Dynamics of Inequalities in a Global Perspective: An Introduction
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Abstract

The contribution in this chapter, and in the volume itself, is to explain how patterns of inequality associated with global capital have been reconfigured in different contexts and have historically produced varied results. Our definition of global inequality transcends Euro- and U.S.-centric models of linear development and comparisons of national income and its distribution to explain how complex socioeconomic hierarchies, including – but not limited to – class, reinforce inequalities among social groups around the globe. We trace contemporary patterns of inequality back to the history of imperial and colonial power so as to reintroduce into the scholarly dialogue on inequality a broader understanding of ascriptive hierarchies of race, gender, caste, and national citizenship and their relationship to colonial conquest, enslavement and labor migrations as interrelated contexts of the global production and reproduction of inequality patterns.

Keywords: global inequalities, capitalism, development, race, gender, citizenship

Introduction

When Eduardo Galeano wrote these words in the 25th Anniversary Edition of Open Veins of Latin America, he could have been writing about any part of what was considered to be the “underdeveloped” world:

For those who see history as a competition, Latin America’s backwardness and poverty are merely the result of its failure. We lost; others won. But the winners happen to have won thanks to our losing: the history of Latin America’s underdevelopment is, as someone has said, an integral part of the history of world capitalism’s development. Development develops inequality. (Galeano pp. 2-3).

The social, political and economic forces associated with the Eurocentrically constructed notion of “development” have shaped patterns of inequality associated with global capital for centuries, producing historically varied results that, broadly speaking, enriched the global North and impoverished the global South. But, in terms of press coverage as well as academic debates in the global North, global inequality is news. As recently as 2012, The Economist still questioned whether inequality needed to be tackled at all, arguing that globalization and technical innovation had narrowed inequality globally (The Economist, 2012). This monograph issue takes the opposite stance, making the dynamics of inequality its primary focus on at least two grounds. First, the gap between rich and poor has increased since the 1980s, especially in high-income countries such as the United States and Great Britain (a fact that the Economist article acknowledged). For example, there are more “Ultra High Net Worth Individuals (UHNWI)” in London than anywhere else in the world – these are people whose net worth not including their primary residence are upwards of
US$30 million (Dorling, 2015). Why London? Because Great Britain has an even more lax tax system than the previously favored Switzerland (Dorling, 2014).

Second, at the same time, income inequality decreased so significantly in parts of Latin America (that, together with the Caribbean, still is the world’s most unequal region) that headlines commending Latin America for putting the “Gini back in the bottle” (The Economist, 2012) vied with those warning that the U.S. is now more unequal than Latin America (Light 2013).

Attention to the rise in income inequalities in the global North more generally prompted scholarly interest in global inequalities as a “new” topic of social science. In an end of year report issued in 2014, the United Nations adviser Amina Mohamed of the World Economic Forum warned that increased inequality between the world’s richest and poorest people threatens to reduce both the sustainability of economic growth and weaken social cohesion and security, and called inequality “one of the key challenges of our time” (World Economic Forum, 2015). At the 2014 World Economic Forum, Oxfam released a report according to which, in 2014, the richest 85 people on the planet owned as much as the poorest 50% (or 35 billion people) – down from 388 in 2010. (Oxfam, 2014; for the skeptical view, see The Economist, 2015).

However, framing global inequalities as a new phenomenon has been instrumental in obscuring the fact that a constant move toward polarization – i.e., toward the rich getting richer while the poor get poorer – has been characteristic of the capitalist world-economy throughout its history (Wallerstein, 1979). While this tendency is most visible at the global level, i.e., as a rise in inequalities between countries, the methodological nationalism inherent in the conventional analysis of social inequalities since the nineteenth century has made the nation-state the most common unit of analysis of inequality studies. Most dynamics of global inequalities thus go unnoticed. This special issue therefore departs from the premise that a shift in the unit of analysis from the nation-state to the world as a whole reveals different structural dynamics of inequality at the global level. Most importantly, such a methodological shift reveals that global inequalities are not a new phenomenon. Indeed, new forms of inequality still result from transregional processes that have been with us for more than five centuries. Yet transregional entanglements – involving intercontinental voluntary and involuntary migration (which includes the European trade in enslaved Africans) and the unequal economic exchange between shifting metropolitan and peripheral areas – shaped the inequality structures of both the former colonizing and the formerly colonized regions at least since the European expansion into the Americas (Boatcă 2015). From the fifteenth century and into the twenty-first, today’s poorer nations were colonized, either by settlement or foreign administration. Colonization reorganized the colonized people’s cultures, economies, and political and social systems by marginalizing the indigenous, taking away their control of their land, extracting their labor and other local resources, and creating an international division of labor designed to stimulate the industrialization and enrichment of the colonizer and force the decline of native industries. Together, these actions caused the colonies’ underdevelopment (McMichael, 2000).

