr Seibel and Dr Frank Janning for their advice and support. Their excellent suggestions have given important impulses for approaching my topic. Not least has their trust and confidence in my work enabled me to pursue this thesis. Further credit goes to Till Blume, who gave me valuable hints when I could not see the wood for trees and who was always present for methodological advice. I would further like to thank Julia Karst, Frederik Trettin and Christoph Ossege for suggestions and criticism at first versions of the thesis. However, most tribute deserves my family.

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Abbreviations:

CCM	–	Civilian Crisis Management
CFSP	–	Common Foreign and Security Policy
DPKO	–	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
EB	–	Eurobarometer
EDA	–	European Defence Agency
EPC	–	European Political Cooperation
ESDI	–	European Security and Defence Identity
ESDP	–	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	–	European Security Strategy
EU	–	European Union
FP	–	Foreign Policy
LI	–	Liberal Intergovernmentalism
MS	–	Member States
NATO	–	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSCE	–	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PM	–	Prime Minister
SC	–	Security Council
UK	–	United Kingdom
UN	–	United Nations
WEU	–	Western European Union

1. Introduction

“Europeanization of military policy evokes a paradox. Not only from the European standpoint was defence the least integrated of all public policies”

(Irondelle, B., 2003: 209).

The decision to establish a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) by France and the United Kingdom (UK) at St. Malo on 4 December 1998 poses a puzzle to European scholars. Even more so does the speed of its progress. Already five years after the initial agreement the European Union launched its first Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding missions in 2003 under the ESDP framework¹. Another five years later the European Union (EU) has mandated 20 missions. Twelve are under the umbrella of Civilian Crisis Management operations and five are military missions; the remaining three include both, military and civilian elements². Eleven are currently running (as of August 2008), a considerable number, in comparison to 16 Peacekeeping operations managed by the United Nations at the same time³. The main question this study addresses is what lead member states to agree to integration and cooperation in this area of high politics within that short a time?

In order to answer this, a theoretical framework is developed to guide an in-depth analysis of key intergovernmental conferences and their respective outcomes. According to the assumption of Liberal Intergovernmentalism that domestic preferences within member states shape their relative bargaining power and hence intergovernmental conferences' final outcomes. The focus lies on how domestic preferences and constraints were formed. Progress so far has been remarkable. It has even infused new life into the integrationist elements of the EU (Howorth 2007: 6). Regelsberger similarly concluded that “European integration would be incomplete without CFSP/ESDP and progress in these highly sensitive fields strengthens the overall integration process” (Regelsberger 2003: 1).

Attempts for European cooperation in security and defence policy previously to 1998 failed. It can be argued that despite the failures efforts to establish such cooperation have been present throughout the major steps of integration for the European Union, starting with the failure of

¹ The terms Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding, Military and Civilian Crisis Management are not clearly distinguished in this paper. In general Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding are used by the United Nations, while Military and Civilian Crisis Management are used by the European Union. In the paper the terms are used interchangeably, as it is not analysed what the terms mean but how it came into being.

² Number are taken from the official website of the European Council, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=en&mode=g.

³ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm>. However these numbers do not take into account the size and scope of the operations. The operations managed by the UN are generally considerably larger on both accounts.

the Pleven and Fouchet Plan in the 1950s and 1960s. Cooperation remained on a basic level; in 1986 the European Political Cooperation (EPC) was included in the European Community with the Single European Act. A Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was established in article J of the Maastricht Treaty, within the second, intergovernmental pillar⁴. Several further steps were made since, including: the development of CFSP; the establishment of the ESDP and the re-structuring of the European security architecture. A bilateral agreement to develop "capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces"⁵ at the European Union level suddenly and unexpectedly this summit paved the way for further integration. It is for that reason that St. Malo will form the starting point of our journey in exploring the domestic preferences, governmental positions and the international bargains until the EU reached operational capability in 2003. The analysis of member states rests on the "big three", the United Kingdom, France and Germany since they were the main driving and constraining forces behind integration in ESDP⁶.

Theoretically this study analyses the emergence of ESDP from a Liberal Intergovernmentalist (LI) perspective. It follows in its design the proposed framework of LI. (1) First, crucial variables forming the domestic preferences of selected Member states (the UK, France and Germany) are identified and compared in a structured focused perspective. Three main factors for these countries' positions towards ESDP have been identified: (a) member states' military spending and budgetary constraints (b) public support for a European Security and Defence Policy and (c) public support for Military versus Civilian Crisis Management (CCM). It is argued that domestic preferences towards these factors have crucially affected the outcome and design of ESDP in its operational capability since 2003. (2) Secondly, governmental positions are under analysis. These are in part formed by domestic preferences, although governments do not act according to a simple principle-agent scheme. Notwithstanding they include strategic calculations of domestic preferences and constraints, in assessing their relative power at international negotiations in order to achieve their targeted outcome⁷. (3) In the conclusion the key findings and the explanatory power of Liberal Intergovernmentalism

⁴ The Maastricht Treaty allowed for a European Security and Defence Policy with the wording, CFSP shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, "including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence". (Article J.4, Treaty of Maastricht: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html>). Common Foreign and Security Policy is the framework that encompasses the European Security and Defence Policy according to article J4 of the Maastricht Treaty. Hence the term CFSP is used to address a wider framework, including ESDP.

⁵ St. Malo Declaration. accessed on 20.07.2008: <http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/French-British%20Summit%20Declaration,%20Saint-Malo,%201998%20-%20EN.pdf>

⁶ A detailed discussion of the reasons for the Case selection offers chapter 3.3.

⁷ LI argues from a rationalist point of view, that this is logical for governments as they seek re-election (Moravcsik 1993: 483).

are critically evaluated, focusing on theoretical strengths, weaknesses and future research required.

1.1 Research question

The European Union is a unique regional organization. Nowhere in the world have member states voluntarily abandoned so much of their own sovereignty. The process of integration has made the European Union a unique case study and a welcome theoretical playground for social scientists. Theories of European integration assess the EU from different angles and have made great progress in explaining key factors. One remaining puzzle has been the recent integration in the European Security and Defence Policy. It is an area that touches upon the core of the sovereignty of member states, the legitimate use of force (Weber 1978: 54), an area of high politics; hence logically progress should have been slow and feeble.

The core questions this study addresses is, why the EU has integrated in this particular area. Some even see the ESDP now as an instrument for the final integration (Kaim 2007: 375). While integration in the remaining policy areas “has recently appeared to be slowing down or even grinding to a halt” it was “within a mere 12 months, at the very dawn of the new century, [that] the EU succeeded in reaching agreement on arrangements over which it had simply avoided discussion for over 50 years” (Howorth 2007: 4). This integrative movement has so far not been analysed using the main integration theories although it poses a very interesting puzzle. One reason is the difficulty theories have in explaining it as they either excluded CFSP in their framework or denied the possibility for integration.

The key questions addressed here are: What caused integration in ESDP in 1998? Who were the key players in this process? What are the reasons for member states to integrate in ESDP? What were the crucial factors behind the sudden integration? What were drivers affecting the success in 1998 that was not possible before? Does the theoretical framework of Liberal Intergovernmentalism offer sufficient explanations for the complex processes at work?

1.2 The argument

According to Liberal intergovernmentalism it is member states that shape the major decision affecting the European Union. Within the negotiations two factors matter most: 1. the formation of domestic preferences that constrain the positions of governments and 2. the relative bargaining power of member states at intergovernmental conferences, leading to the

outcome of the treaties. Concerning ESDP three member states have been crucial for the development, the United Kingdom, France and Germany. The reasons for selection are laid out in more depth in chapter 3.3, however, their weight in European negotiations, their military capabilities, their spending on defence and their role in the world, clearly dominate the other member states. It was in particular the United Kingdom that proved to be the pivotal player in decisions affecting the establishment of an autonomous European Security and Defence Policy, independent from NATO and with its own military capabilities.

Further the second strength of this approach will be the explanation of the timing of the emergence of ESDP. Through a finely grained analysis of domestic preference formation a detailed explanation can be provided. The focal points of analysis are the key junctures in the development of ESDP. The summit at St. Malo, the Cologne European Council, as well as the Helsinki and the Feira European Councils will be discussed. Further taken into account are the Petersberg tasks and the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam. After the bottleneck was opened at St. Malo the EU succeeded in 12 months in reaching on what it had failed to agree for over 50 years.

2. The Theoretical concept

“Theory matters, it structures how we perceive the world and we have theoretical assumptions even if we do not make ourselves aware of them”; without theory we *“would be buried under a pile of detail”* (Rosamond 2000: 4).

While Rosamond’s claim is true for all sciences, it is in particular important for the social sciences and studies of the European Union. The European Union is an incredibly complex political system, which can be analysed from numerous theoretical backgrounds. However, it is remarkable that although the possibilities to grasp the Foreign and Security Policy of the EU theoretically are more than sufficient, “a large part of the literature on the CFSP is more descriptive than theoretically guided research with sometimes very useful thick descriptions on the emerging CFSP as well as the common defence policy” (Knodt/ Princen 2003: 2). Few studies have analysed ESDP in a logically consistent and theoretically-guided framework. This is in particular owed to the fact that the integration in ESDP was predicted by neither of these theories. In fact most of them argued against integration in the area of ESDP. Insofar CFSP and even more so ESDP form a blind spot of European Union theories, a puzzle that has not yet been solved.

2.1 State of the art – Theoretical overview

To explain European Security and Defence Policy, International Relations theories, European integration theories, Europeanization theories, institutional theories and (multi-level) governance theories – to only name a few – can be employed. However, they have either problems offering fine-grained explanations for the development of ESDP or fail to take into account the particular field of security and defence. International Relations theories struggle to explain state behaviour in the specific setting of the European Union. On the other hand theories of European integration that are fine-tuned for decisions made at the European level mostly offer insufficient accounts of intergovernmental bargaining and cooperation, in this field of high politics. The most promising theoretical strands will be introduced and evaluated shortly against the claim that existing theories can, at best, provide a partial explanation (Forster 1997: 297). Two theories, Liberalism, Intergovernmentalism and their common heir Liberal Intergovernmentalism are identified as particularly valuable. The second part gives an overview of empirical studies conducted so far.

In International Relations Theory Realism has long dominated the other approaches. It assumes that International Relations equal the struggle for power and domination by states. States are unitary actors and “driven by self interest, in an anarchic environment” (Waltz

1979: 193). They use institutions as instrument to enhance their power. However, institutionalization in core interests' to states such as at the European (economic) Union or ESDP factually clashes with the limited degree of cooperation that Realism predicts. Constructivism on the other hand focuses on cultural and ideological factors, it its framework because of social interaction and socialization. As ESDP is clearly built on intergovernmental bargaining, Constructivism offers an insufficient framework. Liberalism or Neoliberal Institutionalism is another of the grand theories in International Relations. It basically argues "that institutions perform important tasks for states, enabling them to cooperate" (Keohane 2002: 3). It assumes that domestic political factors are crucial to explaining international relations⁸. Liberalism sees states not as unitary actors; their preferences depend on the domestic competition among member states. Hence Liberalism allows to analyse the cooperation of EU member states in the field of ESDP (chapter 2.3.2 addresses Liberalism in more detail).

With further integration of the European Union, theories have evolved that focus in more detail on the role of institutions; among recent theories, multi-level governance has gained importance and explanatory power. While institutional approaches usually focus on the relationship between institutional development and changes in state behaviour, multi-level governance assumes that the EU is a multi-layered system of governance. Although Smith (2004: 740) sees significant progress "toward multi-level governance of EU foreign policy, particularly when compared to the limited policy co-ordination of the 1970s and 1980s" he also concludes that the theory has difficulties accounting for variations across member states (Smith 2004: 751). As ESDP is clearly not institutionalized in the period under scrutiny from 1998 to 2003 both theories are not applied here.

Theories in particular designed to analyze foreign policy often confuse the standard against which they measure the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU. Mostly they compare the political system of the EU to that of a nation state; leading to the famous claim of the capability-expectations gap of the EU (Hill 1993). It was more often described what the EU *is not* and what it *cannot do* instead of what it actually *is*. However, an approach based on the actorness⁹ of the EU does not explain the reasons moving towards integration in security and defence as that outcome was initiated by only two member states, France and the UK.

