Social citizenship for “the poor”?

Large N data construction, conceptualization, and comparative analysis of social cash transfers across the global South

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To my dear Mum

who waited so long to celebrate my PhD, but passed away before I could complete this doctoral dissertation.

To both my parents

who supported me in many ways over many years.

Preface and Acknowledgements

This doctoral dissertation is the result of many years of research, which I have carried out in different settings with distinct challenges.

I started my doctoral studies as a researcher in the ambitious interdisciplinary FLOOR research project on social security as a human right, which offered inspiring exchange of ideas, travels to different continents, and close cooperation with great team colleagues. This period was full of activity, experiments, and dreams, while the major challenge was not to dream the dream too big.

But the sudden loss of income after the project funding ended entailed a loss of prospects and the dreams crumbled. The ambitious career turned into a participant observation of employment agency advice. This was the period of trials and errors, while I was searching for ways to control the endless, bewildering variety of social cash transfers and to harness the unique resource of the self-constructed database.

Once back within the university system (as a lecturer at the Chair), I continued what I had started even more eagerly than before. A vision emerged, subtle but stubborn, that the knowledge I was creating might contribute insights for the social policy makers and (socio-) political actors in this world. Very ambitious (and successful), I started working as a policy advisor.

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This work is, among others, dedicated to all those PhD students who kept struggling with unfavourable conditions and finally could not complete their PhD. Best wishes to all of you.

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List of Abbreviations

BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CCT	Conditional Cash Transfer(s)
CSB-MIPI	*CSB (Centre for Social Policy Herman Deleeck)-Minimum Income Protection Indicators Database*
DFID	*Department for International Development*
ECLAC	*Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean*
EU	*European Union*
FAO	*Food and Agriculture Organization*
FLOORCASH-Basic	*Basic Dataset on Social Cash Transfers in the Global South*
FLOORCASH-SocCit	*Social Citizenship Dataset on Social Cash Transfers in the Global South*
FLOORCASH-SocPen	*Social Pension Dataset on Non-Contributory Old Age Pensions in the Global South*
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
HDI	*Human Development Index*
ICESCR	*International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*
ILO	*International Labour Organization*
ISSA	*International Social Security Association*

MENA	Middle East and North Africa
NSTP	*Non-Contributory Social Transfer Programmes in Developing Countries Data Set*
ODI	*Overseas Development Institute*
OECD	*Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development*
OHCHR	*Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights*
PPP	Purchasing Power Parities
SALMIC	*Social Assistance in Low and Middle Income Countries Dataset*
SaMip	*Social Assistance and Minimum Income Protection Interim Dataset*
SAPI	*Social Assistance, Politics, and Institutions (SAPI) database*
SDGs/UNSDGs	*(United Nations) Sustainable Development Goals*
SPIN	*Social Policy Indicators Database*
UN	*United Nations*
UNICEF	*United Nations Children's Fund*
UNU-WIDER	*United Nations University – World Institute for Development Economics Research*

Note: A list of the country codes is provided in Appendix 5.4.

1 Introduction

Poverty continues to be a major challenge to humankind. In the many countries of the so-called global South, also referred to as low- and middle-income countries, the share of poor people is huge and the extent of poverty is often extreme and life threatening (World Bank 2018a, pp. 26–27). On the global political agenda "end[ing] poverty in all its forms everywhere" has become the Goal number one of the *United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (UNSDGs)* under the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,* which was solemnly adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2015 (United Nations 2015).[1] But how to reduce, if not end, poverty? In this doctoral dissertation I focus on a more recent policy approach: Since the 2000s, international organizations and states have come to acknowledge that poverty could be reduced if suitable *social protection* programmes were available to support poor and vulnerable persons (Bastagli et al. 2016, pp. 86–104; DFID 2011, pp. 17–20; Fiszbein et al. 2014, p. 175).[2]

Social protection (or social security[3]) is a human right, stipulated most prominently in the *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* (*ICESCR,* Article 9; Buschmann 2013; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 2008; Riedel 2007; Sepúlveda and Nyst 2012). However, according to the latest estimates for 2015, only 45 percent of the world´s population are covered by at least *one* social protection cash benefit (ILO 2017, pp. 7, 9).[4] [5] Coverage is remarkably lower in several world regions such as in Sub-Saharan Africa, where only 12.9 percent of the population are covered. As the United Nations Secretary-General emphasized in a recent report on the progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals, "social protection is not a reality for a majority of the

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[1] https://sdgs.un.org; 2021-05-18.

[2] For a comprehensive study of the global discourse on poverty as part of the ideas behind social cash transfers, including a historical analysis, see Gliszczynski (2015, pp. 104–124).

[3] Nowadays the terms are often used interchangeably (Sepúlveda and Nyst 2012, p. 21), although "social security" is used in United Nations human rights documents, while "social protection" has come to prevail in global politics. Moreover, social protection tends to have a broader meaning than social security; see also section 3.1.2.

[4] Coverage here is defined as receipt of either a contributory or non-contributory cash benefit, or as contributing to a social insurance programme; https://www.social-protection.org/gimi/WSPDB.action?id=19; 2020-08-03.

[5]And only 29% percent of the world population are covered by "comprehensive social security systems throughout the life cycle"; https://www.social-protection.org/gimi/WSPDB.action?id=32; 2020-08-03.

world´s population" (ECOSOC 2019, p. 6).[6] These enormous gaps in social protection are now tackled by a global target that has been set in order to reach Goal 1 of the *Sustainable Development Goals* of "end[ing] poverty in all its forms everywhere": Target 1.3 of the UNSDGs aims at "[i]mplement[ing] nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable".[7] But what are "nationally appropriate social protection systems" and social protection floors to achieve "substantial coverage" of the poor and vulnerable persons?

A key strategy that combines poverty reduction and social protection is "just give money to the poor" (title of Hanlon et al. 2010) – the introduction of social cash transfer programmes. *Social cash transfers* are publicly financed and regular payments in the form of cash to individuals and households who are considered poor and/or vulnerable. Social cash transfer programmes comprise both (means-tested) social assistance programmes that address the poor population as well as ("universal") transfers for all members of a population category such as older persons above a certain age, irrespective of income.

Famous examples of social cash transfer programmes in the global South include South Africa´s *Child Support Grant,* which addresses poor children up to including age 17; Brazil´s famous *Bolsa Família,* which addresses all poor individuals and households (mostly families with children), conditional on the children attending school and participating in regular health check-ups (a so-called *conditional cash transfer*); South Africa´s *Grant for Older Persons,* which addresses poor individuals from age 60; and India´s *Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme*, a cash-for-work programme targeted at adults fit for work.[8] [9]

Since the middle of the 1990s and, even more so, since the early 2000s, social cash transfer programmes have remarkably increased and spread all over the global South (Barrientos 2013a; Hanlon et al. 2010; Leisering 2019; Leisering et al. 2006), leading to a "global rise of social cash transfers" (title of Leisering 2019). They have marked a new "wave" of national and international involvement in social protection (Leutelt 2016).[10] Clearly, social cash

[6] The report of 2019 is the last annual report on the progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals published before the COVID-19 pandemic.

[7] https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal1; 2021-05-18.

[8] For programme typologies see sections 2.3 and 6.4

[9] All references to social cash transfer programmes in this doctoral dissertation are based on the self-constructed databases FLOORCASH-SocCit and FLOORCASH-Basic respectively (see Chapter 5), unless stated otherwise.

[10] Social cash transfers have even been interpreted as a "hidden counter-movement" in the neoliberal era, as which the past few decades may be seen (Harris and Scully 2015, pp. 415–416).

transfers have developed into one of the major social protection instruments to address poor and vulnerable persons. The idea and practice of "simply" giving money to the poor, that is, *directly* paying cash to households and individuals, was even hailed as a "development revolution" (title of Hanlon et al. 2010) and, only recently, as an "entitlement revolution" (Weible and Leisering 2019). Traditionally, development aid has followed the principle of support to self-help with a focus on the promotion of infrastructure and agricultural production, among others. The *direct* support of individuals and households was in contrast to these traditional forms of development aid (Leisering et al. 2006, pp. 33–34). Well into the 1990s, all major international organizations had rejected or ignored the idea of *direct* transfers to the poor (Leisering and Gliszczynski 2019, p. 253) and the UN member states, in the States Parties reports filed under the *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,* had interpreted the right to social security in terms of *collective* welfare and in the context of economic development, respectively, rather than as *individual entitlements* to social security benefits (Davy 2013).

So, social cash transfers are comparatively new in the so-called *global South*, that is basically the countries in Africa, Asia, Central and South America, and Oceania.[11] Whereas cash-based social assistance has a well-established tradition in Western Welfare states with several programmes introduced in nearly all countries over the second half of the 20th century, this monetary form of public support is a relatively young social protection instrument in the *developmental* context. The majority of the programmes in the global South were introduced in the past two decades, although single programmes were introduced in the early 20th century such as South Africa´s *Grant for Older Persons* in 1928.[12]

Today social cash transfers constitute both a "key component of development strategies" (Barrientos 2013a, p. 99) and a "key means of social protection in developing countries" (Davis et al. 2016, p. 1). These new notions have emerged against the background of changing global discourses about development, with a move from collective to individualized concepts

[11] There is no standard definition of the global South (Hollington et al. 2015). Trying to define the concept, some scholars refer to "what was then called the Third World and is now called the Global South" (Hanlon et al. 2010, p. 19). In this doctoral dissertation, I define the global South by combining geographical aspects with criteria of development, and more precisely as all the countries outside Europe and North America, but excluding Australia, New Zealand, and Japan (as very highly developed countries for decades) and including the territories of Palestine, Macao, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Cook Islands (see section 5.1).

[12] Half of all programmes that were running by 2012/13 were introduced after 2002; for an overview of the years of introduction see Weible and Leisering 2019, p. 155.

of development (Gliszczynski 2015, pp. 124–139). So, social cash transfers link basic social security policy and development policy. They are embedded in what is described as *social policy in development contexts* (see for example the similar titles of the volumes edited by Gough and Wood (2004), Mkandawire (2004), and Surender and Walker (2013).[13]

This dissertation starts from the observation that despite the massive spread of social cash transfer programmes in the global South and a plethora of case studies, we know little about the overall contribution of these programmes across the global South. The whole picture is missing, not least because up to the mid-2010s, there was no comprehensive global data basis on social cash transfers that covers all programmes in all countries of the global South.

The knowledge of social cash transfers, in particular on their contribution to social protection, is still highly fragmented and very limited. While we know a lot about *single* social cash transfer programmes, about the programmes in particular world regions (above all, Latin America) as well as about particular programme types (above all about *conditional cash transfers* and so-called *social pensions*), the *overall* picture of social cash transfers in the global South is still fragmentary. Knowledge of *all* programmes is lacking in important respects. In 2015, an estimated 843 million people were "covered" by social cash transfers (Barrientos 2018a). Judging from this figure, we might assume that many poor people are provided with social cash transfers and that consequently, they are socially protected. But who is "covered"? Who is not "covered"? And where are people "covered" and where not? And what do we know about the quality of their social protection? These are still open questions. We still do not know *which contribution* social cash transfers make to the social protection of poor people across the (entire) global South.

To close this knowledge gap, I introduce new data and new theoretical concepts. It is a key contribution of this doctoral dissertation to construct the first comprehensive global data basis on social cash transfers, FLOORCASH-SocCit, that covers all social cash transfer programmes in all countries of the global South (for a first analysis see Weible (2016); for the state of databases in the literature see section 2.5). In theoretical terms, I use the concept of *social citizenship*, developed by the sociologist Thomas H. Marshall (Marshall 1950, 1981a). Marshall's concept is a most fundamental and frequently quoted concept of welfare state

[13] More recently, social cash transfers have been introduced as an instrument of humanitarian aid and of *transitional development assistance*, involving international organizations, (international) non-governmental organizations, but also donor governments (such as Germany); see, for example, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 2020.

research, but it has not been much applied to the global social policy (but see Davy et al. 2013a) and not to social assistance either. In fact, poor relief and social assistance are normally seen as falling short of or even counteracting social citizenship. But in this dissertation, I bring Marshall's concept to bear on issues of social cash transfers, by conceiving of three dimensions of social citizenship that help to throw light on social cash transfers. The core of Marshall´s concept of social citizenship is the status of *membership* (in more recent terms: *inclusion*) in a society which is underpinned by social rights. Marshall sketches the concept of *social citizenship* as "the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society" (Marshall 1950, p. 11). Marshall's reference to the lower end of social citizenship, "a modicum of economic welfare and security", has hardly been taken up in the literature, but it provides the context of this dissertation. I inquire into the contribution of social cash transfers to the social citizenship for poor and vulnerable citizens as the target population who social cash transfers address: *To what extent and in what ways do social cash transfers across the entire global South contribute to social citizenship for persons considered poor and/or vulnerable*?

The citizenship approach goes beyond the conventional concern for reducing poverty. Social citizenship for the poor is not only about poverty reduction, but also about the recognition of the poor as rights-holders. A small but growing body of the literature has analysed social cash transfers in view of social citizenship for the poor, but these are case studies (e.g. Hunter and Sugiyama 2014; Plagerson et al. 2012). The social citizenship approach necessitates a focus on *entitlements* to social cash transfers as individual rights, rather than focusing on outcomes and implementation of social cash transfers as done in most of the literature. I argue that entitlements may be reconstructed by a precise analysis of the programme designs. By scrutinizing who is addressed by each social cash transfer programme, that is by reconstructing what *target groups* are defined and how they are defined, I find out which groups are *entitled* to a social cash transfer under a particular programme. Analysing *entitlement structures* permits us to precisely record who (which groups of the population) are entitled to social cash transfers – and which groups are not entitled. This approach is different from calculating the coverage of individuals and households by social cash transfer programmes, which is rather an indicator of programme implementation. The entitlement approach is not meant to suggest that issues of implementation do not matter. For example, "exclusion errors" – excluding entitled persons from benefits – or "inclusion errors" – benefits for persons who are not entitled – are important findings in the study of implementation and outcomes of social cash transfers. Rather, the idea of this dissertation is that the structure of entitlements deserves closer investigation than usually found in the literature, because the structure of entitlements reflects normative orders and political commitments, and, as I show, is more complex than suggested in the literature and in global policy debates. Furthermore, as I also show, countries differ considerably in view of entitlements and normative orders; there is no homogeneous "global South".

In more detail: Why is it relevant to undertake a comprehensive entitlement analysis in view of social citizenship, including all social cash transfer programmes across all countries of the global South?

First, a comparative *entitlement* analysis of *all* social cash transfer programmes based on quantitative data has not been done so far.[14] This leaves many questions unanswered. Most importantly, we still do not know who (which groups) across the global South is entitled to social cash transfers. The reader might assume that the persons entitled to social cash transfers are simply "the poor" of a country. In fact, there are several social cash transfer programmes which are designed to support poor households in general, for example Sri Lanka´s *Samurdhi Relief Programme*. However, as the analyses in this doctoral dissertation demonstrate, most programmes in the world of social cash transfers are far from such a simple programme design. To give a few examples, Mexico´s famous *Oportunidades* (renamed *Prospera* in 2014[15]) addresses poor families with children up to 18, poor older persons from age 70, and poor households in general. Costa Rica´s *Régimen No Contributivo de Pensiones por Monto Básico* addresses poor older persons from age 65, poor persons with disabilities, poor orphans, poor widows aged 55-65 with children younger than 18 or, if the children are students, younger than 21 as well as "indigents". Kenya´s *Cash transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children* targets orphans and "vulnerable children" below age 18. Mapping all these target groups of all programmes systematically is challenging and has not been done so far. But if we could map all target groups of all social cash transfer programmes, we could classify the target groups, possibly revealing entitlement structures across the global South. Finally, we could answer the question of who (of "the poor") is entitled to social cash transfers – an open question so far.

[14] But see Barrientos 2018a with aggregate data on coverage and budgets of social cash transfer programmes (but not on entitlements).

[15] The programme was disbanded in 2019.

What is more, neither do we know who is entitled, nor do we know who is *not* entitled to social cash transfers across the global South. If we knew who of “the poor” are *not* entitled to social cash transfers in each country, we could identify relevant gaps in social protection. However, in order to detect entitlement gaps, it is not enough to analyse social cash transfer *programmes*. Instead, following a *country approach* to the analysis of social cash transfers, I aggregate the data at the country level: entire *countries* with all their social cash transfer programmes (what I call *national social cash transfer arrangements*) are analysed and assessed in view of entitlements of all poor citizens of the country. Such a *systemic* approach to social cash transfer analysis is new in large-scale comparative research. Only in this way I am able to detect entitlement gaps. Research and knowledge about entitlement gaps could provide crucial contributions to development practice and practical social policy. In the context of the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, which includes principles such as universalism and global goals such as “leaving no one behind” (United Nations 2015), identifying and closing gaps in social protection are of utmost importance. Only by such a careful analysis, the global target of implementing “nationally appropriate social protection systems” including for poor and vulnerable persons may be achieved.

The quantitative comparative study of social cash transfers is a relatively young field of research. Although the academic interest to compare social cash transfer programmes has increased over the past years, comparative studies to include a big number of programmes (*large n* research) are still scarce and have considerable limitations, let alone studies that cover the entire global South. This doctoral dissertation contributes to closing this gap in research.

Second, an empirical analysis of social cash transfers *in view of social citizenship* has not been done in a comprehensive way, that is based on a quantitative dataset (but see Leisering and Barrientos 2013, based on empirical expertise). Analysing the contribution of social cash transfer programmes to social citizenship is a test case of social citizenship, since the groups that are addressed by these programmes – “the poor and vulnerable” – typically constitute marginalized groups of citizens. So, the reference to the concept of *social citizenship* makes it possible to draw conclusions on big social questions such as the integration of marginalized groups such as “the poor” in society.

I conceive of three dimensions of social citizenship:

1. inclusion (the scope of social cash transfers)
2. rights principles (the conditions of access to social cash transfers)

3. institutionalization (the reliability and "security" of social cash transfers).

Following this conceptual framework, I develop the central research questions: *Who is (what groups are) entitled to social cash transfers and to what extent in which countries of the global South, on what conditions, and with what degree of security?*

Third, one big question is still unclear: Why have social cash transfers spread across the global South? Explanatory research based on *quantitative* data on this issue has only begun, with limited data on the social cash transfer programmes (see section 2.1.3). In the literature we find quite a number of different factors that are *assumed* to have contributed to the recent expansion of social cash transfer programmes. They may be grouped into national factors and global factors. Among the national factors that are discussed are: processes of *democratization* in many Southern countries that have increased the influence of low-income groups; economic growth, which led to an increase in domestic revenues and opened up new fiscal space; with respect to Latin America in particular, the so-called *deuda social* (social debt), that is huge deficits in social infrastructure and protection after extensive cuts in the public sector (Barrientos 2013a, p. 11). In the global debate, the spread of social cash transfers has been discussed as a reaction to the limitations of earlier social protection policies such as self-help oriented policies that exclude groups with limited capacities for self-help, policies centred on the formal and urban sector that exclude the informal sector and rural regions, and transfers in kind that were increasingly considered as ineffective (Leisering 2009, p. 248; Leisering et al. 2006, pp. 33–37; Schubert 2005). But it is also wider global discourses that are supposed to have led to the rise of social cash transfers as *global policy models*, namely changes in global discourses on poverty, human rights, development, and insecurity and risks (Gliszczynski 2015; Gliszczynski and Leisering 2016, pp. 331–332).

Although the question of *why* plays only a marginal role in my doctoral dissertation, I claim that this dissertation may inform further explanatory studies in three manners: First, it provides the data on entitlements of all the social cash transfer programmes which are required for large n explanatory statistical analyses (Chapter 5).[16] Second, it provides a consistent methodological approach to mapping social cash transfer programmes in a standardized way as well as to aggregating the data at the country level in order to compare entire national social cash transfer arrangements ("systems"; Chapter 4). Third, it provides

[16] The data may be used as dependent variables on which the impact of multiple independent variables may be statistically tested.

several hypotheses based on the empirical analyses, which may be the starting point for further research (summarized in Chapter 10).

Why do I focus on social cash transfers instead of other social protection instruments? What makes social cash transfers particularly relevant in the context of social protection (and poverty reduction) in the global South?

First of all, *non-contributory* support such as social cash transfers and social assistance is the most relevant form of social protection for poor and vulnerable persons in the global South out of all forms of social protection (that is, according to a common definition of social protection, social assistance as non-contributory support, social insurance as contributory support, and labour market policies; Barrientos 2013a, p. 12). Due to their lack of resources, poor people often may only take part in non-contributory forms of social protection such as social cash transfers. *Contributory* forms of social protection (public social insurance, private insurances, and micro-insurances) play a minor role among poor people, since they often cannot pay the required regular contributions to qualify for benefits (Overbye 2005, p. 309). What is more, in many countries of the global South, social insurance is only rudimentarily developed (see for example Fiszbein et al. 2014, p. 169 on the coverage by world regions; Schmitt 2020, p. 9 on old age pensions; World Bank 2018b, p. 35 on the coverage of the poorest quintile, by country income group), because many or even most persons work in the informal sector of the economy. Micro-insurances are of limited relevance since per definition the scope and scale of risks covered are small (Overbye 2005, p. 309). Non-contributory forms of social protection become even more relevant in developing countries, since large sections of the population in these countries can be considered poor. Here, due to the lack of the social insurances as „first tier“ social protection programmes, social assistance and social cash transfers are often not residual programmes of last resort, but „have to shoulder the full burden of poverty“ (Bahle et al. 2010, p. 460; see also Barrientos 2011, p. 243). As regards *employment policies*, new initiatives in the global South “are thin on the ground” (Leisering and Barrientos, p. S57).

What is more, the form of cash makes the support flexible. In cash-based societies “cash support may help lay the basis for other kind of security” (Lund 2008, p. 53). Whereas support in kind such as food aid and tied benefits such as housing benefits are designed for particular basic needs only, leaving other basic needs uncovered, support in cash may be used for any basic need according to the needs and preferences of the recipients. The flexibility of social cash transfers allows investigating the quality of support to the *general subsistence* of those who are entitled.

Finally, there is empirical evidence that social cash transfer programmes represent the largest part within the *non-contributory* forms of social protection in the global South (social cash transfers, assistance in kind, and personal social services; see IPC-IG 2016, p. 10 on Africa, for example).[17]

How to design a comprehensive entitlement analysis of all social cash transfer programmes across the global South in view of social citizenship? This doctoral dissertation demonstrates that a systematic and comprehensive entitlement analysis is demanding. It requires three different steps which are the three major contributions of this doctoral dissertation:

First, due to a lack of ready-to use datasets on social cash transfers and in particular on *entitlements* to social cash transfers, I have constructed the dataset FLOORCASH-SocCit[18] in order to analyse social cash transfers in view of social citizenship (Weible 2014, 2015, 2018; Leisering and Weible 2020; see Chapter 5; see also www.floorcash.org).[19] It is based on the database FLOORCASH-Basic (Weible et al. 2013, 2015)[20] which a team of two students and myself constructed from 2011 to 2013 as part of the interdisciplinary research project *Social Security as a Human Right* (***F**inancial Assistance, **L**and Policy, and Gl**o**bal S**o**cial **R**ights - **FLOOR**)*.[21] Both datasets cover all identifiable nationally administered social cash transfer programmes and all 148 countries of the global South, as of 2012/2013. Although the access to and the quality of data on social cash transfers has improved considerably over the past years, still today this dataset is the only one to provide refined variables on all social cash

[17] In a few parts of the world, cash-based assistance is (still) not the principal form of social assistance such as in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA region) (Silva et al. 2013, p. 114).

[18] FLOORCASH-SocCit is freely accessible at SowiDataNet|datorium by GESIS; https://doi.org/10.7802/2249.

[19] I thank the World Poverty Institute, now Global Development Institute, University of Manchester, UK, as well as the Bielefeld Graduate School in History and Sociology (BGHS), Bielefeld University, for granting me a visiting research fellowship at the World Poverty Institute, University of Manchester, from September 2013 to February 2014. I constructed the first version of FLOORCASH-SocCit in this period.

[20] Downloadable from www.floorcash.org.

[21] Principle investigators included Lutz Leisering (branch of sociology), Benjamin Davy (branch of land policy), Ulrike Davy (branch of law). I thank the German Research Foundation (DFG) for funding this project 2010-2013 as well as the Faculty of Sociology of Bielefeld University for the work contracts and for providing us with the required offices.

transfer programmes across the global South that are required for an in-depth analysis of *entitlements* (see section 2.5 and Chapter 5).

Second, due to a lack of ready-to use measures on entitlements for the large n analysis of social cash transfers in the global South, I have developed a sophisticated set of indicators tailored to the entitlement analysis of social cash transfers in the global South in view of social citizenship, building on an operationalization of the concept of social citizenship as described above. The measures and indicators of social rights developed in Northern welfare state research, especially Esping-Andersen's decommodification index (Esping-Andersen 1990), are hardly applicable to the global South and of little avail for social assistance (see sections 2.1.3 and 2.4.3). My analytical kit comprises elaborate indices on inclusion and on institutionalization (see Chapter 4). The set of indicators facilitates a standardized mapping and comparison of entitlements across the global South. It can be used by future researchers and by policymakers, for a continued monitoring of programmes and entire national systems of social cash transfer programmes (countries).

Third, I provide the first in-depth and most comprehensive empirical analysis of all 282 social cash transfer programmes in all 148 countries in the global South in view of social citizenship, with a focus on entitlements (Chapters 6 to 9). The two comprehensive databases that were constructed after FLOORCASH have not yet been used for in-depth analyses (see section 2.5), and, as mentioned earlier, are less informative regarding entitlements.

The structure of the doctoral dissertation falls into five parts: the state of the art and the theoretical framework (I); the three contributions to research: conceptualization and operationalization (II), data (III), empirical analyses (IV); discussion and conclusion (V).

At first, I outline the state of the art of the social cash transfer programmes in the global South as well as the relevant gaps in research (Chapter 2). Then I introduce and define the theoretical concepts of my analysis - social cash transfers (and related concepts such as basic income security and social assistance) on the one hand, and social citizenship (and the umbrella concept of citizenship) on the other hand - and examine the relationship between the two (Chapter 3). In the subsequent Chapters, I present the three major contributions of this doctoral dissertation: designing a coherent analytical framework including concepts and measures for a large N analysis of social cash transfers (Chapter 4); the dataset FLOORCASH-SocCit – the social citizenship dataset on social cash transfers in the global South –, which I have constructed myself (Chapter 5); and finally, the empirical analyses of social cash transfers in view of social citizenship (Chapters 6 to 9). In the first empirical

Chapter, I analyse the scope of social cash transfers, both as regards programmes (who is entitled?; Chapter 6) and countries (who is included in national social cash transfer arrangements?; Chapter 7), including a typology of programmes and a classification of countries, respectively. I then inquire into the rights principles of social cash transfers: what conditions of access? (Chapter 8). And lastly, I investigate the institutionalization of social cash transfer programmes: how secure are entitlements? (Chapter 9). In the subsequent Chapter, I first summarize the findings from the empirical analyses and then discuss them in view of social citizenship, which includes a discussion related to perceptions of deservingness (Chapter 10). At the end of the doctoral dissertation, I draw a conclusion from the study, highlighting its major contributions (Chapter 11).