Many African and Latin American nations finally managed to overthrow their colonizers and regain decision-making control over their political and economic infrastructures only in the mid-twentieth century. In 1960 alone,
seventeen new African nations joined the United Nations (UN), and new independent nations in the Caribbean, Africa and Mideast increased the number of UN member nations by 50 percent, to 127 total (United Nations, n.d.). A period of optimism ensued, when the power and promise of newfound political sovereignty and economic independence seemed poised to catalyze economic prosperity, geographic security, and greater global equity. Even political and economically conservative scholars and policymakers who subscribed to theories of modernization believed that newly independent nations could finally develop by going through stages traveled by other more developed nations, until these former colonies would themselves reach a level of modernity in culture and economy generally understood to represent progress. Hope marked the new era of development – but that “development” was meant to occur with economic “aid” from the West that is described as economic stimulation, but that comes with conditions set by lenders and enforced by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Thus did former colonies attempt to emerge from legacies that left their own cultures permanently changed, and where they struggle still to attain political legitimacy and economic sustainability in a world not of their own making (McMichael, 2000).

The mid-20th century promise of progress was left unfulfilled for most nations, despite their ardent attempts to implement strategies for development. Scholars named neocolonialism the vestiges of domination that still reverberate in current political and economic relationships. Other scholars blame forces outside of the poor nation and believe them to inhere in the relationships organizing the global economy so that the growth of more powerful nations occurs at the expense of the less powerful and question whether significant economic progress is possible for poor nations seeking growth in this regime. Raúl Prebisch (1950) first denounced the international division of labor that reduced Latin America to a raw material producer for the industrial centers as the main reason for the region's underdevelopment. André Gunder Frank (1967) later popularized Latin American dependency theory through his notion of “the development of underdevelopment” and others, like Samir Amin (1973, 1977) continued research in this tradition, applying it to countries in Latin America and Africa that must rely upon the export of agricultural goods and raw natural materials. In a more complex elaboration of similar themes, scholars focused upon dependent development theory to explain why economic progress may be possible for some, but come at some cost (including rising domestic inequality, rapid urbanization, and other social and economic ills), and will not likely be achieved by governments that try opting out of the world economy in a quest for economic isolationism as they attempt to avoid the downsides of participation in global capitalist markets (Evans, 1979).

An even broader and longer-term view of the roots of inequality among nations and why inequality persists can be located in world-systems analysis. This approach draws on dependency theorists’ notions of development of underdevelopment and the center-periphery structure of the global economy in order to argue that the historical system that ever since the European colonial expansion in the fifteenth century has been gradually incorporating all regions of the globe is a capitalist one. The international division of labor of this capitalist
world-system relies upon the unequal distribution of profit to the benefit of core countries at the expense of peripheral ones. Immanuel Wallerstein (1974) and his followers argue that, as the system develops, the basic core-periphery division of labor is being continually reproduced, while extreme polarization of the system is held in check by countries of the semiperiphery as a middle stratum that it as the same time exploiter and exploited in the unequal exchange. (see also Chase-Dunn and Grimes, 1995.)

Of course debates persist among the thinkers in these traditions. Theorists in the world-system tradition argue about the age, size, scope, cyclical nature, and uniqueness of the system’s political and economic organization, as well as the conditions under which a nation can develop (Chirot and Hall, 1982). Similarly, while the zenith of the dependency school may be in the past, its insights still represent an important corrective to naive assumptions about the ease of achieving economic development in poorer nations (Chirot and Hall, 1982). Scholars who write and study in the academic subfield known as political economy (of which world systems theory is a part) are critical of the conventional ways that local and global economies are said to operate, but they do not routinely make central the ways that race and gender hierarchies play out in their analyses of domination, or centrally explain systematic global inequality. There are two central assumptions at play. First, there is a widespread belief that the global economy can be made equitable without reference to global hierarchies of domination like race and gender. Even those political economists who abandon the idea of the impersonal market and choose to foreground politics and ideology in market processes still presume that economics (and neither race nor gender) is the engine that drives nationals and the world. Conventional economists point to modernization theories and development strategies; political economists prove their belief in the possibilities of equality in markets by focusing on the poor functioning of market systems even while admonishing that abandonment of markets is unfeasible. A second (and perhaps related but not identical) assumption is that race and gender are both exogenous to the functioning of global and local markets. Neither race nor gender has predictive value in macroeconomic analyses, seemingly, for economic models of neither the conventional nor the critical kind devote much energy to explaining why women and nonwhite peoples consistently fail to share in economic profits so unequally distributed. The idea is that development economics, done right, is the great equalizer.