⁸ One of the most consistent and precisely argued accounts for the theory in book length offers Milner (1997).

⁹ For more information on this debate see: Bretherton/ Vogler 2004; Jopp/ Schlotter 2007.

Seibel (2003: 219) argues that the trend of research in studies of the European Union and in particular Europeanization (and policy studies) has diminished the importance of studying the classical domains of foreign and security policy in political science. For example Smith (2000: 613) analyzes the Europeanization effects of a common Foreign and Security policy at a point that the CFSP and ESDP itself and reasons for continuing integration are not fully understood; “yet the expansion of foreign, and now security policy co-operation in the EU has also increasingly penetrated into the domestic politics of its member states”¹⁰. As this essay borderlines Security Studies and European studies Seibel’s claim can only be confirmed. Few scholars have addressed the Security and Defence Policy with the theoretical toolbox that European integration theories provide in abundance or used classical theories for this new puzzle.

In turning to European integration theories the two competing theories that dominated the debate over early developments in European integration were neofunctionalism (Haas 1968; Lindberg 1963) and intergovernmentalism (Hoffmann 1964; 1966). Both notwithstanding have a blind spot in their theory concerning (CFSP and) ESDP. Neofunctionalism is one of the ‘grand’ theories of European integration. It “has been integral to the study of European unity in the second half of the twentieth century” (Rosamond 2000: 50). However, neofunctionalism, largely relying on the concept of spillover from cognate economic areas does not account for integration in Security and Defence. Few spillover effects are expected to occur in the intergovernmental decision-making structures of military and defence policy, clearly “high politics”. Neofunctionalism rejects integration in high politics; instead it argues that integration first occurs in areas of low politics and technical cooperation, leading leads to spillover effects¹¹. Intergovernmentalism on the other hand asserts the role of states as the primary actors, arguing that national governments are uniquely powerful actors in the process of EU integration. It cannot explain cooperation in ESDP well, as it is based on power politics and has a clear focus on the sovereignty of the state but its assumptions are in accord with the processes leading to ESDP.

2.2 State of the art – Empirical overview

The paradox that forms part of the explanation for few theoretical analysis of CFSP is that European Security and Defence Policy in fact has outrun Common Foreign and Security

¹⁰ Further from an institutionalist perspective: Smith, M. E., 2004: Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation. Cambridge/ New York: Cambridge University Press.

¹¹ For a well presented overview of the logic of low and high politics, see Rosamond 2000: 52-55

Policy in integration; “foreign policy has – in comparison to the rest of what the EU does – resisted pressures for integration” (Smith 2006). While CFSP grows in scope and width, ESDP has in five years grown in substance from nearly zero to enough capability to conduct over 20 Military and Civilian Crisis Management Operations (in the period from 2003 to 2008). For that reason it is surprising that no thorough investigation however, has analysed what triggered the emergence of European Peacekeeping and caused the EU to launch such an amount of operations under the framework of CFSP, respectively ESDP.

Acknowledging the fact that the European Security and Defence Policy was initiated in 1998 by France and the UK and included in the European Union framework with the Cologne European Council in 1999 the puzzle of integration is a very recent topic in the study of European integration. Although new strands of literature have emerged alongside with the process of further integration they are not easily applicable to the intergovernmental emergence of ESDP. A concise empirical overview of ESDP offers Howorth (2007), however, he rejects any theoretical focus in his analysis as none of the existing approaches suits him; “none of the existing schools seems to come close to explaining the ‘ESDP effect’” (Howorth 2007: 25). However, three studies that have been undertaken with a sound empirical basis and a strong theoretical grounding are in particular worth noting¹².

Koenig-Archibugi (2004) conducted a theoretically grounded quantitative analysis explaining government preferences for institutional change in the CFSP. In testing four hypothesis, each based on a different theoretical assumption he concludes that the study of European integration should move towards multi-causal analysis as most of the theorized factors tested “are helpful in explaining the diversity of national positions on sovereignty pooling and delegation” (Koenig-Archibugi 2004: 168). His findings were that “governments of weaker countries are more likely to support supranational CFSP institutions than governments of stronger countries”, and “the share of a country’s population that feels “European” affects the position of its government with regard to constitutional change in EU foreign and security policy” (Koenig-Archibugi 2004: 167).

¹² Risse-Kappen has conducted an analysis of public opinion, domestic structure, and foreign policy in liberal democracies in 1991, providing an excellent overview of key characteristics in public opinion and foreign policy. More analyses exist and some of them apply some theory but few apply the rigour required allowing to put the assumptions of the theory to a test.

Giegerich analyses from the perspective of Strategic Culture in a controlled comparison European member states according to four dimensions of preferences (2006: 12): their use of foreign policy instruments (military versus civilian), their national view of the purpose of the military (territorial defence versus force projection), their basis for security policy (cooperation versus national autonomy) and their arena for cooperation (Europeanism versus Atlanticism). He finds that in response to the European integration that “support for and engagement in ESDP differs markedly across EU member governments” (Giegerich 2006: 11).


Kaim offers the first comprehensive analysis of ESDP and its emergence in all its width and depth from 1990 to 2005 from a Liberal Intergovernmentalist perspective. He notes that a deficit of the research so far has been the lack to use integration theories (Kaim 2007: 38). Although Kaim offers an excellent overview, it is due to the width of ground he has to cover for the 15 year period under scrutiny that the reasons for establishment and development from 1998 to 2003 are not precise enough. Similar to his framework and Liberal Intergovernmentalism an in-depth case study of the establishment of ESDP in 1998 aims to provide valuable additional insights and inference, as well as a theoretical test for the application of Liberal Intergovernmentalism.

2.3 Building the Theoretical Framework

2.3.1 Liberalism

Liberalism, mostly driven by the claim of global economic interdependence, assumes that states are not-unitary actors in World politics but that in fact competition among domestic interests and ideologies influences the behaviour of governments (Hix 2005: 374); “such theories of preference formation almost inevitably begin to factor in processes of domestic politics” (Rosamond 2000: 135). It is the metaphor of the two level games of Robert Putnam (1988) that is widely applied here. It is assumed that states act rationally, in an interdependent environment, influenced by international institutions and domestic preferences and constraints. Logically states’ preferences are not stable, but they depend on the

Figure 1: Process of European integration according to Liberalism (own graphic)



domestic preferences. Interstate cooperation is seen as a viable tool and widely used by states. Liberals are thus more interested in the interaction of states' preferences than in the distribution of capabilities among states (Rosamond 2000: 135). Their position is in response to Realists that have downplayed the "significance of politics *within* nations for the operation of politics *among* nations" (Rosamond 2000: 135, emphasis in original). Bulmer adds an interesting twist in proposing that governments can be seen and understood as "gatekeepers" (Bulmer 1983), determining the opinions that form the basis of governmental decision making. Thus it can be argued accordingly that for Liberalism "the basic unit of the EC system is the national *polity*" (Rosamond 2000: 135, emphasis in original).

2.3.2 Classical Intergovernmentalism

Intergovernmentalism focuses on the state as the primary actors, arguing that national governments are uniquely powerful actors in the process of EU integration: they control the nature and pace of integration. According to its main proponent Stanley Hoffmann (1964), governments only accept closer integration in technical sectors and states cooperate if they have similar interests. Hoffmann analyses CFSP and ESDP in 2002, in his view institutions do not take on a life of their own but are always subservient to states. Additionally, the integration process would not spread to areas of 'high politics' such as national security and defence (Bache/ George 2006:12). CFSP and recent developments show ample contra factual evidence. It is because of those assumptions that mere Intergovernmentalism is not applied to explain the recent development in CFSP/ESDP.

2.3.3 Liberal Intergovernmentalism

Liberal Intergovernmentalism basically combines the best of two worlds, the notion that member states not only matter, but are the leading actors in European integration, and secondly that they are restrained and given direction by domestic interests¹³. It benefits from the fact that it is a liberal theory of national preference formation and an intergovernmentalist account of strategic bargaining between states. Liberal Intergovernmentalism builds on Putnam's idea of the two-level games and thus opens the black box of the state (Bache/ George 2006: 14). The basic idea behind the two level games is that at the domestic level, power-seeking/ enhancing office holders aim to build coalitions of support among domestic groups (Putnam 1988: 434). At the international level, the same actors seek to bargain in ways

¹³ LI basically assumes that economic interest groups are the dominant actors in the domestic settings, influencing governmental positions. That this is not the case for ESDP will be explained in chapter 2.4 and show in the case studies (chapter 4).

that enhance their position domestically by meeting the demands of key domestic constituents (Putnam 1988: 434). Andrew Moravcsik as its main proponent concludes that “the major choices in favour of Europe were a reflection of the preferences of national governments, not of the preferences of supranational organizations” and thus rejects the growing recognition of supranational influence in decision making (Moravcsik 1998). The key advantage of LI is that “there is also a liberal-pluralist emphasis which allows intergovernmental analysis to acquire one of the key advantages of neofunctionalist integration theory and theories of international Political Economy: the exploration of the interface between the domestic and the international” (Rosamond 2000: 136). Hence “the primary source of integration lies in the interests of the states themselves and the relative power each brings to Brussels” (Moravcsik 1991: 75).



Figure 2: Three levels of interaction for governments. (own graphic)

Concerning preference formation LI continues to assert the primacy domestic actors have on governmental positions regarding integration outcomes. It additionally uses Comparative Politics to ascertain the origins of those state preferences. It follows that rational state behaviour does not emerge from fixed preferences, but rather from dynamic political processes in the domestic polity, producing rather stable preferences (Rosamond 2000: 137). The demands on the domestic level form the preferences of governments. They “emerge through domestic political conflict as societal groups compete for political influence” (Rosamond 2000: 137). Governments require the support of votes, parties, interest groups and bureaucracies, “whose views are transmitted, directly or indirectly, through domestic

institutions and practices of political representation (Moravcsik 1993: 483). Moravcsik hence concludes that “an understanding of domestic politics is a precondition for, not supplement to, the analysis of strategic interaction among states” (Moravcsik 1993: 481). These preferences “are the stable positions held by governments, traceable over a large number of years, regardless of the political hue of the government” (Dover 2005: 509). It is therefore the balance of domestic interests and the relative power of states in the negotiations that matters.

Liberal Intergovernmentalism has increasingly been criticized since “governments have relinquished the sole right to make legislation over a range of matters (national sovereignty), in favour of joint decision making with other governments (pooled sovereignty)” (Bache/George 2006: 4). Still, LI and its main proponent Andrew Moravcsik have major influence upon contemporary work in EU studies, “most, if not all”, conceptually-informed work on the EU engages with his work” (Rosamond 2000: 146). Moreover, for the emergence of ESDP Liberal Intergovernmentalism is especially suited as this process was solely driven by member states and little power was handed over to supranational institutions.

2.4 Conceptualizing the Guiding Questions

Decisions about European security and defence policy are taken by member states governments; it is them who are in control of the process of integration for ESDP. Therefore only in looking at MS and their preferences can intergovernmental decisions be explained. The negotiations leading to the critical junctures are clearly *intergovernmental*. If member states have varying governmental positions, these are constructed, according to LI, by different domestic preferences and constraints. Accordingly the drivers for integration are sought in the setting of domestic preferences and constraints across countries that form their relative bargaining power.

Consistently with the framework outlined by Moravcsik it is assumed that a hierarchy of decisions can be derived in three stages to identify the outcomes of international conferences: (1) domestic preference formation, (2) international negotiation with relative bargaining power of states (3) outcomes concerning European integration (institutional choice – pooling or delegation, Moravcsik 1998: 60-67). For a graphical visualization of this step by step approach, see figure 2. However, this has been criticised by Scharpf as “too neat and tidy” (Scharpf 1999: 168). As a consequence, the last two steps that are intertwined in reality are converged into one.

The advantage of focusing on the domestic preferences for the negotiations that allowed the emergence of ESDP is that it is not only based on sound empirical evidence but also allows a fine-grained analyses (tracing processes in a structured-focused comparison) to explain the different positions of member states. This is in line with Scharpf's notion that the most difficult of the three "daunting questions" that LI attempts to answer is: "Why do state leaders have the preferences they have?"¹⁴ (Scharpf 1999: 160). The main assumption made here is that the variance in governmental positions reflects domestic preferences and they account for the positioning of member states during international negotiations and hence form the outcomes of international negotiations. This is based on the core assumptions of Liberal Intergovernmentalism.

