"Within the secret garden of politics"

Candidate selection and the representation of immigrant-origin citizens in Germany

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List of abbreviations and acronyms

AfD  Alternative for Germany
AufenthG Residence Act
BGB  German Civil Code
BWG  Federal Elections Act
CDU  Christian Democratic Union of Germany
CSU  Christian Social Union in Bavaria
DVU  German People’s Union
FDP  Free Democratic Party
FRO  Federal Returning Officer
GDR  German Democratic Republic
GFR  German Federal Republic
NPD  National Democratic Party of Germany
PartG  Act on Political Parties
PDS  Party of Democratic Socialism
MP   Member of Parliament
RuStAG Nationality Act of 22 July 1913
SPD  Social Democratic Party of Germany
StAG  Nationality Act
WASG Labour and Social Justice - The Electoral Alternative
WWII World War II
As a result of immigration of the last decades, modern states are strongly characterized by their ethnic diversity. Regarding politics, it is understood to have profound consequences on immigration policies and party competition. At the same time, immigration not only affects the socio-demographic composition of the population as a whole, but also the composition of legislatures. Relying on research done on the political representation of women and African-Americans in the North-American context, representation scholars ask whether the increasingly diversified electorate is reflected in the composition of legislative bodies.

The great majority of the studies dealing with minority representation in parliaments found that immigrant-origin citizens are (to varying degrees) underrepresented in terms of numbers in the legislatures of Western democracies. Representation literature highlights several reasons to explain this parliamentary underrepresentation of the immigrant-origin population – from voter discrimination towards minority candidates via the supply of aspirants seeking to run for office mainly with regards to their socioeconomic profile and mobilization capacity to features of the electoral system and, finally, the role of political parties and their candidate selection function. The latter has become of crucial interest in the last years. However, only a few studies have analyzed the parties’ candidate selection function in the context of minority representation – and this holds true for Germany in particular. That is why the present study explores the role of candidate selection regarding the political representation of immigrant-origin citizens. The study therefore asks whether immigrant-origin aspirants (that are those who seek nomination within their party) meet specific obstacles during the candidate selection process due to parties’ strategic considerations, party ideology and/or specific intra-party aspects. To answer these research questions, I rely on several complementary data sources (names of aspirants and information about nominations, online-survey conducted among party members).

Drawing on original data gained through intensive media research (local and regional newspapers, Internet searches) and the parties’ minutes of the nomination meetings, I identify 2,125 aspirants who sought nomination (district and/or party list) within their party (SPD, CDU/CSU, Greens, Left party) for the 2013 legislative elections in Germany. Among those aspiring candidates 118 were identified as having an immigrant background as defined by the Federal Statistical Office (i.e. 6 percent of all aspirants) – including 84 belonging to a visible minority. The overwhelming majority sought nomination within one of the three left-wing parties. A further noteworthy finding is the strong presence of Turkish-origin aspirants.
Abstract

About 75 percent of the immigrant-origin aspirants, including visible minorities, eventually got nominated by their party – comparable to the proportion of those without any immigrant origins. At the same time, I observe a strong tendency of immigrant-origin candidates, including those with visible minority origins, to run on the party list and in the district simultaneously – the difference to their non-immigrant-origin counterparts is statistically significant. In addition, the findings show that immigrant-origin candidates – including visible minorities – were nominated predominately in states with high immigrant rates. This result, however, is observable already at the aspirant level.

With regards to the analytical framework, the present study comes to the conclusion that neither party strategy, nor party ideology, or intra-party aspects exclusively, can explain the nomination of immigrant-origin aspirants. Regarding the former, my results show that immigrant-origin aspirants were very seldom nominated in winnable districts. Drawing on an anonymous online-survey conducted among party members who partook in the nomination of candidates for the 2013 legislative elections, the present study is able to show that a striking part of those who nominate the candidates, the party selectors, appeared to be concerned about the electoral consequences of running with minority candidates. Furthermore, the findings indicate that the nomination chances for aspirants with immigrant-origins, including visible minorities, are not lower in the case of the mainstream right party CDU than within the left-wing parties. However, they also less often sought nomination within the Conservatives. Finally, the present study points to the importance of incumbency, dual candidatures as well as regional (negative) and gender quota (positive) regarding the nomination chances of minority candidates.
Zusammenfassung


Auf der Grundlage einer intensiven Medienrecherche (lokale/regionale Tageszeitungen, Homepages der Parteien sowie Aspiranten), die durch den Rückgriff auf Protokolle der Nominierungsveranstaltungen ergänzt wurde, wurden in einem ersten Schritt 2.125 Anwärter und Anwärterinnen um eine Kandidatur für die

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"In one electoral district [...], we [the Greens] nominated candidates with an immigrant background already in the 1990s. One important characteristic of this district [...] is its ethnic diversity mainly due to Turkish and Kurdish immigration. At a certain point in time, all other parties also began to nominate candidates in this district with an immigrant background. From the Left party to the Christian Democrats." (A managing director of a regional Green party branch)

This quote from a (former) managing director of a regional Green party branch highlights mainly two points that are of utmost importance for this study. First, ethnic diversity due to immigration, has become an important feature regarding the population composition in electoral districts, but also regions and entire countries. And, second, political parties respond differently to this changing population composition in terms of immigrant background. This is reflected also in their strategies regarding the nomination of candidates for elected office. These strategies can, however, over time become more similar. Based on these two observations, I will elaborate why a study of candidate selection processes is crucial to understand the numerical presence of immigrant-origin citizens in legislative bodies.

Why political representation of immigrant-origin citizens?

Migration is seen as "one of the key forces of social transformation in the modern world" (Castles 2002: 1144). In the case of mainly immigrant-receiving countries, immigration affects the socio-demographic composition of the population not only
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in terms of ethnic background but also of age or educational level (Weber 2015: 116 sq.) (depending on the type of immigration). Furthermore, immigration is said to have profound consequences on national politics and on party competition (Ware 1996: 220; Alonso and Fonseca 2011: 865). Finally, immigration leaves its traces not only in party programs or in policies, but it is also likely to alter the composition of legislative bodies. In this context, research highlights that immigrant-origin citizens still remain underrepresented in terms of numbers in most European countries but also in countries with a longstanding history of immigration such as Canada or the United States (Bloemraad 2013: 659) – despite differences between countries and political levels (e.g., local, national). Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the share of those citizens within legislatures has been increasing in recent years (Bird et al. 2011: 2).

Since legislative bodies are important "in shaping our individual and collective lives" (Williams 1998: 19) particularly through passing laws (Ismayr 2001: 34), the low proportion of certain societal groups has given rise to an intense normative debate within the scientific community about the idea of descriptive or mirror representation (Pitkin 1967: 11) or more recently of a "politics of presence" (Phillips 1995). Representation scholars argue that the lack of representatives from minority groups impacts on members of the respective minority group in particular in two ways (Bloemraad 2013: 652). First, it is supposed to have consequences regarding the adequate representation of the minority group interests (Mansbridge 1999: 644; Phillips 1995: 43) – in particular if those interests had not yet been articulated (Mansbridge 1999: 644). And second, the virtual absence of members of specific minority groups can also have psychological effects on the minority population in question, through political alienation or distrust (Abney and Hutcheson 1981: 91), because it can call into question the accessibility and democratic legitimacy of the political system (Mansbridge 1999: 641). Combining both arguments, Miki Caul Kittilson and Katherine Tate (2005: 164) argue that "[d]escriptive representation [...] is an important indicator of to what degree democratic inclusion is occurring among racial and ethnic minority groups". Although the findings are far from being uniform across countries or political systems, literature on descriptive representation provides some empirical evidence for a trust-building and empowering effect of minority representation (see, e.g., Tate 2001; Pantoja and Segura 2003; Fairdosi and Rogowski 2015) as well as for a positive impact on interest representation (see, e.g., Whitby 1997; Saalfeld and Kyriakopoulou 2011; Wallace 2014; Wüst 2014).

While early research has mainly focused on the representation of women (see, e.g., Hoecker 1998; Sapiro 1981; Vega and Firestone 1995; Welch 1978), recent
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Research on descriptive representation has started tackling questions related to racial minorities (see, e.g., Gay 2002; Mansbridge 1999) with an emphasis on (new) ethnic minorities such as Latinos and Asian-Americans in the last decade (see, e.g., Pantoja and Segura 2003; Juenke 2014). However, research in this area was for a long time almost exclusively limited to the North American context (U.S., Canada). In recent years, however, it has become more popular also in the European context. In addition to some purely descriptive works (see, e.g., Bloemraad 2013; Donovan 2007; Schönwälder 2013), a rising body of literature deals with ethnic minority representation in an analytical manner. Several studies have analyzed ethnic minority representation as an independent variable by studying for example the impact of legislators’ immigrant background on his or her legislative behavior (e.g., Saalfeld and Kyriakopoulou 2011; Wüst 2011, 2014). Another body of literature seeks to explain why ethnic and immigrant-origin minorities are numerically underrepresented in the great majority of legislative bodies (e.g., Dancygier, Lindgren, et al. 2015; Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Ruedin 2013b; Street 2014). In this context, it is noteworthy that only recently the political science literature as regained interest in empirical questions related to the political representation of women (see, e.g., Dolan and Hansen 2018; Eder et al. 2016; Fortin-Rittberger, Eder, et al. 2017). The present study aims to contribute to the in the European context recently emerging scientific discussion on the political representation of the immigrant-origin population.

Why candidate selection?

In democratic political systems, the voters finally decide who becomes a Member of Parliament (MP) and thus determine the composition of legislative bodies – ideologically and demographically. However, as John H. Aldrich (1995: 14) wrote ‘[t]he path to office for nearly every major politician begins today, as it has for over 150 years, with the party’. Although Aldrich (1995) made this observation in the American context, it holds even more true for party-centered systems where parties are the crucial actors regarding the recruitment and selection of the political elite (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000b; 2001b; 7; Höhne 2013; 18). From a representative democracy perspective, one could argue that the chain of delegation from citizens to representatives (Schoen 2008; 323) begins with the selection of candidates (Hazan and Rahat 2010; 12). Furthermore, particularly in those electoral systems in which voters have only little influence on the composition of
legislatures, "selection is tantamount to election" (Rush 1969: 4, italics in original) (see also Gallagher 1988b: 2; Cross 2008: 601; Hazan 2014). In this context, party scholars mainly point to closed-list proportional and single-member plurality systems (Cross 2008: 604). Additionally, country-specific factors such as weak party competition with a strong regionally dominant party (Cross 2008: 605) or a high number of safe seats (Ranney 1965: 7) can contribute to this predominant role of candidate selection regarding the composition of legislatures. This impact on the ideological and demographic composition of legislative bodies is considered to be not only decisive but also long-lasting (Norris 1997b: 5; Hazan and Rahat 2006b: 368) due also to low legislative turnover rates in some countries. All these factors render parties the "main gatekeepers to elected office" (Norris 1997a: 218) controlling the access to the political elite (Gallagher 1988b: 2). That is why, in representative democracies, candidate selection is considered to be 'a key stage in the political recruitment process' (Gallagher 1988b: 2) and thus is recognized as one of the crucial functions of political parties (Gallagher 1988b: 3; Scarrow et al. 2000: 138; Hazan and Rahat 2010: 6).

However, candidate selection not only consists in selecting the candidates for elected office and therefore in reproducing the party in public office (Katz 2001: 278). In several other ways, this process is decisive – reflecting the two spheres political parties in general and the process of candidate selection in particular encompass, that is a sphere within and one outside of the party (Höhne 2013: 20 sq.). Regarding the former, the outcome of the selection process is understood to reflect power distribution within parties (Norris 1997b: 7). Candidate selection is thus perceived as a key arena for intra-party power struggles (Ranney 1965: 11; Gallagher 1988b: 2; Hazan and Rahat 2010: 9). It is noteworthy that this struggle is often not only about the nomination of candidates, but can also concern the choice of specific selection methods (Katz 2001: 280). Additionally, parties can make use of their selection function as an instrument to discipline their current MPs as well as future potential candidates (Saalfeld, Wüst, et al. 2011: 267). Finally, candidate selection can also foster intra-party participation by offering an 'opportunity for rank-and-file voters to exercise influence within their party and to have an (indirect) influence on public policy' (Cross 2008: 598) – provided that there are possibilities for the rank-and-file members to participate in this process. Regarding the party external sphere, the outcome of the selection process, that is the nominated candidates, "play an important role in defining what the party is" (Katz 2001: 278), for what the party stands for (Mikulska and Scarrow 2010: 312) and therefore how the party looks like (Hazan and Rahat 2006a: 109, 2010: 6). These candidates "fix the programmatic and human image the party presents to
Introduction

the public [...]" (Ranney 1965: 10).

Based on these arguments, it appears to be appropriate to look at candidate selection processes, when aiming to explain the composition of legislatures in terms of demographic profiles in general and immigrant background in particular. In this context, Jerome H. Black and Bruce M. Hicks (2006: 26) argue that 'a focus on candidates [could provide] a basis for determining whether the paucity of visible minorities in the House of Commons [in the case of Canada] may be linked, in part at least, to their relative absence among those contesting the election as parliamentary candidates'. However, while several studies deal with the election stage in the legislative recruitment process (Norris 2006: 89) by analyzing voters’ willingness to vote for immigrant-origin candidates (Brouard, Deiss-Helbig, et al. 2018; Brouard and Tiberj 2011; Holtkamp and Garske 2018; Portmann and Stojanovic 2018; Street 2014), only a small number of studies is dedicated to the nomination stage (Dancygier 2013; Farrer and Zingher 2018; Fonseca 2011; Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Sobolewska 2013; Soininen 2011) - although a multitude of authors points to its importance with regards to minority representation in parliaments (Bird 2005; Kittilson and Tate 2005; Black and Erickson 2006: 556; Bloemraad 2013: 663; Ruedin 2013: 118; Dancygier, Lindgren, et al. 2015: 704 sq.). In a nutshell, and with some risk of oversimplification, those studies have shown that political parties respond differently to the ethnic diversification of the electorate. The nomination chances of immigrant-origin aspiring candidates depend on several factors. First, there is empirical evidence that party ideology matters (see, e.g., Fonseca 2011; Sobolewska 2013; Farrer and Zingher 2018); second, some authors also point to the ethnic composition of the constituencies (see, e.g., Farrer and Zingher 2018); and, finally, some authors highlight the way parties select their candidates, thus the selection methods (see, e.g., Black and Hicks 2006; Sobolewska 2013). However, studies that analyze the nomination of immigrant-origin candidates by taking into account also those who seek nomination within their party (i.e. the aspirants), are almost nonexistent (but see for Great Britain Norris and Lovenduski 1993). However, in order to detect the mechanisms that intervene during the selection process, it is of utmost importance to account also for the aspirant level. The present study takes this in account by asking whether, based on the findings outlined above, immigrant-origin aspirants meet specific obstacles during the candidate selection process based on the parties’ electoral strategies, their party ideology, and/or specific intra-party aspects.

The three main aims of this study are: First, it seeks to contribute to the discussion about the reasons of the numerically low presence of immigrants and their descendants in legislative bodies. As argued above, only recently studies
have started analyzing the role of candidate selection in this context. The central question is thus, to put it simply, whether parties and their ways to select candidates are the core reasons for the low proportion of immigrant-origin citizens in legislatures. Second, the present study also aims to give some new insights into the complex phenomenon of candidate selection that takes place predominantly within parties (Höhne 2013: 30). Although, as argued above, candidate selection is the central function of political parties and distinguishes them from other intermediary actors (Zeuner 1970: 3; Katz 2001: 278), there has been comparably little scholarly attention toward candidate selection (Hazan and Rahat 2010: 6). This holds particularly true for Germany (see more recently Schüttemeyer and Sturm 2005; Reiser 2011, 2013, 2014; Höhne 2013; Detterbeck 2016; Höhne 2017). I thus situate my study within the broader context of candidate selection and apply it to the specific German case. And, finally, referring again to the introductory citation above, this study seeks to make a contribution to the discussion on the challenges political parties face due to societal changes in general and increasing ethnic diversity in particular, and how they react to these challenges that are supposed to 'modify[] their hunting grounds and political arenas' (Panebianco 1988: 266). The current literature that deals in a larger sense with the impact of immigration on parties has focused on three primary areas. First, party and electoral scholars have examined the reactions of the native population towards immigration by analyzing voting behavior and the rise of far-right parties and, related to this, changes in party systems. These efforts also include research on the reactions of mainstream parties to the rise of far-right parties (see, e.g., Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Bale 2003; Green et al. 2016; Rydgren 2008). A second area of research deals with the role of immigrant-origin citizens as voters and the question whether or not they constitute a different kind of electorate (see, e.g., Bergh and Bjørklund 2011; Sanders et al. 2014; Strijbis 2014; Wüst 2012). And, finally, as shown above, a few authors focus on the nomination of immigrant-origin candidates (see above). In addition to the central question of whom to blame for the low presence of immigrant-origin citizens in parliament (see above), the present study aims thus to improve our understanding of how different political parties respond to an increasingly diversified electorate and how they balance the costs and benefits of nominating immigrant-origin candidates.
**Structure of the book**

The present study deals with candidate selection for legislative office in the context of growing numbers of immigrant-origin citizens in immigrant-receiving countries in general and in Germany, in particular.

To this end, I start, in the first chapter, with a review of the main theoretical strands and empirical findings of the political representation literature in general and the work on descriptive or minority representation in particular. The chapter begins with the discussion of the different conceptualizations of political representation and is followed by a discussion of the theoretical concepts and main empirical findings within the sub-field of minority representation. Special attention is paid to three research areas within this field: the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation; the psychological effects that are attributed to minority representation; and the different explanations for minority representation. This section aims to give an overview of the state of art in this field of political research as well as to highlight the need to study party politics in this context. I then conclude by summarizing the main conclusions that can be drawn from the discussion of minority representation.

Attention is then turned, in the second chapter, to research on party politics and its implications for the study of (immigrant-origin) minorities and politics. This is done by, first, describing the main characteristics of contemporary parties; and, second, elaborating in detail one function of political parties that stands in the center of my research: the selection of candidates for elective office. After highlighting the main features of candidate selection, I turn to an overview of the central findings in this particular subfield of party politics. In a final step, I bring together the research on parties and on minorities by summarizing the existing findings on immigrant-origin minorities as voters as well as their incorporation within parties. The review leads to the conclusion that the existing literature does not account enough for the role of candidate selection in the study on minorities and (party) politics.

Chapter three then develops the question of minorities and parties in Germany. First, the topic of immigration is set in the German context and, then a short overview of the composition and actual political inclusion of the immigrant-origin population in Germany is given. The second part of the chapter deals with the legal and institutional party framework and the main ideological and structural characteristics of the contemporary German party system. The chapter concludes with an overview of the German parties’ positions regarding the immigration issue.

Based on the literature review and the arguments developed in the previous
chapters, chapter four presents an analytical framework to explain the selection of immigrant-origin candidates. I focus on three aspects of the selection process and ask whether immigrant-origin candidates face obstacles within the selection process due to parties’ electoral strategies, their ideology and/or aspects of intra-party politics. Several hypotheses are formulated that guide the subsequent empirical analysis. In chapter five, I present my original data and point to the limitations of the research.

Chapter six, then, analyzes quantitatively whether immigrant-origin candidates face specific obstacles in the course of the candidate selection process. This is done by relying on two sources of data. First, I gathered data on those who aspired nomination for the 2013 legislative elections in Germany as well as on the characteristics of the nominations (Aspirant data). And, second, I make use of an online survey conducted among about 940 party members who participated in at least one district or party list nomination for the 2013 legislative elections (Selector Survey data). The first part of the chapter examines quantitatively the presence of immigrant-origin citizens among the aspiring candidates and those who came forward as candidates in the districts and/or on the party list. In the second part of the chapter, I analyze in detail, based on the analytical framework developed in Chapter four, whether parties’ strategic considerations, ideology and/or aspects of intra-party politics are related to the nomination chances of immigrant-origin aspiring candidates.

The concluding chapter summaries the key research findings and discusses the implications of the present study for future research.
Chapter 1

The political representation of minorities

The present study investigates deeper into the role of candidate selection regarding the parliamentarian representation of the immigrant-origin population. That is why, in the following paragraphs, I will discuss the central ideas and findings within the research field of political representation in general and descriptive or minority representation as one specific concept of representation. In a first step, I will outline the purpose of political representation which will lead, in a second step, to a discussion of the ideas associated with the concept of descriptive representation. The remainder of the chapter is dedicated to an outline of the literature dealing with the explanation of the phenomenon of a numerical under-representation of ethnic minority groups.

1.1 Political representation – what does it mean?

The concept of political representation has a long tradition in political sciences. Its central assumptions can be traced back to some of the most influential political theorists – Burke, Hobbes, or Mill to name only a few. Furthermore, it is strongly related to the idea of democracy itself. Today, when talking about democracy, we instantly also talk about representative democracy. In this sense political

\[1\] It is worth noting that neither the idea of democracy is solely thought as representative democracy nor the concept of representation is exclusively connected to the idea of democracy
representation can even be conceived as "the mean to realize the democratic idea of giving people a voice in large states" (Weßels 2007: 833). In contemporary political science the discussion about political representation has resurfaced in the mid-20ths century in particular with the works of Hanna F. Pitkin (1967), Heinz Eulau, John C. Wahlke and colleagues (Eulau and Karps 1977; Eulau, Wahlke, et al. 1959; Wahlke et al. 1962) as well as Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes (1963). Since at least these seminal works, it is common wisdom within research on representation that even though the concept of political representation seems at first sight very simple only few can agree upon a common definition (Pitkin 1967: 5). That is also why, in the decades that followed, the discussion of the meaning of political representation and linked to that also of the importance of the different components of this concept has given rise to many important conceptual as well as empirical works (see, e.g., Mansbridge 2003, 2011; Phillips 1995; Rehfeld 2006, 2009; Saward 2006, 2009; Young 2000).

In her seminal work, Hanna F. Pitkin, by taking a language-philosophical approach defines representation generally taken as "making present in some sense of something which is nevertheless not present literally or in fact" (Pitkin 1967: 8 sq.; italics in original). Applying this general definition to the political sphere, she describes representation as "acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them" (Pitkin 1967: 209). This definition implies two assumptions about the characteristics of political representation that are, however, not uncontested within the research field: representation as "acting for" (or substantive representation), and responsiveness as the central linkage between representatives and represented, and thus as the main criterion to evaluate the quality of representation.

The importance of acting as an important characteristic of political representation is reflected in nearly all conceptualizations of political representation (Ruedin 2013b: 10). However, Hanna F. (Pitkin 1967) in her multidimensional concept of representation (based on the work of A. Phillips Griffiths and Richard Wollheim (1960)) opposes representation as "acting for" diametrically to representation as "standing for" (Pitkin 1967: 80 sq.). According to Hanna F. Pitkin, the former focuses on the "substance of the activity itself" (Pitkin 1967: 11), while within the and thus has to be evaluated by exclusively democratic norms (Rehfeld 2006: 2).

Pitkin develops her concept of political representation by first deriving it from its etymological origins; and second, by discussing Hobbes' (implicit) concept of representation (representation as "authorization, the giving of authority to act" (Pitkin 1967: 11; italics in original) and particularly its shortcomings. The latter serves then to elaborate her conception of representation.
latter the focus lays 'on being something rather than doing something' (Pitkin 1967: 61). Representation as "standing for" then is divided into a descriptive dimension as "the making present of something absent by resemblance or reflection, as in a mirror or in art" (Pitkin 1967: 11) and a symbolic dimension – meaning the making present of something by its presence (e.g. symbols) without requiring any resemblance or reflection (Pitkin 1967: 92). While the multidimensional nature of political representation itself is only rarely contested in scholarly debate (see for further or alternative dimensions, e.g., Mansbridge 2003, Saward 2006), for instance, criticizes Pitkin’s conceptualization of the "standing for"-category, claiming that it denies any "active making [...] of symbols or images of what is to be represented" by limiting it to a "mere transfer of 'information'" (Saward 2006: 301). As the descriptive, 'standing-for' dimension of representation is in the heart of the present study, I will attach closer attention to this concept in Chapter 1.2.

Defining political representation as Hanna F. Pitkin did, namely as "acting in the interest of someone", raises the question about what exactly this means. The predominant view is that "acting for" is seen in terms of policy responsiveness (Campbell, Childs, et al. 2010: 172). In the tradition of Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes (1963) there is a large body of literature measuring interest representation as policy congruence between representatives and represented (see, e.g., Ansolabehere et al. 2001). However, based on the differentiation between position and valence issues (Stokes 1963: 373), it is possible to argue that focusing solely on the representation of interests is deficient. The fact that there are issues above which representatives or parties only disagree regarding the way to achieve them and for which party competence depends on the citizens’ perception (valence issues) (Shikano et al. 2014: 115) highlights the importance of taking into account also the representation of values as well as candidate characteristics. The latter receives more and more scholarly attention and strongly focuses on the representation of specific, mainly (historically) marginalized groups (see, e.g., Phillips 1995, Williams 1998, Young 2000). The concepts employed in this research area are descriptive representation, mirror representation, statistical or proportional representation, (ethnic) group representation or fair representation. It is worth highlighting that in some cases those terms denote different concepts, while in others are used more or less as synonyms to describe the same concept. This issue will be elaborated more closely in Chapter 1.2.

Additionally to substantive, descriptive and symbolic representation, Pitkin (1967) identifies two formalistic dimensions that both focus on the formal arrangements between represented and representatives without accounting for the substantive content of the concept (Pitkin 1967: 55) – representation as authorization and as accountability (Pitkin 1967: 11).
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Attributing to the concept of political representation an acting-dimension instantly points to the question of ‘acting on behalf of whom?’ Traditionally, this debate can be summarized under the label of the ‘focus of representation’ encompassing geographical units (such as (local) constituents or the whole nation), social or ethnic groups, political parties or the representative him or herself as for instance in Jane Mansbridge’s (2003: 520) model of gyroscopic representation. In addition, the delegate-trustee controversy (‘style of representation’) tackles the problem whether representatives are bound by instructions, for instance of their constituents, or whether they act independently (Eulau, Wahlke, et al. 1959: 744 sq.). However, due to the institutional framework and in particular the role of party discipline in Western European democracies, political parties play a central if not the central role in the representative process of those countries (Thomassen 1994: 242; Andeweg 2003: 150; Weßels 2007: 839). That is why the individual representative as primary actor within the citizen-elite linkages is completed by the responsible party model of representation (Miller and Stokes 1963: 45; Dalton 1985: 271). Speaking in terms of a principal-agent relationship, the electorate is seen as the principal and the agent is the representatives who via party discipline is committed to a party program (Miller and Stokes 1963: 45). Furthermore, the model assumes that voters are aware of the distinct party programs offered by political parties and therefore vote rationally, that is in this case following their policy preferences (Thomassen 1994: 251 sq.). Representation in this case is often measured by congruence between parties’ policy positions and policy preferences of the voters (Thomassen 1994: 255).

These assumptions already tackle the question about the nature of the relationship between represented and representatives and, related to this, about the criteria that scholarship puts forward to evaluate the process of representation. In the classical works, the main criteria that structure the representative-represented relationship are, as already mentioned, responsiveness and accountability (Powell 2004). Although already Heinz Eulau and Paul D. Karps (1977) who equated representation to responsiveness pointed to the importance of thinking of responsiveness not only in terms of policy but also of symbols or service responsiveness (Eulau and Karps 1977: 241), most of the (empirical) works measure responsiveness as policy or ideological congruence (see, e.g., Ansolabehere et al. 2001; Golder and Stramski 2010). Good representation is therefore often equated with policy

\[^4\] Thomassen underscores that the weakness in this concept concerns the assumption that the outcome of an election has to be interpreted as a policy mandate even though voters can only vote for a whole package of policy positions (Thomassen 1994: 253, 257).
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correspondence between representatives and represented (Rehfeld 2009: 216). Closely related to the concept of responsiveness is the concept of accountability. Accountability is traditionally understood as "ask[ing] whether the representative is doing what the statically conceived constituent wanted the representative to do" (Mansbridge 2003: 518). However, more and more scholars have begun to identify further normative criteria in order to evaluate the relationship between representatives and represented (see, e.g., Mansbridge 2003; Rehfeld 2006; Saward 2006). According to Jane Mansbridge (2003: 522), there are also forms of representation that imply no relation of accountability or power between representatives and represented but criteria such as the quality of the deliberation process, predictability of action via MPs’ descriptive characteristics or party affiliation, or the (system wide) composition of the legislature. The latter (which Mansbridge calls “surrogate representation”) tackles those cases where we can find no electoral relationship between representative and represented (Mansbridge 2003: 522). It is, however, worth mentioning that, contrary to other scholars who integrate non-elective forms of representation in the concept of representation (see, e.g., Rehfeld 2006; Saward 2009), Jane Mansbridge’s concept of surrogate representation is still situated within the context of elected legislatures. A further characteristic of these more recent concepts of representation is that they conceive the representative relationship as systemic rather than dyadic. Thinking of political representation in a systemic sense means shifting the focus from the dyadic legislator-constituency relationship away to a collective relationship more independent of any direct electoral relationship (Weissberg 1978: 535) as for example in surrogate representation (Mansbridge 2003: 516). Conceptualizing political representation in this way appears in particular meaningful in political systems where constituents elect more than one candidate, for instance whole party lists.

To sum up, representation can be defined in a purely technical manner by equating representation to representative democracy. Representation in this case means that the citizens transfer their power to the elected representatives. However, already the existence of a large body of literature on political representation alludes to the fact that political representation seems to be more than solely representative democracy. According to this literature mainly four (strongly interrelated) questions have been or are still discussed: who represents (e.g. the elected representative, an organization, social movement, party)?, who is represented (e.g. the constituents, the clients, the nation, particular social or ethnic groups)?, what is represented (e.g. interests, perspectives, symbols, persons, non-elective claims)?, and, finally, what is the very nature of the concept of political representation? (Spies and Kaiser 2014: 577 sq.; Dovi 2017). The answers to these questions
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largely depend on the political context, as for instance the importance of parties as representative actors in the European context has shown. Furthermore, due to a constantly diversifying environment and representative claims of groups that traditionally had no or little voice in the representative process, answers proposed by the classical approaches are more and more challenged by more recent approaches. Anne Phillips (1995) summarizes this development as follows:

"In this major reframing of the problems of democratic equality, the separation between 'who' and 'what' is to be represented, and the subordination of the first to the second, is very much up for question." (Phillips 1995: 5)

These ideas will be developed in the remainder of this chapter.

1.2 (Ethnic) minority representation: theoretical concepts and empirical findings

Discussion on political representation was over a long period dominated by views that conceive representation as what Anne Phillips (1995) calls a "politics of idea". I have elaborated the main characteristics of these classical approaches of representation in the previous paragraphs as well as pointed already to some alternative ideas. As in a larger sense the present study deals with the challenges for ideas of political representation due to contemporary migration, I will, in what follows, focus on the concept of descriptive or minority representation. In a first step, I will elaborate the ideas associated with minority representation as well as outline its critique. In a second step, I will turn to the empirical findings in this research field. This will be done by focusing, first, on the effects of minority representation on substantive representation and, second, on the psychological effects of this kind of political representation (and therefore conceiving minority representation in both cases as independent variable). In a third step, I will discuss the main empirical findings regarding the explanations that are put forward in scholarly debate for the numerical under-representation of ethnic minorities. This will be done by differentiating between, on the one hand, demand-side and, on the other hand, supply-side explanations.
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1.2.1 Minority representation: theoretical concepts and its critique

Minority representation is mostly known under the term of descriptive representation. The latter was coined already in the beginning of the 1960s by A. Phillips Griffiths and Richard Wollheim [1960] who defined it as 'one person represents another by being sufficiently like him' (Griffiths and Wollheim [1960]: 188). Nevertheless, it was only Pitkin’s seminal work The Concept of Representation in the mid-1960s through which the concept attracted broader scholarly attention by defining it, as already mentioned in the preceding paragraph, as "the making present of something absent by resemblance of reflection, as in a mirror or in art" (Pitkin [1967]: 11). This analogy also leads to the notion of 'mirror representation' (Tate 2003) when talking about descriptive representation. As this concept of representation focuses on how assemblies are composed, also the term of proportional representation is used (Pitkin [1967]: 61). Hanna F. Pitkin [1967] underlined the importance of descriptive representation, for instance in contexts where the function of representative institutions consists in supplying information about the represented (e.g. the people, the nation) (Pitkin [1967]: 81). In Hanna F. Pitkin’s understanding of descriptive representation it is thus all about supplying "accurate information" (Pitkin [1967]: 88).

Much of the critic of the concept that followed (and which will be discussed in detail below) focuses on descriptive representation in a proportional or microcosmic (Mansbridge [1999]: 631) sense like Hanna F. Pitkin understood it. At the same time, scholars studying descriptive representation have begun to redefine the concept by mainly discussing what should be represented by descriptive representatives (only ascriptive characteristics or also group specific experiences or perspectives) as well as putting questions of inclusion and equality in the center of the concept of descriptive representation. Additionally, scholarship has also begun to connect descriptive representation to the idea of deliberative democracy in contrast to democracy conceptualized purely as a process of interest aggregation.

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5 Jane Mansbridge [1999] highlights the existence of two different forms of descriptive representation – the microcosmic and the selective form of descriptive representation. The former, she argues, focuses on a microcosmic composition of the assemblies achieved through specific methods of representative selection as e.g. lottery. The latter, on the other side, focuses not on the mirroring aspect of descriptive representation but on institutional aspects. Selective descriptive representation is seen as a kind of corrective instrument "in order to bring the proportions of those groups [groups that are disadvantaged by the existing electoral system] in the legislature closer to their percentage in the population" (Mansbridge [1999]: 632) by using for example specific institutional designs (Mansbridge [1999] 631 sq.).
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(see, e.g., Phillips 1995; Young 2000).

Jane Mansbridge (1999), for instance, highlights the importance of shared experiences. Descriptive representatives, she argues, are "individuals who in their own backgrounds mirror some of the more frequent experiences and outward manifestations of belonging to the group" (Mansbridge 1999: 628). This definition points to her main argument: not the congruence of visible characteristics of representatives and their constituents the main question within this idea of political representation, but their shared experiences (Mansbridge 1999: 629). Microcosmic descriptive representation, she argues, is therefore not needed, but corrective instruments helping to bring the proportions of the historically marginalized groups closer to their percentage in the population (Mansbridge 1999: 632). Iris Young (2000) in her approach on group representation even rejects the idea of representation as a relationship between representatives and those they represent based on identity or substitution (as it is done in the majority of the concepts of political representation). In her view, representation has to be conceived as "a differentiated [and active] process relating the representative and constituents" (Young 2000: 143) with a particular importance put on the traces of the past as well as anticipated future within the actions of representatives and constituents (Young 2000: 127). Group representation is therefore not about the sociodemographic characteristics as such but about specific experiences that are supposed to be shared more likely by members of the same group. In Iris Young’s (2000) conception of political representation the descriptive congruence of representatives and constituents is not an absolute condition but may be helpful to guarantee the specific social perspective being represented (Young 2000: 148). Finally, Anne Phillips (1995) with her concept of a 'politics of presence' that is needed additionally to a so-called 'politics of idea' to achieve fair representation of historically marginalized groups, highlights the fact that her concept has neither be equated with proportional representation in a "mirroring of the society"-sense (Phillips 1995: 46 sq.) nor with that of group or descriptive representation (Phillips 1995: 55). The presence of (ethnic) minority groups within parliaments is needed in order to make present "those values and goals and perspectives that most women [or other minority groups] develop out of the experiences that differentiate them from most men [or the majority]" (Phillips 1995: 158). In this context, Williams (1998: 18) explicitly highlights the importance of the experience of group-based stereotypes.

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6 Iris Young (2000: 136) argues that "agents who are 'close' in the social field have a similar point of view on the field and the occurrences within it".
The concept of descriptive representation in its narrow (microcosmic) but also in its wider forms is strongly contested in scholarly debate (Phillips 1995: 21; Mansbridge 1999: 629). Critics for instance argue that if the selection of representatives is done solely on the ground of their ascriptive characteristics, this may lead to a loss of quality of the representative body. Mansbridge illustrates this argument by citing Pennock’s argument that "No one would argue that morons should be represented by morons" (cited by Mansbridge 1999: 629). Furthermore, talking about descriptive representation (in its microcosmic as well as selective form) also inevitably implies a certain kind of essentialist thinking that is the assumption that "a single or essential trait, or nature, [...] binds every member of a descriptive group together, giving them common interests" (Mansbridge 1999: 637). This kind of thinking ignores the existence of intra-group differences as well as the possibility of belonging to multiple groups (Williams 1998: 5; Young 2000). From this follows that "the attempt to define a common group identity tends to normalize the experience and perspective of some of the group members while marginalizing or silencing that of others" (Young 2000: 89). Additionally, taking into account socio-demographic characteristics as gender or ethnicity when thinking about politics could lead to a "balkanization" of the polity. The argument here is that focusing on group differences (ethnicity, race or gender) rather than on policy differences can impact in a dividing manner on society and in the long run on national unity and political stability (Phillips 1995: 22 sq.). A further important critique of the concept of descriptive representation points to the danger of reduced political accountability when selecting representatives not on the ground of ideas but of group characteristics. The main argument in this regard is that for what if not his or her actions a representative can be held accountable for (Phillips 1995: 23; Williams 1998: 6; Mansbridge 1999: 640). A further, and probably one of the most prominent arguments against descriptive representation is that representing in a descriptive sense "[...] involves no action at all but only characteristics" (Pitkin 1967: 90). Many of the critics that followed Pitkin’s work focused on this aspect by opposing in a diametric matter substantive to descriptive representation to stay in Pitkin’s words or a "politics of presence" to a "politics of idea" to speak with Anne Phillips (1995). These authors argue that what should matter the most when thinking about political representation is what representatives do and not what they look like (Pitkin 1967: 209). In a representative democracy, descriptive representatives are not required to promote and represent their descriptive constituents’ interests. It is argued that this can be done by any good representative (Saalfeld 2011: 272). And finally, conceiving minority representation as special group representation also implies advocating
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for specific measures or instruments that are supposed to increase the political representation of specific minority groups (see, e.g., Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995; Young 2000). Regardless of the critique that is put forward against specific instruments of minority group representation (e.g., quotas, minority sensitive districting), there is also the question about whether such a politics of difference is in fact nothing other than interest group politics. This would be at odds with the idea of politics aiming to achieve some kind of general interest (Phillips 1995: 24).

On the other side, there are also arguments that are put forward in favor of minority representation in its various forms. Those scholars in general acknowledge the disadvantages (or 'costs' as Jane Mansbridge names it) descriptive representation can cause. In particular the question how to identify these minority groups that merit attention when talking about fair or minority representation remains difficult to answer. In this context, scholarship points to the existence of political marginalization of a specific group in the past (Williams 1998: 15 sq.) as well as to the current political exclusion of specific groups (Phillips 1995: 46). Furthermore, in a more general way, Iris Young (2000) argues that also political representatives in an orthodox way mostly represent a large and diverse group of citizens so that the representation of their interests is in fact not possible ("the problem of the one and the many (Young 2000: 143)). Therefore, the argument put forward by critics of group or descriptive representation, that is that there are no specific minority group interests, can be extended to the most existing concepts of political representation (Young 2000: 126) and thus loses its power within the discussion against descriptive representation. At the same time, minority representation scholars identify contexts that can call for descriptive representation (Phillips 1995: 38; Mansbridge 1999: 628). First, in contexts of mistrust and in particular if there has been a historically impaired (power) relation between a dominant and a subordinated group, descriptive representatives can enable better vertical (between representatives and their constituents) communication (Mansbridge 1999: 641). Jane Mansbridge argues that

"Representatives and voters who share some version of a set of common experiences and the outward signs of having lived through those experiences can often read one another’s signals relatively easily and engage in relatively accurate forms of shorthand communication." (Mansbridge 1999: 641)

For American politics she highlights that it is not always possible to have a descriptive representative as one’s district MP. The members of the subordinated
group therefore look for, what she calls, "surrogate representatives" who advocate for this view across district boarders (Mansbridge 1999: 642). Second, in contexts of what Mansbridge calls uncrystallized interests, descriptive representatives can provide innovative thinking through horizontal communication (from legislator to legislator). Descriptive legislators, she argues, are likely to share a common set of experiences and therefore also common interest with their constituents on which they can in turn "speak [...] with a voice carrying the authority of experience" (Mansbridge 1999: 644). In this context, Anne Phillips (1995: 43) states that in the case of such not articulated minority issues, descriptive representatives can serve as "more aggressive advocates [for these minority issues, the author] on the public stage". Third, in particular in historical contexts where the ability to rule has been seriously questioned for certain groups (or, they have been even excluded from voting), descriptive representation can create new social meanings including that the members of the concerned minority group are able to rule (Mansbridge 1999: 648 sqq.). This can create also a feeling of 'public acknowledgement of equal value' (Phillips 1995: 40). Finally, scholarship argues that the lack of governmental positions for ethnic minorities can foster political alienation and distrust (Abney and Hutcheson 1981: 91). Descriptive representation therefore can, especially in contexts of past discrimination, help to increase the feeling of inclusion and therefore the polity's de facto legitimacy (Mansbridge 1999: 650 sq.; Gay 2002: 718). To sum up, while descriptive representation within the first two contexts is supposed to enhance the interest of the concerned minority groups (and therefore contributes to higher levels of substantive representation), in the last two contexts the benefits are more of a psychological nature which, as a matter of course, does not exclude substantive consequences (Mansbridge 1999: 251). In what follows, I will elaborate, based on existing studies dealing with minority representation, whether these arguments can also be empirically validated.

1.2.2 The puzzling relationship between descriptive and substantive representation

As argued in the preceding paragraphs, one of the central arguments (and also of the most controversial one) put forward by minority representation scholars is

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7 As uncrystallized interests she defines those issues that have not yet gained public attention in the way that politics have become (or not wanted to become) aware of them (Mansbridge 1999: 644).
that higher levels of descriptive representation will enhance the substantive representation of minority groups – most notably when those groups have historically been marginalized within society in general and politics in particular (Mansbridge 1999: 641). But why should a legislator’s race or ethnic background matter at all when it comes to the kind of interests he or she represents? The central argument here is that personal life experiences together with acquired norms and cultures leave a trace in legislators’ parliamentarian behavior (Gamble 2007: 425; Saalfeld 2011: 276; Saalfeld and Kyriakopoulou 2011: 234). Gamble argues that it is in particular the fact of sharing “the experience of being a member of a historically marginalized group” (Gamble 2007: 425). Others also point to factors such as shared group identity, group consciousness or ‘linked fate’ (Gamble 2007: 426) that are supposed to link descriptive and substantive representation (Wallace 2014: 919). But under what conditions do these experiences or norms acquired through socialization and strengthened through high levels of shared group identity or consciousness lead to minority sensitive legislative behavior? Scholarship argues that this depends, amongst others, on the different legislative roles a legislator plays (e.g. policy advocate), but also on the party strategy a legislator is bound to (Saalfeld 2011: 274). Scholarship highlights that focusing in their legislative activity too strongly on minority-related issues can have negative consequences regarding the chances of reelection of minority MPs (Saalfeld and Kyriakopoulou 2011: 233). Furthermore, in party-centered political systems, legislative behavior is largely structured by party affiliation. This is supposed to weaken the presumed relationship between descriptive and interest representation (Baumann et al. 2015: 179).

The empirical findings regarding the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation are mixed. Some find (more or less clear) evidence for the existence of such a relationship (see, e.g., Whitby 1997; Saalfeld and Kyriakopoulou 2011; Wallace 2014; Wüst 2014), others find no connection between these two forms of political representation (see, e.g., Hero and Tolbert 1995). It is also worth noting that the great majority of the studies dealing with the question of descriptive and substantive representation are dedicated to the U.S. American context. The results have thus to be taken with caution when transferring to the European context. At the same time, research on "[t]he substantive representation of minority-related policy issues by immigrant-origin MPs" (Saalfeld 2011: 287) is still largely missing for the case of European democracies (but see Saalfeld 2011).

There is also a bulk of literature dealing with how gender affects legislative behavior that will not be discussed here (see, e.g., Campbell, Childs, et al. 2010; Vega and Firestone 1995).
The mixed findings mentioned above can be due to several factors: first, institutions matter. In most parliamentary systems, the strength of parties structures MPs’ legislative behavior (Baumann et al. 2015: 179) and in particular the legislative voting behavior – rather than personal characteristics such as gender or ethnicity. In the German context for example, it is worth noting that due to strong party unity personal characteristics play less a role in MPs’ legislative behavior than for example in the U.S. context. Andreas M. Wüst (2014), for example, analyzes parliamentary questions over time and across different levels of the political system to measure the impact of descriptive on substantive representation in Germany. His results clearly show that MPs’ party affiliation (i.e. not belonging to the political left) is one of the main factors explaining the probability of asking migration-related parliamentary questions (Wüst 2014: 14). But also for the U.S. context, belonging to the Democratic Party remains a strong indicator for minority-related legislative behavior (see, e.g., Swain 1993; Whitby 1997; Wallace 2014: 923 sq.).

Second, the mixed results regarding the presumed relationship between descriptive and substantive representation can be due also to different operationalizations of the dependent variable (legislative behavior measuring substantive representation). Most of the works measure legislative behavior (amongst others) via roll-call votes (e.g., Hero and Tolbert 1995; Saalfeld and Kyriakopoulou 2011; Wallace 2014). Others complete roll-call votes by variables of non-roll-call behavior such as for example parliamentary questions (Saalfeld 2011; Wüst 2014; Wüst and Saalfeld 2010), bill (co-) sponsorship (e.g., Rocca and Sanchez 2008; Wallace 2014) or membership in parliamentary committees (e.g., Gamble 2007; Wüst and Saalfeld 2010). For the case of Great Britain, Thomas Saalfeld and Kalliopi Kyriakopoulou (2011) have analyzed, amongst others, the dissenting votes of black and minority ethnic MPs and found no empirical evidence for differences in the legislative behavior of minority and non-minority Members of parliament (Saalfeld and Kyriakopoulou 2011: 241). In a further study, however, using parliamentary questions to measure substantive representation, Thomas Saalfeld (2011) could show that MPs’ visible minority background impacts positively on the amount of migration related parliamentary questions (MPs with a visible minority background) with a visible minority
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background significantly ask more questions related to migration) (Saalfeld 2011: 287). We can therefore conclude that different measurements of substantive representation can result in different findings.

Third, also factors related to the minority group in question (history of relationship between majority and minority population, level of group consciousness) can account for different results in this research area. In particular, the Western European historical context is not only different to the United States but also characterized by its within-European diversity (there are indigenous minority groups, immigrants and their descendants from the different waves of post-war labor immigration to Western Europe or post-colonial immigrants as in France, Great Britain or the Netherlands). These differences have to be kept in mind when trying to transfer U.S. findings to Western Europe as well as when comparing the results of different European countries. Additionally, some studies have found evidence for the importance of the visibility of the ethnic background when analyzing the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation (see, e.g., Wüst 2014: 12 sq.). Finally, also differences in the data availability should account for the mixed results found in this research area. It is worth noting that the low levels of ethnic minority MPs in particular in the European context can make a generalization of the findings difficult.

1.2.3 The psychological effects of minority representation

Besides the (presumed) impact of descriptive on substantive representation or more precisely on the advancement of (ethnic or racial) minority interests, descriptive representation can also "promote [...] goods unrelated to substantive representation" (Mansbridge 1999: 628; emphasis added). Those goods are of mainly symbolic nature for the minority group in question (Gay 2002: 718; Bloemraad 2013: 654). Furthermore, those psychological effects of descriptive representation do not have to be restricted to the attitudinal level, but can also imply behavioral effects (Pantoja and Segura 2003: 443).

Contrary to the impact of descriptive on substantive representation, the connection between the former and phenomena such as political trust or political alienation has received less attention within scholarly debate (Gay 2001: 590).

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10 Thomas Saalfeld’s findings also indicate that there is a relationship between high shares of immigrant-origin population in the districts and the likelihood of MPs, irrespective of their ethnic background, to ask questions related to immigration and ethnic minorities in the British society (even though at different levels) (Saalfeld 2011: 287).
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Nevertheless, several studies analyze this relationship by focusing on different dependent variables, first at the attitudinal level, such as trust in (local, state and/or federal) government (Abney and Hutcheson 1981; Gay 2002; Howell and Fagan 1988), satisfaction with their legislators (at the federal level) (Tate 2001) or political alienation (Pantoja and Segura 2003); and second, at the behavioral level, such as voter turnout (Barreto 2007; Fraga 2014; Gay 2001; Whitby 2007) or sociopolitical participation (Bobo and Gilliam 1990). The former (attitudinal level) can be located within the tradition of the system stability literature presuming a negative impact of high (and ongoing) levels of political distrust or alienation on system stability on the long run (Almond and Verba 1963; Easton 1957). The latter (behavioral level) departs from the assumption that feelings of inclusion and political trust can have a mobilizing (and therefore positive) effect on for example political participation (in particular voter turnout). In both cases, an increase in the number of descriptive representatives is supposed to increase the level of political trust (or decrease the level of political alienation) and the level of political participation, respectively.

For American politics (in the 1970s and 80s), there is empirical evidence for a positive effect of descriptive representation on political trust at the local level (see, e.g., Abney and Hutcheson 1981; Howell and Fagan 1988). The studies indicate that having a co-racial mayor increases trust levels vis-à-vis the local government among Afro-Americans as well as levels of satisfaction with the city government’s policies (Abney and Hutcheson 1981: 98; Howell and Fagan 1988: 345). This relationship, however, does not hold true for the federal level (Abney and Hutcheson 1981: 96; see similar also Bobo and Gilliam 1990: 383; Gay 2002: 723). Claudine Gay (2002) also have found evidence for a positive relationship between descriptive representation and contact: "Regardless of individual ideology, constituents are more likely to contact a legislator of their own race than they are a legislator with whom they do not racially identify" (Gay 2002: 729). These results indicate that descriptive representation can enhance vertical communication between constituents and legislators. Adrian D. Pantoja and Gary M. Segura (2003) can show that the more Latino representatives Latino constituents have (at the state, House and/or Senate level) the lower their level of political alienation (Pantoja and Segura 2003: 450), in particular when constituents additionally are highly politically informed (Pantoja and Segura 2003: 451). Finally, Katherine

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11 It is worth noting that the studies in this research field are almost exclusively dedicated to American politics (but see, for the case of the UK, Nicole S. Martin 2016, who analyzes the impact of descriptive representation on ethnic minority voter turnout).
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Tate (2001: 631) can show that, even after controlling for several independent variables, there is a statistically significant and positive link between same-race legislators and the ratings (job approval and feeling thermometer) they get from their black constituents.\(^\text{12}\)

The arguments put forward in scholarly debate about the relationship between descriptive representation and political orientations such as trust can be divided into policy-related, or instrumental, and extra-policy, or expressive arguments (Heath et al. 2015: 11). Regarding the former, scholarship argues that based on the literature on substantive representation, racial or ethnic identification with a legislator can serve as an information short-cut or "heuristic device" (Pantoja and Segura 2003: 444). According to this argument, legislators' racial or ethnic group membership is seen as a sign of representing policy orientations that are favorable to the minority group in question (Gay 2002: 718; Pantoja and Segura 2003: 444). Trusting a co-ethnic legislator would therefore mean having faith in the legislator’s policy or service responsiveness (Eulau and Karps 1977) to ethnic minority concerns. Regarding extra-policy arguments, scholarship points to assumptions of a better accessibility of the co-ethnic legislator (Gay 2002: 718) or ideas borrowed from the minority empowerment literature. The latter assumes that because of their politically disadvantaged status, ethnic or racial minorities show higher levels of distrust in government. If circumstances change in a positive way (e.g. election of an Afro-American major), the level of distrust or alienation decreases (Pantoja and Segura 2003: 443).

Regarding the effects of descriptive representation at the behavioral level, the results are mixed. While scholarship points to a remarkable decrease in voter turnout among white constituents in districts with black legislators (see, e.g., Gay 2001), the presumed increase in minority turnout is not so clear-cut (see, e.g., Fairdosi and Rogowski 2015; Gay 2001). At the local level, Matt A. (2007: 437) has found empirical evidence for a positive impact of co-ethnic (Latino) candidates running for mayoral elections on Latino voter turnout. On the other hand, Claudine Gay’s (2001) findings regarding this relationship for Afro-American congressman or -women at the federal level, are not so clear-cut: using aggregate data she finds support for the presumed positive relationship only in some of the studied districts (Gay 2001: 598). But these findings not only vary regarding the level of analysis (local/federal) or the minority group under study but also

\(^{12}\) Nevertheless, also in this case party match remains the most important explanatory factor when explaining job approval and to a lesser degree also the feeling thermometer (Tate 2001: 633 sq.).
regarding candidates’ party affiliation.

Amir Shawn Fairdosi and Jon C. Rogowski (2015: 5) can show that black candidates (running for Congress) indeed increase black voter turnout, but only in the case of black Democratic (and not Republican) candidates (Fairdosi and Rogowski 2015: 6). However, this positive impact of black Democratic candidates seems to hold true for all black voters regardless of their partisan leaning (also Republicans) (Fairdosi and Rogowski 2015: 8).

Regarding sociopolitical participation at the local level, Lawrence Bobo and Franklin D. Gilliam Jr. (1990: 382) can show that Afro-Americans living in so-called "high-black-empowerment areas" (Bobo and Gilliam 1990: 382) show significantly higher levels of sociopolitical involvement than comparable whites (in particular after controlling for socioeconomic differences).

1.2.4 Demand and supply-side explanations of ethnic minority representation

In the course of the ethnic and racial diversification of societies, scholarship has not only begun to analyze the policy and psychological effects of minority or descriptive representation, but also to investigate deeper into the causes of the numerical under-representation of ethnic and/or racial minorities. Before exploring the arguments that are put forward in scholarly debate to explain this under-representation in terms of numbers, several issues need to be addressed. First, there is no coherent theory to explain minority (under)representation. Second, and this is related to the first point, most of the time a number of different approaches and explanatory variables are mixed together in order to elucidate minority under-representation (see here Bird 2005; Bird et al. 2011; Dancygier, Lindgren, et al. 2015; Kittilson and Tate 2005; Norris and Lovenduski 1993, 1995; Ruedin 2013b). Contrary to the effects of descriptive representation (presented in the previous paragraphs), research on the causes of (ethnic) minority under-representation is not limited to the U.S. case. More and more literature is emerging to study this question also for (Western) European countries.

The numerical under-representation of minority groups can be explained by referring to literature on legislative recruitment in terms of supply (resources and

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13 The large majority of the works dealing with the impact of descriptive representation on voter turnout at the federal level focus on black Democratic candidates (also because the number of black Republican candidates was until recently very low) (Fairdosi and Rogowski 2015: 3).
motivation of the aspiring candidates) and demand (attitudes and priorities of the party gatekeepers) (in particular Norris and Lovenduski (1993, 1995)). Studying the impact of demand as well as supply-side factors, Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski (1995: 247) have found that supply-side factors account the most for the social bias in the British parliament (see also Norris 1997a: 229; but see more recent findings for immigrant-origin candidates in the British case Dancygier, Lindgren, et al. 2015: 721). However, regarding women and ethnic minorities, supply-side factors and party selectors’ concerns about the electability of those candidates interact (Norris and Lovenduski 1995: 248). Others more broadly study the openness and accessibility of the political system for minority groups (see, e.g., Bird 2005; Bird et al. 2011). The focus here is on the concept of ‘political opportunity structures’ – a concept borrowed from the social movements literature (Bird 2005: 428). A political opportunity structure is defined by several sets of variables. First, on the supply-side, the collective identity of the minority group in question and their capacity to mobilize is identified which in turn are related to, amongst others, the citizenship regime, ethnic group size and geographical concentration or social networks. A further set of variables focuses on the responsiveness of the political system involving factors such as electoral or party selection rules or the level of party competition (Bird 2005: 428 sqq.). Applying this model to explain ethnic minority representation in three countries (France, Denmark, Canada), Karen Bird (2005: 455) has found that in particular the openness of the political system, the design of the candidate selection process as well as electoral rules account the most for the parliamentary under-representation of ethnic minorities in the countries under study.

Furthermore, there are many studies that focus only on one specific explanatory variable. First, from a purely institutionalist perspective existing research illustrates that the level of descriptive representation differs depending on the type of electoral system. Single-member district systems appear to contribute to lower levels of minority representation in parliaments than proportional systems (Kaiser and Hennl 2008; Norris 1985; Rule 1987). The crucial point regarding this relationship can either be located at the election level (via voter discrimination)

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14 At the individual level, Karen Bird (2005: 431) also points to the importance of the electoral strategies of the ethnic minority candidates themselves that are, in turn, influenced by the political opportunity structure.

15 In the case of the U.S., we can find some works that study in detail the impact of minority group size or concentration on the electoral success of minority candidates (see Juenke 2014; Shah 2014).

16 Applying a similar model in a cross-national study, Didier Ruedin’s (2013b: 118) findings point to the importance of attitudes towards marginalized groups within society.
or already at the selection stage (via the parties’ candidate selection strategies). Regarding the latter, the argument is that the possibility of ticket balancing, larger district magnitudes and more centralized candidate nomination procedures (Matland and Studlar 1996: 709) make proportional systems more beneficial for minority candidates than single-member district systems. The majority of studies analyzing this relationship is dedicated to women candidates (see, e.g., Evans and Harrison 2012; Matland and Studlar 1996; Rule and Zimmermann 1994; Schmidt 2008). However, Rafaela Dancygier (2014: 256) can show for the British case that that the type of electoral system together with the size and distribution of the Muslim district population impacts on the selection of Muslim candidates (see similar for the Canadian case Trounstine and Valdini 2008).

Second, although, as mentioned above, Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski (1993, 1995) stressed out the importance of supply-side explanations, that is the absence of minority candidates in the first place, this aspect has until now received little attention (but see, e.g., Dancygier, Lindgren, et al. 2015; Juenke 2014; Shah 2014). In this context, some studies have found that the size of the minority population in the district is the clearest contextual driver for minority candidate emergence (Juenke 2014: 597; Branton 2009: 471). Eric Gonzalez Juenke (2014: 597) also shows for Latino candidates in the U.S. that the impact of the minority population size is much more important at this first stage of candidate entry than at the election stage itself as suggests the literature focusing on demand-side explanations (voting-bloc explanations) (see next paragraphs). One explanation for this relationship could be that candidates (and here specifically ethnic or racial minority candidates) act strategically, i.e. they are more likely to run in districts where they have a realistic chance to win (Juenke 2014: 595).