STATE OF THE ART AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2 State of the art: Towards a comparative analysis of social cash transfers in the global South

Interest in social cash transfers, both practical and academic, has been continuously increasing over the past 20 years. Today we find a huge number of different kinds of publications on social cash transfers. Apart from academic journal articles, many reports and papers are available online, produced by the whole range of stakeholders and policy actors around social cash transfers: international organizations, national governments and their subordinate bodies, private consultancies, non-governmental organizations as well as research institutes and scholars.

What do we know about social cash transfers so far?[22] I do not revise or summarize the flood of existing studies, since most of them analyse single programmes. Instead, I strictly follow my research perspective. The focus of this doctoral dissertation is, for the first time ever, on the systematic and comprehensive *comparison* of *all* identifiable nationally administered social cash transfer programmes in all countries of the global South with a focus on entitlements and based on a large N[23] dataset (FLOORCASH-SocCit, Chapter 5). That is why I concentrate on the state of the art of the *large n* and *comparative* research on social cash transfer programmes and the relevant knowledge gaps. Only where relevant, I refer to smaller-scale analyses and case studies.

At first, I provide an overview of the five relevant strands of literature that meet in the large n comparative analysis of social cash transfers, including their limitations regarding my own research project (section 2.1). The structure of the Chapter is then related to the different kinds of contributions which I make in this doctoral dissertation:

[22] For an early, condensed version of this Chapter on the state of the art, see Weible and Leisering 2019, pp. 139–141.

[23] In the following, I capitalize N ("large N") when N refers to the total universe of cases (social cash transfer programmes) and I use lower case n ("large n") for quantitative comparative studies, which include only a selection of cases.

- First, a contribution to the *empirical knowledge* about social cash transfers as regards the three dimensions of social citizenship – inclusion, rights principles, and institutionalization. I outline the relevant knowledge and the gaps in section 2.2.
- Second, a contribution to the *typologies* of social cash transfer programmes (which forms part of the analysis of the dimension of inclusion in Chapter 6, but which constitutes a separate investigation). I reconstruct the relevant typologies in section 2.3.
- Third, a *methodological* contribution, which consists of designing concepts and developing measures for a large N analysis of social cash transfers in view of social citizenship. I outline the methodological approaches so far and the gap which I fill in section 2.4.
- Fourth, a contribution to the *data* infrastructure regarding basic social protection by means of the self-constructed dataset FLOORCASH-SocCit with a focus on entitlements to social cash transfers. I sketch the available databases and the lack of data in section 2.5.

Finally, I draw conclusions from the state of the art and the gaps in research which I identified for the design of my own study in section 2.6.

2.1 Five strands of the comparative literature and their limitations

In this Chapter I demonstrate that the number of studies that is directly relevant to my doctoral dissertation is quite limited. Yet, there is a wider range of large n comparative studies on social cash transfer programmes, each with significant contributions, but also with considerable limitations. I maintain that these studies may be clustered around five strands of comparative literature which I sketch in the following. I introduce them in an order of *direct* relevance to my own study, starting with the strand of lowest direct relevance. Each strand is characterized by its distinct object of study and its major research interest respectively.[24]

[24] Nevertheless, there are overlaps between some of the strands.

2.1.1 Effectiveness studies: impacts and more

What would be the use of social cash transfer programmes if they were not effective? Do they really provide assistance to poor people as intended and do they reduce poverty? It is thanks to many impact evaluations and effectiveness studies that we know that social cash transfers by and large "work" (see, for example, the large-scale reviews published by ODI (Bastagli et al. 2016) and DFID (2011).

Impact evaluations are the dominant form of assessing the effectiveness of social cash transfer programmes (Barrientos 2013b, p. 28). Impact evaluations focus on the effects of the transfers on the recipients (and their households) and their living conditions. Several impact evaluations investigate the contribution of social cash transfers to poverty reduction (for an overview see Barrientos 2013a, pp. 145–160 and Barrientos and Niño-Zarazúa 2011, for example), to education (Baird et al. 2014, for example), health (see Owusu-Addo et al. 2018, for example), or nutrition.[25]

More generally, *evaluations* look for strengths and weaknesses of the programmes such as feasibility, appropriateness, effectiveness (ODI 2007). These studies investigate and suggest how the programmes *should* be designed to gain the "best" results. Consequently, evaluations usually include "lessons learned" or explicit policy recommendations (such as Ayala Consulting 2003, for example). They analyse what role the programme implementation plays, but also how important the design and "design options" are for the effectiveness of social cash transfer programmes (see Fiszbein and Shady (2009, pp. 22, 165) and Bastagli et al. 2016, for example). The range of topics and issues analysed is vast.[26] To give two examples, means-tested ("targeted") programmes are compared with non-means-tested ("universal") programmes; and programmes with behavioural conditions (*conditional cash transfers)* are compared with programmes without behavioural conditions ("unconditional" transfers) (Slater 2011). But also undesired side-effects of interventions are analysed, such as the increase of child work in the context of social cash transfers (Hoop et al. 2020).

[25] In the development context, the contributions to education, health, and nutrition are referred to as *human capital building* (see Fiszbein and Shady 2009).

[26] For example, see the studies on programmes in African countries published by the *Transfer Project,* a research initiative on social cash transfers undertaken by UNICEF Innocenti, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), University of North Carolina, UNICEF Regional and Country Offices, national governments, and local research partners; https://transfer.cpc.unc.edu/; 2020-09-08.

Evaluations probably represent the most diverse strand of literature on social cash transfers, comprising both scholarly investigations and practice-focused reports by development agencies and consultancies. Typically, impact evaluations and evaluation studies more generally consist of case studies or smaller scale comparisons (such as Veras Soares et al. 2010, for example). Comparative studies are usually limited to a certain type of social cash transfer programmes such as *conditional cash transfers* (Fiszbein and Shady 2009, for example), or to very particular aspects (such as Owusu-Addo et al. 2018 on the impacts on health in Sub-Saharan Africa). Large-scale comparative studies are scarce. They usually consist of literature reviews and lack analyses by standardized data.[27] That is why this strand of literature is only indirectly of relevance to my own investigation.

2.1.2 The "political economy of social cash transfers" and further large n explanatory approaches

A growing strand of literature is related to the political and economic drivers of social policy in developing countries (e.g. Carnes and Mares 2009; Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Huber and Stephens 2012; Rudra 2007). A few studies focus on social cash transfer programmes to investigate the politico-economic conditions that promoted the expansion of these programmes and the national and international circumstances under which the programmes were introduced (e.g. Brooks 2015; Rudolph 2016; and Sugiyama 2011). Other studies try to find out which political factors may account for differences with respect to design and implementation of social cash transfer programmes (de la O 2015). Most of these studies on social cash transfers limit the sample to a sub-set of one particular programme type, most prominently social pensions (such as Böger and Leisering 2020; Rudolph 2016). Alternatively, the studies reduce the sample even further, analysing one particular type in one particular world region such as the conditional cash transfers in Latin America (such as Sugiyama 2011; de la O 2015).

Other scholars attempt to take all social cash transfer programmes into account, but at the cost of resorting to very coarse classifications of social cash transfer programmes, such as simply distinguishing conditional and "unconditional" programmes (Brooks 2015) and relying on incomplete classifications, respectively (Dodlova et al. 2017; for critical discussions of the

[27] The dominance of literature reviews among comparative studies might be explained by the observation that assessing impacts is a demanding issue in itself (Barrientos 2013a, pp. 145–147).

contributions see section 2.3.2 and section 2.4.4, respectively). It may be doubted that such coarse programme classifications are able to comprehend the universe of social cash transfer programmes, which consists of highly diverse programmes, as this doctoral dissertation demonstrates (see section 6.4).

Barrientos has recently tested whether a general theory of welfare institutions may explain the massive expansion of programmes, based on the *Social Assistance in Low and Middle Income Countries (SALMIC)* dataset, which basically covers the entire global South (Barrientos 2019; see section 2.5.2 on the SALMIC dataset). Due to a focus on explanatory factors, the object of study – the social cash transfers – is depicted by a single (dependent) variable: the "reach", defined as the (estimated) total number of direct and indirect beneficiaries of social cash transfers in a country as a fraction of the population. This aggregate measure may be adequate for testing explanatory hypotheses, but it is of little avail for entitlement analyses (see section 2.4.2).

2.1.3 Welfare regimes: a comprehensive approach applied to the global South

Several scholars follow the *welfare regime approach*, a research tradition founded by Esping-Andersen thirty years ago (Esping-Andersen 1990). Esping-Andersen classified North and West European *welfare-state regimes* in view of three aspects: the relationship between the state and market in the production of welfare, stratification, and the so-called decommodification, that is "the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market participation" through social rights, which make workers independent from the requirement to "commodify" their workforce in the labour market (Esping-Andersen 1990, pp. 37; 21–23). Esping-Andersen´s theoretical approach has constantly been refined and extended towards further countries, more recently even towards the global South (see Wehr et al. 2012 for an introduction with respect to the global South; for a critical taking stock of the research tradition see Powell and Barrientos 2015). However, it is questionable whether the welfare regime approach easily "travels South" (title of Wehr 2009), since fundamental assumptions on which the theory is built - such as the standard of a formal labour market and extensive commodification of workers - are not fulfilled in the global South (see Leisering 2019, pp. 26–32 for a discussion).

The welfare regime approach might be considered of relevance to my own study in view of Marshall´s concept of social citizenship, since the approach implies an institutional perspective, which "captures the formal rules that guide and shape the quality of social rights and correlative duties“ (Esser et al. 2009, p. 93). That is why I discuss the social rights approach as a methodological approach to social cash transfers (section 2.4.3).

It is remarkable that scholars following the welfare regime approach were among the first to publish large-scale comparative analyses of social protection (and welfare, more generally) in the countries of the global South (Gough and Abu Sharkh 2010, 2011; Gough and Wood 2004; Wood and Gough 2006).[28] However, these studies tend to use very coarse measures like public spending on health and education (Gough and Abu Sharkh 2010) or spending on social security and welfare (Rudra 2007), that do not allow to draw conclusions on social cash transfers in particular.[29]

Nevertheless, there are two exceptions that do analyse social cash transfers: a contribution by Esser et al. (2009) on child benefits, which suggest a framework for analysis, but lacks the operationalization (see my discussion in section 2.4.1); and an unpublished contribution by Jeremy Seekings on a typology of Southern welfare regimes, based on spending measures. Seekings distinguishes “pauperist” and “workerist” welfare regimes, with pauperist regimes as those largely focused on social assistance, assumingly created through a “wave” of democratization across the global South since the 1990s. Seekings considers the pauperist regimes as having changed into “*citizenship*-based regimes” (Seekings 2013, p. 16, italics there; see also Seekings 2012). I discuss the limitations of the indicator of spending (or expenditure) in section 2.4.2.

2.1.4 Social safety nets: far beyond social cash transfers

“Social safety net” is a label coined by the World Bank and includes a large variety of non-contributory social protection programmes. According to the World Bank, social safety net programmes are “noncontributory interventions designed to help individuals and households cope with chronic poverty, destitution, and vulnerability” (World Bank 2018b, p. 5). In addition to social cash transfers (“conditional cash transfers”, “unconditional cash transfers”, and “social pensions”), social safety nets comprise “[f]ood and in-kind transfers, [s]chool feeding programs, [p]ublic works, [f]ee waivers and targeted subsidies, [o]ther interventions (social services)” (World Bank 2018b, pp. 5–6).

[28] For an overview of studies on welfare regimes in developing countries see Pinilla-Roncancio 2015.

[29] The Annex in Seekings 2013 provides an overview of the measures and indicators of relevant studies.

In the past years the World Bank has regularly issued reports on the *State of Social Safety Nets* (World Bank 2014, 2015, 2017, 2018b). Although the measures to analyse social safety nets and the categories to classify the programmes have been constantly refined over the past years[30], the results are usually not displayed separately by type of social safety net programme.[31] Besides, the Social Safety Nets reports are mainly based on the ASPIRE data base that is predominantly founded on household survey data and largely lacks institutional data (see section 2.5). This limits the utility for entitlement analysis considerably. That is why the social safety net analyses are of limited value for my own study.

2.1.5 Design and implementation of social cash transfer programmes

The largest "strand" of comparative literature on social cash transfers is the remaining literature that deals with the analysis of design and implementation of the programmes. Unlike the previous strands, this strand of literature does not put the emphasis on impacts (section 2.1.1), nor on large n explanatory approaches (section 2.1.2) and it neither follows the welfare regime approach (section 2.1.3), nor the concept of social safety nets (section 2.1.4).

The topics covered by this strand are vast and typically comprise issues such as the spread of programmes across countries; aspects of programme design such as beneficiary selection and "targeting" (see also section 2.2.1), the size of the transfer, and the conditionality of transfers (behavioural conditions, see section 2.2.2); aspects of implementation such as coverage (see section 2.4.2); financing (see section 2.2.3); but also further aspects such as administrative coordination, politics, and legitimacy (see Barrientos 2013a, for example). Some scholars contribute typologies and similar classifications (see section 2.3).

Once again we find that most large-scale comparative publications within this strand of literature are limited to either one particular type of social cash transfers such as social pensions (Böger and Leisering 2017; Palacios and Knox-Vydmanov 2014), or they are limited to a particular world region such as Sub-Saharan Africa (Garcia and Moore 2012) and Africa (Ellis et al. 2009). Other studies select both a particular region and a particular programme

[30] This becomes evident when comparing the latest report of 2018 with the first global report on "safety nets" by Grosh et al. (2008) and with the first State of Social Safety Nets report published in 2014, respectively (World Bank 2014).

[31] As exceptions, the benefit level and income distribution of transfer recipients is displayed for each type of social safety net in the report of 2018; and the number of countries with at least one programme type is indicated separately by programme type (conditional vs. unconditional cash transfers; World Bank 2014, p. 9).

type, such as the most prominent sample of programmes, the so-called *conditional cash transfers* in the region of Latin America (Adato and Hoddinott 2010; Cecchini and Madariaga 2011; de la O 2015, for example).

There are two exceptions: two studies on social cash transfers cover the entire global South and their sample is not limited to a particular programme type. These most pertinent and most comprehensive studies have been published by the two pioneers in comparative research on social cash transfers across the global South: by Armando Barrientos (2013a) and by Lutz Leisering (2019).[32]

Leisering (and team) present the world of social cash transfers including global models shaped by international organizations from a constructivist perspective and embedded in a recognition approach to social policy in development contexts (Leisering 2019). They explain how changing global discourses and how national and international factors contributed to the massive spread of social cash transfer programmes (Leisering and Gliszczynski 2019; Leisering and Böger 2019).[33] The empirical analysis of all social cash transfer programmes in this volume (Weible and Leisering 2019) draws on this doctoral dissertation, that is why I do not discuss it here.

Barrientos (2013a) covers a very wide range of aspects of *anti-poverty transfer programmes* (as he calls the social assistance programmes), with an emphasis on the ethical foundations on the one hand and the "practice" of social assistance including implementation, impacts, financing, and politics on the other hand. Barrientos also covers aspects of programme design and the incidence of social assistance programmes (which I discuss in the relevant sections). His work consistently follows a poverty (reduction) perspective, including a typology (see section 2.3) and a systematic attempt to determine "optimal anti-poverty transfers".[34]

[32] Both scholars have published earlier versions of their main contributions (Leisering et al. 2006, Leisering 2008, 2009; Barrientos 2007, 2011; Barrientos and Niño-Zarazúa 2011, among others). In addition to numerous articles and papers, Barrientos has recently published a comprehensive database on social cash transfers (see section 2.5.2), but the analysis of the data is only at the beginning. – Both scholars have developed typologies of social cash transfer programmes (see section 2.3.1).

[33] These contributions might be assigned to the strand of literature that deals with explanatory approaches, too (section 2.1.2).

[34] His definition of the *anti-poverty transfers programmes* - as he calls the objects of study - underlines that his perspective on the transfers is on *poverty*: "(a)nti-poverty transfer programmes – or social assistance, to use a more precise term – provide direct transfers in cash and/or in kind to individuals or households experiencing poverty or vulnerability, with the aim of facilitating their permanent exit from poverty" (Barrientos 2013a, p. 3).

Irrespective of the great value of Barrientos´ contributions, his study has two important limitations which are relevant in view of my own research objective: first, the study is based on the authors´ exceptional knowledge that links general observations with the detailed insights from particular cases. It is possibly based on a descriptive database of 2010 (Barrientos et al. 2010), but it is not based on a quantitative dataset and quantitative analyses of the programme designs (see section 2.5).[35] [36]

Second, Barrientos´ focus on poverty reduction and on the practice of social assistance entail that his contribution is not an entitlement analysis. He does not raise the question of ´who is entitled to social cash transfers?´. The topic of target groups rather appears as a practical and technical issue in the "strategies" for "beneficiary selection" (Barrientos 2013a, pp. 113–116; see sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2).

As a consequence, there is no large N study of social cash transfers across the global South with a focus on entitlements that comprises all programmes and programme types, respectively.

2.1.6 Conclusion: the research gaps to be filled

The brief sketch of the five strands of comparative literature on social cash transfers in the global South reveals three major limitations that are relevant with regard to my own investigation:

1. Scope: The number of studies that analyse all social cash transfer programmes across the global South is very limited. Most comparative large n studies are restricted to a certain type of programmes or to a certain world region or to both. And if studies include the entire global South, the object of study is mostly not tailored to social cash transfers (but to the label of *social safety nets* or to the much wider concept of *welfare regimes*).
2. Methodological approach: The very few exceptions to analyse all social cash transfer programmes across the global South either resort to a very coarse classification of social cash transfer programmes to cover all programmes, instead of comprehending

[35] The same applies to Leisering´s early contributions (Leisering 2008, 2009).

[36] As one consequence (among others), the typology of social cash transfer programmes he develops are ideal types rather than types consisting of programme clusters reconstructed from empirical data (Barrientos 2013a, p. 129; see also section 2.3).

the universe of social cash transfer programmes precisely (see section 2.3); or they use single aggregate indicators (coverage; spending) which are barely suitable for studying *entitlements* to social cash transfers (see section 2.4).

3. Statistical data: The only *comprehensive* and detailed study to include all social cash transfer programmes across the entire global South (Barrientos 2013a) is not based on a quantitative dataset (see section 2.5) and does not analyse *entitlements*.

These three major limitations outline the research gaps I am filling with my doctoral dissertation:

(1) a comparative empirical analysis of social cash transfers across the global South, which is built on

(2) concepts and an analytical framework adequate to study *entitlements* to social cash transfers and which is based on

(3) *quantitative* data of *all* social cash transfer programmes across the global South (large N).

In the following sections I present the research gaps in more detail.

2.2 Zooming in on the three dimensions of social citizenship: Comparative contributions to the research on social cash transfers

In this section I sketch the state of the art of comparative research on social cash transfers in the global South. The section refers to "what we know" and to the results of empirical studies, respectively (as opposed to the methodological approaches that were applied, which I sketch in section 2.3). The section is structured according to the theoretical foundation of this doctoral dissertation, which I develop in Chapter 3. Anticipating my theoretical contribution, I conceive of three dimensions of social citizenship which guide my analysis: *inclusion* (the scope of social cash transfers; section 2.2.1), *rights principles* (the conditions of access to social cash transfers; section 2.2.2), and *institutionalization* (the reliability and "security" of social cash transfers; section 2.2.3). In the conclusion I summarize the research gaps to be closed (section 2.2.4).

2.2.1 What we know about inclusion: Who is entitled to social cash transfers?

Who are the target groups of the social cash transfer programmes? The issue of target groups has played a marginal role in the comparative literature on social cash transfers. Quite surprisingly, there is no empirical large n study until today to answer this question underpinned by figures. Besides, in most studies the *empirical* question of ´who is addressed´ is not explicitly discussed.[37] Instead, target groups are basically discussed in three respects:

First, what is widely debated in the literature on social cash transfers regarding the target groups are the *targeting mechanisms* (or "beneficiary selection" (Barrientos 2013a, pp. 113–115)). These mechanisms to select the target population of programmes include, among others, means tests (population below what economic thresholds?), geographic selection (in which regions of a country?), and categorical targeting (of what demographic and social characteristics?).[38] I argue that these mechanisms are important issues that have to be taken into account to determine the *scope* of programmes and to analyse the conditions of access to the programmes, respectively (see Chapter 4 on defining the concepts and measures of this study, in particular section 4.3 on the self-constructed *target categories*, section 4.4 on the operationalization of the scope which includes *geographical targeting*, and section 4.6 on the operationalization of the conditions of access which includes *means testing*). Above all, the aspect of "categorical targeting" should have the potential to answer the question of "who is targeted?", on the condition that all categories, which are targeted, are systematically recorded. But this is hardly the case in the literature. Instead, these aspects are merely *discussed*, which does not *answer* the question of "who is targeted". Even statistical evidence, indicating that 66% of the programmes use categorical targeting, 29% use geographical targeting, and 48% use means tests (Dodlova et al. 2018, p. 55) leaves the question of "who do the programmes target?" open.

Second, there are debates about the issue of who *should* be targeted and who actually is targeted, identifying *errors of inclusion* and *exclusion* respectively (e.g. Sabates-Wheeler et al. 2015; Barrientos 2013a, pp. 131–137). Commonly, inclusion in this context only refers to the *overall* share of the population considered as non-poor, while exclusion refer to the

[37] But see, for example, the Chapter in Grosh et al. 2008, pp. 345–372 on "assisting traditionally vulnerable groups", where options in view of the entire social protection system are discussed.

[38] *Categorical targeting* implies "that benefits are made conditional on belonging to a group with certain characteristics (e.g. with regard to age, sex, etc.) or to a specific social category (e.g. women-headed households)." (Dodlova et al. 2016, p. 5 (Codebook)).

overall share of the population classified as poor.[39] But, similar to aspect of targeting mechanisms, these debates are practically silent on the question of who is (what groups are) targeted by the social cash transfer programmes (but see Schubert 2020 with an exceptionally systematic approach to assessing exclusion).

Third, target groups are indirectly referred to in *typologies* of social cash transfer programmes. However, although the target groups are used as one central feature to form the typologies, this is rarely made explicit (see section 2.3). What is more, when scholars refer to particular types of social cash transfer programmes, such as *conditional cash transfers* and *social pensions*, they often make the readers believe that the programme types covered fixed target groups (such as Dodlova et al. 2017, 2018; see also section 2.5 on databases). Social pensions for example are used as synonyms for social cash transfer programmes that target older persons. In my critical discussion of social cash transfer typologies (sections 2.3 and 6.4.1) and in my empirical analysis (Chapter 6), I challenge this simplification of patterns of target groups in social cash transfer programmes.

Apart from the indirect references to target groups, there are a few studies that explicitly mention different target groups of social cash transfers.[40] The earliest global study on social cash transfers both in developed and in developing countries by Lutz Leisering and colleagues provides the following list of target groups: older persons, survivors, persons with disabilities, rural populations, AIDS-affected individuals and households, elderly-headed households, female-headed households, unemployed, working poor, children (Leisering et al. 2006, p. 95).[41]

[39] *Exclusion error* is defined as the ratio of those entitled (here: poor) but who do not receive the transfer, to the totality of entitled citizens (here: the total poor population); *inclusion error* is defined as the ratio of those who are not entitled (here: the non-poor recipients) but who receive the transfer to the totality of recipients (Veras Soares et al. 2010, p. 176; Barrientos 2013a, p. 133).

[40] The SALMIC dataset (Barrientos 2018a) includes indicators on coverage as well as an indicator on the “main target population” and another indicator to assess whether the entire category is covered or only some participants within the category. The dataset also includes indicators on the different targeting strategies. However, analyses on the data have hardly been published yet (but see Barrientos 2019, discussed in section 2.1.2).

[41] Leisering mentions even more target groups in a later publication (Leisering 2008; see section 2.3).

A similar, quite detailed list is provided by a report by the Asian Development Bank on social assistance in Asia and the Pacific (Howell 2001a, 2001b).[42] The "vulnerable groups" within the region are children and youth, persons with disabilities, women ("gender") such as older women living alone, female-headed households, unmarried elderly women, elderly people, and poor people. As regards "the poor", she explains that "[t]he majority of the poor in Asia are unemployed, landless laborers, small-scale fishermen and low-income earners struggling to survive in rural areas" (Howell 2001b, pp. 273–274). This suggests that by "the poor" she refers to poor persons of working age. In addition, Howell mentions victims of natural disasters, "homeless children"[43], war invalids, and ethnic minorities (Howell 2001b, p. 282).[44]

Although the listing seems impressive, it evidently lacks a systematic approach. Moreover, the author does not provide any empirical figures about the relative or absolute sizes of the groups.

Garcia and Moore (2012) at least underpin their findings on the target groups of cash transfer programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa with the following Chart:

[42] Howell´s contribution comprises a wide range of social assistance programmes including subsidies, in-kind support, and public works, in addition to social cash transfer programmes.

[43] "Orphans; Street children; Death of one or both parents; Abandonment; Abuse; Unable to be supported due to poverty in family; Child labor; Children sold into domestic service" (Howell 2001a, p. 322).

[44] Comparing "traditional" with "emerging" types of vulnerable groups, Howells names in addition displaced populations, low status caste, "women who suffer from domestic violence", single-parent households, substance abusers, migrants, and refugees (Howell 2001a, 2001b, p. 283).



Figure 2.2.1 Groups targeted in conditional and unconditional cash transfer programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa

Source: Garcia and Moore 2012, p. 84

Note: Sample size is 15 for CCTs, 96 UCTs, and 111 for all programmes. Samples are based on programmes with known information about the targeted group.

The *International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG)* provides an inventory on non-contributory programmes in Africa and presents a similar graph (IPC-IG 2016, pp. 10–11). The authors admit that about 40 percent of the programmes in their sample addressed “more than one demographic group at the same time” and that “[m]oreover, the targeted demographic categories may overlap” (IPC-IG 2016, pp. 10–11).

All these contributions illustrate how confusing and at the same time complex the world of target groups of social cash transfer programmes is. But the studies contribute little to answer the question of target groups of social cash transfer programmes *systematically*. Evidently, the categories chosen to classify the target groups are neither clear, nor clear-cut, nor are they complementary categories. I revert to the issue of classifying target groups below in the sections 4.3 and 6.1.

2.2.2 What we know about the rights principles: What are the conditions of access to social cash transfers?

Unlike the target groups, the conditions of access to social cash transfers belong to the issues that are extensively discussed. The conditions of access are mostly discussed in the context of the effectiveness of social cash transfers. Studies try to find out how social cash transfers *should* be designed to provide the "best results" (see Bastagli et al. 2016, for example). The debates are mainly centred on a few particular conditions of access, above all, on the *behavioural conditions*, the *means test*, and – to a lesser extent - on the question whether social cash transfers are *individual* or *household* payments. I limit this section to these three conditions of access, since it is also those which I analyse in this doctoral dissertation (see section 4.6 and Chapter 8).