A second reason for the focus on domestic preferences, caused by considerations of the research design and the applied methodology is the problematic reconstruction of governmental positions at international conferences. This is reinforced by the fact that no official records of the real bargaining exist¹⁵. Further, few official documents and statements of the European institutions exist on Council negotiations. The only viable sources are the six monthly presidential conclusions, speeches of senior policy-makers, analysis of party manifestos and stated governmental positions previous to the bargain. However, it is crucial to note that all attempts to identify bargaining positions of governments can only be an approximation; without detailed insight about issue-linkages, trade-offs and side-payments no reconstruction of the bargaining positions can be pursued. In conclusion the study focuses on the first and most important part, the domestic preference formation because of the assumptions of LI, empirical evidence and pragmatic considerations of the research design and methodology. Hence, domestic preferences and constraints are taken as the main indication for the governments' position during negotiations. In explaining the emergence of ESDP, the domestic preferences and intergovernmental bargaining determine the change that occurred and explain why it occurred¹⁶.

¹⁴ The other two questions are: „Once preferences have been accounted for, how do they (along with other factors such as power) translate into negotiated outcomes?“ and “How do leaders get the results of negotiation to stick?“ (Scharpf 1999: 161).

¹⁵ The European Council meets in contrast to national parliaments or the UN General Assembly behind closed doors.

¹⁶ Due to the limited scope of the paper the determination of the relative bargaining power is not included in the model. It is furthermore derived from member states' positions inducted from domestic preferences and constraints.

2.5 Necessary Theoretical Adaptation and Operationalization

Security and Defence Policy is naturally a hard nut to crack for Liberal Intergovernmentalism as it is not a playground for many interest groups. In comparable perspective the challenge even grows¹⁷. Each country has a different constellation of interest groups. At the same time the security environment has changed considerably from 1990 to 1998, territorial defence became outdated and regional wars and stability became more important. Although external pressures for the emergence of ESDP affected member state behaviour, these factors are given marginal weight in the theoretical framework. Without doubt are the Balkan crises, and in particular the European intervention in Kosovo; the weakening military interest of the US in Europe, leading to US troop withdrawal; the changing role of the security environment and the re-evaluation of the primacy of NATO; the enormous increase in small and regional wars and conflicts after the end of the Cold War¹⁸ highly influential and relevant factors, however, it is assumed within the framework of LI that these pressures affect the domestic preference formation as well and are hence, included in that way in the framework. For this reason, taking into account the changing domestic preferences allows to include in particular the long-term external influencing factors. The European Security Strategy (ESS) marks in a way the end point and recognition of these changes by all member states of the European Union passing the common strategy¹⁹.

Clearly one of the weakest points is the precise operationalization²⁰ of how domestic preferences are formed. Moravcsik (1998: 480) does not develop a framework of how the process of domestic preference formation works, in his otherwise methodologically excellent account of Liberal Intergovernmentalism. Daniel Wincott and Fritz Scharpf have correctly criticised LI for providing an inadequate account of domestic policy formulation processes including a failure to account for 'everyday' policy-making (Scharpf 1999: 165/ Wincott 1995: 601)²¹.

Liberal Intergovernmentalism is based on the literature of international political economy and

¹⁷ For example it differs considerably if the government has its own advisory bodies, if there are ways to give advice to governments, for Think Tanks, human rights groups or similar non governmental organizations, associations of military or former military personnel and defence industry or defence contractors that influence to a varying degree governmental preferences.

¹⁸ The Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH) marks 1992 as the year with the most wars in history (http://www.sozialwiss.uni-hamburg.de/publish/Ipw/Akuf/kriege_archiv.htm).

¹⁹ European Security Strategy 2003:

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=266&lang=en


²⁰ According to Schnell et al. the operationalization is crucial and is defined as the allocation of indicators to the theoretical concepts (Schnell/ Hill/ Esser 2005: 8).

²¹ A concise critique from three perspectives can be found in Wallace/ Caporaso/ Scharpf / Moravcsik 1999.

they have to have traceable effects on governments, empowering or constraining them (Moravcsik 1993: 487). They have to be comparable among member states; unique settings that are different in each member state add complexity and limit comparability; their influence has to be constant for the period under scrutiny. They have to be able to adapt to pressures from within the domestic system as well as from outside. In order to highlight differences among member states, variance is needed. Not one indicator can fulfil these criteria. Logically a multi-causal explanation has to be chosen. The variables have been derived from theoretical assumptions of LI, from the empirical studies laid out in chapter 2.2 or from its effect on the outcome of bargaining in ESDP. The three variables are:

- (1) *The military spending of member states and their budgetary constraints concerning ESDP.*
- (2) *Public support for a European Defence Policy and changes therein that affect governmental positions.*
- (3) *Public support for the use of the Military versus the use of Civilian Crisis Management for the European Security and Defence Policy.*

Figure 4 shows the variables included in the processes of decision-making for European Security and Defence Policy. At the domestic level, military spending and budgetary constraints, the Public support for a European Defence Policy and the Public attitude towards using Military or Civilian Crisis Management form or constrain the governmental positions. All variables affect the ability of governments to negotiate at the international level and provide incentives for the governments whose primary interest it is “to maintain themselves in office” (Moravcsik 1993: 483).



2.6 Specification of the Variables and the Hypothesis

In order to test the influences of the variables on governmental positions their effects have to be predicted by hypotheses. Sauder (1995: 434) confirms the argument so far in concluding that the security policy of a given country is shaped by its domestic configuration. For conceptual validity it is important to lay out a precisely argued framework for the operationalization of the key variables and processes at work.

Variable 1: *The military spending of member states and their budgetary constraints concerning ESDP.* Military expenditure of governments has decreased drastically since the end of the Cold War. Budgetary control is not only a key research area for political economists but also considerably variance among the UK, France and Germany can be observed; financing the military is a highly sensitive issue²³. Differences are caused by the role the military plays in the national constitution, the public perception of the military and parliamentary control of the armed forces and its budget. Hence it can be argued that budgetary control in general and for defence in particular is a constant and key characteristic of each political system. For example Puetter (2007) emphasises the important role Finance Ministers had in the EU constitutional treaty; Hallerberg et al. (2007) examine the impact of fiscal rules on public finance expenditure. This is in particular relevant for ESDP as costs for operations carried out under the framework “lie where they fall”²⁴.

A second branch of the literature argues that in particular in the foreign and security policy pressures to integrate were rising because of budgetary constraints.

“Since the end of the Cold War, EU member states have faced strong incentives to integrate their military forces. First of all, shrinking defence budgets in all member states have made their efficient spending more pressing. Member states have therefore been more prepared to participate in joint armaments projects and to engage in role specialization in order to obtain more value for money” (Wagner 2006: 204).

Likewise Neßhöver and Schrader argued in 1997 that cooperation in the defence industry has become increasingly important after the end of the Cold War, as “defence budgets have indeed been dramatically reduced” (Coulomb/ Fountanel 2005: 299). Hence it is assumed that

²³ Ferguson has emphasized in a historical perspective that money is the most important factors for military spending and war (Ferguson, N., 2001: 31).

²⁴ European Council, 2007: Factsheet on Financing ESDP operations: 6 (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ATHENA_june_2007.pdf).

it was rational for governments, given the reduced military expenditure to seek cooperation and efficiency gains at the European level. In particular for the military the amount of money spent on it links closely to the quality and capability of the armed forces. Given the crises on the Balkans in the late 1990s the EU was needed but it failed to act decisively and forcefully, not least because it did not possess the assets and technology required.

Given the incentives of strong constraints on the military spending for cooperation at European Union level, **Hypothesis 1** is:

H1: Governments with smaller defence budgets or with stronger domestic constraints will be more supportive of seeking cooperation and efficiency gains at the European level.

Variable 2: *Public support for a European Defence Policy and changes therein that affect governmental positions.* Valuable insights have been drawn among others from Risse-Kappen's work in 1991 analysing public opinion, domestic structures and foreign policy and aiming to explain why states responded differently to the same international conditions and constraints. Risse-Kappen concludes that "mass public opinion proves to be a resource for strengthening one's position in the coalition-building process" (1991: 511). A similar claim was tested positively by Koenig-Archibugi, investigating the effects that the support of the population had on the institutional change in EU Foreign and Security Policy²⁵.

Seeking a comparable dataset of public opinion on ESDP for Germany, France and the UK the question "What is your opinion on the following statement: Support for a common Defence Policy; Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for or against it"²⁶, posed by the six monthly Eurobarometer survey has been selected²⁷. It provides an excellent baseline against which government behaviour can be measured²⁸. Considerable variance of up to 40 percentage points between countries supports the assumptions of variance among

²⁵ Koenig-Archibugi tested the hypothesis: Governments of countries with strong [mass/elite] identification with "Europe" will be more supportive of supranational integration in foreign and security policy than governments of countries with less European identification" (Koenig-Archibugi 2004: 147) in a quantitative research design.

²⁶ The Eurobarometer survey question for the time period from 1993 to 2002 was "Support for a common defence policy". Since then a slightly altered question was asked, "What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it. For all figures please see Annex 1 or the Excel sheet provided with this paper.

²⁷ For information on the Methodology of the EB see: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/description_en.htm.

²⁸ It is not simply assumed however, that senior decision-makers adapt their policies according to the newest findings of the Eurobarometer (EB), but merely that the EB mirrors the mood in the society that the government knows as well.

countries, reflected in different governmental behaviour. As examples served the UK in spring 2003, when 47 per cent of the population were in favour of ESDP, in comparison to Germany in autumn 2004, when 87 per cent were in favour of ESDP. The same is true for each country over time, again for the United Kingdom support for ESDP was at an all time high of 64 per cent in favour in autumn 1998 at the time of the summit at St. Malo, up to 15 per cent higher than the values at the beginning of the 21st century (ranging from 49 to 53 per cent).

According to Liberal Intergovernmentalism claiming that rational governments seek re-election (Moravcsik 1993: 483) and concordantly governments adapt their position to the opinion of their constituency, **Hypothesis 2** is:

H2: Governments with high values of support for a European Security and Defence Policy will be more supportive of integration in ESDP than governments with lower values of support.

Variable 3: *Public support for the use of the Military versus the use of Civilian Crisis Management for the European Security and Defence Policy.* The last indicator addresses the general public support for the national armed forces; for example, in Germany support for a European Defence ranks highest, although the national military is seen very critically; in contrast to France and the UK. “Among the EU member states, there have been huge differences as regards parliaments’ competencies in security and defence policy. In former colonial powers, for example, governments are usually allowed to deploy troops without the consent of parliament (Born and Urscheler 2004: 64)²⁹.

Given the variation on the dependent variable, 12 of 20 civilian missions carried out under ESDP framework, three including both military and civilian components and only five military. This surge of civilian crisis management after ESDP is in stark contrast to the decision at St. Malo that focused only on military. This indicator is however distinguished from the other two by some degree of “fuzziness”. It has many different facets and insights as variables are taken from a wide array of observations: from the national strategic culture, over the number of military forces sent abroad for multilateral operations to the domestic

²⁹ An example supporting the argument notes Wagner (2006: 204): “Thus, the governments in France and the United Kingdom decided to participate in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air strikes against Serbian targets in 1999 without having consulted parliament”.

discourses on military or civilian crisis management and the position of the Ministry of Defence, the defence industry and the armed forces towards cooperating at European level. Comparison for this indicator is not footed on one baseline indicator. However as an approximation the number of military contributions to peacekeeping can be used. Hence **Hypothesis 3** reads as follows:

H3: The more constrained the government is towards the use of its military, the more it will focus on integration at the European Union and in particular on Civilian Crisis Management.