While local variations exist, there is a global racial system organized by forces that keep races (however phenotypically, socially, or culturally defined) in a relatively stable global racial hierarchy that defines for each racial category the freedom they will feel from economic deprivation, its ability to hoard privilege, and its cultural or physical desirability. Race as a biological given does not exist; racial categories are imagined configurations of presumed physical difference that sort humans into groupings that are hierarchically arranged into superior dominants and those considered to be lesser. As socially constructed (i.e., fabricated in geographic space and historical time to meet identifiable needs) as races are, they are used to determine the allocation of our world’s political, cultural, environmental, and economic resources – they are quite literally a matter of life and death, and as such are key components of the political economy of the globe. The racism that was used to carry out the colonial reorganization of
indigenous societies worldwide has permanently transformed them and destroyed local cultures. But we do not speak here of historical artifacts; race and racism are central organizing tools of modern society (Bashi this volume, and 2013; Smedley and Smedley, 2011; Winant, 2002), capitalist accumulation (Miles, 1989, 1993), and even the building and consolidation of powerful nation states (Marx, 1998). Racism survives, even past the era that witnessed successful struggles both to end colonialism in all its forms and mass mobilizations to win equal rights for all races (Marx, 1998; Winant 2002). Aníbal Quijano’s notion of the *coloniality of power* (Quijano 2000) addresses the interrelations between race, colonialism, and the political economy of global capitalism by conceiving of coloniality as a situation of cultural, political, and economic domination that can be enforced in the absence of colonial administrations and is thus more durable than colonialism. At the same time, coloniality represents the carry-over of both racial hierarchies and the international division of labor produced during the time of direct or indirect colonial rule into post-independence times. Thus, the notion of coloniality of power captures the logic according to which today’s economic, political and racial inequalities still largely mirror the power relations exerted before the presumed decolonization of the world in 1945.

Migration is an important response to global inequality and the racialization that continues to oppress nations in the global South. Scholarship that uses a *migration systems* approach seeks to understand the dynamics of migration that involve the political, economic, cultural and social context in which global migration takes place, as well as the dynamics of the migration streams generated (Massey et al., 1998; Kritz, Lim, and Zlotnik, 1992). Migration systems “fundamentally consist of countries that exchange relatively large numbers of migrants, [and] they are also characterized by certain feedback mechanisms that connect movements of people (immigrants, students, tourists, and employees) to concomitant flows of goods, capital, ideas, and information. Economic, cultural, and political links form a network of relationships holding international migration systems together” (Massey et al., 1998, p. 60). These systems are constellations of linked countries, where links originated in past eras of imperialism, colonialism, the trade in enslaved persons and other commodified natural resources, and perhaps may be thought of as smaller configurations of world economic systems and world racial hierarchies. History has reshaped former transnational relationships but political and economic ties are still in evidence in things like shared languages, interdependent economies, and conjoined politicoeconomic systems that may designate yesterday’s colonies as today’s commonwealths. Migrants choose destinations in their system – and not among innumerable sites worldwide – because the historic connections in these relationships linger. Migrants live transnational lives to the degree that their economic, political and social ties across the planet impact nations’ balance of payments, and affect political outcomes (Basch, Schiller, and Blanc, 1994; Levitt, 1999; Smith, 1993; Kasinitz, 1992).

Migrants, however, are viewed in their destination sites through a racial lens that shapes their ability to move, enter, find work and housing – economically succeed, or fail, according to the racialization to which they are subject (Bashi 2004, 2007; Bashi Treitler, 2013). They are given access to citizenship in ways so unequal that we might easily describe it as a global
hierarchy of citizenship, or, as the colonially of citizenship, as Boaća and Roth do in this volume, drawing on Aníbal Quijano’s colonially of power.