Data on the incidence of conditions of access is usually provided in the form of case studies or a review of these. Only a few years ago, with the earliest publication of a large N dataset on social cash transfer programmes and initial analyses, first quantitative figures on the conditions of access to social cash transfers have become available (Dodlova et al. 2016, 2018; for a critical discussion of the database see section 2.5.2).[45]

Among the most controversial topics is the issue of *conditionality* (often simply referred to as "conditions"), that is whether or not the receipt of the transfer is conditional on the recipients` participation in certain activities. These activities are mostly related to health (such as regular health check-ups and vaccinations), education (such as children´s enrolment in school and regular school attendance), or - in the case of public work programmes - to the provision of labour (see also section 4.6.3).[46] [47] I speak of *behavioural conditions* in order to emphasize

[45] The SALMIC dataset (Barrientos 2018a) includes indicators on the following conditions of access: different kinds of means tests, different types of behavioural conditions, direct recipient of the transfer, payment methods, and recertification of participants. However, analyses of these data have not been published so far.

[46] A few programmes impose different behavioural conditions, such as Brazil´s PETI (*Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil*), which requires children who have formerly worked for income to refrain from such income generating work.

[47] The *SALMIC* dataset (Barrientos 2018a; see section 2.5.2) provides data on different types of behavioural conditions: utilisation of social services, school enrolment, school attendance, periodic health check-ups, immunization, nutritional activities, supply of labour. Analyses have not been published yet.

that the conditionality refers to the recipients´ behaviour.[48] The aspect of behavioural conditions is directly related to one particular programme type, the *conditional cash transfer programmes* (see sections 2.3 and 6.4). The study on social cash transfer programmes in the global South by Dodlova and colleagues suggests that slightly more than half of the social cash transfer programmes are non-conditional (54%; 101 out of 186) (Dodlova et al. 2018, p. 55). However, the total number of programmes which the dataset comprises is comparatively low (see section 2.5.2).

Another condition of access that is frequently discussed is the *means test* (see also section 4.6.1). It consists of an assessment of the financial means (usually income and assets) of applicants in order to determine whether they are eligible for a social cash transfer or not (Barrientos 2013a, p. 114). The means test is usually referred to in the context of *targeting* (or *beneficiary selection*; see section 2.2.1) and *effectiveness* (section 2.1.1). It is one mode to select recipients according to the definition of the target population, such as those citizens with least means (or more precisely, those below the means test threshold). A means test is supposed to contribute to efficient spending of the programme budget (that is on those with least means) and to reduce poverty most effectively (see Samson et al. 2010, p. 105, for example). Dodlova and colleagues find that 48% of the social cash transfer programmes in their sample use means tests and 26% of the programmes use the variant of *proxy means tests* (Dodlova et al. 2018, p. 55). [49] Moreover, Dodlova and colleagues indicate that 19% use *community targeting,* in which local information is used to identify the poorest members and households of the communities. It remains, however, unclear how many programmes apply *any* of these three targeting mechanisms, since the programmes partly combine the different methods.

Finally, there is a debate on the question whether social cash transfers constitute provisions to individuals or to entire households. The distinction between individual transfers and household transfers is most relevant in respect of the size of the transfer.[50] To give an

[48] In the context of Latin America, it is also common to speak of "co-responsibilities" (*corresponsabilidades*), suggesting that the recipients have to contribute their part to the success of the programmes, along with the responsibility of the relevant agencies (see also Barrientos 2013a, p. 121).

[49] "*Proxy means tests* use ´easy to observe – difficult to manipulate´ household or individual variables to generate a welfare index, which is then used to decide on entitlement" (Barrientos 2013a, p. 115; emphasis there).

[50] The distinction between individuals and households may also be of importance in view of appropriate means testing (Samson et al. 2010, pp. 110–112).

example, if a social cash transfer that addresses one person is shared within the household, its relative size may be assessed as much smaller than if it is assessed in view of the individual entitlement holder. Barrientos maintains that “[c]ategorical transfers are on the whole individually based, but in developing countries it is important to see them as a household transfer paid through a specified individual” (Barrientos 2013a, p. 118). He underpins his statement with empirical observations that recipients of categorical transfers shared the money within their household. I argue that the individualization of the transfers is an issue of entitlement and of the programme design rather than of how the money is used in practice. But unfortunately, there is no large-scale empirical investigation about the extent to which social cash transfers are *designed* as payments to individuals or households. Moreover, I argue that this issue is not an issue of “either – or”, but of degree. To underline its gradual quality, I refer to it as the *degree of individualization* of social cash transfers (see section 4.6.2).

In conclusion, large N comparative empirical data on the conditions of access to social cash transfers across the global South is hardly available.

2.2.3 What we know about institutionalization: How secure are social cash transfers?

The institutionalization of social cash transfer programmes is discussed as a crucial issue in the literature on social cash transfers. Barrientos considers institutionalization – along with poverty reduction – as one of the most important challenges related to social cash transfers (Barrientos 2013a, pp. 14–15; 99). Barrientos mentions that the early social cash transfer programmes in the 2000s were introduced as “self-standing flagship programmes” rather than as stable institutions (Barrientos 2013a, p. 99). At the same time, he argues that the mere increase of social cash transfers programmes “reflects institution building in developing countries” (Barrientos 2013a, p. 15). *Institutions* in this context are interpreted as the opposite of self-standing and short-term interventions that have long dominated international development policies (Barrientos 2013a, p. 15). According to Barrientos, pilot projects and social cash transfer programmes with a fixed time window indicate an “embryonic stage” of institution building, whereas the “creation of ministries of social development, including social assistance agencies” and “constitutional or legal changes” mark more mature forms of institutionalization. Leisering mentions statutory regulation, increasing standardization (“bureaucratization”), and professionalization as parts of the process of institutionalization of social cash transfers (Leisering et al. 2006, pp. 192–193; see also section 4.7). The duration of provisions may be seen as another central aspect related to the institutionalization of social cash transfer programmes (see section 4.7). Leisering mentions a couple of programmes that qualify (limit) the provision of social cash transfers in terms of duration (Leisering et al. 2006, p. 217). Yet he admits that for most programmes there is no information about the duration of provisions.

At what stage of the presumed process of institution building are social cash transfer programmes now? Barrientos admits that the degree of institutionalization differs sharply by country, but he is certain that "the progression from embryonic to mature forms of institutionalisation (…) is under way in many countries" (Barrientos 2013a, p. 15). However, Barrientos does not provide empirical data to support his hypothesis. Studies based on large-scale comparative data on the incidence of pilot programmes, the sources of funding, and the legal foundations of the programmes, among others, are still missing.[51]

2.2.4 Conclusion: the knowledge gaps to be closed

The brief literature review underlines that quantitative knowledge from comparative research on social cash transfers across the global South in the three dimensions of social citizenship - *inclusion*, *rights principles*, and *institutionalization* - is hardly available.

We know that there are different forms of inclusion (target populations) and of conditions of access (behavioural conditions, means tests, individualization). But we know very little about their incidence across the global South. There are still many open questions: Who are the target groups? Which are the dominant forms of inclusion, which are minor forms? What are wide-spread conditions of access? In which countries do the different forms prevail?

Moreover, the knowledge of how to classify the target groups is strikingly poor. The available lists of target groups do not seem to follow any order. And we do not know whether the "lists" of target populations are exhaustive in the sense of covering all target populations of all social cash transfer programmes.

[51] The SALMIC dataset (Barrientos 2018a) includes several indicators for aspects of institutionalization. The most relevant are the following: pilot stage, legal framework, administrative agencies, centralization, local government discretion, intermediation through social workers, programme registration, and appeals procedure. In addition, the dataset provides numerous indicators for determining the programme budget and costs, including the sources of funding. However, analyses of the data have not been published yet.

What is more, least is known about the degree of institutionalization of social cash transfers across the South. Statistical analyses are still lacking. This suggests that the reliability and "security" of social cash transfers is a widely unexplored issue.

Finally, large n comparative studies on *entitlements* to social cash transfers have hardly been undertaken so far, with Leisering and Barrientos (2013) as the main exception (and as the only global study on (all kinds of) social cash transfers from a social citizenship perspective, which is, however, based on empirical expertise rather than on a dataset; see section 3.3). As a consequence, knowledge of entitlements to social cash transfers across the global South is vastly lacking.

2.3 Classifications of social cash transfers

Several scholars have classified social cash transfer programmes and some of them created consistent typologies.[52] Typologies of social cash transfers may contribute knowledge about "typical" designs of social cash transfer programmes.

Typologies reduce complex social realities to a limited number of groups or concepts, providing us with a clearer and more structured view of the object of study. So, typologies may enable us to comprehend complex relationships (Kelle and Kluge 2010, pp. 10–11). Typologies are considered "the outcome of the process of clustering the objects of study by one or more features into groups and types respectively", with the aim of reaching maximum homogeneity within the types and maximum difference from other types (Kelle and Kluge 2010, p. 85; translation by K.W.). Typologies demonstrate that a number of cases share several features; and types may be defined as combinations of shared features (Lehnert 2007, p. 98).

I argue that typologies must be consistent as regards their (implicit or explicit) criteria that shape the types. If they lack consistent criteria to classify the programmes, I speak of *classifications*. I first introduce the (consistent) typologies of social cash transfers, which cover the programmes of the entire global South (section 2.3.1). Then I present further (less consistent) global programme classifications as well as classifications and typologies which are limited to world regions and programme types, respectively (section 2.3.2). As a

[52] For an early, very brief version of the following review of extant typologies of social cash transfer programmes, see Weible and Leisering 2019, pp. 174–175.

conclusion from the literature review of typologies, I reconstruct a dominant typology of social cash transfers, which may serve as a starting point for my own investigation of social cash transfers (section 2.3.3).

2.3.1 Global typologies

I identified four consistent typologies of social cash transfer programmes in the literature, which cover the entire global South. Before sketching the typologies, I briefly introduce two popular versions of social cash transfers that are linked to *behavioural conditions*, which touches the issue of "*conditionality*" of programmes (see sections 2.2.2 and 4.6.3).

The perhaps most famous type of social cash transfers are the *conditional cash transfers* (for an overview and introduction see Britto 2010 and the contributions in Yeates 2009). In her monograph on conditional cash transfers in Latin America, Ana Lorena de la O describes conditional cash transfers as "one of the most prominent types of antipoverty programs in operation in Latin America and of the most significant social policy innovations of recent decades" (de la O 2015, p. 3). Their central element consists in that "… to break the intergenerational transmission of poverty, cash transfers are contingent on investments by poor people themselves in their children´s nutrition, health, and education" (de la O 2015, p. 3). By means of these behavioural *conditions,* the families must make sure that their children are enrolled in school and/or attend school regularly and/or that they (and sometimes other family members, too) take part in regular health check-ups in order to receive the transfers.

Public works or *public employment programmes* combine two objectives: They generate public employment by building up local infrastructure and vice versa (Gliszczynski 2015, pp. 61–63). They are conceptualized as "fixed-term programmes for the construction of public infrastructure through low-wage labour" (Gliszczynski 2015, p. 61) and therefore may be viewed as conditional programmes, too.

Both *conditional cash transfers* and *public work programmes* are mentioned in the typologies. Which other types of social cash transfer programmes have been identified? Table 2.3.1 provides an overview of the typologies.

Table 2.3.1 Consistent typologies of social cash transfer programmes across the global South

Study	Typology of …	Types	Criteria (reconstructed)	Data
Leisering 2009, 2008; Leisering et al. 2006	Social cash transfers	Non-contributory (´social´) pensions social assistance (without specific reference to families) family-related social assistance[53] conditional cash transfers (money- for-work/public works; money-for-education)	Target groups; behavioural conditions	Literature review; descriptive programme inventory (self-constructed)
Gliszczynski 2015, 2013	Policy models of social cash transfers in global discourses	Social pensions family allowances conditional cash transfers general household assistance [public employment programmes]	Target groups; behavioural conditions	FLOORCASH-Discourse [Documents by international organizations; expert interviews]
Grosh et al. 2008	Safety nets (here: only social cash transfers)	Needs-based social assistance Non-contributory pensions and disability transfers family allowances conditional cash transfers[54] public work programmes	Behavioural conditions; target groups	Literature review; descriptive inventory of *selected* programmes
Barrientos 2013a, Barrientos 2011	Social assistance	Pure income transfers Income transfer combined with asset accumulation	Poverty concepts [explicit criteria]	Barrientos et al. 2010; literature review;

[53] In Leisering 2009, the two types of s*ocial assistance (without specific reference to families)* and *family-related social assistance* are merged into one single type called *social assistance*.

[54] The authors divide all safety net programmes into three basic categories: 1. *unconditional transfers in cash and in kind*, 2. *income-generation programs*, as well as 3. *programs that protect and enhance human capital and access to basic services.* Social cash transfers figure in category 1 and 3. The unconditional social cash transfers in category 1 are the *needs-based social assistance*; *noncontributory old-age pension schemes* or *noncontributory pensions and disability transfers*; *family allowance*; besides there are the *conditional transfers* of category 3.

	(human development; employment guarantees)	empirical expertise
	Integrated poverty reduction programmes	

Source: Author´s reconstruction.

Lutz Leisering´s typology of social cash transfers in the global South, developed in the mid-2000s, is based on a self-constructed programme inventory with a focus on the programme designs (Leisering 2009, 2008; Leisering et al. 2006). Although this inventory by programme type is very simple,[55] covering only the country and the target group (but not even the name of the programme), it turns the typology in the most relevant one in view of my research questions. Leisering identifies the following types:

1. [non-conditional] *non-contributory (´social´) pensions* for older persons above a certain age (sometimes including persons with disabilities, orphans, widows);
2. *conditional cash transfers*
    a) for families with children (money-for-education)
    b) for poor persons fit for work (public works);
3. [non-conditional] *family-related social assistance* for poor families with children;
4. [non-conditional] s*ocial assistance (without specific reference to families)* for highly diverse target groups, namely “persons threatened by starvation”, “victims of natural disasters”, pregnant women living alone, “single mothers and women with many children”, refugees, youth on vocational training, relatives of prisoners, “diverse other groups”, and the “total population” [sic] (Leisering 2008, p. 86).

Although not made explicit, Leisering classifies the programmes by two criteria: target group and behavioural conditions.

Several years later, Moritz von Gliszczynski discovers very similar types of “policy models” of social cash transfers in global discourses among the leading development policy actors (mostly international organizations and government agencies; Gliszczynski 2015, pp. 27–66, especially Table 2.2, p. 37 with a summary):

1. [non-conditional] *social pensions* for “poor and vulnerable older persons”;

[55] It consists of a few tables presented in Leisering et al. 2006, pp. 106, 129–130, 142, 155.

2. *conditional cash transfers* for “poor and vulnerable families who underinvest in the human capital of their children”;
3. [non-conditional] f*amily allowances* for “poor and vulnerable families with children” and for “poor and vulnerable children as individuals” respectively;
4. [non-conditional] *general household assistance* for “all poor and vulnerable households, including working age poor”;
5. [[conditional] *public employment programmes* for working age poor as an “alternative policy model”].

Again, the criteria used to form the types consist of the target groups and the behavioural conditions. However, it is important to keep in mind that these types are not based on a review of empirical programme designs, but rather on an analysis of global *discourses* around social cash transfers.

Perhaps surprisingly, the five types (of social cash transfers and of policy models respectively) identified by Leisering and by von Gliszczynski are similar to the types of social cash transfers which are included in a broader typology of *safety nets* by Grosh and colleagues (Grosh et al. 2008, pp. 253–337; see pp. 255, 335–337, 465–473, 486–501 for an overview):[56]

1. *noncontributory pensions and disability transfers*,
2. *family allowances*
3. *needs-based social assistance* for “[c]hronically poor working families”, “[t]hose not expected to work: children, the elderly, the disabled”, “[t]hose needing temporary assistance”;
4. *conditional cash transfers* for chronically poor and vulnerable poor families with low level of human capital, especially children and mothers;
5. *public works* for “[c]hronically poor unemployed at the margins of the labor market” as well as “[t]ransient poor, shortterm unemployed, and seasonal workers”.

Again, the typology is evidently based on behavioural conditions and the target group, although with a different emphasis of the two, with behavioural conditions as the main criterion. In contrast to the other two typologies, disability is explicitly mentioned in the first type.

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[56] See section 2.1.4 for the concept of (social) safety nets.

A different typology of social assistance programmes has been developed by Armando Barrientos (Barrientos 2013a, pp. 106–110). His typology draws on the assumption that different understandings of poverty lay the foundation for different designs of the programmes. Barrientos distinguishes three different types: *pure income transfers*, *income transfers combined with asset accumulation*, and *integrated poverty reduction programmes* (Barrientos 2013a, pp. 106–110; see Barrientos et al. 2010 with an early version of this typology).

The first type of *pure income transfers* targets households in (extreme) poverty and vulnerable groups and includes child/family allowances as well as social pensions. According to Barrientos, these programmes follow an understanding of poverty as consumption deficit.

The second type of *income transfers combined with asset accumulation* aims "to strengthen the productive capacity of households in poverty" (Barrientos 2013a, p. 108). The programmes of this type are split into two sub-types: *conditional cash transfers* that promote the education and health of the beneficiaries and *public work programmes*.[57] According to Barrientos, these programmes are based on an understanding of poverty as a deficit in consumption and productivity.

The third type, the *integrated poverty reduction programmes,* "combine a range of interventions focused on the poorest" such as China´s *Dibao*, Chile´s *Chile Solidario* and South Korea´s *Minimum Living Standard System.*[58] These programmes follow an understanding of poverty as a deficit in consumption, productivity, and social inclusion. Barrientos considers this last type of programme "an important innovation in social assistance" (Barrientos 2013a, p. 109).

Barrientos´ typology is outstanding in the area of social cash transfers in that it is based on a theoretical concept. However, concepts of poverty are only indirectly of interest to my research questions. Moreover, mapping and comparing the three programme types empirically would require several indicators that go beyond the cash element of the programmes, in particular in view of the type of integrated poverty reduction programmes with its integrated set of interventions.

[57] In Barrientos´ recent database, the SALMIC dataset (Barrientos 2018a), the second type is split into *income transfers plus human capital investment* (called *conditional income transfers* in the map explorer) and *income transfers plus community assets* (or *employment guarantees*).

[58] In FLOORCASH-SocCit South Korea´s programme is called *National Basic Livelihood Security System.*

2.3.2 Less consistent global classifications and typologies limited in scope

In addition to the four global typologies of social cash transfer programmes presented in the previous section 2.3.1, several global classifications have been published, which, however, lack consistent criteria to classify the programmes (see Table 2.3.2).

Table 2.3.2 Less consistent classifications of social cash transfer programmes across the global South

Study	Typology of …	Types	Criteria (reconstructed)	Data
Dodlova et al. 2018, 2016	Non-Contributory Social Transfer Programmes	Unconditional family support social pensions conditional cash transfers public works	Behavioural conditions; target groups [inconsistent]/ policy models of social cash transfers [incomplete]	Non-Contributory Social Transfer Programmes (NSTP) in Developing Countries Data Set
Silva et al. 2013; World Bank 2018b, 2017, 2015, 2014	Social Safety Nets (here: only social cash transfers)	conditional cash unconditional cash public works (social pension)	Behavioural conditions; (target group) [inconsistent]	ASPIRE (World Bank n.d.)
Chirchir and Farooq 2016	Social protection (here: only social cash transfers)	1. Household targeted social assistance programmes - Unconditional cash transfer - Conditional cash transfer - workfare 2. Individual entitlement programmes - Child benefit - Disability benefit - Old age pension	Beneficiary unit; behavioural conditions; target group [inconsistent]	[not indicated]

Source: Author´s reconstruction.

The dataset *Non-Contributory Social Transfer Programmes (NSTP) in Developing Countries* contributed by Dodlova and colleagues (2018, 2016) provides a programme classification in that all social cash transfer programmes are classified by "programme type". The programme types consist of the following types:

- *unconditional family support* for "low-income households or specifically to children"
- [non-conditional] *social pensions* for the elderly
- *conditional cash transfers* [without definition of the target group]
- [conditional] *public works* [without definition of the target group].

Dodlova and colleagues use conditionality as the main criterion to distinguish the programme types (Dodlova et al. 2018, p. 55). However, the criteria for further distinction, above all as regards the non-conditional programmes, remains unclear. If we assume that the target groups are used as criteria to construct the programme types, it would be inconsistent to single out "the elderly" as the only group to be assigned a separate programme type (social pensions). If we assume that the types follow the logic of policy models (see the typology by Moritz von Gliszczynksi in section 2.3.1), the types remain incomplete, since the model of *general household assistance* is missing. As the criteria which are used to form the programme types remain unclear, I assess the contribution by Dodlova and colleagues as a programme classification (rather than as a consistent typology).

As part of the classification of social safety nets, the World Bank used to simply distinguish *conditional* versus *unconditional cash* (transfers), with *public works* as a separate type (Silva et al. 2013, p. 45; World Bank 2014, p. 3, 2015, p. 8). This simple distinction is still wide-spread (see Brooks 2015, for example),[59] although, in my view, it is not a substantial distinction. Behavioural conditions vary considerably by strictness, that is whether and how non-fulfillment is sanctioned (see de la O 2015 for the conditional cash transfers in Latin America, for example). Behavioural conditions may be introduced long after programme inception, as the example of South Africa´s *Child Support Grant* demonstrates (Weible 2012). And as I show in this doctoral dissertation, 5% of the social cash transfer programmes impose behavioural conditions on only some of their target groups (see section 8.3). As a

[59] As another example, the knowledge sharing platform *socialprotection.org* presents a quite refined classification of social protection programmes, but it uses this simple distinction to classify all social cash transfer programmes; https://socialprotection.org/discover/programme; 2021-05-26. DFID used the distinction as early as 2011 (DFID 2011, pp. 49–51).

consequence, I consider the distinction between conditional and non-conditional programmes as a simple classification (rather than as a typology).

Only in more recent publications on safety nets, *social pensions* were added as an additional type (World Bank 2017, p. 2, 2018b, p. 7). In the latest Safety Net Report, the classification of social cash transfer programmes is refined. First, the *unconditional cash transfers* are split up into “[p]overty-targeted cash transfers, last-resort programs” and “[f]amily, children, orphan allowance, including orphans and vulnerable children benefits”, among other less relevant types; second, *social pensions* are added as an additional type, along with the following sub-types: “Old-age social pensions”, “Disability benefits”, “War veteran benefits”, “Survivorship benefits” (World Bank 2018b, p. 7). Evidently, the target group was introduced as an additional feature to form the programme types. However, this was not done in a consistent way. Above all, it remains unclear why social pensions figure as a separate type rather than as a sub-category of unconditional cash transfers. It remains also unclear why the distinction by target group is not applied to the type of the *conditional cash transfers*. The original classification of *safety nets* by Grosh et al. (2008) presented in section 2.3.1 is similar, but consistent and convincing as a fully-fledged typology.

In their contribution on single and social registries Chirchir and Farooq distinguish *household targeted social assistance programmes* and *individual entitlement programmes* (Chirchir and Farooq 2016, p. 2). Distinguishing these programme types, they introduce a new aspect in the classifications of social cash transfer programmes: the beneficiary unit. But their classification lacks consistency, since the indicator of conditionality is only applied to household transfers and the distinction by target groups is only applied to individual entitlement programmes. I revert to the aspect of the beneficiary unit in my own set of indicators to map and compare entitlements to social cash transfers (section 4.6.2).

In addition to the typologies and classifications of social cash transfers across the (entire) global South, there are a number of typologies and classifications of social cash transfers which are limited in scope. Some of them focus on one particular world region, such as the typology of social protection programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa by Niño-Zarazúa and colleagues who distinguish a *Southern Africa* and a *Middle Africa model* (Niño-Zarazúa et al. 2012; Niño-Zarazúa et al. 2010). According to this typology, the transfers in the Southern African middle-income countries address age categories, whereas the low-income countries in Eastern, Central, and West Africa provide “a mix of poverty-based” transfers. Garcia and Moore (2012, pp. 48–50) identify similar types in Sub-Saharan Africa: the *middle-income* *cash transfers* that are older (set up before 2000) and better institutionalized (in terms of funding, rights and legal basis, administration) with a wider scope, in comparison to the short-term and weakly institutionalized *low-income and fragile cash transfers* with a limited target group.[60] Apart from this typology, Garcia and Moore distinguish *poverty-targeted social assistance, transfers to specific vulnerable groups,* and a *mixture of vulnerability and poverty-targeting* in Sub-Saharan Africa (Garcia and Moore 2012, pp. 62–65).[61] Cook and Kabeer (2009) describe "world regional patterns" of social cash transfers with the help of several parameters.

Other contributions are restricted to particular types of social cash transfer programmes, such as the typology of social pensions in view of social citizenship by Böger and Leisering (2017, p. 31).

2.3.3 Conclusion: reconstructing the dominant typology

It is remarkable that three of the four global typologies introduced in section 2.3.1 share both the criteria to form the types (target groups, conditionality) and the five types of social cash transfer programmes (with some minor variations). I merge the three typologies into one (stylized) meta typology of social cash transfers in Table 2.3.3. I call this meta typology the "dominant" typology of social cash transfers, since alternative typologies are rare - apart from Barrientos´ typology based on poverty concepts, which takes a perspective which is less relevant in view of an analysis of entitlements.

[60] Garcia and Moore themselves comment that their two types are similar to those constructed by Niño-Zarazúa and colleagues (Garcia and Moore 2012, p. 48).

[61] More precisely, Garcia and Moore group the social cash transfer programmes by conditionality and split the groups up into the three sub-categories.

Table 2.3.3 The dominant typology of social cash transfers (reconstructed from three global typologies)

Programme type	(Poor and/or vulnerable) target groups	Behavioural condition
Conditional cash transfers	families with children	yes
Family allowances	families with children (and children as individuals)	no
Social pensions	older persons (persons with disabilities, orphans, widows)	no
General household assistance	all poor and vulnerable households, including working age poor	no
Public work programmes	persons of working age fit for work	yes

Source: Author´s reconstruction based on Leisering 2009, 2008, Leisering et al. 2006; Gliszczynski 2015, 2013; Grosh et al. 2008.

If we reconstruct the five types, we find that each type consists of one main target group that is linked to either conditional or non-conditional transfers. It is remarkable that the target groups seem to play a subordinate part in the formulation of the types. Whereas the aspect of conditionality tends to be emphasized and even figures in the name of one type (*conditional cash transfers*), the target groups are rather implicitly mentioned among other features when the authors describe the types. This is at odds with the actual weight of the target groups in the typologies and requires explanation. I argue that it might be related to the complexity of the world of target groups and patterns of entitlement, which could not be comprehended and consequently has been ignored so far (see section 6.5).

According to the dominant typology reconstructed from the literature, the world of social cash transfers seems clear and clearly shaped by the five types of social cash transfer programmes.