3. Methodology and Research Design

3.1 Research Design

Through a structured focused comparison of three crucial within-cases, the domestic preference formation of Germany, France and the United Kingdom developing a European Security and Defence Policy are analysed and explained. The method allows tracing the process of domestic preference formation and the change therein. This approach follows the theoretically-guided assumptions derived from Liberal Intergovernmentalism emphasizing the importance of three distinct levels in European Union decision making: The formation of domestic preferences, shaping the governmental positions and their governmental power in international negotiations determining the outcomes of international bargains.

The research is of value because it transfers the paradigm of LI to a level that it has not been consistently been tested on³⁰. In order to fulfil the first research goal three key factors concordant with the assumptions of LI have been identified and serve as variables for the different domestic preferences of Germany, France and the United Kingdom. Three hypotheses claiming the impact of these factors are derived and put to a test. Methodologically the within-cases are analysed with the method of structured focused comparison³¹ and the development of changes are traced for each of the processes. As “social science research at its best is a creative process of insight and discovery taking place within a well-established structure of scientific inquiry” (King/ Keohane/ Verba 1994: 12); a new combination of factors assembled in accordance with the dominant paradigm in European integration theory, Liberal Intergovernmentalism, is applied in order to understand the puzzle.

The last decade has brought about an important scholarly debate about qualitative methods in political sciences; Bennett and Elman (2006: 455) call it a “renaissance” of qualitative methods. Although no depletive overview will be given, the most important criteria against which this study will be measured are shortly highlighted. The goal of any research is “to make valid descriptive and causal inferences” (King/ Keohane/ Verba 1994:3), hence the research design follows the demands of the most influential book in Qualitative Methodology

³⁰ However no serious test of the whole theory of LI is conducted as a rational comparison between competing theories is rare and “contrary to naïve Falsificationism, no experiment, experimental report, observation statement or well-corroborated low low-level falsifying hypothesis alone can lead to falsification” (Lakatos 1978: 35). Thus the crucial element in falsification is whether the new theory offers any novel, excess information compared with its predecessor and whether some of this excess information is corroborated (Lakatos 1978: 36).

³¹ For this method it has to be kept in mind that cases “should be undertaken with a specific research objective in mind and a theoretical focus appropriate for that objective” (George/ Bennett 2004: 70).

of (King/ Keohane/ Verba 1994: 13) in separating the four components – “the *research question*, the *theory*, the *data*, and the *use of the data*” – in the research process (emphasis in original). Their four criteria for good scientific research are: (1) The goal is inference, (2) the procedures are public, (3) the conclusions are uncertain and (4) the content is the method (King/ Keohane/ Verba 1994: 7-9). Additionally it is claimed to pose “a question that is “important” in the real world” (King/ Keohane/ Verba 1994: 15), in answering the puzzle of why integration has occurred in ESDP between 1998 and 2003.

3.2 Reasons for a Case study

Case studies have distinct advantages and disadvantages that have been widely discussed (Yin 2003: 1-3; Gerring 2007: 37-63)³². Gerring notes that researchers in general “face a choice between knowing more about less, or less about more” (Gerring 2007: 49). A case study approach is used here in order to test the hypothesis on an exploratory basis and to gain insight into the process of integration in ESDP from a Liberal Intergovernmentalist point of view. The case study of the European Union Foreign and Security Policy from 1998 to 2003 is distinguished in three within-cases (the developments within the member states of Germany, France, and the UK). As case studies are valuable “in testing hypotheses and particularly useful for theory development” as well as valuable in “their potential for achieving high conceptual validity” (George/ Bennett 2005: 19) a case study approach is uniquely suitable for this research purpose. At the same time while the styles for quantitative and qualitative research is very different, the logic of inference is applicable to both (King/ Keohane/ Verba 1994: 3) and “the product of a good case study is insight” (Gerring 2007: 7). Hence the inferred conclusions can be used to test the findings on a larger number of cases.

A further reason for choosing a case study approach is the relative position of research concerning ESDP in the research cycle³³. Research on the ESDP is in its infancy. That is not surprising, given that it is only since 1998 that progress can be observed. Hence little research has been conducted and it is at the moment that the first theoretically-guided analyses are published³⁴. One excellent reference was provided by Kaim (2007).

³² Yin notes that „the demands of a case-study on a person’s intellect, ego, and emotions are far greater than those of any other strategy“ (Yin 1994: 55).

³³ For more information on the relation between the research cycle and possible research see Schnell/ Hill/ Esser 2005: 8; Blatter/ Janning/ Wagemann 2007: 128.

³⁴ The fact that few theoretically guided analysis’s have been undertaken in ESDP also forms the reason for the focus on the period from 1998 to 2003, the establishment of a common ESDP and its operational capability. The latter period since 2003 with 20 missions launched provides a thrilling research area but as little literature exists and the meetings of the European Council are not publically available inferences would be highly speculative or

3.3 Case Selection

For the case of ESDP the universe of within-cases is formed by all member states of the European Union³⁵. The United Kingdom, France and Germany are selected because of their influence on the overall process of integration, their crucial role for the development of ESDP³⁶. They are the three largest member states of the European Union, together they form nearly half of the European population and generate more than half of the European GDP (figures are based on Kaim 2007: 16). Together they send 34.8 per cent of all members of the European Parliament and amount for 27.1 per cent of votes in the Council (Kaim 2007: 16); they have the largest military budgets as well as the most operational capabilities. This is crucial as financing European operations is carried out by the principle of costs lie where they fall³⁷. Only these three states have the resources to send a considerable amount of troops abroad, pay for it and have the diplomatic capabilities to convince others to participate or commonly block any progress. France and the UK both have a permanent seat in the UN Security Council and strong ties to former colonies. At the same time ESDP policies of Germany, UK and France converge in their positions, but offer variance in their domestic preferences and constraints (Kaim 2007: 369). Germany, France and the United Kingdom form crucial cases in so far because if they cannot explain integration in ESDP, then Liberal Intergovernmentalism cannot explain the progress of ESDP.

3.4 Data and Method of Analysis

In qualitative research it is a balancing act between a parsimonious explanation and over-descriptive unstructured explanation that does lay out the issue at hand but limits to draw abstract conclusions and enriching other scholarly work. In retrospect about previous case studies George and Bennett have highlighted that “although individual case studies were often instructive, they did not lend themselves readily to strict comparison or to orderly accumulation” (George/ Bennett 2004: 68). With the method of structured focused comparison three baseline variables are established and referred understand the processes at work for ESDP. With the method no statistical instruments can be applied, but it borrows the

needs to be based on in-depth interviews with key decision-makers. This would be out of proportion for a Bachelor thesis but a highly relevant research project for a Diploma or PhD thesis.

³⁵ It is often argued that the interests of the United States are an important factor, however as they are not part of the European bargains about integration, their role is neglected.

³⁶ It is noteworthy in this context that both Moravcsik, in lying the framework for Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Kaim, conducting the first in-depths analysis of ESDP from a Liberal Intergovernmentalist perspective, limit their analysis to these countries.

³⁷ European Council, 2007: Factsheet on Financing ESDP operations: 6 (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ATHENA_june_2007.pdf).

device of asking a set of standardized, general questions of each case from statistical analysis' (George/ Bennett 2004: 69). This allows systematic comparison and accumulation of the findings of the cases possible (George/ Bennett 2004: 67). The method of structured focused comparison is particularly important, when complex and manifold information exists that is analysed. Only in this way can the reliability and thus precise criticism be maximized as the interpretation is made explicit and only for certain selected aspects. As "qualitative researchers generally unearth enormous amounts of information from their studies" (King/ Keohane/ Verba 1994: 4) it is highly necessary to structure the empirical data used.

Although no in-depth process tracing method is applied some of its tools are used. At the beginning of the analysis (the domestic preference formation and its change) and the end (the decisions to establish and develop an ESDP) it is looked at "a series of theoretically predicted intermediate steps" (Checkel 2005: 5). The clear benefit of process tracing is according to Checkel that "if done properly, it places theory and data in close proximity" (Checkel 2005: 22).

The data under analysis that forms the backbone of the study are: (1) Primary sources, such as publication of the European institutions (The European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council Secretariat and affiliated research institutions), speeches of key decision-makers both on national and European level and statements of Member states (in particular key publications of European strategies, such as White Papers on Defence and statements by the Head of Government). (2) Secondary literature and analysis, in particular for the control of key arguments, and the information about the availability of quantitative data and previous research conducted. (3) Thirdly, statistical evaluations, such as the figures of the six-monthly Eurobarometer, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and troop contributions counted by the United Nations and national governments³⁸. As emphasized in the research design in more detail the aim of the study is to achieve a high degree of transparency and replicability to identify factors that can be employed in further scholarly analysis. For that reason it is mostly attempted to find baseline indicators that are not only identical for all three within-cases but based on standardized data collection techniques.

³⁸ The compiled and aggregated data used here was taken from Giegerich 2006.

4. Empirical analysis

The peaceful unification of our continent has been our great achievement, and now our main challenge is to act as a credible force for good. From a continental agenda, we should move to a global agenda. From building peace in Europe to being a peace-builder in the world.

Javier Solana 2007: 1

4.1 Introduction – the emergence of ESDP and European Peacekeeping

The puzzle that is always raised when the sudden integration in ESDP is analysed is the change in the position of the United Kingdom towards a more collaborative approach. The turning point, the critical juncture, can be pinpointed to the bilateral meeting of France and the United Kingdom in St. Malo from 3 to 4 December 1998. However, what most analysts fail to achieve is to explain the reasons for the change in the British position. Apart from the “standard explanations” of changes in the global security environment after the end of the Cold War and the crises on the Balkans this paper goes new ways in applying the framework of Liberal Intergovernmentalism and in tracing the change within a rational domestically grounded framework.

The approach requires thorough analysis of domestic politics and polity as most of the explanatory factors found in the literature are exogenous to LI as a framework and block out the domestic preference formation or shifts therein. These preferences are seen as constant factors that do not change easily. In identifying the processes of preference formation it will be possible to have a grounded analysis for a Liberal Intergovernmentalist view on the emergence of the European Security and Defence Policy and European Peacekeeping for the first time. The method of structured focused comparison allows comparing the preference formation across countries. First, the most important aspects of the political system and the changes in domestic preferences are highlighted, before the domestic preference formation is investigated according to the three variables introduced in chapter 2.6.

4.2 The United Kingdom

4.2.1 The Political System in the United Kingdom

“In Britain’s highly centralized political system, major decisions about foreign and defense policies are made by the prime minister with input from departmental ministers and senior civil servants. Few interest groups and other constituency groups take a direct interest or lobby the government on broad issues of foreign policy, such as the design or participation in European security

structures, although some such groups – such as defense contractors, human rights groups, or associations of former military personnel – do try to influence specific foreign and defense policy decisions such as spending on weapons systems, support for military intervention overseas, and the size and structure of the armed forces.” (Walsh 2006: 506)³⁹.

4.2.2 Changing domestic preferences in the United Kingdom in the 1990s

In the following analysis no elevated influence was found for interest groups, but changes in the political system were identified as key factors. It is often claimed that the change of the British position towards a European Security and Defence Policy was due to the leadership of Prime Minister Tony Blair. However, although a simple argument following the importance of a strong leader comparable to the ideas of Weber (1985: 852) can be justified it does not perfectly match reality and reduces complexity of the domestic situation at the time too far. A more parsimonious argument points to the characteristic of the political system in England that gives the Prime Minister the central role in Security and Defence policy. Moreover, the change from the Conservative government to the Labour party in 1997 and the comfortable majority of 179 seats in the House of Commons allowed the government under leadership of PM Tony Blair to gain a certain degree of freedom from parliamentary control and allowed policy change in a more controversial policy area (Walsh 2006: 510). Walsh (2006: 500) summarizes that the “change in the government’s political situation allowed the Blair government to adopt the rival policy that its predecessor had lacked the support to implement”. This is in particular important as the ability to implement new policy ideas in British polity “depends in large measure on maintaining the support of [...] its parliamentary majority” (Walsh 2006: 516), the United Kingdom rules by legislation approved in the parliament, not as much by constitutional law (e.g. compared to France and Germany). Thus, the change towards ESDP was influenced in important ways by the government’s estimates of its political viability (Walsh 2006: 500).