Although the low levels of inequality of regions of the Global North gradually came to be perceived as structured around achieved characteristics such as one’s level of education or professional position, their long-term stability had nevertheless been safeguarded by controlling immigration to restrict physical access to these regions on the basis of ascribed categories, especially national identity and citizens (Korzeniewicz and Moran, 2009). Taking the nation-state as the unit of analysis shows a pattern of relative inclusion of the population through redistributive state policies, democratic participation, and widespread access to education in low inequality contexts; however – when researchers shift the analytical frame to the world economy, the pattern instead reveals the selective exclusion of large sectors of the population located outside national borders (Korzeniewicz and Moran, 2009:78). Selective exclusion at the state border maintains national low inequality patterns of relative inclusion and thus reproduces high inequality patterns between nations. According to Korzeniewicz and Moran (2009), the nation-state itself has been the main criterion for social stratification on a global scale ever since this pattern emerged in the nineteenth century. Surely then, we can credit late nineteenth century mass migration across national borders with the significant convergence of wage rates between core and semiperipheral countries – mainly Europe and the so-called settler colonies of North America, Australia and New Zealand; these policies have also tended to raise the competition for resources and employment opportunities within receiving countries, often located in the New World. The result was an increase in inequality in some national contexts, where the large inflow of unskilled labor caused rising wage differentials (relative to wages for skilled labor); but inequality decreased in the sending countries, where wages rose overall but the income differential between skilled and unskilled workers declined. Specifically, migration to the New World provided a poverty outlet to some 50 million Europeans or 12% of the continent’s population between 1850 and 1930 (Therborn 1995:40). Almost all European states during this period were primarily sending countries – some, like the British Isles, experienced out-migration flows as high as 50% of the national population, but in Italy’s case, it was as much as one-third. These developments fostered debates as to whether states had the right to restrict emigration. Labor unrest, the rise of scientific racism by the end of World War I, and social and economic protectionist measures in the wake of the Great Depression gradually made restrictions on immigration across countries of the core necessary, while strengthening notions of citizenship as a basis for entitlement to social and political rights (Korzeniewicz and Moran 2009:84). Large-scale emigration and the high level of ethnic homogeneity attained by the 1950s had ensured that processes of collective identification as well as collective organization within Europe occurred in terms of class interests and class conflict rather than ethnic or racial allegiance. With the decisive reversal of the European migration trend in the 1960s, the ethnic and racial conflicts that accompanied the rise in immigration came to the fore as a largely extra-European problem that increasingly posed a threat to Western Europe in the form of entering ex-Colonial subjects, guest workers (turned permanent), and incessant flows of labor migrants and refugees. As such, they appeared to be – and were often discussed as – forms of
ethnic and/or racial stratification foreign to the class structure otherwise characterizing Western Europe.

The contribution of this special issue on the Dynamics of Inequalities in a Global Perspective, and this introduction, is to recenter a definition of inequality on hierarchies of race, gender, migration and citizenship (and not on the nation state). This allows us, first, to trace contemporary patterns of inequality back to the history of imperial and colonial power, and therefore, and second, to transcend Euro- and US-centric models of linear development.

One important site for marking the effects of inequality is global migration and contested citizenship. Its importance is echoed in a recent World Bank policy paper suggesting that unlike in the mid-19th century’s inequality between capitalists and workers (i.e., the world described in Marx and Engels’ Communist Manifesto), today’s global income differences are marked by gaps in income between countries – hence international migration becomes a powerful tool for reducing global poverty and inequality, and replaces class struggle as a social issue (Milanovic, 2011; see also Bashi 2007). Three papers in this volume focus on these important themes.

Floya Anthias explores the interconnection between inequalities and identities in processes of transnational migrant mobility. Drawing on previous work on her concept of ‘translocational positionality,’ she advances a ‘translocational’ frame as an analytical tool that suggests that the transnational positioning of social actors is a complex process relating to social processes and outcomes of differentiation and the structuration of social place, i.e., in terms of hierarchy and inequality. This is intended as a manifold critique of existing frameworks for the study of inequalities, identities, and migration. Thus, the idea of translocations moves away analytically from the focus on difference, while politically it moves away from the governmentality of difference. It thereby recognizes the global and intersectional nature of social bonds and interests and the need to go beyond ethnocentric and national-based lenses for achieving inclusion and social justice.