Finally, there several studies that focus on how vote choice impacts on the electoral performance of (ethnic or racial) minority candidates (e.g. Highton 2004; Philpot and Walton 2007; Brouard and Tiberj 2011; Street 2014; see recently also Brouard, Deiss-Helbig, et al. 2018; Portmann and Stojanovic 2018; Holtkamp 2017). There is also some literature on the role and effectiveness of specific electoral rules that are supposed to increase the level of minority representation as for example ethnic or gender quota (see, e.g., Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005 or, in particular in the case of the U.S., majority-minority districts (see, e.g. Cameron et al. 1996; Overby and Cesgrove 1996).

Additionally, there are a few studies regarding women candidates. For instance, Richard L. Fox and Jennifer L. Lawless (2004: 275) show for the U.S. case that women are less likely to consider to run for office than men. They found that women are less likely encouraged by, for example, party leaders or elected officials and that they feel less qualified to run for.
However, taken together, the empirical findings regarding the question whether (ethnic) minority candidates suffer electoral penalty from majority voters do not tell a consistent story. Some studies have found at first glance evidence for an (negative) impact of candidate ethnic background on voting behavior, but once intervening variables are controlled for (candidate’s party affiliation, voters’ party identification, incumbency), the statistically significant relationship vanishes (see, e.g. Highton 2004; Philpot and Walton 2007; Street 2014). For the case of Germany, Alex Street (2014) analyzes the effects of voter discrimination on the electoral success of ethnic minority candidates. His results point to an electoral penalty for ethnic minority candidates only in the case of right-wing voters (see similar for Switzerland Portmann and Stojanovic 2018). However, in the German case, ethnic minority candidates are running almost exclusively for left-wing parties (at least at the federal level) (Street 2014: 380). Fisher et al. (2014: 14) have found that British white majority voters are less likely to vote for ethnic minority candidates and even much less likely to cast their ballot for Muslim candidates. Interestingly, once controlled for party, Muslim candidates running for the Conservatives seemed not to suffer electoral penalty (as e.g. findings for the German case but also previous studies for the UK (e.g. Curtice et al. 2005) suggest). Others, on the other hand, have detected no statistically significant effect of candidate ethnic or racial background and voter choice at all (see, e.g. Black and Erickson 2006). And, finally, a third group of studies found empirical support for a negative effect of race or ethnic background on voting behavior even after controlling for further explanatory variables (e.g. Bieber 2013; Terkildsen 1993; Zingher and Farrer 2014). Several factors can be identified that may account for these different and sometimes even contradictory results. First, different research designs can lead to different results (e.g., aggregate vs. individual level). Second, scholars within this research field have employed a variety of methodological approaches to assess how majority voters react to minority candidates (real election data, survey data, (survey) experiments). Third, analyzing questions of race or ethnicity always implies problems of social desirability effects (Hopkins 2009: 770). The size of these effects can be related to the method used in the study. And, finally, particularly when using real election data the low presence of ethnic minority candidates running for elective office (mainly a

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19 There is also a large literature on whether there is a relationship between candidate gender and voting behavior and how the former affects the latter (see, e.g. Bieber 2013; Campbell and Cowley 2013; Darcy and Schramm 1977; King and Matland 2003). Some studies also analyze the interplay between candidate’s ethnicity and sex and voting behavior (see, e.g. Philpot and Walton 2007).
problem in Western European countries) can lead to inaccurate empirical results.

When it comes to detecting the mechanisms that explain voter bias against minority candidates, the current literature has revealed primarily two factors. First, scholarship points to the impact of more general negative attitudes towards specific minorities on the evaluation of candidates of this particular group (Greenwald et al. 2009; Street 2014; Terkildsen 1993). For the German case, Alex Street (2014) has found for particular voter groups empirical evidence for an impact of xenophobia on voting behavior (see also for the U.K. Fisher et al. 2014: 15). Second, voters may also discriminate against minority candidates because they "make political estimations using nonpolitical information" (King and Matland 2003: 599). For instance, voters can make decisions by using cognitive heuristics inferring a candidate’s ideological position from his or her socio-demographic characteristics (see, e.g. Bieber 2013: 116; Fairdosi and Rogowski 2015: 9). For American politics, several studies point to the liberal evaluation of the ideological position of African-American candidates (see, e.g. Fairdosi and Rogowski 2015: 9). For the German case, asking respondents to assign a party label to fictitious candidates, Ina Bieber (2013: 116) has found that ethnic minority candidates (as well as female candidates) are to a much higher degree associated to the Greens (and to a lower degree also the Social Democratic Party of Germany)

1.3 Minority representation: preliminary conclusions

The aim of the present chapter was to elaborate the main ideas of political representation in general and minority or descriptive representation in particular based on the existent literature. I did so mainly for three reasons. First, when dealing with political representation it is crucial to ask what the general purpose of political representation is. Second, as the present study aims to more deeply investigate into the political representation of the immigrant-origin population, elaborating the benefits of minority representation introduced in scholarly debate

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20 At a statistically significant level this holds only true for right-wing voters who at the same time feel threatened by ethnic minorities and suppose that the ethnic minority candidate is running for a left-wing party (Street 2014: 7). Nevertheless, this can also be due to the small sample size of ethnic minority candidates.
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appears to be a matter of course. And, third, as I primarily seek to study the reasons for minority under-representation in legislative bodies, a discussion of the arguments put forward in the literature to explain this phenomenon is a matter of crucial importance.

Regarding the purpose of political representation, I have shown that the majority of the literature conceives the representative process as a transfer of power from the sovereign to political actors (individual representatives or representatives representing political parties). The latter are supposed to act in a responsive manner to their constituents. Although responsiveness is in the majority of the cases thought as policy responsiveness, literature also points to the importance of the symbolic nature of the representational process. Taking up this idea, the minority representation literature highlights the positive effects of being represented by ‘individuals who in their own backgrounds mirror some of the more frequent experiences and outward manifestations of belonging to the group’ (Mansbridge 1999: 628). I have shown that there is at least some empirical evidence that corroborates assumptions of an empowering and trust-building effect of minority representation. Descriptive or minority representation may thus be a measure to improve the citizens-political system linkage in particular in the case of historically marginalized minority groups. Finally, scholarship that deals with the reasons for the numerical under-representation of minority groups in legislative bodies cites mainly three explanations. First, several factors are mentioned that can be located at the supply-side, as the resources and motivations of the aspiring candidates at the micro level, and the mobilization capacity and collective identity of the minority group at the macro level. Second, on the demand-side there is some empirical evidence for voter discrimination of minority candidates. Third, several explanations are put forward that focus on parties as the central actors in the legislative recruitment process, in particular in the case of party-centered political systems. In this context, party selectors’ concerns about the electability of minority candidates as well as specific features of the selection process are cited.

Taken together, the present chapter has highlighted the role of parties as central actors in the representational process in particular in Western European party-centered democracies. In these political systems, parties act as collective actors of representation presenting party programs to which individual representatives are bound to. This is also reflected in the legislative behavior of representatives. Furthermore, parties are important actors in the process of recruiting future representatives. The central role of parties and in particular their candidate selection function will be developed more elaborately in the next chapter.
Chapter 2

Political parties and ethnic minorities

As pointed out in the previous chapter, political parties are conceived as central actors within the representational process (Thomassen 1994: 242; Andeweg 2003: 150; Weßels 2007: 839). In modern representative democracies parties rather than individual deputies are supposed to express the different policy preferences of the electorate and to translate them into public policies (Thomassen 1994: 242). This is in line with the idea of power delegation within democratic theory according to which 'voters delegate policy-making authority to a set of representatives, and political parties are the main organizational vehicle by which such delegation takes place' (Strøm and Müller 1999: 1). From this follows that at least in the context of representative democracy they are seen as the most important connection between citizens and the political system (Poguntke 1997: 257). And to go further, Schattschneider (1942: 1) with his famous quote 'modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of political parties' conceptualizes parties even as the major guarantor of democracy. However, parties are not only actors of political representation, they are also the prime actors in deciding who enters legislative bodies.

That is why the present chapter deals in particular with these two functions that are attributed to political parties: their linkage function between citizens and the political system as well as their candidate selection function – with, however, a stronger focus on the latter. As the present study deals with the relationship between parties and a specific societal subgroup, namely immigrant-origin citizens, I will elaborate this relation in more detail. In a first step, I will based on the
broad range of party literature elaborate the very nature of political parties also by discussing the functions that are attributed to parties as well as by pointing to the different party types. The second part is dedicated to the study of candidate selection as the parties’ function the present study is focusing on. In the last part, based on the existent literature, I will elaborate the main features that characterize the relationship between the immigrant-origin population, or in the case of the U.S. and Canada, the ethnic and racial minorities, and political parties.

2.1 Parties as diverse actors: functions, types and behavior

Throughout most of the twentieth century and still today, political parties are among the central actors in politics (Katz 2008: 294). This is the case particularly for European democracies which "are not only parliamentary democracies but also party democracies" (Müller 2000: 309).

However, it is worth highlighting that, despite their omnipresence, literature on party politics "is excessively cluttered with concepts, terminologies, and typologies that are either unnecessarily redundant (with different terms used to describe the same basic phenomena) or not comparable or cumulative (being based on fundamentally different classificatory criteria)" (Montero and Gunther 2002: 16). This is due, amongst others, to the fact that very different actors are subsumed under the party label (Katz 2008: 294) and that parties are supposed to perform different functions in different types of political systems as well as depending on their party type. I will account for this diverse nature of parties by, first, elaborating the main characteristics attributed to political parties, and, second, shedding light on different party types and their behavior.

2.1.1 Defining political parties

According to Niedermayer (2013b: 62), party definitions highlight in particular three dimensions of political parties. First, the power-seeking aspect of parties is emphasized; second, parties are conceived as institutionalized organizations; and, finally, those who form a party are supposed to pursue a common political goal.

Several party definitions point to the power-seeking aspect of political parties.
Aldrich (1995), for instance, defines parties as 'coalitions of elites to capture and use political office' (Aldrich 1995: 283 sq.). Note two things about this definition. First, parties are seen as coalitions (not a single person) of elites (this narrows the pool of actors that form a political party) with, second, the aim of winning and exercising public office. Political parties in this context are conceptualized as endogenous institutions meaning that they are only seen as an instrument of politicians in order to achieve their various goals (Aldrich 1995: 4). In this context, it is worth noting that John H. Aldrich’s (1995) is meant to describe political parties within the U.S. American context. From this follows that the underlying assumptions of this definition are highly sensitive to the situation of the U.S. American two-party candidate-centered political system. This can also be illustrated by the following statement: "[R]ational, elective office seekers and holders use the party to achieve their ends" (Aldrich 1995: 21). Applied to in particular the West European context, this kind of definition underestimates the role of what Katz and Mair (1993: 594) call "the party on the ground" that are the party members and activists. According to Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair (1993), those actors differ considerably from office-seeking actors in particular with regard to their goals and resources (a detailed discussion of Katz and Mair’s (1993) party tripartition will follow later in this chapter). Additionally, Niedermayer (2013b: 65) highlights the fact that not all parties have the aim and in particular not a realistic chance to gain a seat in parliament (and especially not in government); and this holds particularly true for party systems with more than two major parties. Narrowing the main objective of parties to the simple gain of power at the public office as well as the governmental level (Katz 2008: 296) does therefore not account for the differences regarding party system and party types. That is why Niedermayer (2013b: 65) proposes to replace the aspect of power-seeking as central aim of political parties by the parties’ aim of participating in elections. In this context, Panebianco (1988: 6) points to the fact that parties "[...] are the only organizations which operate in the electoral arena, which compete for votes" and that this characteristic distinguishes them from other actors. Furthermore, Oskar Niedermayer (2013b: 63) points to the fact that while U.S. party literature leaves the issue of the underlying motivation for this pursuit of power unanswered, European party research mostly agrees upon the idea that they do so to realize their political goals and ideas. This leads us two the second characteristic of

21 Also for U.S. American politics Aldrich (1995: 20) points to the relevance of so-called 'benefit seekers' as for instance party activists. They are, however, considered to be less important within parties than the office-seeking (and holding) actors.
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There are several party definitions that focus more strongly on the idea that the group of people that form a party have the common goal of promoting shared political ideals and ideas (White 2006: 5; Vassallo and Wilcox 2006: 413; Dettberbeck 2011: 17; Niedermayer 2013b: 63). This is in sharp contrast to the above mentioned assumption that parties are mainly power-seeking actors according to which political ideology and ideas are, if at all, only a means to an end (Vassallo and Wilcox 2006: 414). In this context, Vassallo and Wilcox (2006: 414) highlight that "most political parties can be identified with at least some ideological elements, and often with a general ideology". And also Jacques J.A. Thomassen (1994: 250) highlights that a common ideology is crucial to any party (see also Luther and Müller-Rommel 2002: 6). However, the definition of (party) ideology is not so clear-cut (Mair and Mudde 1998: 220). In a very abstract manner, ideology can be defined as "a means of orientation guided by abstract principles" (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990: 204). This definition already points to the main function of (party) ideology that is giving orientation or, as Volkens and Klingemann (2002: 144) specify, it "[...] provide[s] blueprints of alternative solutions for current problems of societies". In this context, Panebianco (1988) also points to the function of party ideology as a "hunting domain" that serves to control or dominate its own territory against competing organizations (Panebianco 1988: 13). It is worth highlighting that especially the German party literature (and in particular compared to the U.S. party research) focuses on this aspect of parties as a "carrier of ideas" as Francesca Vassallo and Clyde Wilcox (2006) name it (Niedermayer 2013b: 64). It is worth highlighting that these two party characteristics – power-seeking and importance of ideology – are also reflected in the two often as opposed described views on parties as either rationally acting teams or as a united actor around a coherent set of ideas (responsible party model) (White 2006: 9 sqq.; see also Aldrich 1995: 10 sqq.).

Having a look at the second part of John Aldrich’s (1995) above cited definition that states that "[...] a political party is [...] more than a coalition. A [...] political party is an institutionalized coalition, one that has adopted rules, norms, and procedures" (Aldrich 1995: 283 sq.), we can note that, third, parties are seen as formed in the long-run not as ad-hoc coalitions. From this follows that they are institutionalized organizations with their own rules, norms and procedures.

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22 It has to be noted in this context that Niedermayer (2013b: 65) points to the fact that not all parties can be characterized by having common political goals. There are also purely power-seeking parties. That is why he excludes this characteristic from his very narrow definition of political parties.
The party characteristic of being an organized group can also be found in various other definitions (Niedermayer 2013b: 62) as Joseph A. Schlesinger (1985) shows: 'A political party is a group organized to gain control of government in the name of the group by winning election to public office' (Schlesinger 1985: 1153). And, finally, Sartori (1976) highlights the necessity of intra-party coherence rather than just being an organized group by saying that "[...] the group in question be effective and cohesive enough (if only on a spontaneous, election-by-election, organizationless basis) to have some of its candidates elected" (Sartori 1976: 64; see also Katz 2008: 297; Niedermayer 2013b: 65).

Those three dimensions of parties are also reflected in the functions political parties are supposed to perform. In this context, scholarship generally argues that the majority of these functions are indispensable for the (well-) functioning of modern democracies (Katz 2008: 298). However, as many as different definitions of party exist, as many different functions are attributed to them (Jun 2013: 121). Nevertheless, regardless of the number of functions that can be found in the party literature, political parties can definitively be described as multifunctional institutions (Jun 2013: 121). These functions can be located on two or three different though interwoven levels: the electoral-societal, the governmental-parliamentary (Jun 2013: 120) and some add the party organization level (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000b: 5).

Regarding the electoral-societal level scholarship mainly points to functions that concern the linkage between the citizens (in particular the voters) and the political system (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000b: 6). Parties have, for instance, the function of simplifying choices for voters and structuring electoral choice and thus to contribute to more "user-friendly" politics (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000b: 6). Knowing which party usually represents their interests, voters can use the party label as an information short-cut (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000b: 6) whenever they are confronted with candidates and/or policy positions. This is possible because in modern democracies parties are the primary actors in elections by providing the great majority of candidates and by formulating and articulating policy positions (Steffani 1988: 558; Katz 2008: 300; Detterbeck 2011: 26). Furthermore, parties not only provide short-cuts for voters but they also perform the function of mobilizing voters and party members to participate in elections but also in campaigning or party work in general (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000b: 7; Jun 2013: 123). There is also a symbolic function that parties perform at the electoral-societal level. The argument here is that parties generate symbols of identification and loyalty for the electorate. Partisan attachment or party identification is not only seen as a short-cut for voters when it comes to cast a vote (Brettschneider and Gabriel 2002: 35).
131), but also as a stabilizing force in politics (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000b: 6). A further important function on the electoral-societal level scholarship points to is the representation function. There are mainly two dimensions of this functions. First, parties are seen as the organizational embodiment of societal groups that are assigned to specific ideologies (Steffani 1988: 551; Katz 2008: 301). Parties thus represent political ideologies within the political sphere. Second, parties are also conceived as agents of the people meaning that they speak for their voters and/or party members (Katz 2008: 301). They are supposed to articulate or express the voters’ political interests within political campaigns, legislative debates, or actions of their politicians (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000b: 7 sq.; see, also Sartori 1976: 27).

One of the main functions that parties perform on the party organization level is their recruiting and selecting function (Katz 2008: 300; Jun 2013: 121). Parties are the prime actors within contemporary democracies that are responsible for recruiting and selecting candidates for elective and appointive office. Furthermore, they are not only in charge of finally nominating those candidates but also, in the forefront, of seeking out and screening the potential candidates (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000b: 7). As this study focuses on the recruitment and selection function of political parties, this function will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter. At the governmental-parliamentary level, finally, parties are supposed to perform a certain number of functions related to their role as actors within government and/or parliament – as, for instance, the government formation (Keman 2006: 160; Detterbeck 2011: 28) or organizing and coordinating the legislative process (Katz 2008: 299; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000b: 8 sq.). As the present study focuses on the representation and first and foremost the selection function of parties, I will not elaborate the functions related to the governmental-parliamentary level further.

2.1.2 Party types and party behavior

To begin with, it is worth highlighting that the research on party types and party behavior is characterized by a weakness of theory (Strøm and Müller 1999).

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23 Two points have to be highlighted in this context. First, some scholars, as for instance Uwe Jun (2013), assign the selection function to the governmental-parliamentary level. And, second, it is worth noting that there are further function at the organizational level, as for instance the interest articulation and aggregation function (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000b: 7), that I will not develop further in the present study.
In the case of the former, there exists a broad variety of descriptive and analytical categories for the classification of political parties (Puhle 2002: 59) that are "neither mutually exclusive nor totally exhaustive" (Krouwel 2006: 249 sq.). Furthermore the few commonly used typologies are often subject of an "excessive 'concept stretching'" (Gunther and Diamond 2003: 168) which results in a 'lack of conceptual and terminological consistency' (Gunther and Diamond 2003: 170) regarding party typologies. Regarding party behavior, there is no general theory of party behavior (Strøm and Müller 1999: 5). I discuss party types and party behavior together because theoretical assumptions about party behavior are often strongly related to specific party types; and, vice versa. Furthermore, it is worth noting that I will discuss, in what follows, only those party types that are of importance for the present study.

First, since the mid-1960s much of the literature deals with Otto Kirchheimer's (1966) famous catch-all-party type. Even though the concept was and still is much criticized for its imprecision and its lack of a clear-cut set of defining characteristics (see, e.g., Wolinetz 2002: 146; Krouwel 2006: 256), some fundamental features can be identified: first, catch-all parties focus more strongly on the electoral scene than on the 'encadrement of the masses' (Kirchheimer 1966: 164) with the aim of reaching a wider audience and having a more immediate electoral success (Kirchheimer 1966: 184). And, second, these parties pursue the maximization of their electoral success mainly by down-grading or even abandoning their former ideological position (Wolinetz 2002: 145; Krouwel 2006: 258). However, even catch-all parties are not able to appeal to all kinds of different categories of voters — in particular not in the case of strongly conflicting interests or ideas (Kirchheimer 1966: 186). It is worth highlighting that in addition to Kirchheimer's (1966) "traditional" catch-all party, several similar types of "post-catch-all parties' (Puhle 2002: 63) can be summarized under this well-known label, as for instance Panebianco's (1988) electoral-professional party or, more recently, the 'catch-all party plus' (Puhle 2002: 65) 24. Finally, some scholars also argue that due to the

24 The assumptions regarding the electoral-professional type are quite similar to the catch-all party type but with a stronger focus on party organization (Wolinetz 2002: 146) and in particular the professionalization of party organization (Krouwel 2006: 257). Panebianco (1988: 264) in particular stresses the central role of professionals as well as interests groups, also for party funding, due to, among others, the shifting importance from members ("electorate of belonging") to voters ("opinion electorate") within the party organization. Regarding Puhle's (2002) more recent 'catch-all party plus', this party type can be seen as a response to the often mentioned crisis of the catch-all party type (see, e.g., Puhle 2002: 64; Jun 2013: 132). Puhle (2002) argues that this type of a modified contemporary catch-all party can mainly be characterized by a weakening of the party functions of mobilization and representation and a strengthened role as mediator or of short-term identification, as well as
above mentioned critics, the term of a catch-all party can simply be seen as "a metaphor for describing changes in political parties and the ways in which they approach the electorate" (Wolinetz 2002: 146).

Catch-all parties cannot only be compared in a chronic manner with their precursors or successors (see, e.g., Katz and Mair 1995), but also by taking into consideration the scope of the party program (comprehensive vs. restricted) as well as their electoral appeal (broad vs. narrow) (Jun 2013: 125 sq.) with other party types, as for instance the niche party (see, e.g., Adams et al. 2006; Wagner 2011). The definition of niche parties, however, is rather unclear because some focus on their (supposed) extreme ideology others highlight the across-cleavages cutting and often single-issue character of niche parties (Wagner 2011: 845 sq.). Markus Wagner (2011), for instance, defines niche parties as "parties that compete primarily on a small number of non-economic issues" (Wagner 2011: 847; italics in the original). The reason for doing so is that economics is considered to be the main dimension of political competition, focusing on non-economic issues is therefore interpreted as focusing on niche topics (Wagner 2011: 850).

Others as James Adams et al. (2006: 513) qualify whole party families as niche competitors. Nevertheless, as with many other party classifications, the concept of a niche party can also be seen as an ideal type because "[...] some parties will fulfil the definitional criteria more than others" (Wagner 2011: 850). However, scholarship argues that niche parties do not only differ to mainstream or catch-all parties in terms of party program but also regarding their role in the political institutions, their electoral strategies, the place they occupy in the party system, and their behavior (Wagner 2011: 845 sq.).

Turning now to assumptions about party behavior, rational choice scholars have explained party behavior mainly based on the assumption that parties follow a specific set of goals – that are policy, office, or vote (Strøm 1990: 566.) Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda (1994: 269) add a forth party goal that is intraparty democracy maximization that is in particular important regarding so-called new politics parties. In this context, it is worth noting that the policy, office, vote-seeking categories were primarily developed to explain coalition formation and electoral competition at the cross-national level, and not party behavior in general (Strøm 1990: 570). José Ramón Montero and Richard Gunther (2002: 11) argue that this assumption of goal-orientation of parties seems to be a good point of

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25 It is worth highlighting that according to those definitions that focus on the non-economic characteristic of niche parties, small, single-issue or new politics parties would not be qualified as niche parties, although they share some essential characteristics (Wagner 2011: 851).
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departure for theories of party behavior. Regarding the three categories, the goal of office-seeking points to the desire of parties to win and in parliamentary democracies this means controlling as much as possible of the executive branch (Strøm and Müller 1999: 5). There are several reasons why parties seek to win office: first, it can be the simple "desire to get into government" (Budge and Laver 1986: 490) or instrumental reasons as influencing policy outputs (Budge and Laver 1986: 490) or electoral considerations such as incumbency as a strong advantage for further elections (Strøm and Müller 1999: 6). Regarding the vote-seeking category, the primary goal is seeking votes to realize other objectives, such as policy or power (Strøm and Müller 1999: 11). The value of vote-seeking behavior can therefore be, compared to the two other dimensions, only be instrumental (Strøm and Müller 1999: 9). In this context, it is also important to highlight that parties are not only conceived as vote seekers but also as vote maximizers (Strøm and Müller 1999: 8). This kind of party behavior is not only applicable for two-party contexts, as it would suggest at first sight, but also in multiparty context. The underlying assumption is that the more votes a party gets, the more chances it has to enter a coalition and when entering a coalition, the more power it receives within this coalition (Downs 1957: 159). A final dimension concerns the assumption that a party’s primary goal is the maximization of its impact on public policy (Strøm 1990: 567; Strøm and Müller 1999: 7). It is, however, typically seen not as a substitute for but rather a supplement to office seeking behavior (Strøm and Müller 1999: 8). An underlying assumption of this kind of party behavior is that the contest over public policy decisions is an essential element of democracy (Strøm and Müller 1999: 6). Similar to office-seeking behavior, the policy pursuit can have an intrinsic and an instrumental value (Strøm 1990: 567; Strøm and Müller 1999: 8).

However, within the purely rational choice models of party behavior, "[...] the complexity, multidimensionality, and interactive nature of the objectives parties and their leaders pursue, the strategies they adopt, and their actual behaviour in the real world of politics" (Montero and Gunther 2002: 12) is often ignored. That is why slightly modified rational choice approaches that take into account also contextual constraints impacting on party behavior (see, e.g., Strøm 1990; Strøm and Müller 1999). Kaare Strøm and Wolfgang C. Müller (1999), for instance, explain party behavior by institutional, party system, organizational and situational determinants (Müller and Strøm 1999: 285). They argue that the institutional environment puts constraints on party behavior (Strøm and Müller 1999: 11 sq.). This can happen directly meaning that different institutional settings provide different incentives to party leaders; and, in an indirect way, meaning that different
types of party organization influence party behavior in different ways (Strøm and Müller 1999: 19). In this context, Kaare Strøm (1990: 574) argues that "they [the party leaders] have to take into account the preferences of other individuals in their party organization, and their hands may also be tied to varying degrees by the institutional environment in which their parties operate". Several assumptions can be deduced from this statement. It is assumed that vote-seeking behavior is more likely in two-party-systems, and for large parties also in multiparty systems. For smaller parties, however, this kind of party behavior can be costly in the context of multiparty systems in terms of office benefits and policy influence (Strøm 1990: 592). Office-seeking behavior is supposed to occur in particular in electorally noncompetitive multiparty systems as well as in systems with low degrees of intraparty democracy (Strøm 1990: 593). Finally, the institutional features that support policy-seeking behavior are similar to those that also foster office-seeking (e.g. noncompetitive, multiparty systems), however, contrary to the latter, high degrees of intraparty democracy and impermeable recruitment structures are supportive for this kind of party behavior (Strøm 1990: 594).

It is worth highlighting that each of these three types of party goals or behavior has to be seen as "an extreme (or limiting) case of party behavior" (Strøm 1990: 570). Related to this, it is important to highlight that these party goals can conflict with each other and that there can be a trade-off between these goals (Strøm and Müller 1999: 9). From this follows that, in the empirical reality of parties, they very rarely pursue only one of these party goals; their objectives rather include all three goals (Strøm 1990: 570). The constellations of these trade-offs can vary according to the position of a party (e.g. government, opposition) (Strøm 1990: 572) but one can hypothesize that it differs also according to the party type. Steven B. Wolinetz (2002), for instance, qualifies Richard S. Katz’ and Peter Mair’s (1995) cartel party type as an ideal type of office-seeking party (Wolinetz 2002: 161); catch-all or electoral-professional parties as vote-seeking parties (Wolinetz 2002: 151); and, finally, the classic party of mass integration or the newer new politics parties as ideal types of policy-seeking parties (Wolinetz 2002: 161). However, thinking of both, policy and office-seeking, as a means to an end, office as well as policy-seeking parties are supposed to behave in a quite similar way (Pakull 2018: 71?).

A further important point shared by the great majority of contemporary party politics scholars is the assumption of parties as complex organizations rather than unitary actors (Strøm and Müller 1999: 12). Richard S. Katz (2002: 87) emphasizes that parties are not only political actors but also organizations with their own internal life and politics; not looking inside political parties would therefore
dismiss an important aspect of party politics. Strongly rational choice inspired
approaches, however, as for instance the one of Kaare Strom and Wolfgang C.
Müller (1999), mostly almost exclusively focus on party leaders when analyzing
intraparty dynamics (see also Strøm 1990). Others, as for instance Richard S.
Katz and Peter Mair (1993: 594), see parties as composed of a number of different,
internally not necessary homogeneous, elements. These party faces are strongly
related to one another, showing different patterns of competition and cooperation
(Katz 2002: 92). The first face, the party in public office, is composed by those
party officials who already have a seat in parliament (the German Fraktion or the
legislative caucus) (Katz and Mair 1993: 596). The personal rewards of elected
office and the pursuit of particular policy objectives are seen as their primary
goals (Katz and Mair 1993: 596). However, to achieve these goals, they have
to win elections (Katz and Mair 1993: 597). The party on the ground, on the
other side, is mainly characterized by its voluntary membership (Katz and Mair
1993: 597). Incentives to engage in the party on the ground may be of individual
strategic behavior, but they are mainly conceived in terms of contributing and
influencing party policy and identity. The party on the ground can be considered
as a source for the other party faces (e.g. they provide local knowledge); the
main resource above which they dispose is "their own labor" (Katz and Mair 1993:
598). And, finally, the party central office is composed by the national executive
committee(s) and the central party staff/secretariat. They dispose of several
important resources such as centrality, expertise, and their formal position (Katz
and Mair 1993: 598 sq.). This party face is considered to be the core of the party
from which the two other faces can emerge and which provides several services to
the other two party faces (Katz and Mair 1993: 600).

A further way to disaggregate political parties goes back to Johnn D. May
1973 who distinguishes in his seminal study on the opinion structure of political
parties between different hierarchically stratified groups of party actors that can
be labeled as top leaders, sub-leaders, and non-leaders. He suggests that the
opinion structure within political parties is characterized by a curvilinear disparity
meaning that sub-leaders can be conceived as substantive extremists (that is,
depending on party ideology, the most Leftist or most Rightist cohort within
the party) and top-leaders between non- and sub-leaders (May 1973: 139). The
reasons behind this pattern can be found, according to Johnn D. May (1973),

26 Kaare Strøm and Wolfgang C. Müller (1999 14 sq.) also mention other actors such as
activists or extraparliamentary party organizations, but only in the sense that they 'serve'
party leaders in order to achieve their party goals.
amongst others in different patterns of political socialization of the different party strata (May 1973: 143). Subsequent research has come, however, to unclear conclusions when testing May’s special law of curvilinear disparity (Scarrow et al. 2000: 131; Van Holsteyn et al. 2015: 2). Kitschelt (1989: 407) for instance found for the case of the two Belgian ecology parties in the 1980s that the empirical validity of the law of curvilinear disparity depends strongly on the strength and recruitment of ideologues and pragmatists into the party as well as on the type of party organization. Others, as for instance Van Holsteyn et al. (2015) for the case of Dutch parties, came to the conclusion that the prevailing opinion pattern within parties is that of consensus or, if at all, of a different opinion structure between, on the one hand, top-leaders and, on the other hand, non- and sub-leaders (Van Holsteyn et al. 2015: 9). Without going into detail about the reasons for these unclear empirical findings, it can be summed up that looking inside political parties in order to understand party behavior is important because of the existence of different faces or strata within parties having different resources, goals, constraints, and opinion structures.

To sum up it is important to highlight that how political parties act is conditioned by a multitude of factors. The assumption of a uniform kind of behavior (purely vote, office, policy or intra-party democracy maximization seeking) that all parties perform in the same way is rather unconvincing. Russell J. Dalton and Ian McAllister (2015: 780), for instance, argue that "[...] the presumption of a single, unified, rational actor model that underlies the Downsian spatial modeling literature may be a poor representation of the short-term choices and actions actually facing political parties". Additionally, the party leaders’ freedom of action is most of the time limited by the organizational nature of a party as well as its environmental constraints (Panebianco 1988: 14). At an intra-party level for instance, the number and kind of intra-party factions, the importance of the different strata within parties or of the different party faces are supposed to have an influence on a party’s behavior. Related to this, it can also be concluded that certain party types are more likely to emphasis on a specific kind of behavior than others. For instance new politics parties are more likely to pursue a policy-driven behavior and when they are also niche parties, they have a lower probability to change their policy positions. To conclude, parties are multidimensional actors that perform a multitude of functions, emphasize on different party goals and are

\[^{27}\text{In this context, John D. May (1973: 149) points to the fact that so-called sub-leaders are very rarely rewarded with political careers that is why they value principles – which in turn makes them more extremist than top-leaders.}\]
bound to party-internal but also external constraints. In the following paragraphs, we will elaborate more closely the party function that lies at the heart of the present study, that is the selection of candidates for elective office.

2.2 Candidate selection: "the secret garden of politics"?

In the preceding paragraphs, I have discussed the characteristics of political parties as well as different party types and the goals that are supposed to structure their behavior. Selecting candidates for public office is a party function that touches all three levels on which parties perform their functions – the societal-electoral, organizational, and governmental-parliamentary level; and it is also related to all three party goals mentioned in the previous paragraphs. Furthermore, it is characterized as the most important function of political parties (Scarrow et al. 2000: 138). That is why the remainder of the present chapter will be dedicated to the elaboration of this party function. In this context, it is worth highlighting that the present analysis deals with the selection of legislative candidates. There is also a whole body of literature dealing with the selection of party leaders (see, e.g., Kenig 2009) to which I will not refer here.

Before turning to the conceptualization of candidate selection, it has to be notified that the importance of candidate selection strongly conflicts with the importance this topic occupies in the research literature (Hazan and Rahat 2010: 7) – even if we can observe an increasing interest in this topic in the last years. That is why the process of candidate selection is called "the secret garden of politics" (Gallagher and Marsh 1988). Besides those few works that are rather of conceptualizing nature (see, e.g., Solvang 1982; Rahat and Hazan 2001; Römmele 2004; Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008; Hazan 2014), the majority of the candidate selection literature is on empirical grounds. This literature has focused mainly on three areas.

First, scholars have examined candidate selection methods and processes in a descriptive manner – mostly as single case studies by describing different aspects of candidate selection within a specific country. Taking the 1965 legislative German elections as example, Bodo Zeuner (1970), for instance, has examined in a detailed but purely descriptive manner who decides under which conditions about the selection of legislative candidates and what are the criteria that are applied in order to select the candidates. More recently, Marion Reiser (2011, 2014) described
in detail the characteristics of candidate nominations in German districts as well as the formal and informal party rules and quotas German parties employ when setting up their party lists at the state level. In a longitudinal perspective, Klaus Detterbeck (2016) examined the importance of subnational party elites when nominating German candidates for legislative office. Focusing on candidate nominations for EU elections in Germany, Benjamin Höhne (2013) gives a detailed description of a multitude of aspects of these nominations procedures. Austin Ranney (1965) has studied candidate selection for the British case in the mid 1940s to early 60s. Also for the case of Great Britain but from the perspective of those who select the candidates, John Bochel and David Denver (1983) have studied Labour party selectors’ viewpoints regarding candidates and their characteristics in the mid-1970s in selected Scottish and English constituencies. In a cross-national but descriptive manner, Lars Bille (2001), for instance, has analyzed whether and to what degree a democratization of candidate selection methods has taken place within Western European parties (with a strong focus on Denmark). Another cross-national descriptive study was undertaken by Austin Ranney (1981) where he analyzed candidate selection for parliament but also for directly elected presidents for the case of twenty-four countries. Finally, the seminal work of Michael Gallagher and Micheal Marsh (1988) comprises mostly descriptive single-case studies for a number of (almost exclusively) Western European countries.

Another strand of candidate selection literature has been concerned with understanding the choices for specific candidate selection methods – thus analyzing candidate selection as a dependent variable. For instance, Yael Shomer (2014) and Krister Lundell (2004) both examine in a cross-national manner the impact of political context (country level) – such as territorial organization, party system fragmentation or electoral system – as well as party level characteristics – such as party ideology or size – on candidate selection methods. Focusing more strongly on the determinants of a change of candidate selection methods (towards more democratic, thus inclusive, selection methods), Shlomit Barnea and Gideon Rahat (2007), for example, studied this question in a longitudinal analysis for the case of Israel.

A third area of research has dealt with candidate selection as an independent variable and here in particular with the consequences of candidate selection methods for the representativeness of legislatures, candidates and parties in terms of socio-demography as well as policy (see, e.g., Rahat, Hazan, and Katz 2008; Mikulksa and Scarrow 2010; Spies and Kaiser 2014; Gauja and Cross 2015; Fortin-Rittberger and Rittberger 2015). For the 2009 European Parliament Elections, Jessica Fortin-Rittberger and Berthold Rittberger (2015) have examined how
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candidate selection methods as well as further recruitment characteristics impact on the proportion of women candidates. Others, as for example Dennis C. Spies and André Kaiser (2014) studied in a cross-national manner how different selection methods impact on party-voter congruence in terms of ideology. Based on existent literature, Reuven Y. Hazan and Gideon Rahat (2010) have analyzed in detail not only the consequences of selection methods on representation but also on participation, intra-party competition as well as policy responsiveness (regarding competition see also Rahat, Hazan, and Katz 2008; for policy responsiveness see also Shomer 2009; Hazan 2014). Not exclusively focussing on candidate selection methods, there are also studies dealing more broadly with legislative recruitment (the distinction between recruitment and candidate selection will be discussed in the section that follows) and its implications for the socio-demographic composition of parliaments. Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski (1995), for example, have analyzed legislative recruitment for the British parliament by focusing on the role of recruitment regarding the social composition of the parliament, in particular in terms of gender, class and race (see for the case of the European Parliament elections also Norris 1997a). And finally, some very few studies have also dealt solely with party leaders’ and selectors’ preferences regarding certain types of candidates – thus focusing on the demand-side of the candidate selection process. For the United States, David Broockman et al. (2014), for instance, have studied the preferences of county-level party leaders regarding the ideological profile as well as socio-demographic characteristics of potential candidates and how these candidate characteristics influence the candidate’s nomination chances.

In what follows, I will, first, elaborate the main characteristics attributed to the process of candidate selection in the Western European context. I am doing so because the present study deals with candidate selection in Germany and recruitment procedures are very different in the U.S. compared to Western Europe (Sanbonmatsu 2006: 234).

2.2.1 Conceptualizing candidate selection

Contrary to the nearly infinite number of party definitions that can be found in the party literature, scholarship only offers a limited number of definitions of candidate selection. Furthermore, the few existing definitions often differ strongly one from another also because of different underlying understandings of the phenomenon. By referring to those different definitions, I will, in what follows, elaborate the major features of candidate selection and, at the same time, point to the difficulties
students of political science are confronted with when dealing with this concept.

Starting with a widely used definition, Austin Ranney (1981: 75, emphasis in original) defines candidate selection as the

"predominantly extralegal process by which a political party decides which of the persons legally eligible to hold an elective public office will be designated on the ballot and in election communications as its recommended and supported candidate or list of candidates." (see also Ranney 1965: viii)

The first thing that meets the eye is that Austin Ranney (1965) refers to (predominantly) extralegal party internal processes when referring to candidate selection (see also Hazan and Rahat 2006a: 109) – locating candidate selection therefore in the backroom of party politics. It is worth noting that the legal control mechanisms are not completely absent in Austin Ranney’s understanding of how candidates are selected and nominated. However, according to Austin Ranney (1965, 1981), this happens only at the nomination stage. By the latter he understands the predominantly 'legal proceedings in which eligible persons are formally designed 'candidates' and have their names accepted by public authorities for printing on the election ballots' (Ranney 1965: vii; similar Ranney 1981: 75). It is noteworthy in this context that the legal framework (or even its existence) within which the selection of candidates takes place, differs strongly from one country to another. In some "the processes of candidate selection are purely private and internal to the parties" (Bochel and Denver 1983: 45), while in others there are legal regulations not only at the nomination but already at the selection stage (for the case of Germany this will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.2.2). However, even in those contexts where the selection of candidates is done within a legal framework, informal procedures and party rules are very likely to take place. This can be explained by referring to the parties’ nature as institutions including not only "formal organizations but also informal rules and procedures governing conduct" (Ware 1996: 6). By nature, those informal party procedures and rules are not written down in party statutes. Referring to literature on informal institutions, they can be defined as "socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels" (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 727, italics in original). Those rules can fill gaps and thus complete formal rules and procedures; they can help to coordinate when different institutions intersect; and they can operate parallel to their formal counterparts (Azari and Smith 2012: 41). Additionally, those party rules and procedures can range from lowly institutionalized ad hoc arrangements to highly institutionalized
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informal party rules (Reiser 2014: 62). Together with, if existant, the formal (party) rules, those informal norms and practices are said to limit the choice of those who are in charge of selecting the candidates (Norris and Lovenduski 1995: 198). Similar to the existence of informal rules and procedures guiding the selection process, scholarship also points to the importance of actors with informal decision-making power (besides those with formal decision-making power) taking part in the selection process (Höhne 2013: 65). Who these formal and informal actors are and how they can be identified, will be discussed in detail later in this chapter.

A further important feature of candidate selection at least implicitly present in Austin Ranney’s (1981) definition is the existence of more than one aspiring candidate among which the party selectors can choose. From this can be concluded that intra-party competition in the forefront of the election namely at the selection stage, seems to be an important feature of the process of candidate selection. However, in everyday politics this is not always the case. That is why, for example, Richard S. Katz (2008) limits the term "candidate selection" solely to those nominations where parties can choose "among multiple aspirants" (Katz 2008: 300). All other nominations are qualified as recruiting that is the process of finding someone willing to do the job – in particular in the case of minor (unpaid) offices, hopeless constituencies or to fill the bottom of the party lists (Katz 2008: 300). It is important to highlight that in the present study I will not differentiate between selection and recruiting in this manner. Nevertheless, the distinction between different types of candidacies (in particular hopeless versus promising candidacies) is noteworthy also because they can call for different types of candidates (this assumption will be discussed more detailed later in this chapter). Furthermore, it is important to highlight that the reasons why there is sometimes only one candidate that seeks nomination are multiple and cannot be restricted to the case of hopeless electoral races where a party is searching out for someone to "show the flag" (Ranney 1981: 75). I will come back to this point later in this study.

Let us now return to Austin Ranney’s (1981) definition of candidate selection. This definition also points to the fact that the nominated candidates are those who present the party in public – they are "[the parties’] public face in elections" (Katz 2001: 278). Those candidates are not only the party’s public face, selecting candidates is also considered to be a mean to improve a party’s competitiveness. According to Heinrich Best (2007), "[p]arties/selectorates want to improve their competitiveness through good candidates which can serve parties’ external and internal needs in their struggle for power [...]" (Best 2007: 88 sq.). Regardless of what "good candidates" are (I will give a closer examination of this question in the
next section), this quote already points to the assumption that candidate selection is located at the intersection of an internal and external sphere of parties.

While Austin Ranney’s (1981) definition exclusively focuses on the external sphere of political parties, another focus can be found for example in Höhne’s definition. He defines candidate selection as

"a system of action of individual actors that is more or less open towards its environment [...] [and] that in its external sphere generates candidates by accounting for external demands and at the same time in its internal sphere is bound to its party organization." (Höhne 2013: 20 sq.; author’s translation)

According to this definition, candidate selection encompasses a sphere within the party and one outside of the party. Those two spheres both put (different) constraints upon the process of candidate selection.

Furthermore, scholarship in general agrees upon the assumption that the process of selecting candidates is preceded by further processes or stages and thus is embedded in a more comprehensive process. Although the term of legislative recruitment in some cases is used to describe a stage that precedes the one of candidate selection (see, e.g., Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008; Römmele 2004), it is more commonly applied to describe "the critical step as individuals move from lower levels into parliamentary career" (Norris and Lovenduski 1995: 1; Norris 1997b: 1). According to this perspective, candidate selection is conceptualized as one step within the whole recruitment process (Hazan and Rahat 2006a: 109; Höhne 2013: 18; Solvang 1982: 28) or as Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski (1993: 376) argue as one step on the "multi-step ladder [to parliament]". Following Norris (2006) this ladder encompasses three stages: the certification stage, the nomination stage, and the election stage. The first stage determines who is eligible for elective office. The eligibility of a potential candidate can be conceived as resulting from the institutional and legal framework, the socio-cultural norms and values as well as party internal rules. The nomination stage then is thought in terms of supply (of applicants) and demand (of selectors). The final stage consists of the election of the candidates (Norris 2006: 89). From these stages scholarship deduces four levels of analysis (Norris 1997b: 1). First, the political

28 It is noteworthy that Benjamin Höhne (2013) and Bernt Krohn Solvang (1982) conceives the recruitment process also in terms of supply and demand, but in a different way. The aspiring candidates are located on the demand-dimension because they demand for a candidature; and the parties that offer positions are located on the supply dimension (Solvang 1982: 151).
system that provides the structure of opportunities for candidates. At this level the legal regulations, electoral rules and the system of party competition are located (Norris 1997b: 11) (some others also include the more general political structure of the country and its political culture (see, e.g., Gallagher 1988b: 8)). At a second level we can find the recruitment process itself (here in particular the selection rules and methods). A third level consists of the aspiring candidates willing to pursue a political career (supply level), and finally, the demand of the voters, party members and political leaders as the different gatekeepers. It is worth highlighting that, at the supply level, the motivation (for example family traditions, political ambitions, encouragement from community supporters) as well as the political capital (for example financial resources, political connections, party experience, career flexibility, educational qualifications, legislative skills) of the aspiring candidates are analyzed (Norris 1997b: 13). The aspirants’ resources (or lack of resources) as well as their motivations have an influence on who out of the pool of party members seeks access to parliament (Norris and Lovenduski 1995: 15). It can be summarized that political recruitment studies in the sense Pippa Norris (1997b, 2006) or Benjamin Höhne (2013) and Bernt Krohn Solvang (1982) defines it, do not limit their research object to the process of selecting candidates. As has been shown in the preceding paragraph, they also take into account the factors that are supposed to impact on the selection process, thus applying a new institutionalism perspective on the recruitment process.

A last point that has to be addressed in this context concerns the candidate selection methods or rules thus the way parties select their candidates. According to Reuven Y. Hazan and Gideon Rahat (2010) candidate selection methods are "the nonstandardized and predominantly unregimented particular party mechanisms by which political parties choose their candidates for general elections". In order to classify these party mechanisms, Gideon Rahat and Reuven Y. Hazan (2001: 298 sq.) propose a fourfold classification (see also Hazan and Rahat 2006a, 2010). The first dimension concerns the question of "who can present his or her candidacy?" (candidacy); the second points to the selectorate that is "the body that selects the candidates" (Rahat and Hazan 2001: 301; Hazan and Rahat 2006a: 110). Those two dimensions can both be located on an inclusiveness/exclusiveness.

29 It is worth highlighting that scholarship only provides very few alternative classifications of candidate selection methods. Austin Ranney (1981: 82 sqq.), for example, proposes an analytical framework based on three dimensions: centralization, inclusiveness and direct or indirect participation. The two latter concern the selectorate; the participation dimension additionally asks whether party members are allowed to vote themselves or by delegation (Ranney 1981: 88).
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continuum (Rahat and Hazan 2001: 304) – ranging from all citizens to only party members plus additional requirements (Hazan and Rahat 2006a: 111) regarding candidacy and from one single leader to the entire electorate of a nation (Hazan and Rahat 2010: 33) with regards to the second dimension. The third dimension asks where the selection takes place (decentralization). In this context, Reuven Y. Hazan and Gideon Rahat (2006a: 111) highlight the importance of not mixing-up the second and third dimension arguing that candidate selection methods can be at the same time decentralized but highly exclusive regarding the selectorate. According to the authors, (de)centralization can be thought in territorial as well as functional terms; the latter also concern the representation of particular societal (minority) groups especially by mechanisms that are supposed to ensure functional representation as quotas or reserved seats (Rahat and Hazan 2001: 304; Hazan and Rahat 2006a: 111). Those mechanisms can be defined by law or exist as "voluntary pledges by parties to include a specific percentage of women [or any other particular group]" (Krook and O’Brien 2010: 6; for a worldwide overview see e.g. Bird 2014). According to Reuven Y. Hazan and Gideon Rahat (2010: 56), the (non)existence of such a functional representation (at the party level) expresses "the power of these groups within the parties". The final dimension concerns the question whether the selection is done by appointment or by voting (Rahat and Hazan 2001: 306; Hazan and Rahat 2006a: 110).

The methods parties employ to select their legislative candidates can differ regarding all four above mentioned dimensions. Until only recently very little was known about how and why candidate selection methods vary among parties as well as between countries (Norris 2006: 92). In the last years, some few studies have begun to analyze these questions at a cross-national but also country level by mainly testing three types of explanatory variables: institutional or political system variables, context or party system variables, and party variables (see, e.g., Lundell 2004; Barnea and Rahat 2007; Shomer 2014). They have found that in particular regional patterns, territorial organization (cross-national level) (Shomer 2014: 543) as well as party size (Lundell 2004: 36) account the most for diverging candidate selection methods. Regarding party size, Krister Lundell (2004: 40) summarizes that "[l]arge organizations [...] are often marked by complexity, hierarchy and bureaucracy, which is associated with a higher degree of centralization". In this context, Kaare Strøm and Wolfgang C. Müller (1999 16 sq.) claim that more inclusive selection methods can be a consequence of a party’s ideology (new left parties promoting participatory norms (see, e.g., Poguntke 1987: 81)), but also of a party leaders’ strategy in order to activate and compensate party activists for their engagement within the party. Finally, regarding what Gideon Rahat and
Reuven Y. Hazan (2001: 304) call functional decentralization (namely (in)formal party rules and quotas), Marion Reiser (2014: 63) points to the importance of party type as well as party ideology in order to understand party differences.

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2.2.2 Analyzing the demand-side of candidate selection: party selectors and selection criteria

In the last section, candidate selection has been defined as a process by which a party decides who is running for elective office. As I have shown in Chapter 2.1 parties are complex organizations composed of different types of actors. This leads us directly to the question who the actors that select the candidates are and what criteria they apply when selecting legislative candidates. Although considered to be an important intermediary actor (Bochel and Denver 1983: 45; Best and Cotta 2000: 11; Hazan and Rahat 2010: 33), little is known about those party selectors, their attitudes, and the criteria they apply when selecting candidates for elective office.

This holds also true for the definition of the selectorate that only at first sight appears to be straightforward. Gideon Rahat and Reuven Y. (2001: 301) define the selectorate simply as "the body that selects the candidates" (see also Hazan and Rahat 2006a: 110). Heinrich Best (2007: 89) proposes another definition conceiving the party selectorate as

'collective actors who select candidates according to complex choices considering the probable value of the contenders' resources for electoral success", to their ideological fit with, their instrumental function for, and their loyalty to the selectorates".

A closer look at both definitions reveals several difficulties in particular when applying them to the political reality. First, the empirical identification of those who (collectively) select the candidates depends strongly on the stage within the recruitment process of interest. Mainly in the U.S. literature, we find several studies dealing with (informal) selectors that intervene in the processes prior to the nomination stage in the narrow sense, that is at the certification stage as Pippa Norris (2006) defines it. Those party actors are thus not called "party selectors" but more broadly "party recruiters" (Crowder-Meyer 2013) or "party gatekeepers" (Broockman et al. 2014) consisting mainly of (local) party leaders. Others, as
for example John Bochel and David Denver (1983), analyze the viewpoints of those actors who officially are in charge to nominate the candidates – in the case of Great Britain local committees of party members (Bochel and Denver 1983: 45; see similar Norris and Lovenduski 1993, 1995). These examples show that it is important to differentiate between different types of party actors who at one moment or another within the recruitment process participate in selecting candidates. Second, and this is also related to the first point, it is important to differentiate between de jure and de facto decision-making bodies (Norris 2006: 93) that is between formally (by law or party statutes) defined and informal party selectors (see also Höhne 2013: 65). To identify those selectors and in particular those who are not formally defined as such, Benjamin Höhne (2013) points to the importance of intra-party power distribution. As informal party selectors often belong to important and powerful intra-party networks (Höhne 2013: 66), identifying those powerful networks may help to get to those actors who are also informally in charge of selecting candidates.

Turning back to Heinrich Best’s (2007) definition of the selectorate, he points to 'complex choices' that guide the selection of candidates. According to Heinrich Best (2007), party selectors make these choices by taking into account four candidate characteristics: his or her resources for electoral success, his or her ideological fit with the party, his or her instrumental function for the selectorate, and his or her loyalty to the selectorate. These characteristics, in turn, reflect the double task the selectorate is faced to. On the one hand, there is an external focus that guides the selectors’ choices (candidate types transmit a certain image of the party to the public), and on the other hand, they have also to account for the internal needs of the party (internal focus, e.g. expertise for certain policy issues, intermediates to interest groups, acquired competences and qualifications) (Best 2007: 90 sq.). While party external aspects in particular concern a party’s competitiveness vis-à-vis other parties thus mainly electoral aspects, the party internal focus tackles the question whether a certain type of candidate helps to guarantee party cohesion/unity (Höhne 2013: 87 sq.; see also Römmele 2004). Additionally, Benjamin Höhne (2013: 83) argues that there is a further reason guiding selectors’ candidate choice: nominating specific candidates can impact on the selector’s power-position within the party. The motivation for selecting certain candidates in this case reflects individual power-seeking or power-maintaining aspects. A certain number of formal as well as informal selection criteria can be deduced from these internal and external needs as well as the individual power aspects. In this context, it is worth highlighting that empirical evidence regarding what selection criteria matter is still very rare (Höhne 2013: 79).
Scholarship provides several classifications to structure the selection criteria that can be found in the party literature. Those classifications differentiate between, on the one hand, achievement-related or political characteristics and, on the other hand, ascriptive characteristics (see Seligman 1971; Bochel and Denver 1983). While the former are closely related to the political role in question, the latter are not (directly) connected to the role as legislative candidate or future politician (Klein and Ohr 2000: 201).

The achievement-related or political characteristics can comprehend purely political characteristics such as record of service in the party organization, political ideology, specific political experiences, political connections and group networks as well as subjective personal characteristics – as John Bochel and David (1983: 53) call it – that are not necessarily political such as expertise in organizing, communication and bargaining skills, integrity or hard working (Seligman 1971: 12; Bochel and Denver 1983: 53; Norris 1997b: 6). One of the achievement-related or political characteristics that merits special attention in the literature about candidate selection is incumbency. Scholarship puts forward several reasons that reflect both, external as well as the internal party needs, why incumbency is often considered to be one of the most important selection criteria. Regarding the former, it is argued that incumbents have already proved to be electorally successful (Bochel and Denver 1983: 50), in most cases they already have a strong base in the constituency (Hazan and Rahat 2010: 27). Putting these reflections in economic terms, it can be argued that by (re)selecting incumbents the costs of evaluating the candidate in question will be low and therefore reduce the transaction costs (Solvang 1982: 165). In their analysis of Scottish and English constituencies John Bochel and David Denver (1983) identified the ability to win votes as being the most important attribute of potential candidates (see also Norris and Lovenduski 1995: 139). Regarding internal party needs, incumbents are, due to their legislative mandate, in most of the cases, first, strong intra-party actors (Hazan and Rahat 2010: 27), and, second, have more policy-experience than newcomers (Pemstein et al. 2015: 1430). Furthermore, from the MPs’ point of view "[i]ncumbent reselection can be seen as a reward given in exchange for loyalty to the party" (Hazan and Rahat 2010: 28).

Ascriptive candidate characteristics encompass in particular socio-demographic characteristics such as age, family, social status or class belonging, race, religion, gender, group affiliation and locality (Seligman 1971: 12; Bochel and Denver 1983: 53). Scholarship argues that despite not being political characteristics they matter when selecting candidates because of their value as information-short cuts (Gay 2002: 718; Römmele 2004: 269) and more precisely as "a proxy measure of an
applicant’s suitability" (Norris and Lovenduski 1995: 124). As has been already argued in Chapter 1.2, certain socio-demographic characteristics, such as ethnicity or gender, are often associated with particular policy positions or ideological leanings (see, e.g., Gay 2002: 718; Bieber 2013: 116). In this context, Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski (1995) argue that because applicants for a legislative candidature are often unknown to the selectors, their perceptions of the candidates are strongly influenced by discrimination, that is “[…] whether applicants are judged positively or negatively by virtue of their group characteristics, not according to their individual merits, abilities and experience” (Norris and Lovenduski 1995: 124). They differentiate between direct, namely the selectors’ attitudes, and imputed discrimination, the perceived attitudes of the electorate. However, while scholarship finds no empirical proof for a (direct or imputed) discrimination of women candidates (see, e.g., Bochel and Denver 1983: 55; Broockman et al. 2014: 11), there is empirical evidence for party selectors being biased against candidates’ ethnic background or skin color in particular because these candidates are perceived to be electorally disadvantageous (Bochel and Denver 1983: 56; Norris and Lovenduski 1995: 136).30

Some final points have to be briefly addressed when dealing with party selectors and their preferences. First, and this has been discussed already indirectly in the preceding paragraphs, the decisions selectors make and thus their preference for one selection criterion or another “[…] take place within the context of formal party rules, and informal norms and practices, which limit their choice” (Norris and Lovenduski 1995: 198). From this follows that individual party selectors are not autonomous when selecting candidates for legislative office. Studying country-specific legal regulations as well as formally defined and informal selection rules is therefore important to understand the importance of specific selection criteria. As a second point it is worth mentioning that the preference for certain achievement-related and/or ascriptive candidate characteristics within the selection process varies according to a number of factors: the electoral position in question (hopeless race, competitive race, safe seat, electoral rules/ballot type (single-member district race vs. multimember), party type, party ideology as well as type of selectorate. Scholarship, for instance, points to the fact that in the case of hopeless races where a party has no chance of winning the election, the party is likely to look for a candidate who is first of all able to put forward the party’s policies (Bochel and Denver 1983: 49 sq.). In these cases the ideal candidates not

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30 David Broockman et al. (2014: 11) also find some evidence for the assumption party selectors being (slightly) biased against blue-collar workers.
necessarily have to bring with them a high amount of political capital – defined as a composition of 'leisure hours, political positions and shown loyalty, professional competence and ability to represent a group' (Solvang 1982: 152) – quite the contrary, they can increase their political capital by conducting a campaign in a hopeless race (Solvang 1982: 153). In the case of competitive races, however, the non-incumbent party could be inclined to nominate a 'standard-bearer' (Rush 1969: 8) able to get as much as votes as possible. Regarding party type it can be argued that electoralist parties, for example, mainly look for a candidate’s personal attractiveness and to a much lower degree for other achievement-related or political characteristics as length of service to the party (Gunther and Diamond 2003: 185).