The five types suggest that there are "fixed" empirical patterns of how the target groups and the behavioural conditions are combined in the design of social cash transfer programmes. But is this so?

There is a remarkable point as regards data: None of the typologies is based on a quantitative dataset. A quantitative dataset to comprise all social cash transfer programmes across the global South was not available by that time (see section 2.5). Von Gliszczynski refers to documents published by international organizations as the main source of his study. By contrast, Grosh and colleagues and Leisering (and colleagues) refer to self-constructed programme inventories. However, these programme inventories are mainly based on literature reviews. And by the time the scholars developed their typologies, a considerable part (if not most) of the available studies were reports for development agencies (Leisering 2009, p. 247). Information on the social cash transfer programmes which was (more) independent from the perspectives of development agencies was scarce then. Even in 2010, Devereux and White complain with respect to Africa, “while numerous evaluation reports and commissioned research studies have been generated in the effort to ´build the evidence base´ for cash transfers, much less research has been invested in cash transfer programs that are operated and financed by national governments *without* donor support” (Devereux and White 2010, p. 74; emphasis there).That is why I assume that the quality of the data based on which the typologies were generated had a strong impact on the typologies and the types respectively. In other words, due to the limited information by that time, all three studies might have used similar sources, but these sources might not have covered all programmes, and in particular those programmes without international involvement may have lacked. This supposition, however, raises questions on the ”completeness” of the typologies. Consequently, I will put the dominant typology of social cash transfers to a test, based on a quantitative dataset on social cash transfers (section 6.4).

Nevertheless, the two parameters which the three typologies use to form the programme types - target groups and behavioural conditions - seem relevant aspects to analyse, characterize, and “comprehend” the world of social cash transfers. Consequently, I take these two indicators into account for my own typology of social cash transfer programmes (section 6.4).

As the literature review in this section shows, the typologies of social cash transfers have been limited to *programmes* so far. First attempts to classify entire *countries* – such as referring to a single programme by country (Brooks 2015) - are not convincing (see sections 2.4.4 and 8.3). In addition to contributing a typology of social cash transfer programmes based on a quantitative analysis of entitlements, this doctoral dissertation takes up the challenge of classifying the national social cash transfer arrangements (systems) of entire countries (section 7.3).

2.4 Methodological approaches to mapping and comparing social cash transfers

“Every program is different and there are huge variations, from universal child benefits in Mongolia to pensions in Africa to family grants in Latin America” (Hanlon et al. 2010, p. 47).

Evidently, the huge diversity among social cash transfer programmes poses a challenge to large n comparative analyses, since these analyses require measures that are applicable to all the programmes, however diverse they may be.

Facing the huge variety of programmes, how have scholars managed to compare the diverse programmes at a larger scale, that is, beyond comparisons of single cases?

As I show in this section, few attempts have been made so far to systematically compare *all* the social cash transfer programmes in the global South.

2.4.1 The first attempts at comparing social cash transfers in the global South

Among the few attempts that have been made, what methodological approaches have been chosen or developed to analyse and compare the diverse social cash transfer programmes in the global South?

The few attempts that have been made so far at developing a genuine mapping approach to social cash transfer programmes have remained at a rudimentary stage. Esser and colleagues developed a "framework for comparing social protection in developing and developed countries" (title) with the example of child programmes (Esser et al. 2009). The authors propose five dimensions to study social protection programmes in developing countries: financing, administration, eligibility, benefit generosity, and implementation. However, the paper does neither include an analysis following this framework, nor does it suggest concrete indicators for an adequate operationalization of the five dimensions (Esser et al. 2009, p. 98). Besides, as the authors emphasize, their framework may only provide a "middle-range" approach (Esser et al. 2009, p. 95).[62]

One way of comparing countries in a standardized way is clustering the programmes by programme type in a first step and comparing them in a second step, as done for example by

[62] What is more, the authors use a selective sample of countries and probably incomplete data at least for one world region, which may bias the results, especially when comparing world regions. Esser and colleagues mention that only one country in sub-Saharan Africa had child benefits directed to "single parents and orphans" (Esser et al. 2009, p. 92). However, according to FLOORCASH-SocCit, social cash transfer programmes addressed orphans in eleven countries by that time, among them seven child programmes. Programmes had been introduced in Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Zimbabwe by 2008. Programmes that address single parents have not even been taken into account here. This comparison of cases underlines how poor the data available was by that time.

Dodlova and colleagues (2018). I discuss the problems associated with this strategy in section 2.5.2.

Some contributions have been made with respect to particular aspects of social cash transfer programmes that have been developed for a particular programme type in a particular world region. In her study on *conditional cash transfers* in Latin America, de la O (2015) has developed two indices to analyse the "robustness" of the programme design and programme implementation. Székely (2008) has developed an index to measure the degree of institutionalization of Latin American "social policy" programmes, which I discuss in section 4.7.

The few comprehensive comparative studies on social cash transfer programmes mentioned above in section 2.1.5 (Barrientos 2013a; Leisering 2008, 2009; Leisering et al. 2006) circumnavigate the issue of a methodological approach to large n comparison of social cash transfer programmes, since the studies are not based on a large n dataset.

2.4.2 Aggregate measures to compare programmes

Still, there is no standard set of indicators by which social cash transfer programmes in the global South are commonly mapped and compared. However, in the comparative literature on social assistance in OECD and EU countries we find the following indicators that have been used by several studies to compare the programmes at a larger scale (Bahle et al. 2011, pp. 222–224):

1. the number of *recipients* and beneficiaries respectively[63] to measure the *scope* of a programme (indicator: ratio of number of recipients/beneficiaries to either the total population or to the relevant population category);
2. programme *expenditure* to measure the *extent* of a programme (indicator: ratio of expenditure to total social expenditure in a country);
3. the *benefit level*/size of the transfer to measure the *generosity* of a programme (indicator: ratio of benefit level to a poverty line).

Over the past years the first studies on social cash transfers in the global South have been published with data on these three indicators, although for a single programme type only:

[63] Beneficiaries are defined as the recipients including dependent household members (Bahle et al. 2011, p. 18).

social pensions (Böger and Leisering 2020, 2017; Palacios and Knox-Vydmanov 2014; Schmitt 2020; World Bank 2018b, pp. 154–160).[64] [65]

The very first studies to analyse all (types of) social cash transfer programmes by aggregate measures have recently been published, too:

As regards the *scope*, Barrientos has recently tested the explanatory power of theories of welfare as regards the expansion of all social cash transfer programmes in low- and middle-income countries (Barrientos 2019). Expansion is measured in terms of "reach" (scope or coverage) of all programmes per country over time. The way how this measure is constructed may be legitimate to test the theories, above all since it is the first attempt at covering all social cash transfers in such a broad explanatory study. However, in the context of the search for standardized measures to compare social cash transfers programmes more generally, I see three issues related to the measure of "reach":

First, Barrientos does not distinguish between entitled persons (what he calls "direct beneficiaries") and the households of entitled persons (what he calls "indirect beneficiaries"). It is questionable whether an entire household may be classified as covered or "reached" just because of one transfer targeted at one member of the household (and which, presumably, takes a size tailored to this individual). At least from the perspective of the entitlement approach which I follow (see section 4.2), such an approach is rejected.

Second, to measure the "reach" of all programmes in terms of the number of *households* who receive a social cash transfer, he "converts" the coverage of transfers that address individuals into a coverage of households, by multiplying the coverage of individual transfers by the country´s average household size (Barrientos 2019, p. 8). However, as I show in this doctoral dissertation, most social cash transfer programmes target *individual* persons rather than households (see section 8.2.1). Consequently, the reach of most programmes represents an *estimate* rather than exact empirical figures.

Third, one of the trickiest issues is the aggregation of programme coverage at the country level. Barrientos adds up the number of households "reached" by all programmes and then calculates the ratio to the entire population of the country. As Barrientos himself admits, the way of how this "population reach" is calculated may overestimate the share of the population

[64] The World Bank calculates the benefit level as a ratio to the GDP per capita and expenditure as a ratio to GDP.

[65] Schmitt compares low- and middle-income countries with and without non-contributory programmes by the coverage rates of persons above statutory pensionable age (Schmitt 2020).

covered, since potential overlaps of recipients (households that receive more than one transfer) are not taken into account (Barrientos 2019, p. 8). I argue that a different and more precise approach to aggregating the data at the country level is desirable (such as the approach I develop in this doctoral dissertation, see Chapter 4). At the same time, the approach which Barrientos chooses underlines how challenging data aggregation at the country level is.

As regards *expenditure*, the Asian Development Bank has developed the *Social Protection Index* to evaluate and compare the social protection arrangements of Asian countries. The index consists of the ratio of the total expenditure of social insurance, social assistance, and labour market programmes to the (weighted) sum of the "intended" beneficiaries of all these programmes (ADB 2013, p. 6). This ratio is then divided by GDP per capita. This index was developed explicitly as "an indicator for assessing social protection *effectiveness* within and across countries" (ADB 2016, p. 1; emphasis by K.W.). It is not limited to social cash transfers.

Both the indicators *number of recipients* (*coverage)* and *expenditure* are of limited relevance to an analysis of *entitlements*, since neither aggregate data on the spending nor on the coverage does reveal who is entitled to what benefits.[66] These indicators measure the extent of implementation and practice in the later stages of the policy process rather than the entitlements according to the *design* of the programmes.[67] Moreover, the volume of expenditure for social assistance and the number of recipients depend on many factors, which are not necessarily linked to the programme design, but to the socio-economic context

[66] For a summary of the argumentation see Pfeifer 2012, p. 15.

[67] But the indicator of coverage does not measure other core aspects of implementation such as *take-up rates*. A low take-up rate may reveal a discrepancy between the institutional design on the one hand and the actual availability, accessibility, and/or acceptance of the transfers by the target groups on the other hand.

including the level of (un)employment, to demographic developments,[68] and to the existence of first-tier social protection programmes.[69]

The indicator of the *benefit level* is more relevant to the analysis of entitlements, as I show in the following section 2.4.3. The World Bank has recently published comparative data on the monthly transfer amount of social safety nets,[70] converting the absolute figures in US-Dollar Purchasing Power Parities (PPP)[71] of 2011 (World Bank 2018b, p. 144). The SALMIC dataset includes the transfer amounts expressed as US Dollar PPP, too (Barrientos 2018a). Such standardization of transfer levels facilitates cross-country comparisons of *programmes*.

However, programmes may address different target groups at the same time (Chapter 6). And as I show, the quality of entitlements varies by target group, sometimes even within the same programme (Chapters 6 to 9). So, whereas data on the transfer level makes it possible to compare *programmes* with respect to the question of "what does the programme provide?", the question of "who is entitled to what and on what conditions?" may still not be answered adequately.

A different approach is required to compare *entitlements of target groups.* One way of handling the challenge of different target groups of programmes consists in comparing only one particular type of social cash transfer programmes. This approach assumes that all the programmes of one type addressed the same target group. Although I show in this doctoral dissertation that programme types and target groups are not necessarily identical (section 6.4), it might be a legitimate way of comparing entitlements. The *social citizenship index for social*

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[68] To give two examples, welfare spending typically rises in periods of high unemployment (if social assistance for unemployed people is available) and when the population is aging (if social assistance for elderly people is available), although entitlements remain constant or even become subject to retrenchment (see the discussions in Nelson 2013, p. 389 and Marx and Nelson 2013). Marx and Nelson add, that "(i)t is also difficult, if not impossible, to control for the duration in receipt of benefits, which may differ substantially between individuals as well as across countries and over time, thus distorting the validity of the empirical findings based on analyses of social expenditure data" (Marx and Nelson 2013, p. 11).

[69] A low expenditure level in social assistance may indicate a low degree of social protection in a country (what Bahle and colleagues call "rudimentary minimum income protection") or the low expenditure level may be a result of "residual citizenship-based minimum income protection" in a country where most citizens are entitled to social insurance benefits (Bahle et al. 2011, pp. 226–227; see also Marx and Nelson 2013, p. 11).

[70] See section 2.1.4 for a definition of social safety nets.

[71] "PPPs are calculated based on the price of a common basket of goods and services in each participating economy and are a measure of what an economy's local currency can buy in another economy"; https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/icp; 2021-05-28.

pensions developed by Böger and Leisering (2017)[72] and the s*ocial pension wealth indicator* to measure individual pension entitlements by Palacios and Knox-Vydmanov (2014, pp. 260–261)[73] are convincing approaches to map and compare the quality of social pension entitlements.

Yet these approaches cannot simply be transferred to other programme types, let alone to all kinds of social cash transfer programmes. As mentioned above, social cash transfer programmes do often address a number of distinct target groups at the same time (section 6.4) and in many countries, the target groups are addressed by several programmes (sections 7.2.2 and 7.3). That is why we cannot directly conclude from a programme type to the target groups of a programme and vice versa (section 6.4.1). Moreover, the benefit level of a programme may vary by target group.[74] Consequently, comparing benefit levels of *programmes* is of limited use to an analysis of *entitlements*, since the question of who is entitled to these benefits remains unanswered. This also underlines how essential it is to answer the question of who the programmes address – which I do in this doctoral thesis.

2.4.3 The social rights approach to measure individual entitlements

Entitlements to social cash transfers in the global South have not been compared at a large scale so far, except more recently for particular programme types (see section 2.4.2). But in the research on European welfare states, studying entitlements to social security provisions has a tradition (see section 2.1.3), which includes measures of social rights, most prominently Esping-Andersen´s *decommodification index* (Esping-Andersen 1990; see Pfeifer 2012, pp. 15–16 and Leisering 2019, pp. 59–60 for an overview of measures). However, these measures including the *decommodification index,* focus on the entire social security system and primarily on social insurance and non-means-tested provisions. So, they are of little avail for comparing entitlements to social assistance (see Leisering 2019, pp. 89–90 on the

[72] The *social citizenship index for social pensions* takes the years of coverage (depending on age of eligibility and average life expectancy at age 60), the targeting approach (in terms of the relation between benefits and the means of the recipients), and the benefit level into account (Böger and Leisering 2017, p. 24).

[73] The *social pension wealth* is indicated as a multiple of per capita income in a country and takes the life expectancy at the age of eligibility into account.

[74] Many of the *complex* social cash transfer programmes with several programme components have such distinct benefit levels (see section 3.1.1).

marginal role of social assistance in Esping-Andersen´s measures of social rights). Moreover, they are hardly applicable to the conditions of the global South (see section 2.1.3).

Comparative research on *social assistance* is comparatively young, even in European welfare states (see Eardley et al. 1996a as the first comparative study on social assistance in OECD countries; see Bahle et al. 2011, pp. 223–224 for an overview of the comparative studies on social assistance in (mostly European) welfare states). The first *entitlement* studies on social assistance in Europe were published only a decade ago (Bahle et al. 2011; Nelson 2007, 2010). They underline that the *social rights approach* can be applied to social assistance, too.

The *social rights approach* - sometimes referred to as the *institutional approach* - is linked to the concept of social citizenship in that the rules that shape the *design* of social protection programmes are supposed to define the quality of social rights and duties (Marx and Nelson 2013, p. 12). The core idea of the institutional approach is measuring *individual* social citizenship rights rather than *aggregate* figures on the programmes such as costs and coverage (see section 2.4.2). This entails that the measures must be constructed from the design of the programmes and more precisely, from the rules and regulations linked to the programmes. What measures are constructed?

Nelson uses the *benefit level* as the key indicator to compare entitlements to social assistance in a standardized way across countries (Nelson 2007, 2010, 2013). He constructs the data in the SaMip (Social Assistance and Minimum Income Protection Interim) dataset based on two principles: First, entitlements are compared with the help of so-called *type-cases* or *model families* (Nelson 2013, p. 390). The model families consist of a single person household, a couple with two children, and a lone parent with two children.[75] They facilitate a standardized comparison of benefit levels, since benefit levels vary by household composition. Second, *all* the social assistance programmes in a country are considered as functional equivalents and are taken into account in order to assess the entire social assistance *system* of a country.[76] This is what I call the *country approach* or *systems approach* (section 4.5).

[75] Another dataset on social assistance in Europe, the *CSB-Minimum Income Protection Indicators Database* (CSB-MIPI), adds the type of a couple without children (van Mechelen et al. 2011; see section 2.5).

[76] Nelson includes the entire "benefit package" of social assistance programmes (housing benefits, child benefits, tax credits, in addition to the standard social assistance benefit, which may also include rent, electricity, heating) to which the model families are entitled, in order to calculate the benefit levels for each country (Nelson 2013, p. 390). He, however, excludes possible additional benefits for special needs (such as disability or sickness) and occasional needs (funeral expenses, furniture).

Despite its great contributions to comparative research of social assistance, the model family approach has important limitations, too. The type-cases used to construct the values of the benefit level only refer to persons of working age (including the spouse and children as dependents). Recipients consisting of older persons are not taken into account. And children only take the part of dependents of persons of working age. Calculating the benefit level for persons of working age, even if differentiated by the type of dependents, leaves open whether the population apart from the persons of working age able to work are entitled to benefits and if so, how generous these benefits are. Moreover, the model family approach has another limitation in the context of developing countries. It was developed for European countries, and so were the model families. However, family and household structures are different in the global South. Households are bigger on average, often comprising several generations. And particular family patterns such as the AIDS-affected households in Sub-Saharan Africa, typically consisting of grandmothers taking care of several orphans, suggest that the model families would need to be adapted to Southern conditions. Moreover, it might be challenging to construct a handful of typical family models representative for the entire global South.[77]

Bahle and colleagues analyse *minimum income protection*, that is means-tested residual last safety nets which are supposed to guarantee "the social minimum below which no one in society should be allowed to fall" (Bahle et al. 2011, p. 13). However, in view of the conditions in the global South, the concept of minimum income protection seems too demanding for an analysis of social cash transfers in the global South. As I show in this doctoral dissertation, only few countries across the South have fully inclusive social cash transfer arrangements that might be comparable to a last safety net. The study by Bahle and colleagues covers all three dimensions mentioned in section 2.4.2 (generosity, scope, expenditure) and categorical differentiation of the system of minimum income protection (see Bahle et al. 2011, p. 222 for a summary). While the measures for generosity and scope take into account different groups of the population (families, persons of working age, older persons above age 65), the limitations of the measures of scope and expenditure discussed in section 2.4.2 remain. The data to measure generosity is taken from the SaMip dataset (Nelson 2007, 2010), of which I discussed the methodological approach in the previous paragraph.

[77] The case of Italy, which lacks a national social assistance programme and where street-level bureaucrats exercise a high discretionary power, underlines how challenging it may be to apply the model family approach to different contexts – even within the EU member states (see Arlotti and Sabatinelli 2017).

In conclusion, there is no measure ready to use for a large N analysis of entitlements to social cash transfers across the global South.

2.4.4 The units of analysis: programmes and countries

The units of analysis in the (few) large n comparative studies on social cash transfers published so far consist of the social cash transfer *programmes* (such as Barrientos 2013a).[78]

Exceptions that focus on the *countries* as the units of analysis are rudimentary analyses such as the comparison of the number of countries (partly clustered into world regions) with "conditional" and "unconditional" programmes (World Bank 2014, pp. 7–9).

Brooks (2015) tries to establish a direct link between the design of single programmes and entire countries. As an attempt to analyse the factors favourable to the introduction of conditional versus non-conditional programmes, Brooks classifies entire countries into adopters of conditional programmes versus adopters of non-conditional programmes (Brooks 2015, p. 565). However, the assumption that countries allegedly introduced either conditional or non-conditional programmes cannot be confirmed based on the comprehensive dataset FLOORCASH-SocCit (see section 8.3). Without doubt, classifying countries by their national social cash transfers arrangements is not that simple (see also section 7.3).

Only recently, Barrientos has contributed a study on social cash transfers, in which he compares the scope of the programmes at the country level (Barrientos 2019). However, in the search for standardized measures to compare social cash transfers more generally, I see several issues with his approach (see my discussion in section 2.4.2).

A number of tools to map and compare entire social protection systems of countries have been developed by international social policy actors.[79] But these tools either provide aggregate figures that are not adequate for entitlement analysis[80] and/or they go well beyond the scope

[78] Several case studies, by contrast, do analyse countries´ entire *systems* of social assistance, such as Schubert 2020 on low-income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa as well as Weible and Leisering 2012 and Seekings 2008 on South Africa.

[79] For an overview on mapping and assessment tools on social protection by global social policy actors see Berten and Leisering 2017 and Berten 2019.

[80] The *Social protection floor index* (SPFI), developed by Bierbaum and colleagues and published by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, calculates the finance gap required to provide basic income security and basic health security for all individuals per country (Bierbaum et al. 2016).

of social cash transfers.[81] The monitoring of the UN *Sustainable Development Goal* number 1 to “end poverty in all its forms everywhere” follows the country approach. However, the operationalization of Target 1.3 on the implementation of “social protection systems” combines contributory and non-contributory forms of social protection.[82] [83] [84]

Even if the perspective on entire countries as “systems” has received more attention,[85] the focus of comparative analyses of social cash transfers is still on programmes. Systemic approaches go beyond the area of social cash transfers.

2.4.5 Conclusion: lack of analytical framework tailored to large n analysis of entitlements to social cash transfers

In conclusion, there is no set of indicators available to map and compare entitlements to social cash transfers across the countries of the global South. The indicators that have been developed so far to compare social cash transfers are of limited use to my research project. They are either not adequate to compare *entitlements* of target groups or they do not allow a comprehensive analysis of all (types of) social cash transfer programmes across the global South. The social rights approach which has been developed to study entitlements to social assistance in Northern welfare states cannot simply be transferred to the conditions in the

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[81] Examples are the *Social protection index,* developed by the Asian Development Bank (2013, 2016), and the *Global Age Watch Index,* developed by HelpAge International (2015).

[82] Target 1.3: “Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable”; Indicator 1.3.1: “Proportion of population covered by social protection floors/systems, by sex, distinguishing children, unemployed persons, older persons, persons with disabilities, pregnant women, newborns, work-injury victims and the poor and the vulnerable”; https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal1; 2020-09-23.

[83] Based on the *World Social Protection Database* (see section 2.5.1), the ILO offers data on the related indicator of “effective coverage” that is defined as “the proportion of the total population receiving at least one contributory or non-contributory cash benefit, or actively contributing to at least one social security scheme”. https://www.social-protection.org/gimi/WSPDB.action?id=16; 2021-05-29.

[84] The ILO presents similar ways of mapping national social security systems: in terms of the “number of policy areas covered by at least one programme” and in terms of the “existence of a statutory programme” for several target categories (ILO 2017, pp. 230–239).

[85] See also the most recent publication of the “Handbook on social protection systems” (Schüring and Loewe 2021).

global the South, and similar approaches have not yet been created for social cash transfers in development contexts.

Moreover, comparative studies have focused on comparing social cash transfer *programmes*, whereas the entire national arrangements of social cash transfer programmes have hardly been used as units of analysis. This focus on *programmes* rather than on the national social cash transfer arrangements of entire countries is surprising, since the wider perspective on entire countries with their social protection *systems* has increasingly gained relevance on the global social protection agenda. Both the *United Nations Social Protection Floor Initiative*, culminating in the *ILO Social Protection Floors Recommendation* in 2012 (ILO 2012; see also Deacon 2013)[86] and the *United Nations Sustainable Development Goals* under the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2015 (United Nations 2015), imply the focus on entire countries.[87] A systemic focus in research on social protection seems overdue (see also Schubert 2020).

Even in the context of European welfare states, where we may expect sophisticated methodological approaches to compare social assistance programmes, scholars regret the "general lack of basic research aimed at providing the analytical framework for indicator construction related to social policy legislation and regulation" (Marx and Nelson 2013, p. 13). The lack and limitedness of methodological frameworks and approaches has direct consequences for broad-scale studies based on quantitative indicators on the design of social assistance programmes in Europe, since they "have hitherto been very difficult to conduct" - among other reasons, due to these methodological limitations (Marx and Nelson 2013, p. 13).

These statements of reknown scholars underline how demanding it is to compare social assistance and social cash transfers respectively. At the same time, they highlight the relevance of my methodological contribution in this doctoral dissertation to comparative analysis of social protection in the global South.

Against this background, I develop my own set of indicators to map and compare all Southern social cash transfers programmes and all national social cash transfer arrangements systematically (see Chapter 4).

[86] https://www.social-protection.org/gimi/ShowProject.action?id=2767; 2020-09-23.

[87] https://sdgs.un.org/; 2020-09-23.

2.5 Databases on social cash transfers

The number of databases on social security and social protection in the global South has considerably increased over the past ten years (for an overview until 2014 see Grünewald 2014).[88] Yet, anticipating the conclusion from this section, a dataset with standardized data on social cash transfer programmes across the global South apt to measure entitlements precisely has not been published yet. That is why I constructed the required dataset myself: *FLOORCASH-SocCit* (see Weible 2014, 2015, 2018; Leisering and Weible 2020 and Chapter 5). It is based on another non-computable dataset FLOORCASH-Basic, which two colleagues and myself constructed as part of the research project FLOOR (see Chapter 1), with data collection until 2013 (Weible et al. 2013, 2015). As I had recoded FLOORCASH-SocCit by 2015 (version 2), I split this section into two parts: data available until 2015 (section 2.5.1) and data available after 2015 (section 2.5.2).[89]

2.5.1 Data available until 2015

Until around 2015, the *data bases* (online accessible platforms) and *data compilations* (published as books or internet documents) that had been published were largely text-based and, if at all, figures were spread over the text-based descriptions. Moreover, most of the databases and compilations were either limited to one particular type of social cash transfer programmes (such as Fiszbein and Shady 2009 on conditional cash transfers, the *social pensions database* provided by HelpAge International,[90] and the *Disability Benefit Database* provided by Development pathways[91]) or they were limited to one particular world region (such as Garcia and Moore 2012 on Sub-Saharan Africa and the *Non-contributory Social Protection Programmes Database* provided by ECLAC on Latin American conditional cash

[88] See also the databases used as sources for FLOORCASH in Leisering and Weible 2020 as well as the SALMIC website (Barrientos 2018a); http://www.social-assistance.manchester.ac.uk/documentation/; 2021-05-29.

[89] For an early, condensed version of the following review of extant databases, see Weible and Leisering 2019, pp. 151–152.

[90] To my knowledge, the *social pensions database* was the first publication of an entirely quantified dataset on social cash transfers worldwide; http://www.pension-watch.net/social-pensions-database/social-pensions-database--/; 2020-09-24; the dataset FLOORCASH-SocPen constructed by Böger (2013b) was published in 2017.

[91] http://www.developmentpathways.co.uk/publications/#disability-database; 2020-09-24.

transfer programmes, social pensions, and labour and productive inclusion programmes[92]). The Asian Development Bank has published a *Social protection indicator database* which also includes data on social assistance measured by a few aggregate indicators (expenditure, coverage, size of benefits and distributional impact on poverty and gender) on the Asian countries.[93]

Other databases include all countries worldwide, but the data on social cash transfers is limited. In the ILO *Social Security Inquiry*[94] (and the more recent version, the ILO *World Social Protection Database*[95]) and in the ISSA *Social Security Country Profiles*[96] data on social cash transfers are inadequately covered, since these databases primarily focus on social insurance programmes. The *Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database* (Barrientos et al. 2010) was the main data source on all types of social cash transfer programmes across the global South over many years (with the first version published in 2005), but it is a purely text-based data compilation and its sample is mainly limited to so-called flagship programmes. The manuals on social policies worldwide and in developing countries respectively, edited by Porsche-Ludwig (2013, 2012) are also text-based.