The papers in this volume direct the reader toward benefits that accrue to social analysis conducted with a global rather than national focus. While most approaches to citizenship in the West have tended to focus on the equalizing effects of the modern institution of citizenship within states, a global perspective on citizenship reveals its role as a mechanism of social exclusion mobilized by prosperous states against non-citizens and thus as an inequality-generating institution. Patricio Korzeniewicz and Scott Albrecht link migration to the politics of citizenship using a cross-national analysis of data to highlight the variables that explain migration patterns. While their model uses the nation state as a variable, their quantitative analysis employs a global frame centering inequality among nations as an important explanatory variable. Among their many intriguing findings, they note that links between colonizer and formerly colonized explains fewer transnational migrant movements than might be expected.

The paper by Manuela Boatcă and Julia Roth argues that the institutionalization of citizenship in the West has gone hand in hand with the legal (and physical) exclusion of non-European, non-White and non-Western populations from most rights and that these exclusions have historically occurred along a constitutive gender dimension. Building on the literature on
coloniality of power, Boatcă and Roth review the longue durée of racialization and ethnicization of women and colonial subjects in order to reveal the systematic distribution of unequal and gendered rights since the European colonial expansion, which they analyze as the coloniality of citizenship. The paper claims that citizenship and gender remain to this day the most decisive factors accounting for extreme inequalities between individuals in rich and poor countries. Against this background, strategies of social mobility that circumvent or subvert the ascriptive logic of citizenship allocation range from the elite phenomenon of investor citizenship to the more widely available international migration, transnational marriages and motherhood, all of which are both more prone to precarious conditions and criminalization and more vulnerable to gendered forms of exclusion.

Several other papers take a stance to question and make problematic standard academic analyses of gendered relations around the globe. Opening her paper with a call from Fanon to decolonize our nations and the world by rendering value the native intellectual traditions, Maureen Ikeotuonye critiques Eurocentric popular culture’s current call for “women’s empowerment”. Maintaining that the secular and non-secular fuse outside of Europe; by contrast, in Europe they remain strictly separate. For Nigeria’s Igbo people, the white Virgin Mary becomes “Mary Amaka” (loosely translated to “Mary, overly pretty” and thus suspicious); thus does Mary Amaka (MA) Feminism bring to Africans a style of feminism corrupted by its roots in a colonial construct as well as prejudices that Africans do not produce relevant philosophy. Ikeotuonye argues here against the polemical embrace of colonial and postcolonial systems that educated African women to be compliant, pious, and committed to ‘development’ or ‘progress’ that saw their cultures and traditions as impediments. Tellingly, Ikeotuonye points to renown novelist and public figure Chimamanda Adichie, a self-described “happy African Feminist”, as indicative of the cosmopolitan African-or MA-Feminist type, and Ikeotuonye dissects a subset of Adichie’s statements to make the point that she “is packaging Igbo [culture] for a quasi-non-Igbo colonial audience,” rendering it laughably monolithic and (sometimes even fatally) sexist. She concludes that ubiquitous feminism (like air, no one can claim to fail to subscribe to it) and its opposite, patriarchy (likened to the “Holy Ghost”, i.e., presumably everywhere) still hearkens to coloniality in proposing Westerners as the vanguard of human rights.

Amrita Pande examines how new technologies of reproduction used in surrogacy in India (a US$ 2 billion business even though it operates at a relative global bargain) effectively reinforces a racial hierarchy that disregards their humanity as women of color in the global South. High fertility rates in the global south are generally understood to indicate reckless reproduction and cause dangerous poverty, which in turn necessitates reproductive control. But through their participation in surrogacy (requiring constructing power relationships across class, caste, race, and nation from their wombs to wealthy “intended mothers”) Indian women “ultimately conform to this global imperative of reducing the fertility of lower class women in the global south”; indeed, many forego their own family reproduction to do the work of the surrogate or womb mother. Pande advocates a global solution to global surrogacy that can institute “fair trade” principles to protect the rights of womb mothers and increase transparency in the process rooted in a politics of solidarity that acknowledges
relationships created between mothers, fathers, and children without subsuming them to rights to privacy.