2.2.3 Different selection methods – different political consequences?

As has already been pointed out in one of the previous paragraphs, the party mechanisms by which parties choose their candidates for elections (Hazan and Rahat 2010: 4), thus the candidate selection methods, differ between countries but also between parties within one and the same country. This leads to the question whether different candidate selection methods can have different political consequences. While several studies deal with the supposed impact on the socio-demographic background of candidates and/or MPs (mainly regarding gender) and thus are interested in the consequences for the composition of the legislature (see, e.g., Rahat, Hazan, and Katz 2008; Gauja and Cross 2015), others focus on whether and how different candidate selection methods impact on the policy representation of parties (Spies and Kaiser 2014) or of individual candidates (Mikulska and Scarrow 2010). As a further political consequence the relationship between selection methods and MPs’ legislative behavior is analyzed (see, e.g., Shomer 2009; Hazan 2014). And, finally, some others focus on the impact on the characteristics of the selection process itself, in particular the level of competitiveness (see, e.g., Rahat, Hazan, and Katz 2008) or the turnout rate of the selectorate (see, e.g., Hazan and Rahat 2010), or on partisan involvement (see, e.g., Kernell 2015).

The theoretical arguments put forward in scholarly debate explaining why different kinds of candidate selection methods should matter regarding the type of selected candidate, a party’s policy representation legislative behavior strongly focus on the consequences of two specific features: the type of selectorate as well
as the degree of (de)centralization of the selection process namely the level where
the selection takes place (see, e.g., Shomer 2009, Mikulska and Scarrow 2010,
Spies and Kaiser 2014). As the present study focuses on the role of candidate
selection regarding the profile of the nominated candidates and in particular of
the ethnic profile, I will limit the following discussion on the consequences for the
socio-demographic or policy profile.

The type of selectorate is considered to produce the most important political
consequences (Hazan and Rahat 2006a: 114). Based for example on assumptions
made by Johnn D. May (1973), it is argued that party actors belong to different
intra-party strata with different kinds of preferences and motivations (as already
exposed in Chapter 2.1). According to this logic, party selectors will choose those
candidates who are most likely to translate their preferences into policies. On the
one hand, sub-leaders, for instance party delegates, who are expected to be, due to
their intra-party position, rather policy than office seeking actors want their (ex-
treme) policy positions to be fulfilled and will thus choose extreme candidates. On
the other hand, so-called non-leaders, for example party members, are supposed to
have rather moderate policy preferences which are close to the median non-party
voter and are thus more inclined to nominate moderate candidates. And, finally,
(top) leaders, as office-seeking actors are more closer to the sub-leaders’ preferences
because of the need of their intra-party support (Spies and Kaiser 2014: 579).
However, the empirical results regarding Johnn D. May’s (1973) assumptions
are not so clear-cut, as Anna B. Mikulska and Susan E. Scarrow (2010: 315)
emphasize. Nevertheless, what can be concluded is that different types of party
actors differ regarding their (policy) preferences which is supposed to lead to the
selection of different types of candidates. Focusing more on the inclusiveness of
the selectorate, it can also be argued that, on the one side, selection methods
where the membership ballot decides, thus with a rather inclusive selectorate,
are characterized by candidate choices based on the individual party member’s
preference. On the other side, when candidates are selected by a small committee,
thus a rather exclusive selectorate, the choices are supposed to be the result of
compromise, consensus-building and negotiations; the driving forces are not the
selectors’ individual preferences but the assumed collective interest of the party.
In the first case, the communication structure is vertical (between would-be nomi-
nees and their selectors) rather than, as in the second case, horizontal (between
the selectors) (Rahat, Hazan, and Katz 2008: 666 sq.). Finally, selection by
party delegates is considered to be an intermediate case (depending on how the
delegation is organized, they act more in accordance with the membership ballot
assumption or more like a small committee) (Rahat, Hazan, and Katz 2008: 667).
Scholarship formulates two contradictory expectations about the impact of the type of selectorate on the candidates’ socio-demographic profile. Reuven Y. Hazan and Gideon Rahat (2006b: 372), for example, argue that “[t]he more inclusive the selectorate, the less representative the selected candidates, and vice versa”. Others, however, claim the exact opposite relationship – at least for the case of policy representation. They consider that ‘[…] more inclusive candidate selection rules have led to a greater proximity between party candidates and party voters’ (Mikulska and Scarrow 2010: 317). And finally, some others, as for instance Dennis C. Spies and André Kaiser (2014) suggest that the relation is not linear – from the most inclusive to the least inclusive pole – but curvilinear meaning that selection by party members produces the most representative parties (in terms of policy), while selection by party delegates (and not party committees as more exclusive selectorates) is supposed to lead to the least representative parties (Spies and Kaiser 2014: 580).

Regarding the impact of the degree of territorial decentralization of candidate selection, Anna B. Mikulska and Susan E. Scarrow (2010: 316), argue that more centralized selection rules allow the selectorate to select multiple (types of) candidates by balancing the party lists or obliging certain districts to choose a certain type of candidate. These types of selection methods allow the national party level to ’impose their political strategies on subordinated party levels’ (Spies and Kaiser 2014: 579). That is why scholarship, on the one side, expects more centralized selection process to be more beneficial to women candidates (Norris 1997a: 220). On the other side, decentralized candidate selection methods make it difficult for ’[…] central party organs wanting to increase women’s representation […] in getting their wishes carried out at the local level’ (Matland and Studlar 1996: 709).

The aforementioned arguments are mainly put forward to explain why different types of selectorates nominate different types of candidates – in terms of socio-demography but also regarding their policy positions. Regarding the empirical validation of these arguments, there is some evidence for the assumption of more exclusive selectorates producing more socially representative candidates. For the case of Israel, Gideon Rahat, Reuven Y. Hazan and Richard S. Katz (2008), for instance, have established a negative relationship between the level of inclusiveness of the selectorate and the representation of women on party lists (Rahat, Hazan, and Katz 2008: 672). Also Anika Gauja and William Cross (2015) have found empirical evidence for more exclusive selection methods being more favorable to female candidates (for the case of Australia). However, they have also detected that the existence of this relationship varies strongly between parties (Gauja and
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Cross (2015: 293). From this can be concluded that not solely party organizational differences, namely selection methods, matter but that party cultures differences have to be considered at least as mediating variable between selection methods and their impact on the type of selected candidate (Gauja and Cross 2015: 294). Contrary to the above presented results, a recent study conducted by Jessica Fortin-Rittberger and Berthold Rittberger (2015) reveals that more inclusive selectorates lead to more women on party lists, but that this relationship only appears at the first stage in the nomination process (where candidates are initially picked up) (Fortin-Rittberger and Rittberger 2015: 778). Regarding the consequences of the type of selectorate on the policy representation of candidates and parties, the empirical findings are not so conclusive. Anna B. Mikulska and Susan E. Scarrow (2010), for instance, have shown for the case of Great Britain that more inclusive selection procedures produce candidates who, in their policy preferences, are closer to the electorate (Mikulska and Scarrow 2010: 327). Dennis C. Spies and André Kaiser (2014: 585), however, have detected the exact opposite relation: nomination by party leaders (committees) appears to lead to the most representative parties in terms of ideology – thus supporting the hypothesis put forward by Anika Gauja and William Cross (2015). Dennis C. Spies and André Kaiser (2014) could find no empirical support for the assumption of delegates producing less representative parties than party members. It is beyond the scope of this study to investigate deeper into the reasons for these contradictory results in terms of policy representation. However, it is worth mentioning that these two studies operationalize their dependent variable differently, which might contribute to these different results.

Regarding the impact of the level of centralization of the nomination process none of the existing studies, at least to the author’s knowledge, has established an (independent) link between the degree of centralization and representation in terms of socio-demography or policy (Norris 1997a: 220; Spies and Kaiser 2014: 583; Fortin-Rittberger and Rittberger 2015: 776). Dennis C. Spies and André Kaiser (2014: 584) point to a combined effect of centralization and inclusiveness with selection by party delegates producing the most representative parties in terms of ideology the higher the degree of centralization.

To sum up, it is widely acknowledged that the selection of candidates impacts on the composition of legislatures – in terms of socio-demography and policy

31 While Dennis C. Spies and André Kaiser (2014) study the party-voter congruence measured by the left-right dimension in nine Western European countries, Anna B. Mikulska and Susan E. Scarrow (2010) analyze only for the case of Great Britain how candidate selection rules affect the (non-incumbent) candidate-voter congruence in terms of policy positions.
representation – as well as on the behavior of the MPs once elected (Hazan and Rahat 2010). However, the empirical validation of this presumed relationship gives a quite complex picture of the phenomenon. Mainly two closely connected points can be retained in this context. First, there is empirical evidence that the relationship between selection method and the various political consequences is mediated by a number of factors, amongst others party ideology or 'culture' as Gauja and Cross (2015: 294) name it. That is why, second, certain types of selection methods can provide '[...] opportunities to enhance representation, yet there is still a need to motivate forces within the party to press for the use of these opportunities' (Hazan and Rahat 2010: 119).

Before discussing in the remainder of the present chapter the relationship between parties and minorities, I will summarize what in the present study is understood of candidate selection.

Put in a nutshell, I define candidate selection as an intra-party process taking place within a set of formal and/or informal rules and procedures by which party actors with formal and/or informal decision-making power nominate the party’s candidate or list of candidates out of a pool of legally eligible aspirants.

This definition highlights the nature of candidate selection as a process combining formal country or party specific rules and procedures and the 'shadowy pathways' (Bjarnegard and Kenny 2015: 749). The latter not only point to the existence of informal rules and procedures but also of two kinds of party selectors. The term 'candidate selection' as employed in the present study is thus neither restricted to the informal process preceding the formal nomination of candidates nor limited to the procedure of formally designing aspirants as candidates. I am doing so, first, to capture the whole process, and, second, because past research has shown that empirically these processes are difficult to separate (Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008: 30). Regarding informal party rules, it can be argued that they mainly operate parallel to formal institutions, complete and serve to coordinate the many existing formal party rules and procedures (this could be for instance an informal rule about which formal/informal quota is prioritized about the others). The specific methods political parties employ to select their candidates can differ between countries or within the same country on all four dimensions proposed by Gideon Rahat and Reuven Y. Hazan (2001). Electoral systems as well as further
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legal requirements shape party selection rules by setting important constraints on parties' decision process (Scarrow et al. 2000: 139 sq.). At the between-party level, these methods are likely to differ according to party size and party ideology or more generally party type. Additionally, candidate selection methods can also be the result of diffusion in the way that parties can learn from each other. Together with in particular a party’s ideology or culture different types of selectorates are said to lead to different types of candidates as well as impacting on legislative behavior and on the nature of the selection process.

Furthermore, the candidate selection process cannot be thought independently from its environment. It has to be seen as one stage within the whole process of recruiting individuals to elected office. The main actors within this process are on the supply-side the aspiring candidates or aspirants defined as those who seek nomination by their party compared to the candidates who have already been nominated and who officially run for office. In this context, Lester G. Seligman (1971: 4) argues that there are aspirants with solely formal political opportunity meaning that they are not barred by law and those who are also not barred by law but additionally having "the resources, abilities, and motivations for political activity [...] [and thus] have effective opportunity" (Fox and Lawless 2004: see also). On the demand-side, party selectors with formal and informal decision-making power select the candidates based on their ascriptive and/or achievement-related characteristics while party internal and external needs are guiding their choices. The latter also encompass the (presumed) demand by the electorate (see Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1: Parliamentary recruitment and candidate selection

Source: Own elaboration adapted from Norris and Lovenduski (1993) and Norris (1997b).
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2.3 Parties and (immigrant-origin) minorities: theoretical foundations and empirical findings

After having discussed the characteristics of political parties and their behavior as well as elaborated in detail the candidate selection function of parties, the present section is concerned with the multi-layered relationship between parties and in particular immigrant-origin minorities. Accordingly, I shall devote the remainder of this chapter to an outline of the relevant literature and in particular of the empirical findings regarding this relationship.

It is worth highlighting that this relationship has until recently not received much attention in scholarly debate. Regarding the political effects of large-scale immigration in the host countries, most scholars have focused on the reactions of the native population (Dancygier and Saunders 2006: 962) as well as, in particular in the European context, on the challenge the Extreme Right poses to the other parties (Fonseca 2011: 109). In the last years however, political scientist have begun to analyze the relation between, on the one side, in particular ethnic and racial minorities in the North American case and immigrant-origin minorities in Western Europe and, on the other side, parties from many different angles: in particular their electoral relationship by studying ethnic minorities’ voting behavior, but also the incorporation of immigrants into political parties for example as candidates running for office. In the beginning mainly limited to Northern America (see, e.g., Wolfinger 1965; Uhlker et al. 1989), more and more research is now also emerging in the European context (see, e.g., Saggar 1998; Wüst 2004, 2012, 2016; Bird et al. 2011; Fonseca 2011; Soininen 2011). One major reason for this shortcoming in particular regarding the electoral relationship in the Western European case was and still is the lack of data (population of interest to small in most survey data bases) when aiming to analyze the political behavior of immigrant origin populations (Dancygier and Saunders 2006: 963).

Examining the multi-layered party-minority relationship on the basis of the existing literature, I will, in what follows, focus mainly on two aspects. I will do so by referring to parties as multidimensional actors who, as argued in the introductory part of this chapter, fulfill functions mainly on three levels – the last two, however, largely overlap: the electoral-societal, the party organization, and the governmental-parliamentary level (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000b). First, on the electoral-societal level, it has been argued that parties are the main linkage between citizens and the political system amongst others by structuring electoral
choice and by electorally mobilizing voters. Furthermore, from the electorate are recruited the potential candidates, and, it is the electorate that votes for a party amongst others due to their candidate portfolio. That is why, in a first step, the electoral relationship between ethnic minority groups and political parties will be analyzed. And, in a second step, on the party organization level, I will focus on the parties’ recruitment and selection function of the political personal. I limit the discussion of the literature to these two levels because the parliamentary-governmental level is of less importance in the present study and was, at least partly, treated already in Chapter 1.2. Several points in particular regarding the second level have already been alluded in the previous paragraphs; I will come back to them.

2.3.1 Ethnic minorities: a different kind of electorate?

Past research has shown that ethnic and racial as well as immigrant-origin minorities show lower turnout levels than the majority native-born population (for the U.S., see Uhlaner et al. 1989, for Western Europe, see Togeby 1999, Maxwell 2010, Feenema and Tillie 1999, Wüst 2004, 2012). The reasons for this phenomenon have been found in the ethnic or racial group belonging (see, e.g., Feenema and Tillie 1999, Togeby 1999, Saggio 2000, Anwar 2001), the socio-demographic composition of the specific minority group (see, e.g., Wüst 2004), the geographical concentration (see, e.g., Togeby 1999, Fieldhouse and Cutts 2008) as well as co-ethnic candidates in the electoral race (Bobo and Gilliam 1990, Fairdosi and Rogowski 2015).

The first thing that meets the eye when browsing studies dealing with ethnic minority voting behavior in Western countries is the strong and cross-national tendency for left-leaning parties (for France see Brouard and Tiberj 2005: 54; for Norway, see Bergh and Bjørklund 2011: 308; for Sweden, see Tahvilzadeh 2011: 82; for Switzerland, see Strijbis 2014: 622 sqq.; for Denmark, see Mikkelsen 2011: 89; for Great Britain, see Sanders et al. 2014: 233; for the Netherlands, see Michon and Tillie 2011: 77; for Belgium Jacobs and Delwit 2011: 80; for Latinos in the U.S., see Alvarez and García Bedolla 2003: 37; for Canada, see Bird 2011a: 67). Having a closer look at these findings, it becomes evident that the left-leaning party preference mainly concerns Social-Democrats or alike. Only very few studies, mostly at the local level, have furnished empirical evidence for electoral support (of specific ethnic minority groups) for other left-leaning parties such as Green
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Parties (see, e.g., Heelsum 2002: 184; Michon and Tillie 2011: 76). Although the latter, as will be shown in the following sections, are in the majority of the cases strong supporters of new politics issues including the promotion of minority rights. Regarding the left-leaning voting behavior, some studies, however, have found that the native-immigrant gap is rather small and the rejection of the conservative-right parties thus is not as much pronounced among immigrant-origin minorities (e.g., for the case of Switzerland see Strijbis 2014) as some studies might suggest. There is also empirical evidence for specific ethnic groups supporting or identifying more strongly with conservative-right parties than other ethnic minority groups in the same country do, as for instance Cuban-origin Latinos in the United States (Alvarez and García Bedolla 2003: 37), Asians and here in particular Indians in Great Britain (Anwar 2001: 538; Saggar 2000: 126 sqq.) or immigrants from the former Soviet Union (and Romania) in the case of Germany (Wüst 2004: 350 sqq.).

Regarding the deviating voting behavior of migrants from both Eastern Europe and Cuban-origin Latinos, scholars point to experiences of communism which may, in a first step, result in anticomunist sentiments, and then in a second step, lead to the rejection of Socialist or Social-Democratic parties because these parties are associated with Communism (Bergh and Bjorklund 2011: 312; Strijbis 2014: 616).

The observed differences between the group of immigrants (and their descendants) and the native majority population as well as between different minority groups call for further explanations. One of the central questions in this context is whether the strong left-leaning voting behavior of the majority of immigrants and their descendants is simply due to the distribution of socio-economic characteristics and political ideology within this group (thus to factors explaining vote behavior in general) or to minority specific explanations that make of the this group a particular electorate. Regarding the former, the idea is that a lower socio-economic status and a left-leaning ideology and not ethnic background explain the left-leaning voting behavior of immigrant groups (Bergh and Bjorklund 2011: 308 sq.). According to the idea of a special social class profile of the minority electorate, Shamit Saggar (2000) describes the Labour party as the 'champion of

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32 For the Belgium case, Celine Teney et al. (2010) highlight that "[...] the ecologist party seems to have a hard time in assuring support among non-EU origin immigrant groups" (Teney et al. 2010: 293).

33 At the local level, Dirk Jacobs and Pascal Delwit (2011: 82) have found also that Turkish origin electorate supports to a certain degree the Right-Liberals and Moroccan-origin and other non-EU-origin voters the Christian Democrats (Jacobs and Delwit 2011: 80). However, these findings have to be taken with caution because they concern only one specific city in Belgium.
the ‘have nots’” (Saggar 2000: 75). Related to this, it is argued that the more the socio-economic profile of the minority group resembles the majority population (this is mainly a question of length of stay in the host country), the more likely the group of immigrants is to show a voting behavior similar to the majority population (Wolfinger 1965: 896). Regarding the idea of a particular electorate, the term of group, bloc or ethnic voting is used as well as the idea of ‘linked fates’ (Zingher and Farrer 2014: 2). According to these assumptions, members of an ethnic group are likely to vote for a party even socio-demographic characteristics are controlled for (Wolfinger 1965: 896; Bergh and Bjørklund 2011: 309).

The great majority of the existing literature comes to the conclusion that the traditional factors explaining vote behavior account only marginally for the voting behavior of the immigrant electorate. Even though several socio-economic factors do not seem to be completely irrelevant for immigrant voting behavior, immigrant background or ethnic group identification remain significant in most of the studies even when controlled for these variables (for Germany, see Wüst 2004: 354; for Norway, see, e.g., Bergh and Bjørklund 2011: 322; for Latinos in the U.S., see Alvarez and García Bedolla 2003: 40; for Great Britain, see Dancygier and Saunders 2006: 974). There are very few studies that, in this context, explicitly examine ideology or attitudes as a predictor for vote choice. David Sanders et al. (2014: 243), however, have found for the British case that ideologically based spatial thinking seems to be (even) less important for ethnic minority voters than for their white counterparts. However, regarding the relevance of attitudes for the party identification of ethnic minorities, some studies have demonstrated evidence for such a relationship. For the U.S. case, R. Michael Alvarez and Lisa García Bedolla (2003: 44) noted a strong impact of Latino voters’ attitudes towards government health insurance. Analyzing attitudes towards policy issues and their impact on party identification in the British case, Maria Sobolewska (2005: 212) has found that there are some few issues that seem to matter for ethnic minority party identity. Their relationship, however, is not the same as for the one of the

34 Raymond E. Wolfinger (1965: 896) underscores that the concept of ‘ethnic voting’ can also have a second meaning namely the phenomenon of voting for a candidate with a particular ethnicity even across party lines which will be discussed in one of the following paragraphs (for a different use of group and ethnic voting see also Bergh and Bjørklund 2011: 313).

35 For the case of Great Britain, David Sanders et al. (2014: 244), for instance, have found that occupational class appears to play a role for ethnic minority groups but not for the native majority population. Similar, R. Michael Alvarez and Lisa García Bedolla (2003: 40) have found for the case of Latino voters in the United States that, all things constant, the lower the educational level the more likely they are to be Democratic than Republican.
majority population (Sobolewska 2005: 209). Furthermore, those political issues that are normally high on the political agenda appear to matter less to ethnic minorities (Sobolewska 2005: 212).

There is, however, increasing empirical support for the assumption that the rather homogeneous voting behavior of immigrants and their descendants is characterized by factors that go beyond the traditional explanatory variables. Taking the case of Italian descendants in New Haven in the early 1960s as an example, Raymond E. Wolfinger (1965: 903) has shown that the "most important lines of division in the electorate are ethnic rather than economic" (although their socio-economic status should lead to vote for a Democratic candidate, they showed a strong support for Republicans). Since then, studies have found empirical evidence for a multitude of explanations for this phenomenon. In one of the preceding paragraphs, I have already argued that above average vote for conservative parties in the case of certain immigrant groups compared to other immigrant groups can be explained by the Communist past of their country of origin. For the German case, there seems to be empirical support for such a socialization effect as Andreas M. Wüst (2004: 354) can show that former citizenship proves to be significant regarding vote choice even when controlling for further explanatory factors. However, more recent findings indicate that immigrants from Eastern Europe no longer more strongly reject the Social Democrats than the majority native population does. Additionally, the strong support for the conservative parties only holds true for the first generation of immigrants (mediated probably by socio-economic and cultural attitudes) (Wüst 2012: 173) which could be interpreted as supporting the socialization hypothesis for this specific kind of immigrant group. Further studies point to the relevance of specific minority attitudes and experiences when explaining the vote choice of this electorate. David Sanders et al. (2014), for example, have revealed that perceived personal discrimination (egocentric) as well as against minorities in general (sociotropic) matter regarding ethnic minority voting behavior in Great Britain – with party preference effects that differ depending on whether immigrant origin voters show additionally high levels of cultural integration (Sanders et al. 2014: 246 sq.). And also Andreas M. Wüst (2012: 173) has noted for the German case a higher probability to vote

36 Maria Sobolewska (2005: 209) has found for the British case that issues that are traditionally not attributed to Labour, here the encouragement for private medicine, appear to significantly impact on identifying with Labour. The ethnic minority population apparently does not see a contradiction between Labour’s political agenda and private medicine.

37 Rafaela Dancygier and Elizabeth N. Saunders (2006: 974), however, has found that attitudes towards social spending (but not towards redistribution) impacted on party identification of ethnic minorities in Great Britain.
for other parties than the conservatives when belonging to an immigrant group with high discrimination potential (Wüst 2012: 173) (see also for the French case Tiberj 2011: 71). Similar, Oliver Strijbis (2014: 623) has shown that Swiss voters with an outgroup migration background are more likely to vote for left-leaning than for conservative-right parties (Strijbis 2014: 623). It is, however, worth highlighting that he also found that the vote choice of this group is mediated by party identification (Strijbis 2014: 623). The underlying assumption is that party identification is formed during important politico-historical events. During these events, specific parties play a specific political role for, in this case, ethnic outgroups. The party identification acquired in this time may be passed on to the next generation (Strijbis 2014: 615). It is worth highlighting that others have found that ethnic background or minority specific variables still have an impact on vote choice when party identification is controlled for (see, e.g., Wüst 2004: 355; Sanders et al. 2014: 241). Shamit Saggar (2000: 73 sq.) employs in this context the term of "historic legacy school" meaning that a specific party (in this case Labour) is historically identified as the party the most supportive in the collective interests of ethnic minorities. Others point to the importance of group identification. Rafaela Dancygier and Elizabeth N. Saunders (2006: 976) summarize that "identification with one's ethnic group leads immigrants to affiliate with the party that is dominant among the group".

Finally, past research has shown conflicting cues regarding the impact of the length of stay in the host country. Some have found support for the assumption that the longer immigrants and their descendants stay in the host country, the more their voting behavior resembles the one of native majority population (see for Norway, Bergh and Bjørklund 2011: 323 sq.). Others have pointed to the importance of differentiating between immigrant origin groups as, for instance, Andreas M. Wüst (2012) who shows that while the strong preference for the conservative parties in the case of ethnic Germans seems to be restricted to the first generation of immigrants, the strong link of guestworker immigrants to the Social Democrats seems to hold regardless of immigrant generation (Wüst 2012: 174). Regarding the strong identification with Labour, Rafaela Dancygier and Elizabeth N. Saunders (2006: 976) have found no statistically significant impact of length of stay in the host country, implying that immigrants and their descendants

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38 Oliver Strijbis (2014) highlights that "the results reveal that for some migration backgrounds [outgroup background], party identification might explain a link with electoral choice while in other cases the impact of migration background on vote choice is mediated by other determinants" (Strijbis 2014: 626) – speaking of bloc voting therefore does not fit with the socio-political reality.
do not resemble the majority population the longer they spent time in the host country (it is group identification, see above). For the U.S. case, Bruce Cain et al. (1991) point to differences between groups. While Latino party identification is significantly related to the time they have been in the U.S. (the more time they spent in the U.S., the more likely they are to identify with the Democrats), this relationship cannot be found for Asian Americans (Cain et al. 1991: 403 sqq.).

To briefly summarize, the previous paragraphs have shown that the electoral linkage between particular immigrant-origin minorities and parties appears to be rather homogeneous as the overwhelming majority of the studies point to a left-leaning voting behavior of immigrant origin voters. The reasons for this phenomenon, however, appear to be multifaceted and to some degree still puzzling. Furthermore, it is worth highlighting that the lack of cross-national studies makes it difficult to state whether the presented findings are country specific or whether they can be transferred to other national contexts. In what follows, I will complete the picture of the minority-party relationship by elaborating their incorporation within parties thus focusing on the parties’ organizational level.

2.3.2 Incorporation of (immigrant-origin) minorities in political parties

In the last paragraph, I discussed based on the existent literature the electoral relationship between parties and, in particular, immigrant-origin minorities. While this aspect receives not a lot but at least some attention within scholarly debate, other aspects of the party-minority relationship even less studied. As the present study deals with the political incorporation of immigrants and their descendants within parties and more particularly with those citizens running as candidates for elections, I will illuminate, in what follows, the existent findings regarding this particular aspect of the party-minority relationship. It is, however, worth highlighting that this aspect has already been touched briefly on several occasions in the previous paragraphs and chapters.

The few studies dealing with minority incorporation as (legislative) candidates have found, in short, that immigrant-origin candidates are not only underrepresented at the parliamentary but already at the candidate level (the following findings are restricted to the national level). However, and this finding holds true for the great majority of the studies, their number is increasing (for Great Britain, see Anwar 2001: 544; Sobolewska 2005: 624; for Germany, see Wüst 2014: 420; for Canada, see Black and Hicks 2006: 27). For the German case, however, it has
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to be highlighted that by disaggregating the data into minority subgroups, Sara Claro Fonseca (2011: 120 sq.) can show that, since 1990, the share of ethnic Germans (so-called (Spät) Aussiedler) as a percentage of all candidates with migration background declines while, at the same time, the share of non-Germans (mainly first- and second generation Turks) rises. This trend leads, at an aggregated level, to a downward trend regarding the nomination of candidates with migration background.

Several explanations are put forward in scholarly debate to explain this underrepresentation at the candidate level, or put differently, to understand under which circumstances a rise in numbers is likely to happen. As with minority representation at the parliamentary level (see Chapter 1.2), there is no coherent theory but rather a multitude of explanatory variables to explain this phenomenon. To explain why and when political parties open up to ethnic minority candidatures, Miki Caul Kittilson and Katherine Tate (2005) propose a model that includes explanations focusing on elite-driven party and bottom-up processes as well as on the political environment. The former are those processes where "parties as rational actors [...] alter their environment in a top-down process" (Kittilson and Tate 2005: 164). In this case, the promotion of minority candidates can be seen as a mean by party representatives to attract voters (Kittilson and Tate 2005: 164). Some processes, however, are also caused by changes at the societal level to which parties react in a bottom-up process (Kittilson and Tate 2005: 164). However, according to Miki Caul Kittilson and Katherine Tate (2005) "[t]he key to opening up the party structure to minority groups will depend as well on the political environment in addition to elite behavior and grassroots mobilizations' (Kittilson and Tate 2005: 165). Regarding the opening to (ethnic) minority groups in particular three factors of the political environment or political opportunity structure are identified: the legal environment, the intra-party organization, and demographic as well as changes in the electoral landscape (Kittilson and Tate 2005: 179 sqq.). Studying the British case, Maria Sobolewska (2013) identifies in particular three factors that are beneficial or detrimental to minority incorporation within parties: the nature of candidate selection process, the supply of candidates as well as the perceived level of prejudice within the electorate from the part of the selectorate. Accordingly decentralized multi-stage selection processes, lower socio-economic resources of the applicants and the idea of loosing votes when

39 The political opportunity structure is defined as "a political party’s receptivity to the demands placed on it by either minority political leaders or by the masses below" (Kittilson and Tate 2005: 175).
nominating ethnic minority candidates due to highly prejudiced electorates are seen as barriers to the nomination of these candidates (Sobolewska 2013: 619 sqq.). Recently, Benjamin Farrer and Joshua N. Zingher (2018) have demonstrated in their study on Australia, Great Britain and the U.S. that the interaction of party (ideology) and district characteristics (ethnic composition) are important to explain the nomination of ethnic minority candidates.

Regarding the role of party ideology, Maritta Soininen (2011) highlights that the identity of a political party can be an "important obstacle to the party organization fulfilling such a function and including immigrants in the party organization" (Soininen 2011: 148). In particular for conservative or center-right parties, fielding ethnic minority candidates can be a hazardous choice because in doing so they can risk to alienate their traditional constituencies (Rensmann 2014: 63). A leftist party ideology, on the other side, is considered to be based upon egalitarian ideologies (Caul 1999: 81) and thus being favorable for nominating ethnic minority candidates. Some also point to the importance of differentiating between old and new left parties – the former being traditionally tied to the concerns of the working class, the latter explicitly to minority rights (see, e.g., Caul 1999: 82).

Empirically, the supposed left-right divide at the candidate level (without looking at their chances to win) does not hold true for all countries. For the Canadian case, Jerome H. Black and Bruce M. Hicks (2006: 29) have demonstrated that the Conservatives show the highest percentage of visible minority candidates (in 2004). Similar findings have been reported for the British case. Maria Sobolewska’s (2005: 624) analysis demonstrates that a comparable number of ethnic minority candidates was running as candidates for the three major parties in the 2010 elections (Sobolewska 2005: 624). For other countries, as for instance Germany, the left-right divide (for non-German origin candidates) still (at least for the mid-2000s) holds true (Fonseca 2011: 121 sq.).

Furthermore, the nature of the selection process and here in particular the type of selectorate and the degree of centralization, is cited as a further explanatory variable (see, e.g., Caul 1999; Kittilson and Tate 2005; Sobolewska 2013). I have elaborated this relationship already in Chapter 2.2, that is why I will only briefly summarize the findings. Regarding women candidates, empirical evidence has proven to be mixed. Some studies have established a positive relationship between more exclusive selectorates and the number of women nominated, others have found this relationship only mediated by party and some others have demonstrated that there is no statistically significant relationship at all between type of selectorate and the number of women at the final nomination stage, but only at the initial stage though in the opposite direction (more inclusive selectorates producing
more women candidates). Also restricted to the case of women, Mikki Caul (1999: 81) finds support for the assumption that "[w]eakly institutionalized [that is with a weak rule-oriented recruitment process] parties tend to bias candidate nomination in favor of those who have accumulated 'personal political capital', resources based upon personal status or external group support". Regarding ethnic minority candidates, Jerome H. Black and Bruce M. Hicks (2006: 28 sq.) have stressed the role of search committees aiming to show the party’s inclusiveness by fielding minority candidates when trying to explain the high level of visible minority candidates in the case of the Conservative party. However, further empirical validation of the assumption of the nature of the selection process impacting on the nomination of ethnic minority candidates is still missing.

In this context, several studies dealing with ethnic minority nomination emphasize the role of intra-party networks or organizations. Maritta Soininen (2011: 155), for instance, argues that in particular informal networks within parties, to which members of under-represented groups have traditionally difficulties of access, have a conserving effect, thus strengthen the status quo. In particular in the Swedish case, these networks and informal social contacts appear to be important channels through which search committee members get knowledge about potential candidates (Soininen 2011: 155). In some countries, parties’ internal organizations, and in particular those organizing people with immigrant background, appear to be important actors in mobilizing intra-party support for minority candidates and promoting political careers (Blätte 2015: 230). In his analysis, Andreas Blätte (2014: 148 sq.) can show for Germany that leading figures from these organizations have successfully entered regional, federal and European parliament.

As a further explanatory variable for the under-representation of (ethnic) minorities at the candidate level, scholars emphasize the role of prejudiced selectorates – thus the demand-side of the selection process. As has already been shown in Chapter 2.2, there is some empirical evidence for party selectors being biased against candidates’ ethnic background or skin color in particular because these candidates are perceived to be electorally disadvantageous (imputed discrimination) (Bochel and Denver 1983: 56; Norris and Lovenduski 1995: 136; Soininen 2011: 161). In this context, Alan Ware (1996) has stressed a further point. He argues that giving jobs and other benefits (thus also candidacies) to members of new groups (e.g. immigrant-origin minorities) would imply reducing the number of jobs and benefits given to groups already in the party. Admitting new groups

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40 Outside the party, those organizations also fulfill the function of mobilizing new voters (Blätte 2015: 230).
in the party or not is thus a question of intra-party competition about scarce resources (see also Farrer and Zingher 2018: 3). He concludes that "[...] until the voting strength of a group is so great that it has to be 'taken on board' and given a share of the material benefits, the party is likely to resist giving it very much" (Ware 1996: 80). Jerome H. Black and Bruce M. Hicks (2006: 28) point to the role of local party officials or prominently positioned individuals who want to preserve their hold on power or are uncomfortable with the idea of visible minorities as candidates due to imputed discrimination or also protecting of incumbent MPs (Black and Hicks 2006: 27 sq.).

Closely related to the calculations made by party representatives or those who are in charge to select candidates are arguments pointing to the importance of characteristics of the district or the specific seat in question. Several studies highlight the fact that ethnic or racial as well as immigrant-origin minority candidates are more likely to run in districts with higher shares of ethnic minorities (see, e.g., Black and Hicks 2006: 28; Wüst 2016: 421; see recently Farrer and Zingher 2018: 15). The assumption is that, in particular in the case of candidate-centered electoral systems, parties try to use the ethnic origin of a candidate to mobilize ethnic voters (Black and Hicks 2006: 28), thus as a tool for appealing to minorities voters (Zingher and Farrer 2014: 2). From a strategic point of view, this seems to be electorally successful in particular in areas where ethnic minorities are concentrated in high numbers. Rafaela Dancygier (2013), however, has reported that, in the case of British Muslim candidates, a strong local presence (in terms of numbers) of the minority population does not necessarily lead to better chances for minority candidates to come forward. In economically deprived areas, a strong Muslim presence appears to have a negative impact on the chances of Muslim candidates to get nominated (Dancygier 2013: 12). She concludes that "in constituencies where a large share of Labour’s core support base is likely to feel threatened by Muslim political advances and the economic and religious gains these generate, Muslims find it difficult to gain entry into the Labour Party" (Dancygier 2013: 17). In their recent study, Benjamin Farrer and Joshua N. Zingher (2018) demonstrate that the impact of the ethnic composition of the district interacts with party ideology. Their analysis shows that center-left parties are more responsive to the district population in terms of ethnic background than their center-right counterparts (Farrer and Zingher 2018: 12). Though from the voter perspective, there is neither a clear "yes" nor "no" to the question whether ethnic minority voters vote for ethnic minority candidates. Those who have proven empirical evidence for co-ethnic voting highlight the importance of party effects.
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(positive effects only for Labour, see Zingher and Farrer 2014: 6) or differences between ethnic or religious minorities (see, e.g., Fisher et al. 2014). Regarding the latter, Stephan D. Fisher et al. (2014: 17) have shown that a candidate’s ethnicity and religious denomination cannot be separated, i.e., Pakistani voters are not inclined to vote for non-Pakistani Muslim candidates. Additionally, the co-ethnic voting behavior appears to be limited to specific minority groups (Pakistani and Bangladeshi and not Indians or Blacks voters) (Fisher et al. 2014: 18). At the local level (however limited to only three municipalities in Brussels), Celine Teney et al. (2010) have found that "[...] people who are themselves of immigrant origin vote significantly more often for a candidate of foreign origin than voters without an immigrant background" (Teney et al. 2010: 292).

Finally, several scholars highlight the assumption that ethnic minority candidates are more likely to be nominated in districts that are very hardly (or not at all) to win. The nomination in such districts is thus seen as a strategic act to color the lists (Matland and Studlar 1996: 709) without granting those candidates access to office. There are only few studies trying to validate this assumption for the case of ethnic or immigrant-origin minorities. For instance, Maria Sobolewska (2013: 624) has shown for Great Britain that two-thirds of the ethnic minority candidates of the Conservatives are nominated in unwinnable seats (this holds also true for the Liberal Democrats). However, this pattern cannot be observed for the Canadian case, where non-incumbent visible minority candidates were as likely as their non-visible minority counterparts to be placed in winnable districts (except for the Bloc Québécois) (Black and Hicks 2006: 30 sq.). Raphaela Dancygier (2014) has demonstrated that the chance of Muslim candidates to get nominated (at the local level) depends on a combination of safety of the seat, district magnitude, and minority population size. Her findings indicate that "[...] the tendency to place Muslim candidates on tickets they are unlikely to win is mainly a feature of SMD [single member district] contests. Once again, however, Muslims’ electoral strength conditions this effect and critically shapes Muslims’ entry into local politics (Dancygier 2014: 256).

41 Interestingly, survey experiment data for Canada show that in the Canadian case first and foremost the Conservatives can gain support from ethnic/visible minorities when having run an ethnic candidate (Bird 2011a: 68).
2. Political parties and ethnic minorities

2.4 Political parties and immigrant-origin minorities: concluding remarks

The present chapter sought to investigate the relation between, on the one side, parties as the central political actors linking citizens and the political system and, on the other side, immigrant-origin minorities. In a first step, I focused on the analysis of political parties and their function of selecting candidates for elective office. I argued that parties are complex and diverse political actors who with varying foci pursue a policy, office and/or vote-seeking behavior. Those actors are complex in the sense that they are composed of different intra-party actors with different goals and resources and whose actions are limited by their intra-party rules and norms as well as their external environment. This holds true also for the party function of selecting candidates for elective office. Furthermore, how parties select their candidates can have an impact on the (non)nomination of immigrant-origin candidates, as several studies could show. However, the empirical findings in this regard have not proven to be uniform. Additionally, I have shown that immigrant-origin minorities strongly support left-leaning parties. This could have an impact on the electoral strategies of center-right parties that can expect, in the majority of the countries, only little, if at all, support from immigrant-origin voters. Finally, further factors could be identified that have proven to be beneficial or detrimental to the nomination of immigrant-origin candidates, as for instance the ethnic composition of the district or intra-party networks. In this context, it is worth highlighting that a lack of suitable candidates can also account for the low number of immigrant-origin candidates. Several authors pointed to the supply-side of the legislative recruitment process for explaining under-representation at the candidate level. As the present study focuses on political parties and in particular their candidate selection function, thus on the demand-side, I did not develop this aspect further. Before presenting in Chapter 4 the analytical framework, I will in the next chapter point to some particularities of political parties and the immigrant-origin population in Germany as well regarding their relationship to this specific part of the German population.
Chapter 3

The immigrant origin-population and parties in Germany

The present study deals with the selection of immigrant-origin legislative candidates in Germany. That is why after reviewing the literature on minority representation and on political parties as well as elaborating the central concepts linked to my research question, I will, in what follows, take a closer look at the German case. As the present study investigates deeper into the political representation of the immigrant-origin population, I will, in a first step, provide an overview of what characterizes Germany as a country of immigration. In a second step, I will describe the specific role political parties play in Germany and briefly summarize the main characteristics of its party system. The remainder of the chapter is dedicated to a brief outline of the German parties’ positions towards immigration and integration.

3.1 Germany as a country of immigration

In the present section, I shall give an overview of what characterizes the situation of the minority population under study in the present analysis, that are immigrants and their descendants in Germany. I am doing so because the composition of minority populations as well as their socio-political situation are very country specific. As the present study deals with the 2013 legislative elections, the main focus will be on aspects of immigration in the 21st century. However, to understand
the situation of immigrants and their descendants today, I will additionally briefly touch some important changes in the citizenship regime in the past. This will be done because prior citizenship rules are supposed to have a lasting impact on the political inclusion of immigrants and their descendants, today.

How nations understand their national identity and how these ideas are codified in citizenship laws strongly affects "questions of inclusion within, or exclusion from, the national political community" (Takle 2007: 18). That is why the first part of this section is dedicated to a brief description of the conceptualization of nationhood and citizenship in Germany before giving an overview of the ethnic composition and regional distribution of the immigrant-origin population in Germany. The section concludes with a brief summary of the inclusion of immigrants and their descendants in German politics.

3.1.1 The German conception of nationhood and citizenship

For a long time, the German immigration policy distinguished between different categories of immigrants and in particular between immigrants of German descendant and those without German ancestry. Until the reform of the citizenship law in 1999/2000, the former had more or less automatic access to citizenship (even if their ancestors emigrated hundreds of years ago). For the latter, becoming German citizen was only possible by naturalization. As a consequence, even those who were born in Germany remained, legally, foreigners (Koopmans 1999: 628 sqq.) which means that "[...] the status of 'foreigner' [was] transmitted across generations" (Koopmans 1999: 630). The law then in force (Nationality Act of 22 July 1913 [RuStAG]) dated back to 1913 and was based solely on the *ius sanguinis* meaning that only those with German parents were considered as Germans. Furthermore, the requirements for naturalization were strict implying, amongst others, a minimal permanent residence of 15 years as well as no possibility to legally challenge the administration’s decisions regarding naturalization requests.

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42 According to Marianne Takle (2007: 18), an immigration policy can be defined as "the laws governing immigrants’ access to territory (entry) as well as political rights (citizenship) and measures provided by the state for the integration (social integration) of immigrants".

43 Simon Green (2001: 97 sq.) highlights that a change or even renaming of the RuStAG was not possible before the German reunification because it could have been interpreted as a signal for a separate west German citizenship and thus of an abounding of the "Alleinvertretungsanspruch" (i.e. West Germany represents all Germans) (Green 2001: 86).
3. The immigrant origin-population and parties in Germany

(Takle 2007: 20 sq.). This exclusive citizenship regime (Joppke and Morawska 2014: 30) was reflected in the government’s official position that "Germany is not a country of immigration" (Takle 2007: 17) (even though the size of the immigrant-origin population was in stark contrast to this statement, see Table 3.1). Scholarship argues that this concept of nationality that mainly differentiate between ethnic German and non-German immigrants is closely related to the idea of nationhood as an ethnocultural fact (Brubaker 1992) or, differently put, of a community of descent diametrically opposed to the idea of a community of consent. The latter is based on the idea that everybody who agrees upon common values and institutions is part of the nation (Koopmans 1999: 629 sq.).

In the 1990s, several important changes in the German immigration policy took place. On the one side, by introducing naturalization regulations in the Foreigners’ Act (in 1991, revised in 1993), immigrants became the legal right to citizenship – focusing, form then on, on immigrants’ right and not, as before, on the German self-interest (Green 2001: 95; Takle 2007: 22). On the other side, privileges regarding access to the German territory and further political rights for ethnic German immigrants from Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union ((Spät)Aussiedler) were accorded only to those born before 1993 (Takle 2007: 22). A further important change regarding access to the territory was the so-called asylum compromise in 1992 through which the access of those who sought to claim asylum status in Germany was dramatically restricted (especially through the introduction of the safe-country principle) (Schmidtke 2016: 402). However, it was the Nationality Act (StAG) that came into force in 2000 under the SPD/Greens coalition that fundamentally changed the German citizenship regime. The most crucial change consisted in a break-up with the pure ius sanguinis as the central criterion for entitlement (art. 4(1) StAG) as well as a shortening of the naturalization period for foreigners who lived in Germany for a long time (art. 10 StAG). Citizenship was now given at birth to children of foreign parents if at least one parent lived at least for eight years permanently in Germany and possessed a right of residence for an unlimited period (art. 4(1) StAG). Until the reform of the citizenship law in 2013 (which will not be taken into account because the present study focuses on the 2013 elections), those children who had by birth

44 For a critical discussion of Brubaker’s historical approach to citizenship and especially the strict opposition of ethnic and civic idea of national identity (apparently unable to explain the fundamental changes in German citizenship law in the 1990s, see below) see Hagedorn (2001) or Takle (2007) (similar see also Hansen and Kochler 2005).

45 As it is beyond the scope of this study, we will not discuss the different ideas and theoretical approaches of nationhood. For a detailed discussion see, e.g., Takle (2007), particularly chapter two.
the German as well as the foreign citizenship of their parents had to choose until their 23rd birthday whether to retain the German citizenship (and lose the foreign citizenship of their parents) or the foreign citizenship of their parents and thus lose the German citizenship (art. 29 StAG). The dual citizenship was thus considered only as a time-limited option.\footnote{It is worth highlighting that multiple nationality was possible under certain circumstances (art. 13(2) StAG) for EU-citizens and Switzerland and art. 13(1) for those from countries where citizens are not allowed to give up citizenship.} The second important change introduced by the StAG concerned the shortening of the naturalization period to eight years (plus requirement of language knowledge etc.) (art. 10(1) StAG). Ethnic German immigrants, on the other side, still had a particular status within the citizenship regime. According to article 7 of the StAG ethnic German immigrants acquire the German citizenship by certificate (art. 15 Federal Expellees Act). Due to the fact that they did not become German citizens by naturalization, they were no longer displayed in the official naturalization records. A final important change of the German immigration policy (until 2012) was the Residence Act (AufenthG) that came into force in 2005. By this law, Germany officially acknowledged, for the first time, its status as an immigration country (Rensmann 2014: 72) by introducing a publicly funded integration program, making thus the structural integration of immigrants the responsibility of the state (Takle 2007: 23; Rensmann 2014: 72). In the decades preceding the Residence Act, the official slogan "Germany is not a country of immigration" was in stark contrast to the social facts (increasing numbers of immigrant population, permanent residence of guestworkers and their families). That is why Dietrich Thränhardt (1988) introduced the term of an "undeclared immigration country".

To capture what characterizes Germany as a country of immigration besides the, mainly legal, aspects, I will, in what follows, describe the main characteristics of the immigrant-origin population in Germany.

### 3.1.2 Characteristics of the immigrant-origin population

When describing the non-autochthonous population in the 21st century in Germany, the prevailing term is 'population with immigrant background'. The differentiation between population with and without immigrant background has substituted the former distinction between, on the one side, foreigners and, on the other side, German citizens (Rühl 2009: 5). This happened because of the changes in the...
naturalization legislation as well as in the citizenship regime (that already have
been discussed in the last section). According to its annual Mikrozensus report,
the Federal Statistical Office defines an immigrant background as follows:

"A person has an immigrant background if he or she or at least one of
her/his parents does not hold German citizenship by birth." (Statistisches
Bundesamt 2017c: 4; author’s translation).

According to the Federal Statistical Office, the term "immigrant background"
includes the following categories of immigrants: first generation foreigners as well
as those foreigners who did not immigrate to Germany themselves, naturalized
citizens immigrated themselves to Germany or living in second generation in
Germany, ethnic German immigrants, and German born citizens with parents
belonging to one of the three aforementioned groups. At the same time, this
definition excludes all those persons who have been born abroad, but from parents
without any immigrant background (Statistisches Bundesamt 2017c: 4).

In 2012 (the moment when the first German parties nominated their candidates
for the 2013 legislative elections), 19.1 percent of the population in Germany had
an immigrant background – amongst them 8.1 percent without German citizenship.
Two-thirds of the population with immigrant background can be identified as first
generation immigrants, thus having migrated to Germany themselves (of these
first generation immigrants, a slight majority does not held German citizenship)
(Statistisches Bundesamt 2017c: 7). Regarding the distribution of national origins
of the immigrant-origin population in 2012, four countries stand out numerically:
Turkey, Poland, the Russian Federation, and Kazakhstan (Statistisches Bundesamt
2017c: 7). Table 3.1 shows the numerical importance of these countries since
2006.47 The headline findings within the table are fairly clear. First, among the
about 15 million people with immigrant background Turkish or Turkish-origin
people make up the largest group – about every sixth person with immigrant
origins has Turkish roots. Among the EU-27 countries, which represent about one
third of the population with immigrant background since 2008 (not shown in Table
3.1), people of Polish descendant make up the largest group. Since 2009, they
represent almost 10 percent of the overall population with immigrant background,
followed by people originated from the Russian Federation (about 8 percent),

47 Before 2005, official statistics in Germany only provided information about German citizens
and foreigners, but not about the population with immigrant background, i.e. German
citizens with foreign born parents (Rühl 2009: 5).
3. The immigrant origin-population and parties in Germany

Table 3.1: National origin of the immigrant-origin population in Germany - 2006, 2009, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in 1.000</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>in 1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2,790</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>2,903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1,036</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>1,463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>1,132</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>1,223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (immigrant origin pop.)</strong></td>
<td>15,123</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>15,718</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mikrozensus 2006, 2009, 2012 (see Statistisches Bundesamt [2017a,b,c]); own calculations.

and as the only Asian country of origin with a sizable number of immigrants – Kazakhstan.

However, the term 'immigrant background' not only embraces a multitude of different countries of origin, but also, as already mentioned above, different categories of immigrants. Those immigrant groups correspond, at least partly, to specific countries or regions of origin and, until recently, were treated very differently, in particular regarding their access to citizenship. Especially five such immigrant groups can be identified in post-1945 Western Germany: refugees and expellees of the postwar period, so-called Übersiedler from the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), ethnic German immigrants, guestworkers, asylum seekers and war refugees (Koopmans 1999: 627 sq.; see also Green 2001: 85 sqq.). The first group of immigrants consisted of about eight million refugees and expellees who in the recent postwar period fled from the former German territories in Eastern Europe to the three Western German zones and thus, as Simon Green (2001: 85) puts it, 'were not de jure immigrants at all'. The second group encompasses the about three million GDR residents who came before the construction of the Berlin wall (it goes without saying that there was a second wave of immigration from this group between 1989 and 1990). Third, until 2001 a similar number of ethnic Germans came particularly from Poland, Romania, and the former Soviet Union (Aussiedler and from 1993 on Spätaussiedler) – in particular after 1988 but in lower numbers also during the Cold War (Koopmans 1999: 627). The immigration from the fourth group, the so-called guest-workers, started in 1955 as a consequence of the economic miracle in the 1950s with the first labor recruitment contract signed between the federal German government and Italy, followed by Spain, Greece, Turkey, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia, and Yugoslavia. Until the official termination of the recruitment program in 1973 about 14 million particularly from Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Italy came to Germany; of those, as a consequence of the principle
of rotation, about 11 million returned to their country of origin. However, in contrast to the idea of a temporary stay of the contract workers in Germany, the termination of the recruitment program had the "unintentional side-effect of creating a permanent immigrant minority" (Green 2001: 87). This can be explained by the fact that a large number of those who already had permanent working contracts decided to stay in Germany and bring in their families (Green 2001: 86 sqq.). As (partly) shown above in Table 3.1, the labor migration had far-reaching consequences on the ethnic composition of the immigrant-origin population in Germany. Although in the beginning of the recruitment program, Italians constituted the single largest foreign nationality in Germany, they were quickly followed by the Turks (Green 2001: 87) who make up the the largest single ethnic group until today. Furthermore, more than every third citizen with an immigrant background in 2012 immigrated him- or herself or is born of parents from one of the former recruitment countries ("Gastarbeiteranwerberstaaten") (Statistisches Bundesamt 2017c: 7). In this context, it is also worth highlighting that the GDR also recruited guestworkers. However, in much lower numbers than the Federal Republic and from different countries (mainly from Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique, Cuba and Poland) (Hess and Green 2016: 317 sq.). The last group of immigrants in Germany are asylum seekers and refugees. This group is ethnically highly diverse. Disregarding the recent influx of asylum seekers mainly from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the most dramatic number of asylum seekers came in the early 1990s as a result of the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and in particular the civil war in ex-Yugoslavia (Koopmans 1999: 628; Green 2001: 89 sqq.).

As the present study deals with the political representation of the immigrant-origin population and in particular its access to the political sphere, it is important to make a further distinction – that is between German citizens and those without German citizenship. According to the German Federal Elections Act (BWG), only the former have the right to vote and to run for office at the national level (aliens are not allowed to run for office, but naturalized citizens are) (art. 12(1) and 15(1) BWG, respectively) 48 As depicted in Table 3.2, in 2013, about 5.2 million people with immigrant origins hold German citizenship and were aged 18 years and older, thus had passive and active voting rights – these are 8.5 percent of the German eligible population. When looking at the regional distribution, we can see clear differences between the German states. The highest share of eligible

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48 As in all member states of the European Union, EU-citizens have the right to vote and to run for office at the local level. But, contrary to some other European countries, this right is not attributed to citizens from non-EU countries.
Table 3.2: Immigrant population in Germany - total and eligible population (2012-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Eligible population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in 1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baden-Württemberg</td>
<td>10,541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bavaria</td>
<td>12,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>3,348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brandenburg</td>
<td>2,451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bremen</td>
<td>653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamburg</td>
<td>1,726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hesse</td>
<td>6,005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mecklenburg-Vorpommern</td>
<td>1,603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Saxony</td>
<td>7,778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Rhine-Westphalia</td>
<td>17,547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhineland-Palatinate</td>
<td>3,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saarland</td>
<td>996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saxony</td>
<td>4,049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saxony-Anhalt</td>
<td>2,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schleswig-Holstein</td>
<td>2,804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thuringia</td>
<td>2,175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>80,413</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data for the total population from Mikrozensus 2012 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2017c; 128 sqq.), for the total eligible population from Bundeswahlleiter (2013), and for the eligible population with immigrant background from Konferenz der für Integration zuständigen Ministerinnen und Minister/Senatorinnen und Senatoren (IntMK) der Länder (n.d.).

Notes: Shown are the share of the immigrant-origin population (*with imm.*) from the total population in Germany and of the eligible immigrant-origin population from the eligible German population.

Voters with immigrant background can be found in Bremen, closely followed by Baden-Württemberg, Hamburg, Hesse, and North-Rhine-Westphalia (all between 12.4 and 11.2 percent, see Table 3.2) – all states with also high immigrant rates. One exception that has to be highlighted is the city-state of Berlin where the share of people with immigrant origins is high, the share of those who are also eligible to vote in national election, however, is rather low (24.3% compared to 8.7%). Nevertheless, the share of the total immigrant-origin population and the part that has active and passive voting rights at the state level are strongly correlated (Pearson’s \( r = .98, p < .05 \)). Although it is beyond the scope of this study to further investigate into these numbers, they have to be kept in mind for our further analyses.
Furthermore, when comparing the overall population with immigrant origins to the one with active and passive voting rights, we can observe sharp differences regarding country of origin. On the basis of the 2009 Mikrozensus, Andreas Blätte (2015) shows that German citizens with Turkish-origin constitute only about 10 percent of the eligible population with immigrant background, while within the overall immigrant-origin population about every fifth person is of Turkish-origin (the numbers are similar for citizens from the EU-28 countries). For ethnic German immigrants, quite the opposite is the case: while they constitute only about 25 percent of the population with immigrant roots, they make up up to 55 percent of the eligible population (Blätte 2015: 217 sq.). At least partly, those differences can be explained by differences in the past in the access to citizenship between ethnic German and non-ethnic German immigrants which has been discussed in the preceding section. But, even after the liberalization of the citizenship regime in 1999/2000, the naturalization rates of Turkish-origin citizens remained rather low and even showed a decreasing trend (Blätte 2015: 217).\footnote{It is noteworthy that naturalization rates in Germany are in general low compared to other countries such as France or the Netherlands (Green 2006: 116).} It is, however, beyond the scope of this study to deeper investigate into the reasons of this phenomenon (see here, e.g., Blätte 2015: 217 sq.).

Finally, I will briefly discuss whether or not the term 'immigrant background' needs further differentiation in the German context. I have already alluded to the fact that the population with immigrant origins in Germany is strongly diversified in terms of countries of origin as well as type of immigration (e.g., labor migration, ethnic Germans, refugees). Those different immigrant groups not only have to face different legal challenges regarding, for instance, access to citizenship or labor market, research conducted not only in the German context suggests that they are also perceived and treated differently from the part of the native-born majority population (see, e.g., McLaren 2003: 919; Strijbis 2014: 615; Ford 2011: 1026; Hainmueller and Hangartner 2013: 19). Robert Ford (2011: 1019), for example, highlights the importance of cultural difference by arguing that those from more culturally distinctive regions receive more opposition within the majority population because they are perceived as threat to the cultural unity. In a similar way, Oliver Strijbis (2014) differentiate between in- and outgroups. The latter are at the societal level those groups 'with which most members of the majority group do not identify and which they perceive as directly opposed to them' (Strijbis 2014: 615). For his analysis of the Swiss case, Oliver Strijbis (2014) cites as possible outgroups foreigners, people from South East Europe, Muslims,
Blacks from Sub Saharan Africa, and asylum seekers. Others point to the visibility of the immigrant background as a feature that differentiate members of specific immigrant groups from others (see, e.g., Wüst and Saalfeld [2010] Lhommeau and Simon [2010] Wüst [2014: 4]). That is why the term 'visible minorities' is employed.