Despite their limitations, all these descriptive and fragmented data compilations available by 2013 provided the main data source of the database FLOORCASH-SocCit, completed in 2015 (see also section 5.2).

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[92] The latter category of programmes was added after 2013; https://dds.cepal.org/bpsnc/sp; 2020-09-24.

[93] https://spi.adb.org/spidmz/index.jsp; 2020-09-23; previous versions of this database were available before 2015.

[94] The ILO database provided little data on social assistance programmes at the time of data collection for FLOORCASH-Basic (until 2013).

[95] This database is largely based on the ILO *Social Security Inquiry* Database (ILO 2017, p. 207), complemented by a few other resources such as the ISSA database, but is more user-friendly and offers interactive illustrations in data dashboards. It provides the basis of the latest *World Social Protection Report* (ILO 2017). Social protection expenditure (as share of GDP) and coverage rates (by target category) are provided for each country; https://www.social-protection.org/gimi/WSPDB.action?id=32; 2020-09-24; see also the final paragraph of section 2.4.4 on the monitoring of the UN *Sustainable Development Goal* number 1.

[96] The ISSA database is structured around particular risks, which is only adequate for insurance-based programmes; https://ww1.issa.int/country-profiles/about; 2020-09-24.

2.5.2 Quantitative contributions after 2015

In 2016, the limitation to fragmented and text-based data changed. Dodlova and colleagues *published* the *Non-Contributory Social Transfer Programmes (NSTP) in Developing Countries Data Set* (Dodlova et al. 2016) , the first *published* quantitative and computable dataset on social cash transfers across the global South that is not limited to one particular type of social cash transfer programmes. In 2016, analyses based on my dataset FLOORCASH-SocCit and on the dataset FLOORCASH-SocPen (which also draws on the basic dataset FLOORCASH-BASIC) had already been published (Weible 2016; Böger 2013a), but the FLOORCASH datasets as such had not yet been published. NSTP basically covers targeting mechanisms, cost and coverage (in non-standardized, absolute figures), and donor support. While the dataset is more recent by two years compared to FLOORCASH (referring to programmes that were in operation in 2015, as opposed to in 2012/13), the dataset has, however, considerable limitations, which restricts its utility for comparative analyses of entitlements. The major shortcoming consists in the lack of an indicator on the target group. Instead, the programmes are assigned to one of four "programme types": unconditional family support (for "low-income households or specifically to children"), social pensions (for the elderly), conditional cash transfers, and public works (the latter two without definition of the target groups; see also section 2.3.2).

This approach is implicitly based on two assumptions: first, that each programme type corresponded to one target group and second, that these four programme types covered all empirical programmes. In this doctoral dissertation I demonstrate that both assumptions can hardly be sustained (see section 6.4). At most, the dataset facilitates comparisons of stylized (and not empirically based) programme types, but hardly of entitlements. Another considerable limitation are the sources: The authors refer to five data compilations only – although each of them covers social cash transfer programmes either in a marginal way (due to the focus on social insurances) or in a limited way (due to the focus on particular world regions or on particular programme types), as I illustrate in the previous section 2.5.1.[97] This might have resulted in a reduced (and possibly skewed) sample of programmes. What is more, the authors exclude programmes that "are solely available to a small group of the most destitute such as the disabled, widows, orphans, specific occupational groups, or ethnicities"

[97] The authors emphasize that the data bases "were complemented by further typically programme specific sources such as programme evaluation reports and national social security boards." (Codebook p. 1.) Yet these kind of data sources are of limited help to identify additional programmes.

(Dodlova et al. 2018, p. 53). Consequently, the dataset presents a comparably low number of programmes (N=186) if compared to FLOORCASH-SocCit (N=282) or to SALMIC (N=224), which I present in the following paragraph.[98] The number of Southern countries covered is considerably lower, too.[99] - Evidently, FLOORCASH-SocCit is the most comprehensive dataset on social cash transfer programmes in the global South in terms of programmes and countries covered.

The most topical dataset on social assistance in the global South is the *Social Assistance in Low and Middle Income Countries Dataset (SALMIC),* which was published by Armando Barrientos in 2018 (Barrientos 2018a, 2018b).[100] [101] The database consists of time series data from 2000 to 2015 on social assistance programmes in low- and middle-income countries (although several Latin American countries are included, which are classified as high-income countries, such as Chile, Uruguay, and Trinidad and Tobago). The database focuses on programme design, objectives, coverage ("reach"), institutionalization, and funding with remarkably refined variables for each of the dimensions. The data and indicators provided are extensive. I limit the discussion of the dataset to the relevant dimensions in the context of this doctoral dissertation: In what way does the dataset cover the dimensions of inclusion, conditions of access, and institutionalization of social cash transfers in the global South? And in what way is the data suitable for entitlement analyses?

Several indicators on the conditions of access as well as on the institutionalization of social cash transfer programmes are of relevance in this respect. However, even this extensive dataset has considerable limitations in view of my research questions.

First and foremost, SALMIC lacks standardized indicators to map and compare the target groups of programmes precisely. The social cash transfer programmes are assigned to seven

[98] FLOORCASH identifies a bigger number of programmes, although it does not include European countries as the other two datasets do and although it includes public work programmes only if they provide employment guarantees (like SALMIC).

[99] NSTP covers 101 countries (including 12 European countries) and SALMIC covers 110 countries (including 13 European countries), while FLOORCASH-SocCit covers 148 countries of the global South, including 35 countries without social cash transfer programmes.

[100] The data is presented online at the *Social Assistance Explorer*, which includes interactive visualizations in the *Map exporer;* http://www.social-assistance.manchester.ac.uk/; 2021-05-30.

[101] A similar database, the *Social Assistance, Politics, and Institutions (SAPI) database (UNU-WIDER 2018)* with Armando Barrientos as the "core contributor", consists of a nearly identical codebook, but different and less comprehensive data entries.

main target categories.[102] A binary variable indicates whether beneficiaries are selected within these target categories.[103] However, the extent of the within-category selection is not measured. Moreover, it is not indicated to which of the target categories the within-category selection applies (in case that several target categories are registered). Refined descriptions of the target groups are added, but in a non-standardized string variable containing any aspect of restriction, including the descriptions of geographical, categorical or age restrictions. In short, refined large n data on the target groups is not provided. This is a shortcoming for the analysis of inclusion and, in particular, of exclusion. What is more, as the question of target groups is closely connected with the issue of entitlements (see sections 4.2 and 6.1), analyses of *entitlements* based on the SALMIC dataset seem hardly feasible.

Second, smaller programmes, although some of them nation-wide, are not necessarily included in the SALMIC dataset, in particular as regards countries with several social cash transfers programmes.[104] This suggests that programmes that address smaller groups only (such as widows, war veterans, disabled adults, and many more; see sections 6.1.1 and 6.4) may not be included in SALMIC.[105] This might bias the sample in favour of bigger target groups and against smaller target groups.

Third, SALMIC does neither cover the degree of individualization of entitlements as an important aspect of rights principles (conditions of access), nor the duration of entitlements as a central aspect of the security of entitlements (institutionalization; see Chapter 4).[106]

Fourth, the aggregation of the data at the country and regional level is only provided for coverage and resources (in the Map Explorer), not for indicators to measure entitlements. Although this is, strictly speaking, a methodological issue, it suggests that the focus of the

[102] The target categories are the same as those used in FLOORCASH-SocCit, plus “women”, which is included in FLOORCASH-SocCit as a gender variable rather than as a target category, in order to maintain the complementarity of the target categories (see section 4.3 and the FLOORCASH-SocCit Codebook).

[103] The data entries are 0 for most programmes, except for a few categorical-universal social pensions or child grants. This limited variance might challenge the utility of this variable.

[104] “For some countries with a large number of small or localised programmes, the data collection focused on nationwide, large-scale, and/or leading programmes.” - http://www.social-assistance.manchester.ac.uk/frequently-asked-questions/; retrieved 2019-03-08.

[105] The total number of programmes identified is indeed smaller compared to FLOORCASH, although FLOORCASH excludes the global North (see the paragraph on NSTP further above in this section).

[106] SALMIC includes different variables instead: minimum, maximum, and average of the transfer amount and a variable on the exit strategy respectively.

SALMIC dataset is rather on the numbers of poor persons (and households, respectively) reached by the programmes and on the amounts of resources spent. Who are the entitled persons and households in each country and across the South, and who is entitled and who is not entitled to the transfers - these questions are evidently *not* intended to be answered with the data.[107]

Evidently, both the SALMIC dataset and the SNTP dataset have hardly been used for analyses yet. Publications on particular issues - most of them related to the politics of social protection - have only started (Barrientos 2019; Dodlova 2020; Dodlova et al. 2017).

There are further databases on social protection worldwide that have been made available after 2015.[108] However, they are of limited use for the study of entitlements to social cash transfers. The *Atlas of Social Protection – Indicators of Resilience and Equity (ASPIRE),* provided by the World Bank, covers "social assistance/social safety net programmes", including social cash transfer programmes (see section 2.1.4 for the definition of social safety net). It offers standardized indicators on the benefit level, coverage, and performance (targeting accuracy, reduction of poverty and inequality; World Bank n.d.). However, the data is mainly based on household surveys that tend to capture only the largest programmes.[109] Household surveys may be used to study the impacts of the transfers on the households, but they do not depict institutional structures of the programmes.[110] Data on the programme designs is, however, imperative for an analysis of entitlements (see section 2.4.3).

At *Socialprotection.org*, a knowledge sharing platform launched in 2015, "cash transfer programmes" (among many other social protection programmes across the global South) are described in a standardized way, but still in the form of text.[111] More recent publications that

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[107] The "who" question is not an issue in Barrientos 2018b, which introduces the SALMIC codebook.

[108] For an overview see the list provided by Armando Barrientos at the SALMIC webpage at http://www.social-assistance.manchester.ac.uk/documentation/; retrieved 2020-09-24.

[109] Data on coverage is available in a programme inventory that is based on administrative data. However, only selected social cash transfer programmes (evidently the "main programmes") per country are included; http://datatopics.worldbank.org/aspire/indicator_glance; 2019-03-11.

[110] A note at the ASPIRE website provides this important limitation; http://datatopics.worldbank.org/aspire/indicator_caveats; retrieved 2019-03-11.

[111] The platform has been "developed in consultation with the World Bank Group, the International Labour Organization (ILO), and leading agencies gathered under the Social Protection Inter-Agency Cooperation Board (SPIAC-B)". According to the ILO website, "[t]he Social Protection Inter-Agency Cooperation Board is a light, lean and agile inter-agency coordination mechanism—composed of representatives of international organizations

contribute knowledge of social cash transfers in little explored world regions still provide data in a descriptive form (such as Machado et al. 2018 on the Middle East and North Africa, the *Inventory on social protection programmes in Africa* (IPC-IG 2016), and IPC-IG and UNICEF 2019 on Asia and the Pacific).

The *institutional approach* following Marshall´s concept of social citizenship and the focus on *entitlements* has a remarkable tradition in welfare state research and is reflected in the data infrastructure on (Western) welfare states and, above all, EU member states (see section 2.4.3).[112] But there is no such dataset on entitlements to social cash transfers in the global South.[113]

2.5.3 Conclusion: Lack of entitlement-based datasets

The world of data on social cash transfer programmes across the global South is a dynamic field. Over the past ten years, several new data compilations and data bases have been created and some of the early databases have been reorganized.[114] All of them improve the availability of data on social cash transfers considerably.

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and bilateral institutions—to enhance global coordination and advocacy on social protection issues and to coordinate international cooperation in country demand-driven actions. The establishment of the Board responds to a request from the G20 Development Working Group." http://www.ilo.org/newyork/issues-at-work/social-protection/social-protection-inter-agency-cooperation-board/lang--en/index.htm; 2019-01-29.

[112] The three datasets on social assistance in EU countries comprise (see also section 2.4.3):
- the S*ocial Assistance and Minimum Income Protection Interim Dataset* (SAMIP; Nelson 2007, 2013; Nelson et al. 2020) as part of the *Social Policy Indicators* (SPIN) database at Stockholm University (Nelson et al. 2020);
- the *CSB-Minimum Income Protection Indicators Database* (CSB-MIPI), constructed by researcher at the University of Antwerp (van Mechelen et al. 2011);
- the *Minimum Income Protectin in Europe* (EuMin) Database at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES), Germany (Bahle et al. 2011).

[113] At least SAMIP has started to integrate data on selected developing and threshold countries, but the number of these countries is still very limited.

[114] To my knowledge, the most recent undertaking to construct a new database including social cash transfer programmes is the *Global Welfare State Information System* (WeSIS) by the Collaborative Research Centre 1342 "Global Dynamics of Social Policy" at Bremen University, funded by the German Research Foundation for the period 2018 - 2021; https://www.socialpolicydynamics.de/projects/project-area-a-global-dynamics/project-a01/en/; 2020-09-24.

By the time of data collection for FLOORCASH (2011-2013), no dataset with quantitative, computable data on all social cash transfer programmes across the global South was available. Although the two comprehensive quantitative datasets which have been published after the construction of FLOORCASH (Barrientos 2018a; Dodlova et al. 2016) are more recent by two years compared to FLOORCASH (with data on 2000-2015 and 2015 respectively, as opposed to 2012/2013), they have important shortcomings if compared with FLOORCASH. They cover a considerably smaller number of programmes and countries respectively, have at best crude indicators for target groups, tend to exclude programmes which address smaller target groups, and lack indicators for individualization and duration of entitlements, for example. Most importantly, they are not suitable to map, measure and compare *entitlements* to social cash transfers. And they have not yet been used for in-depth analyses.

The review of the databases suggests that constructing comparable and standardized data on social cash transfer entitlements across the countries of the global South is a demanding issue. This is where my self-constructed FLOORCASH-SocCit database starts (see Chapter 5). FLOORCASH-SocCit, published recently (Leisering and Weible 2020), is not only the first quantitative dataset on all social cash transfer programmes in all countries of the global South, but also the most comprehensive database in terms of cases (programmes and countries). And above all, it is the only large N dataset tailored to *entitlements* to social cash transfers across the global South. In-depth analyses showcase the high quality of the data (Weible 2016; Weible and Leisering 2019).

2.6 Conclusion: analytical framework, data, and comparative large N analysis required

Comparative analysis of social cash transfers in the global South constitutes a young, but dynamic field of research with constantly new contributions as regards empirical studies, analytical approaches, and databases. However, with respect to comparing *entitlements* to social cash transfers, it becomes evident that the gaps in research are still considerable in all three respects (analysis, analytical framework, data).

First, comparative empirical research on social cash transfers that covers all programmes across the global South is still scarce. The literature review suggests that the empirical knowledge of the dimension of inclusion is poor, that the knowledge of the conditions of access is fragmentary, and that we have little knowledge of the institutionalization of social cash transfer programmes that is underpinned by large n empirical data. With respect to the target populations, classifications are very crude and lack underpinning by empirical data. Most importantly, a large N analysis of entitlements to social cash transfers is lacking.

Second, the poor and selective knowledge seems to be at odds with the typologies of social cash transfer programmes that have been developed and that suggest that the world of social cash transfers consists of five programme types with clear target groups (and clear behavioural conditions). This discrepancy suggests that a test of the typologies based on quantitative data, which includes all identifiable social cash transfer programmes across the global South, makes sense.

Third, a coherent analytical framework including an integrated set of indicators to compare entitlements to social cash transfers across the global South has not been developed yet. Moreover, approaches that facilitate data aggregation at the country level are lacking.

Fourth, although the quality of large n data has considerably improved in the past years, a dataset suitable for analysing *entitlements* to social cash transfers is still lacking. First and foremost, data on all social cash transfers across the global South is required that facilitates a precise analysis of *target groups* and of the quality of the entitlements of these target groups.

The gaps as regards empirical analyses, methods, and data are evidently intertwined. Due to the lack of a quantitative dataset over many years, there was no need to develop methodological approaches for large n analyses and little chance of undertaking comprehensive quantitative studies. Consequently, refined *data* on entitlements to social cash transfers and an *analytical framework* including a conceptualization and sophisticated measures are required to facilitate a *large N comparative analysis of entitlements to social cash transfers across the global South*, including a comparison of the national social cash transfer arrangements of entire *countries*.

This doctoral thesis contributes to filling these research gaps:

1. It provides a conceptualization for studying social cash transfers in view of social citizenship (Chapter 3)
2. It presents a coherent analytical framework for large N comparative analysis of social cash transfers, including novel indices to map, measure and compare *entitlements* to social cash transfers as well as a sophisticated approach to aggregate data at the country level (Chapter 4).

3. It contributes to building up the required data infrastructure, introducing the self-constructed dataset FLOORCASH-SocCit on entitlements to social cash transfers across the global South (Chapter 5).
4. It analyses all social cash transfer programmes in all countries of the global South, with a focus on entitlements (Chapters 6 to 9).

3 Theoretical framework: Social cash transfers and social citizenship - an uneasy relationship

Social citizenship is not only a popular, but also a strong concept in social policy research. As I demonstrate in the following sections, the concept permits assessing social cash transfers in view of their contribution to the integration of their target groups – the persons considered poor and/ or vulnerable - in society.

In this Chapter I introduce the theoretical concepts that are relevant to inquire into the contribution of social cash transfers to social citizenship. At first, I precisely define social cash transfers and relate them to similar terms and concepts (section 3.1). I then sketch the concept of *social citizenship*, including the broader concept of *citizenship* (section 3.2). After having introduced both social cash transfers and social citizenship, I discuss the relationship between these two concepts (section 3.3). Finally, I present three dimensions of research to measure the contribution of social cash transfers to social citizenship as well as refined research questions (section 3.4).

3.1 "Social cash transfers" – basic income security in development contexts

Social cash transfers are apparently an elusive object of research. On the one hand, many different labels around "social cash transfers" are used, sometimes quite indistinctively. These categories do not only cover short forms like "social transfers" (Barrientos and Niño-Zarazúa 2011; Sabates-Wheeler et al. 2015) and "cash transfers" (Garcia and Moore 2012), but also different concepts such as "social assistance" (Barrientos 2013a) and "(social) safety nets" (World Bank 2017; see also section 2.1.4 on social safety nets). On the other hand, a huge empirical variety of social cash transfer programmes may be found across the global South (see my empirical analyses, Chapters 6 to 9). So, what are *social cash transfers*?

3.1.1 What are social cash transfer programmes? Definition and dissociation

In this doctoral dissertation social cash transfer programmes are defined as *publicly financed programmes that provide regular non-contributory, non-repayable, and untied payments in* *the form of cash to individuals and households considered poor and/or vulnerable, as defined by the programme regulations.*[115]

In the following, I explain the definition of social cash transfer programmes by contrasting them with other kinds of programmes which I do not consider social cash transfers.

Social cash transfer programmes are *publicly financed*, that is funded out of the government budgets (by taxes, for example, as the "most significant source of government revenue" in the global South; see Barrientos 2013a, p. 178). But several programmes receive (additional) funding by bilateral or international donors (*external funding*; see sections 4.7.2 and 9.2). Public funding contrasts with private initiatives such as funding by non-governmental organizations.

Social cash transfers are *regular* transfers. The payments are made usually once per month (for details see Weible et al. 2015). One-off payments as well as pay-for-performance programmes that simply reward the participation in certain measures (such as vaccinations) are not included (while *regular* transfers that are conditional upon certain requirements such as completing a vaccination schedule are classified as social cash transfers, and more precisely as so-called *conditional cash transfers*; see sections 2.3.1, 4.6.3, and 6.4).[116]

Social cash transfers are *non-contributory* in a wider sense. This means that they are provided independently from individual achievements, including financial contributions paid to social insurances and work done, and independently from merit such as in the case of civil servants and national heroes (see also Leisering 2019, p. 77).[117] Consequently, I do not classify *public employment programmes* as social cash transfers, since the participants receive "wages" for their "work" done, which is clearly an achievement-based element. But if public employment programmes imply a *guaranteed* transfer if work is not or cannot be offered in due time, they are classified as social cash transfer programmes, such as Bangladesh´s *100 Days*

[115] This definition is based on early studies on social cash transfers by Leisering 2009, 2008 and by Leisering et al. 2006. The definition has been refined during the collection of data for the database FLOORCASH-Basic, from which the dataset FLOORCASH-SocCit has been reconstructed (see Chapter 5).

[116] Some programmes (above all *conditional cash transfers*) include *supplements* for certain achievements such as graduation from a certain educational level, but this does not affect the classification of the programme as a social cash transfer programme.

[117] All transfers that address war veterans are classified as social cash transfers, as they address a presumably vulnerable group. Nevertheless, a few transfers that address war veterans might be border cases, especially those which are non-means-tested and which are paid irrespective of invalidity, such as under Kazakhstan´s *Special State Social Benefits*.

Employment Generation Programme (EGP; now called *Employment Generation Programme for the Poorest - EGPP)* and India´s famous *Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme* (MGNREGS).

Social cash transfers are *non-repayable,* which distinguishes them from credits such as micro-credits and traditional mutual aid associations (Midgley 2012; Overbye 2005; see also section 10.2.2).

Social cash transfers are *untied*, which implies that they may be used in a flexible manner (see also Gliszczynski 2015, p. 31; Lund 2008, p. 53 on the flexibility of provisions in cash more generally). The recipients of social cash transfers are free to spend the money. This contrasts with tied payments such as housing benefits, which are provided for a predefined purpose.

The form of *cash* is contrary to other forms of social assistance that are "in kind" such as food supply and social services such psychosocial support.

The transfers are paid directly *by the state to the households and individuals,* respectively. The direct support of individuals and households contrasts with traditional forms of development aid which targets bigger entities such as infrastructure projects and municipalities (Leisering et al. 2006, pp. 33–34). The direct link ”state-individual" turns social cash transfers into a relevant object of citizenship studies (see section 3.2).

The persons addressed by social cash transfers – the *target groups* – are persons who are *classified as poor and/or vulnerable*, according to the relevant national definitions and programme regulations. I argue that the ways how target groups are defined in the programme design shed light on the question of who is considered poor and/or as vulnerable in the countries of the global South (see sections 6.1 and 8.1). So, this doctoral dissertation adopts a constructivist perspective on how poverty and vulnerability might be defined.

Box 3.1.1 summarizes the key elements of social cash transfers.

Box 3.1.1 Defining social cash transfers

Social:	address persons considered poor and/or vulnerable
	non-contributory
	publicly funded
	non-repayable
Cash:	monetary payments
	untied, to be used freely and for all purposes (general subsistence)
Transfers:	from state to households/individuals

Source: the author.

In this doctoral dissertation I only refer to *governmental* programmes, which implies that a public agency such as a ministry must oversee the programme. Private initiatives such as the *Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction/Targeting the Ultra Poor (TUP)* in Bangladesh are not included (see section 5.1 on the case selection).

A social cash transfer programme can consist of either one or of several programme components. I call those programmes which comprise several components *composite (or complex) programmes.* Each component of a composite programme addresses one or more groups within the target population of the programme and usually provides a transfer of a distinct level to address these groups. So, a composite programme comprises different transfers of mostly different levels for different target groups, but all components share the name of the composite programme. Composite programmes are frequently found among *conditional cash transfer programmes* in Latin America (see section 6.4).[118]

3.1.2 Social cash transfers as part of social policy, social protection, and social assistance

Which wider concepts may help to classify and confine social cash transfers? I suggest defining social cash transfers in relation to *social policy*, *social protection*, and *social assistance*.

[118] Knowledge of composite programmes and their components has turned out as key to distinguish different kinds of *poor people programmes* (see sections 4.4.2 and 6.1.6).

First, social cash transfers form part of *social policy*. But what is social policy? I use the concept developed by the Swiss (German speaking) sociologist Franz-Xaver Kaufmann to distinguish social cash transfer programmes as *social policy programmes* from other transfer programmes which are not *primarily* measures of social policy (Kaufmann 2009, p. 79). Basically, he defines social policy as political measures that are intended to improve the opportunities of deprived social groups to participate in the social conditions (living conditions) of a society (Kaufmann 2012, pp. 146–179). Although developed in view of the European welfare states, I argue that his definition of social policy is open to diverse social, cultural, and economic contexts, since it neither determines the normative ends of social policy, nor does it limit social policy to particular measures or areas.[119] Having his concept of social policy in mind, I distinguish social cash transfers from initiatives to generate public employment by building up local infrastructure (Gliszczynski 2015, pp. 61–63; see also section 3.1.1) and from a universal basic income grant for any citizen, which goes beyond social policy and rather towards a transformation of society (see Standing and Samson 2003 on the discussion in South Africa).[120]

Second, in the literature social cash transfers are generally described as one form of *social protection* (Carter et al. 2019, p. 13; Barrientos 2011, 2013b; Barrientos and Hulme 2010). Some authors speak of social cash transfers as *basic* social protection (e.g. Gliszczynski 2015). The International Labour Organization (ILO) defines social protection as "the set of policies and programmes designed to reduce and prevent poverty, vulnerability and social exclusion throughout the life cycle" and refers to both contributory and non-contributory programmes (ILO 2017, p. 194). Remarkably, the terms of *social protection* and *social security* are now used interchangeably (Carter et al. 2019, p. 13; ILO 2017, pp. 194–195). While United Nations human rights documents use "social security", in global politics it seems more modern now to speak of "social protection",[121] although the term is still less

[119] Kaufmann´s concept of social policy is much more elaborate than sketched here; see Weible and Leisering 2012, pp. 248–251 for an interpretation of Kaufmann´s concept of social policy in a strong sense, applied to South Africa.

[120] Not a single country of the globe has introduced a universal "unconditional" basic income so far. Initiatives are limited to a small number of pilot projects, some of them private initiatives, such as the *Madhya Pradesh Universal Cash Transfer* in India, *Renda Básica de Cidadania* in Brazil, and the *Basic Income Grant* in Namibia.

[121] This development is underpinned by the ILO changing the title of its "World Social Security Report" (ILO 2010 into "World Social Protection Report" (ILO 2014b, 2017).

clear-cut. In the context of the global North, social protection is understand as social insurance, social assistance, and labour market policies. But in development contexts, social protection is often limited to measures to address poor and vulnerable sections of the population (Barrientos 2013a, p. 12).

To be precise, I prefer referring to the concept of *social security* here (see Table 3.1.2).[122] I focus on *basic social security*, and in particular, on *basic income security,* which excludes social services such as public health services (Leisering 2019, p. 83).[123] Basic social security comprises non-contributory provisions that are either based on *citizenship* or on *need* (verified by a means test). In contrast to social security in general, *basic* social security excludes social insurances (as contributory programmes with provisions based on individual *achievements*) and allowances for civil servants respectively *(*as provisions based on *merit*) (Leisering 2019, p. 77). Consequently, I clearly distinguish these measures from social cash transfers.