Several of these papers focus on hierarchies – some more broadly, and others more specifically. Vilna Bashi Treitler offers a theory of racial paradigms, and applies that theory to the development of racial hierarchy that was birthed under British colonialism in Ireland and matured on North American soil when applied first to North American natives and then to enslaved and imported Africans; the paradigm’s advanced years saw it exported to the German Nazi and South African apartheid regimes. Bashi Treitler’s work describes the components of racial paradigms (offering four basic ones: racial categories, hierarchies, commonsense and Politicultures) to aid us in understanding how and why socially constructed racial fictions persist over the historical long term despite the weight of scientific evidence against them.

Surinder Jodhka takes on the reproduction and persistence of caste hierarchies in India, offering an analysis that – instead of considering caste as representative of Indian exceptionalism – sees caste as a system of ascriptive hierarchies, like race, to which he compares it. Jodhka departs from Cox’s Caste, Class and Race (1948), which effectively ended such comparisons, arguing that Cox’s knowledge and analysis of caste was flawed, as are others who come after him and approach caste as an exceptional system. Like Bashi Treitler, Jodhka queries why such antiquated socially constructed systems persist – particularly when evolutionary modernization predicted its certain demise. Jodhka’s answer is that caste, like race, evolves – caste is now more visible and complex. Caste may have become redundant under capitalist development and mechanization but it did not die. Caste (like race) becomes more potent when economic and political competition is at stake: Jodhka shows that caste matters in formal and informal labour markets, and caste-related violence is increasing (perhaps because, as Jodhka also finds, caste relations are also renegotiated power relations).

The paper by Godwin Onuoha takes on the political economy of core and periphery. He focuses upon the media’s iconographic image of “Africa Rising” as a notion developed at the turn of the new millennium (a contrast with the pessimistic notion of the pre-2000 “lost decades” of development that African nations suffered under IMF-imposed structural adjustment). Onuoha explains that “Africa Rising” is a reference to wealth in resources (particularly in high quality oil) and the ability to redefine its interests in trade relations with emerging powers; but he likens this new focus on resource extraction to a new scramble for Africa, involving the USA, China, and India in particular, but also implicating African elites in hoarding the benefits of resource mobilization. The continuities with the 19th century European colonial occupation are more than apparent. Thus, Onuoha concludes, “In spite of its rising profile in the global economy,...unequal relations are produced and reinforced in Africa’s extractive sector” (Onuoha, this volume, HIS PAGE 14) with the help of a renewed development rhetoric.

Appropriately, the volume concludes with a treatise on the global constitutionalization of human rights by Guilherme Leite Gonçalves and Sérgio Costa. They suggest that a human rights program is amenable to administration by extra-state entities such as multilateral agencies, or private transnational actors like religious institutions. Proponents (perhaps idealistically) believe that
a world civil society regulated by cosmopolitan law is possible: constitutionalizing this “international law will promote the creation of an international political community capable of integrating diverse citizens and peoples as subjects of rights” (Gonçalves and Costa, this volume, THEIR PAGE 4), but “[t]he question is whether international law, constructed by and for Western dominance, is capable of overcoming its own limitations” (Gonçalves and Costa, this volume, THEIR PAGE 6). They conclude that protections for minorities and subaltern groups can only be had in conditions where dominant powers are reduced at the legal and social levels; otherwise the power imbalances remain. Honing in on minority cultural rights as a case – with a specific focus on the Maroon peoples of Suriname and Quilombos in Brazil (both Afro-descendant groups) because these cases in particular allow for examination of uneven legal creation and implementation – the authors show how redress and protection for such groups (treated as “other”) usually perpetuated the inequities they suffered. Further, at least two instances (one, in a decision following an army massacre of Maroon; and the other where agribusiness and smaller landowners caused a loss of expected land titles to the Quilombo) resulted in a loss of rights. Gonçalves and Costa conclude that Eurocentrism and biases resulting from imperialism and the colonial legacy reproduce inequalities rather than fully redress them, even under a global constitutionalism designed to protect and ensure minority rights.

Together, the writings in this volume serve to make obvious and critique the perpetual and perpetuated inequalities that manifest across the globe. Thus, they do not paint an optimistic picture of the dynamics of inequality on a global scale. We become more optimistic when we see our academic colleagues who contribute to this volume toil to assess, analyze, discuss, and elaborate upon these injustices and in some cases offer avenues for redress. To the extent that academic research affects global social policy, we remain hopeful about our efforts to contribute toward building a world where justice and human dignity prevail.

References