In section 3 of the Canadian Employment Act from 1986 visible minorities are defined as 'persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour'. It is noteworthy that the terms of 'colour' or 'race' are not used in continental Europe (Salentin [2014: 27; Wüst [2011: 252]). Nevertheless, this definition applied to the context of continental Europe points to the visibility of an immigrant background due to the physiognomy, language and/or religion and, related to that, the geographical origin (Bloemraad [2013: 656]).

Irene Bloemraad (2013: 655) emphasize the fact that what is considered as an ethnic/visible minority group is time- as well as place-specific. As in the present study, I investigate deeper into what conditions the access to elective office for people with immigrant origins, it appears of great importance to ask whether all kinds of immigrant background are equally disadvantageous (or beneficial) for being nominated as a party’s candidate. That is why I will, in what follows, differentiate between the broader category of immigrant background and the more narrow category of visible minority. However, in contrast to the Canadian definition of visible minorities, none of the above cited European studies gives a clear-cut definition of who is considered to belong to a visible or ethnic minority group; and this holds in particular true for the specific German case. In Chapter 5, I will propose an operationalization of the visible minority concept in the German context. However, to account for the complexity of the concept of immigrant background, the analyses that follow will be done for the broader category of immigrant background as well as for the narrow category of visible minorities.

Having outlined in the previous sections the German conception of citizenship as well as the main characteristics of the immigrant-origin population in terms of ethnic composition and regional distribution, I will, in a last step, briefly review the literature that deals with the political inclusion of this subpopulation in Germany.

50 It is worth noting that some scholars, as, for instance, Kurt Salentin [2014: 27), use the term 'ethnic minority' to point to the visibility of an immigrant background.
3.1.3 The political inclusion of the immigrant-origin population in Germany

In the last two sections, I have shown that the immigrant-origin population constitute a growing segment of the German society in the 21st century. At the same time, an important part of this subgroup was until recently excluded from citizen rights because of their status as foreigners and the rather exclusive citizenship regime. As the present study deals with the chances and barriers immigrant-origin aspirants face in the candidate selection process for the 2013 legislative elections, I will, in what follows, briefly summarize the main findings regarding the general political inclusion of this subgroup. It is noteworthy in this context that the focus here is on the inclusion within politics in the receiving society (and not on the so-called homeland-oriented political participation, see here, e.g., Ögelman 2003).

The political inclusion of the immigrant-origin population in Germany was for a long time limited to two marginal institutions: the federal and local Foreigners’ Commissioners (Ausländerbeauftragte) (now known at the federal level as Commissioners of the Federal Government for Migration, Refugees and Integration) and the local Foreigners’ Advisory Councils (Ausländerbeiräte) (Koopmans 1999: 635). Both were characterized by having very few resources as well as only an advisory status and thus no power within the decision-making process (Koopmans 1999: 635; Diehl and Blohm 2001: 407; Peucker 2016: 125). The latter were, and still are, elected by the local residents of foreign origin (foreigners and naturalized citizens) (Peucker 2016: 125). These limited possibilities for political participation and representation were mainly due to the exclusive citizenship regime outlined above and the related active and passive voting rights that are at the national level only granted to German citizens and at the local and European level exclusively to EU-citizens.

What characterizes the political inclusion of immigrant-origin citizens in the 21st century in Germany? Until now, only little research has been conducted about this issue in the German case (but see Diehl and Urbahn 1998; Wüst 2004; 2012). In the previous chapter, I have briefly touched the question of turnout rates of the immigrant-origin population. Past research had shown that their turnout rates are lower than the one of the population without immigrant origins. For Germany, Andreas M. Wüst (2012: 170) has demonstrated that this finding does not apply to the particular group of guest-workers and their descendants; for the remaining immigrant groups, lower turnout rates could be observed for the first generation of immigrants. In this context, Andreas M.Wüst (2012) highlights that the lower
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Turnout rates for ethnic German immigrants were probably due to the distribution of participation related attitudes within this immigrant group. The left-leaning tendency regarding vote choice of the former guest-workers and their descendants as well as the (in the last years decreasing) preference for the mainstream right in the case of citizens with origins in the former Soviet Union and Romania was already outlined in Chapter 2.3.1. From the supply-side, that is the parties, this party attachment was explained by a monocultural versus multicultural cleavage around the question of who belongs to the political community. According to Andreas M. Wüst (2004: 356), the monocultural pole is linked to the idea of an ethnically exclusive German nationality which was served by the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU)/Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU), resulting in a close relationship between these two parties and ethnic German immigrants. I will come back to the positioning of the German parties towards the immigration issue later in this chapter.

A further, and in the present study the most important, feature of the political inclusion of immigrant-origin citizens in the host society is their representation at the parliamentary level. As already pointed out, research on the representation of the immigrant-origin population in Germany is still scarce. What can be summarized for the existing studies is that their political representation is still, at all political levels, low compared to their share within the German population (see, e.g., Bloemraad 2013: 659; Schönwälder 2013: 635); with, however, an increase in numbers in the recent years (for the regional level, see Schönwälder 2013; for the local level, see Schönwälder et al. 2013: 481). For the regional level, Karen Schönwälder (2013) points to strong regional differences (i.e. between the German länder) with the three city-states as the frontrunner where more than 60 percent of all immigrant-origin regional representatives had been elected in 2011 (Schönwälder 2013: 639). As explanation for this phenomenon, Karen Schönwälder (2013: 647) emphasizes the composition of the immigrant population (low shares of ethnic Germans and high shares of Turkish-origin citizens in some city-states), institutional differences (personal vote, high number of seats), a more open-minded electorate and the existence of a dense network and communication structure in metropolitan cities.

In terms of numbers, only five MPs with an immigrant background could be identified on the national, regional and EU-level combined, in 1990; this number

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51 In a previous study, Andreas M. Wüst (2004) had shown that former citizenship, year of naturalization or birth in Germany did not prove to have a significant impact on voter turnout of naturalized German citizens. It is in particular the age composition of this group that leads to slightly lower turnout levels (Wüst 2004: 348 sq.; see similar Wüst 2006).
was multiplied by six in 2001 (31) and once again more than doubled in 2008 (65) (Wüst 2011: 253 sqq.). Regarding the two legislative elections for the Bundestag preceding the present study, Table 3.3 shows that eleven first and second generation immigrant-origin MPs out of 612 MPs were elected in 2005. At the same time, 4.7 million out of 61.887.711 eligible German citizens had an immigrant background – that are individuals of German nationality aged 18 years and older. Accordingly, 1.8 percent of all MPs in the Bundestag in 2005 had immigrant origins compared to 7.6 percent within the eligible population (parity ratio of 0.24). Doing the same calculations for the 2009 legislative elections, we can see that 20 MPs out of 622 had an immigrant background (3.2 percent) compared to 5,534,000 out of 62.168.000 eligible German citizens (8.9 percent) (see Table 3.3). The parity ratio – as a measurement for the parliamentary representation of minorities (Bloemraad 2013: 657 sq.) – thus increased from 0.24 to 0.36 (0 indicating no representation and 1 perfect descriptive representation, see Bloemraad (2013: 658)). As pointed to in the previous chapter, the increasing number of immigrant-origin representatives cannot be observed at the candidate level (8.7 percent of immigrant-origin candidates in 1990 compared to 4.0 percent in 2005, see Fonseca (2011: 120)). This decline is due to a tremendous drop of those of German ancestry among immigrant-origin candidates (at the same time, the number of non-German origin candidates is strongly increasing) (Fonseca 2011: 121).

A further point that can be observed for all political levels, is the strong presence of Turkish-origin citizens among representatives with immigrant background in Germany (Wüst 2011: 253). At first sight, this finding is somehow surprising. As already outlined above, they make up the largest immigrant group in Germany, this is, however, not reflected in the eligible population in Germany. Furthermore, their average educational level is lower than in other immigrant groups.

Table 3.3: Share of immigrant-origin MPs in the German Bundestag compared to their share in the eligible population – 2005 & 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th></th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>% in 1.000</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant-origin</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non immigrant-origin</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>98.2</td>
<td>602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>622</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data for immigrant-origin MPs from Wüst (2014) and Wüst and Saalfeld (2010), for the total eligible population from Bundeswahlleiter (n.d.[c]), and for the eligible population with immigrant background from Ministerium für Kinder, Familie, Flüchtlinge und Integration des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen (n.d.[a],[b]).
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(Schönwälder et al. 2013: 485) which is considered disadvantageous for a political career (Norris and Lovenduski 1993: 386 sqq.). At the same time, it is widely acknowledged that Turkish immigrants and their descendants constitute an immigrant group that is highly organized within civil society (Diehl and Blohm 2001: 409; Blätte 2015: 213; Schönwälder 2013: 642). Scholarship has established high organizational levels for not directly migration related organizations such as labor unions (Wüst 2004: 346; Berger et al. 2004: 499) but also for immigrant-origin associations (Ögelman 2003: 166) and especially political immigrant organizations having close links to German parties (Blätte 2014: 138) (see also Chapter 2.3.2). Gökçe Yurdakul (2006: 444 sq.), for example, shows for the case of two Turkish immigrant associations in Berlin that there are (close) links to German parties (not only the Social Democrats, also the Conservatives in the case of the religious orientated/conservative organization). Furthermore, Maria Berger et al. (2004: 503) demonstrate that, for Turks, trade-union membership is positively related to political participation (this holds true also for Italians). And also regarding political activities towards the country of origin, there is empirical evidence that this kind of activity is positively related to political participation in the host country (see, e.g., Berger et al. 2004: 504). Claudia Diehl and Michael Blohm (2001: 414) have demonstrated that only membership in both, ethnic and German voluntary associations, impacts positively on interest in politics of the host country. These findings point to a high political mobilization potential of the group of Turkish-origin citizens in Germany. Furthermore, from an electoral/recruitment perspective, these societal organizations are not only seen "as representative and consultative bodies in immigrant issues [for the institutions of the host country]" (Yurdakul 2006: 436), but they can also serve as multiplicators for parties. Being able to mobilize this specific electorate, they make of the Turkish-origin voters an interesting immigrant electorate to target (Blätte 2015: 213). This can be done, for instance, by recruiting and nominating Turkish-origin candidates (Blätte 2015: 223) which in turn is reflected in the comparatively high level of Turkish-origin representatives.

52 For an overview of the associational landscape of immigrant-origin association of mainly Turkish origin citizens in Germany, see, e.g., Ögelman (2003).

53 Their are similar findings regarding the group of Turkish-origin immigrants in Denmark (see, e.g., Togeby 2004).

54 It is worth highlighting that, contrary to Turkish-origin citizens, former citizens of the Soviet Union show rather low degrees of union-membership (Wüst 2004: 346). This holds equally true for political interest and political knowledge (Wüst 2004: 347).
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To summarize, the population with immigrant background in Germany has grown fast over the last decades – making up now about one fifth of the total German population. Furthermore, the German conception of citizenship has restricted the access of immigrants and their descendants to the political sphere for years – meaning that not only first generation immigrants were unable to fully participate in politics, but also the following generations (Donovan 2007: 466). At the same time and in contrast to these observations, mainly Turkish-origin citizens appear to be well represented in elected bodies. It is important to keep these findings in mind- when analyzing the nomination of immigrant-origin candidates for the 2013 legislative election in Chapter 6.

3.2 Political parties in Germany

The present study not only deals with the immigrant-origin population in Germany, it is first and foremost an analysis of the inner life of political parties and especially of the candidate selection processes. That is why, in what follows, I will summarize the specific role of parties in Germany. In a first step, I will tackle the main characteristics of parties in Germany by focusing on the legal and institutional aspects as well as on the parties’ societal connection. Second, I briefly outline the legal and institutional framework of the selection of legislative candidates as one of the most important party functions and of special interest in the present study. And, finally, I briefly summarize the main structural and ideological characteristics of the German party system.

3.2.1 Legal and institutional framework and parties’ societal ties

Political parties play an important role in German politics. This can be illustrated by the fact that they are incorporated in the constitution (Tsatsos 1997: 133). Their principal functions as well as their obligations are clearly defined in article 21 of the Basic Law and completed by the German Act on Political Parties (PartG). The latter serves as a framework that is in turn completed by further legal sources as for example the law of associations in the German German Civil Code (BGB), the Federal Elections Act (BWG) and finally the parties’ statutes (Tsatsos 1997).
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137). Article 21(1) of the Basic Law defines the parties’ principal functions and their obligations as follows:

*1) Political parties shall participate in the formation of the political will of the people. They may be freely established. Their internal organisation must conform to democratic principles. They must publicly account for their assets and for the sources and use of their funds." (Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz n.d.)

The importance of political parties within the German political system can be illustrated additionally by the fact that the German Bundestag, as the most important institution in the political decision-making process (Morlok 2013: 243), is qualified as a "Fraktionenparlament" (Schüttemeyer 1998: 12). This term points to the important role of parliamentary groups (so-called Fraktionen) regarding the functioning of the German parliament (Morlok 2013: 243). Furthermore, due to Germany’s federal structure (16 länder with 16 state parliaments), German parties are important actors at the federal as well as at the state level (Morlok 2013: 250). Additionally, the federal structure not only impacts on the party in public office (i.e. the parliamentary party), but also on the two other party faces, that are the party on the ground (party membership) as well as the party central office (party executive) (Poguntke 1994: 186).

Furthermore, at the electoral level, elections in Germany are conducted mainly along party lines (Katz 1986: 43). The Members of the Bundestag are elected by proportional representation (second ballot) combined with the personal election of candidates (first ballot). As the overall distribution of seats in parliament mainly depends on the second ballot where voters vote for closed party lists, the party can be qualified as more important than the candidate vote (Roberts 1988: 96). And also the elections of the candidates in the districts, the first ballot, are seen as first and foremost party elections due to the importance of the party label during electoral campaign (Nohlen 2014: 381), but also on the election day (Brettschneider and Gabriel 2002: 128). Furthermore, the recruitment of the political elite is done almost exclusively, at least for national elections, by political parties. The candidate selection function of political parties is clearly defined in article 1,2 of the PartG stating that, amongst others, they *[...] shall participate...
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in forming the people’s political will in all fields of public life, in particular by
[...] participating in elections at the federal, Land and local levels by nominating
candidates' (art. 1(2) PartG). The candidate selection function of parties in
Germany is strongly connected to the principle of internal democracy, defined in
article 21(1) of the Basic Law (see above). From this follows that the criteria for
the selection process have to conform to democratic principles. I will come back
to this point later in this chapter.

The principal of internal democracy, as stipulated in Basic Law, not only
applies to the selection of candidates but also to the parties’ organizational
structure in general. From this follows that not only the processes by which
candidates are nominated have to conform to democratic principles, but also those
processes (and bodies) by which the party assemblies and party executives are
composed. According to article 9 and 11 of the Party Law (that specifies the
need of internal democracy formulated in the Basic Law) there is a limitation of
so-called "ex-officio memberships" within party assemblies and party executives

Furthermore, the institutional setting, and here mainly the federal system
impacts on the characteristics of political parties in Germany in the way that
they are fragmented in multiple ways (Poguntke 1997: 264). The federal structure
of the German political system has a multiplying and at the same time unifying
effect. The former points to, as already mentioned above, the multiplication of
party (sub)units on all political levels. In this context, it is worth noting that
German parties can be conceived as "federations of more or less independent and
powerful Land organizations" (Poguntke 1994: 187; italics in original) highlighting
the important role of the state level in Germany. Furthermore, the federal system
impacts in a unifying manner on German parties in the way that, within the state
branches, all parties have more or less the same organizational structure: at the
lowest level there are the local party branches (Ortsverein/-verband), followed
by the Kreisverbände or in the case of the SPD the Unterbezirke, and finally the
branches at the state level (in the case of the SPD also Bezirke below the Land
level) (Poguntke 1997: 265).\footnote{It is worth highlighting that also the extra-parliamentary faces of the the parties are charac-
terized by similar internal structure (for more details, see, e.g., Poguntke 1997: 266 sqq.).}

As the previous paragraphs have mainly dealt with the party in government
and party organization (Key 1964), a final word has to be said about the party
in the electorate and thus the party-society linkage for the four parties under
study. In the German case, this relationship is not only characterized by parties

56
as membership organizations, but also by their multiple collateral organizations such as party’s youth or women’s organizations (Bukow and Poguntke 2013: 183). Those organizations are responsible for targeting specific societal groups and connecting those groups to the party. There are a variety of such organizations in Germany and the parties differ in terms of numbers of such organizations (Poguntke 1997: 262). The SPD, for instance, is characterized by a multitude of so-called ancillary organizations (Poguntke 1994: 201) meaning that they are fully integrated within the party organizations and that party membership in both (i.e. the party and the ancillary organization) is required (Poguntke 2002: 49). This rather thick party organization in the case of the SPD can also be seen as a contemporary manifestation of its past as a class-mass or mass integration party representing the working class (Ware 1996: 114; Gunther and Diamond 2003: 179). Thomas Poguntke (1997: 262) emphasizes that this can to a certain degree also be said for the CDU and the Radical Left (Die Linke). It is noteworthy in this context that already Otto Kirchheimer (1966) at least doubted the qualification of the CDU as a classical mass integration party by pointing to its multidenominational character (Panebianco 1988: 115). He highlighted that "[i]n the CDU, ideology was from the outset only a general background atmosphere, both all-embracing and conveniently vague enough to allow recruiting among Catholic and Protestant denominations" (Kirchheimer 1966: 187). In its beginnings the Christian Democrats were a rather weak institutionalized party with rather autonomous federal organizations (Panebianco 1988: 115) and a strong dependence on its societal environment (Panebianco 1988: 121). Even though the party became more institutionalized in the 1960s/70s (Panebianco 1988: 123), it still has a tradition of strong collateral organizations⁵⁷ that serve as "important power bases for party careers [...] [due to] their ability to control relevant power resources like money or strategically indispensable segments of the electorate" (Poguntke 1994: 200). The Greens, on the other hand, had in its beginnings no and still have only very few collateral organizations. Instead, and functionally more or less equivalent, they have so-called "Arbeitsgemeinschaften" (working groups) that are rather ideological or thematically organized than by segmental interests (Poguntke 1994: 202). They also have rather strong (informal) ties to new social movements (Poguntke 2002: 48) – underlying their character as a movement party (Gunther and Diamond 2003: 188). The latter are characterized by a

⁵⁷ The CDU’s collateral organizations were traditionally affiliated organizations meaning that membership in the party is not necessarily required; this has recently however changed (Bukow and Poguntke 2013: 183).
very heterogeneous member base and strong commitment to direct participation (Gunther and Diamond 2003: 188 sq.).

3.2.2 The intra-party level: candidate selection as a process constraint by the legal and institutional context

In the last subsection, I argued that parties in Germany are multiply fragmented organizations – fragmented, however, in a unifying manner. These similar organizational structures are mainly due to the constitutional and legal (Act on Political Parties, Electoral Law) framework that puts rather strong constraints on party organization. This holds also true for the party function which at several times has been described as the probably most important function political parties perform nowadays (see, e.g., Gallagher 1988b: 3; Scarrow et al. 2000: 138; Hazan and Rahat 2010: 6). Contrary to the majority of Western European countries, candidate nomination in Germany is regulated in detail by law (Ranney 1981: 81; Schüttemeyer and Sturm 2005: 541). Additionally, candidate selection (for the Bundestag) is strongly influenced by the impact of one central institutional feature of the German political system, namely the electoral system as a mixed-member proportional system (Shugart and Wattenberg 2001: 1) characterized by a combination of regional closed-list proportional representation with a nominal plurality vote in single-member districts (Manow 2015: 3). This means that half of the MPs are elected from closed party lists in the states (länder) and the other half by relative majority in single member districts (plurality tier) (art. 1,2 BWG). Accordingly, there are two different formally separated modes of candidate selection located on two different levels: the ranking of candidates on the party list is determined in conventions at the state level, district candidates are selected at the district level.

As already mentioned in the previous subsection, the selection of candidates has to conform to the principle of internal democracy as stipulated in article 21,1 of the Basic Law. The Act on Political Parties (PartG), Electoral Law, and the parties’ statutes regulate how this constitutional requirement for internal democracy is applied to the candidate selection process (Schüttemeyer and Sturm 2005: 541).

According to article 17 of the PartG, the selection of candidates for elective office has to be done by secret ballot. This is required for the nomination of the candidates in the districts (art. 21,3 BWG), but also for the ranking of the candidates on the party list (art. 27,5 BWG). The parties’ statutes – and more
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precisely their Verfahrungsordnungen and Wahlordnungen - then regulate how the nomination of the candidates is done in detail (art. 21.5 and 27.5 BWG).

Furthermore there are strict requirements regarding the selectorate that are those who nominate the candidates for elective office. As already mentioned, the German electoral system for the Bundestag calls for two formally separated nomination procedures. Regarding the nomination of candidates for single-member races in the constituencies, this must be done either by a general membership meeting or by a delegate constituency convention. In the case of the latter, the delegates have to be elected by the party members living in the district and being eligible to vote (art. 21,1 BWG). According to art. 21,3 of the Electoral Law, this has also to be done by secret ballot. Past research has shown that at least in the case of the major parties in Germany, candidate selection is in most cases done by delegation conventions. Marion Reiser (2011: 245), for instance, has demonstrated for the 2009 legislative elections that about 70 percent of all district nominations of the CDU/CSU, SPD, and the Left Party (only East Germany) have been done by delegate conventions. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that, at least for the case of the 2009 elections, the CDU nominated more district candidates by membership meetings than the SPD (about 52 percent compared to 14 percent) (Reiser 2011: 245). Regarding the party lists at the state level, there is, according to Electoral Law (art. 27.5 BWG), also the possibility of nomination by a membership meeting or by a delegate convention. As for at the district level, the delegates have also be elected by secret ballot (art. 27.5 BWG). To the author’s knowledge, there is, up to now, no knowledge about the frequency of these two types of selectorates at the state level. Regarding the selectorate, we can conclude that, according to Electoral Law, the party on the ground (the rank-and-file party members assembled in membership meetings or delegate conferences) is the main formal selector (Höhne 2013: 75). However, at least for the case of the district candidates, electoral law stipulates that the executive board at state level has the possibility to object the nomination of district candidates (art. 21(4) BWG). Scholarship points to the fact that the consequence of such an objection is merely that the selection procedure is repeated. In day-to-day politics, trying to intervene in local business is usually seen as counter-productive (see, e.g. Reiser 2014). It appears that there are rather local and regional power centres that intervene in the selection process than the party executive at the state level (Poguntke 1994 188 sq.). Those aspects of the selection process will be analyzed in detail for the 2013 legislative elections in Chapter 6.

The fact that the two nomination procedures are formally two separate processes does not mean that they are completely separated. Quite the contrary, in
reality the nomination in the district and at the state level can hardly be separated from one another. First, candidates often run for office in the district and on the party list simultaneously (so-called dual candidacies). Klaus Detterbeck (2016: 4) demonstrates that since 1990 about 30 percent of all candidates for the federal elections have run for the district and on the party list simultaneously – with, although small, inter-party differences. For the 2009 elections, Marion Reiser (2013: 131) indicates that 86 percent of all elected MPs have run as dual candidates (for an historical overview see Manow and Nistor 2009: 608). This leads to the second point, namely the observation that a district candidacy is often regarded as a precondition for promising list positions. Suzanne S. Schüttemeyer and Roland Sturm (2005: 548) highlight that the selectorate might call for district candidatures in order to be placed favorably on the party list because such candidates have proven to do also hard work on the ground that is in the district.

Finally, regarding the question of who can be nominated as candidate for legislative office, German electoral law stipulates that, equally to the active voting rights, only German citizens have the right to run for office at the national level (art. 15(1) BWG). Further legal requirements concern the minimum age of the candidate running for legislative office (18 years) (art. 15(1) BWG) (but no maximum age as in some other countries (see, e.g., Gallagher 1988a: 247) as well as all not having been excluded from the right to vote (art. 15(2) BWG)).

To briefly sum up, according to the "official story" (Bukow and Poguntke 2013: 180), candidate selection in Germany is characterized by its democratic nature (vote by secret ballot, legally defined selectorate), a decentralized locus of nomination (in the district and at the state level), different types of selectorates (delegate conventions and membership meetings) at different levels, and rather inclusive requirements concerning candidacy. The fact that the nomination in the district and at the state level are two formally separated processes leads to the characterization of the selection process as a mixed candidate selection system implying that different potential candidates face different selectorates in often different locations (Rahat and Hazan 2001: 299 sq.). In reality, however, due to the widespread practice of the dual candidacies a substantial part of the aspiring candidates face both selectorates, while the remaining aspirants either face the selectorate in the district or at the state level.

It is worth highlighting that I will not refer to a multi-stage selection method (Rahat and Hazan 2001: 300) for the German case because the two nomination processes are not conceived as a two necessary consecutive processes, at least from a formal point of view.
3.2.3 Ideological and structural characteristics of the party system

After having focused, in the last sections, on parties in general and on the intra-party level, the following section is dedicated to the inter-party level, that is the party system and its component parties. Parties within a party system interact and the mode of interaction is mainly competition for elective office and the control of government (Wolinetz 2006: 51). Furthermore, the mode of interaction between parties has not to be exclusively of competitive nature, parties also co-operate (Ware 1996: 7). When describing (or comparing) party systems it is thus important to study the parties that form the party system as well as the patterns of interactions between these component parties (Niedermayer 2013a: 739). The party (system) literature provides a large number of properties to describe party systems (see, e.g., Wolinetz 2006: 52 sqq.; Niedermayer 2013b: 85 sqq.). In a nutshell it can be distinguished between quantitative and qualitative party system characteristics (Niedermayer 2013b: 85) that can be measured at the parliamentary as well as at the electoral level. The former mainly encompass system properties such as the absolute number of parties, their relative sizes, or the question whether or not the relation between the parties is balanced or not. The latter mostly deal with "the position of parties on the ideological spectrum" (Blondel 1968: 187).

First, what characterizes the German (national) party system from a numerical point of view? Regarding the number and strength of the parties at the parliamentary level, it is well known that Germany evolved from a two-and-a-half-party system with two major parties, namely the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democrats (SPD), and the smaller Liberals (FDP), the so-called "Bonn parties", to a so-called "fluid five-party system" (Poguntke 2012: 3; Niedermayer 2013a: 753). The development towards this fluid five-party system started with the emergence of the Greens at the national level.

It is worth highlighting that, because the present study deals with the selection of candidates for the 2013 legislative elections, I will not discuss the developments of the party system resulting from the 2013 elections (neither the 2017 elections).

CSU is the Bavarian sister party of the CDU. Although they are two different parties, since 1949, they appear as one parliamentary group in the German Bundestag (Weigl 2013: 471). Furthermore, as the CSU only runs in Bavaria and the CDU in the other 15 remaining states, neither at the electoral nor at the parliamentary level they compete against each other (Niedermayer 2013a: 740). That is why, in the present study, they will be analyzed together. I will only refer explicitly to the CDU or CSU respectively, when there are particularities that merit special attention.
for the first time in 1983, and finally, the Radical Left (Die Linke, the merger of the former governing party in the GDR the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) and the newly founded West German Labour and Social Justice - The Electoral Alternative (WASG)) (Poguntke 2012: 3 sq.). At the electoral level, we can therefore observe an increasing level of party system fragmentation since the beginning of the 1980, and in particular since 2002 (Poguntke 2012: 6). Regarding the vote share of the two major parties, it is worth noting that, at the federal level, the Social Democrats were able only twice to become the largest party. Most of the time the symmetry of the party system was in favor of the Christian Democrats, though sometimes the relation between CDU/CSU and SPD was more balanced than in other times (Poguntke 2012: 8 sq.). However, what we can also observe, and this is strongly related to a stronger fragmentation of the party system, is what Thomas Poguntke (2012: 2) calls a "vanishing hold of the catch-all parties", namely the Social Democrats and the Christian Democratic Parties (see also Allen 2009: 643 sq.). This points to the fact that since at least the 2002 elections the two major parties are decreasingly able to catch up large parts of the electorate.

A final word regarding the quantitative properties of the German party system has to be said about the level of volatility because it gives a hint about trends in party loyalty (Poguntke 2012: 12) or more generally about the citizen attachment towards parties (Dalton 2012: 43). Dalton (2012: 43), for instance, shows that about 25 percent of the voters who had voted also in the 2005 elections cast their vote for another party than they did in 2005. Although it is a measurement at the aggregate level, a high level of volatility can also be seen as an indicator for an increase in the level of "available voters" that is those "who [are] willing to consider modifying [their] party choice" (Bartolini 2002: 93). Available voters in turn can be conceived as an important condition for party competition (Bartolini 2002: 94).

Additionally to the purely numerical characteristics, it is also important to study the qualitative properties of the party system that is in particular the ideological polarization and thus the position of the parties within the ideological spectrum. In the last decades and at least until recently, the German party system was characterized by a two-dimensional rather weak cleavage structure.

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61 It is worth highlighting that there are strong differences regarding party strength in the Eastern and Western German states. In almost all Eastern states the Left party was, until the 2017 elections, the leading or second important force, the Greens and FDP almost no relevance. That is why Thomas Poguntke (2012: 4) speaks of a "split party system".

62 Simon Franzmann and André Kaiser (2006: 175) show in their analysis of German party manifestos that there is a great amount of valence issues (in contrast to position issues). This underscores the observation of a rather low polarization of the German party system.
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The economic dimension is represented by a cleavage around the question of state intervention into the economic sphere (social protectionism vs. market liberalism (Pappi and Seher 2009: 405)) (Niedermayer 2013a: 747). This cleavage began to be salient in the 1960s when it modified the former economic cleavage that differentiated between ideas related to small business/self-employed and employee/unionist ideas (Niedermayer 2013a: 745 sqq.). The welfare-state cleavage was originally occupied by the Social Democrats as strongly anchored in the unionized blue-collar worker electorate on the left side (Scarrow 2004: 86) and the Christian Democrats on the right side. However, from the end of the 1990s on (with Gerhard Schröder’s so-called 'Agenda 2010' and thus a movement more towards the center), the SPD lost more and more ground (on the economic dimension) to the far-left party 'Die Linke' (Debus 2009: 283; Niedermayer 2013a: 752). The non-economic dimension was once represented by the state-church cleavage. As this cleavage has lost importance, the non-economic dimension is since the 1970/80s strongly associated with the materialism/post-materialism cleavage (Kriesi et al. 2006: 923). The two opposite poles on this cleavage can be labeled as the Gal (green/alternative/libertarian) and the Tan (traditionalism/authority/nationalism) pole (Marks et al. 2006: 157). The emergence of the German Greens in the late 1970s was a clear consequence of this newly emerged cleavage which at the Gal-pole focuses on so-called new politics such as for instance equal rights for sexual/ethnic/gender minorities, participatory democracy, ecology, unilateral disarmament, and solidarity with third world (Poguntke 1987: 78 sq.). Christina Boswell and Dan Hough (2008: 335) highlight that at latest since the 1990s the CDU became more clearly a center-right party, in particular due to its position on the non-economic dimension. However, in the last years the Christian Democrats under the leadership of Angela Merkel moved more and more towards the center of the Gal-Tan continuum by giving up "several conservative taboos ranging from gay marriage to the preference for parental child care at home" (Poguntke 2012: 16; see also Jun and Jakobs 2015: 148 sq.), the Tan-pole was, in the years preceding the 2013s elections, not occupied (at least at the federal level). Although scholarship unanimously agrees upon this observation, it can

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63 It is noteworthy that, since their emergence, the Social Democrats have also lost voters to the Greens (Langguth 2004: 141).

64 New left parties can also be qualified as left-libertarian parties. The main characteristic of so-called left-libertarian parties is their critique towards the logic of societal development and the institutions of the postwar period (Kitschelt 1988: 194 sq.). According to Herbert Kitschelt (1988: 197) the label 'left' in this context highlights their opposition to the market place and insistence on solidarity and equality, while the libertarian label points to the rejection of centralized bureaucracies, promotion of individual autonomy and participation.
also be shown that prior to the 2013 elections the CDU/CSU still remained the "only established parties that tend to head towards authoritarian values" (Jun and Jakobs 2015: 148), in particular in the policy fields of security and immigration (Jun and Jakobs 2015: 143). And this statement holds particularly true for the CSU, the sister party of the CDU that runs for elections only in Bavaria. The Christian Social Union has been and still is traditionally more conservative than its non-Bavarian counterpart (Boswell and Hough 2008: 335; Poguntke 2012: 16).

To briefly sum up, this section has shown that German parties occupy a prominent position within the political system and that regarding their intra-party organizational and procedures they have to comply with German laws (among others Basic Law, Party Law, Electoral laws). This holds in particular true for the process of candidate selection which is strongly conditioned by the need for internal democracy. Additionally, the institutional setting strongly impacts on the parties’ structure – in the way that German parties are horizontally and vertically fragmented actors. The German fluid five-party system can, at least until the 2013 legislative elections, be qualified as a classic example for a party system of moderate pluralism (Sartori 1976). This can be illustrated by the fact that for a long period it was characterized by centripetal modes of competition because of the lack of relevant extreme left- and right-wing parties (Poguntke 2012). Until the 2013 elections, electoral competition mainly took place between, on the one side, the two major parties (SPD vs. CDU/CSU), and, on the other side, the three small parties (Left party, Free Democratic Party (FDP), Greens regarding race on third position) (Niedermayer 2013a: 753). After having described the main conflict structure of the contemporary German party system as well as the parties’ position within the ideological space, I will elaborate, in what follows, more in detail the parties’ position towards the specific issues of immigration and integration.

65 It is worth noting that the location of the major German parties within the ideological space has been shown only in a nutshell. There is an enormous stream of literature that deals with the correct location of parties within ideological space (see, e.g., Gabel and Huber 2000; Franzmann and Kaiser 2006; Pappi and Seher 2009). Because it is beyond the research question, I will not elaborate this issue more in detail.

66 It goes without saying that this observation holds true until the 2013 elections. Already in the aftermath of these elections it became evident that there is a change undergoing in the German party system that points to a broaden of the ideological spectrum (emergence of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD)).
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3.3 German parties and the immigration issue

Immigration is supposed to have various impacts on national politics (Alonso and Fonseca 2011: 865). As we have seen in the first sections of this chapter, the German Federal Republic (GFR) has a history of immigration that goes back to its beginnings after World War II (WWII). I have also shown that the composition of the immigrant-origin population changed over the decades – from refugees and expellees from the former German territories in the postwar period to first generation guest workers of diverse origins in the 1970s and ethnic Germans in the 1990s to more and more second or even third generation (German) citizens with immigrant background. The main changes that occurred over the years at the policy level have already been expounded in the first section of this chapter. However, immigration is also supposed to have consequences on party politics in general and party competition in particular (Alonso and Fonseca 2011: 865). Before, in the next chapters, exploring in detail how immigration impacts on the political elite (and more specifically on legislative candidates), I will, in what follows, based on existing research in this field, outline how the major German parties deal with immigration and integration as a policy issue. I am doing so because when studying the barriers and chances for the selection of immigrant-origin candidates, identifying the parties’ general position towards the immigration issue appears of great importance.

In this context it is worth highlighting that there are several methods to measure party positions - be it their general location within the ideological space or their position vis-à-vis specific policy issues such as immigration and integration. Scholarship mainly points to party elite positioning, citizens’ perceptions of party positions, expert evaluations such as the Chapel Hill expert survey (see, e.g., Bakker et al. 2015), and party manifestos such as the Comparative Manifesto Project (Dalton and McAllister 2015: 764 sq.). Manifestos can be seen as "formal blueprints for party positions" (Dalton and McAllister 2015: 764) and in general "reflect the majority opinion of a party" (Jun and Jakobs 2015: 129) even if individual party members may deviate from the official party line (Odmalm 2012: 5). It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the pros and cons of these methods, but several studies have found that the majority of these methods (highly) correlate (see, e.g., Ruedin 2013a: 100; Dalton and McAllister 2015: 766 sq.).

Furthermore, it is noteworthy that there are only very few recent works analyzing the immigration and integration issue for the case of Germany (but see Tietze 2008; Wüst 2016; Kortmann and Stecker 2017). In what follows, I
will briefly summarize the main findings regarding the salience (i.e. the priority parties attach to specific issues) and the parties’ position (Kortmann and Stecker 2017: 4) regarding the immigration and integration issue.

First, regarding the salience of the immigration issue in Germany, Oliver Schmidtke (2015: 380) highlights that although there have been and still are highly polarizing public debates about migration, the major parties, at least until recently, did not deal with immigration as an electoral issue. Based on election manifests, Christoffer Green-Pedersen and Simon Otjes (2017), for instance, can show that in Germany, as in other Western European countries, immigration was almost a non-issue for parties at the beginning of the 1980s. The issue then became more salient in the German context until the end of the 1990s and then decreased again (in 2013 around 3 percent on average in the party manifestos) (Green-Pedersen and Otjes 2017: 5; see similar Kortmann and Stecker 2017: 12). With regards to party differences in Germany, Matthias Kortmann und Christian Stecker (2017) have found in a longitudinal analysis of regional and federal party programs that, on average, the Liberals showed the lowest level of issue attention to immigration and integration in their programs. They were followed by the SPD and the CDU/CSU (similar attention rates), the Greens, and then the Left party (Kortmann and Stecker 2017: 11). In this context, Andreas M. Wüst (2016: 418) has demonstrated that the salience of the immigration issue increased in the party programs of the CDU/CSU and SPD (and FDP), and lost importance in the case of the Greens and the Left party. Over the years, the major German parties thus moved closer regarding the priority they attach to the immigration and integration issue (Wüst 2016: 419). Past research presents several explanations for why some parties attach more attention to these issues than others (see, e.g., Green-Pedersen and Otjes 2017: 7; Kortmann and Stecker 2017: 13 sq.). In this regard, Jan Rovny (2012), for example, claims that "[p]olitical parties primarily invest in issues that lie at the core of their identity" (Rovny 2012: 273). Furthermore, parties with divided core constituencies over specific issue have more difficulties when dealing with this issue than others. One strategy can be to present this issue in a vague manner, another to de-emphasize it (Rovny 2012: 273). This could be an explanation for why the German mainstream-right (CDU) and mainstream-left (SPD) is reluctant to more strongly emphasize the immigration issue. Those

\[ It^67 \text{ It is worth noting that Matthias Kortmann and Christian Stecker (2017: 11) have found that the three far-right parties, the AfD, as well as the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) and German People’s Union (DVU), which at the time of the study were of importance at the state level, showed the highest level of issue attention towards immigration and integration.} \]
parties are confronted with ideological intra-party division because they campaign at the same time on the economic and on the socio-cultural cleavage dimension (Kortmann and Stecker 2017: 5).

Second, how do the major German parties tailor the immigration issue? From a longitudinal perspective several studies have found that, until the mid-1990s, both mainstream parties, the CDU and the SPD have moved simultaneously towards the anti-immigrant pole (Alonso and Fonseca 2011: 878). The Christian Democrats, however, did so more strongly (Alonso and Fonseca 2011: 878). In the 1980s and 1990s, the CDU focused mainly on immigration control, return-policy and restrictions regarding family reunion (Boswell and Hough 2008: 336 sq.; Schmidtke 2015: 382). At the same time, the Christian Democrats supported rather generous policies for ethnic German re-settlers (Wüst 2004: 350; Fonseca 2011: 116). From the mid-1990s on, the party position of the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats towards immigration went in opposite directions (Alonso and Fonseca 2011: 878). During this time period, the CDU initiated the debate about a so-called 'Leitkultur' (guiding culture) demanding that the immigrants and their descendants had to adapt to this guiding culture. Mainly the Greens opposed to this position by highlighting the need for integration and multiculturalism, in opposition to assimilation of the immigrants (Demesmay 2009: 205 sq.). Since the 2000s, the Christian Democrats have slightly moved away from the anti-immigration pole (Alonso and Fonseca 2011: 878). Andreas M. Wüst (2016) shows that the Greens and the PDS/Left party were during the period from 1990 to 2013 located more towards the pro-immigration pole than the Liberals, SPD and the CDU/CSU. In this context, Oliver Schmidtke (2016: 405) asserts that '[...]'the Green Party and in particular the Left have positioned themselves discursively as the main advocates for immigrants’ rights and demands for equitable inclusion'. During this period, the Social Democrats could be located between the CDU/CSU and the three smaller parties. Although the Social Democrats emphasize the risks of immigration, their focus on the promotion of immigrant voting rights and dual citizenship clearly distinguish them from the Christian Democrats (Schmidtke 2015: 389). However, for the 2013 legislative elections, Andreas M. Wüst (2016) observes a convergence of the position of all main German parties towards more

68 It is noteworthy that even though the Liberals in Germany focus on the economic cleavage dimension (thus are active on only one dimension), they showed the lowest level of attention towards the immigration issue (Kortmann and Stecker 2017: 15).

69 These findings for Germany are in line with findings for other Western European countries. At a cross-national level (Western Europe), Sonia Alonso and Sara Claro da Fonseca (2011: 873), for instance, can show that Green parties are the most pro-immigrant party, this holds also true for Communist, all other party families show more anti-immigration positions.
restrictive immigration policies (Wüst 2016: 420).

Regarding the major German parties’ positions towards immigration, Olivier Schmidtke (2015: 385) highlights that there is general agreement with regard to the economic dimension (i.e. immigration of high-skilled workers, benefit for economic competitiveness...), but dissent regarding the defense of national interests and identity. This already points to the fact that the respective parties frame the immigration issue differently. Based on a frame analysis of party discourse between 2003 and 2013, Oliver Schmidtke (2016: 404) identifies four frames within which the issue of migration and integration can be located: the identity, security, interest, and social justice frame (see also Schmidtke 2015: 386). The author can show that while the CDU/CSU frames immigration as security threat as well as having negative socio-economic effects, the Left party and the Greens frame this policy issue strongly in terms of social justice (fundamental rights of immigrants). The Left party is doing so in depicting immigrants as 'subject to exploitation in a capitalist economy' (Schmidtke 2015: 389). Mainstream right parties often connect the immigration issue with law and order (Alonso and Fonseca 2011: 867). This can also be observed for the CDU/CSU who, in their 2013 election manifesto for instance, highlight the risks of 'parallel societies' (Schmidtke 2015: 390). The Social Democrats make use of the interest frame but with a focus on the positive effects of migration (Schmidtke 2016: 404 sq.). The identity frame is issued by the CDU/CSU but to a rather moderate degree (Schmidtke 2015: 386 sq.).

Scholarship mainly points to two, complementary rather than competing, ideas to explain party differences regarding the immigration issue: party ideology and parties’ strategical considerations (Breunig and Luedtke 2008: 128). It is thus assumed that parties opt for an anti- or pro-immigration position according to their position on the left-right scale (Breunig and Luedtke 2008: 128 sq.) with left-wing parties having a more egalitarian ideology and thus being more favorable towards immigrants (Norris 1997b: 218). Christina Boswell and Dan Hough (2008), for instance, argue that the CDU's rather restrictive attitude towards immigration is, amongst others, due to their 'rigid cultural conservatism' (Boswell and Hough 2008: 339). There is, however, evidence that immigration is orthogonal to the left-right dimension meaning that it does not necessarily have

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70 In their cross-national analysis, Sonia Alonso and Sara Claro da Fonseca (2011: 875) can show that this development can be observed in many other countries. All mainstream party families have developed more negative immigration views over the last decades.

71 When trying to explain these policy differences at a cross-national level further factors such as the institutional setting, the economic situation, the socio-political structure, or the national history of a country a also taking into consideration (see, e.g., Breunig and Luedtke 2008: 128 sqq.).
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to correlate (Breunig and Luedtke 2008: 141; Odmalm 2012: 2). The Gal-Tan
label, as already mentioned above, clearly puts the pro-immigration position on
the Gal-pole and the anti-immigration position on the Tan-pole (Marks et al.
2006: 157). From a pure ideological point of view, the Greens, as a classic
example of a party located at the GAL-pole, seem to be naturally aligned to the
pro-immigration position. But also their "largely [...] well-educated, middle-class
constituency" (Schmidtke 2016: 408), make strategical consideration regarding
this policy issue easier. And also regarding the Left party, Oliver Schmidtke
(2016) argues that the party has successfully integrated their position towards
immigrants within the social justice frame by describing them "as subject to
exploitation in a capitalist economy, given their relative exclusion from equitable
opportunities in the educational system and labour market" (Schmidtke 2016:
408). However, regarding the mainstream left's position towards immigration,
scholarship has found evidence that they "show the least congruence between their
positions on the left-right and on the immigration scale" (Alonso and Fonseca
2011: 874). This becomes also evident for the German case with, compared
to the other left-wing competitors, the SPD's difficult relationship towards the
immigration issue (Schmidtke 2016: 406). Scholarship argues that this holds
true for the mainstream left parties in general because they are faced to a mixed
electorate. On the one side, those parties traditionally represent the blue collar
workers, a social group who in the 21st century expresses a "sense of insecurity
and fear of social downward mobility" (Schmidtke 2016: 407). On the other
side, they aim to reach the left electorate with a high socio-economic level and
liberal views (Alonso and Fonseca 2011: 868). Mainstream left parties are thus
challenged on their right and on their left regarding the immigration issue (Alonso
and Fonseca 2011: 868). Schmidtke (2016) expresses this situation in the following
way: "In its approach to immigration and cultural diversity, the SPD has found it
challenging to respond to the emerging left-libertarian cleavage that cuts across a
more class-based conflict rooted in redistributive politics" (Schmidtke 2016:
407). Finally, it is, however, noteworthy that, from a strategical point of view, 'play[ing]
the race card' could also be a costly strategy for Conservatives or, in the specific
German case, Christian Democrats. On the one side, this could cost votes from the
(conservative) immigrant-origin electorate; on the other side, the core electorate
could also see this party position as contradictory to traditionally Christian values
such as human rights and humanitarian values (Boswell and Hough 2008: 331).
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3.4 The immigrant-origin population and parties in Germany: concluding remarks

Before in the next chapter presenting the analytical framework for the analysis of the selection of immigrant-origin legislative candidates, the aim of the present chapter was twofold. First, it attempted to give an overview of what characterizes the specific minority group under study, namely the immigrant-origin population in Germany, particularly in terms of access to citizenship, ethnic composition and political inclusion. And, second, it sought to outline the main features of political parties in Germany. I did so because the characteristics of minority groups as well as the inner life of parties, the functions they perform and the location within the ideological space are time- and particularly country-specific. I argued that, for a long time, the legal framework in Germany resulted in an exclusion of a major part of the immigrant-origin population from politics in their host country, even though their share within the German population was constantly rising. This can be seen as an unfavorable starting point for the political representation of this subpopulation. However, since several years, their share in legislatures is increasing – with strong differences between the individual immigrant groups. Regarding parties in Germany, their intra-party processes as well as organizational structure and particularly their candidate selection function are rather strongly constraint by law. This makes "the secret garden of politics" more accessible for scientific investigations. Whether or not it opens access to the political elite for the minority groups under study, will be part of the following analyses. Furthermore, I could show that German parties deal differently with the immigration issue due to their location within the ideological space and, related to this, to their electorate. In the next chapter I will, based on the present as well as the previous chapters, set up the analytical framework for the analysis of the selection of immigrant-origin candidates in Germany.
Chapter 4

Explaining the selection of immigrant-origin candidates: a framework of analysis

The present study aims to elaborate the relationship between candidate selection and the political representation of immigrant-origin citizens in the German *Bundestag*. After having presented the relevant literature and findings related to my research question as well as having put this in the German context, I will, based on these discussions, develop the analytical framework. I am doing so by relating ideas about party behavior and goals to institutional arguments.

We argued in Chapter 2.3.2 that although scholarship more and more points to the importance of the candidate selection process regarding the political representation of immigrant-origin or ethnic and racial minorities in parliament, explicit assumptions about the mechanisms behind the (non)selection of those minority candidates are scarce. Several authors propose explanatory models that take a broad perspective focusing on pressures from within as well as from outside parties (i.e. the societal level) (see, e.g., Kittilson and Tate 2005; Laurence and Maxwell 2012). Others explicitly study the recruitment or more specifically the selection process and highlight the lack of supply of aspiring candidates but also electoral concerns of the selectorate (see, e.g., Norris and Lovenduski 1995: 247 sq.; Sobolewska 2013: 619 sqq.), district characteristics (see, e.g., Farrer and Zingher 2018), party ideology (see, e.g., Fonseca 2011: 124; Farrer and Zingher 2018) as well as specific features of the selection process (see, e.g., Sobolewska 2013). It is noteworthy that the latter is almost exclusively analyzed regarding the nomination process.
of women candidates (see, e.g., Gauja and Cross [2015] Fortin-Rittberger and Rittberger [2015] but see Sobolewska [2013]). Our analytical framework focuses on the selection stage and will be developed by, first, asking what characterizes the intra-party process of candidate selection; and, second, by applying this framework to the selection of specific types of candidates, that are immigrant-origin aspiring candidates. Based on this framework I will then develop my hypotheses.

Departing from the definition presented in Chapter 2.2, candidate selection is an 'intra-party process taking place within a set of formal and/or informal rules and procedures by which party actors with formal and/or informal decision-making power nominate the party’s candidate or list of candidates out of a pool of legally eligible aspirants’. The main actors are thus the party selectors with formal and/or informal decision-making power. It goes without saying that the aspiring candidates with their resources and motivations are also important actors within the selection process. However, the focus in the present analysis is on the demand-side of candidate selection, thus parties looking for and selecting candidates. We are doing so because, contrary to, for instance, the U.S. context where candidate recruitment is most of the time studied from the perspective of "ambitious office-seekers or 'self-starters' who decide to run for office on their own" (Sanbonmatsu 2006: 234; see also Carson 2005; Jacobson and Kernell 1983), the German party-centered context calls for a stronger focus on parties as the driving forces in the candidate selection process. However, this does not mean that, in what follows, the supply-side (i.e. the aspirant level) is completely ignored. Quite the contrary is the case – however, I will not analyze the aspiring candidates’ ambitions to run for office.

From the literature on party behavior, we know that parties can pursue vote-seeking strategies to gain more votes. At the same time, they also 'have distinct ideological identities and are embedded in a network of supporters that substantially restrict their freedom to significantly change the parties’ basic political positions' (Dalton and McAllister 2015: 761). Applied to the specific context of candidate selection, I argue that party selectors rely on strategic considerations when nominating candidates or that this process is guided by their party’s ideology. However, as the definition presented above as well as the party behavior literature indicate (see, e.g., Strøm 1990: 592; Strøm and Müller 1999: 19; Meyer and Wagner 2013: 1252), not only electoral strategy (vote seeking) and/or ideology (policy seeking) impact on who will be nominated as a party’s candidate, but also the logics of intra-party politics (party internal power relations, formal and informal selection rules). That is why the analytical framework to study the selection of immigrant-origin candidates proposed in the present chapter focuses
on the role of strategical considerations, party ideology as well as intra-party politics.

4.1 Candidate nomination as vote-seeking strategy

The nomination of candidates as an electoral vote-seeking strategy has to be seen within the debate of a rapidly changing electoral market. Changes in the class structure and a decline of traditional party loyalties (to name only a few) have led to important changes in the electoral market: at the one hand to a decline of the traditional core party clienteles and on the other to "a growth in the ‘available electorate’" (Mair, Müller, et al. 2004: 3) that are those voters who are "willing to consider modifying [their] party choice" (Bartolini 2002: 93) (see Chapter 3.2.3 for Germany). From this follows that elections have become more and more competitive (Bartolini 2002: 93; Schoen and Weins 2014: 232).

There are various strategies parties can fall back on to face these electoral changes: by undertaking reforms of their internal organization, by redefining their relations to the other parties seen as competitors, by adapting their policy positions to their voters, by redefining their traditional electoral target groups or by revising their nomination strategies, for instance by recruiting different and more diverse types of candidates (Mair, Müller, et al. 2004: 11 sqq.). If we conceive the nominated candidates as "[the parties’] public face in elections" (Katz 2001: 278) and the nomination of candidates as a mean to improve a party’s competitiveness (Best 2007 88 sq.), the strategy of redefining the electoral target group, on the one hand, and of nominating candidates, on the other hand, can be conceived as being strongly related. Regarding the electoral target groups, the redefining can be done by replacing old by new target groups, by adding new target groups to the traditional one(s) or/and by intensifying their ties to the traditional target groups (Mair, Müller, et al. 2004: 12). From this follows that the nomination of candidates can, but has not to, follow a catch-all or broad-appeal strategy. The catch-all strategy (which is mainly thought in the context of parties’ policy position, and not nomination strategies) implies that parties converge to the center by de-emphasizing their party ideology (Somer-Topcu 2015: 843); thus a process of depolarization towards the median voters (Volkens and Klingemann 2002: 145 sq.). The broad-appeal strategy is similar to the catch-all idea with, however, the parties’ central aim of "increas[ing] the size of [their] constituency by
appealing to their diverse interests’ (Somer-Topcu 2015: 842) - this not necessarily implies a converge to the center.

But why should the nomination of specific types of candidates be an electoral strategy? We already argued that candidates are the parties’ public face in elections. From research on voting behavior, we know that candidate orientation, besides voters’ party identification and issue orientation, constitute an important factor to vote choice (Campbell, Converse, et al. 1960; Campbell, Gurin, et al. 1954). For several reasons, research on electoral politics has given more and more importance to candidate orientation (Wattenberg 1991). First, the debate about a rise of candidate-centered politics makes candidates more important subjects of research. Second, partisan dealignment processes (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000a) and the decline of party identification are said to increase the importance of candidate and issue orientation regarding voting behavior (Vetter and Gabriel 1998: 95; Dalton, McAllister, and Wattenberg 2000: 49). Personalization of politics not only means that candidates have become more important but also that candidate characteristics that are not directly connected to the role as candidate or future politician (e.g. personal characteristics) (Klein and Ohr 2000: 201) have gained more importance (Schoen and Weins 2014: 299). As argued in Chapter 2.2.2, candidates’ personal characteristics, such as gender, race or ethnic background, can serve as cognitive shortcuts or road maps to evaluate political candidates and to choose between them (Norris and Lovenduski 1995: 14; McDermott 1998: 912). However, whether or not candidates’ personal characteristics matter regarding vote choice (and if so, which specific characteristics) is strongly discussed in the literature (see, e.g., Campbell and Cowley 2014), and this in particular applies to Germany (Rohrschneider et al. 2012: 21).

First, the continuing importance of party identification in Germany at least raises some questions about the observation of a rising importance of candidates’ personal characteristics in German electoral politics (Brettschneider and Gabriel 2002; Kaase 1994). And, second, the strong party dominated electoral context (Gschwend and Zittel 2014: 1) with for the second ballot closed party-lists (Rohrschneider et al. 2012: 23) also questions the relevance of candidate characteristics. However, one can assume that, even in professionalized, party-centered campaigns due to increasingly targeted electoral strategies, parties more and more focus also on candidates and their personal characteristics (Saalfeld and Kyriakopoulou 2011: 232; Wüst, Schmitt, et al. 2006: 427 sqq.). From the research on the importance of candidate evaluation of frontrunners, in particular chancellor candidates for whom German citizens can technically not vote for, we know that candidate evaluation matters regarding vote choice (see, e.g., Rohrschneider et al.
This appears to hold true more for non-identifiers than for voters with a strong party identification (Brettscheider and Gabriel 2002: 140 sq.). The question here is, however, whether these findings can be transferred to district candidates and even more party lists. Several studies using survey experiments have shown that physical attractiveness as well as facial competence have an influence on voter choice, even after controlling for several other explanatory variables (see, e.g., Jäckle and Metz 2016: 233; see for similar findings Klein and Rosar 2005). Additionally, in particular newcomers running against incumbents benefit from their (perceived) physical attractiveness (Jäckle and Metz 2016: 236). There is also empirical evidence that personalized campaign style increases the vote probability for district candidates (Giebler et al. 2014: 160). Others have shown that certain candidate characteristics, as for instance local ties or political competence, impact positively on the evaluation and visibility of district candidates (Pappi, Kurella, et al. 2017: 324).

The arguments presented so far focused on the question whether candidates matter at all regarding vote choice, especially in the German party-centered context. In what follows, I will apply these assumptions to immigrant-origin aspiring candidates.

Thinking of candidate selection as an electoral strategy, nominating immigrant-origin candidates can be conceived as a strategy to broaden the party’s electorate (in the case of parties traditionally neutral regarding the immigrant-origin population or even anti-immigration) or to intensify the links to its traditional electoral target groups (in the case of traditionally pro-immigrant parties). However, as it is the case with immigration as an issue position, nominating immigrant-origin candidates has to be thought ”in terms of a party’s perceptions of the costs and benefits of occupying a given ‘space’” (Boswell and Hough 2008: 332). Applied to candidate selection, this means that party selectors have to balance costs and benefits of nominating specific types of candidates. In Chapter 2.2.2, I argued that selectors nominate candidates according to complex choices that are, amongst others, based on the candidates’ prospective electoral success (Best 2007: 90 sq.). In this context, scholarship has found empirical evidence for party selectors being concerned about losing votes when nominating immigrant-origin candidates (see Bochel and Denver 1983: 56; Norris and Lovenduski 1995: 136). Based on these assumptions, I hypothesize that

*If party selectors fear losing votes when nominating immigrant-origin candidates then immigrant-origin aspirants have a reduced chance to be nominated*
4. Explaining the selection of immigrant-origin candidates

*as a party’s candidate (H1).*

A result of this electorally driven behavior might be that access is frozen to 'candidacies that are associated with the best electoral prospects' (Black and Hicks 2006: 28). The candidate characteristics that are associated with electoral success are various (as discussed in *Chapter 2.2.2*), but one assumption could be that candidates have to 'fit' with their constituency. Immigrant-origin candidates thus should have better chances for nomination in areas where immigrant-origin citizens make up larger parts of the total constituency population. The arguments are located on the demand-side. First, regarding the so-called majority electorate (i.e. those without immigrant-origin background), there is empirical evidence that people living in areas with high levels of immigrant populations show lower levels of anti-immigrant attitudes (see, e.g., Heerden and Ruedin 2017: 11) and thus from an electoral perspective nominating immigrant-origin candidates appears to be a less risky strategy. Second, regarding the minority electorate, research has demonstrated that ethnic and racial minorities show higher levels of voter turnout in areas where they make up a large proportion of the electorate (see, e.g., Togeby 1999: 676; Fieldhouse and Cutts 2008: 544) (as briefly outlined in *Chapter 2.3.1*). In those areas, they have a greater potential for electoral mobilization than in other regions. Additionally, there is some (albeit not consistent) empirical evidence that ethnic or racial minorities are more likely to vote for co-ethnic/racial candidates (see, e.g., Zingher and Farrer 2014; Fisher et al. 2014; Teney et al. 2010).