Third, social cash transfers are often labelled as *social assistance* in the literature (Barrientos 2018a, 2013a; Carter et al. 2019, p. 13; World Bank n.d.). In a strict sense, social assistance is defined as "*[m]eans-tested* and tax-financed regular public benefits to the poor" (Leisering 2019, p. 401; italics by K.W.; see also Leisering 2019, pp. 81–83). Consequently, if a programme applies a means test, we may certainly speak of social cash transfers as a form of *social assistance*. However, as Table 3.1.2 illustrates, there are non-contributory provisions which are not social assistance in the strict sense, since the programmes do not apply a means test. In these cases, we may speak of *citizenship-based programmes* that address particular categories of citizens, regardless of their individual economic situation. That is the reason why such programmes are often referred to as "universal" programmes (Leisering 2019, p. 77). But the "universality" of these programmes extends only to particular (usually demographic) categories of the population (Leisering 2019, pp. 82–83). I argue that these categories are conceived of as vulnerable categories (see sections 6.1.2 and 8.1).

In short, social cash transfers comprise both (means-tested) social assistance and (non-means-tested) transfers that are paid to all citizens of a population category.

[122] Provisions in kind are not included in Table 3.1.2.

[123] For an overview of the historical evolution of basic income security see Leisering 2019, pp. 67–72.

Table 3.1.2 Social cash transfers as part of social security

<table>
<tr><td colspan="7">Social security</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="6">Income security</td><td rowspan="5">Social services</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">Basic income security
(non-contributory)</td><td rowspan="4">Social insurance
(contributory)</td><td rowspan="4">Allowances
(e.g. for public sector employees)</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Social assistance
(means-tested)</td><td colspan="2">Citizenship-based programmes
(non-means-tested)</td></tr>
<tr><td>Categorical</td><td>Population-wide
(non-categorical)</td><td>Categorical</td><td>Population-wide
(non-categorical)</td></tr>
<tr><td>Social cash transfers
e.g. means-tested social pension</td><td>e.g. poor people programme</td><td>e.g. “universal” social pension</td><td>Universal “unconditional” basic income</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr>
</table>

Sources: the author, partly based on Leisering 2019, pp. 77, 82; for explanations on the programme types at the bottom of the Table see sections 2.3 and 6.4.

3.2 The concept of social citizenship

Citizenship is a broad and multi-faceted concept (see the diverse contributions in Kabeer 2005, on “inclusive citizenship”, for example). Seventy years ago, the British sociologist Thomas Humphrey Marshall presented his interpretation of the concept of citizenship in his famous contribution “Citizenship and social class” (Marshall 1950). Since then, his interpretation has evolved into a classic, which has also been applied to the global South (Hunter and Sugiyama 2014; Plagerson et al. 2012). Marshall´s concept of citizenship is outstanding in that he identifies three different elements of citizenship, of which one explicitly applies to “the social” (*social* citizenship). This social element of citizenship provides the theoretical basis of this doctoral dissertation.

The literature on social citizenship is vast and scholars have contributed various and sometimes quite controversial interpretations (see Powell 2002, for example). That is why I mainly focus on two strands that are most relevant for the purpose of this study: first, Thomas H. Marshall´s contributions as the original source of the concept (Marshall 1950, 1981a, 1981b); second, those recent contributions which have applied the concept of social citizenship directly to social cash transfers in the global South (Davy et al. 2013b; Leisering and Barrientos 2013).

I introduce the concept developed by Marshall in two steps: At first, I sketch the broader concept of *citizenship*, of which *social citizenship* is one element (section 3.2.1). Then I introduce the concept of social citizenship (section 3.2.2).

3.2.1 Citizenship: Who is recognized as a full member of society?

Marshall defines citizenship as “a *status* bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are *equal* with respect to the *rights* and duties with which the status is endowed” (Marshall 1950, pp. 28–29; emphasis by K. W.). Marshall claims, that there “is *no universal principle* that determines what those rights and duties shall be, but societies in which citizenship is a developing *institution* create an image of an ideal citizenship against which achievement can be measured and towards which aspiration can be directed” (Marshall 1950, p. 29; emphasis by K. W.).

Marshall´s concept of citizenship comprises three elements (Marshall 1950, pp. 10–14): civil rights to guarantee individual freedom such as liberty of the person, which emerged in the 18th century; political rights to “participate in the exercise of political power” (Marshall 1950,

p. 11) such as the right to vote, which developed in the 19th century; and finally, social rights such as the “right to a modicum of economic welfare and security” (Marshall 1950, p. 11), which were created in the 20th century.

Some scholars understand citizenship as *subjective* sensibility and personal feeling of belonging (see Davy et al. 2013b, p. S1, for example, on the global perspective). In fact, Marshall argues that citizenship requires “a direct sense of community membership based on loyalty to a civilisation which is a common possession. It is a loyalty of free men endowed with rights and protected by a common law” (Marshall 1950, pp. 40–41). In the following I argue that citizenship is much more than a subjective sense.

The brief quotations at the beginning of this section 3.2.1 contain many features of citizenship that are relevant in the context of this study:

Firstly, citizenship is a question of *status*. The status implies that a person (the citizen) is *recognized* as a full member of a society (a nation). Consequently, I argue below that *recognition* is a central aspect of Marshall´s concept of (social) citizenship (section 3.4).

Secondly, citizenship consists basically of *rights*. These rights are “individual rights, bestowed upon singular human beings (not upon groups or on account of group membership)” (Davy 2014, p. 208). The rights are complemented by duties, although Marshall remains parsimonious about his ideas on duties and obligations (Powell 2002, p. 237). I argue that rights and more precisely, individual entitlements are essential to inquire into (social) citizenship. That is why I put *entitlements* to social cash transfers into the centre of this study.

Thirdly, citizenship is a question of *equality*: citizenship implies an „an urge towards a fuller measure of equality“ (Marshall 1950, p. 29). Marshall points to equality of status and “equality of opportunity” (Marshall 1950, p. 65) rather than equality of outcome. As Davy argues, Marshall emphasizes *basic* equality, which is compatible with social inequality ”caused by unequal abilities or fortune” (Davy 2014, p. 208). This understanding of basic equality seems oriented towards *universality* within the society: Marshall argues that citizenship implies an „increase in the number of those on whom the status is bestowed“ (Marshall 1950, p. 29). This notion of universality suggests paying attention to the *extent* of the increase towards universal coverage, which I do in the research dimension of *inclusion* (see section 3.4).

Fourth, citizenship is an *open* and *contingent* concept that has to be defined and adapted by each society according to the given circumstances and conditions, such as the national income, the structure of a society, and the position of individuals in the society (Marshall 1981a, p. 88). This openness is also reflected in Marshall´s understanding of *rights*, since he emphasizes that "[t]he rights are created, not god-given or inferred from reason" (Davy 2014, p. 208). The rights are *constructed* in view of the given conditions in a society (Marshall 1981a, p. 89). Due to the openness of the concept, I argue that the principles of the rights and duties that shape citizenship may be studied and uncovered, but must not be judged in terms of "good, better than, best" (research dimension of *rights principles*, see section 3.4).

Fifth, *institutions* and institution building respectively play a crucial part for citizenship, since rights need to be underpinned by institutions to become effective, as Marshall emphasizes in the context of civil rights: "Equality before the law did not exist. The right was there, but the remedy might frequently prove to be out of reach. The barriers between rights and remedies (...) first arose from class prejudice and partiality (...) Class prejudice, which undoubtedly coloured the whole administration of justice in the eighteenth century, cannot be eliminated by law, but only by *social education* and the *building of a tradition* of impartiality" (Marshall 1950, p. 36; emphasis by K. Weible). I argue that the degree of institutionalization of citizenship is indispensable for a comprehensive analysis of citizenship (research dimension of *institutionalization*, see section 3.4).

Finally, Marshall developed his concept of citizenship in view of the British society and explicitly defines citizenship as *national*, as opposed to local (Marshall 1950, p. 12; see also Davy 2014, p. 208).[124] Still following Marshall´s concept of citizenship, Davy and colleagues discuss whether there is anything like *global* (social) citizenship (Davy 2013; Davy et al. 2013b). Following the perspective of Davy and colleagues, I inquire (social) citizenship across the global South. But in my study, the "global" view emerges by adding up the findings on citizenship in each of the 148 Southern nation states and independent territories. So, I keep to Marshall´s original understanding of citizenship.

[124] Nevertheless, some scholars suggest a local focus of citizenship, such as Powell (2002, pp. 238–239) due to Marshall´s definition of citizenship as "membership of a community" and his attention to local welfare traditions in history.

3.2.2 Social citizenship: the right to a "modicum of economic welfare and security" and beyond

Marshall´s concept of citizenship comprises civil, political, and social rights (see previous section 3.2.1). In this doctoral dissertation I focus on the social rights as the relevant aspect in the context of basic income security and social cash transfers.

What Marshall describes as "social rights" has evolved into a central concept in research on social policy and in particular on welfare states: *social citizenship* (for an overview see Stephens 2010). Esping-Andersen, famous for his "three worlds of welfare capitalism", maintains that social citizenship constitutes the "core idea of a welfare state" (Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 21).

However, the definition of the social rights by Marshall himself remains vague. He mentions that social rights comprise "the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society" (Marshall 1950, p. 11). He also speaks of "a universal right to real income which is not proportionate to the market value of the claimant" (Marshall 1950, p. 47; see also section 3.3.2). But Marshall has not explained his ideas in more detail (Powell 2002, p. 229). Consequently, the interpretation of the social rights has been controversial (Powell 2002; Stephens 2010). One of the most relevant controversies as to the topic of social cash transfers is whether means-tested benefits may constitute social rights (Stephens 2010, p. 512), which I discuss below in section 3.3.1.

Notably, Marshall points to a range "from ... to..", that is, social citizenship comprises a wide spectrum, dependent on the context. According to Powell (2002, p. 241), social citizenship "needs to be disaggregated into the minimalist, conditional citizenship of cash with the maximalist, unconditional citizenship of kind, reflecting the minimum and the optimum". This interpretation suggests that the "modicum" is close to a minimum. As this doctoral dissertation is about poor and vulnerable persons, I limit the analysis to the "minimalist end" (Powell 2002, p. 234) of the spectrum, that is "the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security".

Although Marshall did not precisely define his ideas on the social rights, we may assume that Marshall considers them as essential elements that have the potential to shape societal structures. Davy argues that the social rights "aim at moderating inequalities, especially in the socioeconomic sphere" (Davy 2014, p. 218; see also section 3.3.2). Following Davy´s interpretation (2014, p. 217), Marshall expects the social rights to have substantial impacts, since they are expected not only to raise the "floor-level in the basement of the social edifice", but to "remodel the whole building" (Marshall 1950, p. 47).

In the following section I discuss whether social cash transfers can be interpreted as a "modicum of economic welfare and security" in the Marshallian sense and so contribute to social citizenship.

3.3 Social cash transfers and social citizenship: the social rights of poor and vulnerable persons to public support

May social cash transfers contribute to social citizenship? To answer this question, we have to examine two issues: First, whether citizenship-based and means-tested forms of social security may contribute to social citizenship (section 3.3.1); second, whether provisions in the form of cash may contribute to social citizenship (section 3.3.2). I then continue with exploring the relationship between social cash transfers and social citizenship theoretically (section 3.3.3) and empirically (section 3.3.4).

3.3.1 Test I: Can social assistance contribute to social citizenship?

Above I explained that social cash transfers fall into two categories of basic income security (section 3.1.2): means-tested social assistance programmes and citizenship-based programmes that do not apply a means test. May either form contribute to social citizenship?

When Marshall speaks of "a universal right to real income" to describe social citizenship (Marshall 1950, p. 47; see section 3.2.2), the term "universal" touches an aspect of social citizenship which needs to be discussed. "Universal" in the strictest sense means "everyone" or, more precisely, "every citizen". Healthcare for all citizens such as under the British *National Health Service* is often mentioned as an example. A universal income in the strictest sense would imply a universal "unconditional" basic income, which, however, goes beyond social policy (see section 3.1.2, including Table 3.1.2). And this form is not in the centre of the debates around social citizenship.

Instead, social citizenship rights are mainly interpreted in two ways (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S53): first, as social insurances which cover major parts of the population and are therefore considered as "universal". These contributory programmes are not the object of study here (see section 3.1.2). Second, transfers that are provided for all citizens of a certain population *category,* irrespective of means and income. Social cash transfers that do not apply a means test form part of these programmes. These programmes are often labelled "universal", but are, limited to a certain population *category* such as social pensions (see section 3.1.2). These provisions are by definition based on citizenship (Leisering 2019, p. 77). We may therefore assume that the citizenship-based social cash transfers, which are not means-tested, may contribute to social citizenship.

But, as I show in the empirical part of this doctoral dissertation (section 8.1), 80% of all social cash transfers are means-tested. What about these means-tested transfers? May these social assistance programmes also contribute to social citizenship?

Contrary to universal benefits and social insurance, social assistance has largely been claimed to impair rather than promote social citizenship, since the benefit is granted only in a residual or "selective" way addressing poor people (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S53). The means test as well as the principle of discretion which bestows officers with the power to decide whether social assistance is granted or not were interpreted as conflicting with the principle of universality of social citizenship (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S53).

More recently, however, scholars have emphasized that Marshall (1950, 1981a) considered means-tested provisions as social rights, too (Stephens 2010, p. 512; Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S53). Leisering and Weible introduced the term *protection universalism* to underline that means-tested rights may also be "universal" social rights (Weible and Leisering 2019, pp. 144–145): To the extent that every citizen is *protected by entitlements* to a certain provision, once the designated contingency has occurred (such as social assistance for the contingency of poverty and old age pension for the contingency of old age), social assistance – just as social insurance – may be protection-universal programmes, too. As Palacios and Knox-Vydmanov (2014, p. 258) argue, social pensions – defined as means-tested (and pension-tested[125]) social cash transfer programmes for older persons - may provide entitlements and "ensure that all older people receive a pension".

Leisering and Barrientos (2013) are among those scholars who argue that means-tested provisions form part of social citizenship rights. Referring to Marshall (1981a), they make three arguments in favour of social assistance as a component of social citizenship. At first,

[125] Similar to a means test to identify those without sufficient means (as defined by the programme regulations), a pension test is used to identify those without income from a pension (see Böger and Leisering 2017, pp. 18–19 for a classification of means tests in social pension programmes).

they make the “recognition argument”: Social assistance *may* be part of social citizenship if it is “institutionalised in a way to secure *recognition* of the claimants” (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S54; emphasis there). In this context, Leisering and Barrientos refer to a “welfare consciousness” among the public, the politicians, and the administration, which makes them “fully accept the legitimacy of the claims, take them seriously and give them a high degree of priority” (Marshall 1981a, p. 89). This argument highlights the importance of recognition when studying social citizenship (see section 3.4).

Second, Leisering and Barrientos make the “resource argument”: Social assistance *must* be a component of social citizenship to guarantee “basic equality” in the dimension of resources: “Universal schemes [like social insurances which cover broad sections of the population;[126] K.W.] need to be complemented by selective schemes [like social assistance; K.W.] to produce a ´universal´ overall architecture of public welfare” (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S54). I revert to the implications of “basic equality” in section 3.3.3.

Third, Leisering and Barrientos make the “institutionalisation argument”: Whether or not a social assistance programme forms part of social citizenship depends on the way it is “designed, institutionalised and contextualised” (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S54). Formal rights need to be embedded in institutions. Among the relevant institutions are a legal profession to substantiate civil rights and a “collective responsibility to seek to achieve welfare” (Marshall 1981a, p. 88) among the officers in charge to turn the right to social assistance subject to discretion into a citizenship right (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S54; for institution building see also section 3.2.1). This argument emphasizes that the way a programme is designed and the degree a programme is institutionalized matters for social citizenship (see sections 3.3 and 3.4).

Following Leisering and Barrientos´ arguments, we may conclude that social assistance, including (the major part of) social cash transfers, may contribute to social citizenship, depending on the recognition of the claimants and the institutionalization of the programmes. Consequently, the research design has to pay tribute to these two aspects. Following Leisering and Barrientos´ arguments, I make the aspect of recognition very strong in this doctoral dissertation: the social cash transfers are put to a tough and thorough test in the dimension of recognition (see section 3.4). Besides, I put emphasis on the degree of institutionalization of the social cash transfer programmes to test their contribution to social citizenship.

[126] See Leisering and Barrientos 2013, S53.

Social assistance and the means-tested social cash transfers respectively may be seen as a test case of social citizenship rights, since poor people have typically been considered a marginalized group in society (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, pp. S63–S64). If in a society even the poor section of citizens - “the poor” – are granted social rights, we may assume that social citizenship rights are of relevance in this society.

3.3.2 Test II: Could a modicum of economic welfare and security be provided in cash?

When sketching the origins of social citizenship, Marshall speaks of “a universal right to real income which is not proportionate to the market value of the claimant” (Marshall 1950, p. 47). This implies that social citizenship may be realized in the form of “real income”, which certainly includes monetary benefits when we think of the context of Marshall´s work, the British society of 1950. Most notably, Marshall mentions that the form of a “money payment” - rather than a “service rendered” - increases the “degree of equalisation” (Marshall 1950, p. 54). Increasing the equality of status is a crucial aspect of citizenship (section 3.2.1). “Cash benefits subject to income limits and means test had a simple and obvious equalising effect”, since they reduced inequalities among the classes, at least with respect to the “prescribed minimum” (Marshall 1950, p. 54).

Regarding the size of the “real income”, Marshall stresses that it must be different from the market value. As mentioned in section 3.2.2, Marshall does not define the level of the “modicum of economic welfare and security”. But Marshall mentions that the “degree of equalisation” depends on several issues, among other criteria on “whether the minimum is high or low” (Marshall 1950, p. 54). As *social* cash transfers are non-contributory benefits and independent of the “market value of the claimant”, they might contribute to social citizenship.

From a theoretical point of view, we may conclude that all forms of social *cash* transfers (means-tested and non-means-tested transfers) may contribute to social citizenship.

3.3.3 Applying the theoretical concept of social citizenship to social cash transfers

Leisering and Barrientos (2013) have applied the concept of social citizenship to social cash transfers, refining the concept in this particular respect. I sketch their interpretations in this section, since I follow them in parts.

Leisering and Barrientos interpret social citizenship as “rights-based inclusion with regard to sharing resources, actively participating in social life and being recognised by others” (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S63). So, the authors identify three aspects as key to studying social citizenship in the context of social cash transfers: resources; participation „in common activities in markets, politics, and civil society“; and recognition, understood as „conveying a sense of belonging, dignity, personal worth and voice“ (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S52).

Anticipating the result of the following discussion, I largely share Leisering and Barrientos´ interpretation, but make a crucial distinction: Whereas they present the three dimensions as equal elements of social citizenship in the context of social cash transfers, I argue that the most central aspect is recognition, whereas participation and resources are relevant, but sub-ordinate. Put differently, I maintain that when studying Marshall´s concept of social citizenship in the context of social cash transfers, the aspect of recognition should be analysed in the first place. This has implications for my research design (see section 3.4).

Leisering and Barrientos emphasize that the three dimensions (resources, participation, recognition) are “framed in terms of individualized legal rights” (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S52), that is as *entitlements* of individuals. Entitlements in the form of rights to social cash transfers imply *recognizing* individual citizens as holders of rights and as full members of a “community of individual rights-holders” (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S52). The focus on individual rights underlines that recognition is central to Marshall´s concept of social citizenship.[127]

I argue that what Leisering and Barrientos call *recognition* may be linked to Marshall´s understanding of “equality”: the equality of status.[128] Equality is a central aspect of citizenship, which is, however, controversially interpreted and therefore needs to be discussed. Marshall emphasizes *equality of status* when defining citizenship: “All who

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[127] Leisering and colleagues have defined variations of recognition, based on the relationships between recognition and redistribution of political measures. *Embedded recognition* refers to redistributive social policies that imply recognition of the recipients, such as social insurance. *Symbolic recognition* refers to “cultural artefacts that communicate the worth of individuals or groups even if recognition does not materialize in the institutionalization of welfare schemes” (Leisering et al. 2014, pp. 571–572).

[128] Marshall also speaks of “equalisation”, which is similar, but which indicates a direction and development Marshall 1950, pp. 54, 56. Marshall states that “[w]hat matters is that there is a general enrichment of the concrete substance of civilised life, a general reduction of risk and insecurity, an equalisation between the more and the less fortunate at all levels” (Marshall 1950, p. 56).

possess the status [that is, citizenship; K.W.] are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed" (Marshall 1950, pp. 28–29). But how to interpret this equality of status? What does the concept imply and what does it not mean?

An important point of reference is the relationship of the equality of status with economic equality and the aspect of resources, respectively. In this respect, Powell sees Marshall´s concept of citizenship "associated with equality of status and horizontal redistribution more than vertical redistribution" (Powell 2002, p. 231). Citizenship does not imply "equality" with respect to outcome, it is, if at all, only moderately egalitarian (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, pp. S52–S53). Equality of status might be interpreted as close to equality of opportunity (Powell 2002, pp. 233–235). And as Powell emphasizes, Marshall´s equality of opportunity is embedded in *legitimate* inequality (Powell 2002, p. 234).

With respect to *participation*, the social services and above all the educational system are crucial to enable citizens to participate in societal life. Besides, these institutions are central to "make full use of their civil and political rights" (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S53). The latter point hints at the interdependence of the three types of rights. With respect to participation in the context of social cash transfers, I argue that p*articipation* refers to the level of *implementation* of the programmes. Participation in this sense is logically the second step after the first step of recognition, which is reflected in the programme design, such as in the definition of target groups. The implementation of the cash transfer programmes "tends to lag behind program design" (de la O 2015, pp. 40–41, with respect to conditional cash transfer in Latin America). That is why I argue that the aspect of participation in this sense is sub-ordinate to the aspect of recognition, which I study in view of the programme designs.

Another interpretation of the dimension of *participation* relates the programme design to the actual living conditions. In a large n study on social citizenship for older persons in the global South, Böger and Leisering measure participation as the difference between the life expectancy at age 60 in each country and the qualifying age of the social pension in this country (Böger and Leisering 2017, pp. 24–25). This way, they test to what extent older persons are likely to enjoy their entitlements to a social pension so that they are able to "participate" in the markets and in society. Again, I argue that making use of one´s entitlement is only possible *after* the entitlement has been created in a programme of a distinct design. The implementation (facilitating that persons make use of their entitlements to social cash transfers) is the second step, following logically the recognition (entitlements defined in the programme design) as the first step. That is why I consider the aspect of participation sub-ordinate to recognition when analysing social citizenship.

With respect to the aspect of *resources*, Leisering and Barrientos emphasize that “Marshall left benefit standards unspecified” (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S53). To outline the aspect of resources, Leisering and Barrientos refer to the requirements of “basic equality” (Marshall 1950, p. 9), “a modicum of economic welfare and security”, and the participation in social life “according to the standards prevailing in the society” (Marshall 1950, p. 11). The aspect of resources is important in the sense that, according to Marshall, some “basic equality” must be provided. However, I maintain that the precise level may be interpreted as of sub-ordinate relevance to study social cash transfers in view of social citizenship. In a later contribution on welfare, including a section on the relationship between welfare and equality, Marshall argues that “equality in terms of welfare is not something that has to be defined by calculating the redistributions of income or measuring the economic value of social services. It is a qualitative, not a quantitative, concept” (Marshall 1981b, p. 65). Similarly, in his contribution on social citizenship, Marshall maintains that “[e]quality of status is more important than equality of income” (Marshall 1950, p. 56). Against this background, I argue that the aspect of resources may be interpreted as less critical to the analysis of social citizenship compared with the aspect of recognition. As Marshall´s definition of the “right to a modicum of economic welfare and security” is so vague, I do not investigate the *quantitative* aspects of the “modicum”, such as the benefit level in more detail. Instead, I focus on other, *qualitative* aspects, such as the question whether a defined social group is entitled to *any* social cash transfer, no matter of what level, and such as the issue whether the social cash transfer programmes apply a means test.

Leisering and Barrientos offer a fourth aspect of social citizenship: the concept of *inclusion* to which the three aspects recognition, participation, and resources “add up” (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S53). Following Leisering and Barrientos´ interpretation, inclusion - rather than equality - captures the core of Marshall´s concept of social citizenship, emphasizing that Marshall´s idea of citizenship was not egalitarian (see further above in this section). They maintain that if social citizenship is interpreted as inclusion, the concept of citizenship may be applied to low- and middle-income countries, since it “opens up the standards of benefits that make up social citizenship” (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S53). Inclusion matches well with Marshall´s statement that citizenship implied an „increase in the number of those on whom the status is bestowed“ (Marshall 1950, p. 29).

For my own study on assessing the contribution of social cash transfers to social citizenship, I rearrange the terms and aspects of social citizenship which Leisering and Barrientos introduce. They present the concept of *inclusion* as a kind of umbrella concept of social citizenship in the context of social cash transfers, which comprises the three aspects of recognition, resources, and participation. Taking up this idea, I make *inclusion* the major research dimension of my study (out of three dimensions altogether). *Within* the concept of inclusion, however, I adapt the relative weight of the three aspects *recognition*, *participation*, and *resources.* Whereas Leisering and Barrientos evidently see these three aspects as equally important, I conceive of recognition as the most relevant aspect of social citizenship. Consequently, I emphasize recognition more than resources and participation. Finally, in this doctoral dissertation *inclusion* implies aspects of *recognition*, *equality of status,* and *entitlement.* To a lesser extent, inclusion is linked to the aspects of *participation* and *resources*, as outlined by Leisering and Barrientos (2013; see section 3.4).

Leisering and Barrientos offer a fifth central aspect of Marshall´s concept of social citizenship. They interpret social citizenship as closely linked with institutions and institution building (see also the "institutionalisation argument" in section 3.3.1). They emphasize that Marshall mentions relevant institutions for each of the three elements of citizenship. With respect to social citizenship, Marshall maintains that "[T]he institutions most closely connected with it are the educational system and the social services" (Marshall 1950, p. 11). Leisering and Barrientos argue that "[i]nadequate institutionalisation implies deficits in social citizenship" (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S59). Institutions and the degree of institutionalisation matter for social citizenship. When Marshall refers to citizenship as a "developing institution", he speaks – among other aspects - of the „enrichment of the stuff of which the status is made" (Marshall 1950, p. 29). Consequently, I make institutionalisation (here: of social cash transfer programmes) one of the three central dimensions of analysis in this study (see section 3.4).