4.2.3 The formation of domestic preferences in the United Kingdom

4.2.3.1 Military spending and budgetary constraints

³⁹ Walsh (2005) presents a concisely researched overview of British security policy after the Cold War (based on process tracing and interviews with senior decision makers). He discusses factors affecting policy change in the British case and examines three periods relevant for policy change, 1. the policies under conservative PM John Major, 2. the Major’s governments response to the policy failure in Kosovo and 3. the policy change under Labour PM Tony Blair. As his findings are concordant with those of this paper, Walsh’s article can only be recommended for more detailed information on the British case.

One factor for the move to more cooperation at St. Malo was “the government’s desire to reduce or maintain the defence budget” (Dover 2005: 511).

“The Labour party’s approach to defence policy leading up to the 1997 election had been to place a great emphasis on the economic benefits that could be derived from a revised defence policy, to be realised through an improvement to the defence and high technology industrial bases they argued had been neglected by the Conservative Government” (Dover 2005: 511).

This is in line with the data of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, showing a steady decline from 4.1 per cent of military spending in GDP in 1991 to 2.6 per cent in 1998. That value decreased to 2.4 per cent from 2000 to 2003⁴⁰. While a similar trend exists for France and Germany as well, the UK even undercuts the level of spending of France both in GDP and absolute terms for the period from 1997 to 2002. That is remarkable as the UK invested up to 0.7 per cent more of its GDP for Defence than France (for example in 1991, Figure 13). This trend of sinking defence budgets continued from the mid 1990s until the beginning of the 21st century, before the spending as part of GDP grew again. Normally the UK military spending lies consistently above that of France and Germany, both in relative terms to its GDP as well as its absolute spending.

Given the Labour party programme that defence cooperation should “lead to a more cost-effective provision of defence across the EU” and that “consolidation would however, produce an estimated cost saving of some 10-12 per cent” (Dover 2005: 512) the wish for increased cooperation and coordination to reduce the defence spending is rational. The increasing financial demands of the “new wars” on military capabilities and spending and the increasingly important role of technology, was underscored in the mid 1990s by the conflict on the Balkans.

4.2.3.2 Public support for a European Defence Policy

In contrast to Germany or France, the British government faced considerable headwind from its political opposition. “From the very beginning of Tony Blair’s premiership, the Conservative Party unequivocally positioned itself as eurosceptic alternative to the government” (Oppermann 2006: 13). This allowed the young prime minister on the one hand to create a profile that differed from his predecessor John Major, on the other hand his credibility was at stake in case he would lose the majority in Parliament or lose significant

⁴⁰ The data used was extracted from the SIPRI Military Expenditure database of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), accessible under <http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4>

public support by his constituencies. This is in line with the findings of British inter-party dissent in European Policy; scrutinized with a “content analysis of the two main parties 1997 election manifestos. In conclusion the Labour manifesto displays an overwhelming preponderance of positive references to the European Union, in contrast to the Conservative manifesto that is more negative” (Klingemann et al. 2006, cf. Oppermann 2006: 13).




Figure 5: Salience of European Policy to the British Public (Oppermann 2006: 17)

Figure 5 highlights two relevant aspects, first that the “salience of European policy issues to the British public is highly volatile”, and that the government’s defence initiative and the St. Malo declaration in December 1998 coincide with a noticeable increase (Oppermann 2006: 16-17). A strong linkage between the support of ESDP and public opinion reveals the Eurobarometer. The support for a common defence and security policy among the British population increased from 57 per cent in autumn 1997 to 64 per cent in autumn 1998. Hence the fresh wind that the new Labour government initiated was in accordance with its constituency. Such a high support has not been reached since⁴¹. This strengthens the argument of domestically rooted support for ESDP in 1998 and clearly shows that it was not only an initiative from the government⁴². With the Eurobarometer serving as an independent baseline for general trends in public opinion the

⁴¹ For the graph, showing the Eurobarometer results from 1996 to 2007 please see eight and nine in the Annex.
⁴² As a reference point, the same findings are true for the support for CFSP, with two limitations: 1. the highest value for the period from 1996 to 2007 of 52 per cent in support of CFSP has been reached once after autumn 1998, in spring 2007. 2. Overall the percentage in support of CFSP is considerably lower than for ESDP. Further an increase in support for CFSP and ESDP in autumn 1998 can be found as well for the EU at large as well as for Germany and France.

argument developed before confirms the reasons for the British openness to cooperation in the field of ESDP at St. Malo in December 1998 and not before. Sjursen finds in affirmation that cooperation in this particular policy was far less sensitive domestically in Britain than for example the European Monetary Union (Sjursen 1999).

4.2.3.3 Public support for Military versus Civilian Crisis Management

The United Kingdom has a tradition of using the whole array of security and defence instruments when necessary and the attitude of the British population is very positive in judging its armed forces and their use in conflicts. Wagner uses the example of the participation of the UK (and France) in the NATO air strikes against Serbian targets in 1999 that the government decided without having consulted the parliament (Wagner 2006: 205). A survey of the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences carried out in 2006 reflects that 68 per cent of the British population agree that the armed forces have proven valuable in missions in and outside the country, compared to 47 per cent in Germany and 52 per cent in France (own translation, compiled from: Bulmahn/ Fiebig/ Sender 2008: 82, 85)⁴³. 71 per cent have a positive attitude towards the armed forces (55 per cent in Germany, 52 in France) and 66 per cent feel pride for the armed forces, Germany 42 per cent, France 53 per cent (Bulmahn/ Fiebig/ Sender 2008: 82, 85). Further influential political actors, the Ministry of Defence, the armed forces and the Foreign Office have been in support of enhanced European cooperation in Security and Defence. As the UK has a strong defence industry, it was the governmental desire to embed the support for defence cooperation in most of the core documents to follow (St. Malo, European Councils in Cologne and Nice). In conclusion the British public appreciates the use of forces in crisis situations and does have an instrumental relation towards using military or civilian crisis management.

Table 1: A comparative overview of selected domestic opinion on the armed forces

Acceptance for a national military in percentage for:	UK	France	Germany
Protection from War and terrorism	81	84	87
To secure power and influence of the state	40	51	35
To promote the respect of international law	55	62	73
I feel gratitude for the armed forces	64	52	30
Pride for armed forces	66	53	42
The armed forces have proven valuable in the mission in and outside of the country	68	52	47
Overall I have a positive attitude towards the armed forces	71	65	55
Translated and compiled from: Bulmahn, T./ Fiebig, R./ Sender, W., 2008: 82, 85			

⁴³ For an overview, please see table2.

Summing up from a domestic perspective, the British agreement at St. Malo was no failure of an inexperienced Prime Minister or a mere adaptation to outside pressure, it is in concordance with domestic developments previous to the St. Malo conference. The increased engagement towards the European Union and the lead in ESDP opened the opportunity for a more efficient defence expenditure as well as cooperation in the field of defence industry and react more effectively and coherently in major crisis situation. “British officials understood how to negotiate in the European Union and that their voices would carry weight on security issues because Britain’s capabilities to deploy force overseas was far more advanced than all of the other members except France” (Walsh 2006: 505).

4.3 France

European integration would not be imaginable without the vibrant support of France, the same goes for the European Security and Defence Policy. France is equipped with a Security Council seat, nuclear capabilities, functioning ties to numerous former colonies, including an influential role in the hot-spots in the Middle-East and Africa. France is not a member of the NATO alliance⁴⁴. Keeping its own military capability and autonomy has remained a core issue for French foreign and defence policy.

4.3.1 The Political System in France

France is a presidential system in which the directly elected President is the most influential player in both foreign and defence policy (Risse-Kappen 1991: 490). In fact it is article 15 of the French Constitution that announces the President as heading the forces and outlines its responsibility for territorial defence⁴⁵. It is emphasized that in French European (military) policy making political, economic and bureaucratic elites have played the most important role⁴⁶ (Grossman 2007; Irondelle 2003: 212). “The executive and a core of top civilian and military officials remain to a large extent insulated from pressure groups, societal pressures and parliamentary groups” (Irondelle 2003: 221). The role of the society in general is rather weak it is “dominated by the state and, above all, the presidency, particularly concerning foreign and defense policy”; the French public even seems “to be disconnected from the

⁴⁴ This has considerably influenced the French behaviour towards NATO and its support for a European defence architecture. It has however kept a working relationship with NATO since it left in 1966. In the 1990s it appeared for some time that France might even rejoin the Alliance, this failed however due to clashing positions of France and the USA.

⁴⁵ In the English translation article 15 reads as follows: “The President of the Republic shall be commander-in-chief of the armed forces. He shall preside over the higher national defence councils and committees“. The French Constitution can be accessed online via <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/english/8ab.asp#TITLE%20II>

⁴⁶ This is in part owed to the fact that “the number and the importance of institutional veto-points are rather limited in the defence field when confronted with the leadership of the executive power” (Irondelle 2003: 213).

policy-making process” (Risse-Kappen 1991: 504, 491).

4.3.2 Changing domestic preference in France in the 1990s

France has been a lead nation for ESDP. It reformed its military forces already between 1991 and 1996, the reasoning anchored in the new strategies identified by the French Whitebook on defence that addressed the new security threats already before the crisis on the Balkans. “The White Book on Defence of 1994 presented the necessity of adapting military strategy to the new risks linked to the development of regional conflicts” (Coulomb/ Fountanel 2005: 298). Recognizing that no European country alone could solve the issue, France adopted a paradigm that gave primacy to European co-operation. Irondelle even finds an “Europeanization” of the defence budget in France, “the co-operation programmes in the defence budget constantly increased: from 1996 to 2002 the share of the co-operation programmes increased from 15 per cent to 34 per cent in the defence budget” (Irondelle 2003: 217). It can be concluded that the domestic “institutional framework of French military policy-making – the President’s *domaine reserve* and the specific institutional configurations between 1993 and 1996 with the White Paper Commission and the Strategic Committee – structured this process” of continuous European orientation (Irondelle 2003: 223, emphasis in original).

4.3.3 The formation of domestic preferences in France

4.3.3.1 Military spending and budgetary constraints

In the presidential regime of the Fifth Republic the budgeting process is very concentrated. The parliamentary control is considerably weak and budgets usually pass as the government “by definition enjoys a parliamentary majority”⁴⁷. We can conclude that an important feature “of French budgeting is the strong centralized control in the hands of the Prime Minister and his Ministers of Budget and Finance. The current process in France is as centrally controlled as it seems possible to imagine in a democracy” (Baumgartner/ Foucault/ François 2006: 1095)⁴⁸. In statistical terms the French military spending as percentage of GDP has declined steadily from 3.6 per cent in 1988 to 2.4 per cent in 2006, the latest date available⁴⁹. Between 1998 and 1999 the military spending as part of GDP remained constant for two years, before

⁴⁷ “Typically a large one due to the two-ballot electoral system used in the Fifth Republic as opposed to proportional representation used in the Third and Fourth Republics” (Baumgartner, F. R./ Foucault, M./ François, A., 2006: 1094). For more information on the French budgetary process in general and concerning defence policy in particular see Baumgartner/ Foucault/ Francois 2006.

⁴⁸ These findings makes it difficult to fulfil the scope of the paper, namely distinguishing the domestic influence from governmental preferences and distinguishing their respective influence on the governmental decisions for the big bargains of ESDP.

⁴⁹ The data used was extracted from the SIPRI Military Expenditure database of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), accessible under <http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4>

it decreased further to 2.5 per cent from 2000 to 2002. The total numbers are astonishing as the military spending in absolute terms did not grow, but is in fact still lower than the military expenditure of 1988. The general European trend of an increased military spending since 2001 can be noticed in France as well.

As executive control is considerable it is argued that the reduction is caused by strategic reasoning of the government. With the military reforms France was able to use its budget more economically. Secondly, the French government was aware that investment in technology is growing in importance and synergy effects have to be reached through European cooperation. Additionally France had a strategic and economic interest in strengthening its defence industry through cooperation because “the French armaments industry is third in the world for arms exports, with about 10 per cent of world exports” contributing up to 5 per cent of total French exports (Schmidt/ Pilandon/ Aben 1990: 96).