Based on these assumptions, I thus generate the following hypothesis:

*The higher the proportion of the immigrant-origin population within the constituency population (district or state), the more likely immigrant-origin aspirants are nominated as their party’s candidate (H2).*

Furthermore, I argue that the 'best candidate type’ also depends on the specific competitive situation. In this context, scholarship points to the impact of the

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72 It is noteworthy that there is also a supply-side argument regarding the impact of high immigration areas on the nomination of immigrant-origin candidates. In those areas, immigrant-origin individuals are likely to be also stronger represented among party members, so that the recruitment pool is also larger.

73 It is noteworthy that the empirical findings regarding the relationship between outgroup size and negative attitudes towards minorities are mixed. For a discussion of this relationship see, e.g., James Laurence and Lee Bentley 2018.
4. Explaining the selection of immigrant-origin candidates

On the one hand, single-member district races are understood to be more sensitive electoral races because the party’s candidate has to compete against established parties and personalities which, in turn, is assumed to be disadvantageous for the nomination of minority candidates (Donovan 2007: 472). Party lists, on the other hand, have a variable number of slots for (different types of) candidates (Fonseca 2011: 119). From a broad-appealing strategy, party lists are seen as an opportunity to strategically balance the party lists in order to 'maximize electoral competitiveness, reward party stalwarts, groom young talent, or ensure legislative policy-making ability' (Pemstein et al. 2015: 1422). Putting a certain number of specific types of candidates on the party list, can signal the party’s 'closeness' to certain quarters of the electorate' (Best 2007: 90) without risking to lose (too many) votes. Thus, I test the following hypothesis:

If immigrant-origin candidates seek nomination on a party list, then they are more likely to be nominated as their party’s candidate than those who aim to be nominated in a district (H3).

Additionally, if the nomination of candidates is thought as an electoral strategy, the selection of immigrant-origin candidates can also be seen as a strategic act to color the parties’ candidate portfolio (Matland and Studlar 1996: 709). The parties’ principal aim is thus not to provide those candidates a realistic chance to enter parliament, but to appeal to a broader electorate. Based on this idea, I formulate the following hypothesis:

If a district or a list position is qualified as 'winnable' for a party, then immigrant-origin aspiring candidates are less likely to be nominated as their party’s candidate than their non-immigrant counterparts (H4).

4.2 Party ideology matters

However, parties cannot be seen as solely vote-seeking actors — as "catch-all-parties" without any real ideologies (Kirchheimer 1966: 186). With regards to the relationship between ideology and policies, Ian Budge, Hans Keman et al. (2012: 91) underscore that "[p]arties after all owe their distinctiveness to being
Socialist, Social Democratic, Christian, Liberal or Conservative. Adherence to such divergent world views supplies a bond between leader, activists, and supporters; a common way of interpreting events and reacting to them in policy terms; and a boundary between themselves and the other parties. A party’s ideology thus addresses the question ‘what parties are’ (Mair and Mudde 1998: 220). That is why it can be argued that the nominated candidates, as the party’s public face in elections, and the party ideology should harmonize. We claim that, regarding the nomination of immigrant-origin candidates, party ideology matters in two ways. First, a party’s ideology, as something that ‘[…] goes right to the heart of a party’s identity’ (Mair and Mudde 1998: 220) has a direct impact on the type of candidate selected. And second, and this is related to my first argument of parties as vote-seeking actors, parties have to be considerate of the (presumed) preferences of their voters, when nominating candidates for general elections. We assume that this holds true not only for the policy positions a candidate stands for, but also for his or her socio-demographic profile.

Based on findings from the literature on parties’ positions towards immigration as a policy issue (see Chapter 3.3), I differentiate, regarding the nomination of immigrant-origin candidates, between left-wing and conservative parties (Norris 1997a: 218) as well as between new and old left parties (Caul 1999: 87). Regarding the former, scholarship has shown that left-wing parties are more open-minded towards minorities because they embrace a more egalitarian ideology ‘which stresses access for all political minorities’ (Norris 1997a: 218). Even though there is empirical evidence for conservative parties being also favorable towards ethnic and racial minority candidates (Sobolewska 2005: 624; Black and Hicks 2006: 29; Bird 2011a: 68) (see Chapter 2.3.2), past research could not establish this relationship for the German case. Regarding the differentiation between new and old left parties, the former are seen as more favorable towards minorities because the new politics ideology explicitly highlights the promotion of equal rights for immigrants, women and sexual minorities (Poguntke 1987: 78). We therefore hypothesize that

> if immigrant-origin aspirants run for nomination within left-wing parties and in particular new left parties, then they are more likely to be nominated as candidate than when seeking nomination within conservative parties or old left parties (H5).

Finally, based on the assumptions about party ideology, the effects expressed in H2 (high immigrant areas), H3 (type of candidature) and H4 (winnable candidatures)
should be less pronounced in the case of parties being ideologically more close to the immigrant-origin population (Greens, Left party, SPD) than those who in the past could be located more closely to the anti-immigration pole (CDU/CSU).

4.3 Institutions matter: the logics of intra-party politics

In the last two sections, I argued that immigrant-origin aspiring candidates can face barriers within the selection process due to parties’ strategical considerations and/or the parties’ ideology. However, in Chapter 2.2.2 I also brought forward the argument that the decisions party selectors make are strongly influenced and restricted by formal party rules as well as informal norms and practices (Norris and Lovenduski 1995: 198). Accordingly, how parties select their candidates (i.e. their selection methods) is understood to impact on who the candidates are (candidates’ socio-demographic/policy profile) (see, e.g., Gauja and Cross 2015; Mikulska and Scarrow 2010).

In Chapter 2.2.1 I defined candidate selection methods, according to Reuven Y. Hazan and Gideon Rahat (2010: 4), as "the non-standardized and predominately unregimented particular party mechanisms by which political parties choose their candidates for general elections". Scholarship argues that especially inclusive selectorates, methods that give favor to incumbents, and that are done in a decentralized manner, are detrimental to the nomination of minority candidates (in particular women and ethnic minorities) (Hazan and Rahat 2010: 112 sq.).

Regarding the German case, a further dimension appears to be an important aspect to study when dealing with the impact of selection methods on the type of nominated candidate: the functional (de)centralization of the selection process that is the existence of mechanisms that are supposed to ensure the representation of specific societal groups (Rahat and Hazan 2001: 304). In this context, Marion Reiser (2014) highlights that there is a broad range of party-internal rules to ensure representation for specific societal groups. Those can be formal rules, either legally defined by law (and therefore apply to all parties within a country) or individually written down in the party statutes, as well as informal party rules. Regarding the latter, scholarship differentiate between ad hoc arrangements that are only lowly institutionalized and highly institutionalized informal party rules (Reiser 2014: 62).

How do the candidate selection methods impact on the chances of immigrant-
4. Explaining the selection of immigrant-origin candidates

origin aspirants of being nominated as their parties’ candidate? Before starting my argumentation and presenting the hypotheses, it is worth highlighting that due to the rather strong legal framework within which parties in the German context have to operate (see Chapter 3.2), the methods German parties employ, at least from a formal point of view, are quite similar to one another. That is why I assume the strongest differences at the informal level.

As shown in Chapter 3.2.2, electoral law stipulates that all candidates (district, land level) are selected in a decentralized manner. Candidates for the single-member races in the districts are selected at the district and candidates for the party lists are nominated in conventions at the state level. That is why I do not assume that in the German case the territorial decentralization dimension accounts for party differences regarding the nomination chances of immigrant-origin aspirants. However, with regards to the selectorate, the legal framework leaves room for variance. As outlined in Chapter 3.2.2, electoral law stipulates that candidates for legislative office have to be nominated either by a general membership meeting or by a delegate constituency convention. As the former gives all eligible party members living in the electoral district the possibility to participate in the candidate nomination, it is considered to be more inclusive than the latter where delegates elected by a membership assembly partake in the nomination. Based on the literature on the consequences of candidate selection methods, I formulate the following hypothesis:

*If immigrant-origin aspiring candidates face exclusive selectorates, then they have a higher chance of being nominated than those who are confronted to more inclusive selectorates (H6).*

Scholarship has also shown that parties implement a broad range of mechanisms that are supposed to ensure the representation of different societal groups, but also of intra-party factions, regions or to renumerate party service or legislative experience (Höhne 2013; Reiser 2014). Those intra-party mechanisms are supposed to send a signal outside the party (to the electorate) as well as to serve party internal needs. Regarding the former, Maria Sobolewska (2013: 617), for instance, argues that one of the reasons why the Conservatives in Great Britain have began to actively diversify their political personal, was their poor electoral performance as well as poor image within society regarding women and minorities. We thus hypothesize that, similar to gender quotas,
4. Explaining the selection of immigrant-origin candidates

If a party provides formal or informal intra-party mechanisms to ensure the representation of the immigrant-origin population, then immigrant-origin aspirants are numerously better represented in the party’s candidate portfolio (H7).

Additionally, scholarship points to the importance of incumbency as incumbents often enjoy automatic or almost automatic renomination (Hazan and Rahat 2010: 27). As outlined in Chapter 2.2.2, (re)selecting incumbents is an opportunity for party selectors to reduce transactions costs, because those candidates have already proven to be electorally successful (Solvang 1982: 165); they are also, mostly, strong intra-party actors (Hazan and Rahat 2010: 27) and their reselection can be seen as exchange for their loyalty (Hazan and Rahat 2010: 28). However, the (re)selection of incumbents also obstructs or at least slows down the selection of new types of candidates (Ware 1996: 272). As a matter of fact immigrant-origin aspirants are, to date, mostly newcomers. If a party attaches great importance to reselect incumbents, this could be an obstacle for the representation of the immigrant-origin population. According to this assumption, I formulate the following hypothesis:

If a party attaches less importance to incumbency as a selection criterion, then immigrant-origin aspiring candidates have higher chances of being nominated as their parties’ candidate (H8).

Above I hypothesized that being nominated in the district is more difficult for immigrant-origin aspirants than obtaining a position on a party list (H3). Additionally, past research highlights the importance of dual candidacies that are candidates running in both tiers (district and party list) simultaneously (see Chapter 3.2.2). Consequently, I expect that

If a party attaches high importance to district candidatures regarding party list nominations, the immigrant-origin aspirants are less likely to be nominated on the party list (H9).

To conclude, it is worth highlighting that, as a result of the complex and sometimes also nontransparent process of candidate selection, the aforementioned arguments are far from being exhaustive. However, the central aim of the present study is
to analyze whether or not the numerical under-representation of the immigrant-origin population in the German *Bundestag* is related to the process of candidate selection and more specifically whether a party’s strategic considerations, its ideology and/or aspects related to intra-party politics are disadvantageous for this specific kind of candidate type. The above listed arguments are factors that I deduce from the existing literature to answer my research question.
Chapter 5

Data and methods

This chapter presents the data and methods used in this study to analyze the relevance of candidate selection regarding the political representation of the immigrant-origin population. I employ a quantitative, factor-centric (Gschwend and Schimmelfennig [2011] 8) research design by drawing on different types and sources of data. I am focusing on the causal factors because, due to the poor state of the art in the European context, I concentrate on one specific aspect that is supposed to contribute to the explanation of the political representation of the immigrant-origin population, that is the process of candidate selection (and not on the voters or on the supply of the applicants). Also regarding candidate selection, my aim is not to give a comprehensive explanation of why candidates with an immigration background are nominated or not, but rather to test the explanatory power of factors that were identified as potentially detrimental or beneficial to the selection of this specific type of candidates.

The chapter is structured as follows. I first present the arguments for my decision to study district and party list nominations for the 2013 legislative elections in Germany. I then present my different types of data by describing the sources, the sample as well as the sampling procedures. This is followed by a description of the operationalization of the main dependent and independent variables on which I will rely in the following analyses. The chapter concludes with the limitations of the study.
5. Data and methods

5.1 Case selection

In the present study, I analyze my research question for district and party list nominations for the 2013 legislative elections in Germany. I am thus employing a purely cross-sectional research design (Gerring 2012: 76). Furthermore, I limit my analysis to the four main parties at the national level at the time of the study.

First, the decision to study candidate selection in Germany mainly comes from four reasons. As shown in Chapter 3.1, Germany is among the European countries with the highest number of citizens with immigrant origins. This empirical fact raises the question about the political inclusion of this societal subgroup, also within the parliamentary recruitment process. Furthermore, mainly due to the electoral system with its combination of nominal plurality vote and regional closed-lists, parties in Germany have the major say in deciding how the composition of the legislature looks like (Reiser 2011: 237). Additionally to these two points, there are further reasons that make nominations in Germany an interesting case to study. The rather strong legal regulation of candidate selection in Germany facilitates the study of this particular intra-party process, at least the formal part of it. Finally, the mixed electoral system gives the opportunity to study electoral system effects without having to account for factors at the country level.

Second, the decision to study nominations for legislative elections at the national level is mainly due to their characterization as first-order-elections in parliamentary systems (Reif and Schmitt 1980: 8). National elections are considered to "offer voters the critical choice of who should govern the country" (Norris and Reif 1997: 111). Studying nominations for elections where something is at stake, appears to be a reasonable decision when aiming to investigate deeper into the political representation of the immigrant-origin population. Furthermore, I decided to study the national level for practical reasons. Although at the formal as well as informal level, parties differ regarding the way they select their candidates, the Federal Election Law (BWG) provides a rather strict and unifying framework for candidate selection at the national level in Germany. Thus, by studying candidate selection for the Bundestag, it is possible to elaborate in detail the selection processes at the party level by holding other explanatory factors constant, as, for instance, features of the electoral system.

Third, why restricting the following analyses to the Christian Democratic Union (CDU/CSU), the Social Democrats (SPD), the Greens, and the Left party? I include in my analyses only those parties for which, at the time of the district and party list nominations (mainly from July 2012 to March 2013), the polls predicted a large enough election outcome that their entry in the next Bundestag
was nothing they had to fear about. I am doing so to have for all parties under study similar conditions under which the nomination of candidates took place. It can be assumed that fearing of having any representation in the legislature has an additional impact on the selection of candidates for which I aim to control for by excluding such parties from the analysis. According to the polls of the *Forschungsgruppe Wahlen*, the CDU/CSU was expected to finish at around 39 percent, the SPD at 29 percent, the Greens at 13 percent, and finally, the Left party at 6 percent (*Forschungsgruppe Wahlen* n.d.), in the above mentioned period of time. It could thus be argued that, regarding the Left party, it was not as safe as for the other three parties that they will meet the 5%-threshold of second votes, necessary in Germany for becoming entitled to any representation in the *Bundestag*. However, contrary to the FDP who was expected at that time at around four percent, the Left party has some strongholds in several eastern states (see below). Winning a minimum of three districts is an alternative to the above mentioned 5%-threshold. Furthermore, the right-wing populist party AfD who also narrowly missed the threshold of five percent in the 2013 legislative elections, was only founded in April 2013 (Arzheimer 2015: 535). Additionally to the fact that they were in the polls only from April 2013 on, their entry in the German *Bundestag* was also uncertain. Furthermore, they were not included because, as this party was founded only shortly before the legislative elections, they did not nominate district candidates in all of the 299 electoral districts (Böth and Kobold 2014: 847).

5.2 Outlining the data

5.2.1 Aspirant data

The first data set I rely on in the present study, the aspirant data, contains information on, first, the entire population of district and party list aspirants for the 2013 German legislative elections of the four parties under study, second, the characteristics of those nomination races, and third, sociodemographic features of all 299 electoral districts as well as all 16 German states (*länder*). Several sources have been used to construct the aspirant data set that I will briefly describe in

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74 The expected election results are an average of the forecast for the nine month between July 2012 and March 2013.
5. Data and methods

the following paragraphs.

First, I compiled information (first and family name, party affiliation, sex, incumbency, district and/or party list nomination) on all district and party list aspirants. I define aspirants (for the German legislative elections) as follows:

*All those who seek nomination as candidate for legislative elections in an official nomination race as defined by article 21 (district candidates) and 27 (party lists) of the Federal Elections Act [BWG].*

Individuals who have withdrawn their candidacy for nomination are thus not taken into account. Two particularities have to be briefly mentioned. In addition to my rather narrow definition of aspirants, I also qualify those as aspirants who stood for nomination in internal nonbinding party members’ polls that took place in the forefront of the official nomination race as defined above. The Social Democrats in Berlin, for instance, opted for such a nomination procedure in almost all of their electoral districts in the city-state of Berlin. However, such a procedure was only rarely used (see *Chapter 6.2.3*). Furthermore, there is the special case of the Greens’ party list nomination in Berlin. At first, they intended to put up the list by a membership assembly. Due to the fact that the minimal number of attendants required by the Green party statutes was not achieved, a delegate convention drew up the list by confirming the complete party list voted previously by all present party members (see Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Neukölln n.d.). I thus define all those as aspirants who sought nomination in the nonbinding membership vote.

For all other party list nominations, however, I only qualify those as aspirants who sought nomination in the official nomination race. This applies also to those cases where conventions (of the SPD and CDU) at the regional (i.e. intra-state) level took place prior to the final nomination conventions at the state level (see here Deiss-Helbig 2017: 74). I am doing so mainly because of practical reasons of data availability.

To identify those aspirants as well as gather the information mentioned above, I relied on content analysis of local and regional newspapers as well as intensive Internet searches (in particular candidates’ websites and those of the local and regional party branches). The research was done between November 2012 and July 2013 and covers all 299 nominations at the district level as well as all 16 party list nominations at the state level for the CDU/CSU, the SPD, the Greens and the Left Party. The media research for the party list nominations was amended by the minutes of the parties’ nomination meetings. I did so because information in particular about the number and name of the aspirants competing for a list
position was only rarely publicly available. Regarding district nominations, the parties’ minutes were only requested, if the above mentioned information was not possible to gather through the content analysis and Internet searches. After request by the author, the parties’ minutes were kindly provided by the parties’ regional and district headquarters. By applying this research strategy, I was able to identify 2,082 aspirants in the narrow sense as defined above. When broadening my definition and including also those who sought nomination in an internal nonbinding party members’ poll for district candidates as well as all aspirants who put their candidature for the party list of the Greens in Berlin, I count a total of 2,125 aspirants for the 2013 legislative elections.

In order to identify those aspirants with immigrant origins, I relied on, based on the definition of the Federal Statistical Office of immigrant background (see Chapter 3.1.2), the following criteria: first and family name and place of birth and former nationality of the aspirant as well as, if available, of his or her parents. It is noteworthy that the first and family name is not included as a criterion in the definition of the Federal Statistical Office. However, to identify potential immigrant-origin aspirants in the first place, I looked at the names and then investigated deeper into a possible immigrant background (for a similar procedure see Fonseca 2011). Furthermore, based on the discussion of the different immigrant groups in Germany as well as their perception by the majority population in Chapter 3.1.2 I differentiate between the broad category of immigrant background and the one of visible minorities. Regarding the latter, I propose an operational definition. I define visible minorities, thus, as follows:

\[ A \text{ person who himself or herself or at least one of his/her parents immigrated from a country that is not part of the EU-27 (except Bulgaria and Romania) and not situated on the American continent and not from Australia or Oceania.} \]

I choose this definition to account for the fact that research has shown that immigrants and their descendants from countries or regions that are perceived as culturally distinctive, receive opposition from the part of the majority population (Ford 2011: 1019) (see also Chapter 3.1.2). I am aware, however, of the shortcomings of this definition. First, according to this definition, ethnic German immigrants and their descendants ((Spät-)Aussiedler) from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are included in the concept of visible minorities. However, due to their often German first names (Fonseca 2011: 120), their immigrant background is, in most cases, not "visible". That is why I will exclude ethnic
German immigrants and their children from my definition of visible minorities. It is noteworthy that, the latter (second generation ethnic German immigrants), additionally, are very difficult, if at all, to identify (Fonseca 2011: 120). A further shortcoming concerns the country of origin and not the visibility of an immigrant background (e.g. skin color) as main criterion for a visible minority background. Because of his or her country of origin, an (hypothetical) aspirant with African-American origins would, according to my definition, be excluded from the concept of visible minority. As their number within the German population is rather small, I will, however, stick to my original definition of visible minorities and then, based on the data, decide on the individual case. To summarize, for reasons of practicality, I make use of this operational definition based on country of origin to differentiate between people with an immigrant background in the broad sense, as defined by the Federal Statistical Office, and those belonging to a visible minority.

To distinguish visible minorities from those with an immigrant background as well as those without any immigrant origins, I rely mainly on first and/or family names. Additionally, I make use of photographs (for a similar approach, see e.g., Wüst and Saalfeld 2010). Josef Winkler, for instance, a candidate of the Greens and former MP with on his mother’s side Indian origins, can neither be identified by his name nor by his birthplace as an aspirant with a visible minority background. However, it is important to highlight that the photographs alone never served as sufficient criterion for a visible minority background; it was always completed by further research. It is worth highlighting that, and this holds true for in particular for the broader concept of immigrant background, also by means of my method, it is possible that some, in particular second generation immigrants cannot be identified as having an immigrant background. However, as the present study analyzes immigrant background in the context of candidate selection, I argue that the immigrant origins of a person have to be somehow visible (by appearance or name) to play a role in the selection process.

By the above mentioned sources, I additionally gathered information about the characteristics of the nomination races at the district and land (party lists) level. By identifying the aspirants who sought nomination in the district or on a party list, I also got information about the number of aspirants applying for a list position or a district candidature and thus about the level of competition. Additionally to the names and number of aspirants, I also collected data regarding who selected the candidates, that is the type of selectorate (party members, delegates), as well as the votes that the aspirants received in the district or list nomination race.

Regarding the data I compiled for the aspiring candidates as well as for the
Table 5.1: Missing data: Electoral districts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SPD</th>
<th>CDU/CSU</th>
<th>Greens</th>
<th>Left party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number aspirants</td>
<td>2 districts</td>
<td>5 districts</td>
<td>37 districts</td>
<td>101 districts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of origin</td>
<td>1 district asp.</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imm. generation</td>
<td>3 district asp.</td>
<td>all available</td>
<td>1 district asp.</td>
<td>1 district asp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type selectorate</td>
<td>12 districts</td>
<td>8 districts</td>
<td>all available</td>
<td>122 districts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Aspirant data 2012-2013, own elaboration.

characteristics of the nomination races, I have to deal with missing data for several variables. While I identified the first and family name for all 299 finally nominated district candidates for all four party under study, information is lacking about potential aspirants who failed district nomination in two districts for the SPD, in five districts for the CDU/CSU, 37 for the Greens, and finally in 101 district for the Left Party (see Table 5.1). In those cases, it is not possible to know whether there have been any further aspirants failing nomination against the finally nominated candidate. However, the media research has shown that, at least regarding the four parties under study, nomination races where more than one aspiring candidate sought nomination most of the time received any kind of media coverage. From this follows that the aspirant data should reflect the political reality quite well and that the missing data should not distort the results in a significant way. Regarding the question whether a current MP sought renomination in the district, data is available for all districts for all four parties. Furthermore, regarding the country of origin as well as the immigrant generation, data is missing for one and three district aspirants, respectively, in the case of the SPD and none for the CDU/CSU. In the case of both the Greens and the Left party, information about the immigrant generation is missing for one district aspirant. Finally, regarding the type of district selectorate, information is lacking for 12 districts in the case of the SPD, 8 for the CDU/CSU and 122 for the Left party (see Table 5.1).

Regarding the party lists, information about potential aspirants who failed nomination on the party list is lacking for five out of 64 party lists of the four parties (in four länder for the Left and one for the CDU/CSU). In those cases, as I did for the district nominations, only the finally nominated candidates on the party list are included in the data base (see Table 5.2). With regards to the country of origin of the immigrant-origin list aspirants as well as their immigrant generation, information is lacking on both for one aspirant in the case of the Social Democrats and for the Greens for two aspirants. In the case of the CDU/CSU as well as the Left party, there is information lacking only for the immigrant
5. Data and methods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.2: Missing data: Party lists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SPD</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number aspirants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imm. generation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Aspirant data 2012-2013, own elaboration.*

Finally, I compiled information about the composition of the population in the 299 electoral districts as well as the 16 German states in terms of immigrant background. To calculate the percentage of people with an immigrant background, as defined by the Federal Statistical Office (see Chapter 3.1.2), from the total number of people living in an electoral district, I make use of data provided by the Federal Returning Officer (Bundeswahlleiter) for the 2017 legislative elections. This data includes information about immigrant background of the district population based on the 2011 population census (Bundeswahlleiter 2017: 110 sqq.). Since there have been some marginal changes of the electoral district boarders between the 2013 and 2017 legislative elections, data is missing for some few electoral districts. Additionally, for those municipalities that are split into two or more electoral districts (Hamburg, Hanover, Berlin, Aachen, Cologne, Mettmann, Dusseldorf, Stuttgart, Munich), information is only available at the municipality (and not electoral district) level. As, however, the level of the immigrant-origin population differs strongly from one urban district to another, I rely in these cases on alternative sources (mainly Statistical Offices of the respective city, 2011 population census directly). For the German länder, I distinguish between the population with an immigrant background in the broad sense, as I did for the district level, and the population with a visible minority background as defined in one of the previous paragraphs. To calculate the share of both immigrant populations within the total number of individuals living in a state, I make use of the 2012 Microcensus-Panel data (Statistisches Bundesamt 2017c: 128 sqq.). For the district level, information about the composition of the immigrant-origin population according to country of origin to calculate the visible minority population was, unfortunately, not available.

It is worth noting that the measurement for the visible minority population has in particular one problem. The category of visible minorities includes also countries as Kazakhstan or Romania. For the case of the aspiring candidates, I excluded those people with origins in one of those countries that can be identified as ethnic German immigrants. Based on the Microcensus-Panel data, this is, however, not possible for the state population.
5. Data and methods

5.2.2 Selector survey data

The second data set, I rely on, is survey data gained through an anonymous self-administered online-survey conducted between December 2014 and July 2015 among party members who participated in the nomination of candidates for the 2013 legislative elections. There are several problems associated with online surveys that I will briefly discuss in the last section of the present chapter. However, I decided in favor of the use of an online based survey mainly for two reasons. First, there is the lower costs-argument compared to paper-based questionnaires. And, second, online surveys are supposed to provide access to unique populations that, otherwise, would be difficult to reach (Wright 2005). The target population – party members who took part in a specific candidate nomination – were difficult to reach in the sense that access to this population was only possible via the party headquarters.

As the aim of the present study is to identify potential barriers in the candidate selection process for immigrant-origin aspirants, the population of interest is defined by the following characteristics: all party members of the four German parties under study who participated in at least one candidate nomination (district candidates and/or regional party lists) for the 2013 legislative elections where at least one visible minority aspirant sought nomination (hereafter minority nominations). I limit those minority nominations to the case of visible minorities (and not the broader category of immigrant-origin) to make sure that the visible minority aspirants seeking nomination in the respective district or list nomination are also perceived as such by the survey respondents. When asking questions about the importance of the immigrant background of, for instance, a second generation Austrian aspirant, I cannot be sure about the validity of the measurement. When asking the same question in the case of an aspirant with, for instance, an Iranian background, I increase the chance of really measuring the importance of immigrant background. I identified those districts and states where a minority nomination took place based on the aspirant data (see Chapter 5.2.1). All party members who participated in such minority nominations, thus the entire population, are, hypothetically, part of the sample (Gerring 2012: 75) so that we do not deal with a random sample. This has implications for the following empirical analyses (in particular the p-values) as well as the generalizability of the findings (Gerring 2012: 87). In this context, Andreas Broscheid and Thomas Gschwend (2003: 13)

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76 It goes without saying that not all party members also took part in the survey. The composition of the actual sample will be discussed below.
highlight that also in the case of entire population sample it can be useful to rely on test of statistical significance – but rather as a criterion of good quality of the analysis than to give information about the generalizability. To carry out the online-survey, the parties’ district and regional headquarters were asked to forward a link to the questionnaire to the party members who partook in the respective minority nomination. As the Federal Elections Act stipulates in detail who is entitled to participate in the nomination of legislative candidates, the district and regional party headquarters most of the time have a mailing list with those candidates at their disposal. Additionally, to increase the response rate, the respondents were invited to take part in a drawing for two wine vouchers (70 euros each). In the questionnaire were included questions about district and party list nominations. The respondents were asked in what kind of nomination (district, party list) they participated, so that, through filter questions, they were confronted only with the relevant questions (see questionnaire in Appendix A). The questions in the questionnaire tackled general issues about the specific nomination the respondent took part in as well as specific aspects of the nomination, as for instance the respondents’ voting behavior in the nomination. It could be that respondents who partook in a minority party list nomination, were also involved in the selection of their district candidate. In this case, they were also asked to answer the battery of questions dealing with the district nomination although it could be that the latter was not identified as a minority nomination. The same holds true for party members participating in minority district and non-minority party list nominations. That is why, in the analyses that follow, I can make use of the data for minority as well as non-minority nominations.

Based on the aspirant data, I identified 22 district nomination races for the SPD where at least one visible minority aspirant sought nomination, five such nominations for the case of the CDU\footnote{\textit{It is worth noting that I identified no minority nomination for the case of the Bavarian CSV. That is why, regarding the selector survey data, I will only refer to the CDU.}}, 19 and 18 minority nominations for the Greens and the Left party, respectively. Regarding the party lists, for the SPD eight states could be identified where at least one visible minority aspirant aimed to obtain a position on the list; this applied to four states for the CDU, 10 and seven states, respectively, for the Greens and the Left party. All in all, 942 party members responded to the questionnaire. 834 respondents indicated that they participated in a district nomination and/or a party list composition for the 2013 legislative elections. Regarding the type of nomination the respondents participated in, 699 stated that they partook in a district nomination and 671
5. Data and methods

Table 5.3: Selector Survey: number of respondents by party affiliation and type of nomination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SPD</th>
<th>CDU/CSU</th>
<th>Greens</th>
<th>Left p.</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-minority nomination</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District nomination</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party list</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minority nomination</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District nomination</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party list</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>618</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Selector survey 2015, own elaboration.

Notes: Entries are the number of respondents per party who participated in a district and/or list nomination qualified either as non-minority or as minority nomination.

When differentiating between minority and non-minority nominations we can see that while in the case of the former the number of respondents who partook in such a list nomination is higher than the one participating in a minority district nomination, the contrary can be observed for non-minority nominations (see Table 5.3). Regarding the number of respondents per party, my data is biased. From the 834 respondents who participated in a nomination, 433 indicated that they were party members of the Greens, 226 of the Social Democrats, 114 of the CDU and 61 of the far-left "Die Linke". The party imbalance holds also true for the minority nominations, as Table 5.3 illustrates. This is due to two reasons. First, for instance regarding the Christian Democrats, there are simply less minority minority nominations than for the other three parties under study. And, second, there were party differences regarding the willingness to forward the link to the questionnaire. This imbalance regarding party has to be kept in mind when performing analyses based on the selector survey data.

As the exact size of the target population is unknown to me (the number of party members partaking in minority nominations is available to us only for some districts and states), it is not possible to give an exact response rate. However, it is possible to say in how many of those district and party list nominations that I qualified as minority nominations at least one party member answered to the questionnaire. For those cases, I try to give an approximate response rate based

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78 It is worth highlighting that while only a minority of the respondents participated in only one of the two nominations (135 and 163 out of 834 respondents only in, respectively, party list or district nominations), the great majority of respondents took part in both types of nominations (536 out of 834 respondents).
on the data available to us. Regarding district nominations, for all parties but the far-left 'Die Linke', party members from 50 percent or more of the minority nomination electoral districts participated in the survey. While for the Greens party members from 12 out of 19 minority nomination districts took part in the survey, this was the case for three out of five of such nominations for the CDU and eleven out of 22 for the Social Democrats. For the Left party, we have only some very few respondents (see Table 5.3) in two out of 18 minority district nominations. That is why, in what follows, I will exclude the Left party respondents from the analyses dealing with district nominations. But also for the other parties, the number of respondents per district is in some cases rather low (see Table B1 and B2 in Appendix B). Additionally, for those minority nominations for which I have information about the number of eligible party members present at the respective nomination meeting, it is possible to calculate an average response rate. For the SPD I calculate an average response rate of 8 percent; of 6 percent for the CDU and 11 percent for the Greens. It is, however, worth repeating that these response rates have to be taken only as approximate measures. Regarding party list nominations, at least one party member responded to the questionnaire in all those list nominations of the Social Democrats and the Greens that I qualified as minority nominations. It is, however, worth highlighting that in the case of the latter, the number of respondents is very low in three out of ten states. While regarding the Left party respondents answered to the questionnaire in four out of seven minority list nominations, this was the case in only one out of three such list nominations of the CDU (see Table B3 in Appendix B). Also here it is possible to calculate an average response rate for all those minority party list nominations for which at least one party member took part in the survey and for which information about the number of selectors is available via the party minutes. On average, 13 percent of those party members who took part in a minority party list nominations of the Greens responded to the questionnaire. This was the case for 9 percent of the SPD, 14 percent of the CDU and 10 percent of the party members of the Left party.

79 For the SPD information is available about the number of selectors in seven out of the 11 district minority nominations for which I have survey data, while for the Greens data is missing only for one of such district nominations. For the CDU information about the number of selectors is available for all of the three district minority nominations for which I have survey data.

80 It is worth highlighting that the response rate differs strongly between states. For the Greens in Bavaria, for instance, I calculate a response rate of 44 percent, while for the Greens in Bremen only 0.5 percent. I will come back to these regional imbalance later in the chapter.
5.3 Operationalization

5.3.1 Dependent variables

The present study seeks to understand whether there are features of the parties’ candidate selection process that impede the nomination of immigrant-origin candidates, but also in a more general way, whether they impact on the political representation of the population with immigrant origins. That is why the main dependent variable in this study is a dichotomous variable indicating whether an immigrant-origin aspirant was nominated in the district and/or the party list or not. This variable does not seek further clarification.

However, the nomination of a candidate says nothing about his or her chances of getting elected. List positions and electoral districts can be safe, promising or winnable, or hopeless for a candidate depending on the electoral strength of a party in a district or a state. Scholarship provides several definitions as well as operationalizations of this concept (see, e.g., Kaack 1969; Hennl and Kaiser 2008: 327; Manow and Nistor 2009; Hazan and Rahat 2010: 14). Based on the definition of Annika Hennl and André Kaiser (2008) as well as Reuven Y. Hazan and Gideon Rahat (2010), I will make use of the concept of 'promising candidatures' that can be defined as those positions on the list and electoral districts that the parties consider promising (list positions) or winnable (districts) at the moment of the nomination (see similar Hennl and Kaiser 2008: 327; Hazan and Rahat 2010: 14). This definition makes clear that the concept of promising candidatures is closely related to the parties’ perception of what can be considered as a promising list position or winnable district. However, as this information is not available to us, I will rely on the parties’ electoral results in the previous legislative elections (2005 and 2009) to measure promising candidatures (for a similar approach see Hennl and Kaiser 2008). Furthermore, due to the German electoral system, promising candidatures have to be operationalized and measured for the district as well as for the party list level separately.

Regarding promising candidatures at the district level, I distinguish between winnable and non-winnable districts for a party. Districts that have been won by at least a 10-percent margin of the first votes by a party’s district candidate are qualified as safe districts for this party and, at the same time, as non-winnable for their opponents (Zittel and Gschwend 2007: 302; see also Zeuner 1970: 27). As winnable I qualify, additionally to the safe districts, also all those electoral districts where, in the previous legislative election, at least one party had a less than 10-
percent-vote-margin to the winner. The district is then qualified as winnable for those two parties. The majority of the winnable districts are identified as winnable for the CDU or CSU’s district candidate and their SPD opponent. Depending on the electoral strength of the Left party and in some few cases also the Greens, a district can be qualified as winnable also for their district candidates (see Table 5.4). In this context, it is worth highlighting that there have been some marginal changes of the district boarders between the 2009 legislative election, on which I draw my calculations, and the 2013 election. Those electoral districts (six out of 299) are thus excluded from the calculation of winnable districts.

Promising list positions in the present study are identified based on the two previous legislative elections and more precisely on the last list position on which a candidate had still become a member of parliament. I thus calculate for each position on a party list whether the position can be considered as promising or non-promising (for further operationalizations, see, e.g. Kaack [1969] 60; Höhne [2013] 183). Promising list positions ($Pos_{prom}$) are measured as follows:

$$Pos_{prom} = \frac{lp_{05} + lp_{09}}{2} + 1$$

$lp_{05}$ and $lp_{09}$ stand for the last position on the list on which a candidate has entered parliament in the 2005 and the following legislative election (2009), respectively. To the sum of those two positions divided by two is added one further list position. I am doing so because, first, in a political system where running in the district and on the party list simultaneously (see Chapter 3.2.2) is a widely used practice, last list positions seem to be a more reliable measurement than seats won by party in a state. Philip Manow and Martina Nistor (2009) 608 sq., for instance, have shown that in the case of the CDU/CSU and the SPD the number of list seats...
won in a land very often does not correspond to the last position through which a candidate still got a seat in parliament. Calculating promising list positions based on last list positions, is a way to account for this German particularity. Second, due amongst others to increasing electoral volatility (Höhne 2013: 182), the results of a single election are not a very reliable indicator for measuring the chances ascribed to a list position (Manow and Nistor 2009: 612). I aim to account for this fact by relying on the last two elections that took place before the 2013 legislative elections. And, finally, a further list position is added to the average position of the last two elections because the aim is to measure promising and not necessarily safe list positions (for the operationalization of safe list positions, see, e.g., Manow and Nistor 2009). Nevertheless, my operationalization of promising positions has one particular shortcoming related to the above mentioned dual candidacies. Due to this particularity, what can be identified as a promising list position is very sensitive to the number of electoral districts won by a party in a state as well as to the presence of those district candidates on the top of the party lists. It is thus possible that from one election to another, the last position on the list changes depending on how many district candidates at the top win the district race. I am aware of this shortcoming and take this operationalization as an approximation of what parties could perceive as promising list positions.

Finally, it is worth highlighting that the concept of promising candidatures is measured at the candidate and not the district or list position level. This implies that a candidate can be placed on a promising list position and in a winnable district at the same time, but it only counts as one promising candidature.

### 5.3.2 Independent variables

In the analyses that follow I make use of several variables to explain the nomination of aspirants with immigrant origins in general, and as promising candidates in particular.

First, to measure strategical aspects of the candidate nomination process I rely on the concept of imputed discrimination borrowed from Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski (1995). This concept implies that party selectors are reluctant to nominate specific candidate types because they fear that they could be electorally disadvantageous (Norris and Lovenduski 1995: 124). I employ a single-item measure (on a five-level Likert scale) from the online survey to operationalize this concept. The item wording is as follows: "What do you think, would certain types of candidates help your district party to gain many (1), some (2) first votes, make
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no differences in terms of votes (3), lead to the loss of some (4), or many (5) first votes? Please evaluate each of the following candidate types: [...] c. candidates with a visible immigrant background [...].* A further independent variable is the ethnic composition of the electorate measured by the size of the immigrant-origin population at the electoral districts and länder level as well as, in the case of the latter, the population defined by visible minority origins (see Chapter 5.2.1). I am relying on the total immigrant-origin as well as visible minority population and not on the eligible population because data for the latter is available only at the state and not the electoral district level. Regarding the state level, I have shown in Chapter 3.1.2 that the shares of those two subpopulations (total and eligible immigrant-origin population) are strongly correlated. That is why this operationalization should not be problematic.

In addition to imputed discrimination and ethnic composition of the electorate, I include in the analyses that follow several other variables that are supposed to account for the institutional aspects of the nomination process. I make use of the concept of incumbency as well as of an index that is supposed to measure the importance of district candidatures regarding party list nominations. Incumbency is operationalized by the variable in the aspirant data indicating whether or not a district and/or list aspirant was, at the time of the nominations, already member of parliament in the ongoing legislative period (2009-2013). Furthermore, I make use of the NIRI-index proposed by Reuven Y. Hazan and Gideon Rahat (2010: 130). This index is supposed to measure the importance of incumbency for party lists the other way round by quantifying the relevance of newcomers on the party lists. The NIRI-index is measured (for a single selection event) as follows:

\[ NIRI = \frac{V_{\text{pnew}}}{V_p} \]

\( V_{\text{pnew}} \) stands for the value of all promising list positions won by newcomers in one single selection event (i.e. here, one single party list nomination in one state). For instance, with two promising positions on a list, position 1 gets the value 2, position 2 the value 1. If, for example, a newcomer is placed on the first list position and the second is occupied by an incumbent, than the total value for this single event is 2 (if there are more than one newcomer the values are summed up). \( V_p \) stands for the total value of all promising positions on a list in a specific selection event. If the NIRI-index takes the value 1, this means that all promising list positions had been won by newcomers; the other way round, a value of 0 indicates that none of the promising positions on a list had been won.
by newcomers. Similar to the NRI-index, I calculate the DICA-index in order to measure the importance of district candidacies for promising list positions. The index is thus measured (for a single selection event) as follows:

\[
DICA = \frac{V_{pdist}}{V_p}
\]

\(V_{pdist}\) stands for the value of all promising list positions won, in one single selection event, by candidates that simultaneously run in the district. As for the NRI-index, \(V_p\) stands for the total value of all promising positions on a list in a specific selection event.

Furthermore, to measure the level of inclusiveness of the selectorate, I rely on the continuum commonly proposed in the candidate selection literature that locates the entire electorate at the most inclusive and one leader at the most exclusive pole (see, e.g., Rahat and Hazan 2001: 301; Hazan and Rahat 2006a: 110). In the German case, the common differentiation is done between party members and delegates; with the former located more towards the inclusive and the latter to the exclusive pole, as argued in Chapter 4. To capture the importance of further party selectors that are located even more to the most exclusive pole, I make use of two questions from the selector survey (district and party list nominations). The item wording for the district level is as follows: 'In your opinion, how much influence had the following individuals or groups of individuals regarding the nomination of the district candidate in your district? Please tell me for each of these individuals/groups whether they had very much, much, little or no influence at all: a) delegates or party members, b) executive board at the federal level, c) executive board at the state level, d) regional party branch, e) executive board at the district level, f) the incumbent MP in the district, g) other individuals/groups of individuals, please note which individuals/groups of individuals.' For the party list nominations, the item wording is as follows: 'What would you say, how much influence had the following individuals or groups of individuals regarding the final party list ranking? Please tell me for each of these individuals/groups whether they had very much, much, little or no influence at all: a) delegates or party members, b) executive board at the federal level, c) executive board at the state level, d) executive board at the regional level, e) district party branches, f) other individuals/groups of individuals, please note which individuals/groups of individuals.' (for the German version, see Q23 and Q16 in Appendix A).
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5.4 Limitations

In this final section, I will point to some characteristics of the present study that may influence the interpretation of my findings. In this context, I will highlight especially two issues: first, the survey method I used to conduct my survey among party selectors; and, second, the regional clustering regarding the respondents in the selector survey.

First, one of my main data sources, the selector survey, is gained, as explained above, through a self-administered online-survey. Literature dealing with this kind of survey method in particular highlights errors of nonobservation and associated to this issues of representation (see, e.g., Couper and Miller 2008: 832). As online surveys are by nature restricted to the online population, this may result in a biased sample regarding for instance age or education (Couper 2000: 471 sq.). The target population are party members who have taken part in a minority nomination for the 2013 legislative elections. To the author’s knowledge, there are no studies dealing explicitly with the sociodemographic profile of this subpopulation in Germany. However, from research on party members in Germany, we know that party members predominately tend to be at least 50 years and older, male and with higher educational levels than, on average, the German population (see, e.g., Klein 2011). When comparing the age distribution in the present survey sample with, for instance, data from the party member survey done by Tim Spier and colleagues, we can see that respondents aged 34 and younger are more strongly represented among the respondents of all four parties than within the party member survey (Klein 2011: 45). But also those age groups that make up the largest part in the main German parties (50 to 64 years and 65 to 79 years) (Klein 2011: 45), are rather well represented in the present survey (see Table B4 in Appendix B). Research, however, has shown that younger party members display higher levels of activity within the party (Spier 2011: 100). That is why I assume that, compared to the overall population of party members, younger members are also more strongly represented among those who actively participate in candidate nominations. Regarding education, those respondents who took part in the survey (and who answered the question regarding their educational level) show a much higher educational level than the results from the party member survey would

81 It is worth highlighting that there are further problems associated with online surveys as for instance, on average, higher nonresponse rates. There is empirical evidence that the latter in online surveys is very sensitive to the design of the survey (e.g., type of question) (Bryman 2012: 674 sqq.).
suggest (see here Klein 2011: 48). This holds true for all parties under study but the Greens. Finally, it is noteworthy that the composition regarding gender in the survey sample is more or less in accordance with results regarding the presence of women and men among German party members (see, e.g., Klein 2011: 42). Respondents of the Greens and the Left party show the highest levels of women among their party members, followed by the Social Democrats and the CDU (see Table B5 in Appendix B). To sum up, how could the sociodemographic composition of the sample distort the findings? Several studies, also for the case of Germany, have shown that negative attitudes towards immigrants increase with age and decrease with education (see, e.g., Semyonov et al. 2004: 691; Dirksmeier 2014: 850 sq.). As in particular highly educated party members (and also more young members) took part in the survey, this could have an impact on the response behavior regarding sensitive questions dealing with the immigrant background of aspiring candidates. However, as there is no information about the composition of the target population in terms of education, it is not possible to know whether or not this causes problems for the interpretation of the findings.

Second, I have to highlight a further issue concerning the composition of the selector survey sample which is not related to the method I used to conduct the survey, that is the regional composition of the survey. The sample is, for all four parties under study, regionally biased. The states of Hesse, Bavaria and also North Rhine-Westphalia are overrepresented in the survey (see Table B6 in Appendix B). For Hesse, this holds true for all parties under study but the Left party. The high percentage of Bavarian respondents is due to the high response rate of the respondents who took part in the list nomination of the Bavarian Greens (see above). Respondents from North Rhine-Westphalia are strong represented mainly among the members of the Social Democrats and the CDU. The regional clustering that I identify in the data is not only due to higher response rates in some states, but also to the fact that minority nominations (party lists and districts) occur in some länder more often than in others. As party members participating in such nominations constitute the target population, the respondents in the survey can be found mainly in those states. Since I do not have information about regional particularities of the nomination procedures, I am not able to draw any conclusions from this regional clustering on the response behavior of the survey respondents. However, this imbalance in the data has to be kept in mind for the following empirical analyses.

Finally, it is worth highlighting that, as the title of the present study already suggests, a study of intra-party processes is inevitably faced to problems of encompassing the whole real story (Bukow and Poguntke 2013: 180). Although
I try to account for this shortcoming by studying not only the "official story" (for instance party statutes), but also try to enter the 'secret garden of politics' in particular by the means of the selector survey, there are surely parts of this complex process for which I am not able to account for in the present study.
Chapter 6

Exploring the selection of immigrant-origin candidates in Germany

Taking the 2013 legislative elections as an example, this study seeks to explore how German parties fulfill their function of representation – meaning in this context first and foremost in terms of descriptive representation. Concretely, I ask whether immigrant-origin aspiring candidates meet specific obstacles on the multi-step ladder to parliament and more particularly in the course of the candidate selection process. In Chapter 4, I argued that these obstacles can be due to a party’s electoral strategy, their party ideology, and/or specific intra-party aspects. It is worth highlighting that, by doing so, I also aim to identify whether there are factors that are beneficial for their nomination.

Until now, there is, to the author’s knowledge, no study in the German context that deals with the moment between the certification and nomination stage (Norris 2006: 89) that is where we can find the pool of aspirants seeking to run for legislative office. That is why, in a first step, I will map out the presence of immigrant-origin individuals within the candidate selection process (aspirant and candidate level). In a second step, I seek to explain the selection of immigrant-origin candidates by employing the framework of analysis presented in Chapter 4. I will do so, first, by analyzing whether there are barriers (or incentives) for immigrant-origin aspiring candidates within the selection process related to the parties’ electoral strategies; second, by examining the role of party ideology regarding the selection of immigrant-origin candidates; and, third, by examining
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whether there are logics of intra-party politics that are (dis)advantageous with regards to the selection of immigrant-origin candidates.

6.1 Mapping immigrant-origin aspiring candidates for the 2013 German legislative elections

Before exploring the reasons why immigrant-origin aspiring candidates are nominated or not, we will, in what follows, study in a mainly descriptive manner the presence of immigrants and their descendants among the aspiring and the finally nominated candidates. This will be done by looking at the (aspiring) candidates with an (identifiable) immigrant background as well as at the more narrow category of visible minorities as defined in Chapter 5.2.1. I am doing so because the definition of immigrant background as defined by the Federal Statistical Office is a very broad one, as already argued in Chapter 3.1.2. It includes all foreign born persons or persons with at least one foreign-born parent. Consequently, also persons born (or of parents born), for example, in an European neighboring country (such as for example France) are considered as persons with an immigrant background. However, research has shown, and I argued so on several occasions in this study, that some immigrant groups are perceived differently than others by the majority population. When thus aiming to identify potential barriers within the selection process, it is important to have a closer look at this specific immigrant background (i.e. visible minorities).

6.1.1 From aspiring candidates...

Based on the media research as well as on the party minutes of the nomination meetings, I identified a total of 2,125 persons who run for district and/or party list nomination for the 2013 legislative elections within one of the four parties under study. Among those 2,125 aspirants, 118 persons can be identified as having an immigrant background as defined in Chapter 3.1.2 - that are 6 percent of all aspiring candidates of the SPD, CDU, CSU, Greens and Left party together.

It goes without saying that in the context of the present study only those persons with an immigrant background can be displayed who have been identified by means of the method outlined in Chapter 5.2.1.

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**Figure 6.1: Share of immigrant-origin/visible minorities among aspirants (in % of all aspirants per party)**

![Graph showing share of immigrant-origin aspirants and visible minority aspirants across different parties.](image)

*Source: Aspirant data 2012-2013, own calculations. N=503 (Greens), N=401 (Left party), N=565 (SPD), N=656 (CDU/CSU).*

*Notes: Entries are, for each party separately, the percentages of immigrant-origin and visible minority aspirants of all aspirants.*

(see dotted line in first graph in Figure 6.1). By comparison, in 2013 the overall population with immigrant background aged 18 years and older (thus the eligible population) constitute 9 percent of the German eligible population (see Chapter 3.1.2). We can thus see a difference in terms of numbers, although it is not as remarkable as when comparing with the total population with immigrant origins (i.e. German citizens and foreigners, all ages). Furthermore, when looking at the data we can see that there are slightly more first than second generation immigrant-origin aspirants (64 and 46 out of 118, respectively – i.e. 54% and 39% – see second and third graph in Figure 6.2). In particular due to lack of information regarding the parents’ country of birth, the second generation immigrants - and here particularly those with not obvious foreign sounding names - are more difficult to identify (Wüst and Saalfeld 2010: 316). That is why it is possible that the number of second generation immigrants is underestimated in the present study. However, one could argue that if even after a detailed investigation, such a background was not possible to identify, then it is also of lower, if at all, importance – at least regarding his or her role of legislative aspirant.

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83 It is worth noting that, due to lack of information, eight aspiring candidates could neither be classified as first nor second generation immigrants.
To get a more fine-grained picture of the very broad category of immigrant background, I will also have a look at the country of origin of the (aspiring) candidates. The picture revealed by Figure 6.2 is fairly clear. The large majority of immigrant-origin aspiring candidates has a Turkish background (54 out of 118 aspirants (46%), see first graph in Figure 6.2). This is in accordance with the fact that the Turkish-origin population constitutes the largest group within the German population with immigrant background (17% of the whole population with a migration background in 2012, see Chapter 3.1.2). However, I have also shown that their presence among the eligible population with immigrant background is much lower (Blätte 2015: 217 sq.). What then explains this strong presence at the aspirant level? First, scholarship points to the fact that strong ethnic communities can help to develop a sense of attachment also to the larger political regime in the host country (Bird 2011b: 26), in the present case the German political system. It could thus be argued that the rather strong presence in terms of numbers of Turkish-origin citizens within the German population is a mobilizing factor for the members of this group. This is in accordance with the fact that, as shown in Chapter 3.1.3, the Turkish-origin population in Germany constitutes a highly organized immigrant group within civil society. Additionally, involvement in organizations directed to the host as well as to the country of origin has proven to be a mobilizing factor (see, e.g., Berger et al. 2004: 504). However, there is, to the best of author’s knowledge, no study analyzing this relationship for the kind of political mobilization that is examined in the present study, namely running for elective office. Scholarship also hypothesizes that the rather disadvantageous position of Turkish-origin citizens as well as experiences of discrimination could 'provide a stronger motivation to become active than among better-placed immigrant groups' (Schönwälder et al. 2013: 485). Finally, it could be also that parties actively encourage Turkish-origin citizen more than other immigrant-origin citizens to seek nomination because, amongst others due to their rather high mobilization potential, they constitute from a vote-seeking perspective an interesting immigrant-origin electorate to target (Blätte 2015: 213).

The Turkish-origin aspirants are then followed by, by a wide margin, persons with Iranian or Greek background (7 and 6 out of 118, respectively (6% and 5%)). The remaining 51 aspiring candidates have their roots in 27 countries. The great majority in one of the EU-25 or EU-28 states, respectively (18 and 24, respectively (15% and 20%)), followed by the African sub-Saharan region and Southern Asia (both 6, 5%), North and South America (5, 4%), Post-soviet states (3, 3%), further West Asian countries other than Turkey or Iran (2), and finally North Africa and East Asia (both one) (see by country first graph Figure 6.2). Among those
6. Exploring the selection of immigrant-origin candidates in Germany

Figure 6.2: Aspirants’ countries of origin

Source: Aspirant data 2012-2013, own calculations.
Notes: Entries are percentage of aspirants with respective country of origin within the group of immigrant-origin aspirants (first graph), the group of first generation immigrants (second graph) and within the group of second generation immigrants (third graph).

118 aspiring candidates with immigrant origins four can be identified as so-called ethnic Germans (three born in Romania and one in Kazakhstan). These numbers reveal that compared to their share in the eligible population with immigrant origins (Blätte 2015: 217) (see Chapter 3.1.2), (Spät)Aussiedler are strongly underrepresented in terms of numbers among the population of immigrant-origin aspirants. Even though this result calls for further analyses, I will not tackle this question in the scope of the present study. Based on the definition presented in Chapter 5.2.1, we can thus identify 84 aspiring candidates who have a visible minority background that are four percent of all those who sought nomination within one of the four parties (see dotted line in second graph in Figure 6.1).

Figure 6.1 also gives a clear picture about what party immigrant-origin aspirants and more specifically those with a visible minority background seek to run for office. The vast majority of the visible minority aspirants stood for nomination within a left-wing party (77 out of 84 visible minority aspirants, i.e. 92%) (see Figure 6.1). In absolute numbers but also compared to their total share of aspiring candidates, the Greens as the Idealtyp of a new politics party counts the highest number of aspirants with a visible minority background (30 out of 503 aspirants, i.e. 6%). The assumption that left-wing and more
specifically new politics or left-libertarian parties are particularly open-minded towards (immigrant-origin) minorities because they explicitly promote equal rights for minorities in general and immigrants in particular (Poguntke 1987: 78) seems to be reflected already at the aspirant level. It could be that this subpopulation feels more appealed by the programmatic offer of the new left parties - including their position towards the immigration issue (see Chapter 3.3) - but also that those parties intentionally encourage aspirants with visible minority background to stand for nomination. The Greens are then followed by the Left party with 22 of visible minority background out of 401 aspiring candidates (6%). Although this party does not fit into the category of new left-parties, I have shown in Chapter 3.2.3 that regarding their position towards the immigration issue, they are very close to the Greens - albeit with a stronger anti-capitalist framing. Even though (far) ahead the conservatives, the Social Democrats appear less appealing to visible minority aspirants than the Left party and the Greens (or they court less visible minority aspirants). Within the SPD 4 percent of all aspiring candidates (25 out of 565) can be identified as having a visible minority background. This result already points to the difficult relationship towards the immigration issue, scholarship attributes to mainstream left parties which is reflected, amongst others, in their manifestos (as outlined in Chapter 3.3). Finally, the lowest level of visible minority aspirants can be observed for the Conservatives (1% of all CDU/CSU aspirants, i.e. 7 out of 656).

It is worth highlighting that the same distribution between parties can be found regarding the broader category of immigrant background (see first graph in Figure 6.1). However, one particularity stands out: when looking at the visible minority aspirants within the CDU/CSU their number decreases from 12 (immigrant-origin) to 7 (visible minorities). Additionally, two out of the four ethnic Germans immigrants (that are not qualified as visible minorities) that have been identified among all aspirants, seek to run for the Conservatives. As argued in Chapter 3.3, the CDU/CSU is the party that is the nearest located to anti-immigration pole (although still rather in the middle of the ideological spectrum); at the same time they supported for a long time rather generous policies regarding ethnic German immigrants. This could be a reason why in particular people with a visible minority background feel less appealed to the Conservatives and thus are less likely to seek nomination within one of these two parties.

When looking at the German states in which the immigrant-origin aspiring candidates and more particularly those with a visible minority background sought nomination, a clear pattern appears. About 60 percent of all immigrant-origin
aspirants stood for nomination in the district and/or on the party list in only four states (North Rhine-Westphalia, Baden-Württemberg, Berlin, Bavaria). The same holds true for the subgroup of visible minority aspirants. In all five Eastern German states together only three (out of 118) immigrant-origin aspirants sought nomination (in Brandenburg and Saxony-Anhalt); in the case of visible minorities only one aspirant could be observed (in Saxony-Anhalt). Comparing these findings to the distribution of the immigrant-origin population across all German states, we can see that except the state of Bavaria, all of the aforementioned states have immigrant shares above the nation-wide average. As the number of immigrant-origin aspirants in a state is also related to the size of the state in question and thus to the number of electoral districts and list positions, the number of immigrant-origin aspirants has to be compared to the overall number of aspirants in a state.