3.3.4 Developing the research questions to fill the knowledge gaps

Leisering and Barrientos (2013) do not only elaborate on the theoretical concept of social citizenship when applied to social cash transfers, they also contribute several observations on social citizenship in the global South from an empirical point of view.[129] These statements give us some ideas of how social cash transfers might contribute to social citizenship and how this social citizenship in the global South might look like. Leisering and Barrientos´ empirical contributions are based on their outstanding expert knowledge, but their statements are not underpinned by quantitative empirical data on social cash transfers. I take Leisering and Barrientos´s statements as the state of the art on the subject and as hypotheses to be tested in this doctoral dissertation based on the quantitative dataset FLOORCASH-SocCit. Moreover, Leisering and Barrientos leave a lot of questions open. These open questions are the knowledge gaps which I fill in this doctoral dissertation. In the following I outline three major gaps.

First, Leisering and Barrientos (2013) find that social cash transfers have contributed to social citizenship in the global South. However, they leave open to what extent and in what ways exactly. The authors state that "[t]he extension of citizenship associated with the expansion of social assistance is associated with greater inclusion in social protection" (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S61). The authors maintain that "social assistance schemes geared to groups in poverty spreading all over the South since the 1990s" have made the "overall social protection arrangements in the South (...) *more inclusive*" (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S64; emphasis there). They attribute the increased inclusiveness both to "an extension of citizenship (including more people)" and "a *shift in the social organisation of social citizenship*, namely a growing share of non-contributory, mostly means-tested welfare provisions" (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S64; emphasis there). This means, Leisering and Barrientos see the contribution of social cash transfers to social citizenship in an increase in both the number of "people included" and of programmes. However, the authors are silent on important details. Regarding the increase in persons included, what persons were included (what target groups)? Are the persons included as individuals or households (which beneficiary units)? To what extent are persons included (what scale)? Regarding the increase in programmes, what programmes have been increased (what programme designs)? How inclusive are the programmes (what inclusiveness)? And how many programmes have been introduced (what scale)? Summing up, Leisering and Barrientos´ contribution lack information on the questions: *What social cash transfer programmes with what designs and*

[129] Böger and Leisering 2017 also investigate social cash transfers in view of social citizenship in the global South, but they limit their object of study to one programme type, the *social pensions* for older persons.

with what target groups have been established? How inclusive is social citizenship in the global South?

Second, Leisering and Barrientos emphasize that, although the concept of social citizenship has come close to universality and although it implies basic equality, in practice "[c]itizenship remains *stratified* and *exclusionary* in many ways" (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S65; emphasis there). They argue that citizenship implied stratification and new exclusions in the global South, establishing "*limits*" to social citizenship (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, pp. S61–S62, S65; emphasis there). With respect to stratification, Leisering and Barrientos explain their hypotheses. Stratification with respect to resources may be a result of "the categorical differentiation of the overall arrangement of social assistance in a country" (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S61), that is, social cash transfer programmes address particular social categories and the benefit level varies by programme. Besides, resource stratification may be due to different "levels of provision" of those social groups entitled to benefits of social assistance, compared to recipients of social insurance programmes. Although the second aspect is beyond the interest of my study (as social insurance is not part of the object of study), we need to know more about the first aspect: *To what extent are the social cash transfer arrangements of the countries categorically differentiated? And in what way do they entail stratification of social citizenship?* With respect to exclusion, the authors mention that some groups such as the unemployed are missing among the groups that are addressed by the social cash transfer programmes. *In what ways do social cash transfer programmes exclude groups? Who is excluded? To what degree is social citizenship exclusionary?*

Third, Leisering and Barrientos discover a "potentially new kind of social citizenship in development contexts" (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S64). Although, as the authors admit, the contribution of social assistance (and social cash transfers in particular) to this new social citizenship was at an "embryonic" stage (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S65), the concept of s*ocial citizenship* - originally applied in welfare state research - seems now promising for research on social protection in the global South. *In what way is there a new kind of social citizenship in the global South? What is it like?*

Evidently, the extent and the ways of the alleged contribution of social cash transfers to social citizenship has not been studied systematically yet. What is more, the claims that social citizenship entailed new exclusions and stratification still lack refined empirical investigations underpinning the assertions. Finally, whether there is a "potentially new kind of social citizenship in development contexts" (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S64) and what it is like, are still open questions. In conclusion, I address all these open questions, investigating the following central research question in my doctoral thesis:

To what extent and in what ways do social cash transfers across the entire global South contribute to social citizenship for persons considered poor and/or vulnerable?

As explained in the definition of social cash transfers (section 3.1.1), the persons who are considered poor and/or vulnerable constitute the target population of social cash transfers.

3.4 Measurement: Measuring the contribution of social cash transfers to social citizenship – three dimensions

This doctoral dissertation analyses social cash transfer programmes across the global South in view of their contribution to social citizenship for persons considered poor and/or vulnerable.

Box 3.4 Definition of "poor and/or vulnerable"

In this doctoral dissertation, the term „poor and/or vulnerable" always implies social *attributions* of poverty and/or vulnerability, that is it refers to persons and households who are *considered* poor and/or vulnerable in the respective countries. I distinguish between "poor" and "vulnerable" in the empirical analyss (sections 6.1 and 8.1).

Framing the empirical analysis by the concept of social citizenship facilitates assessing the contribution of social cash transfers across the global South to the social integration ("inclusion"; Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S63; see section 3.3.3) of the poor and/or vulnerable sections - their target groups - in society. The concept permits analysing whether citizens who are classified as poor in a society are equipped with the social right to a "modicum of economic welfare and security" (section 3.2.2) – here: social cash transfers –, in whatever way poverty is defined by the relevant national rules and programme regulations, and so whether the citizens who are classified as poor may be considered "full members" of this society (section 3.2.1).

However, for the purpose of an empirical study, a more elaborate conceptualization of social citizenship is required. I conceive of three dimensions of social citizenship: inclusion, rights principles, and institutionalization (see Table 3.4).

Table 3.4 Social citizenship applied to social cash transfers

Dimension of social citizenship…	… transferred to *entitlements* to social cash transfers	Research questions	Objective
Inclusion: „increase in the number of those on whom the status is bestowed“[130] (recognition; indirectly: participation, resources)	Scope of entitlements • Target categories of entitlements	Who is entitled, who is included?	*Mapping the subjects of entitlements*
	• Inclusiveness of entitlements	To what extent are the target categories entitled (included)?	*Measuring the quality of entitlements*
	• Target configurations	Which target configurations can be identified?	*Mapping the variety of target configurations; identifying patterns and constructing types*
Rights principles: „no universal principle that determines what those rights and duties shall be“[131] (participation, recognition, resources)	Conditions of access to entitlements	On what conditions are the target groups entitled?	*Mapping (the contingency in) the quality of entitlements*
Institutionalization: „enrichment of the stuff of which the status is made“[132] (participation, recognition, resources)	Security of entitlements	To what extent are entitlements institutionalized and in this sense “secure”?	*Measuring the quality of entitlements*

Source: the author, based on Marshall (1950, 1981a, 1981b); brackets in the left column refer to the dimensions developed by Leisering and Barrientos (2013).

First of all, *entitlements* to social cash transfers are in the centre of my analysis, since I follow Leisering and Barrientos´ interpretation that entitlements constitute the “frame” (or even the

[130] Marshall 1950, p. 29.

[131] Marshall 1950, p. 29.

[132] Marshall 1950, p. 29.

“base”) of social citizenship (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, pp. S52, S63; section 3.3.3). Entitlements in the context of social cash transfers may be defined as rights of individuals or households to a social cash transfer, as stipulated in the relevant statutes (if any) and according to the national regulations. The relevant statutes and regulations shape the *design* of social cash transfer programmes. I speak of “entitlements” regardless of whether a programme is based on statute or not (for the analysis of the legal basis see section 9.1). Entitlements are linked to the dimension of recognition (see section 3.3.3). Consequently, as entitlements are the central object of this study, the aspect of recognition in social citizenship is present throughout my empirical analysis.

Entitlements are crucial, in particular regarding those social cash transfers that are means-tested, since these transfers may only contribute to social citizenship on the condition that they are institutionalised in a way that secures *recognition* of the claimants (“recognition argument”, see section 3.3.1). Entitlements are one way of securing this recognition, since entitlements as individualized rights imply recognition of individual citizens as right holders and as full citizens with social rights (see section 3.3.3). Consequently, I assume that all persons who are *entitled* to a social cash transfer, no matter whether means-tested or not, can be recognized as full citizens (full members of the society).[133] The focus on entitlements in this study entails what I call the *entitlement approach to social citizenship* that I follow (see section 4.2). The research question which follows from the focus on entitlements is: *Who is (which target groups are) entitled to social cash transfers?*

Second, I analyse social citizenship in view of three dimensions: *inclusion*, *rights principles*, and *institutionalization*. I claim that by analysing social cash transfers in these three dimensions, we can assess and map the contribution of social cash transfers to social citizenship in the global South. I argue that assessing the contribution of social cash transfers to social citizenship can be made by *measuring* the degree to which social cash transfers contribute to the dimensions of *inclusion* and *institutionalization* and by *mapping* contingency in the dimension of *rights principles* (see Chapter 4).

Inclusion is the most elementary dimension, since the transfers may contribute only to social citizenship for those groups who are “included”, that is who are within the scope of the programmes. Only in a second step, the quality of this inclusion in terms of the rights principles and institutionalization becomes relevant. I understand inclusion as the „increase in

[133] “Full” membership here refers to the social dimension (social citizenship), whereas the other two dimensions of citizeship (political and civil; see section 3.2.1) are not studied in this doctoral dissertation.

the number of those on whom the status is bestowed“ (Marshall 1950, p. 29). So, inclusion may be interpreted as a dynamic element of social citizenship, since we may argue that it targets towards those who are not yet included (see also section 3.3.1 on universalism). In the first place inclusion refers to the target population who is entitled. But it also entails the question whether inclusion is *limited* to particular (usually demographic) categories, implying the notion of exclusion. Inclusion refers to the *scope* of entitlements within the target population and to the issue whether the target population is fully included or only partially included – and to the question of who is *not* included: *Who is entitled, that is who is included and to what extent? Who is not included?*

Moreover, inclusion refers to the configurations of target groups, that is the combination of target groups in the programme design. I argue that *target configurations* - the groups which a programme addresses at the same time - are the key feature of programmes and programme types. *What target configurations can be identified? What variety and what patterns (types) can be identified?*

Inclusion integrates the social citizenship aspects of *recognition* and *equality of status* that Leisering and Barrientos (2013) mention (see section 3.3.3). Social cash transfers may, in principle, constitute a “modicum of economic welfare and security” as the relevant minimalist end of the spectrum of social citizenship. In this respect, the entitlements to social cash transfers may contribute to “basic equality” (see section 3.3). But: *are the target categories equally entitled?*

Inclusion indirectly refers to the aspect of *participation* (if interpreted as programme implementation). As programme implementation tends to lag *behind* the programme design, or put differently, as “governments are not promising much more than they are delivering” (de la O 2015, p. 40 on *conditional cash transfers* in Latin America), we may take the design of a programme as an indicator of the *maximum* degree of participation in this programme. If the programme is implemented under the most favourable conditions, the programme might achieve an extent of inclusion that is identical (or comes close) to the programme design. We may ask: *Who might, at best, participate in the social cash transfer programmes?*

Inclusion indirectly refers to the aspect of *resources*, too: Those who are included are entitled to some resources, however small the quantity may be. *Who is entitled to any resources?*

Institutionalization is also an important dimension of social citizenship, since rights need to be underpinned by institutions to become effective, as Marshall emphasized in the context of civil rights (see sections 3.2.1 and 3.3.1). I understand institutionalization of social citizenship as the „enrichment of the stuff of which the status is made“ (Marshall 1950, p. 29). Most importantly, I interpret institutionalization in the context of social cash transfers in terms of *reliability* and *security* of entitlements. I claim that the stronger programmes are institutionalized, the more secure are the entitlements to social cash transfers based on these programmes. Leisering and colleagues argue that institutionalisation facilitates reliability where politicians and citizens face local clientelism, the changeable character of national policies, and the instability of donor support (Leisering et al. 2006, pp. 192–193). So, *to what extent are the entitlements institutionalized and may in this sense be considered secure?*

Institutionalization establishes a link to the aspect of *participation*, since it is institutions like the educational system and the social services that facilitate citizens´ participating in society (see section 3.3.3). Institutionalization is also related to the security of participation in society: *To what extent may the citizens entitled participate in society on a reliable basis?*

Institutionalization is also related to *recognition* in as far as social cash transfer programmes are based on statutes, which underpin the recognition of the target groups and their entitlements legally: *To what extent are entitlements legally recognized?*

What is more, institutionalization in terms of security may be connected to *resources* if we emphasize the *qualitative* features of resources. The duration of the entitlement influences the security of social cash transfers and so establishes a connection between resources and institutionalization in terms of security: *To which period of entitlements are citizens entitled?*

In addition to the two dimensions of inclusion and institutionalization, I add a third dimension, *rights principles*. The rights principles refer to the contingency and the broad range of principles according to which social citizenship may be organized, since there is „no universal principle that determines what those rights and duties shall be“ (Marshall 1950, p. 29; see sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2). In my analysis of social cash transfers the rights principles refer to the conditions of access to entitlement and to the issue whether the access is restricted by additional conditions such as behavioural conditions*: On what conditions are the target groups entitled to social cash transfers?*

As a direct consequence of the contingency with which social citizenship may be shaped, I argue that the rights principles must not be judged in terms of "good, better than, best" (unlike the dimensions of inclusion and institutionalization; see section 4.6). Nevertheless, we may assume that the more additional conditions - of whatever kind - are linked to entitlements to social cash transfers, the more conditional is the status of social citizenship and the less may the target groups be "unconditionally" *recognized* as full citizens. This links the rights principles to the aspect of recognition: *To what extent are the entitlements linked to additional conditions of access, making the recognition of the entitlement holders as full citizens dependent on additional requirements?*

The dimension of rights principles is related to the aspect of *participation*, since the conditions of access define the conditions and circumstances under which entitlements to social cash transfers can be "realized" to partake in society: *On what conditions may the citizens entitled partake in society?*

Moreover, we may draw a link between the rights principles and the aspect of *resources* if we emphasize the *qualitative* features of resources such as the means test. Whether entitlements are means-tested is relevant to both the aspect of resources and to the conditions of access: *On what conditions are the right holders entitled to the resources?*

The discussions in this Chapter suggest that the concept of social citizenship implies certain ideals and benchmarks. In the dimension of inclusion social citizenship evidently implies the ideal of universal ("full") inclusion of citizens classified as poor in a country´s national social cash transfer arrangement (*protection universalism*, see section 3.3.1; see section 4.5 on the country approach). Similarly, in the dimension of institutionalization social citizenship obviously implies the ideal of a high degree of institutionalization ("full" institutionalization; see further above in this section). Consequently, I *measure* and *assess* entitlements to social cash transfer against the ideal benchmarks of "full inclusion" and "full institutionalization", respectively (see Table 3.4, right column). By contrast, there is no such an implicit benchmark with regard to the dimension of rights principles and with regard to the subjects of entitlements (target categories). As social citizenship is an *open* and *contingent* concept, the rights principles must be defined and adapted by each society according to the given circumstances and conditions (see further above in this section). Regarding the subject of entitlements, the same contingency and openness may be assumed, since no principle to prioritize any target category may be derived from social citizenship (but the ideal of including all citizens classified as poor in a country´s national social cash transfer arrangement). Consequently, I *map* the contingency of entitlements to social cash transfers in the dimension of rights principles and *map* the subjects of entitlement (target categories) in the dimension of inclusion, without assessing the findings in terms of "better than" and "best" (see Table 3.4, right column).

In conclusion, I analyse social cash transfers in view of the three dimensions of social citizenship *inclusion*, *rights principles*, and *institutionalization,* following three basic research questions:

Which groups in which countries of the global South are entitled to social cash transfers, on what conditions, and with what degree of security?

Once I am able to answer these questions, I will be able to answer the central question of this doctoral thesis: *To what extent and in what ways do social cash transfers across the entire global South contribute to social citizenship for persons considered poor and/or vulnerable*?

In the subsequent Chapter 4 I explain how I operationalize the three dimensions of social citizenship.

CONTRIBUTION I: DESIGNING CONCEPTS AND MEASURES FOR A LARGE N ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL CASH TRANSFERS

4 Designing concepts and measures for a large N analysis of social cash transfers in view of social citizenship

How to analyse all social cash transfer programmes in view of social citizenship? In the preceding Chapter 3 I present the three dimensions of social citizenship of which I conceive: inclusion, rights principles, and institutionalization. In this Chapter 4 I present a coherent set of indicators that operationalize these three dimensions of social citizenship. I develop an innovative methodological approach to mapping and comparing *all* the social cash transfer programmes in *all* countries of the global South.

Comparing *all* social cash transfer programmes throughout the global South is a demanding undertaking. It requires *standardized* indicators that are tailored to the theoretical framework of social citizenship and to the research questions. As explained in section 2.4 on the state of the art, there is no ready-made set of indicators available for this purpose. Consequently, I design the concepts and measures tailored to the purpose of this study myself. I develop a mixed-methods approach and a multi-stage research strategy, which I sketch in the following section 4.1. I then introduce my basic approach to the concept of social citizenship, the entitlement approach (section 4.2). I proceed by developing distinct units of analysis, six standardized *target categories* (section 4.3). In the next sections I introduce the set of indicators along the three dimensions of social citizenship: inclusion as regards programmes and countries respectively (sections 4.4 and 4.5), rights principles (section 4.6), and institutionalization (section 4.7). At the end, I provide a compact overview of the indicators I use in the empirical analysis (section 4.8).

4.1 Introduction and overview: Developing a mixed methods approach and a multi-stage research strategy

The empirical maze of programmes and programme designs may be overwhelming at the beginning of any large N research on social cash transfers and might drive researchers to dispair, fearing that a basis for mapping and comparing all programmes empirically might never be found. Facing this empirical maze, I developed a *mixed methods approach* including inductive and deductive elements as well as quantitative and qualitative methods.

On the one hand, I followed a *deductive* approach for the construction of the *basic* data - the database FLOORCASH-Basic (with the help of a team consisting of two research assistants and myself; Weible et al. 2013, 2015; see Chapter 5). FLOORCASH-Basic is the first database to comprise all the 282 social cash transfer programmes in all countries of the global South as of 2012/2013 (but see Barrientos et al. 2010 as a more selective database; see section 2.5.1). FLOORCASH-Basic includes (quantitative and qualitative) indicators used by the few early, selective databases and studies on social cash transfers (see section 2.5.1). FLOORCASH-Basic is a largely descriptive database in the form of text rather than in computable codes.

On the other hand, I followed an *inductive* approach with the help of case studies which proved as indispensable sources to comprehend the diversity of programme designs.[134] I undertook a qualitative country case study on the social cash transfers in South Africa. It comprises interviews with experts of the government ministry in charge (*Department for Social Development, DSD*), of the implementing agency *(South African Social Security Agency – SASSA)* as well of civil society organizations (Weible and Leisering 2012). Moreover, I benefited from in-depth investigations on the Greater China region (China, Taiwan, Hong-Kong, Macao) undertaken by my colleague Tao Liu of the FLOOR research team (Leisering et al. 2017; Liu 2014; Liu and Sun 2016a, 2016b).[135] In addition to these case studies, I undertook several "mini" case studies on selected programmes with the help of expert interviews (see the list of interviews indicated as sources in FLOORCASH-Basic and FLOORCASH-SocCit version 4 (Leisering and Weible 2020), respectively) and extensive research in multiple sources, for example on Brazil and Chile. This way I was able to test empirical cases against the set of indicators: Do the indicators map the programmes adequately, especially when comparing them with other, contrasting cases? So, indicators could constantly be refined and more indicators could be added during the data collection.

In addition to the mixed methods approach, this doctoral dissertation is built on a *multi-stage research strategy* which is linked to the construction of the data. The construction of the

[134] The two largest studies on social assistance in European welfare states and OECD countries respectively consist of two parts: case studies on the one hand and a comparative analysis on the other hand (Bahle et al. 2011; Eardley et al. 1996a, 1996b).

[135] I am deeply indebted to Tao Liu for the close cooperation on the region.

database FLOORCASH-Basic which provides data on many aspects of all social cash transfer programmes as of 2012/13 was the first step of this strategy (see Chapter 5). Only when the basic data collection was completed, I started to recode the data into a computable dataset in a second step (FLOORCASH-SocCit; Leisering and Weible 2020; Weible 2014, 2015, 2018; see Chapter 5). In a third step, I developed the final set of indicators for the empirical analysis. This methodological step was intertwined with the empirical analysis of the social cash transfers itself.[136] The final selection of indicators was influenced, among other issues, by the availability of data and the number of missing values.[137] [138]

In conclusion, the analytical framework is the outcome of a long research process during which I constructed, tested, and refined indicators and indices over many years. What now forms a simple, coherent, and clear framework is the result of a long period of trials and errors and modified trials and with modified errors. In this way I developed new and innovative measures of basic social protection in the global South.

4.2 The entitlement approach: recognition as part of social citizenship

As explained in Chapter 3 (section 3.4), I interpret Marshall´s concept of social citizenship with an emphasis on recognition. Consequently, I suggest an *entitlement approach* to analyse social cash transfers in view of social citizenship.[139]

The entitlement approach is an analytical approach (here: to social cash transfers) that focuses on *individual* entitlements. Interpreting Marshall´s understanding of rights, Davy characterizes entitlements (rights) as individual, equal, "created" (constructed), and granted

[136] For the empirical analyses I used the software IBM SPSS statistics version 25 (of 2017). For most of the calculations I created a SPSS syntax, especially for the indices (inclusion, institutionalization) as well as for aggregating the data at the country level (dimension of inclusion).

[137] To give an example, it turned out that the data collection on the aspect of institutional integration of social cash transfer programmes in a national development plan or similar political programmes with concrete objectives (as an indicator of institutionalization suggested by Székely (2008; see section 4.7) was too time-consuming for the large number of programmes and countries.

[138] As regards the construction of indices, the quality of the data had an impact on which indicators I selected to construct the indices. Issues such as lacking empirical variance (such as in case of whether a regular government ministry was in charge of a social cash transfer programme, see section 4.7.4) and negative correlations with other indicators excluded the indicators in question from the indices.

[139] For an early version of the following "entitlement approach to the analysis of social cash transfers" (Weible and Leisering 2019, p. 141), see Weible and Leisering 2019, pp. 141–151.

by the nation state (Davy 2014, p. 208). In the context of this study, *entitlements* are defined as individual claims (rights) to a social cash transfer derived from the rules and regulations that form the design of a social cash transfer programme.[140] In the context of this doctoral dissertation, *entitlements* to social cash transfers are not necessarily based a statute (for the empirical analysis of legal recognition see section 9.1). An entitlement implies that there must be an individual or a household to whom the entitlement is conferred. In technical terms, we speak of the *target groups* (or target populations) of the social cash transfer programmes as the individuals and households who are entitled to social cash transfers. The target groups are central to entitlement analyses as regards the dimension of inclusion, since the target groups define the scope of entitlement (see Table 3.4 in section 3.4).

What are the advantages of the entitlement approach, particularly over quantitative approaches to social protection using aggregate indicators? As explained in section 2.4.2, quantitative approaches that focus on coverage and/or expenses of programmes provide aggregate data at the level of programmes. But they hardly distinguish between different *target groups* and are consequently inadequate to scrutinize the dimension of inclusion. Moreover, they are unsuitable to measure *qualitative* aspects of the programme designs such as the conditions of access.

By contrast, the entitlement approach takes the *quality* of *entitlements* (social rights) of individuals as the basis for analyses. Consequently, the entitlement approach is basically a qualitative approach. In the context of my analysis to investigate *all* the 282 social cash transfer programmes across the global South, we may speak of a *qualitative approach to quantitative data*. The approach refers to the *institutional design* of the programmes and to the programme regulations that establish the rights and duties of individuals (Marx and Nelson 2013, p. 12; see section 2.4.3). That is why we may also speak of an *institutional approach* or *social rights approach*.

Following the entitlement approach, I develop a methodologically stringent way of mapping programmes by *individual* entitlements which are *independent* (in analytical terms) from the composition of the household of which the individuals are members. I explain this way of mapping entitlements in the following by defining the variable of the *unit of intervention* and by clearly distinguishing the analysis of *entitlements* from the analysis of the *degree of*

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individualization of social cash transfers, from the analysis of *benefits*, and from the analysis of the *direct recipient*s.

First of all, how does the perspective on *individual* entitlements go together with the definition of social cash transfers (section 3.1.1) which indicates that social cash transfers may target individuals *and households*? This question relates to the unit of intervention. I define the *unit of intervention* as those persons who, according to the programme design, are entitled to a social cash transfer. The unit of intervention may consist of individuals[141] (such as older persons) or of households[142] (such as households which include an older person). I argue that the *unit of intervention* is central to analyse entitlements, since the unit of intervention precisely indicates the target groups of the programmes. Therefore, it is important to find out who within the household (as the unit of intervention) *justifies* the entitlement. To give an example, a family allowance that addresses households with children up to age 18 entitles families with children up to age 18, so the entire household as the unit of intervention is entitled to the transfer.[143] But as soon as their last child turns 18, the family is not entitled any more to this family allowance because only children aged 0-17 *justify* the entitlement. I call the child the *right-establishing person*. Consequently, I record this family allowance as entitlements of children up to age 18, assigning the programme to the target category of

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[141] *Individuals* here simply mean natural persons, independently from the fact whether they are able to receive (collect) the social cash transfer on their own or only with the help of a carer such as in the case of children and in the case of some persons with disabilities.

[142] I define the category of *household* analytically as a collective of persons living together and sharing income and/or assets, regardless of the age of the household members and independently from the question whether the household includes children.

[143] The terms "family" and "household" are frequently mixed and mixed up in the literature, in government documents, and in data bases. My analytical definition of *family* implies that at least one caregiver lives together with at least one child and that they have a kin relationship. Analytically speaking, the target group of any programme that addresses *families* consists of a household as the unit of intervention and of (at least) one child as the person who justifies the entitlement. So, the family is a particular type of the broader analytical category of the household.

children (see the following section 4.3). The families (households) of the children are recorded as the units of intervention.[144] [145]

The unit of intervention does not necessarily tell anything about the *degree of individualization* of the social cash transfer. If households are entitled to a social cash transfer, the transfer may be individualized transfers, too (see sections 4.6.2 and 8.2). Whether social cash transfers are individual or household transfers is an *empirical* question, which I answer based on the empirical findings in section 8.2.5. This empirical question is different from the entitlement approach as an analytical approach.

Entitlement is different from informal and indirect *benefit* due to intra-household and inter-household redistribution of transfers.[146] Taking the example of an old age pension, if an older person in a household is entitled to the old age pension, the family and other household members may *benefit* from this social cash transfer to which the older person is entitled, but the family members are not *(directly* and *independently*) entitled themselves.

Finally, it is important to distinguish the unit of intervention from the (*direct) recipient* as the person who is entitled to *collect* the payments. Receipt and payment refers to the level of programme implementation. Conditional cash transfer programmes in Africa, for example, require that the transfer has to be paid out to the mother (Garcia and Moore 2012, p. 21), although the unit of intervention is often the entire household.