4.3.3.2 Public support for a European Defence Policy

The public support for an ESDP has remained strong in France throughout the 1990s. France has the highest values of support for the period from spring 1998 to spring 2001; that time period coincides with the strong promotion of an ESDP by France and with considerable successes in integration with agreements at St. Malo, the Cologne, Helsinki, Feira and Nice European Council. In particular for autumn 1998, the time of the St. Malo summit more than 80 per cent of the French population supported a common ESDP. This peak appears noteworthy as it shows for the UK and Germany as well and is even visible for the mean of all European Union MS. After 2001 the German values of support for ESDP were above those of France; however, the French values remained significantly above those of the European Union mean⁵⁰.

4.3.3.3 Public support for Military versus Civilian Crisis Management

The French public is similar to the United Kingdom concerning its use of military and defence policy where the country’s interests are at stake. Burmester notes that similarly to the instrumental use of its nuclear status during the Cold War, France uses peacekeeping in the new world order of regional conflicts to secure its position in the SC and remain the most

⁵⁰ Support of the French population for CFSP shows similar tendencies, however it is more volatile than the support for ESDP. It can be distinguished into two periods, before 2001 (from 1996 to 2001) the support swings around 70 per cent and slightly above. After spring 2001 support for a common FSP sinks 60 per cent in spring 2002 but recovers and ‘zigzags’ between 65 and 70 per cent (Eurobarometer, for more information please see Annex 1 and 2).

important player in continental Europe in comparison to the Germans (Burmester 1997: 100).

In the period of the mid 1990s France was actively involved in the crisis on the Balkans. France sent the largest troop contribution for the UN Peacekeeping mission in the former Yugoslavia (Canivez 1997: 177). “France thus placed itself at the top of the political engagement that was – at the time – also the focus of the United Nations and the International Community” (translated from: Canivez 1997: 177). The French engagement was extraordinary; “in terms of force missions and military involvement, the previous record of immobilism has been replaced by an almost frenetic activism” (Howorth 1997: 43). The French troops contributing to the United Nations suffered the most injured and dead (Canivez 1997: 177). The decision that the EU needs to be able to address such crises in the future stems partly from that painful French experience, in particular as the US did not want to intervene in the beginning and demanded a more active role of the EU.

4.4 Germany

Although – or in particular because – Germany is not a key military player in the European Union, its role has been and remains pivotal for the development of a common European Security and Defence Policy. It was under the German Presidency that the ESDP was included in the framework of the European Union, that civilian crisis management capabilities were added and the transfer of the WEU into the EU was outlined.

4.4.1 The Political System in Germany

Germany’s key domestic preferences were strongly favouring European integration⁵¹ in general and economic integration in particular, Multilateralism and international law, and Civilian Crisis management but were very critical of military intervention with a ‘culture of restraint or even ‘anti-militarism’⁵². Germany supported the NATO security primacy but also backed stronger European defence cooperation. Its close ties to France made it an important ally for a common ESDP. The German domestic structure, in which comparatively strong state institutions deal with well-organized societal actors in a democratic corporatist network suggest that “public opinion influences foreign policy mainly through the party system and

⁵¹ “EU membership is traditionally seen as one of the most essential elements of German foreign policy and there is a broad consensus in favour of a common European foreign policy” (Alec de Flers 2004: 1). However concerning defence, Germany has a clear position that “military force must always remain a last resort” and be undertaken only “in accordance with the United Nations Charter” ; It is complementary that “Germany is in particularly in favour of developing civilian and military capabilities on an equal basis” (Alec de Flers 2004: 1).

⁵² Baumann and Hellmann call this the ‘culture of restraint’, ‘Germany’s exceptionalism’, or its ‘anti-militarist culture’ (Baumann, R./ Hellmann, G., 2001: 62).

that interactive patterns prevail between elites and masses” (Risse-Kappen, 1991: 493). Hence the research focus is chosen accordingly.

4.4.2 Changing domestic preferences in Germany in the 1990s

Within Germany a considerable shift in public opinion occurred in the mid- to late- 1990s. The resemblance of German preferences towards military and ESDP in particular can be distinguished in two main parts. The first, after the Second World War and until the mid-1990s was coined by a anti-military resentment and even the belief in a constitutional constraint to send troops out-of-area⁵³. In 1994 the Federal Constitutional Court had to decide and voted positively. Although the decision taken was quite tight (5 to 3 votes) it was unanimously accepted by politicians⁵⁴. According to the Federal Constitutional Court, the use of the armed forces is not within the executive’s sole discretion but as a ‘parliamentary army’ part of the democratic constitutional order. (Wagner 2006: 207).

The second shift in the late 1990s, comparable to the British swing of positioning before St. Malo, is marked by the recognition of its responsibility to act (if necessary even with military force) to prevent crises from getting out of control. This paradigm change can be summarized in three words respectively: From “No more war!” to “No more Auschwitz!” (Baumann/ Hellmann 2001: 74). Thus a “pace of convergence accelerating since the mid-1990s” shifted German preferences, in fact coming to terms with the use of military forces for crises in Europe’s neighbourhood and beyond. In result “while Germans were still almost totally absent from the scene of military action during the Gulf War of 1990/91, they found themselves centre-stage only nine years later in NATO’s war in Kosovo” (Baumann/ Hellmann 2001: 61). “The stunning result – unimaginable for most Germans only five years ago – was that this has been widely accepted both among foreign policy elites as well as the public more broadly” (Baumann/ Hellmann 2001: 75). However, Germany remained a clear position that “military force must always remain a last resort” and be undertaken only “in

⁵³ Baumann and Hellmann describe the German population as “willing recipients or even zealous proponents of the anti-militarist re-education favoured by the Western allies” (Baumann/ Hellmann 2001: 61).

⁵⁴ When looking at the historical processes in more detail, history tells a story that seems to be schizophrenic. Although the Free Liberal Democrats (FDP) supported Christian Democratic Union (CDU), their partner in government in their quest to send troops, it backed at the same time the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Green Party in a plead before the Federal Constitutional Court to decide whether the governmental decision was legitimate. “On 12 July 1994, it decided the issue in the affirmative: the Bundeswehr may take part in an out-of-area operation if the Bundestag gives its authorisation and if this operation is conducted within the framework of a system of collective security”. “This ruling immediately put an end to the contentious debate, since all its participants now accepted the constitutional basis for German out-of-area deployments as indicated by the Constitutional Court” (Baumann/ Hellmann 2001: 74). The debate was instrumental in redefining the boundaries for a legitimate German use of force.

accordance with the United Nations Charter” (Alec de Flers 2004: 1). Given this development Germany is particularly suited to illustrate the conflicting demands of military integration, parliamentary control and domestic preference formation.

4.4.3 The formation of domestic preferences

4.4.3.1 Military spending and budgetary constraints

Germany’s strong anti-militaristic attitude, both in the population and the government has a strong influence on the military expenditure. Germany differs distinctly in its high budgetary constraints from the UK and France. Military spending as percentage of GDP has reduced continuously and significantly to a third from 2.9 per cent in 1989 to 1.3 per cent in 2006. In 2006 the percentage of GDP was half that of the United Kingdom. In comparison with the absolute Military spending this trend can be confirmed.

In a way these data is surprising as Germany has been actively involved since the mid 1990s in Peacekeeping, Peace-Support and Post-Conflict Reconstruction missions under UN, NATO, OSCE and EU framework. However, what these numbers obviously do not catch is other ways in which the German government has paid for its international engagement, apart from defence spending. Due to its clear focus on CCM the military budget is only one of several to consider. Given the domestic pressure it is reasonable for the government to avoid these in placing CCM activities in the budget lines of other governmental agencies⁵⁵. Taking this into account, the German government’s laggard position can be qualified. However, it should not be forgotten that the main reason for the expansion of CCM and the reduced expenditure for the military is because of the domestic constraints for spending on military and defence.

4.4.3.2 Public support for a European Defence Policy

“In autumn 2004 80 per cent of the respondents in Germany supported a common foreign policy of the EU member states and 87 per cent were in favour of a common defence and security policy” (EB 62/ Alec de Flers, N., 2004: 1). Although the German population has been strongly in favour of European integration, CFSP and ESDP, its commitment to military and civilian crisis management differs significantly. This forms a paradox of the inconsistency

⁵⁵ For CCM in particular the budget of the Federal Foreign Office is suitable as well as the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. The latter enlarged considerably against the trend of cutting back on expenditure. In Germany among others the GTZ, DED, InWent and the KfW work in the respective field. Further Germany is a large donor to both the regular budget of the UN and the EU as well as specialized funds and agencies.

between a relatively pacifist society on the one hand that was against an active German military role and on the other hand, the support of further European integration, which was widely backed by the German public. In 1994 Chancellor Kohl has addressed this and asked citizens to rethink their position in stating that: “Those who refuse the development of a European defence identity – this sentence has to be underlined – oppose, in the final analysis, the political unification of Europe (cf. Bohnen 1997: 59).

4.4.3.3 Public support for Military versus Civilian Crisis Management

Germany faced strong domestic constraints in the use of its military force as argued in chapter 4.4.2. Over time “the limits of legitimate German use of force set by public opinion have been removed” (Baumann/ Hellmann 2001: 64). However, “the German political class maintained a reserved if not hostile attitude towards external military engagements” (Bohnen 1997: 53).





Figure 6: Germany’s Participation in Military Operations 1989 to 1998
 “German military contributions have become larger”, however, “at the same time, the operations Germany is ready to take part in have become more ‘militarised’ and thus more dangerous” (Baumann/ Hellmann 2001: 66-68).

Sauder argues that in addition the strong role of the German parliament effectively restricts the ability of the government to use domestic resources for foreign policy goals (Sauder 1995: 430). Overall it is noticeable that party positions play a significant role in the German case. Adapting to the positions of its citizens, Germany has focused on multilateral action and given primacy to the ruling of the UN Security Council. “In conclusion, once the bottle neck was

overcome the Bundestag “authorised the German participation in IFOR with a broad majority, as most deputies of the SPD and almost half of those of the Green Party voted with the government” (Baumann/ Hellmann 2001: 75) ⁵⁶. As a result “Germany’s participation in NATO’s Kosovo War was the culmination point of this realignment” (Baumann/ Hellmann 2001: 75). In a longer term perspective “opinion polls have suggested that the pacifist tendency among the German public is fading and that a more pragmatic approach to defence is likely to prevail in the long term” (Bohnen 1997: 54) ⁵⁷.

Considerably stronger than military support have been the German attempts to strengthen civilian capabilities; in particular “conflict prevention and crisis management is seen to be of special importance” (Alec de Flers 2004: 1). Bulmahn et al. concordantly find in a survey conducted in 2006 that the German population clearly prefers civilian instruments over military measures (Bulmahn/ Fiebig/ Sender 2008: 45).



⁵⁶ These findings are particularly interesting as they indicate a drastic change in party positions, in particular in the “anti-military parties” of the SPD and Bündnis90/ Die Grünen. It can be argued that they have now adopted an “internationalist” perspective, highlighting the responsibility to intervene in humanitarian crisis. This is in accordance with debates at the global level about the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) since 2001. For more information on the concept see: <http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp>.

⁵⁷ Given its history it is not surprising that “Germany continues to have the most restrictive arms export rules. Between 1992 and 1994, 98.8 per cent of German exports went to NATO and Scandinavian countries, whereas Britain exported 76 per cent and France 50 per cent of its arms to developing regions. Thus, there is a huge market to which Germany cannot deliver because of its self-imposed policy” (Bohnen 1997: 60).

5. Analysis of the main decisions establishing ESDP

“The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises”

(Franco-British declaration at St. Malo 4 December 1998).

The bilateral summit of France and the UK was a milestone for the further development; it was a major breakthrough, the bottleneck that previous negotiations had not overcome. From December 1998 to the launch of the first European mission it only took five years to establish the military capabilities, the organizational structures and the political will of MS to appear as one actor on the stage of world affairs. Basically on two pages the future of one of the most vibrant activities of the EU was developed.