The correlation between the percentage of immigrant-origin aspirants in a state (district and party list nominations together) and the share of the immigrant-origin population in a state is strong (Pearson’s r=.70, p<.01) and significant; this holds also true for the subpopulation of visible minorities (Pearson’s r=.74, p<.01). The ethnic composition of the constituency thus not only impacts on the demand-side of the selection process assuming a vote-seeking party behavior (as my second hypothesis suggests and what has still to be (dis)confirmed by further analyses in Chapter 6.2) but also on the supply-side. In short, immigrant-origin aspirants, and in particular those with a visible minority background, seek more frequently nomination in those states where they also represent a larger proportion within the overall population. This seems to be a logical consequence because also the pool of immigrant-origin and visible minority citizens from which they can emerge is broader in those regions.

Running two linear regressions with the share of minority aspirants in the total population of aspirants in a state as the dependent and the percentage of the respective minority population in the state population (one for the group of immigrant-origin and one for the visible minority group), confirms this relationship (b=0.30, p<.01 and b=0.38, p<.01, respectively). However, Figure 6.3 also reveals that there are cases that deviate from the main trend. According to conventional statistical controls (Field et al. 2012: 292), the state of Berlin in the immigrant-origin model (first graph Figure 6.3) and the state of Schleswig-Holstein in the visible minority model (second graph Figure 6.3) can be identified as outlier

84 For simplicity reasons, I will refer to "minority" aspirants or candidates when speaking of both immigrant-origin and visible minority aspirants or candidates.
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Figure 6.3: Immigrant-origin/visible minority aspirants and share of immigrant-origin/visible minority population in the states (linear regression)

Source: Aspirant data 2012-2013, own calculations. N=16.
Notes: Shown are linear regression models for \( y = \) percentage of (visible) immigrant-origin aspirants in state and \( x = \) percentage of (visible) immigrant-origin population in state with lower and upper confidence limits (90%).

(standardized residual of 2.36 and 2.52, respectively). In both cases the share of minority aspirants among all aspirants in the state is higher than expected based on the (numerical) importance of the respective minority population in the state. At this stage of the analysis, we could only speculate about the reasons for this phenomenon. That is why these findings have to be kept in mind to see whether they reemerge when dealing with the nominated candidates or whether they can be explained based on the analyses in Chapter 6.2. Additionally, it is worth highlighting that at this stage of the analysis, I only take into account the state in which the aspirant seeks nomination without differentiating between district and party list nominations. However, the proportion of the immigrant-origin population measured at the state level has not to correspond to the proportion in each district of the respective state. In order to measure the relationship between emergence of minority aspirants and ethnic composition of the constituency, the analyses have to be done for each type of nomination (district, party list) separately. Nevertheless, the present findings give a first idea about the relation between ethnic composition of the state and candidate emergence. Whether or not this relation is strengthened when it comes to the nomination of the candidates and if it still holds true when differentiating between district and party list nominations,
will be analyzed later in this chapter.

A final word has to be said about what type of candidature immigrant-origin and visible minority citizens aspired as well as about the socio-demographic composition of the group of minority aspirants in particular in terms of gender; and whether or not this differs from the population without immigrant background.

First, it is worth noting that the number of immigrant-origin aspirants trying to run in the district as well as on the list is slightly higher than in the case of aspirants without any immigrant origin (59 out of 118 compared to 924 out of 2007, i.e. 51% vs. 46%). This difference is even more pronounced in the case of visible minority aspirants: 54 percent of all visible minority aspirants sought nomination in the district and on the land list (45 out of 84). All differences, however, are not significant at conventional statistical levels (immigrant-origin: \( \chi^2 = 0.70, p=.40 \), visible minority: \( \chi^2 = 1.88, p=.17 \)). They were also less likely seeking to run solely in the district (20 out of 84 (24%) compared to 620 out of 2041 (30%)) \( (\chi^2 = 1.65, p=.20) \). It could be hypothesized that because of their minority status those aspirants fear for having to face more difficulties from the part of the selectors as well as the voters. This could explain why, compared to their non-immigrant counterparts, they more frequently seek nomination in both tiers (district and party list). Furthermore, it could be that they more often fail nomination in the district and thus try to be placed at least on the party list (in the great majority of the cases the district nomination takes place before the nomination of the party list (Detterbeck 2016: 4)). Unfortunately, it is not possible to verify this assumption by means of my data. Finally, this phenomenon could also be due to the fact that visible minority aspirants more frequently seek nomination in those parties that, in the past, had only (very) little chances to win district races (Greens, Left party) (Manow 2015: 129 sq.). That is why in particular in those parties trying to run in both tiers could be a mean to increase the chance of winning a seat in parliament. I will elaborate this point further in Chapter 6.2.

Finally, regarding the gender balance of the group of aspirants, the minority aspirant subpopulation is, according to the data, more male than the non-minority population, this holds true in particular for the aspirants with immigrant origins in the broader sense (69% men – 81 out of 118 – compared to 65% among the aspirants without immigrant background – 1305 out of 2007) and to a lower degree for the visible minority subpopulation (67% men – 56 out of 84 – compared to 65% among the non-visible minority population – 1330 out of 2041). Whether or not this small difference regarding the gender composition of the minority population is getting more pronounced (or not) at the candidate level, will be analyzed in
the next section.

To sum up, the results outlined above concern the aspirant level, thus the supply-side where aspiring candidates seek party nomination. Which type of aspirants are finally nominated as their party’s candidate as well as whether or not immigrant-origin aspirants face specific obstacle when trying to run for elective office will be analyzed in the next sections.

6.1.2 ... to nominated candidates

Having mapped out how many, in what states and for what parties people with immigrant origins sought nomination for the 2013 legislative elections as well as specified the countries of origin of those aspirants, I will, in what follows, analyze the presence of these aspirants among the aspiring candidates who have finally been nominated by their party. In doing so, I also aim to detect possible patterns that could give us some first hints regarding the verification (or falsification) of my hypotheses.

First of all, the data reveals for the four parties under study that 1.685 out of the 2.125 aspirants (79%) were nominated as their party’s district and/or list candidate; *vice versa* 440 of the aspiring candidates (21%) failed nomination. Among the nominated candidates 19 percent run solely as district candidates, while 29 percent only run on the party list. The large majority (52%) stood for election in the district and on the party list at the same time. This is in accordance with the literature that found similar percentages of dual candidatures for the 2009 elections (Manow and Flemming, 2012: 781 sqq.). The data also reveals that the percentage of those who failed nomination was the highest for the Greens (27%), followed by the Social Democrats (23%), the CDU/CSU (18%) and, finally, the Left party (14%) (for similar findings for the 2009 elections see Manow and Flemming, 2012: 781 sqq.). This can be interpreted as a sign for a more competitive nature of the (official) nomination races in the case of the Greens. Furthermore, regarding the question of dual candidacies the share is the highest among the Social Democrats (66% of all candidates), followed by the Greens (58%), the CDU/CSU (44%), and finally the Left party (40%). A further noteworthy point in this context: while within the two mainstream parties (SPD CDU/CSU) only a (very) small number of candidates stood for election only in the district (3% and 12%, respectively), this was much more common in the case of the two smaller parties (24% in the case of the Greens and even 46% in the case of the Left party).
When it comes to the nominated candidates with immigrant origins, the data shows that 74 percent of all immigrant-origin (87 out of 118 aspirants) and 76 percent of all visible minority aspirants (64 out of 84) were finally nominated as their party’s candidate. Putting these numbers in relation to the number of nominated candidates in general, this means that 5 percent and 4 percent, respectively, of all candidates running for the 2013 legislative elections for either of the four parties has an immigrant-origin or visible minority background (see dotted line in the two graphs in Figure 6.4). Comparing these results for the candidates to the share of immigrant-origin and visible minority aspirants, we can see, for both immigrant groups, that their share decreases, however, very slightly and at a very low level (from 5.6 to 5.2% and 4.0 to 3.8%).

Regarding the immigrant origins of the nominated candidates, Figure 6.5 shows that the share of Turkish-origin citizens among the immigrant-origin candidates stays more or less the same compared to the aspirant level (41 out of 87 immigrant-origin candidates, i.e. 47%, compared to 54 out of 118 immigrant-origin aspirants, i.e. 46%). Identical to the aspirant level, Turkish-origin candidates are then followed by, by a wide margin, people with Iranian, Indian or Greek background (5 and 4 out of 87, respectively – 6% and 5%). Regarding the remaining regions of origin, the distribution stays almost the same as it was at the aspirant level.
However, candidates with origins in a North or South American country show at the candidate level even lower numbers than at the aspirant level (2 out of 87, i.e. 2%) (see first graph in Figure 6.5). It is interesting to note that, as one of the few guestworker providing countries of the first guestworker wave that showed comparatively high numbers of aspirants, those with Italian background are now at the candidate level only very poorly represented (only 1 of 4 aspirants with Italian origin has been nominated). Comparing aspirant and candidate level for all aspiring candidates with origins in one of the former guestworker providing countries together (here Italy, Greece, Croatia, Tunisia), we can see that their share (slightly) decreases from 11 to 9 percent. Regarding the so-called (Spät)Aussiedler, their share within the group of immigrant-origin candidates remains at the same low level as at the aspirant stage (3 percent, 3 out of 87 candidates). It can thus be summarized that Turkish-origin individuals are not only numerous at the aspirant level but they are also rather successful when it comes to the nomination as candidate. As already argued in the previous section regarding the aspirant level, as a result of their number and high mobilization potential. Turkish-origin citizens constitute an interesting electorate to target. Furthermore, regarding the intra-party level they are relatively well represented.
– which could be advantageous when it comes to the nomination as candidate. Andreas Blätte \(2014^{151}\) points to the fact that almost all immigration related intra-party organizations in Germany are founded by people of Turkish-origin. Regarding the immigrant generation, \(Figure 6.5\) also shows that the percentage of second generation immigrants has slightly increased compared to the aspirant level (from 42 to 44 percent of all those who could be qualified as first or second generation immigrants).

In the previous section, I have already shown that immigrant-origin as well as visible minority aspirants were more strongly represented among the aspiring candidates in states with high shares of immigrant-origin populations. This relationship persists at the candidate level. The correlation between ethnic composition of the state and nomination of immigrant-origin and in particular visible minority candidates is strong (Pearson’s \(r = .55\), \(p<.05\) and \(.63\), \(p<.01\), respectively), however less pronounced than at the aspirant level. Rerunning a linear regression as I did in the previous section, but this time for the candidate level, underscores the relationship between ethnic composition and nomination of minority candidates (\(b=0.27\), \(p<.05\) and \(b=0.36\), \(p<.01\)). \(Figure 6.6\) however, once again points to cases that deviate from the main trend. However, at the candidate level, only the city state of Berlin can be qualified as an outlier (in both models) (standardized residuals 3.05 and 2.95). The state of Schleswig-Holstein does not deviate substantially from the main trend - as it did at the aspirant level. We can only speculate about the reasons for this outstanding position of Berlin. First, it could be the status of Berlin as a city-state that contributes to this (comparatively) high number of immigrant-origin as well as visible minority candidates. Karen Schönwälder \(2013^{639}\) points to dense ethnic networks, open-minded electorates and the specific composition of the immigrant population in German city states. When, based on the Microcensus-Panel data, looking at the numerical importance of Turkish-origin citizens in the German \(länder\), we see that the highest shares of Turkish-origin citizens in the immigrant-origin population can be found in Berlin together with North Rhine-Westphalia and also Bremen (see \(Table C1\) in \(Appendix C\)). At the same time, 7 out of the 11 immigrant-origin candidates in Berlin are of Turkish-origin. However, this explains not the outstanding character of Berlin compared to Bremen. We will keep this finding in mind when investigating deeper into the barriers and advantages for immigrant-origin and visible minority aspirants within the candidate selection process in \(Chapter 6.2\).

In the last section, I showed that about 50 percent of all immigrant-origin aspirants sought nomination in both tiers. We can now see that this tendency is
even more pronounced at the candidate level: about 60 percent of all immigrant-origin candidates are nominated in the district and on the party list simultaneously (i.e. 53 out of 87) compared to about 50 percent in the case of non immigrant origin candidates (i.e. 821 out of 1598) ($\chi^2=3.01$, $p<.10$). On the other side, they are less often nominated solely on the party list compared to their non-immigrant-origin counterparts (21 compared to 29 percent of the candidates without any immigrant origin, i.e. 18 out of 87 and 467 out of 1598) ($\chi^2=2.99$, $p<.10$). The differences between the broader category of immigrants and visible minorities that were observable at the aspirant level disappear at the candidate level (61% dual candidacies, 22% only list, 17% only district, i.e. 39, 14 and 11 out of 64).

Furthermore, regarding the distribution of men and women among immigrant-origin candidates, we can see that regarding the broader category of immigrant background there are no differences between the immigrant-origin candidates and their counterparts without any immigrant background (36.8 and 37% women, respectively) ($\chi^2=0.00$, $p=.95$). The highest share show the visible minority candidates where 39 percent of all candidates are women ($\chi^2=0.11$, $p=.74$). We can thus observe that women are slightly more represented at the candidate than at the aspirant level; however, the increase is rather weak and there are differences

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**Source:** Aspirant data 2012-2013, own calculations. $N=16$.

**Notes:** Shown are linear regression models for $y=$percentage of (visible) immigrant-origin aspirants in state and $x=$percentage of (visible) immigrant-origin population in state with lower and upper confidence limits (90%).
between the groups (no immigrant background, immigrant background, visible minority). As the differences, however, are very small, it is more appropriate to state that women appear not to have a more disadvantageous status when having immigrant origins compared to those without. This is in accordance with studies that even found regarding the election of immigrant-origin women candidates that this supposed 'double minority status' has proved to be less a disadvantageous than an advantageous candidate characteristic (see for G.B., e.g., Dancygier, Lindgren, et al. 2015: 712).

Finally, when looking at variations between parties, I have shown in the last section that immigrant-origin and even more visible minority candidates seek nomination mainly within one of the three left-wing parties and here in particular within the Greens and the Left party. The same can be observed for the candidate level. From the 64 nominated visible minority candidates 59 were nominated in one of the three left-wing parties (that is 92 percent of all visible minority candidates) - 21 within the Greens (33%), 19 both within the Social Democrats and the Left party (30%). The same distribution can be observed, though with more pronounced differences, for the broader category of immigrant-origin candidates. Out of 87 nominated immigrant-origin candidates 78 were nominated within one of the three aforementioned parties (that is 90 percent of all immigrant-origin candidates) - 29 within the Greens (33%), 26 within the Left party (30%) and, finally, 23 within the SPD (26%). However, as the number of nominated candidates differs between the four parties (due to party lists of different lengths), the number of minority candidates has to be set in relation to the number of nominated candidates. Figure 6.4 shows that regarding immigrant-origin candidates, on the one hand, the difference between Greens and Left party has almost vanished compared to the aspirant level (7.9 and 7.5 percent for the candidate level compared to 8.5 and 7.2 percent for the aspirant level), while, on the other hand, the distance to the Social Democrats has become larger (5 percent of all SPD candidates have immigrant-origins compared to 6.0 percent of the aspirants). Regarding visible minority candidates the party differences are more or less identical to the aspirant level. Concerning the distribution of immigrant-origin candidates between parties, the present results are in line with those, at the best author’s knowledge, the only study done in this area in the German context. For 2005, Clara Fonseca (2011: 122) identifies the highest share of immigrant-origin candidates among the candidates of the Greens and the Left party (3%), followed, by large, the SPD (1%) and the CDU/CSU (1%). At the same time those results also show that, since 2005, the share of immigrant-origin
candidates has increased for all parties. When thus comparing the aspirant and the candidate level, we can see that the percentage of visible minority candidates slightly decreases in the case of the CDU/CSU (0.9% compared to 1.1%) and the Greens (5.7% compared to 6.0%); it stays the same for the Social Democrats (4.4%) and the Left party (5.5%) (for the candidates see second graph in Figure 6.4). Regarding the broader category of immigrant background, we can observe that the share also decreases (except for the Left party where it stays the same) and, at least for the SPD and the Greens, slightly more than it does for the visible minority candidates (see first graph in Figure 6.4). I will examine the party difference in more detail when analyzing in Chapter 6.2.2 the relevance of party ideology regarding the nomination of immigrant-origin and visible minority candidates.

To sum up, what can be said about the presence of immigrants and their descendants among those who aspired nomination for the 2013 legislative elections and those who succeeded in being nominated as candidate? First of all, we have observed that immigrant-origin and visible minority candidates make up only a relatively small proportion of the nominated candidates (of the four parties under study). However, their overall share at the candidate level resembles their share at the aspirant level. From this can be concluded that the pool of immigrant-origin aspirants is already rather small. From this small pool, a similar share as for the aspirants without any immigrant background is nominated as candidate. Figure 6.7 once more emphasizes this observation: Without accounting for party differences, both, immigrant-origin and visible minority, candidates have a lower chance of being nominated (odds ratios are below one) compared to their counterparts without any immigrant background or, in the case of visible minorities, to the those without immigrant origins as well as those with immigrant background but who were not qualified as visible minorities. The odds ratio, however, are close to one (in particular in the case of visible minority aspirants) and not significant at conventional statistical levels (see Figure 6.7). Based on these results, one could argue that the parliamentarian under-representation of immigrant-origin citizens in terms of numbers is due to the supply-side that are those who are willing to run for office. However, the number of aspirants for which I run my analyses is limited to those who at the official nomination meeting stood for nomination. It could be, and scholarship suggests so (see, e.g., Reiser 2011: 252; Detterbeck.

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85 However, it is noteworthy that those numbers are restricted to non-German origin candidates. The present results either comprise all immigrant-origin individuals (that is also so-called ethnic Germans) or visible minorities (where neither Western immigrants nor ethnic Germans are included).
6. Exploring the selection of immigrant-origin candidates in Germany

Figure 6.7: Nomination chances of immigrant-origin and visible minority aspirants

Source: Aspirant data 2012-2013, own calculations. N=2,125.
Notes: Entries are odds ratios for immigrant-origin and visible minority aspirants being nominated as their party’s candidate (compared to those without immigrant or visible minority origins). Visible minority aspirants odds ratio=0.83, CI-90%; 0.55:1.30; immigrant-origin aspirants odds ratio=0.72, CI-90%; 0.51:1.00.

2016 7), that the number of those who consider to run for office is higher than those who finally enter the official nomination race. There are a multitude of reasons why those potential aspirants quit nomination races before they officially start, and it is beyond the scope of this study to further investigate into these reasons. However, one reason could be that the supply of aspirants and (presumed) concerns of the selectors interact (Norris and Lovenduski 1995: 248) meaning that immigrant-origin citizens do not come forward because they fear they might be less successful to be nominated than their non immigrant origin counterparts. While, in the present study, I cannot account for this assumption, it makes the investigation into potential barriers during the candidate selection process all the more important.

Furthermore, I could show that immigrant-origin and in particular visible minority candidates are more strongly represented in the candidate portfolio of left-wing parties (SPD, Greens, Left party). Also the mainstream left (Social Democrats) scored worse than the Greens, as the classic new left party, and the Left party, as on the programmatic level a strong supporter of immigrants and refugees. However, the findings also indicate that this strong disequilibrium between left and right can be observed already at the aspirant level. The results

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also revealed that there is a strong relationship between, on the one side, the immigrant-origin and visible minority population in a state and, on the other side, the share of immigrant-origin and visible minority candidates in a state. But also this connection can already be observed, and even at a stronger level, at the aspirant level. A further point to highlight that clearly needs further investigation in the remainder of this chapter is the very strong presence of Turkish-origin aspirants as well as candidates (47 and 46 percent, respectively). Calculating the parity ratio proposed by Irene Bloemraad (2013) (see Chapter 3.1.3), Turkish-origin citizens appear to be quite well represented among the candidates. Based on the share of citizens with Turkish roots in the German population (foreigners and nationals) as well as their percentage among the legislative candidates, I calculate a ratio of 0.75 (the parity ratio for all immigrant-origin candidates together is 0.6, however, in relation to their share in the eligible (not the total) German population). Unfortunately, I do not have reliable information about the number of eligible Turkish-origin citizens. However, Andreas Blätte (2015) has shown that their share within the eligible immigrant-origin population is rather low compared to their numerical presence within the total population with immigrant origins (see Chapter 3.1.2). That is why the parity ratio should even be above the calculated 0.75. This strong presence of Turkish-origin is in line with previous studies dealing, however, with the level of elected representatives (for the local level, see Schönwälder et al. 2013: 485; for the regional level, see Schönwälder 2013: 642).

Finally, it is important to highlight that until now we treated all candidatures equally. However, as already argued Chapter 5.3.1, the nomination as candidate says nothing about his or her chances of being elected. That is why, in what follows, I will also take into account the concept of promising candidatures that are those candidatures that are seen at least as winnable before the elections.

### 6.2 Explaining the selection of immigrant-origin candidates

In the last section, I have shown, taking the 2013 elections to the Bundestag as an example, how immigrant-origin citizens, including visible minorities, moved up the legislative recruitment ladder from aspiring to nominated candidates. Based on these results, the remainder of the present chapter assesses whether these aspiring candidates meet specific obstacles within the selection process. The aim
6. Exploring the selection of immigrant-origin candidates in Germany

is thus to enter the 'secret garden of politics' to detect whether parties’ strategic considerations, ideology and/or aspects related to intra-party politics impact on the chances of minority aspirants not only to be nominated as legislative candidates, but also to be nominated in districts and/or on list positions that offer a realistic chance of being elected in the Bundestag. In this context it is worth highlighting that the three dimensions of our explanatory model (strategy, ideology, intra-party politics), expounded in Chapter 4 are far from being independent from each other, quite the contrary is the case, they are strongly connected. In what follows, I will analyze them separately, but have to keep this interwovenness of the factors in mind.

6.2.1 Candidate nomination as an electoral strategy?

When presenting the analytical framework, I argued that parties can pursue a vote-seeking strategy by nominating specific types of candidates in order to broaden its electorate or to strengthen the link to its core electorate. In the case of immigrant-origin and especially visible minority candidates, this is supposed to be a question of balancing costs and benefits.

In what follows, I will, first, analyze whether there is a relationship between, on the one side, the type of candidature (district vs. party list nomination; promising vs. non-promising candidature) as well as characteristics of the constituency (district, state), and here in particular the share of immigrant-origin citizens in the district/state population, and, on the other side, the chances of immigrant-origin and visible minority aspirants to be nominated as legislative candidates. In a second step, I focus on the party selectors’ attitudes towards the nomination of minority candidates and here in particular on the selectors’ electoral concerns of having these candidates running for their party.

6.2.1.1 Type of candidature and constituency characteristics

In Chapter 4 I argued that as a result of a party’s strategic behavior the nomination of immigrant-origin candidates could depend on the type of candidature as well as on the socio-demographic composition of the constituency. Party selectors could be reluctant to nominate minority candidates for more sensitive election races such as district races or be more interested in coloring their candidate portfolio than nominating them on promising list positions or districts. That is
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why I hypothesized that the nomination of those candidates is more likely on party lists than in districts, and on non-promising list positions or districts than on those positions or districts that the party hopes to win. Furthermore parties could show a strategic behavior by nominating candidates in constituencies where they "fit" in terms of socio-demography to the constituents.

In the previous chapter, I defined promising candidatures as all those positions on the list and electoral districts that the parties consider promising (list positions) or winnable (districts) at the moment of the nomination (for the operationalization see Chapter 5.3.1). All in all, about 39 percent (i.e. 665 out of 1685 candidates\(^{86}\)) of all candidatures for the 2013 legislative elections within one of the four parties under study can be qualified as promising candidatures meaning that districts and/or the list positions on which those candidates candidates run are seen at least as winnable before the elections (not shown). About half of these 665 candidates (391, i.e. 59%) ran as dual candidates either in a district that can be qualified as hopeless for their party but on a promising list position (31%) or the other way around, on a non-promising list position but in a district qualified safe or at least winnable for their party (28%). Another 25 percent was running in a district considered winnable for their party and, at the same time, on a promising position on the list (170 out of 665). Safeguarding district candidates by putting them on a promising list position, is a common practice in German politics (Reiser 2013: 131). It is interesting to note that 130 out of all 271 candidates (48%) who are running in competitive districts - that are those districts, as defined in Chapter 5.3.1, where at least one party had a less than 10-percent-vote-margin to the winner in the previous legislative election – were safeguarded on promising list positions.

Looking at the group of immigrant-origin candidates, we can see that 31 out of 118 aspirants with an immigrant background (26%) were nominated in districts and/or on list positions that can be considered at least as winnable before the election. The first graph in Figure 6.8 illustrates that the proportion of aspiring candidates without any immigrant origin is slightly higher; the difference, however, is not statistically significant. A further glance at the more narrow category of visible minorities reveals that the difference to the group without visible minority background (that are all those without any immigrant background as well as those with immigrant origins who according to my definition of visible minorities cannot

\(^{86}\) Out of those 665 candidatures 18 were qualified as non-promising because the candidates run in a redistricted district (and on a non-promising position or only as district candidate). For practical reasons, I excluded those districts from the calculation of the promising candidatures (for more detail see Chapter 5.3.1).
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Figure 6.8: Promising candidatures (in % of aspirants)

Source: Aspirant data 2012-2013, own calculations. N=2,007 (non immigrant origin), N=118 (immigrant-origin); N=2,041 (non visible minority), N=84 (visible minority). Notes: Pearson’s Chi-square test: non immigrant vs. immigrant-origin $\chi^2 = 1.47$ ($p=0.23$), non visible minority vs. visible minority $\chi^2 = 0.30$ ($p=0.58$).

These findings seem at least not to support the fourth hypothesis suggesting that nominating immigrant-origin (or visible minority) aspirants is more a strategy to diversify the candidate portfolio than nominating those candidates in winnable districts or on promising list positions. However, in Chapter 6.2.2 I will examine whether this finding still holds true when taking party differences into account.

Above I have shown that, leaving any immigrant background aside, there is a certain pattern regarding the composition of promising candidatures (district/party list). In Figure 6.9, the types of promising candidatures for the group of candidates without any immigrant background, those with immigrant origins in the broader sense, and finally the group of visible minority candidates are compared. The figure reveals some interesting insights into the composition of the promising candidatures as well as differences between the different subgroups of candidates. While for all three subgroups those having a promising list position but are running in an hopeless district constitutes the largest group of promising candidates, the percentage is much higher in the case of the two immigrant groups than their non-immigrant counterparts. Almost two-thirds of all immigrant-origin and visible minority candidates can be ranked among this type of promising candidature compared to only about one third of the candidates without any immigrant origin. The percentage of those who are running in winnable districts,

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87 It is worth noting that some few candidates have a promising position on the party list and run in a redistricted district. For practical reasons, those candidates were integrated in the category "Promising position (hopeless district)."
6. Exploring the selection of immigrant-origin candidates in Germany

Figure 6.9: Types of promising candidatures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non immigrant origin (N=634)</th>
<th>Immigrant-origin (N=31)</th>
<th>Visible minority (N=26)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Promising position (hopeless district)</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winnable district (non-promising position)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winnable district AND promising position</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winnable district (only district asp.)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promising position (only list asp.)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promising position (not nominated in district)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winnable district (not nominated on list)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Aspirant data 2012-2013, own calculations.
Notes: Entries are, for all three subgroups separately, percentages of a certain type of promising candidature from the total number of promising candidatures in the respective subgroup.

in particular either also on a promising list position or on a non-promising list position, is much lower in the case of the two immigrant groups (26% and 30%, respectively, compared to 55%) (see Figure 6.9). These results provide support for the third hypothesis stating that party list positions are easier to occupy by minority candidates than districts – at least for the case of promising candidatures. I could thus argue that the data supports the assumption that parties nominate immigrant-origin candidates, including those of visible minority belonging, for strategical reasons only very seldom in winnable districts. They supposedly do so because the electoral risk of nominating immigrant-origin candidates is perceived as to high. Party lists, on the other side, have the advantage of providing more than one slot so that different types of candidates can be placed on the list. However, those findings could also be a simple artifact due to the fact that, as exposed in Chapter 6.1 immigrant-origin and particularly visible minority candidates are more likely to run for the two smaller left-wing parties (Greens, Left party) who have almost none (in the case of the Greens) or at least very few (in the case of the Left) districts they can call winnable, as shown in Chapter 5.3.1. Additionally, it is worth highlighting that regarding the question whether nomination is more likely for minority aspirants when seeking nomination on the list than in the district (H3), the answer is a qualified yes. Regarding immigrant-origin aspirants,
6. Exploring the selection of immigrant-origin candidates in Germany

Table 6.1: Successful list vs. district candidatures (immigrant-origin & visible minority aspirants)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Immigrant-origin</th>
<th></th>
<th>Visible minority</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>District</td>
<td>List</td>
<td>District</td>
<td>List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not nominated</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nominated</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Aspirant data 2012-2013, own calculations.
Notes: Pearson's Chi-square test: immigrant-origin aspirants $\chi^2=1.33$, $p=.25$, visible minority $\chi^2=0.70$, $p=.40$.

18 percent of those who sought nomination on the list compared to 25 percent who aimed for a district nomination failed nomination. With regards to visible minority aspirants, 23 percent failed nomination in the district compared to 17 percent for the party list (see Table 6.1). For both immigrant groups, the differences between failure at the district and on the party list level are not statistically significant. In what follows, it will thus be interesting to focus on the two mainstream parties, and here in particular the Social Democrats because their chances to win district races are higher.

In a final step, I will analyze whether the nomination of immigrant-origin candidates is related to the socio-demographic composition of the constituency (i.e. in the case of district candidates the district and in the case of the party lists the land) and more particularly to the composition in terms of immigrant background. As Chapter 6.1.2 showed, there is a rather strong correlation between ethnic composition of a state and the share of minority candidates among all candidates in the state. However, I did not disaggregate the data into district and party list nominations. I am doing so in the following paragraphs by running several binomial regression analyses.

First, running two separate logistic regressions (for immigrant-origin aspirants and for visible minority aspirants) with the percentage of immigrant-origin citizens in the district as the independent variable and the winnable district vs. non-nomination/hopeless district as the dichotomous dependent variable shows

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88 In this context, it is important to highlight that to tackle the relationship between ethnic composition of the constituency and nomination chances of aspirants with an (visible) immigrant background, I distinguish between promising candidatures, on the one side, and non-nominations or non-promising candidatures taken together, on the other side. I am doing so because the present study mainly asks for the reasons of the weak presence (in terms of number) of people with an immigrant background in the German Bundestag. That is why I
that for the case of visible minority aspirants increased shares of immigrants in the district are associated with increased probabilities of being nominated in a winnable district (see second graph Figure 6.10). Although the coefficient in the model is only significant at the 90-percent level (see Table C2 in Appendix C), the odds ratio of 1.09 highlights this positive relationship between numerical importance of immigrants in the district and the nomination chances in winnable districts of visible minority aspirants. This means that an increase in one percent of the immigrant population in the district results in 0.9 percent increase in the odds of being nominated in a winnable district (i.e. for an increase in ten percent, the odds increase 2.46 times). By calculating the predicted probabilities of being nominated in a winnable district for the district with the lowest percentage (6.4%) and the one with the highest percentage (45.7%) of immigrant-origin citizens we observe probabilities of 0.023 and 0.443, respectively (the predicted logits are -3.764 and -0.227) (see also second graph in Figure 6.10). This means that the probability of being nominated in a winnable district for visible minority aspirants in the district with the highest share of immigrants is about 20 times that of aspirants in the district with the lowest percentage.

Replicating the two models for the case of party lists shows, for the group of immigrant-origin aspirants, that although the odds ratio are also positive, they are very weak and not statistically significant (see first graph in Figure 6.11, see also Table C3 in Appendix C). For the case of visible minority aspirants, the regression coefficient and the odds ratio neither indicate a positive nor a negative relationship (b=0.01, odds ratio=1.01) (see second graph in Figure 6.11, see also Table C3 in Appendix C). This means that increasing shares of immigrant-origin populations in a state do not substantially increase the probability of visible minority aspirants being nominated on a promising list position. Interpreting these findings in terms of electoral strategy, we could conclude that nominating candidates with a visible minority background in winnable districts with high immigration rates could be seen as more electorally rewarding than nominating those candidate types on promising list positions. A reason for this could be that the potential constituents are smaller in size and thus more easily to target in the case of district races than in the case of state-wide party lists.

aim to identify the mechanisms that obstruct or boost in particular those nominations with realistic winning chances.

89 For the sake of completeness I have to add that, in the case of the wider category of immigrant-origin aspirants, the percentage of people with immigrant roots ranges from 3.3% to 45.7%.
6. Exploring the selection of immigrant-origin candidates in Germany

Figure 6.10: Chances of winnable district candidature by composition of district population (binomial regression)

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure610}
\caption{Chances of winnable district candidature by composition of district population (binomial regression).}
\end{figure}

Source: Aspirant data 2012-2013, own calculations. N=92 (immigrant-origin), N=65 (visible minority).
Notes: Shown are on the y-axis the predicted probabilities for a winnable district candidature (0=not nominated (in district) or nominated in hopeless district, 1=nominated in winnable district), x-axis percentage of immigrant-origin citizens at the district level with lower and upper confidence limits (90%); for model statistics see Table C2 in Appendix C.

6.2.1.2 Party selectors’ electoral concerns

In order to tackle the question whether, due to the parties’ electoral strategies, immigrant-origin aspirants meet specific obstacles when seeking to run for office, we have focused until now on the relationship between type of candidature as well as characteristics of the constituency and the nomination of those aspiring candidates. We could show that there is some evidence for a strategic party behavior when it comes to the nomination of immigrant-origin in a broader sense and visible minority candidates as a more narrow category. For instance, the strong tendency of nominating those candidates on promising list positions but too a much lower degree in winnable districts as well as the relationship between the share of immigrant-origin people in a district and the probability of, in particular, visible minority aspirants to be nominated in winnable districts can point to such a behavior. However, we could also show that this relationship cannot be observed for party list nominations. Furthermore, we could show that in particular visible minority aspirants are almost as often nominated on promising
Figure 6.11: Chances of promising list position by composition of state population (binomial regression)

Source: Aspirant data 2012-2013, own calculations. N=85 (immigrant-origin), N=64 (visible minority)
Notes: Shown are on the y-axis the predicted probabilities for a promising list position (0=not nominated (on party list) or nominated on promising list position, 1=nominated on promising list position), x-axis percentage of immigrant-origin citizens at the state level with lower and upper confidence limits (90%); for model statistics see Table C2 in Appendix C.

list positions than those aspirants without any immigrant background or with immigrant origins that we do not qualify as visible minority origins (non visible minority group). Another way to tackle the vote-seeking aspect of the nomination of immigrant-origin candidates is to analyze party selectors’ attitudes regarding the electoral chances of having immigrant-origin candidates run for office. As argued in Chapter 4, party selectors might be biased towards minority candidates because they fear to lose votes. However, it could also be that they hope to win additional votes when running with those candidates. In this context, it is worth remembering the results presented in the previous section regarding the role of the ethnic composition of electoral districts because they can also be interpreted as reflecting party selectors’ electoral considerations.

In what follows we aim to measure this aspect directly by relying on survey data gathered through an online survey conducted among party members who took part in party list and/or district nominations for the 2013 legislative elections (for detailed information regarding the survey and the survey population see Chapter 5.2.2). It is worth remembering that the following analyses are done solely for
6. Exploring the selection of immigrant-origin candidates in Germany

Table 6.2: Anticipated vote gains and losses of immigrant-origin district candidates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SPD</th>
<th>Greens</th>
<th>CDU</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gain votes</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No difference</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lose votes</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Notes: Item wording see Chapter 5.3.2. "Gain votes" and "lose votes" are an aggregation of "gain many" and "gain some votes", "Lose votes" of "lose some" and "lose many votes".

the case of party members of the Greens, the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats. Due to the very low response rate in the case of district nominations of the Left party (see Chapter 5.2.2), we will not report the findings for those party members.

In a first step, we will describe how the survey respondents evaluate immigrant-origin candidates running in the district in terms of possible vote gains and losses. The headline findings within Table 6.2 are fairly clear. Almost one third (32%) of the respondents in the survey stated that having candidates with visible immigrant origins running in their district could lead to vote losses. Furthermore, while about one quarter (25%) declared that those candidates could be an electoral benefit, the majority of the respondents considered immigrant-origin candidates neither as an electoral benefit nor as a disadvantage. However, looking at the party level reveals some strong differences. Party selectors of the Conservatives, but also the Social Democrats, too a much higher degree fear losing votes when having immigrant-origin candidates running in the district. The majority of the respondents who participated in a district nomination of the Greens declared that running which such candidates would electorally seen make no difference (see Table 6.2).

Although the sample is biased in several ways (see Chapter 5.4) and the number of respondents in some cases is quite low, in particular in the case of the CDU, the above presented findings indicate that there is a sizable proportion within the group of party selectors that has electoral concerns of having immigrant-origin

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It is worth highlighting that this question was only asked to respondents who stated that they participated in a district nomination for the 2013 legislative elections. All in all, 650 party members of the SPD and CDU, and Greens stated that they participated in a district nomination.
candidates running for their district party. In order to assess whether or not these electoral concerns impact on the likelihood that visible minority aspirants are nominated as district candidates, as hypothesized in Chapter 4, it is important to take a closer look at the attitudes of those respondents in the survey who participated in nomination meetings where at least one visible minority aspirant sought nomination (minority nominations). Although in the previous sections I run the analyses also for the group of immigrant-origin aspirants in the broader sense, I will, in what follows, restrict the analyses that are based on the survey data to visible minority aspirants. As argued on several occasions, the latter differ from the former in several aspects. We argue that in particular when dealing with expected vote gains or losses the visibility of the immigrant background is more important than the country of birth in the passport (see for reasons of construct validity also Chapter 5.2.2 For the Greens, the Social and the Christian Democrats together we can identify 194 respondents who participated in such minority nominations (see also Chapter 5.2.2).

The data shows that the response behavior of those party selectors does not differ significantly from the one of respondents who participated in district nominations where no visible minority aspirant sought nomination (hereafter non-minority nominations). While about one third (33%) fears electoral disadvantages (compared to 31% who participated in non-minority nominations; \( \chi^2 = 0.08, p = .77 \)), 29 percent values candidates with visible immigrant origins as an electoral advantage (compared to 23%; \( \chi^2 = 1.52, p = .22 \)). Interestingly, the percentage of those who see no difference at all is lower than in the case of so-called non-minority nominations (38% compared to 46%; \( \chi^2 = 2.09, p = .15 \)) (see Table C4 in Appendix C). Although, due to the problems associated with the quality of the data, we should not overemphasize this finding, party selectors in districts where at least one visible minority aspirant seeks nomination seem to have a clearer idea about the electoral prospects (vote gains or losses) of this specific type of candidate (the differences, however, are not statistically significant, see above).

Above we have already seen that the party selectors’ evaluations of the electoral consequences of immigrant-origin candidates are far from being equally distributed among the three parties in question. Having now a look at the party differences in the case of respondents having taken part in minority nominations, Figure 6.12 (second graph) illustrates that, on average, the CDU party selectors are the most concerned of having candidates with visible immigrant origins running for their district party (for reasons of comparability the means for respondents having taken part in non-minority nominations are shown in the first graph of Figure 6.12). While respondents of the Greens, on average, see more electoral advantages
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Figure 6.12: Anticipated vote gains/losses of district candidates with visible immigrant origins

Source: Selector Survey 2015, own calculations. \( n=478 \) (non-minority nominations), \( n=167 \) (minority nominations).
Notes: Shown are bootstrapped means and 90%-CI; y-axis scale: 2=gain some votes, ..., 4=lose some votes (item wording see Chapter 5.2.2).

than disadvantages of nominating immigrant-origin candidates, respondents of the SPD can be located between the two parties (see also Figure 6.12). These findings are in line with several studies that, at the policy level, point to the difficult relationship of the Social Democrats with the immigration issue.

However, besides the fact that there seems to be a sizable proportion of party selectors who is concerned about the electoral consequences of having minority candidates running for their district party, we do not know whether this has any relevance for the nomination of those candidates. To get a first impression about this relationship, we compare the responses of party selectors (mean) in those districts where a visible minority aspirant was finally nominated to those where these aspirants failed nomination. Figure 6.13 shows that in those districts where a visible minority aspirant was nominated as district candidate, party selectors, on average, rated on a scale from 1 (many vote gains) to 5 (many vote losses) the electoral consequences as less negative (mean of 2.9) than in those where those aspirants were not nominated (mean of 3.2). The means aggregated at the district level and the nomination of visible minority aspirants are negatively correlated at a moderate level; this relation, however, is not statistically significant at the 90-percent level (point-biserial correlation \( r_{pb} = -.36, p = .16 \)). As this relationship
is measured at the district level, the sample size is very small (n=17) which could be a reason for the non-significance. The negative correlation, however, indicates that the nomination of a visible minority candidate is negatively related to the, on average, perceived vote losses of minority candidates.

To investigate this relationship in more detail, I additionally run some analyses at the individual level. I am doing so by analyzing whether party selectors are less likely to support the nomination of visible minority aspirants (and thus to vote for him or her) when they fear that this type of candidate could be disadvantageous for their party in terms of votes. As the focus is on the impact of the anticipated electoral consequences of the nomination of candidates with visible immigrant origins, the analyses will be performed only for the above defined minority nominations. All in all, 194 respondents (SPD, CDU, Greens) in the

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91 There were a total number of 44 districts for the 2013 legislative elections where at least one visible minority aspirant sought nomination within one of the three parties (CDU, Greens, SPD). In the selector survey, I could assign the respondents to 26 (out of the 44) such districts. From these, respondents from nine districts with only 1 to 3 respondents with valid answers on the independent variable per district had been excluded from the analysis.
selector survey participated in 26 minority nominations.

To analyze whether the party selectors’ electoral concerns impact on their willingness to nominate visible minority candidates, I performed several binomial regressions with a dichotomous dependent variable measuring whether a respondent had voted for the nomination of the visible minority aspirant (coded: 0=vote for opponent, abstention,... 1=vote for visible minority aspirant), and the anticipated vote gains and losses when having minority candidates running in the district as the (continuous) independent variable (coded: 1=gain many ... 5=lose many). It is worth noting in this context that out of the 194 respondents who participated in those minority nominations, only 137 had valid answers for both variables. A first correlation analysis between these two variables shows that the party selectors’ electoral concerns are significantly related to the vote for visible minority aspirants (point-biserial correlation $r_{pb}=-.21$, $p<.05$). Meaning the more party selectors are concerned regarding the electoral performance of candidates with a visible immigrant background, the less likely they are to support their nomination by voting for them. Figure 6.14 underscores this finding and provides confirmation for the first hypothesis – the probability of voting for the nomination of a visible minority aspirant decreases when party selectors are more concerned about the electoral consequences of minority candidates. Furthermore, the b-coefficient estimate ($b=-0.45$, $p<.05$) is significant at the 95-percent level. At the same time, the rather low pseudo R square (Nagelkerke) of .06 points to the fact that only a small proportion of the variance in the dependent variable can be explained by this model that only consists of one independent variable (see Table C5 in Appendix C). However, as the central aim was to analyze whether concerns about the electoral performance of visible minority candidates matter regarding their nomination, the focus is not on the overall fit of the model.

However, as the survey observations are grouped into party nominations at the electoral district level, we have to do some further analyses to check the robustness of the present results. I am doing so because "the random component of observed outcomes cannot be treated as independently and identically distributed within a cluster" (Esarey and Menger 2018: 2). Thus ignoring the nested structure of the data can lead to incorrect standard errors (Steenbergen and Jones 2002: 219). To account for the nested structure of data, scholarship commonly points to analyses with cluster-robust standard errors (CRSE) or multilevel models (McNeish and Stapleton 2016: 495). I opt for a further binomial regression but this time with cluster-robust standard errors to check the robustness of the results. The findings of the CRSE analysis support the previous findings. Although the standard errors get larger (SE=0.23), and so does the confidence interval (-0.90, -0.005), the
6. Exploring the selection of immigrant-origin candidates in Germany

Figure 6.14: Anticipated vote gains/losses and voting probability for visible minority aspirants (binomial regression)

Source: Selector Survey 2015, own calculations. n=137.

Notes: Shown are on the y-axis, the predicted probabilities for voting for a of visible minority aspirant (0=vote for opponent, abstention... 1=vote for visible minority aspirant), and on the x-axis the party selectors’ anticipated electoral consequences (1=gain many ... 5=lose many) with lower and upper confidence limits (90%); Item wording see Chapter 5.2.2.

relation remains still statistically significant (p<.05). Additionally, to further test the robustness of the present findings and to account for the fact that some authors point to a possible underestimation of standard errors when dealing with small number of clusters (<40 clusters) (Esarey and Menger 2018: 1) (and thus to find statistically significant relationships where actually they do not exist (Esarey and Menger 2018: 3)), I additionally run a Pairs clustered bootstrapped t-statistics (PCBST)\(^92\). Running the PCBST analysis with 100 replications shows that the results are stable. The cluster bootstrap p-value of p=.06 (90% CI: -0.91, 0.002) indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 90-percent-level.

\(^{92}\) Justin Esarey and Andrew Menger (2018: 4 sq.) propose three alternatives to CRSEs: pairs cluster bootstrapped t-statistics (PCBSTs), wild cluster bootstrapped t-statistics (WCBSTs), and cluster-adjusted t-statistics (CATs). For the present analysis the latter seem not to be the appropriate procedure. Due to the rather low number of observations in some clusters (i.e. party nominations) and the related missing variation on the dependent variable in those cases, CATs can go with some problems (Esarey and Menger 2018: 8).
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6.2.2 The role of party ideology

Thus far, I have analyzed whether parties’ electoral considerations are in some way related to the nomination of minority candidates. Based on the available data, I could indeed find some evidence for such a relationship (supporting thus at least partly hypotheses 1 to 4). However, the descriptive analyses have already already indicated a stronger presence of immigrant-origin candidates in a larger sense, but in particular in the narrow sense of visible minority background within left-wing parties than within the only conservative party in this study, the CDU/CSU (see Chapter 6.1). Additionally, we could also observe differences between the two smaller left-wing parties and the mainstream left party, that is the Social Democrats. These results point to the importance of examine in more detail party differences along ideological lines when investigating deeper into the reasons for minority nomination. In Chapter 4, I argued that parties cannot be conceived as solely vote-seeking actors who pursue their electoral strategies without accounting for their ideological background. That is why, in what follows, I will have a closer look on the role of party ideology regarding the nomination of immigrant-origin as well as visible minority candidates.

As I have argued previously, the nomination of a candidate says nothing about his or her chances of getting a seat in parliament. Placing minority candidates in non-winnable districts or on non-promising list positions can be seen as a strategic act to color the candidate portfolio without granting them real access to elected office. I thus replicate the analyses done in Chapter 6.1, but taking this time the chances of success associated with a candidature into account. Figure 6.15 clearly shows that the presence of promising candidates with immigrant origins as well as visible minority background is much stronger within left than right-wing parties (for reasons of comparison, I print again the results for aspirants and candidates). For both immigrant groups the differences between the three left-wing parties, on the one side, and the Christian Democrats and Christian Social Union, on the other side, are statistically significant (immigrant-origin: $\chi^2=8.99$, p<.01; visible minority: $\chi^2=8.94$, p<.01). Their share is the highest among candidates of the Greens - 11 and 9 percent, respectively (i.e. 9 and 7 out of 81 promising candidates), of all Green candidates have a immigrant or visible minority background. They are then followed by far by the Left party (6 and 5%, respectively, or 6 and 5 out of 96) and the Social Democrats (11 and 9 out of 207; i.e. 5 and 4%, respectively). With 2 and 1 percent (5 and 3 out of 281), respectively, the CDU/CSU lies far behind the three other parties (see Figure 6.15). It is noteworthy that the difference between the Greens and the Left party
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Figure 6.15: Share of persons with immigrant origins or visible minority background (in percent per party and respective group)

![Graph showing share of persons with immigrant origins or visible minority background](image)

Source: Aspirant data 2012-2013, own calculations. Aspirants: N=503 (Greens), N=401 (Left party), N=656 (CDU/CSU); candidates: N=368 (Greens), N=347 (Left party), N=537 (CDU/CSU); promising candidatures: N=81 (Greens), N=96 (Left party), N=207 (SPD), N=281 (CDU/CSU).

has become larger and between the Left party and the SPD smaller compared to the aspirant and the more general candidate level.

However, these findings do not (dis)confirm the fifth hypothesis stating that when minority aspirants seek nomination within a left-wing party (and more particularly a new left party), they are more likely to be nominated. To verify this hypothesis, we have to analyze the nomination chances of aspirants with immigrant origins as well as a visible minority background. I am doing so by running several binomial regressions with party dummies as independent variables. First, taking the CDU/CSU as baseline category (to test the left vs. right-wing-party argument), the regressions do not yield convincing results (see Table C6 in Appendix C). This is probably due to the very low number of in particular visible minority but also the broader category of immigrant-origin aspirants in the case of the CDU/CSU (see above). Regarding the nomination chances, for all, but the Left party (and for visible minority aspirants this holds also true for the SPD), the regression coefficients of the party dummies are negative – meaning that immigrant-origin aspirants seeking nomination within the Social Democrats and the Greens are less likely to be nominated than those aiming nomination within the Conservatives. And for the promising candidates, this relationship appears even for all three left-wing parties. However, the standard errors for the
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Figure 6.16: Nomination chances/promising candidatures and new left vs. old left party differences (binomial regression)

Source: Aspirant data 2012-2013, own calculations. N=106 (Immigrant origin); N=(Visible minority).
Notes: Shown are the odds ratios (with 90%-CI) for immigrant-origin and visible minority aspirants for being nominated as candidate and pursuing a promising candidature; independent variables are dummy variables (baseline category: SPD).

Independent variables are all very large (see Table C6 in Appendix C) and the expected frequencies for the CDU/CSU are in more than 20 percent of the cells below 5 (Field et al. 2012: 323). These findings lead us to conclude that these observations have to be taken with caution. Second, taking the Social Democrats as the baseline category (to test the new vs. old left argument), Figure 6.16 shows that immigrant-origin aspirants have an about four times higher chances (odds ratio of 4.14) of being nominated when seeking nomination within the Left party than within the Social Democrats. Regarding visible minority aspirants this relationship is less pronounced (odds ratio of 2.00). However, seeking nomination within the Greens compared to the SPD does not yield any differences in terms of nomination chances for immigrant-origin aspirants (odds ratio of 0.99); for visible minority aspirants the chances are even lower (odds ratio of 0.74, respectively) with, however, large standard errors (see Table C8 in Appendix C). Looking at the chances of being nominated in a winnable district and/or promising list positions the odds ratio for both immigrant groups (immigrant-origin and visible minority) and for both parties do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Furthermore, the standard errors are very large. That is why, the negative coefficients for the Greens as well as the Left should not be gain to much weight (for model statistics see Table C8 and C9 in Appendix C).
In toto, the empirical results only partly support the fifth hypothesis stating that immigrant-origin as well as visible minority aspirants seeking nomination within left-wing compared to right-wing parties as well as within new left compared to old left parties are more likely to be nominated as candidate. While there is clear evidence for a stronger presence of those candidates within left-wing parties, the nomination chances (also for promising candidatures) within the CDU/CSU seem not to be inferior to the one within left-wing parties. However, it is not possible to know whether this finding would hold if there were more minority aspirants seeking nomination within the Conservatives. Regarding the new vs. old left argument, I have shown that immigrant-origin as well as visible minority candidates are strongly represented among the promising candidates of the Green party. When comparing the nomination as well as chances for promising candidatures between the three left-wing parties, we could observe that immigrant-origin aspirants have a higher chance of being nominated compared to the Social Democrats (the effect regarding visible minority aspirants is smaller and not statistically significant). For the Greens, we could not observe any difference to the Social Democrats. The findings regarding promising candidatures have to be taken with caution. As, the number of promising candidatures is in general lower within the two smaller parties than within the SPD the chances for any type of aspirant seeking nomination in those parties are smaller. The negative results for the two small parties, could thus be a statistical artifact.

To complete the picture of the chances of immigrant-origin as well as visible minority aspiring candidates to be promisingly nominated and to test the robustness of the previous findings regarding those chances compared to the aspirants without immigrant background (see Chapter 6.2.1.1), I will, in what follows, replicate the analyses done in the first part of Chapter 6.2.1.1 by, additionally, accounting for party differences. Without accounting for party affiliation, I previously found that the proportion of promising candidates is slightly lower in the case of visible minority but in particular the broader category of immigrant-origin aspirants compared to their counterparts without any immigrant origin (the differences, however, were not statistically significant). Figure 6.17 now gives a clearer picture regarding the association between immigrant and visible minority background and nomination as promising candidate when accounting for party differences. First of all, the analyses reveal that none of the differences presented in Figure 6.17 reaches conventional statistical significant levels (see Notes below Figure 6.17). Furthermore, the percentage differences are rather low (from 7 to 0 percent points difference). When looking at the immigrant-origin aspirants, we can see that the proportion of promising candidates among those without any immigrant origin
6. Exploring the selection of immigrant-origin candidates in Germany

is slightly higher compared to their immigrant counterparts in the case of the Social Democrats and the Left party (5 and 3 percentage points difference, respectively). The percentages are almost the same regarding the Conservatives and even higher in the case of the Greens (5 percentage points difference). Regarding visible minority aspirants, the observed (admittedly very small) difference almost disappear for all parties but the Greens. In the case of the latter, 23 percent of the visible minority aspirants seeking nomination within this party are nominated in a winnable district and/or on a promising list position compared to only 16 percent of all aspirants without a visible minority background. Therefore, for the case of the 2013 legislative elections, there is only little empirical evidence for the
assumption that hypothesis 4 (promising candidatures) is less pronounced in the case of parties ideologically closer to the immigrant-origin population. I could indeed find that, in the case of the Greens, the share of promising candidates is slightly higher for visible minority aspirants than for their counterparts without visible minority background. What I could not find, however, was that in the other parties, and here in particular the CDU/CSU as the right-wing party and the SPD as the old left party, immigrant-origin or visible minority candidates are more often nominated in non-winnable districts and/or on non-promising list positions. It is though worth repeating that the number of visible minority aspirants is for all parties, and the CDU/CSU in particular, low. For illustration, 43 percent of promising candidates (CDU/CSU) in the case of non-visible minority aspirants means in total numbers 278 out of 649 aspirants; for the case of their visible counterparts 43 percent means 3 out of 7 aspirants.

As a further particularity of minority nominations, I have found in Chapter 6.2.1.1 that immigrant-origin as well as visible minority candidates are predominantly nominated on promising list positions and too a much lower degree in winnable districts. As I did not account for party differences, it was not clear whether this could be interpreted as a party strategy to reduce the electoral risk of running with minority candidates or simply as a consequence of combined party and electoral system effects. There are in particular two things that meet the eye when looking at Figure 6.18. First, although the first graph in Figure 6.18 reveals that there are some few winnable districts in the case of the Left party, minority candidates (immigrant-origin and visible minority) running for this party are exclusively nominated on promising list positions. Is it possible to interpret this as strategic behavior of the Left party to minimize the electoral risk of running with minority candidates? When verifying the regional distribution of the Left party’s winnable districts, we can see that almost 90 percent of these districts are located in one of the East German states. The remaining districts are all but one located in the Eastern fringes of Berlin. It is difficult to ascertain whether this finding is due to supply or demand-side factors. Regarding the former, one could argue that the low numbers of immigrant-origin populations in East Germany is reflected in the almost non-existence of (in particular visible) immigrant-origin aspirants in Eastern German states (see Chapter 6.1). Regarding the latter, one could also argue that due to higher levels of xenophobia in East Germany (Krumpal 2012, 1399), the Left party is more reluctant to nominate minority candidates in those
Second, due to the mixed electorate they face, one would expect a similar tendency for the Social Democrats than we observed for the Left party. However, visible minority candidates resemble their counterparts without any immigrant origin with regards to the type of promising candidature (district and/or party list) they pursue. More than 50 percent are running in winnable districts (5 out of 9 promising visible minority candidates). However, only one of those candidates is also safeguarded on a promising list position; this is much more common for the non-immigrant origin candidates. In this context, it is interesting to note that only one of those five visible minority aspirants nominated in a winnable district is nominated in a district that I qualified as safe; one runs in a competitive district but is safeguarded on the list; the two remaining candidates on non-promising list positions (not shown). To sum up, regarding the type of promising candidature, we could not observe differences along the (at least expected) ideological lines. On the one side, the Greens (almost) exclusively nominate visible minority candidates on promising list positions because they dispose only about a very limited number of districts that can be qualified as winnable. The Left party, on the other side, exclusively nominates those candidates on list positions although the party does

---

In this context, Sylvain Brouard, Elisa Deiss-Helbig, et al. (2018) can show in a survey experiment that voters in Eastern Germany are less likely to vote for candidates with a clearly foreign sounding name than for a candidate with a typical German name.
have such districts at its disposal. One explanation could be regional particular-
ities. This assumptions leads us to a further possible explanation, namely the
nomination according to the composition of the constituency and party differences.

We observed in the previous chapter that increased shares of immigrants in
a district are, at least in the case of visible minority aspirants, associated with
increased probabilities of being nominated in a winnable district. As in this
chapter the focus is on party differences along ideological lines, the question is
whether this observation holds true for all four parties under study. To answer
this question, I will examine whether the ethnic composition of an electoral dis-
trict differs according to whether a minority aspirant was nominated or even
promisingly nominated (winnable district) or whether he or she failed nomination
or the district could be qualified as hopeless. I will perform the comparison of
means for all four parties. However, as shown above, neither immigrant-origin nor
visible minority candidates are nominated in winnable districts in the case of the
Left party and only one in the case of the Greens. That is why I will compare
the group means regarding the winnable districts only for the two mainstream
parties, the CDU/CSU and the Social Democrats. Regarding the nomination
of minority candidates, in only three out of eight constellations the relation is
in the expected direction. For the Greens, the share of the immigrant-origin
district population is, on average, higher in districts where immigrant as well as
visible minority aspirants got nominated (M=26.6 and M=28.4, respectively; see
Table 6.3) than were they failed nomination (M=23.6 and M=21.1, respectively).
For the CDU/CSU this holds true only for visible minority aspirants (M=24.7
vs. M=26.6, see Table 6.3). While only one of those differences is statistically
significant at the 90-percent-level (visible minority aspirants seeking nomination
within the Greens), all three differences represent medium-sized effects (between
r=.30 and r=.69, see Table 6.3). In the opposition direction, this holds also true
for visible minority aspirants seeking nomination within the Left party (also here
the differences are statistically significant). It can be conclude that Table 6.3 does
not provide confirmation of the assumption stating that left-wing and in partic-
ular new left parties should behave less strategically when nominating minority
candidates which could be reflected in nomination strategies more independent of
the ethnic composition of the electorate. Although the Christian Democrats seem
to nominate visible minority aspirants, on average, in districts with higher shares
of immigrant-origin population, while the contrary can be observed for the Social
Democrats and the Left party. The Greens, however, resemble much more their
conservative counterparts. Interpreting these results in terms of responsiveness
rather than electoral strategy (see similar Farrer and Zingher 2018: 12), it is also
possible to argue that Greens and the Christian Democrats are more responsive with regards to the composition of the district population in terms of ethnic background than their counterparts of the Left party or the Social Democrats. Regarding winnable districts, only the results for the Social Democrats are in the expected direction; however, none of the constellations reach conventional levels of statistical significance (see Table 6.4). It is, however, worth highlighting that due to the low number of in particular visible minority aspirants in the case of the CDU/CSU, the number of districts for which the means are calculated are also very small (8 for immigrant-origin aspirants, 5 for visible minority aspirants). Additionally, the distribution between the groups (nominated vs. not nominated, not nominated/hopeless vs. winnable) is in some cases very uneven (e.g. 2 not nominated vs. 23 nominated immigrant-origin Left party aspirants, see Notes below Table 6.3). The conclusions drawn from these calculations have thus to be taken with caution.

Finally, I replicated those analyses also for the party lists. In Chapter 6.2.1, I did not find any substantial increase of the nomination probabilities of (visible) immigrant-origin aspirants with increasing shares of immigrant-origin state populations. The present comparison of means, however, shows some interesting party differences. While for the Left party the share of the immigrant-origin state population is, on average, higher in states where (visible) immigrant-origin aspirants got nominated (M=21.0 and M=19.6, respectively) than where they failed party list nomination (both M=16.6), we could not observe any difference in terms of immigrant share for the Greens (the comparison of means could not be performed for the SPD and the CDU/CSU due to the fact that only one and in the case of the latter none of the (visible) immigrant-origin aspirants failed party list nomination). In this context it is worth highlighting that none of the differences are statistically significant. Interestingly, exact the opposite holds true for promising list positions. The share of the immigrant-origin state population is, on average, higher in states where aspirants seeking nomination within the Greens were nominated on promising list positions (M=23.4 and M=23.7, respectively) than where they were not nominated at all or only on non-promising list positions (M=20.7 and M=21.9, respectively). While we could observe no difference in the case of the Left party, the opposite relation can be identified for the Social Democrats. Regarding the latter, the differences only represent small effects (r=0.12 and r=0.14, respectively) and the standard errors for the group of promising nominated aspirants are quite large (M=21.0 SE=3.12, M=22.3
For the case of the CDU/CSU, I did not perform a comparison of means for the nomination as well as for the promising list positions. I did so because, regarding the former, all (visible) immigrant-origin aspirants were nominated on a party list, and, regarding the latter, the two aspirants who were nominated on a promising list position were both nominated in North-Rhine-Westphalia. Calculating a mean in this case seems not to be very meaningful.
Table 6.3: Nomination chances and composition of district population by party (Welch’s t-test)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Immigrant-origin</th>
<th>Visible minority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not nominated</td>
<td>Nominated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mean</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>2.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>2.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left party</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: Welch’s t-test. Means are percentage of immigrants in a district.

Table 6.4: Nomination in winnable districts and composition of district population by party (Welch’s t-test)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Immigrant-origin</th>
<th>Visible minority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not nom./hopeless</td>
<td>Winnable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mean</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>1.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>1.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: Welch’s t-test. Means are percentage of immigrants in a district.
6. Exploring the selection of immigrant-origin candidates in Germany

6.2.3 The importance of intra-party politics

In the previous chapters, I have analyzed, first, whether the nomination of immigrant-origin as well as visible minority candidates is related to strategic considerations of the parties under study; and, second, whether there are party differences along ideological lines regarding the nomination of these candidates. The results regarding party ideology were not clear. While the clear majority of minority candidates can be found within one of the three left-wing parties and they also make up the largest percentages within the total number of candidates of those parties, the nomination chances as well as the probability of being promisingly nominated are not higher within the Social Democrats, Greens or Left party compared to the CDU/CSU. The same holds true for the old vs. new left difference. Admittedly, due to the very low number of minority candidates in the case of the Christian Democrats, these findings have to be taken with caution. But, these results at least not dismiss the possibility of a successful run of immigrant-origin (including visible minority) candidates for nomination within the Conservatives. I have also empirically tested the assumption that parties ideologically closer to the immigrant-origin population show lower degrees of strategical behavior with regards to the nomination of minority candidates than those who are more closer to the anti-immigration pole. However, there was only little evidence for this assumption. While within the Greens, on the one side, immigrant-origin as well as visible minority candidates pursue more often a promising candidature (exclusively on promising list positions) than their non-immigrant counterparts, on the other side, visible minority aspirants are also more often nominated in districts with, on average, higher shares of immigrants. The contrary, however, could neither be observed for the Christian Democrats (left vs. right) nor the Social Democrats (new vs. old left).

In Chapter 4 I argued that the decision party selectors take are influenced and restricted by party specific candidate selection methods. The rules and procedures employed by parties to select their candidates as well as the actors involved in the process can be formal or informal (see Chapter 2.2). There are rules that are supposed to ensure the representation of specific groups, as for example gender quotas; and I will examine whether such rules also exist for immigrant-origin candidates. At the same time, research has shown that “[general] formal and informal [selection] rules are not neutral in relation to immigrant candidates, but tend rather to be directly or indirectly disadvantageous” (Soininen 2011: 161). That is why the remainder of this chapter is dedicated to an in-depth analysis of the way parties select their candidates, thus the candidate selection methods.
6. Exploring the selection of immigrant-origin candidates in Germany

### 6.2.3.1 Inclusiveness of the selectorate

In *Chapter 2.2*, I have demonstrated that the selectorate – defined as 'the body that selects the candidates' (Rahat and Hazan 2001: 301) – receives the most attention within scholarly debate dealing with the relationship between candidate selection methods and minority representation. Based on this finding, I have argued that the type of selectorate should impact on the nomination of immigrant-origin aspiring candidates. More specifically I hypothesized that more exclusive selectorates should be beneficial to the nomination of candidates with immigrant origins (H6). I will empirically test this assumption for the German case by focusing on two aspects. First, I will examine whether the type of formal selectorate is related to the nomination of minority candidates. And, second, based on the data from the selector survey, whether the role of specific informal (and in most cases more exclusive) selectors impacts on the nomination of those candidates.

As pointed out in *Chapter 3.2.2*, in Germany the Federal Elections Act (BWG) clearly defines who the selectors are. The candidates at the party lists as well as in the districts are nominated either by a party membership assembly or by a delegate convention. In both cases this is done in a decentralized manner either at the state (party lists) or the district level (district candidates). While in party membership assemblies all party members who, according to article 21(1) of the BWG, "at the time of their meeting are eligible to vote in the German Bundestag elections in their constituency" (Bundeswahlleiter n.d.[b]) can participate, this is restricted in delegate conventions to delegates elected by the party members. That is why the former are considered to be more inclusive than the latter.

Regarding nominations of district candidates, *Table 6.5* shows that in more than 50 percent of all district nominations of the four parties for the 2013 legislative elections, party membership assemblies decided about who runs as their district candidate. Having, however, a look at the party level, we can observe strong differences. While in the case of the Greens all district candidates are

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95 It is worth noting that data is missing in some districts in particular for the Left party (see *Table 5.1*, p.125). The choice for membership assemblies is not only a consequence of the party deciding to open candidate selection up to all party members, but also of the size of the respective local party branch. In the case of the Left party, there are strong regional differences regarding the electoral importance and thus also the size of the local branches of the Left party. As the present data is missing mainly for Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg (but also North-Rhine-Westphalia), we can hypothesize that the number of membership assemblies is even higher for the Left party and thus for the four parties under study, in general.
nominated by membership assemblies, which is accordance with their call for more participatory democracy (Poguntke 1987), this was also the case for about 80 percent of the district nominations of the Left party. Compared to the two latter, the nomination of the district candidates within the two mainstream parties, SPD and CDU/CSU, was done more often by delegate conventions. Nomination by membership assemblies was least in the case of the Social Democrats. This finding is in accordance with previous results (for the 2009 elections, see Reiser 2011: 245). In this context, it is worth pointing to a third hybrid type of selectorate that is delegate convention but with previous membership consultations. Although there were differences in the practical procedure, candidate nomination in those cases was done in two steps. First, an internal nonbinding party members’ poll took place. The vote of this poll was then, second, confirmed (or shot down) by a delegate convention. This type of selectorate was more common in the case of the Social Democrats than their conservative counterparts (see Table 6.5). Regarding party list nominations, Elisa Deiss-Helbig (2017: 74) has shown that this was done for the 2013 legislative elections almost exclusively by delegate conventions. For the four parties under study, membership assemblies took place only in four cases: the Greens in Hamburg, Bremen, and Hesse as well as the Left party in Bremen.

When comparing now those district nominations where at least one immigrant-origin as well as where at least one visible minority aspirant sought nomination to

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96 It is worth highlighting that the Greens in Berlin originally intended to put up their party list by a membership assembly. However, due to the fact that the minimal number of attendants required by the Green party statutes was not met, the nomination was finally done by a delegate convention (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Neukölln n.d.).
6. Exploring the selection of immigrant-origin candidates in Germany

Table 6.6: Type of district selectorate and immigrant-origin aspirants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SPD</th>
<th></th>
<th>CDU/CSU</th>
<th></th>
<th>Greens</th>
<th></th>
<th>Left party</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegates</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Aspirant data 2012-2013, own calculations.
Notes: Entries are total numbers and percentages, respectively, of delegate conventions (delegates), membership assemblies (members) and delegate conventions with previous membership consultation (consultation) for all (available) 2013 district nominations (data is missing for the Left party for 6 district nominations involving immigrant-origin aspirants).

Table 6.6 and 6.7 indicate that nominations where at least one immigrant-origin and visible minority aspirant, respectively, is involved are more often membership assemblies or member consultations (68% and 67% compared to 61% and 62%, the latter is not shown in the tables). It is noteworthy that regarding the SPD, the percentage of delegate convention combined with membership consultation is higher in the case of immigrant-origin aspirants and even more visible minority district aspirants (see Table 6.6 & 6.7). Furthermore, regarding the CDU/CSU, immigrant-origin aspirants (but not visible minority aspirants) face more often membership assemblies than this is the case for the total population. Due to the almost exclusive use of delegate conventions for the party lists, it is not worth replicating these analyses for the party lists. Minority aspirants therefore face different types of selectorates depending on the party they seek to run for elective office. While for the Greens there are, at the district level, only membership assemblies, also minority aspirants seeking nomination within the Left party are more often confronted to membership assemblies. For the Christian Democrats, there is regarding the visible minority aspirants no differences regarding the type of selectorate. And, finally, immigrant-origin aspirants, including visible minorities, more often face delegate conventions but also membership consultations. Furthermore, the above presented findings suggest that, expect for the case of the Greens, there is some variance regarding the type of selectorate. I thus test for all parties but the Greens whether there is an association between
Table 6.7: Type of district selectorate and visible minority aspirants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SPD</th>
<th>CDU/CSU</th>
<th>Greens</th>
<th>Left party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegates</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Aspirant data 2012-2013, own calculations.

Notes: Entries are total numbers and percentages, respectively, of delegate conventions (delegates), membership assemblies (members) and delegate conventions with previous membership consultation (consultation) for all (available) 2013 district nominations (data is missing for the Left party for 4 district nominations involving visible minority aspirants).

the type of selectorate\(^{97}\) and the nomination of immigrant-origin as well as visible minority candidates. The results show that the direction of the relationship is not as hypothesized. Compared to delegate conventions, membership assemblies tend to increase the probability that an immigrant-origin aspirant is nominated as district candidate. This holds true for immigrant-origin aspirants in the larger sense as well as for visible minority aspirants (odds ratio of 2.10 and 1.58, respectively); the association, however, is not significant at conventional statistical levels ($$\text{chi}^2=1.72$$ (p=.19) and $$\text{chi}^2=0.47$$ (p=.49), respectively). However, it could also be that this finding is a result of the party effect observed in Chapter 6.2.2.

Running a binomial regression with the type of selectorate and party dummies as independent variables confirms this assumption for the case of immigrant-origin aspirants. While seeking nomination within the Left party (compared to the SPD) is positively and significant at the 90-percent-level related to the probability of being nominated as district candidate (odds ratio of 6.10), the type of selectorate looses its relevance (odds ratio of 1.01). For visible minority aspirants the findings become less stable (see Table 6.8).

When testing the relationship between type of selectorate and nomination in a winnable district only for the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats (neither the Left party nor the Greens have minority candidates running in a winnable district, see Chapter 6.2.2), the results become inconclusive because of the very large standard errors (not shown). Finally, I test the relationship between type of selectorate and nomination chances of immigrant-origin as well as visible minority aspirants.

\(^{97}\) I coded '0' for delegate conventions and '1' for membership assemblies including also delegate conventions with previous held membership consultations.
6. Exploring the selection of immigrant-origin candidates in Germany

Table 6.8: Nomination chances, type of selectorate and party (binomial regression)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Immigrant origin</th>
<th>Visible minority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B (SE)</td>
<td>90% CI for OR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower OR Upper</td>
<td>Lower OR Upper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selectorate</td>
<td>0.01 (0.70)</td>
<td>0.32 1.01 2.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ref: delegates)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...CDU/CSU</td>
<td>0.18 (0.86)</td>
<td>0.30 1.20 5.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...Left party</td>
<td>1.81* (0.94)</td>
<td>1.43 6.10 34.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.32 (0.41)</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 58 42

Source: Aspirant data 2012-2013, own calculations.
Notes: Immigrant-origin: $R^2 = .09$ (Hosmer-Lemeshow), .10 (Cox-Snell), .15 (Nagelkerke). Model $\chi^2=6.31$ ($p<.10$); Visible minority: $R^2 = .05$ (Hosmer-Lemeshow), .06 (Cox-Snell), .08 (Nagelkerke). Model $\chi^2=2.37$ ($p=.50$); * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

minority aspirants only for the case of the **SPD**. I am doing so mainly for reasons of data availability. The number of observations is higher than in the case of the **CDU/CSU** and the share of delegate conventions and membership assemblies is more balanced than in the case of the Left party. But also here the findings have to be taken with caution due to the rather low number of observations (31 and 23, respectively for immigrant-origin and visible minority aspirants). Regarding the nomination chances, the findings resemble the findings for all parties presented above. The odds ratio are (slightly) above 1 (1.27 for immigrant-origin and 1.09 for visible minority aspirants), the association, however, is not statistically significant (Likelihood ratio test $\chi^2=0.09$, $p=.77$ and $\chi^2=0.01$, $p=.93$, respectively). The same can be observed for winnable districts (immigrant-origin: odds ratio of 0.69, Likelihood ratio test $\chi^2=0.11$, $p=.74$; visible minority: odds ratio of 0.66, Likelihood ratio test $\chi^2=0.13$ $p=.72$).

As far as the distinction between party members and delegates concerned, there is no support for the sixth hypothesis stating the more exclusive the selectorate, the higher the nomination chances of minority aspirants. However, as argued in **Chapter 2.2** there are in addition to these legally defined selectors also party actors with informal decision-making power within the selection process (Höhne **2013**: 65). Those actors mostly intervene in the forefront of the formal decision making process. I could therefore argue that it is not the differentiation between members
6. Exploring the selection of immigrant-origin candidates in Germany

and delegates that matters when aiming to measure the degree of inclusiveness of the selectorate, but rather the question whether there had been any decision taken by a more exclusive selectorate in the forefront of the official nomination procedure. In order to identify such more exclusive (informal) selectorates, I rely on the data from the online party member survey as well as on the data that I gathered for the 2013 nominations, and here in particularly on the average scores that candidates (on promising list positions) received.

First, regarding the party lists, respondents were asked in the online survey about the perception of the influence of different types of party actors on the nomination of the party list candidates. Figure 6.19 reveals mainly two things. Firstly, the formal selectorate, that are either the delegates or the party members, is far from being perceived by the respondents as the most influential party actor within the selection process. And, second, there are important differences between the four parties under study when it comes to the (perceived) influence of the different types of party actors. The most influence in the party list nomination is, except for the case of the Greens, attributed to the executive board at the state level. In the case of the two mainstream parties, also the executive board at the

![Figure 6.19: Importance party selector types - party lists](image)

Source: Selector Survey 2015, own calculations.
Notes: Shown are the aggregated answers (in %) of "very much" and "much influence". Item wording see Chapter 5.3.2
6. Exploring the selection of immigrant-origin candidates in Germany

regional, that is the intra-state level, seems to be an important actor within the selection process. These findings come as little surprise because the party statutes of the Social Democrats and the CDU highlight the importance of these two party actors within the selection process (Deiss-Helbig 2017: 74 sq.). Article 12 (5) of the national statute of the SPD, for instance, highlights that the ranking of the candidates on the list has to be done in accordance with the executive board at the state level (SPD 2011). In most of the cases this means that the executive board predesigns the list (Listenvorschlag) which is then in turn voted by the delegates. In the survey, more than 80 percent both of the SPD and the CDU respondents stated that such a predesigned list was brought in during the list nomination, compared to 64 percent in the case of the Left party and only 14 percent in the case of the Greens. Regarding the intra-state level, some state branches of the Social and Christian Democrats stipulate also conventions at the regional level held prior to the conventions at the state level (Deiss-Helbig 2017: 74). Finally, comparing the ratings the selector type *delegates/members* received in the online survey to the average score that candidates on promising list positions received during the delegate conventions or party membership assemblies (see here also Deiss-Helbig 2017), we can see that those two measurements of *importance of formal selectorate* strongly correlate. The lower the influence is rated for the delegates/members, the higher the score candidates on promising list positions received during the party list nominations (Pearson’s r = .98, p<.05).

Having shown that for the four parties under study, different types of selectorates seem to be of different importance regarding the nomination of the party list candidates, I will, in what follows, explore in more detail whether and if so, how these different types of selectorates matter regarding the nomination chances visible minority candidates. To do so, I aggregate the data on the perceived influence of the different selectorate types by state and party and compare the mean across states. In the case of the Social Democrats, there are visible minority aspirants in eight states. Five visible minority aspirants are placed on promising list positions (in Hamburg, Saxony-Anhalt, Berlin, North-Rhine-Westphalia, Baden-Wurttemberg) and three have non-promising list positions as defined in Chapter 5.3.1 (in Lower-Saxony, Hesse, Bavaria). The analyses yield some interesting findings. There is no correlation between the level of (perceived) influence of the state executive board and the existence of (at least) one visible minority aspirant among

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98 I assume that the closer the average score candidates receive for their placement on the list is to unanimity, the more likely it is that there has been some kind of agreement or list proposition in the forefront of the official nomination meeting.
The promising list candidates in a state (point-biserial correlation $r_{pb} = .01$, $p = .99$). There is a moderate positive, but statistically insignificant, correlation between (perceived) influence of delegates and visible minority aspirants among promising list candidates (point-biserial correlation $r_{pb} = .40$, $p = .33$). This means that the higher, on average, party members in a state rate the influence of delegates, the higher the probability that (at least one) a visible minority aspirant was nominated on a promising list position. Two types of selectorates, however, appear to be strongly and statistically significant related to the nomination chances of visible minority aspirants. First, the higher the (perceived) influence of the executive board at the regions/administrative districts level, the lower the probability that at least one visible minority candidate is nominated on a promising list position in a state (point-biserial correlation $r_{pb} = -.81$, $p < .05$). And, second, the higher the (perceived) influence of the district party branches, the higher the probability that (at least) one visible minority aspirant is among the promising list candidates in a state (point-biserial correlation $r_{pb} = .79$, $p < .05$). In the case of the Greens, none of the correlations reaches conventional levels of statistical significance. For the seven states in which visible minority aspirants sought nomination on the party list and for which data is available, the correlations range from $r_{pb} = -.39$ ($p = .39$) for the state executive board to the regional executive board $r_{pb} = .44$ ($p = .32$). For the Christian Democrats as well as the Left party, aggregated means are only available for two states, each. That is why I will not calculate the correlations for these two parties.

Looking at the district level, Figure 6.20 reveals some interesting findings. First, the respondents of the two large parties, SPD and CDU, attribute more power to the formal selectorate, that are the delegate conventions or party membership assemblies, than this was the case for the party list nominations (about 60 percent compared to 30 and 50 percent, CDU and SPD, respectively). Coming to the same conclusion but 60 years ago, Heino Kaack (1969: 88) has found also that delegates have more power at the district than at the state level because the latter are highly formalized procedures. Second, the executive board of the district party is perceived as the most important in the case of Christian and Social Democrats and second most important party actor in the selection process in the case of Left party and Greens. Figure 6.20 indicates that (strong) intervention of party actors from other political levels seem to be rare in the case of district candidates. In the case of the Christian Democrats, also the incumbent in the district is perceived as having some influence in the selection process. Furthermore, it is worth highlighting that the number of respondents who stated that further individuals or groups of individuals had at least some influence in the selection
6. Exploring the selection of immigrant-origin candidates in Germany

Figure 6.20: Importance party selector types - district candidates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>District executive board</th>
<th>Delegates/members</th>
<th>Regional party branch</th>
<th>State executive board</th>
<th>District incumbent</th>
<th>Federal executive board</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>n=147</td>
<td>n=145</td>
<td>n=135</td>
<td>n=142</td>
<td>n=144</td>
<td>n=145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>n=81</td>
<td>n=74</td>
<td>n=78</td>
<td>n=78</td>
<td>n=74</td>
<td>n=74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>n=287</td>
<td>n=285</td>
<td>n=275</td>
<td>n=288</td>
<td>n=281</td>
<td>n=287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left party</td>
<td>n=32</td>
<td>n=37</td>
<td>n=35</td>
<td>n=37</td>
<td>n=33</td>
<td>n=35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Selector Survey 2015, own calculations.
Notes: Shown are the aggregated answers (in %) of "very much" and "much influence". Item wording see Chapter 5.3.2.

process is higher in the case of district nominations than party lists. Named were mainly members of the local elite as for instance actual or former mayors, members of the local council or the local party branches (Ortsvereine,-verbände).

Finally, I analyze, in the same way as I did for the party lists, whether the (perceived) power of different types of selectorates is related to the nomination of visible minority district candidates. What can be concluded for the Social Democrats and the Greens is that none of the correlations between (perceived) influence of the several selectorate types and nomination of visible minority aspirants in the district proof to be statistically significant. Furthermore, all correlations are weak to moderate and almost exclusively positive – meaning the higher, on average, the perceived influence of the respective selector type, the more likely the nomination of a visible minority district candidate. The only negative correlation can be observed for the (perceived) influence of the incumbent MP (point-biserial correlation r_pbi=-.43, p=.29). Regarding the Christian Democrats there are only two districts in which visible minority aspirants sought nomination and for which
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data is available\footnote{It is worth noting that there are all in all five districts in which visible minority aspirants sought nomination for the Christian Democrats.} that is the district 'Mettmann I' in North-Rhine-Westphalia and the district 'Mainz' in Rhineland-Palatinate. What meets the eye when comparing the levels of perceived influence of the different types of selectors is that in the case of 'Mettmann I' the influence of the incumbent MP and the state executive board is rated much higher than in the second district where, in turn, the influence of the delegates is perceived slightly higher and of the district executive board slightly lower than in the first district. In this context it is worth adding that in 'Mettmann I' the incumbent MP, a woman with Iranian background, was renominated as district candidate, while in 'Mainz' a 26-year-old aspirant with Turkish roots failed nomination in the district. For the case of the Left party, the number of observations in the districts is too low for meaningful analyses.

6.2.3.2 Incumbency and the importance of district candidatures

Political parties provide a number of mechanisms that are important to their process of candidate selection. In the last paragraphs, we have already dealt with the question of who has a say in the selection process. Furthermore, it is interesting to ask whether there are specific mechanisms that are detrimental (or beneficial) to the nomination of immigrant-origin candidates. In what follows, I will analyze this question in detail for two specific characteristics of the selection process. First, I will look at the importance of incumbency in the selection process of German parties. And, second, I will examine the role of district nominations for the nomination of party list candidates. I am doing so because the former, that is incumbency, is widely known as one – if not the – most important selection criterion (Ranney 1981: 78; Hazan and Rahat 2010: 27) and scholarship points to its capacity to impede the access to elected office for new types of candidates (Ware 1996: 272). Regarding the latter, we deal with a question that is strongly related to a common practice in German politics that are so-called dual candidacies – meaning that candidates are running in the district and on the party list at the same time. In Chapter 6.1.2, I have already analyzed the magnitude of this phenomenon for the 2013 legislative elections. In what follows, I will examine whether or not this practice is detrimental to the nomination of immigrant-origin and visible minority candidates on promising list positions.

While in some countries incumbency is a formal condition for candidacy,
it is not stipulated in any of the statutes of the German parties under study. However, in the online survey 400 out of 489 respondents who participated in a list nomination (82%), stated that regarding the party lists, the candidates’ experiences made as members of parliament were an (very) important criterion for the composition of the party list. In this context it is worth highlighting that the differences between the four parties are rather small and not statistically significant ($\chi^2=5.89$ (p=.12)). 91 percent of the respondents of the CDU (58 out of 64) stated that this was a (very) important criterion, compared to 88 percent in the case of the Left party (37 out of 42), 81 percent of the SPD respondents (86 out of 106), and, finally, 79 percent (219 out of 277) in the case of the Greens. 18 percent of all respondents (85 out of 463) even declared that is was the most important criterion when drawing up the party list. Almost 50 percent of the respondents of the CDU (27 out of 60) rated incumbency as the most important selection criterion, compared to 33 percent in the case of the Left party (13 out of 39), 20 percent of the Social Democrat respondents (20 out of 101), and, finally, 10 percent of the Greens (25 out of 263) (differences are statistically significant $\chi^2=48.14$, p<.001, all findings not shown).

Those findings are reflected in political reality, as Table 6.9 shows. Incumbents made up almost 50 percent (47%) of all those who sought district nomination for the 2013 elections for the CDU/CSU and about one third (32%) of those who aimed to be nominated on a party list. The CDU/CSU incumbents are followed by the Social Democrats with 25 percent incumbents in the district and 27 percent for the party lists, and by the Left party with 20 and 28 percent, respectively.

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100 The item wording is as follows: "According to you, which of the following criteria have been important for your state party branch when drawing up the party list for the 2013 legislative elections? Please indicate for each of the following criteria whether it was very important, important, less important, or not important at all. a) The candidates previous electoral success (first votes), b) their experiences as MP, c) their expertise, d) their role and function within the party, e) their local popularity and rootedness, f) their engagement in local clubs, g) their local presence, h) their personality, i) their regional belonging, j) their age, k) their gender, l) their immigrant background, m) their religious denomination, n) their occupational category, o) specific quotas (please indicate which quotas), p) their attractiveness towards new voters groups (please indicate which voters groups), q) their group belonging (please indicate which group), r) others (please indicate which others)."

101 The item wording is as follows: "When you think how the party list was drawn up, which, according to you, of the following criteria was the most important, the second most important, [...] and the least important criterion? Tagging all nine stars means that you consider this criterion to be the most important criterion; tagging one single star indicates that this criterion was the least important. With the remaining stars you can give grades to the other criteria. It is possible to tag different criteria with the same numbers of stars. a) To secure district candidates, b) regional quota, c) to consider 'newcomers', d) to account for intra-party factions and wings, e) to secure incumbents, f) gender quota, g) the candidates immigrant background, h) other criteria (please indicate what criteria)."
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Table 6.9: Incumbency – aspirant and candidate level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SPD</th>
<th>CDU/CSU</th>
<th>Greens</th>
<th>Left party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aspirant level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Districts</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... incumbents</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... newcomers</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party lists</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... incumbents</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... newcomers</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Candidate level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Districts</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... incumbents</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... newcomers</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party lists</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... incumbents</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... newcomers</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Aspirant data 2012-2013, own calculations.
Notes: Entries are number of candidatures for district nominations/party list positions and district/party list candidatures. Aspiring candidates seeking nomination in the district and on party lists are counted twice (for district and for party lists).

The Greens showed the lowest number of incumbents among their aspirants in the districts (15%) and for the party lists (17%). When looking at those who finally got nominated, we can see that while in two thirds of the districts of the CDU/CSU an incumbent was running for office (67%), this was the case in 38 percent of the districts of the SPD in 22 percent of the Left party, and, finally, in 20 percent of the districts of the Greens. Regarding the party lists, the party differences are less pronounced. About 30 percent of all list candidates of the CDU/CSU Left party and Social Democrats and about 20 percent of those of the Greens were current MPs (see Table 6.9). However regarding the party lists, it is worth noting that a comparison between parties is more difficult than in the case of the district candidates due to the strongly varying numbers of candidates placed on a party list. To even more illustrate the relevance of incumbency, it is interesting to see that 99 percent of all incumbents who sought renomination for the 2013 legislative elections were finally nominated (448 out of 454). And

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102 Taking the state of Baden-Württemberg as an example, the CDU presented a list with 55 candidates, the SPD with 40 candidates, the Greens with 38 and, finally, the Left party a list with only 16 candidates.
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91 percent of the current MPs were even nominated on a promising list position and/or in a winnable district (415 out of 454). There are almost no differences between the parties regarding the renomination rate (100% in the case of the Greens, 99% for the SPD and the Left party, 98% of the CDU/CSU). However, we can observe differences regarding the renomination in winnable districts and/or on promising list positions. 196 out of the 207 incumbents of the CDU/CSU were nominated on a promising list position and/or in a winnable district (94%), compared to 109 out of 116 incumbents of the Social Democrats (94%) and 59 out of 69 incumbents of the Left party (86%), and, finally, 51 out of 62 of the Greens (82%). To sum up, there is a large number of incumbents seeking renomination and this holds true in particular for the CDU/CSU but also the Social Democrats. It becomes also clear that an important number of district candidatures is occupied by incumbents - and this holds true in particular for the Christian Democrats, but also the SPD. Furthermore, when incumbents seek renomination they are, with very few exceptions, successfully renominated; in most cases even on promising list positions and/or in winnable districts.

Comparing the number of incumbents among immigrant-origin (including visible minority) aspirants to the one among their non immigrant counterparts, we can observe strong differences. Only 14 out of 118 immigrant-origin aspirants are incumbents (that are 12 percent compared to 22 percent of their non immigrant origin counterparts). Regarding those with visible minority background, the percentage is slightly higher (13% compared to 22%). The difference between those two aspirant groups is the highest in the case of the CDU/CSU (8% compared to 32% for those with immigrant origins and 14% compared to 32% for visible minorities) and the lowest (and even in the opposite direction) for the Greens (14% of those with immigrant origins and 12% those without; 13% compared to 12% in the case of visible minorities). In the case of the Left party, 14 percent both of aspirants with immigrant origins and visible minority aspirants compared to 17 percent of their non immigrant counterparts are sitting MPs. Finally, regarding the Social Democrats, nine percent of immigrant-origin aspirants and 12 percent of those with visible minority origins were current MPs, while this was the case for 21 percent of those without any immigrant origin or a visible minority background.

Aiming to measure the impact of incumbency on the nomination chances for immigrant-origin and visible minority aspiring candidates, I, first, calculated the NIRI-index as defined in Chapter 5.3.2 for each of the 16 party lists for the four parties under study. I then test how the NIRI-index is related to the chances of each minority aspiring candidate to be placed on a promising list position. It goes without saying that I will analyze this relationship only for the newcomer
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minority candidates that are those candidates who had not been elected to the German Bundestag in the previous election. I test the relationship for each party separately, first, for immigrant-origin aspirants in the broader sense and, second, for visible minority aspirants. The analyses show mixed results for the four parties under study. For the Social Democrats and the Greens, we can observe rather weak correlations which in both cases and for both immigrant groups do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. However, in the case of the SPD the correlations are in the expected direction - meaning the higher the NIRI-index the higher the chance of a promising candidature (immigrant-origin aspirants: point-biserial correlation $r_{pb}=.03$, $p=.89$; visible minority aspirants: $r_{pb}=.04$, $p=.87$). For the Greens, however, the correlations are negative meaning the more newcomers on higher list positions the lower the chances for minority candidates to be nominated on a promising list position (immigrant-origin aspirants: point-biserial correlation $r_{pb}=-.18$, $p=.36$; visible minority aspirants: $r_{pb}=-.15$, $p=.51$).

For the Left party as well as the CDU/CSU, however, we can observe positive moderate to strong correlations which, at least partly, reach statistical significance. For both parties, we can thus conclude that the higher the NIRI-index the higher the chances for minority aspirants to be nominated on promising list positions (Left party, immigrant-origin aspirants: point-biserial correlation $r_{pb}=.45$, $p<.10$; visible minority aspirants: $r_{pb}=.40$, $p=.20$). For the case of the CDU/CSU however, the rather strong correlations of $r_{pb}=.63$ ($p=.13$) for immigrant-origin and $r_{pb}=.95$ ($p<.05$) for visible minority aspirants have to be taken with caution due to the very small number of (newcomer) aspirants with immigrant and visible minority origins ($N=7$ and $N=4$, respectively).

Regarding the district level, Figure 6.21 reveals that the great majority of all newcomer aspirants seeking nomination in the district also competes against newcomers. I qualify such district nominations as 'open district nominations' opposed to 'closed district nominations' where an incumbent seeks renomination. This holds true for all four types of aspirants (differences do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance, see Notes below Figure 6.21). While seven percent of the newcomer aspirants who can be qualified as non-immigrant origin aspirants compete against incumbents (80 out of 1.076), this holds true for only three percent of their immigrant-origin counterparts (2 out of 78). We can observe the same percentages for the category of visible minority aspirants and their non-visible minority counterparts (see second graph in Figure 6.21). Put it the other way round, in the great majority of cases where an incumbent seeks renomination, this incumbent runs unopposed. This holds true for 89 percent of the 111 closed nomination races of the SPD for 86 percent of the 200 incumbent nominations of
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**Figure 6.21: Open district nominations**

![Diagram showing open district nominations for immigrant-origin and visible minority aspirants.]

*Source: Aspirant data 2012-2013, own calculations. N=1,076 (non-immigrant origin aspirants), N=78 (immigrant-origin aspirants); N=1,100 (non-visible minority aspirants), N=54 (visible minority aspirants). Notes: Shown are percentages of newcomers seeking nomination within districts against other newcomer aspirants. Pearson’s Chi-square test: Immigrant-origin aspirants: \(\chi^2=2.61\), \(p=.11\); Visible minority aspirants: \(\chi^2=0.30\), \(p=.58\).*

the CDU/CSU, 88 percent of the 60 incumbent nominations of the Greens and, finally, 89 percent of the 63 nominations of the Left party.

Regarding the second specific characteristic of the candidate selection process in Germany that I will examine more closely here, I have already shown in *Chapter 6.1.2* that more than 50 percent of all candidates for the 2013 legislative elections run simultaneously in the district and on the party list. The Social Democrats showed the highest level of so-called dual candidacies followed by the Greens, the CDU/CSU and, finally, the Left party (see *Chapter 6.1.2*). These findings raise the question about how important district candidacies are for (promising) positions on the party list. It could be, and the candidate selection literature suggests so, that running as district candidate is considered by the selectorate as a precondition for a promising list position (Schüttemeyer and Sturm 2005: 548). I have also found evidence in the previous sections that, in particular regarding district candidatures, aspirants with immigrant origins including visible minorities face several barriers. Concerns about the electability of those candidates and, in particular for the two mainstream parties, high levels of incumbency can be seen as impeding factors for minority district nominations. The German electoral system with its combination of nominal plurality vote and regional closed-lists and the associated common practice of dual candidacies could thus twice penalize minority aspirants; first, regarding the district candidatures, and second, for the party list nominations. In what follows, I will thus examine the importance of district candidacies for (promising) party list positions for the 2013 legislative elections.
as well as how this is related to the party list nomination of immigrant-origin candidates including visible minorities.

The measurement of the importance of district candidatures is done in a similar way than of the relevance of incumbency. The DICA-index (for the calculation of the index see Chapter 5.3.2) is supposed to quantify the presence of district candidates on promising party list positions. It goes from 0 – none of the promising list positions is occupied by district candidates – to 1 – all promising list positions are occupied by district candidates. For the majority of the party lists of all four parties the index is 1 meaning that all promising list positions are occupied by candidates who are also running in the district. The index is the lowest for the Left party (average of 0.85 for all 16 party lists) and the highest for the CDU/CSU (average of 1 for all 15 party lists). The Social Democrats range between the two latter together with the Greens (both average of 0.94 for all 16 party lists). In two of the three city-states (Hamburg, Bremen), one of the two promising list positions of the SPD was occupied by a candidate who was not simultaneously running as a district candidate. Regarding the Greens, one pure list candidate among those candidates on promising list positions could be observed in two out of 16 states (Thuringia, Saarland). Finally, regarding the Left party there were even two state party lists where not a single candidate was running as dual candidate. All in all, these findings once again highlight the importance of district candidatures for promising list positions for all four parties under study. With regards to the those parties that traditionally are successful in district races – in particular CDU/CSU and SPD – at a much lower level this holds also true for the Left party –, this practice can be interpreted as safeguarding district candidates on promising list positions. However, district candidatures generally come along with a heavy workload (particularly compared to party list candidatures). That is why this can also be seen as rewarding district candidates for their work with promising list positions (Zeuner 1970: 156). Furthermore, those findings also suggest to look more closely at the district nominations. That is why failed district nominations for the 2013 elections of immigrant-origin aspirants are compared to those of their non-immigrant counterparts. The same is done for the group of visible minorities. Figure 6.22 shows, regarding the broader category of immigrant-origin, different results for the two major parties CDU/CSU and the two smaller parties (Greens, Left party). While in the case of the former, immigrant-origin aspirants more often failed district nomination than their non-immigrant counterparts, the contrary was the case for the Greens and the Left party. Regarding the more narrow category of visible minorities, the differences got even larger in favor of the visible minority aspirants (i.e. they less often failed
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district nomination), disappeared completely for the Social Democrats and got in the other direction for the Christian Democrats. It is however worth highlighting that none of these constellations reach conventional levels of statistical significance (see notes below Table 6.22). When replicating the previous analysis only for

Figure 6.22: Failed district nomination of district aspirants

![Bar charts showing failed district nomination for different groups and parties.](image)

Source: Aspirant data 2012-2013, own calculations. (Non-)immigrant origin: N=425 and N=31 (SPD), N=431 and N=8 (CDU/CSU), N=367 and N=28 (Greens), N=308 and N=25 (Left party); (non) visible minority aspirants: N=433 and N=23 (SPD), N=434 N=5 (CDU/CSU), N=376 and N=19 (Greens), N=315 and N=18 (Left party). Notes: Shown are percentages of aspirants within the respective group who failed district nomination by their party. Pearson’s Chi-square test or Fisher’s exact test for subsamples with expected frequencies smaller than 5: (Non-)immigrant origin: SPD \( \chi^2 = .88 \) (\( p = .35 \)), CDU/CSU Fisher’s exact test \( p = .71 \), Greens \( \chi^2 = 0.68 \) (\( p = .41 \)), Left party Fisher’s exact test \( p = 1 \); (non) visible minority: SPD \( \chi^2 = .00 \) (\( p = .95 \)), CDU/CSU Fisher’s exact test \( p = .66 \), Greens Fisher’s exact test \( p = .58 \), Left party Fisher’s exact test \( p = .70 \).

newcomer aspirants, we can see that, for all parties, immigrant-origin aspirants including visible minorities either less often failed district nomination or showed equal percentages as their non-immigrant counterparts. However, also here none of the differences are statistically significant (see Figure C1 in Appendix C).

Although the above presented findings did not indicate any disadvantageous position of immigrant-origin and in particular not visible minority aspirants compared to their non-immigrant counterparts when it comes to the nomination
as district candidate, we have shown that they are already weakly presented among aspiring candidates. That is why, it appears to be important to investigate into the reasons for the non-nomination of the few minority aspirants who decide to try to come forward as candidate. To do so, I will analyze what explanations party selectors bring up to explain why they did not vote for a minority aspirant.\footnote{Unfortunately the number of observations for the Left party was too low for meaningful analyses. That is why only the results for the Social Democrats, the Christian Democrats, and the Greens are shown.}

The first graph in Figure 6.23 shows the importance party selectors accorded to a number of selection criteria when voting for an aspirant in a district nomination – irrespective of the fact whether or not this involved a minority aspirant. Relying on the same list of selection criteria, the second graph gives information about what led the party selectors’ decision to not vote for a visible minority aspirant. In the second graph in Figure 6.23, mainly three criteria stand out – one of each category of selection criteria (political characteristics, locality, ascriptive characteristics): the aspirant’s lack of expertise (as a political characteristic), of local rootedness (concerning locality), and of personality (as an ascriptive characteristic). When comparing these results with the reasons party selectors put forward to explain why they voted for an aspirant (regardless of his or her immigrant background) (see first graph in Figure 6.23), we can see that these findings complement one another. Except for the Greens, all three criteria that mattered in a negative sense for selectors’ vote against visible minority district aspirants, seemed to an important criterion for party selectors when voting for an aspirant. In the case of the Greens, local rootedness and local presence (as criteria related to locality) also ranged third, but with a larger distance to the two other criteria (expertise and personality) than this was the case for the Social and Christian Democrats. Although the results for the vote against minority aspirants have to be taken with caution due to the rather small number of observations (see indications below Figure 6.23) comparing those two findings suggests that visible minority aspirants failed nomination not because of their immigrant background but rather due to the lack of general characteristics that are valued in district candidates. However, as we know from research on such sensitive issues as the role of immigrant background in voting behavior or on discriminatory behavior in general, it could also be that these findings are biased by effects of social desirability.
Figure 6.23: Importance selection criteria district nominations

Source: Selector Survey 2015, own calculations. SPD: n=115, n=115, n=114, n=111, n=113, n=114, n=115, n=116, n=115, n=117, n=114, n=115; CDU: n=63, n=64, n=64, n=66, n=63, n=63, n=62, n=64, n=63; Greens: n=160, n=160, n=161, n=161, n=161, n=161, n=161, n=159; vote against: n=42, n=42, n=42, n=41, n=41, n=40, n=41, n=41, n=41, n=40, n=42, n=41, n=41 (all number of observations in order of appearance).

Notes: Shown are percentages of answers 'very important/important' selection criterion. Item wording: 'Which of the following criteria have been important in your choice to vote for/against [name of district aspirant]? Please indicate for each of the following criteria whether it was very important, important, less important, or not important at all. a) His/her previous electoral success (first votes), b) (lack of) experience as MP, c) (lack of) expertise, d) role and function within the party, e) (lack of) local popularity and rootedness, f) (lack of) engagement in local clubs, g) (lack of) local presence, h) (lack of) personality, i) age, j) gender, k) immigrant background, l) religious denomination, m) occupational category, n) capacity to attract new voters (please indicate which voter groups), o) group belonging (please indicate which group), p) sociostructural composition of the district (please indicate which composition), q) others (please indicate which others).'
6.2.3.3 Immigrant-specific intra-party mechanisms

Past research has shown that political parties provide a number of mechanisms to ensure the representation of various kinds of societal as well as intra-party groups or factions (Reiser 2014). In the last section, we have already examined in detail the importance of incumbency both for the nomination in the district and on the party lists as well as of district candidatures with regards to party list nominations. The remainder of the present chapter is dedicated to the question whether German parties also provide minority-specific mechanisms, and if so, how they are related to the nomination of candidates with immigrant origins including visible minorities. Research has shown that specific intra-party rules for candidate selection often occur together (see, e.g., Reiser 2014: 63 sq.). That is why we will have a look at the whole range of intra-party rules or quotas. It is worth highlighting that the following analyses focus on the composition of party lists and only marginally touch the case of district nominations. I am doing so because rules that are supposed to ensure the representation of specific subgroups are more likely to be in place in the case of party lists than for single-member candidatures in the district.

Figure 6.24 once again highlights the relevance of the two nomination rules studied already previously, that are incumbency and priority given to district candidates. However, the first thing that meets the eye when looking at Figure 6.24 is that, for all parties under study but the Christian Democrats, the gender quota is perceived as the most important rule for drawing up the party lists. Respondents in the online survey rated the gender balance of the party lists on average with 8 points in the case of the Greens and the Left party (out of possible 9 points), 7.1 points in the case of the SPD, and even 6.7 points in the case of the CDU. This finding is in line with previous studies that highlighted the importance of gender quota for composing the party lists in particular in the case of the three left-wing parties (see, e.g., Reiser 2014: 59). With regards to immigrant-origin and in particular visible minority candidates, this result could also be an explanation for the in the context of the present study not negative role of the "double minority status", accorded in the representation literature to women with immigrant origins. Chapter 6.1.2 has shown that, in particular, women aspirants with visible minority origins do not worse than those without such a background. When calculating the share of women among visible minority candidates on promising list position, we can see that 58 percent of all promising candidates with visible minority origins (11 out of 19) are women. Furthermore, aspirant’s gender and chances for a promising list position appear to be negatively
related in the case of visible minority aspirants. The odds ratio of 0.31 indicate that men with visible minority origins have a lower chance to obtain a promising list position than women do ($\chi^2 = 4.80$, $p<.05$). Based on the results regarding

**Figure 6.24:** Importance intra-party quotas for party list composition

![Graph showing the importance of various quotas for party list composition](image)

*Source: Selector Survey 2015, own calculations.*

*Notes: Shown are bootstrapped means for importance of specific intra-party rule/quotas (1=least important intra-party quota, 9=most important intra-party quota). Item wording see footnote 103.*

the importance of gender quota for party list compositions, nominating a woman with visible minority origins could be seen as a strategy to satisfy, at once, gender quota needs and calls for diversifying the party lists.

Additionally to incumbency and priority rule for district candidates, regional quotas can be identified as a further important mechanism for drawing up the party lists in particular in the case of the CDU and the SPD as can be seen in *Figure 6.24*. This finding is also in accordance with previous research on candidate selection in Germany (see, e.g., Reiser 2014: 59). It is worth highlighting that, contrary to gender quotas which are (voluntary) written down in all statutes of the parties under study except the Christian Social Union (Deiss-Helbig 2017).
rules that are supposed to account for the regional particularities of the respective land can be found only in some of the state party statutes of the Social Democrats and the CDU/CSU (for the SPD in Lower-Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Bavaria; for the CDU/CSU in North Rhine-Westphalia, Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria). And only the Christian Democrats in Baden-Württemberg stipulate in their statutes a precise formula to regionally allocate the list positions (Deiss-Helbig 2017: 77). According to Marion Reiser (2014: 60), regionally balanced party lists are also considered to be important at least in some state branches of the Left party, although such a quota is not written down in the statutes. The fact that this is not reflected in the present findings can be due to the small number and a regionally unequal distribution of observations in the case of the Left party.

What can also be seen in Figure 6.24 is that the party selectors who participated in the online survey considered the candidates’ immigrant background, on average, as one of the least important criteria for the composition of the party lists (on average 3.8 to 4.7 out of 9 points). Only the incorporation of newcomers on the party lists is perceived as less important. However, research did already in the mid-1960s pointed to the importance of intra-party differences, meaning between the different state party branches, regarding the importance of selection rules or quotas (Zeuner 1970: 158 sqq.). That is why, in what follows, I will analyze whether the perceived importance of a potential immigrant rule differs between states and whether or not this is related to the list positioning of minority aspirants. Furthermore, I will examine how the existence of regional quota impact on the nomination chances of visible minority aspirants. I am doing so because, first, regional quota are supposed to vary strongly between states depending on the specific territorial composition of the respective state. And, second, I hypothesize that strong regional quotas are detrimental to the nomination of minority candidates because in those cases allocation according to regions is the prevailing criterion for composing the party lists. I run four binomial regression analyses with the nomination chances on promising list positions for visible minority aspirants as the dependent variable and the mean of the immigrant and regional quota variable, respectively, aggregated for each state as well as incumbency as independent variables. The latter is included in the analysis because it has proven to be a very important determinant for promising list positions for all kinds of aspirants. The models are calculated separately for the Social Democrats and the Greens, a procedure that is equivalent to interacting each independent variable with a party dummy. Due to the small number of observations (44 visible minority party list aspirants for the Social Democrats and the Greens), I opt
6. Exploring the selection of immigrant-origin candidates in Germany

Table 6.10: SPD: Immigrant quota and nomination chances of visible minority aspirants (binomial regression)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B (SE)</td>
<td>90% CI for odds ratio</td>
<td>B (SE)</td>
<td>90% CI for odds ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower OR Upper</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lower OR Upper</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imm. quota</td>
<td>0.67 (0.72)</td>
<td>0.61 - 1.96</td>
<td>0.99 (0.80)</td>
<td>0.79 - 2.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbency</td>
<td>2.60* (1.46)</td>
<td>1.36 - 13.49</td>
<td>213.90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.95 (3.18)</td>
<td>-5.88 (3.65)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 19 19

Source: Selector survey 2015 and Aspirant data 2012-2013, own calculations.
Notes: Model 1: $R^2 = .04$ (Hosmer-Lemeshow), .05 (Cox-Snell), .07 (Nagelkerke). Model $\chi^2 (1)=0.95$ (p=.33); Model 2: $R^2 = .20$ (Hosmer-Lemeshow), .21 (Cox-Snell), .30 (Nagelkerke). Model $\chi^2 (2)=3.48$ (p<.10); * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.

for separate analyses. However, also here the number of observations is rather small. That is why the two predictors are included stepwise. Additionally, the Christian Democrats and the Left party are excluded from the following analyses due to the very small number of observations available for analysis. In the case of the former, this is due to the number of visible minority list aspirants (N=5). Regarding the latter, the number of observations in the online survey in those states where visible minority list aspirants stood for nomination is too low for meaningful analyses. Furthermore, I will run the regression on immigrant rule and promising list positions only for the Social Democrats. I am doing so because of lacking variance in the main independent variable in the case of the Greens (the importance of an immigrant rule is rated from 2.7 to 4.1 out of 9 points, with an average of 3.6 points).

In accordance with the seventh hypothesis, Table 6.10 reveals for the case of the Social Democrats, that the higher, at the state level, the importance of an immigrant rule for the party list composition is on average rated by the survey respondents, the higher the chances for visible minority aspirants to obtain a promising position on the list. In both models, however, the coefficients for this measure do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Including incumbency improves the first model, as the AIC decreases from 24.95 (model 1) to 23.47 (model 2). Furthermore, being a current Member of Parliament increases the probability of being promisingly nominated on the party list about 13 times (odds ratio of 13.49, see Table 6.10). Given the small number of observations (N=19), potentially influential cases merit special attention. Furthermore, we
want to detect whether there are observations to which the models fit only poorly. We thus consult the diagnostic statistics to identify those cases (in particular DFBetas and studentized residuals see, Field et al. [2012: 340 sq.]). For one of the 19 cases, the DFBetas are greater than one (in both models). When we look more closely at this single case (Karamba Diaby in Saxony-Anhalt), we can see that the importance of an immigrant rule ranges the highest in this state (average of 7.0 points, average for all states is 4.7). Excluding this case from the analysis changes the direction of the relationship between immigrant rule and nomination chances (i.e. it becomes negative). Regarding the studentized residuals as a way to identify observations to which the model fits poorly, two cases in model 2 have values +/- 1.96. Looking at those two cases (Ülker Radziwill and Cansel Kiziltepe in Berlin), we can see that both sought nomination on the same party list. The importance of an immigrant rule was thus rated the same for both aspirants. Additionally, both aspirants were newcomers, but only one of the two obtained a promising position on the party list. The model is thus not able to predict in those cases the outcome variable based on those two predictors. When looking at the party documents available to us, we can identify two particularities that may help explain the observed difference in the outcome variable. First, while one of the aspirants tried to run for another (promising) position than the one envisaged by the state executive board’s list proposition, the second aspirant did not try to run for a safer position (on the executive board’s list proposition, she was already on a promising position). And, second, the successful aspiring candidate was endorsed as first priority candidate by the intra-party association “Working group on migration and diversity” (AG Migration u. Vielfalt). According to article 23* (2) of the statutes of the SPD Berlin, a representative of the latter is part of the state executive board of the SPD in the city-state of Berlin. The phenomenon that representatives of specific intra-party associations are members of the state party executive board can be found also in some further state party statutes of the SPD (e.g. in Hamburg or Bavaria). However, it is only in the case of Berlin that an immigrant-specific intra-party association is mentioned. To sum up, there are three conclusions for the Social Democrats. First, the relevance of such mechanisms for the composition of the 2013 party lists is perceived, on average, as rather low. The importance ranges from 3.5 points, on average, in Hesse to 7 points, on average, in Saxony-Anhalt. Second, the impact of such a mechanism on the chances of visible minority aspirants to obtain a promising list position is difficult to establish. Although, we can observe an impact in the expected direction, the models are very unstable as could be demonstrated by excluding an influential case from the analysis. Finally, the brief comparison
of the two cases in Berlin already points to the relevance of immigrant-specific

**Figure 6.25:** Regional quota and promising list positions for visible minority aspirants

![Graph showing the relationship between regional quotas and promising list positions for visible minority aspirants for SPD and Greens.](image)

*Source: Selector Survey 2015 and Aspirant data 2012-2013, own calculations.*

*Notes: Shown are on the y-axis the predicted probabilities for a promising list position of visible minority aspirants (0=not nominated on list/unpromising position, 1=promising list position), on the x-axis the aggregated perceived importance of a regional quota (1=least important selection rule... 9=most important selection rule party lists; item wording see footnote 103) per state with lower and upper confidence limits (90%); for more model statistics see Tables C10 and C11 in Appendix C.*

Additionally to the impact of a possible immigrant rule for the party list, we have a look at the relationship between regional quotas and the chances of visible minority aspirants to obtain a promising list position. *Figure 6.25* reveals some interesting findings. While the coefficient in both models (SPD and Greens) does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance, the direction of the relationship is the opposite in the two models (see also *Table C10 and C11* in Appendix C). While for the Social Democrats, with an increasing importance of the regions, the probability of obtaining a promising list position decreases, the contrary is the case for the Greens. In both models, all cases have DFBetas for the predictor lower than 1; which indicates that there are no influential observations. We also look for observations to which the model does not fit. We can identify in both models each one observation with studentized residuals +/- 1.96. In the case of the SPD one aspirant (Karamba Diaby in Saxony-Anhalt) obtained a promising list position, although the state in which he sought nomination was
rated, on average, rather high regarding the importance of a regional allocation of the list positions. For the Greens, the contrary was the case for Özcan Mutlu in the city-state of Berlin (rather low importance of regional allocation of list positions, but promising list position).

To sum up, while a possible immigrant rule for the allocation of the party list positions could be detected, if at all, only in one state in the case of the Social Democrats, the relationship between this rule and promising list positions was as expected, the result for regional quotas are much more complex. First, such an allocation mechanism appear to be more important in the case of the Social Democrats than for the Greens. And second, we found at least some evidence that its relevance impacts differently on the chances of visible minority aspirants to obtain a promising list position.
Conclusions

The great majority of legislatures in the Western world are characterized by their homogeneity in terms of socio-economic profile and also with regards to gender and ethnic background. Over the last several decades, political science literature has attempted to find explanations for this phenomenon. In its beginnings, research mainly focused on the imbalance regarding gender as well as socio-economic profile. In the 1980s and 1990s, literature in the U.S. context then dealt with the political representation of African-Americans. More recently, the representation literature has begun to deal with these questions also regarding more recent immigrant minorities in the European context. Political science literature has offered a multitude of explanations for the numerical under-representation of women or the immigrant-origin population. In this regard, the role of political parties, and in particular their candidate selection function, has become of crucial interest in the last years. However, only a few studies have analyzed whether immigrants and their descendants (as well as women or other minority groups) face specific obstacles when seeking to run for office, or, in a more general way, asked what contributes to a successful candidature of immigrant-origin aspiring candidates. This study has therefore cast a closer look at potential barriers and/or benefits for immigrant-origin aspiring candidates within the candidate selection process by taking the 2013 legislative elections in Germany as an example.

Strategy, ideology or intra-party politics? Rather all three of them

To locate the present study in the representation literature, the idea of descriptive or minority representation based on general assumptions about political representation was explored in detail. The review of the different ideas of representation
as well as the different assumptions associated with these concepts lead to the conclusion that political representation is more than the delegation of power from citizens to representatives through elections. In particular, the minority representation literature is among those which suggest that it is also about the representation of values or specific experiences that are closely related to the biography or socio-demographic profile (for example gender or ethnic background) of representatives. The reviewed empirical studies indicated, though not unanimously, that the presence of co-ethnic or racial representatives in legislatures can have trust-building and empowering effects for the minority group in question. To get to the bottom of the rather homogeneous composition of legislative bodies, in terms of ethnic or racial background as well as gender, several explanations were analyzed. Although diverse in their approaches and the variables which were analyzed, this literature highlights four findings in particular. First, voter discrimination towards minority candidates strongly depends on voters’ party identification. Second, the supply of aspirants seeking to run for office appears to be an important factor regarding the composition of legislatures. Third, there is empirical evidence that electoral system features impact on the composition of legislative bodies. And, finally, strongly related to these three factors, political parties in general, and in particular the party selectors’ attitudes, as well as specific features of the recruitment process (especially the specific selection methods as shown in Chapter 2) appear to be crucial factors regarding the composition of legislative bodies.