Following the analysis of main domestic preferences this chapter addresses crucial governmental positions at critical junctures that led to the establishment of ESDP. In boiling down the decade long negotiations and the different positions of European Member states two key decisions (reached between 1998 and 2000) have shaped the development of the European Security and Defence Policy; its implementation took three more years. The key decisions were: (1) First, to establish a European Security and Defence Policy and to agree for the EU to have the capacity for autonomous action (St. Malo 1998). This includes the choice of the European Union as the organization instead of the WEU and transferring the WEU into the EU (Cologne European Council, 1999). (2) Second, to agree on the development of military capabilities that should equip the EU both in capability and in its scope (Helsinki European Council 1999) and the development of civilian aspect of crisis management and set it on equal footing with the military ambition (Feira European Council 2000). The main domestic drivers and constraints were pointed out in the previous part.

5.1 Establishing a European Security and Defence Policy

Although cooperation in Security and Defence Policy was debated since the inception of the European project, formalization occurred considerably late. It can even be argued that it was the unique interaction of a set of processes (for the in-depth within-case studies see part 4). It all started with the Treaty of Maastricht. Howorth (1997: 24) illustrates that it was at French insistence, with German backing that the clause: “The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, *including the eventual framing*

of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence” was inserted in article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty ⁵⁸ (emphasis added).

The UK had always vetoed a European defence and insisted on the primacy of NATO. Hence in 1992 a common defence policy did not appear to be possible or realistic in the near future. The main focus in the 1990s was to establish a European defence. With strong support of the UK a European arm of NATO was formed, namely the re-activation of the Western European Union (WEU). However the WEU proved unsuccessful to reach its ambitions set by the Petersberg Tasks in 1992⁵⁹. The “UK learnt painful lessons in the Balkans from ambitious but meaningless declarations, reliance upon an ambivalent US, ineffective capabilities or use of ‘soft power’, a lack of leadership thanks to squabbles and internal EU jockeying.” (Oliver 2003: 5). The “outcome of the conflict in Bosnia led senior British politicians and civil servants to conclude that the policy of relying on NATO had failed” (Walsh 2006: 503).

In the negotiations towards St. Malo, the UK government knew that it was the pivotal player concerning ESDP. With its approval Europe could go ahead, without it, the EU would not be able to agree or become a viable actor in international security. The British drivers were mainly the sinking military budgets, the recognition that armed forces were needed for specialized missions and the lack of the necessary military capabilities at the scale required. As highlighted in chapter four the system of foreign policy in the UK is highly centralized. The change of government to the more pro-European Labour party with a considerable majority in Parliament allowed the Prime Minister to agree on ESDP, without facing serious problems in the parliament⁶⁰. The strategy chosen by the Labour government was rational in so far as it combined the goal of the reduction of the military budget with the aim to increase effectiveness and efficiency in accepting coordination at the level of the European Union. As figures 12 and 13 in the Annex show, the reduction was considerable, lowering the UK absolute spending and in percentage of its GDP below that of France. At the same time the government enjoyed considerable support of the public in 1998, the all time high in recent

⁵⁸ European Union, 1992: Treaty of Maastricht: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html>.

⁵⁹ The Petersberg Declaration of 1992 asserted the principle laid out in the Maastricht Treaty and defined the priority areas for the WEU: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking (http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/key/declaration_petersberg.php)

⁶⁰ In line Dover argues that “the scrutiny function of both Houses was given a low profile during the formulation of the Saint Malo initiative” (Dover, 517). This changed, “in particular the Report on the ESDP by the House of Lords Committee on the European Union demonstrated the depth and reach of parliamentary scrutiny on the emerging European security and defence policy” (House of Lords, 2000, cf. Dover 2005: 517)

British history. It was only with these changes in the British government that cooperation in the field could be discussed and an agreement reached.

The step forward at St. Malo served as well as a bargaining chip for the UK reaffirming its wish to take a leading role in the EU to balance its rejection of EMU. Military incapability, given the sinking defence budget was very visible in the Kosovo war, with the superior US air force and technology. Sjursen notes that “changes in the British position were partly a result of Blair’s desire to lead an active European policy” (Sjursen 1999)⁶¹. It is before this background that the UK agreed that “the European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage... This includes the responsibility of the European Council to decide on the progressive framing of a common defence policy in the framework of CFSP”⁶². The Cologne European Council, under the German presidency included the Franco-British consensus in the framework of the EU at the Cologne European Council and set a clear and ambitious agenda for the years to come.

Concerning the position of France towards a European Defence and Security Policy, the public opinion was highly supportive of ESDP and the government also had the position to seize benefits from European defence cooperation. Grossman emphasizes, “it goes without saying that this foreign policy would and should be led by France. Europe was seen as an opportunity to recover French grandeur“ (Grossman 2007: 983). Apart from that the French experience with the crisis on the Balkans and its military reform as well with the identification of new threats and the need for stronger European cooperation in the Defence White book, it was clear that “in particular, France believes that there are likely to be future circumstances where the Europeans might wish to intervene militarily in an operation with which the United States does not wish to be militarily involved” (Howorth 1997: 34). The need for European cooperation was streamlined into all aspects of French Security and Defence Policy. However France played only the role of an supporting actor, however it had set the incentives right at the time and caused the current change in the British position to be locked-in at St. Malo.

⁶¹ The bilateral push forward served both purposes, a leading role for the UK and the inclusion of France as the key partner. Moreover Dover points out that “the pro-European defence initiative should, therefore, be seen as part of the government’s broad European policy rather than a solely defence-based initiative, although one in which the government believed that real benefits to collective European defence and security capabilities could be accrued” (Dover 2005 513).

⁶² Franco-British Declaration, 1998: St. Malo Declaration.: <http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/French-British%20Summit%20Declaration,%20Saint-Malo,%201998%20-%20EN.pdf>

Germany was not involved in the St. Malo negotiations, but nevertheless support of the content of the agreement. Domestically, its values for ESDP were the highest; the same goes for the budgetary constraints, leading to strong incentives for integration. The German paradox as described in chapter 4.4.3.3 of strong support for ESDP while at the same time a very critical opinion of the military in the population triggered the support of the government to cooperate at the European level. German was further in support of institutionalization. In contrast to France and the UK the German position was in favour of integration, consistent with the German paradigm “Security through integration” as observed by highlighted by Sauder (1995: 412).

5.1.1 Establishing the ability for autonomous action of the EU

The second major decision reached at St. Malo was the commitment for the EU to have

“the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises”⁶³.

This was backed by the Cologne European Council:

“We are now determined to launch a new step in the construction of the European Union. To this end we task the [...] inclusion of those functions of the WEU which will be necessary for the EU to fulfil its new responsibilities in the area of the Petersberg tasks”. It continued that „by the end of the year 2000... the WEU as an organisation would have completed its purpose“

(Presidency Conclusions of the Cologne European Council, June 1999: 35⁶⁴).

It was a rational step for the British government to agree on the framing of a common defence policy, being able to act outside of NATO, as has been argued in the previous chapter. The reasons for it are largely the same. The WEU was initially favoured, because of its weak organizational structure that was only supposed to act as a “European arm” of NATO⁶⁵. That had changed in 1998 and a more reliable structure was needed, hence the previous red card turned out to be a wild card. Walsh emphasizes that this shift was not occurring suddenly, but

⁶³ Franco-British Declaration, 1998: St. Malo Declaration.: <http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/French-British%20Summit%20Declaration,%20Saint-Malo,%201998%20-%20EN.pdf>

⁶⁴ European Council, 1999: Presidency Conclusions: Cologne European Council: http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/kolnen.htm

⁶⁵ The WEU was not part of the EU and its advanced decision-making mechanisms, merely “synchronization” and “cooperation” between the two organizations was outlined in the Maastricht Treaty (Declaration on WEU, A.). Concerning the relations to NATO the WEU it should develop “close working links” and close cooperation between the bureaucracies of both organizations.

since early 1998 “the government launched a wide-ranging review of Britain’s position in the European Union, soliciting ideas and position papers from inside and outside the government departments” (Walsh 2006: 508).

France strongly promoted autonomous European defence cooperation over a security structure based on NATO because it was not a member of the Alliance. That fact has strongly affected the French pursuit of policies to strengthen autonomous European military capabilities. This positioning became increasingly crucial after the end of the Cold War, as France realized as the first nation in Europe that the security structure had changed and no territorial defence, but a professional army was needed. The French military reforms indicate the fine-tuned antennae of the French military interest groups, particularly the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces. As a result the government initiated significant structural reforms in the European security architecture, first with the rapprochement to NATO and the attempts to create a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), the following revival of the Western European Union and with the agreement at St. Malo and the Cologne European Council the transfer of the WEU to the EU.

In contrast to France and the UK, Germany had a mediating position. Although it at did not question the primacy of NATO it was a strong ally of the French. In the eyes of the German government the EU and NATO should complement each other. Germany was always balancing its ambition for European integration with its aim “to preserve the paramount role of the United States within NATO” (Bohnen 1997: 49).

5.2 Development of military and civilian capabilities

While already clear at St. Malo agreement was found to strengthen EU military capabilities⁶⁶ it was the Helsinki European Council one year later that decided on the exact military capabilities needed. The European Headline Goal 2003 stated that, by 2003 50.000 to 60.000 troops, deployable within 60 days and up to 1 year, covering the Petersberg tasks, needed to be provided by MS to the EU⁶⁷. After these initial steps it was at the Feira European Council that the military leg was supported by a second, civilian one. The MS agreed to provide

⁶⁶ “Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defence industry and technology” (Franco-British Declaration <http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/French-British%20Summit%20Declaration,%20Saint-Malo,%201998%20-%20EN.pdf>).

⁶⁷ European Council, 1999: Presidency Conclusions: Helsinki European Council. accessed on 25.07.2008: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Helsinki%20European%20Council%20-%20Annex%20IV%20of%20the%20Presidency%20Conclusions.pdf>

civilian police capabilities of up to 5000 police officers by 2003, 1000 deployable within 30 days. Further a database capturing civilian capabilities of member states to identify further progress needed was agreed upon. This shift towards a Civilian orientation was introduced and backed the strong German position with its resentment against military at the domestic level. It met no objection of France and the UK as they were used to use both, civilian and military instruments in foreign policy. However, over time, the Civilian aspect has grown considerably.

The UK sees the use of force as an instrument and uses it accordingly and whenever necessary. It has a pragmatic approach towards ESDP. The main reasons for cooperation were to increase European military capacity. Thus the British have focused on enhancing Europe's military capabilities, particularly in areas in which the UK is benefits from European cooperation and burden-sharing. These are not only the troops provided to the EU, when needed, but also economic instruments of the EU and areas in which the UK lacks financial means, such as defence industry, airlift capability, technology and research. The UK is willing to "utilise a mixture of soft and hard power", they see CFSP as a continuum between the soft end of aid and trade and the hard end, meaning soldiers (Oliver 2003: 3). Domestically the UK remained a capable army; it consistently spent more of its budget in both relative and absolute terms on defence, in comparison to the larger GDP of France and Germany. Hence it has been crucial for the UK that they did not rely on a European Defence. Hence the UK always insisted on intergovernmental decision making. In conclusion the British reason for agreeing to European defence cooperation and the strengthened European military capabilities. At the same time pressure was exerted by Germany and France with increased bilateral cooperation (as agreed in article 17.4 of the Maastricht Treaty), tempting the UK to participate and not fall behind in the European project⁶⁸.

The same is valid for France. In 1996, "the new president, Jacques Chirac, undertook a reform of the armed forces, a 'revolution', in which the complete professionalization of the armed forces and the abolition of conscription were the fundamental modifications" (Irondelle 2003:

⁶⁸ Treaty of Maastricht: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html>. One area of cooperation that became an example for European military cooperation (and the establishment of a European army) was the Franco-German Eurocorps. It showed the mutual will for closer military cooperation and strengthens the target of a common European defence policy (Burmester 1997: 105; Howorth 1997: 24). In that way the Eurocorps served as an important catalysing mechanism that ensured trust and viability of a European defence. Franco-Germany cooperation started early, already in 1990 they "have built up several common institutions such as a defence council, a land brigade, joint plans of armament" (Schmidt/ Pilandon/ Aben 1990: 101).

208). “French military policy evolved towards a ‘multinational action’ paradigm founded on the principle of co-operation – essentially European – served by an army immediately available and cooperational to participate in multinational interventions outside France, mainly in Europe or its vicinity” (Irondelle 2003: 215). “Since 1996, France has made the choice, which is inviolable and fundamental, to be a complete military power, by retaining a capacity of nuclear deterrence, by developing a capacity of intervention in all fields, as well as a capacity of command of a multinational operation” (Coulomb/ Fountanel 2005: 298). The reform “was a paradigm change in French military policy” (Irondelle 2003: 208). Consequently the French government wanted to integrate in ESDP to seize the benefits from its restructuring policies. “According to the French authorities, these changes were necessary in the prospective development of European defence, one of the main objectives of French military policy” (Irondelle 2003: 208)

Germany, having strong domestic constraints on the use of its military, its defence budget but a support for ESDP combined this mix in an interesting way. Firstly it used the European dimension to escape the domestic pressures. A European military was acceptable to the public and served the German goal. For example “Germany will take part in four of the 13 planned Battle groups” (Alec de Flers 2004: 2). Over time the demands of participation grew and the “call from Brussels” indicated to the public that the government was not again becoming a warmonger but answered the requests of its key partners to participate in multinational military operations. At the same time a “humanitarianism” established itself in the German population, this argument is in particular supported by the switch of the green party from a anti-military party to the strongest supporter (Bulmahn/ Fiebig/ Sender 2008: 82-85). For that reason “conflict prevention and crisis management is considered to be of particular importance” for Germany for the further development of ESDP (Alec de Flers 2004: 9). In supporting institutionalization in ESDP the government was able to circumvent pressures on the budget, as financial demands were always set high on Germany. At the same time it supported in particular the Civilian aspect of ESDP and gained in recognition at home.

While the UK was the pivotal actor in allowing the European Union to gain a common Security and Defence Policy, it was in particular the strong position of the German government boosting the civilian aspect of crisis management. While the UK and France have focused on developing military capabilities accessible for the European Union, Germany has

focused on promoting civilian structures⁶⁹. “Germany is particularly in favour of developing civilian and military capabilities on an equal basis and sees the combination of civilian and military instruments as one of the special and chief characteristics of ESDP” (Alec de Flers 2004:6). Throughout its involvement, starting at the Cologne European Council the German government (successfully) attempted to stream those aspects into the agreements. Germany was also in favour of stronger institutionalization. The General Affairs Council (GAERC), the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Military Committee (EUMC) and the Military Staff (EUMS) were established under its presidency. The Cologne European Council formalized the bilateral agreement at St. Malo. It prominently placed the paragraph: “The European Council invites the Council (General Affairs) to deal thoroughly with all discussions on aspects of security, with a view to enhancing and better coordinating the Union’s and Member States’ non-military crisis response tools.

⁶⁹ One such initiative, domestically, was the establishment of the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) in 2002. The ZIF was established “with the aim of enhancing Germany’s civilian crisis prevention capacities. ZIF’s core mandate is the training, recruitment, and support of German civilian personnel for peace operations and election observation missions conducted in particular by the OSCE, the EU, and the UN” (<http://www.zif-berlin.org/en/index.html>).

6. Conclusion

In general, given the domestic preferences identified (the military spending and budgetary constraints, public support for ESDP and support for the military versus civilian crisis management) it is not surprising that integration occurred in ESDP faster than compared to CFSP. Additional incentives and benefits were strong for governments. With the changed security environment after the end of the Cold War no territorial national armed forces capable of territorial defence were needed but versatile Crisis Management forces that can do all the tasks required.

6.1 Discussion of empirical findings

This paper identified factors explaining the emergence of ESDP within the Liberal Intergovernmentalist framework. It was possible to trace the processes at work, affecting governmental positions and their decisions at international conferences to establish an ESDP. It has to be noted that only with a multi-causal explanation sufficient results were reached. Each indicator distinctly influenced governmental behaviour, but varied in degree for each country. Of utmost importance were the domestic preferences and constraints and in particular their changes in the period leading to St. Malo. The pivotal player for the whole process was the United Kingdom, blocking progress before 1998.

For the position of the British government it was validated that the processes, leading to the change in the governmental position were based on domestic preferences and constraints and hence in conformance with LI. The reasons were leading to the change in the governmental decision of the UK were: (1) First, the change in the government to the more pro-European Labour Party and their party programme to reduce the defence budget and seeking efficiency gains at the European level. In 1998 the values of both the military spending as percentage of GDP and the absolute value had decreased below the value of France. Until 1998 and at the beginning of the 21st century the values were above those of France. (2) Secondly, the strong gain in popular support (as mirrored in the rise of public support from 57 to 64 per cent⁷⁰). (3) Thirdly, the failure on the Balkans and the British recognition that the EU needed capable European Crisis Management capabilities; this was highly visible to the public and one of the reasons for their support of ESDP at the time.

France on the other hand was strongly in favour of ESDP throughout the establishment and

⁷⁰ Values of autumn 1997 and autumn 1998, data from the Eurobarometer (Annex: figure 8).
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/standard_en.htm

development of autonomous European capabilities. It can be argued that without the favourable position of the French, the European integration in ESDP would not have proceeded so far so quickly. (1) Concerning its military budget, the French budget decreased as well, but it remained relatively constant, compared to the decrease in the UK. (2) Additionally the French public opinion was most favourable of ESDP from spring 1998 to spring 2000, over 80 per cent in autumn 1998. Domestically it had also adapted early to the changing international security environment with the military reforms in the mid-1990s. (3) France, not a member of NATO was hence most favourably for the EU to have independent military capabilities to address crisis situations.

Although Germany was not part of the agreement at St. Malo and in its military capabilities not on the same level with France and the UK, it was strongly in favour of ESDP and very important for the development and progress in ESDP. It was under the German presidency that ESDP was acknowledged and the necessary institutional arrangements were decided. Germany faced strong domestic constraints in its military spending. (1) The parliament plays an important role in the German budget approval process, thus the military expenditure was the lowest for the whole period, roughly one percent below (expenditure as part of GDP) those of the UK and France⁷¹. (2) The German government faced a paradox, while the population was highly in favour of ESDP it was very critical of the use of military force. As a result it was rational for the government to integrate in European structures as it did not meet any objection in integrating in European structures. This is consistent with the finding that the German position on sovereignty concerning integration in ESDP was the most favourable. (3) At the same time Germany pursued a civilian approach to crisis management at the European level instead of a military one and changed the outcome first decided at St. Malo considerably. From a European cooperation for defence Germany turned the EU to a main civilian crisis management actor; this is consistent with the role of the EU as a “civilian” superpower in international politics. In conclusion, only with Germany, the “Triumvirate” of France, the UK and Germany was able to move beyond what was thought possible in terms of integration in five years, from 1998 to 2003, and establish a fully operational capability of the European Union to launch independent Peacekeeping and Civilian Crisis Management Operations.

⁷¹ For the figure showing the data, please see figure 13: Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), <http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4>

6.2 Results of the test of the Hypothesis

H1: Governments with smaller defence budgets or with stronger domestic constraints will be more supportive of seeking cooperation and efficiency gains at the European level.

With the decreased budget in the United Kingdom from 1997 to the beginning of the 21st century the incentives for the government were high. This has been exemplified by the British agreement at St. Malo and the following support to developing and strengthening European military capabilities. France has been the strongest supporter of ESDP, with the sinking budget in the 1990s the efforts of the government to create European structures for cooperation increased further. However the French case is not as visible as no major turn such as in the UK occurred. In France and the UK, particularly strengthening European military capabilities were important points for the government. Germany makes a good case for the hypothesis as it has the lowest defence budget and has been a very high supporter of ESDP throughout the process. The German government had high incentives for cooperation because of its limited budget.

In summary the hypothesis is accepted. Significant evidence exists for two of three cases. However this has to be qualified because the evidence varies across countries. With a case study the mechanism cannot be taken for granted, that is why a comparative study for all European member states would shed additional insight on the claim to be able to affirm or reject the hypothesis.

H2: Governments with high values of support for a European Security and Defence Policy will be more supportive of integration in ESDP than governments with lower values of support.

This hypothesis is in line with the previously tested hypotheses by Risse (1991) and Koenig-Archibugi (2004), both coming to positive conclusions. In summarizing the findings of the paper, the hypothesis is accepted. France and Germany, with particularly high values for ESDP, significantly over the European Union mean, were strongly in support for creating an ESDP. At the same time the opposite finds factual evidence as well.

The UK, with considerably lower values for support for ESDP has shown resentment to agree on ESDP. The values increased significantly before St. Malo in 1998; even with this spike, support in the UK was more than ten points below the European Union mean and 17 below the French value. However support of the population was increasing (and with the other

developments in the UK at the time as described in chapter 4.2) resulting in the change of the governmental position. With rising domestic support the UK switched from supporting a European security and defence within WEU (and thus NATO) structures to support military capabilities for the European Union. As a consequence St. Malo became the manifestation of the change in the British position. For both, France and Germany the argument of the hypothesis can be confirmed. Both had very high values of support domestically, mirrored by favourable governmental position towards ESDP.

H3: The more constrained the government is towards the use of its military, the more it will focus on integration at the European Union and in particular on Civilian Crisis Management.

This hypothesis has to be rejected. While findings confirm for Germany that the domestic constraints on the use of its military were solved at the European level, sufficient empirical evidence cannot be found for France and the UK. It can be argued however, in support of the hypothesis that France and the UK are exceptional cases. They are the leading military player in the EU, have former colonial ties and are the only ones with a permanent seat in the Security Council⁷².

In conclusion two of the three hypotheses are accepted, one rejected but qualified by the cases selected. The public support for ESDP and the budgetary constraints at domestic level, offering incentives to cooperate at European level were the two central findings of this paper. In outlook, to establish a sound knowledge base on the EU, as indicated for each one of the hypothesis a comparative study of all EU member states offers additional insight.

6.3 Outlook

As with the application of ESDP an implicit test of the theory has been pursued, it will be outlined in a few words what the key findings were concerning theoretical strengths and weaknesses and future research required. It was possible to link the domestic and international level for the processes leading to the establishment of ESDP. The theory was successfully applied and explains the processes at work reasonably well.

However LI did not offer a very parsimonious explanation, much ground had to be covered to identify the factors and causal mechanisms at work. One reason for the difficulty is that little

⁷² For evidence supporting this, see Koenig-Archibugi (2004: 163).

research exists and that research is at the beginning of the research cycle. As has been noted before “research on the ESDP has been theoretically weak and empirically superficial, it has been neither systematic nor cumulative, and has suffered from presentism and lack of a focused debate” (Forsberg 2006: 6). Thus more reason to foster research on this topic. A clearer operationalization of the processes across various policy areas for the European Union would greatly benefit future research. Such a comparative perspective would shed light on both the importance of factors that affect governmental behaviour and hence decisions made in favour of Europe.

Future research would also greatly benefit from case studies that are structured and focused in scope about the proceedings of the integration in ESDP, paired with in-depth case studies of “niche” topics that allow to fully understanding the complex mechanisms at work. This research should be complemented by the modelling of Political Economy to allow testable hypotheses to be drawn from the case-studies to be tested and improved. In particular game-theoretical approaches prove to be promising.

7. Annex

Figure 8: Support for ESDP⁷³





Figure 9: Support for CFSP⁷⁴



⁷³ Source: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/standard_en.htm

⁷⁴ Source: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/standard_en.htm. The Eurobarometer survey question for the time period from 1993 to 2002 was “Support for a common foreign policy”, “Support for a common defence policy”. Since then a slightly altered question was asked, “What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it. 2. A common foreign policy among the member states of the EU towards other countries.” The second sentence was altered equally for the defence policy: “A common defence and security policy among EU Member States.”

Figure 10: Support for CFSP/ ESDP⁷⁵





Figure 11: Troop contributions to Peacekeeping Missions. 1999-2005⁷⁶



⁷⁵ Source: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/standard_en.htm

⁷⁶ Source: Giegerich 2006: 122-123, 143, 167

Figure 12: Military spending in the UK, France and Germany⁷⁷





Figure 13: Military spending in the UK, France and Germany as part of GDP⁷⁸




⁷⁷ Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), <http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4>

⁷⁸ Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), <http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4>

Figure 14: Previous and ongoing operations under the ESDP framework.

(ISIS Europe, 2008: European Security Review 39: http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2008_esr_56_esr39.pdf).



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