Chapter 2 aimed to put candidate selection and its role in the political representation of immigrant-origin population in a broader perspective on party behavior. Party literature describes political parties as complex and diverse actors that perform functions that are located at the electoral-societal, governmental-parliamentary as well as party organizational level. They pursue a policy-seeking, office-seeking and/or vote-seeking behavior that is understood to vary according to party type, but also institutional environment (in particular electoral and party system features). Based on the party literature, I concluded that candidate selection is one of the most, if not the most, important functions performed by parties – also because it combines all three levels on which those intermediary actors operate. By selecting candidates, political parties decide who, potentially, will become a Member of Parliament. The reviewed literature showed that the decision for one candidate or another is taken based on party-external aspects (in particular other parties and the electorate) as well as party-internal needs. The selection criteria employed by party selectors are supposed to reflect these two constraints. The reviewed studies on candidate selection also suggested that selectorates can be
either exclusive or inclusive. Those studies also showed that the type of selectorate, as one of the most important ways of classifying selection methods, may (but does not necessarily) have consequences on the type of candidate selected, in terms of policy, gender or ethnic background. In this context, party scholars point to the increased vote-seeking behavior of more exclusive selectorates (mainly party leaders or search committees) which could be reflected in more balanced candidate lists or choices for candidates that "fit" with their voters, including in terms of ethnic background. The reviewed literature on voting behavior of immigrant-origin citizens revealed for the majority of Western European countries a predominantly (but not exclusively) homogeneous left-leaning electorate – there are, however, signs in some countries and within specific immigrant groups that mainstream right parties may also be able to count on these voters. This left-right divide can also be observed regarding the nomination of immigrant-origin candidates – although there are exceptions, such as Canada or Great Britain. Although scarce, the reviewed literature on the nomination of candidates with immigrant origins showed that party ideology is not the only important factor; also important were the selection methods, the type of selectorate, and (related to this) strategic considerations of the party selectors concerning the eligibility of those candidates as well as the composition of the districts and the importance of the seat(s) in question.

As this study has been chiefly concerned with candidate selection and the representation of the immigrant-origin population in Germany, Chapter 3 outlined several aspects regarding the immigrant-origin population and political parties in the German context. Based on the existent literature as well as on relevant legal sources, I showed that the ethnic composition of the German population is strongly characterized by immigrants and their descendants from formerly guest-worker-providing countries, in particular (but not exclusively) from Turkey, as well as by immigration of so-called (Spät)Aussiedler (ethnic German immigrants) from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Furthermore, the rather restrictive German citizenship law until 2000, as well as the low naturalization rates of foreigners, were identified as one of the reasons for the political under-representation of immigrant-origin representation in terms of numbers. However, the reviewed literature also suggested that the share of representatives with immigrant origins is increasing over the last several years, at all political levels, and this could be observed in particular for those with Turkish origins. Parties in the German context were identified as intermediary actors that have to comply with several German laws regarding their party organization as well as their candidate selection procedures, based mainly on the constitutional requirement for internal democracy.
Due to the federal system as well as the legal requirements, parties in Germany are additionally characterized by their uniformly fragmented party organization. This has also an impact on the parties’ candidate selection procedures in the way that several political levels (mainly state, regional and local) are involved in the process. Furthermore, the reviewed party literature highlighted the – until recently – fluid five-party system with centripetal modes of competition between, the two mainstream parties, the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) on the one side, and the three smaller parties (Greens, Left party, Free Democratic Party), on the other side. This is reflected also in the parties’ positions towards immigration. Although party literature suggested that the Greens and the Left party, as the main advocates for immigrant rights and equal inclusion, were located more towards the pro-immigration pole than the Christian Democrats, the Liberals and the Social Democrats, it recently observed a convergence of all parties towards more restrictive immigration policies.

Based on the reviewed party and representation literature in Chapters 1 to 3, Chapter 4 set out to explain the nomination of immigrant-origin candidates as conditioned by the interaction of parties’ strategic considerations, party ideology and intra-party aspects. Ideas about the nomination of candidates as a strategy to deal with and to benefit from a growing available electorate, due to partisan dealignment processes and decline of party identification, led to assumptions about the nomination chances of immigrant-origin aspiring candidates conditioned by the parties’ perceptions of costs and benefits. These electoral considerations were supposed to find expression in parties taking the ethnic composition of the constituency population into account when nominating immigrant-origin candidates, as well as different nomination strategies depending on the immigrant background of an aspiring candidate (i.e. nomination primarily on party lists, in hopeless districts or non-promising list positions). However, based on the reviewed party literature in Chapter 2 and the findings regarding German parties’ positions towards immigration (Chapter 3), attention was drawn also on the role of party ideology when it comes to the nomination of immigrant-origin candidates. Additionally to strategic considerations and party ideology, the importance of intra-party aspects, and here in particular the way parties select their candidates (type of selectorate, formal and informal selection rules) was highlighted.

Drawing on original data gained through intensive media research (local and regional newspapers, Internet searches) and the parties’ minutes of the nomination meetings, attention could be paid not only to the candidates who run for elective office, but also to those who seek nomination, thus the aspirants. This approach is unique insofar as, until now, no recent study, of which the author is aware, dealt
with this stage within the legislative recruitment process in European countries. Differentiating between the broader category of aspiring candidates with an immigrant background as defined by the Federal Statistical Office, and the more narrow category of visible minorities (discussed in Chapters 3 and 5), I showed in Chapter 6.1 that aspirants of both immigrant categories are already weakly represented at the aspirant level and that they seek nomination mainly within one of the three left-wing parties; this was even more remarkable for the group of visible minorities. A further noteworthy finding was the strong presence of Turkish origin aspirants – they made up almost 50 percent of all immigrant-origin aspirants and almost two-thirds of all visible minority aspirants. On the other side, from the former guest-worker-providing countries, only those of Greek origin stick out in terms of numbers – although their number remains low. Furthermore, aspirants with ethnic German origins are also under-represented within the population of legislative aspirants compared to their share in the immigrant-origin population and especially the eligible immigrant-origin population. The analyses also indicated that there is a strong link between immigrant rates within the state population and the emergence of immigrant-origin (including visible minority) aspirants seeking nomination. A further examination of those who were eventually nominated by their party shows that a slightly lower, but more or less equal, share of immigrant-origin (including visible minority) aspirants got nominated compared to their non-immigrant counterparts. Regarding minority aspirants, we could thus not observe a dramatic decline in terms of numbers between the aspirant and the candidate level – at least not based on the number of aspirants available to us – which would have been a strong argument for the assumption that people with immigrant origins and in particular visible minorities face considerable obstacles when seeking to run for office. Furthermore, the analyses show that Turkish-origin individuals are not only numerous at the aspirant level but that they are also comparatively successful when it comes to the nomination as candidate; unlike, for instance, their Italian-origin counterparts. I could even show that Turkish-origin candidates almost achieve parity when comparing their share among legislative candidates for the 2013 elections and their share within the (eligible) German population. However, the results also indicated that immigrant-origin candidates, including visible minorities, run for office more frequently in both tiers (district, party list) than their non-immigrant counterparts. This link was even more pronounced at the candidate than at the aspirant level.

The findings generated in Chapter 6.2 regarding the role of parties’ strategic considerations, party ideology, and intra-party aspects concerning the nomination of minority candidates are mixed. First, I found that immigrant-origin aspirants
are, compared to their non-immigrant-origin counterparts, less often nominated in winnable districts or on promising list positions. The differences, however, were small and could not be observed for the more narrow category of visible minorities. At the same time, what I could show was that aspiring candidates from both immigrant groups were only very seldom nominated in winnable (competitive or safe) electoral districts. In almost two-thirds of the cases they were nominated on promising list positions and running in hopeless districts. They also more often failed nomination in the district than on the party list (the differences, however, were not statistically significant). With regards to the link between ethnic composition of the constituency population (district and state) and chances of a winnable district candidature or promising list position, the findings suggest that this relationship exists only for visible minority aspirants at the district level (and neither for the broader category of aspirants with immigrant origins at the district level, nor for both immigrant groups in the case of promising party list positions). Drawing additionally on data that was gained through an online-survey among party members of the four parties under study who participated in the district and/or party list nominations for the 2013 elections, I could furthermore show that party selectors in particular of the Social and Christian Democrats appeared to be concerned about the electoral consequences of running with district candidates with a visible immigrant background. The differences between respondents who partook in a nomination that involved at least one visible minority aspirant (minority nomination) and those who participated in nominations without such an aspirant were rather small. Furthermore, I found some empirical evidence for lower nomination chances of visible minority aspirants in the case of, higher average concerns on the part of the selectors about potential negative electoral consequences of running with minority candidates. This link could be observed at the aggregated level regarding the nomination of the candidate, as well as at the individual level regarding the probability of the individual party selectors to support the respective candidate. In the case of the latter, the results remained stable, even after controlling for the nested structure of the data by running a binomial regression with cluster-robust standard errors as well as with Pairs clustered bootstrapped t-statistics.

Second, I empirically tested the assumption that the nomination of immigrant-origin aspirants depends on the ideological leaning of the party for which they were seeking to run. This link could be confirmed in the way that those aspirants were most numerous within left-wing parties and in particular the Greens – particularly among those candidates that were running a promising candidature, and also compared to those aspirants without immigrant origins. The Greens also nomi-
nated visible minority aspirants more often in districts with, on average, higher proportions of immigrant-origin populations. At the same time, the analyses concerning the nomination chances yielded inconclusive results, due in part to the low number of immigrant-origin (and in particular visible minority) aspirants in the case most notably of the Christian Democrats. When comparing left against right-wing parties as well as new vs. old left parties, the nomination chances for minority aspirants were not higher in the case of the parties ideologically more sympathetic towards immigrants (left-wing and new left). Furthermore, the analyses regarding the ethnic composition of the district population done separately for each party were, except for the Greens, inconclusive. A reason could be that aspirants already almost exclusively seek nomination within districts with higher than average immigrant-origin populations, so that the differences disappear regarding the nomination.

Finally, I further investigated several important features of the candidate selection process (type of selectorate, incumbency, dual candidacies, regional quotas) to detect whether they could be detrimental or beneficial for the nomination of immigrant-origin candidates, including those belonging to visible minorities. The findings showed that those nominations in which at least one minority aspirant seeks to run for office were more often membership assemblies or consultations than is the case for nominations involving no such aspirant. Separating between parties indicated that minority aspirants are confronted by different types of selectorates depending on the party for which they aim to run. I could not demonstrate any relationship, either positive or negative, between more exclusive selectorates (delegate conventions) and the nomination of minority aspirants, and this remained true for winnable districts. As well as the formal party selectors, I tested the impact of the influence of potential informal party selectors. Relying once again on the survey data, the findings showed in the case of the Social Democrats that the (perceived) higher importance of the regional (i.e. intra-state) level (executive board), the lower the chances for visible minority aspirants to be placed on a promising list position. At the same time, the higher the importance of the district level, the higher the chances for those aspirants to be nominated on a promising list position. For the remaining three parties, I did not find such a link. Regarding the district level, all correlations were far from being statistically significant, so we were unable observe a link between the importance of a certain type of informal selectorate and the nomination chances of visible minority aspirants. Additionally, the findings highlighted the importance of incumbency in general, especially in the case of the nomination of minority aspirants. Incumbents (in the district and on the party list) were almost always renominated – this holds particular true for the
two mainstream parties (SPD and CDU/CSU). For all parties, immigrant-origin and visible minority aspirants were to a much lower degree incumbents compared to their non-immigrant-origin counterparts. In the case of the Left party and the Christian Democrats, I could even find evidence for a negative relationship between the numerical importance of incumbents and the nomination of minority aspirants. Regarding the importance of district candidatures, I showed that promising list positions of all parties are almost exclusively occupied by district candidates. At the same time, immigrant-origin aspirants seeking nomination within the SPD or CDU/CSU more often failed nomination in the district than their non-immigrant-origin counterparts. Trying to get to the heart of the failed nomination of immigrant-origin as well as visible minority aspirants, the results based on the survey data showed that party selectors in particular questioned certain abilities (independent of their immigrant background) that they defined as important for district candidates. Finally, investigating deeper the immigrant-specific intra-party mechanism, the findings, first, showed that the importance of more general intra-party quotas and rules for party lists differed between parties. While gender quotas appeared to be important to all parties under study, regional quota, for instance, were considered to be less important in the case of the two smaller parties (Greens, Left party). Something like an immigrant rule was among the least important selection rules for all four parties under study. Finally, I could identify a link between the importance of regional quota for the party lists and the nomination chances of visible minority aspirants. In the case of the Social Democrats, this link was negative – meaning that the higher the importance of regions in the list composition, the lower the chances of visible minority aspirants to obtain a promising list position. The contrary could be observed for the case of the Greens.

The findings presented in this study suggest that, first, there are some features of candidate selection processes in Germany that appear to be disadvantageous for immigrant-origin aspirants. On the one side, explicitly because of their immigrant origin (fear of losing votes); on the other side, because of their status as (often) newcomers. High incumbency rates at the district level, as well as the importance of these district candidatures to obtain a promising list position, are important barriers for newcomer aspirants. Furthermore, the importance of regional belonging in the case of the two mainstream parties appear to be an obstacle for immigrant-origin aspirants. To sum up, the nomination of immigrant-origin aspirants, including those of visible minority belonging, depends neither exclusively on parties’ strategic considerations, nor solely on party ideology or party-internal aspects. Rather all three aspects together help to understand under
what circumstances minority aspirants are successful in the nomination process. Furthermore, the present findings strongly recommend to look more closely at the aspirant level and to understand why aspirants with immigrant origins decide (or not) to run for office.

Outlook: Candidate selection strategies in an increasingly diversified but also immigrant–hostile environment

The present study also revealed several ideas for further research. First, it became apparent that Turkish-origin citizens do well in the course of the candidate selection process. This can be attributed to their strong organization level, inside as well as outside of political parties. Intra-party organization can serve as "a springboard from which new groups can press particular claims for representation in party politics" (Kittilson 2011: 81). Further research should thus investigate deeper into the incorporation of aspiring candidates with immigrant origins within immigrant-specific but also within broader intra-party networks. There is already some research regarding women in the U.S. American context (see, e.g., Crowder-Meyer 2013; Kittilson 2011); this should be elaborated in more detail and for the immigrant-origin population in the European and particular German context.

Second, the study has shown that immigrant-origin citizens (including visible minorities) are weakly represented, in terms of numbers, at the aspirant level. It would thus be important to analyze what explains this low presence. Is it that they are already numerically underrepresented among party members, or are there further reasons that could explain why they do not more often come forward as aspirants? In the German context, there are already scholars who focus on socioeconomic profiles of party members (see, e.g., Klein 2011). However, there are no studies, to the authors’ knowledge, that deal explicitly with immigrant backgrounds among party members. Furthermore, it would be interesting to study the recruiting of immigrant-origin candidates in further detail, exploring how "[...] party leaders reach out to potential candidates and encourage them to seek office" (Broockman et al. 2014: 5). A few studies concerning female representation highlight that "[w]hat matters is the diversity of the pool of candidates in the initial stage – and who makes the first set of selections – rather than who gets to make final decisions on the composition of lists" (Fortin-Rittberger and Rittberger
I have to point to several limitations of the present study. First, the findings presented in this study are drawn from the experience of only a single country. However, countries differ strongly in both the impact of immigration on host societies (with regards to countries of origin, socio-economic profile of immigrants, geographical concentration) and in the ways in which parties select their candidates, including legal regulatory factors. When transferring the results to other countries, therefore, country-specific aspects have to be taken into account. Second, and this is perhaps the most important caveat, the present study deals with aspirants and candidates for legislative office. While the latter, at least in Germany, are easily identifiable through the official records of the Federal Returning Officer (Federal Returning Officer (FRO)), information about the former was collected via intensive media research and document analysis. Furthermore, aspirants were defined as those who sought nomination within an official nomination race. However, it could be that the number of those who consider running for office is higher than those who finally enter the official nomination race, because there are often a number of potential aspiring candidates who quit nomination races before they officially start (Reiser 2011: 525; Detterbeck 2016: 7). By adopting a quantitative approach that covers all 299 electoral districts as well as all 16 party lists, I was able to identify some of those potential aspirants, but certainly not all. Therefore I cannot ascertain whether or not people with immigrant origins were more numerous among such potential aspirants. In this context, Pippa Norris (2006: 93) highlights that "certain groups such as ethnic minorities [could be] discouraged by the formal or informal rules of the game and never even come forward to pursue elected office" (Norris 2006: 93). Third, and Chapter 4 already touched this question, the idea of conceiving the nomination of specific candidate types as an electoral strategy is problematic in the strongly party-centered German context. Although there are some arguments and empirical findings that support such a conclusion, a comparison with countries for which such nomination strategies could already be observed clearly points to the different contexts, including those relating to those countries’ immigrant-origin populations. For instance, Jonathan Laurence and Rahsaan Maxwell (2012: 29) argue, for the British context, that "[t]he combination of single-member district elections and relatively high levels of ethnic residential segregation [...] allow for unique immigrant leverage in the candidate selection process. Moreover, high turnout rates (and high residential segregation) among South Asians in Britain have made them especially attractive as candidates in local elections where victory can come down to a handful of votes". We could therefore ask whether the mixed findings concerning nomination
Conclusions

as an electoral strategy are at least partly due to different conditions. Finally, two points concerning the data as well as the used method have to be highlighted. In Chapter 5, I already identified the problem of the low number of observations, regarding in particular the aspirant data, but also with regards to the selector survey data. The former is due to the low number of immigrant-origin and visible minority aspirants in politics. The latter is related to the quality of the data (low and unequal response rates in some states and electoral districts). In both cases, the robustness of the findings is in some cases uncertain and generalizations of the findings not possible. The present study has thus to be seen as a first attempt to investigate deeper into candidate selection and the political representation of the immigrant-origin population.

The present study was conducted for the 2013 legislative elections in Germany. Since then not only has the share of the immigrant-origin population in Germany increased (22.5 percent compared to 19.1 percent in 2012 see Statistisches Bundesamt [n.d.]), but the political discourse regarding immigration and immigrants has also dramatically changed. Not least, the entry of the far-right AfD in the German Bundestag and in almost all state parliaments can be seen as a striking sign of a changed political climate. At the same time, a growing immigrant-origin electorate, in part a consequence of the possibility of dual citizenship since 2014, seems likely to claim more presence within politics in general, and legislative bodies in particular. Existing research indicates that a majority of citizens with immigrant origins support the idea of a stronger minority representation (see, e.g., Saggar [2000]: 213). There is also empirical evidence from other countries that immigrant-origin voters could turn towards specifically immigrant-oriented parties, as for instance in the case of local elections in the Netherlands. In this context, Claudia Diehl and Michael Blohm [2001]: 415) also have found that a considerable number of Turkish respondents in their survey would be willing to support an immigrant-specific party. Although the emergence of a (successful) immigrant party at the national level in Germany seems unlikely, it is, a possible scenario at the local level. It will be interesting in the future to see how the main German parties, especially the two mainstream parties, deal with an electorate which is rapidly diversifying and at the same time increasingly skeptical for immigration.
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Appendix

A: Selector survey questionnaire

Herzlich willkommen zur Umfrage "Selektoren Survey zur Bundestagswahl 2013"!


S1: Bitte geben Sie Ihr Geschlecht an

1) weiblich
2) männlich

S2: In welchem Jahr sind Sie geboren? (Offene Frage)

S3: Sind Sie in Deutschland geboren? (Offene Frage)

1) Ja
2) Nein
APPENDIX

S3a: [Falls nicht in D geboren] In welchem Land Sie sind geboren? (Offene Frage)

S3b: [Falls nicht in D geboren] Seit wann leben Sie in Deutschland? (Bitte geben Sie eine ungefahre Jahreszahl an)

S4: Ist Ihre Mutter in Deutschland geboren?

1) Ja
2) Nein

S4a: [Falls Mutter nicht in D geboren] In welchem Land ist Ihre Mutter geboren? (Offene Frage)

S5: Ist Ihr Vater in Deutschland geboren?

1) Ja
2) Nein

S5a: [Falls Vater nicht in D geboren] In welchem Land ist Ihr Vater geboren? (Offene Frage)

S6: Hatten Sie bei Ihrer Geburt eine andere als die deutsche Staatsbürgerschaft?

1) ja, bitte angeben, welche: (offene Frage)
2) nein

S6a: [Falls keine dt. Staatsbürgerschaft seit Geburt] Seit wann haben Sie die deutsche Staatsbürgerschaft? Bitte geben Sie eine ungefahre Jahreszahl an. (Offene Frage)

Nun wurde ich Ihnen gerne einige Fragen zu Ihrer Funktion innerhalb Ihrer Partei sowie der Teilnahme an der Aufstellung der Landesliste in Ihrem Bundesland und/oder der Teilnahme an der Aufstellung von WahlkreiskandidatenInnen für die Bundestagswahl 2013 stellen. Ich bitte Sie, keine der folgenden Fragen auszulassen, da die Beantwortung der Fragen notwendig für die weiteren Verlauf der Umfrage ist. Vielen Dank!

Q1: Sind Sie Mitglied von [Name Partei]?

1) Ja
2) Nein

Q2: Und in welchem Jahr sind Sie [Name Partei] beigetreten? Wenn Sie es nicht mehr ganz genau wissen, schätzen Sie bitte (vierstellige Jahreszahl)

Q3: Waren Sie als stimmberechtigtes Mitglied oder Delegierte(r) an der Aufstellung der Landesliste für die Bundestagswahl 2013 Ihrer Partei beteiligt?
APPENDIX

1) Ja
2) Nein

Q4: [Falls Teilnahme Listenaufstellung] In welchem Bundesland waren Sie bei der Aufstellung der Landesliste für die Bundestagswahl 2013 beteiligt?

1) SchleswigHolstein
2) MecklenburgVorpommern
3) Hamburg
4) Niedersachsen
5) Bremen
6) Brandenburg
7) SachsenAnhalt
8) Berlin
9) NordrheinWestfalen
10) Sachsen
11) Hessen
12) Thuringen
13) RheinlandPfalz
14) Bayern
15) BadenWürttemberg
16) Saarland

Q5: [Falls Teilnahme Listenaufstellung] Nun ist Ihre Ansicht gefragt, für Sie ganz persönlich, welche Kriterien, waren Ihnen bei der Aufstellung der Landesliste für die Bundestagswahl 2013 wichtig?
Bitte geben Sie für jedes der folgenden Kriterien an, ob dieses sehr wichtig, wichtig, weniger wichtig oder unwichtig war

A) das Abschneiden der KandidatInnen bei vorangegangenen Wahlen (Erststimmen)
B) die Erfahrung der KandidatInnen als Bundestagsabgeordnete
C) die Fachkompetenz der KandidatInnen
D) die Rolle und Funktionen der KandidatInnen innerhalb der Partei
E) die lokale Popularität und Verbundenheit der KandidatInnen
F) die Tätigkeit der KandidatInnen in lokalen Vereinen
G) das kommunale Engagement der KandidatInnen
H) die personliche Sympathie der KandidatInnen
I) die regionale Herkunft der KandidatInnen
J) das Alter der KandidatInnen
K) das Geschlecht der KandidatInnen
L) der Migrationshintergrund der KandidatInnen
M) die Konfessionszugehörigkeit der KandidatInnen
N) die Berufsgruppenzugehörigkeit der KandidatInnen
O) Proporzüberlegungen, bitte geben Sie an, welche:
P) Anziehungskraft der KandidatInnen auf neue Wählerschichte, bitte geben Sie an, welche:
Q) die Gruppenzugehörigkeit der KandidatInnen, bitte angeben, welche:
R) sonstige, bitte geben Sie an, welche:

Q6: [Falls Teilnahme Listenaufstellung] Und wenn Sie nun an die Wahlverbraucher Ihrer Partei in Ihrem Bundesland denken: Wie wichtig sind diesen Ihrer Meinung nach, die folgenden Kriterien bei der Aufstellung von Landeslisten für Bundestagswahlen?

A) das Abschneiden der KandidatInnen bei vorangegangenen Wahlen (Erststimmen)
B) die Erfahrung der KandidatInnen als Bundestagsabgeordnete
C) die Fachkompetenz der KandidatInnen
D) die Rolle und Funktionen der KandidatInnen innerhalb der Partei
E) die lokale Popularität und Verbundenheit der KandidatInnen
F) die Tätigkeit der KandidatInnen in lokalen Vereinen
G) das kommunale Engagement der KandidatInnen
H) die persönliche Sympathie der KandidatInnen
I) die regionale Herkunft der KandidatInnen
J) das Alter der KandidatInnen
K) das Geschlecht der KandidatInnen
L) der Migrationshintergrund der KandidatInnen
M) die Konfessionszugehörigkeit der KandidatInnen
N) die Berufsgruppenzugehörigkeit der KandidatInnen
O) Proporzüberlegungen, bitte geben Sie an, welche:
P) Anziehungskraft der KandidatInnen auf neue Wählerschichten, bitte geben Sie an, welche:
Q) die Gruppenzugehörigkeit der KandidatInnen, bitte angeben, welche:
R) sonstige, bitte geben Sie an, welche:

Q7: [ALLE] Waren Sie als stimmberechtigtes Mitglied oder Delegierte(r) bei der Aufstellung des Direktkandidaten/in in Ihrem Wahlkreis stimmberechtigt und beteiligt?

1) Ja
2) Nein

Q8: [Falls Teilnahme Wahlkreisnominierung] In welchem Bundestagswahlkreis waren Sie an der Aufstellung des Direktkandidaten/der Direktkandidatin für die Bundestagswahl 2013 beteiligt?

Q9: [Falls Teilnahme Wahlkreisnominierung] Was meinen Sie, ganz allgemein gedacht, für Ihre Partei in Ihrem Wahlkreis, würden bestimmte Direktkandidatentypen viele Erststimmen dazugewinnen, einige Erststimmen dazugewinnen,
keinen Unterschied machen, zu einigen Stimmverlusten oder zu dem Verlust vieler Erststimmen führen?
Bitte geben Sie Ihre Bewertung für jeden der folgenden Kandidatentypen ab:

A) mannlich
B) weiblich
C) mit erkennbarem Migrationshintergrund
D) ohne erkennbarem Migrationshintergrund
E) junger
F) alter

Q10: [ALLE] Haben Sie zum Zeitpunkt der Kandidatenaufstellung zur Bundestagswahl 2013 eine oder mehrere der folgenden Funktionen innerhalb Ihrer Partei ausgeübt? (Falls ja, bitte Zutreffendes ankreuzen (Mehrfachnennung möglich)

1) nein, ich hatte zum Zeitpunkt der Kandidatenaufstellung zur Bundestagswahl 2013 kein Parteiamt inne

Bundespartei
2) Vorsitzende(r) des Bundesvorstandes
3) Stellvertretende(r) Vorsitzende(r) des Bundesvorstandes
4) Generalsekretar(in)/Geschäftsführer des Bundesvorstandes
5) andere, bitte nennen

Landespartei
6) Vorsitzende(r) des Landesverbandes
7) Stellvertretende(r) Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes
8) Geschäftsführer(in) des Landesverbandes
9) andere, bitte nennen:

Bezirksverband
10) Bezirksverbandsvorsitzende(r)
11) Stellvertretende(r) Bezirksverbandsvorsitzende(r)
12) Geschäftsführer(in) des Bezirksverbandes
13) andere, bitte nennen

Kreisverband
14) Kreisverbandsvorsitzende(r)
15) stellvertretende(r) Kreisverbandsvorsitzende(r)
16) Kreisgeschäftsführer(in)
17) andere, bitte nennen:

Ortsverein/-verband
18) Ortsverbands/Ortsvereinsvorsitzende(r)
19) stellvertretende(r) Ortsverbands-/Ortsvereinsvorsitzende(r)
20) Geschäftsführer(in) des Ortsverbands, -vereins
21) andere, bitte nennen:

Q11: [ALLE] Waren Sie selber Kandidat/Kandidatin bei der Bundestagswahl 2013?
Q12: Wurde im Vorfeld der Abstimmung über die Belegung der einzelnen Listenplätze durch die stimmberechtigten Delegierten/Mitglieder ein Vorschlag über die Reihung der Landesliste durch den Landesvorstand eingebracht?

1) ja
2) nein

Q13: Und nun, was meinen Sie, welche Kriterien waren in Ihrer Partei in Ihrem Landesverband bei der Aufstellung der Landesliste für Bundestagswahlen 2013 von Relevanz?

Bitte geben Sie für jedes der folgenden Kriterien an, ob dieses sehr wichtig, wichtig, weniger wichtig oder unwichtig war

A) das Abschneiden der KandidatInnen bei vorangegangenen Wahlen (Erststimmen)
B) die Erfahrung der KandidatInnen als Bundestagsabgeordnete
C) die Fachkompetenz der KandidatInnen
die Rolle und Funktionen der KandidatInnen innerhalb der Partei
E) die lokale Popularität und Verbundenheit der KandidatInnen
F) die Tätigkeit der KandidatInnen in lokalen Vereinen
G) das kommunale Engagement der KandidatInnen
H) die personliche Sympathie der KandidatInnen
I) die regionale Herkunft der KandidatInnen
J) das Alter der KandidatInnen
K) das Geschlecht der KandidatInnen
L) der Migrationshintergrund der KandidatInnen
M) die Konfessionszugehörigkeit der KandidatInnen
N) die Berufsgruppenzugehörigkeit der KandidatInnen
O) Proporzüberlegungen, bitte geben Sie an, welche:
P) Anziehungskraft der KandidatInnen auf neue Wählerschichten, bitte geben Sie an, welche:
Q) die Gruppenzugehörigkeit der KandidatInnen, bitte angeben, welche:
R) sonstige, bitte geben Sie an, welche:

Q14: Gab es bei der Listenaufstellung Ihrer Partei in [Bundesland] Gegenkandidaturen bei der Belegung der Listenplätze?
Unter Gegenkandidatur wird hier verstanden, dass es mindestens bei einem Platz mehr als eine(n) Bewerber(in) gab

1) Ja
2) Nein

Q15: Wenn Sie an die Belegung der Listenplätze denken, welches der folgenden Kriterien war, Ihrer Meinung nach, am wichtigsten, am zweitwichtigsten, [...] und am unwichtigsten bei der Listenaufstellung?

_Ein Markieren aller 9 Sterne bedeutet, dass dieses Kriterium am wichtigsten war, das Markieren eines Sternes, dass dieses Kriterium am unwichtigsten war. Mit den Sternen dazwischen können Sie Abstufungen vornehmen. Das Verteilen der gleichen Anzahl an Sterne für unterschiedliche Punkte ist möglich._

1. Absicherung der DirektkandidatInnen
2. Regionalproporz
3. Berücksichtigung von 'Neulingen'
4. Berücksichtigung der parteiinternen Strömungen/Flügel
5. Absicherung der aktuellen Bundestagsabgeordneten
6. angemessenen Berücksichtigung von Frauen
7. der Migrationsghintergrund der KandidatInnen
8. anderes Kriterium, bitte angeben welches:
9. anderes Kriterium, bitte angeben welches:

Q16: Was würden Sie sagen, wie viel Einfluss hatten die folgenden Personen/Personengruppen bei der endgültigen Aufstellung der Landesliste Ihrer Partei? _Bitte geben Sie für jede Kategorie an, ob diese sehr viel, viel, wenig oder gar keinen Einfluss hatte_

A) Delegierte bzw. Mitglieder der Landesdelegierten /Landesmitgliederkonferenz
B) das Abschneiden der KandidatInnen bei vorangegangenen Wahlen (Erststimmen)
C) Bundesvorstand
D) Landesvorstand
E) Bezirks bzw. Regionalverbandsvorstände
F) Kreisverbände
G) andere Personen/Personengruppen, bitte angeben, welche:

Q17: _Falls Delegierte/Mitglieder wenig bzw. gar keinen Einfluss/ Und was waren, Ihrer Meinung zufolge, die Gründe dafür, dass die Delegierten/Mitglieder wenig oder gar keinen Einfluss auf die letztendliche Reihung der Landesliste hatten? (Mehrfachnennungen möglich)_

1) über die Reihung der Liste wurde bereits auf Regionalkonferenzen im Vorfeld der Landesdelegierten(mitglieder)konferenz entschieden
2) eine Findungskommission hat bereits im Vorfeld über die Reihung entschieden
3) andere Gründe, bitte angeben, welche:

Q18: Welche der folgenden Personen(gruppen) bzw. Institutionen hatte einen Einfluss auf Ihr eigenes Abstimmungsverhalten bei der Belegung der einzelnen Listenplätze? (Mehrfachnennungen möglich)

1) ich habe mich an die Empfehlungen meines Kreisverbandes gehalten
2) ich habe mich an die Vorschläge des Landesvorstandes gehalten
3) ich habe mich an die Empfehlungen bestimmter innerparteilicher Gruppierungen gehalten, bitte angeben, welche:
4) sonstige, bitte geben Sie an, welche:
5) andere Personen(gruppen) bzw. Institutionen hatten einen Einfluss auf mein Abstimmungsverhalten, bitte angeben, welche:
6) ich habe mich an keine Empfehlungen/Vorschläge gehalten

Q19: Wann ist bei Listenplätzen, auf die nur ein/e Anwärter/in kandidiert hat, Ihr Entschluss für oder gegen diesen Anwärter/in zu stimmen, gefallen?

1) Jedes Mal bereits im Vorfeld der Delegiertenkonferenz/Mitgliederversammlung zur Aufstellung der Landesliste
2) Jedes Mal während der Delegiertenkonferenz/Mitgliederversammlung zur Aufstellung der Landesliste
3) Teils bereits im Vorfeld/teils während der Delegiertenkonferenz/Mitgliederversammlung zur Aufstellung der Landesliste

Q20: Und wie war das bei Listenplätzen, auf die mehrere Anwärter/innen kandidiert haben? Wann ist hier Ihr Entschluss für oder gegen denjenigen/diejenige Anwärter/in zu stimmen, gefallen?

1) Jedes Mal bereits im Vorfeld der Delegiertenkonferenz/Mitgliederversammlung zur Aufstellung der Landesliste
2) Jedes Mal während der Delegiertenkonferenz/Mitgliederversammlung zur Aufstellung der Landesliste
3) Teils bereits im Vorfeld/teils während der Delegiertenkonferenz/Mitgliederversammlung zur Aufstellung der Landesliste


Q21: Wenn Sie an die WählerInnen Ihrer Partei in Ihrem Wahlkreis denken, wie wichtig sind diesen, Ihrer Meinung nach, die folgenden Kriterien bei der Aufstellung von WahlkreiskandidatInnen? Bitte geben Sie für jedes der folgenden Kriterien an, ob Sie der Meinung sind, dass diese dies als sehr wichtig, wichtig, weniger wichtig oder unwichtig erachten
A) das Abschneiden der KandidatInnen bei vorangegangenen Wahlen (Erststimmen) empfohlen
B) die Erfahrung der KandidatInnen als Bundestagsabgeordnete
C) die Fachkompetenz der KandidatInnen
D) die Rolle und Funktionen der KandidatInnen innerhalb der Partei
E) die lokale Popularität und Verbundenheit der KandidatInnen
F) die Tätigkeit der KandidatInnen in lokalen Vereinen
G) das kommunale Engagement der KandidatInnen
H) die personliche Sympathie der KandidatInnen
I) das Alter der KandidatInnen
J) das Geschlecht der KandidatInnen
K) der Migrationshintergrund der KandidatInnen
L) die Konfessionszugehörigkeit der KandidatInnen
M) die Berufsgruppenzugehörigkeit der KandidatInnen
N) Anziehungskraft der KandidatInnen auf neue Wahlerschichten, bitte geben Sie an, welche:
O) die Gruppenzugehörigkeit der KandidatInnen, bitte angeben, welche:
P) sozialstrukturelle Merkmale des Wahlkreises, bitte angeben, welche:
Q) sonstige, bitte geben Sie an, welche:

Q22: Wann fand, Ihrer Meinung nach, die Entscheidung für oder gegen den/die letztendlich nominierte/n KandidatIn in Ihrem Wahlkreis zur Bundestagswahl 2013 statt?

1) bereits im Vorfeld der offiziellen Nominierungsveranstaltung
2) während der offiziellen Nominierungsveranstaltung

Q23: Wie viel Einfluss hatten, Ihrer Meinung nach, die folgenden Personen/Personen- 
gruppen bei der Nominierung des/der Wahlkreiskandidaten/in in Ihrem Wahlkreis [Wahlkreis]?
Bitte geben Sie für jede Kategorie an, ob diese Ihrer Meinung nach sehr viel, viel, wenig oder gar keinen Einfluss auf die Nominierung im Wahlkreis hatte

A) Delegierte bzw. Mitglieder der Nominierungskonferenz
B) Bundesvorstand
C) Landesvorstand
D) Bezirks/Regionalverband
E) Kreisvorstand
F) der/die frühere Direktkandidat/in im Wahlkreis
G) andere Personen/Personengruppen, bitte angeben, welche:

Q24: [Falls Delegierte/Mitglieder wenig bzw. gar keinen Einfluss] Und was waren, Ihrer Meinung zufolge, die Gründe dafür, dass die Delegierten/Mitglieder wenig oder gar keinen Einfluss auf die Nominierung des/der DirektkandidatenIn hatten? Mehrfachnennungen möglich

1) der Kreisvorstand hatte sich bereits im Vorfeld der offiziellen Nominierungskon-
ferenz fur eine/n Kandidaten/in entschieden
2) die Entscheidung fur den/die nominierte/n Kandidaten/in fand bereits im Vorfeld in Form einer Mitgliederbefragung statt
3) andere, bitte nenne:

Q25: Wurde die Wahl eine/r der Anwärter/innen auf die Direktkandidatur bereits durch den Kreisvorstand im Vorfeld der offiziellen Nominierung empfohlen?

1) nein, die Wahl keines/r der Anwärter/innen wurde empfohlen
2) ja, die Wahl des/der letztendlich gewahlte/n Direktkandidat/in wurde
3) ja, die Wahl eines/r der unterlegenen Anwärter/innen wurde empfohlen
4) ja, die Wahl zweier Anwärter/innen wurde empfohlen (Wahlkreis umfasst zwei Kreisverbände)

Q26: Konnen Sie mir sagen, fur welchen der folgenden AnwärterInnen Sie bei der Nominierung des Wahlkreiskandidaten in Ihrem Wahlkreis gestimmt haben?

1) Name Bewerber/-in
2) Name Bewerber/-in
3) ich habe mich enthalten
4) ich habe eine ungültige Stimme abgegeben
5) weiß nicht

Q27: Welche Kriterien waren wichtig fur Ihre Entscheidung FÜR [Name Bewerber/in] zu stimmen?

A) sein/ihr Abschneiden bei vorangegangenen Wahlen (Erststimmen)
B) seine/ihre Erfahrung als Bundestagsabgeordnete(r)
C) seine/ihre Fachkompetenz
D) seine/ihre Rolle und Funktionen innerhalb der Partei
E) seine/ihre lokale Popularität und Verbundenheit
F) seine/ihre Tätigkeit in lokalen Vereinen
G) sein/ihr kommunales Engagement
H) seine/ihre persönliche Sympathie
I) sein/ihr Alter
J) sein/ihr Geschlecht
K) sein/ihr Migrationshintergrund
L) seine/ihre Konfessionszugehörigkeit
M) seine/ihre Berufsgruppenzugehörigkeit
N) seine/ihre Anziehungskraft auf neue Wählerschichten, bitte geben Sie an, welche:
O) seine/ihre Gruppenzugehörigkeit, bitte angeben, welche:
P) sozialstrukturelle Merkmale des Wahlkreises, bitte angeben, welche:
Q) sonstige, bitte geben Sie an, welche:

jedes der folgenden Kriterien an, ob dieses sehr wichtig, wichtig, weniger wichtig oder unwichtig war.

A) sein/ihr Abschneiden bei vorangegangenen Wahlen (Erststimmen)
B) seine/ihre Erfahrung als Bundestagsabgeordnete(r)
C) seine/ihre Fachkompetenz
D) seine/ihre Rolle und Funktionen innerhalb der Partei
E) seine/ihre lokale Popularität und Verbundenheit
F) seine/ihre Tätigkeit in lokalen Vereinen
G) sein/ihr kommunales Engagement
H) seine/ihre persönliche Sympathie
I) sein/ihr Alter
J) sein/ihr Geschlecht
K) sein/ihr Migrationshintergrund
L) seine/ihre Konfessionszugehörigkeit
M) seine/ihre Berufsgruppenzugehörigkeit
N) seine/ihre Anziehungskraft auf neue Wählerschichten, bitte geben Sie an, welche:
O) seine/ihre Gruppenzugehörigkeit, bitte angeben, welche:
P) sozialstrukturelle Merkmale des Wahlkreises, bitte angeben, welche:
Q) sonstige, bitte geben Sie an, welche:

[ALLE] Vielen Dank, dass Sie diese Fragen zu Ihrem Abstimmungsverhalten beantwortet haben! Nun würde ich Ihnen gerne noch abschließend ein paar allgemeinere Fragen stellen.

S7: In der Politik spricht man manchmal von 'links' und 'rechts'. Wo auf der Skala würden Sie sich selbst einstufen, wenn 0 für links steht und 10 für rechts?

S8: Unabhängig davon, ob Sie Mitglied oder Angehöriger einer Kirche oder Religionsgemeinschaft sind, fühlen Sie sich einer bestimmten Religion oder Konfession zugehörig?

1) Ja
2) Nein
3) Weiß nicht

S9: Welche Religion oder Konfession ist das? (Nur eine Nennung möglich)

1) RömischKatholisch
2) Evangelisch/Protestantisch (ohne Freikirchen)
3) Östlichorthodox
4) Andere christliche Konfession, bitte eintragen:
5) Jüdisch
6) Moslemisch/Islam
7) Ostliche Religionsgemeinschaft (Buddhismus, Hinduismus, Sikh, Shinto, Tao)
APPENDIX

8) Andere, nichtchristliche Religionsgemeinschaft, (bitte eintragen):
9) Weiß nicht

S10: Als wie religiös würden Sie sich auf einer Skala von 0 überhaupt nicht religiös bis 10 sehr religiös beschreiben?

S11: Hatten Sie zum Zeitpunkt der Aufstellungskonferenz für die Bundestagswahl eines 15 der folgenden politischen Mandate inne?

1) Mitglied des Deutschen Bundestages
2) Mitglied des Landtages
3) Mitglied des Europaparlaments
4) Mitglied im Gemeinderat
5) andere, bitte angeben:

S12: Sind Sie Mitglied in einer der folgenden (Arbeitsgemeinschaften o. Arbeitskreise/Vereinigungen u. Sonderorganisationen/Organisationen o. Arbeitsgemeinschaften)? (Mehrfachnennungen möglich) [Je nach Partei verschiedene AGs/AKs etc. zur Auswahl sowie offene Kategorie]

S13: Sind Sie aktives Mitglied in einer der oben genannten Vereinigungen?

1) ja, bitte geben Sie an, in welcher:
2) nein

S14: Bitte ordnen Sie Ihre jetzige/letzte berufliche Stellung anhand dieser Liste ein

1) Selbständiger Landwirt, Genossenschaftsbauer
2) Akademischer freier Beruf
3) Selbständiger in Handel, Gewerbe, Industrie, Dienstleistung u.a.
4) Beamter, einfacher Dienst (bis einschl. Oberamtsmeister)
5) Beamter, mittlerer Dienst (Assistent bis einschl. Hauptsekretär/Amtsinspektor)
6) Beamter, gehobener Dienst (Inspektor bis einschl. Oberamtsmann/Oberamtsrat)
7) Beamter, höherer Dienst, Richter (vom Regierungsrat aufwärts)
8) Angestellter, einfache Tätigkeit (z.B. Verkäufer, Kontorist, Stenotypistin)
9) Angestellte, die schwierige Aufgaben nach allgemeiner Anweisung selbständig erledigen (z.B. Sachbearbeiter, Buchhalter, technischer Zeichner)
10) Angestellte, die selbständige Leistungen in verantwortungsvoller Tätigkeit erbringen (z.B. selbständige Mitarbeiter, Prokurist, Abteilungsleiter)
11) Angestellter mit umfassenden Führungsaufgaben und Entscheidungsbefugnissen (z.B. Direktor, Geschäftsführer, Vorstand größere Betriebe und Verbände)
12) Arbeiter, unangelernt
13) Arbeiter, angelernt
14) Vorarbeiter, Kolonnenführer, Brigadier, Industrie- und Werksmeister im Angestelltenverhältnis, Meister, Poliere

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15) Facharbeiter und gelernter Arbeiter
16) Lehrling
17) Praktikant, Volontär
18) Noch im Studium
19) Mithelfender Familienangehöriger
20) Sonstiges, bitte angeben:

S15: Welchen allgemein bildenden Schul oder Studienabschluss haben Sie? (Nur eine Nennung möglich, nur höchster Schulabschluss)

1) Bin noch Schüler(in)
2) Schule beendet ohne Abschluss
6) Abgeschlossenes Studium an Hoch- oder Fachhochschule, Universität

*Vielen herzlichen Dank, dass Sie an dieser Umfrage teilgenommen haben. Falls Sie Fragen, Anregungen haben oder an den Ergebnissen interessiert sind, können Sie mich gerne kontaktieren unter elisa.deissheilig@sowi.unistuttgart.de*
## B: Survey population (Selector Survey)

**Table B1: Respondents in district minority nominations (SPD & CDU)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral districts</th>
<th>SPD</th>
<th>CDU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>185</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>186</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>206</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>251</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>267</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>273</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Selector survey 2015, own elaboration.

Notes: Entries are number of survey respondents in electoral districts qualified as minority district nominations. Numbering of the electoral districts based on Bundeswahlleiter [n.d.[a]].

**Table B2: Respondents in district minority nominations (Greens)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral districts</th>
<th>Greens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>133</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>183</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>184</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>187</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>255</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>258</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>272</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>279</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>287</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>293</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Selector survey 2015, own elaboration.

Notes: Entries are number of survey respondents in electoral districts qualified as minority district nominations. Numbering of the electoral districts based on Bundeswahlleiter [n.d.[a]].
### Table B3: Respondents in party list minority nominations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SPD</th>
<th>CDU</th>
<th>Greens</th>
<th>Left party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schleswig-Holstein</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamburg</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Saxony</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>m.d.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bremen</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saxony-Anhalt</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>m.d.</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Rhine-Westphalia</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>m.d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hesse</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
<td>106</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhineland-Palatinate</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>m.d.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bavaria</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>124</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baden-Württemberg</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>m.d.</td>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>155</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Selector survey 2015, own elaboration.

Notes: Entries are number of survey respondents per party in states with party list nominations qualified as minority list nominations. No entry means that there was no minority list nomination for the respective party in this state; m.d. indicates that there is no data available although the party list nomination in this state was qualified as minority list nomination.

### Table B4: Respondents selector survey: sociodemographic statistics - age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SPD</th>
<th>CDU</th>
<th>Greens</th>
<th>Left party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>younger than 35</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-49</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-64</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65-79</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 79</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>226</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Selector survey 2015, own elaboration.

Notes: Entries are respondents in age groups (percentages and absolute numbers).

### Table B5: Respondents selector survey: sociodemographic statistics - gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SPD</th>
<th>CDU</th>
<th>Greens</th>
<th>Left party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>men</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>women</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>224</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Selector survey 2015, own elaboration.

Notes: Entries are respondents according to gender (percentages and absolute numbers).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>SPD n</th>
<th>SPD %</th>
<th>CDU n</th>
<th>CDU %</th>
<th>Greens n</th>
<th>Greens %</th>
<th>Left party n</th>
<th>Left party %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schleswig-Holstein</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mecklenburg-Vorpommern</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamburg</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Saxony</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bremen</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brandenburg</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saxony-Anhalt</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Rhine-Westphalia</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saxony</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hesse</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thuringia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhineland-Palatinate</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bavaria</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baden-Württemberg</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saarland</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>225</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Selector survey 2015, own elaboration.*

*Notes: Entries are number of survey respondents per party and state.*
C: Additional tables and graphs

**Table C1: Ethnic composition of immigrant-origin population - German länder**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immigrant-origin population</th>
<th>Turkish origin</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in 1.000</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>in 1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schleswig-Holstein</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mecklenburg-Vorpommern</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamburg</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Saxony</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bremen</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brandenburg</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saxony-Anhalt</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Rhine-Westphalia</td>
<td>905</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3.224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saxony</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hesse</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1.296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thuringia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhineland-Palatinate</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bavaria</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baden-Württemberg</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2.279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saarland</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2.671</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12.665</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Mikrozensus 2012 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2017c: 128 sqq.); own calculations.*

**Table C2: Chances of winnable district candidature by composition of district population (binomial regression)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immigrant-origin asp.</th>
<th>B (SE)</th>
<th>90% CI for odds ratio</th>
<th>Visible minority asp.</th>
<th>B (SE)</th>
<th>90% CI for odds ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% imm. pop. in district</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.96-1.06</td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.84</td>
<td>-3.94--1.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.15)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Aspirant data 2012-2013, own calculations.*

*Notes: Immigrant-origin asp.: R² = .01 (Hosmer-Lemeshow), .01 (Cox-Snell), .01 (Nagelkerke). Model chi² (1) = 0.48 (p = .49); Visible minority asp.: R² = .07 (Hosmer-Lemeshow), .05 (Cox-Snell), .10 (Nagelkerke). Model chi² (1) = 3.34 (p < .10); * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.*
Table C3: Chances of promising list position by composition of state population (binomial regression)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Immigrant-origin asp.</th>
<th></th>
<th>Visible minority asp.</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B (SE)</td>
<td>90% CI for odds ratio</td>
<td>B (SE)</td>
<td>90% CI for odds ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower OR Upper</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lower OR Upper</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% imm. pop. in district</td>
<td>0.03 0.05</td>
<td>0.96 1.03</td>
<td>0.01 0.08</td>
<td>1.03 1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.59 (-1.02)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>85 64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Aspirant data 2012-2013, own calculations.
Notes: Immigrant-origin asp.: $R^2=.01$ (Hosmer-Lemeshow), .01 (Cox-Snell), .01 (Nagelkerke). Model $\chi^2 (1)=0.47 (p=.49)$; Visible minority asp.: $R^2=.00$ (Hosmer-Lemeshow), .00 (Cox-Snell), .00 (Nagelkerke). Model $\chi^2 (1)=0.02 (p=.89)$; * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

Table C4: Anticipated vote gains and losses of district candidates with visible immigrant origins - Minority vs. non-minority nominations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-minority nominations</th>
<th></th>
<th>Minority nominations</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SPD Greens CDU</td>
<td></td>
<td>SPD Greens CDU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n %</td>
<td>n %</td>
<td>n %</td>
<td>n %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gain votes</td>
<td>16 21 47 28 9 13</td>
<td>25 26 19 39 4 18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No difference</td>
<td>24 32 92 55 26 38</td>
<td>37 39 21 43 6 27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lose votes</td>
<td>36 47 28 17 33 49</td>
<td>34 35 9 18 12 55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>76 100 167 100 68 100</td>
<td>96 100 49 100 22 100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Selector Survey, 2015, own calculations. n=311 (Non-minority nominations), n=167 (Minority nominations).
Notes: Item wording see Chapter 5.3.2. "Gain votes" and "lose votes" are an aggregation of "gain many" and "gain some votes", "Lose votes" of "lose some" and "lose many votes".

Table C5: Voting probability for visible minority aspirants (binomial regression)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B (SE)</th>
<th>90% CI for odds ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>90% CI for odds ratio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote losses</td>
<td>-0.45** (0.19)</td>
<td>0.46 0.64 0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.53 (0.60)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>137</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Selector Survey 2015, own calculations.
Notes: $R^2=.03$ (Hosmer-Lemeshow), .04 (Cox-Snell), .06 (Nagelkerke). Model $\chi^2 (1)=6.20 (p<.05)$; * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. 268
### Table C6: Nomination chances according to left vs. right-wing party (binomial regression)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immigrant origin</th>
<th>B (SE)</th>
<th>90% CI for odds ratio</th>
<th>Visible minority</th>
<th>B (SE)</th>
<th>90% CI for odds ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>OR</td>
<td>Upper</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>OR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
<td>(0.74)</td>
<td>0.18 0.70 2.32</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>(0.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
<td>(0.74)</td>
<td>0.18 0.69 2.21</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>(0.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left party</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>(0.90)</td>
<td>0.63 2.89 13.35</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>(1.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>(0.67)</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N: 118 84

Source: Aspirant data 2012-2013, own calculations.

Notes: Immigrant-origin: $R^2 = .04$ (Hosmer-Lemeshow), .05 (Cox-Snell), .07 (Nagelkerke). Model chi² (1)=6.05 (p=.11); Visible minority: $R^2 = .02$ (Hosmer-Lemeshow), .03 (Cox-Snell), .04 (Nagelkerke). Model chi² (1)=3.0 (p=.55); * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. CDU/CSU is baseline category.

### Table C7: Chances of promising candidature according to left vs. right-wing party (binomial regression)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immigrant origin</th>
<th>B (SE)</th>
<th>90% CI for odds ratio</th>
<th>Visible minority</th>
<th>B (SE)</th>
<th>90% CI for odds ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>OR</td>
<td>Upper</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>OR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>(0.69)</td>
<td>0.21 0.70 2.14</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>(0.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>-0.99</td>
<td>(0.70)</td>
<td>0.12 0.37 1.19</td>
<td>-0.90</td>
<td>(0.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left party</td>
<td>-1.01</td>
<td>(0.74)</td>
<td>0.11 0.37 1.25</td>
<td>-0.94</td>
<td>(0.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
<td>(0.59)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>(0.76)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N: 118 84

Source: Aspirant data 2012-2013, own calculations.

Notes: Model 1: $R^2 = .02$ (Hosmer-Lemeshow), .03 (Cox-Snell), .04 (Nagelkerke). Model chi² (1)=3.11 (p=.38); Model 2: $R^2 = .02$ (Hosmer-Lemeshow), .03 (Cox-Snell), .04 (Nagelkerke). Model chi² (1)=2.10 (p=.55); * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. CDU/CSU is baseline category.
Table C8: Nomination chances according to new vs. old left party (binomial regression)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immigrant origin</th>
<th>Visible minority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B (SE)</td>
<td>90% CI for odds ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower OR Upper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left party</td>
<td>1.42** (0.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.74** (0.37)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 106 77

Source: Aspirant data 2012-2013, own calculations.
Notes: Model 1: $R^2 = .05$ (Hosmer-Lemeshow), .06 (Cox-Snell), .08 (Nagelkerke). Model $\chi^2 (1)=6.04$ (p<.05); Model 2: $R^2 = .02$ (Hosmer-Lemeshow), .03 (Cox-Snell), .04 (Nagelkerke). Model $\chi^2 (1)=2.01$ (p=.37); * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. SPD is baseline category.

Table C9: Chances of promising candidature according to new vs. old left party (binomial regression)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immigrant origin</th>
<th>Visible minority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B (SE)</td>
<td>90% CI for odds ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower OR Upper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>-0.59 (0.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left party</td>
<td>-0.61 (0.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.74** (0.36)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 106 77

Source: Aspirant data 2012-2013, own calculations.
Notes: Immigrant-origin: $R^2 = .01$ (Hosmer-Lemeshow), .02 (Cox-Snell), .02 (Nagelkerke). Model $\chi^2 (1)=1.61$ (p=.45); Visible minority: $R^2 = .02$ (Hosmer-Lemeshow), .02 (Cox-Snell), .03 (Nagelkerke). Model $\chi^2 (1)=1.39$ (p=.50); * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. SPD is baseline category.
Figure C1: Failed district nomination of newcomer district aspirants

Source: Aspirant data 2012-2013, own calculations. (Non-)immigrant origin: N=313 and N=28 (SPD), N=226 and N=7 (CDU/CSU), N=313 and N=22 (Greens), N=260 and N=25 (Left party); (non) visible minority aspirants: N=321 and N=20 (SPD), N=229 N=4 (CDU/CSU), N=320 and N=15 (Greens), N=250 and N=15 (Left party). Notes: Shown are percentages of newcomer aspirants within the respective group who failed district nomination by their party. Pearson’s Chi-square test or Fisher’s exact test for subsamples with expected frequencies smaller than 5: (Non-)immigrant origin newcomers: SPD $\chi^2=0.02$ ($p=.89$), CDU/CSU Fisher’s exact test $p=.46$, Greens $\chi^2=0.40$ ($p=.52$), Left party Fisher’s exact test $p=1$; (non) visible minority: SPD $\chi^2=0.23$ ($p=.63$), CDU/CSU Fisher’s exact test $p=1$, Greens Fisher’s exact test $p=.57$, Left party Fisher’s exact test $p=1$.
### Table C10: SPD: Regional quota and nomination chances of visible minority aspirants (binomial regression)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) B (SE)</th>
<th>90% CI for odds ratio</th>
<th>(2) B (SE)</th>
<th>90% CI for odds ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>OR</td>
<td>Upper</td>
<td>Lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional quota</td>
<td>-1.16</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.78)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbency</td>
<td>3.38*</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>29.31</td>
<td>1873.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.96)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>6.44</td>
<td>8.99</td>
<td>18.99</td>
<td>124.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.93)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 19

Source: Selector survey 2015 and Aspirant data 2012-2013, own calculations.
Notes: (1): $R^2 = .13$ (Hosmer-Lemeshow), .14 (Cox-Snell), .20 (Nagelkerke). Model $\chi^2 (1)=2.76 (p=.10)$; (2): $R^2 = .32$ (Hosmer-Lemeshow), .31 (Cox-Snell), .45 (Nagelkerke). Model $\chi^2 (2)=6.97 (p=.03)$; * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

### Table C11: Greens: Regional quota and nomination chances of visible minority aspirants (binomial regression)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) B (SE)</th>
<th>90% CI for odds ratio</th>
<th>(2) B (SE)</th>
<th>90% CI for odds ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>OR</td>
<td>Upper</td>
<td>Lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional quota</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>3.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbency</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>8.87</td>
<td>124.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.39)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.63</td>
<td>-3.98</td>
<td>8.87</td>
<td>124.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.29)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 21

Source: Selector survey 2015 and Aspirant data 2012-2013, own calculations.
Notes: (1): $R^2 = .06$ (Hosmer-Lemeshow), .06 (Cox-Snell), .09 (Nagelkerke). Model $\chi^2 (1)=1.34 (p=.25)$; (2): $R^2 = .17$ (Hosmer-Lemeshow), .17 (Cox-Snell), .26 (Nagelkerke). Model $\chi^2 (2)=4.01 (p=.13)$; * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.