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[144] The concept of family as used in national documents often leave open how many nuclear families or generations together form one household with children. Distinctions between the nuclear family and the extended family comprising three or more generations living together in one household are rarely made transparent in the documents on social cash transfer programmes. One example of a social cash transfer programme that explicitly distinguishes the nuclear family (as the beneficiary unit) from the wider concept of any household with children is Panama´s *Red de Oportunidades* (World Bank 2009, p. 7; Robles 2009, p. 42; Fiszbein and Shady 2009, p. 274). In this case, if one household consists of various nuclear families, each of these families can receive their own benefits to the extent that they represent a nuclear family.

[145] Taking the famous example of the employment guarantee scheme MGNREGS in India (see sections 3.1.1 and 6.4), the definition of a household is determined by the issue whether the persons are "cooking together".

[146] On the one hand, several studies have revealed that the *individual* benefits, in particular old age pensions, are shared among the *household* (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S11). On the other hand, internal household relations and even conflicts among household members may inhibit that each member of a household benefits from a transfer handed out to the entire *household* (see Robles 2009 on the example of Panama´s *Red de Oportunidades*; for a sketch of the programme with key data see Fiszbein and Shady 2009, p. 274). Such issues of how the transfers are shared in practice are beyond the focus of my study.

4.3 Defining new units of analysis: from programmes to entitlements of standardized target categories

As I argue in the preceding section 4.2, the target groups are the central variables for entitlement analyses. This has implications for the unit of analysis. Whereas previous studies simply took the social cash transfer programmes as units of analysis (see section 2.4.2), I construct innovative units of analysis that take entitlements seriously.[147] I do this in several steps.

At first, all target groups of all programmes were assigned a numerical code. Similar target groups were grouped together and assigned the same code. I proceeded inductively, preferably assigning target groups to existent clusters of target groups (with the same code) and creating new clusters (codes) if required.[148] The final groups are shown in Appendix 6.1.1.

In this way of clustering target groups, I was able to (re)construct six standardized categories of target groups, the *target categories* (see section 6.1):

1. children (from age 0 to including 17; including children with disabilities);
2. persons of working age (without disabilities) (18-59);
3. older persons (from age 60 to including 80);
4. adults with disabilities (from age 18 to including 80);
5. small groups (residual category).
6. poor people (defined in economic terms, not categorically constructed).

The target categories may be grouped by type of entitlement. Target categories 1 to 5 refer to *categorical* entitlements, which are limited to particular categories of persons. Category 6 ("poor people") refers to *non-categorical* entitlements, which is defined without referring to categories of persons (for a detailed analysis of targeting criteria see section 6.1.2).

[147] For early versions of the following definition of new units of analysis, see Weible 2016, p. 179; Weible and Leisering 2019, 153–154, 160.

[148] It turned out as crucial to code the target groups separately in a first step rather than directly classifying them into bigger target categories, since the classification of single target groups into wider target categories was adapted and improved several times over the research process.

The age ranges in each target category reflect the empirical ages ranges of the vast majority of target groups within a target category (see section 6.1.3 and Appendix 6.1.3).[149]

Once I had (re)constructed the six standardized target categories, I mapped the social cash transfer programmes by the target categories they address, using binary variables for each of the six target categories. I assigned each target group of each social cash transfer programme to only one target category (see Table 4.3). Appendix 6.1.1 makes transparent which target group I assigned to which target category.

Table 4.3 The units of analysis: target categories, separately per programme

		Target categories					
		Children	Persons of working age	Older persons	Adults with dis-abilities	Small groups	Poor people
Social Cash Transfer Programmes	programme A	C - 1	WA - 1	OA - 1	D - 1	SG - 1	PP - 1
	programme B	C - 2	WA - 2	OA - 2	D - 2	SG - 2	PP - 2
	programme C	C - 3	WA - 3	OA - 3	D - 3	SG - 3	PP - 3

Source: the author.

When assigning target groups who consist of *individuals* (such as older persons from age 60) to one of the standardized target categories, it is quite evident to which of the six target categories the target group belongs to. However, when classifying *households*, several target categories might be relevant. That is why I followed strict rules of assigning target groups to target categories in order to make sure that the data is constructed in a transparent and standardized manner. The rules are the following:

First, when assigning the target groups to the target categories, it is not of relevance whether the target groups consist of individuals or of households.[150] Instead, it is of relevance which individual (of the household) justifies the entitlement. I call this person the *right-establishing*

[149] The target category of persons of working age is defined and confined by the other two life cycle categories, the categories of children and older persons. In order to measure the entitlements of the target categories of older persons and adults with disabilities by degree of inclusion, both categories are confined to an upper age limit (including age 80), see section 4.4.5.

[150] See sections 4.2, 4.6.2, and 8.2.1 on the distinction between individuals and households as beneficiary units.

person.[151] To give an example, if a social cash transfer programme is designed for the target group of families with children below age 6, the *right-establishing person* is the child below age 6, since the household is only entitled to the transfer as long as the child below age 6 is a household member. Consequently, I assign the target group to the category of children, irrespective of the fact that the entire household (family) is mentioned as the unit of intervention (see also section 4.2). Similarly, social cash transfers that address households with an older person as the heads of the household are assigned to the category of older persons, since it the old person who justifies and "establishes" the entitlement to the transfer (see also Appendix 6.1.1 that lists all target groups by target category).

Second, if a target group refers to two categories (such as widows with children/ families with a widowed parent, who refer to *children* and to widows as a *residual small groups*), the life cycle categories are given priority over other categories.[152] Consequently, the category of *residual small groups* was used in residual cases only.

Third, if a target group might be assigned to two life cycle groups (such as children of elderly parents/elderly parents with minor children/families with elderly parents), then the target group is assigned to the category of children.

I claim that this mapping approach enables us to map the target groups of any social cash transfer programme in the global South adequately and in a uniform way.

For each programme, I analyse the entitlements to social cash transfers of the six target categories separately. This turns the *target categories per social cash transfer programme* into the central units of analysis, in addition to entire programmes and – in the dimension of inclusion – countries (*national social cash transfer arrangements;* section 4.5).

I use the six target categories to construct what I call the *target configurations* of social cash transfer programmes and the *entitlement profiles* of national social cash transfer arrangements (countries), respectively. A binary code for each of the six target categories indicates whether the target categories are addressed (entitled). "1" indicates that the target category is addressed; "0" indicates that the target category is not addressed. The binary codes are

[151] The *right-establishing person* is different from the *recipient* who – in case of families with children – is usually the caregiver (parent) and who is entitled to collect the payment at the level of implementation (see section 4.2).

[152] See section 6.2.3 for the definition of the life cycle categories.

presented in the following order: children – persons of working age – older persons – adults with disabilities – small groups – poor people (see sections 6.4.2 and 7.2.1).

4.4 The dimension of inclusion (programmes): target categories and inclusiveness

In comparative studies on social cash transfers, it is common to approach the dimension of inclusion by analysing social cash transfer *programmes,* mostly in terms of *coverage* as the overall number of recipients or beneficiaries of a programme. This measure is, however, of limited use to analyse entitlements (see section 2.4.2). Contrary to this common approach to determining the scope of programmes, I have constructed a sophisticated set of indicators to measure inclusion in social cash transfer programmes precisely. As I argued in section 4.2, the target groups of social cash transfer programmes are key to study entitlements (see also section 6.1). That is why I analyse the target groups of social cash transfer programmes as accurately as possible. Moreover, I analyse entire countries (see section 4.5).

I conceive of two pillars of the dimension of inclusion: First, the *target categories* (explained in the previous section 4.3); second, the *scope* of entitlements, which comprises the *social range of a target group*, the *age range of a target group*, and the *geographical range of programmes*, which I sketch in the following.

I do not take the issue of means testing into account in the dimension of inclusion (but rather in the dimension of the conditions of access, see section 4.6.1), since my entitlement analysis is limited to those citizens in each of the countries who are classified as poor and/or vulnerable, according to the relevant national regulations. So, I assume that the individuals and households who are classified as poor, pass the means test if a programme applies such a test (see also sections 3.4 and 6.1.2).

4.4.1 The social range of a target group

The social range of a target group refers to the *size of the target group* of a programme *in proportion to the corresponding standardized target category.* It distinguishes target groups that represent only a *subcategory* of the corresponding target category from target groups that cover the target category *entirely*. Examples of *subcategories* of the target category of children include the target group of “orphans”; and examples of subcategories of the target category of adults with disabilities include the target group of “persons with disabilities who need constant care”. Examples of *entire categories* include the target group of “children” without any reference to a particular social group of children and the target group of “persons with disabilities” without any reference to a particular social group of persons with disabilities.[153] All target groups assigned to the target category of *residual small groups* are, by definition, subcategories due to their small numbers and residual features.

It is important that the measure of *social range* only refers to the *social situation* of the target groups (such as lack of care as regards children and lack of education as regards persons of working age), to aspects related *work* (such as vulnerable forms of employment), and to different *kinds of disability* (such as persons living with HIV/ AIDS; see Appendix 6.1.1 for more examples). The social range does not refer to age, geographical limitations, the financial situation (means test), and behavioural conditions, which I analyse with the help of separate measures (which I introduce in the following sections). Moreover, it is independent from the unit of intervention (see section 4.2). To give a few examples, whether a social cash transfer programme addresses children with disabilities or families with a child with disabilities, makes no difference to the social range, since both target groups form subcategories of the target category of children. And both the target groups of seasonal workers and families of informal workers constitute subcategories (of the target category of persons of working age and of the target category of children, respectively).

The target category of poor people is the most challenging to analyse. For the first time ever, I construct precise indicators that enable us to distinguish target groups of “poor people” that cover the category of poor people entirely (that is, all individuals and households respectively, who are classified as poor according to the programme regulations) from subcategories of “poor people” that represent only “some” poor individual and households respectively (see the following section 4.4.2). This reconstruction was only possible due to a precise analysis of all empirical cases.

The *social range of a target group* is one of the most innovative measures of my set of indicators. It enables us not only to classify programmes broadly by target category - such as in the SALMIC dataset (Barrientos 2018a, largely unanalysed so far) -, but also to distinguish between different sizes of target groups that come under the same target category. In the

[153] “Disability” is a concept that is only vaguely defined in the programme designs.

empirical analysis this measure turns out as indispensable to map and measure entitlements adequately.

4.4.2 The social range of "poor people"

Estimating the social range of programmes that address "poor people" is particularly challenging. If a social cash transfer programme addresses "poor people", does this mean that all poor people of the country are entitled who come under the definition of poverty that the programme applies? Or rather some of the poor people in the country? Let me illustrate the question by comparing several examples of poor people programmes. Are the "needy families" of Tunisia´s *Programme national d'Aides aux Familles Nécessiteuses (PNAFN)* who are identified based on a "national poverty register" (République Tunisienne/Ministère des Affaires Sociales, p. 5) comparable to the "families in poverty and extreme poverty" who are addressed by Brazil´s famous programme *Bolsa Família* and who are identified by a similar national register (CadÚnico)? And are the poor people addressed by the *Social Assistance* in Benin, which is a low-income country, the same type of poor households who are addressed by the *Minimum Living Standard Scheme (MLSS)* in the emerging economy of China? The researchers´ intuition says clearly "no" to the questions raised. However, the data sources would not give any answer. So how to distinguish "poor people" from "poor people"?

Elaborating distinct criteria to distinguish different types of poor people is particularly challenging. Based on a systematic mapping of *all* the social cash transfer programmes in each country and through a precise analysis of the institutional structure, I was able to develop several indicators to distinguish programmes which evidently target all poor people in a country from programmes which presumably only target *some* poor people in a country – although the programme descriptions and other sources are silent about that.

I use the following indicators to distinguish "poor people" by social range:[154]

First, several social cash transfer programmes describe their target groups simply as "poor people". At first sight, these programmes seem to follow a non-categorical approach to beneficiary selection, that is they define their target group in financial (economic) terms only, without referring to particular social, biological, and work-related "categories" (see sections 4.3 and 6.1.2). However, why do some programmes address further target groups in addition

[154] The indicators are summarized in Table 6.1.6 in section 6.1.6 below.

to “poor people”, without separating the additional target groups into separate programme components with distinct benefit levels (as some conditional cash transfer programmes do, offering a flat rate transfer for all poor households and *supplements* for particular groups such as school-age children)? To give an example, why does Saint Vincent´s *Public Assistance*, which is not divided into sub-components, address orphans as well as disabled and chronically ill adults, in addition to poor people? Again, arguing logically, we can assume that the programme does not target “all poor people”. The indicator of *separation of additional target groups into detached programme components* can be used to distinguish target groups who include *all* poor people from target groups who include only *some* poor people.

Second, religious funds suggest that the target groups of these programmes are defined by religion and consequently do not address “all” poor people, even if the funds are administered by a government department (in accordance with the definition of social cash transfers in section 3.1.1). Again, *religious funds* can be used as an indicator to differentiate the target groups within the category of poor people.

Third, a number of governments explicitly admit that the eligibility criteria of the social cash transfer programmes are unclear.[155] If such statements are discovered in a data source, it can be used as an indicator which suggests that only *some* poor people are addressed by the programme.

Fourth, following a *country approach* (introduced in section 4.5 below), I mapped all the programmes of each country. The mapping of all the social cash transfer programmes of a country revealed that in some countries two social cash transfer programmes for “poor people” could be identified. Arguing logically, we can assume that neither of the two programmes targets “all poor people”. The indicator of *two social cash transfer programmes for poor people in the same country* can be used to distinguish target groups who comprise *all* poor people from target groups who comprise only *some* poor people.[156]

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[155] A document by the national government of St. Lucia finds that "eligibility criteria were not clearly defined" (Government of St. Lucia n.d., p. 10, see FLOORCASH-Basic); and similarly, the government of Dominica states that “criteria for eligibility are not documented" (Commonwealth of Dominica 2006, p. 83).

[156] In the case of Zimbabwe, one of the two programmes is newer (the *Harmonized Social Cash Transfer Programme*, introduced in 2012). It replaces the older one of 2005, which merely existed on paper. The new programme addresses only a subcategory of poor people (extremely poor and at the same time labour-restricted households).

If at least one of these four indicators suggests that a programme addresses only *some* poor people rather than *all* poor people, I assume a “blurred selection” of poor people. Consequently, I argue that the social range of the target group of this programme is reduced. The reduced social range of the target group is taken into account when measuring the inclusiveness of entitlements (*inclusion index*; see section 4.4.5).

4.4.3 Age range of a target group

The measure of the *age range of a target group* is new in the analysis of social cash transfer, too. I introduce it to measure the number of years of life that are covered by entitlement per target category. It is calculated as the ratio of the number of years covered by entitlement to the total age range of the target category (see Table 4.4.5 in section 4.4.5 on the inclusion index).

The measure of the age range cannot be applied to the target category of *poor people*, since this category is by definition constructed in non-categorical terms only. Similarly, the measure of the age range is not applied to the target category of residual small groups since these are usually not defined in terms of age (see Appendix 6.1.1 with an overview of all target groups).

4.4.4 Geographical range of programmes

Not all social cash transfer programmes cover the entire country (see Table 6.1.6 in section 6.1.6 on poor people programmes, for example). That is why I argue that the aspect of the geographical scope of social cash transfer programmes is imperative for the analysis of entitlements to social cash transfers.

In the literature, the geographical dimension of social cash transfers is discussed with reference to the term *geographical targeting*. Geographical targeting is one of several strategies of defining the target groups (see section 2.2.1). The objective of geographical targeting is selecting those areas of a country “with a high concentration of households in poverty” (Barrientos 2013a, p. 81). However, this strategy implies that poor individuals and households who are classified as poor (at the household level), but who live in an area which is not targeted by a programme (usually areas with a reduced concentration of poverty at the regional level[157]), are not entitled to social cash transfers from this programme. Following the principle of basic equality as part of the concept of social citizenship (section 3.2.1), I argue that all these individuals and households who live in regions which are not targeted by a social cash transfer programme are excluded from any entitlement to a social cash transfer, if they are classified as poor according to the relevant national definitions. I emphasize that this form of exclusion occurs due to the geographical targeting as *intended* by the programme design and must not be mixed up with the exclusion errors discussed in the literature (see Barrientos 2013a, pp. 138–139, for example).[158] Exclusion errors occur due to a deficit in implementation rather than as a consequence of programme design and entitlement.

To account for the geographical dimension of social cash transfer entitlements, a measure is required to distinguish between programmes of different geographical scope.
I distinguish three forms of geographical scopes of social cash transfer programmes:

- nation-wide programmes which address citizens *in any part* of the country;
- geographically limited programmes which either target *selected* areas of a country according to a particular measurement technique[159] or which address either the rural or the urban parts of a country;
- pilot programmes (or pilot projects) which address only one or several *small regions* of a country (see the precise definition below in this section).

How to distinguish geographically limited programmes from pilot programmes? The term "pilot project" is normally used by international development actors and national governments to declare that the programme is considered a test case and that the small scale of the programme might be increased in the future if it proves as successful. Precise criteria to determine whether a social cash transfer programme constitutes a pilot project, which go beyond the rather subjective descriptions, are rare. Devereux and White (2010, p. 70) sketch pilot programmes as tentatively "limited in scale (often confined to a single district), time-

[157] Sometimes areas with insufficient health and education facilities are excluded, too, as in Honduras´ *Bono 10.000*.

[158] *Exclusion error* may be defined as the ratio of those entitled (here: poor) but who do not receive the transfer, to the totality of entitled citizens (here: the total poor population); *inclusion error* is defined as the ratio of those who are not entitled (here: the non-poor recipients) but who receive the transfer to the totality of recipients (Barrientos 2013a, p. 133; Veras Soares et al. 2010, p. 176).

[159] For examples of approaches in Latin American countries see Barrientos 2013a, p. 116.

bound, and discretionary rather than rights-based". However, as I show in Chapter 6, these criteria may apply to programmes other than pilots, too.

That is why I develop a precise definition of pilot programmes to distinguish them from regular but geographically limited programmes. The definition is based on an empirical sample of ten social cash transfer programmes that were declared as "pilot" programmes in the relevant sources and for which details on their regional scope was available (see Appendix 4.4.4). The sample suggests that pilot programmes cover less than 25% of the administrative units of a country, whereas regular but geographically limited programmes cover at least 25% of the administrative units of a country. Coverage of a pilot programme *within* an administrative unit may be selective, that is only a few spots may be targeted within the administrative unit.

Based on these findings, I define those social cash transfer programmes as *pilot programmes* that cover less than 25% of the administrative units of a country (or more than 25% if the number of recipients per administrative unit is very small, such as in case of Kenya´s *Cash Transfer for OVC).* And I define those social cash transfer programmes as *regular programmes with limited geographical scope* that cover between one third and two thirds of the administrative units of a country (or less than one third if the programme is still in the stage of inception, such as Zimbabwe´s *Harmonized Social Cash Transfer Programme*). The social cash transfer programmes which are close to covering all administrative units are classified as nationwide programmes.[160] The empirical shares feed into the definition of the geographical sub-scores of the inclusion score (see the following section 4.4.5).

4.4.5 The inclusion index: measuring the inclusiveness of entitlements to social cash transfers

How to *measure* the degree of inclusion or "inclusiveness" of entitlements?[161] For this purpose, I construct a new index, the *inclusion index*. It indicates to what extent a target category is covered ("included") by entitlements to social cash transfers. All the three measures to analyse the scope of entitlements – social range of a target group, age range of a

[160] For examples of a few social cash transfer programmes which do not run in a few administrative units, but which are nevertheless classified as nationwide programmes see Appendix 4.4.4.

[161] For early versions of the following introduction of the *inclusion index*, see Weible 2016, pp. 180–181; Weible and Leisering 2019, 168, 387-389.

target group, geographical range of programmes – feed into the inclusion index. Depending on the data values, each of the three measures is assigned a certain score between (including) 0 and 1, which I call *sub-scores* of the (total) inclusion score. The sub-scores are empirically based estimates, which I explain further below in this section. The inclusion index is applied separately per target category.

Table 4.4.5 The inclusion index

Dimensions of index	Sub-scores	Entitlements to social cash transfers extend to...	Examples of target categories		
			Programmes for children (0–17)	Programmes for small groups	Programmes for 'poor people'
Social range	1	Entire category	All children	-	All poor people
	0.5	Half the category	Girls only	Five small groups (e.g. widows, abandoned women, divorced women, war veterans, and indigenous people: 5*0.1)	Some poor people (blurred selection)[162]
	0.1	A fraction of the category (*subcategory*)	Orphans only	Pregnant women (one small group: 1*0.1)	–
	0	No one of the target category	No one of the target category	No one of the target category	No one of the target category
Age range	Max = 1 Min = 0	Age range in terms of ratio: years covered/total age range of the target category	If a programme targets children from 0 to below 2: 2/18 = 0.11	Maximum age coverage (1) (age of minor importance for definition of target group)	maximum age coverage (1) (by definition independent of age)

[162] See the indicators for "blurred selection" in section 4.4.2.

Geo-graphical range	1	The entire country	Persons living in any area of the country
	0.5	Large area of the country	Only the poor(est) areas of a country are covered
	0.125	Small area of the country (pilot programme)	A programme is tested on a small scale in a limited number of administrative units
	[0]	[no social cash transfer programme for the target category]	

Source: the author; for early versions, see Weible and Leisering 2019, p. 388; Weible 2016, pp. 180–181.

To calculate the inclusion score of each target category, the three sub-scores are multiplied. The multiplicative index construction is based on the assumption that a sub-score of 0 in one component of the index cannot be compensated by another component (Bortz and Döring 2003, p. 146).[163] To give an example, if the target category of children is not included at all (sub-score of the social range is 0), the inclusion score for the target category of children is 0, even if the programme extends to the entire country (sub-score of geographical range is 1).

[163] Any index construction is based on the assumption that the components of the index measure (different) dimensions of the same issue (Schnell et al. 2013, p. 156). Consequently, the components should correlate positively with one another and with the dependent variable (Kromrey 2009, pp. 168–169). As the inclusion scores are calculated separately for each target category, I limit this test to correlating each of the components of the inclusion index (the sub-scores) with the inclusion scores of each target category (the dependent variable). All variables that feed into the index are constructed as ratio scale variables, so we can test them using Pearsons´s correlation coefficient r (see Cleff 2015, pp. 73–74, for example).
For each target category we find a strong positive correlation between the sub-score of the social range and the inclusion score (r between 0.972 and 0.780; on how to interpret r see Cleff 2015, p. 101, for example). Depending on the target category, we find a moderate to strong positive correlation between the sub-score of the age range and the inclusion score (persons of working age: r=0.902; older persons: r=0.536; children: r=0.446). Although the test indicates at best a weak positive (and for some target categories no) correlation between the geographical sub-score and the inclusion scores of each target category (r between 0.001 and 0.247), I decided to factor in the geographical dimension as explained above. Otherwise, a target category might achieve the same score, no matter whether it is targeted by a tiny pilot programme, by a programme that applies geographical targeting or a nation-wide programme. In this regard, I follow the argument that the theoretical considerations are what matters when constructing an index. Schnell and colleagues, for example, emphasize that the choice of the dimensions to be part of the index is based on theoretical considerations (Schnell et al. 2013, p. 158).

How have the sub-scores been constructed (second column from the left in Table 4.4.5)? Whereas the minimum (0) and maximum (1) of the sub-scores are obvious measures for no inclusion and full inclusion respectively, the sub-scores in-between require explanation. As mentioned above, most of them are derived from empirical data (see Schnell et al. 2013, p. 162, for example, on how to gain the weights of the single indicators from empirical data).

As regards the *social range* of *subcategories*, I take empirical data on orphans as a reference, since orphans are the most frequently identified subcategory (see section 6.1.1 and Appendix 6.1.1). According to UNICEF, more than 20% of the children are orphans in some Sub-Saharan countries like Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, and Rwanda, having lost one or both parents (in many cases due to AIDS).[164] However, in other countries of the global South, the share of orphans in relation to the entire target category of children is considerably lower, amounting to only a few percent. To take the wide range of the share of orphans and the huge differences by country into account, I take half of the maximum share as the standard sub-score for subcategories (10% or 0.1). As orphans can be assumed to be among the biggest subcategories, at least in some countries, I use the same sub-score for all subcategories of all target categories to make sure that the subcategories are accounted for to an adequate extent (for a list of all target groups of social cash transfer programmes, including all subcategories, see Appendix 6.1.1).

Moreover, I use the same standard sub-score for the category of small groups, since the small groups a comparable to the subcategories of the other five target categories, but as *residual* groups, they constitute a target category of their own. If a programme addresses *one* small group, the sub-score for the category of small groups of this programme is 0.1.[165]

To calculate the *age range* of a target group, the years of life covered by entitlements are divided by the years of life that the relevant target category covers. The target categories cover the following age ranges (see section 4.3):

- Children: 0 - 17 (18 years)

[164] http://data.unicef.org/hiv-aids/care-support; 2020-07-22.

[165] Strictly speaking, one small group represents a fraction of the "entire" target category of small groups. However, the "entire" target category of small groups is rather a hypothetical construction for analytical purpose, since it is hard to draw sensible conclusions from a (hypothetical) maximum score of 1 for this target category. A high inclusion score of this category rather indicates a high degree of particularization and, possibly, of fragmentation in social cash transfer entitlements (see section 6.1.5).

- persons of working age (without disabilities): 18 – 59 (42 years);
- older persons: 60-80 (21 years);
- adults with disabilities: 18-80 (63 years).

Probably due to the "natural" increase of disability in old age, the distinction between persons with disablities and persons without disabilities is blurred to some extent in old age. In ten countries social cash transfers for persons with disablities are converted into transfers that address older persons, irrespective of disabilities ("social pensions"), as soon as the entitled persons reach a defined age, such as in Chile, South Africa, and Saint Kitts and Nevis.[166] In three other countries (Antigua and Barbuda, China, Indonesia) entitlements of adults with disabilities start at age 60 only. In these countries, entitlements to the general old age social pension starts at a later age (and on different conditions respectively, such as in China). To take these entitlements into account, the target category of adults with disabilities is constructed until including age 80 (just as the target category of older persons).[167] [168]

The indicator of age is not considered for the target category of small groups, since age is of little importance for the definition of the target groups, which is reflected by the lack of data on age for most target groups. Similarly, the target category of poor people is defined irrespective of age.

Regarding the *geographical range* of entitlements, I use the findings from the analysis of a sample of social cash transfer programmes taken from FLOORCASH-Basic with data on geographical limitation (see section 4.4.4 and Appendix 4.4.4). In this sample pilot programmes are spread to less than 25% of the administrative units of a country (ratio 0.25). But many pilot programmes run in a much smaller area of a country. Based on these findings, I take half of the maximum ratio to define the geographical scope of pilot programmes in a uniform sub-score (0.25/2 = 0.125). Similarly, the *regular* social cash transfer programmes in the sample that are limited to particular regions of the country, but that are *not* described as

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[166] Analytically, the conversion of transfers is recorded as the end of entitlement of adults with disabilities at the defined age (see Appendix 6.1.3). However, age is not considered when depicting the entitlements of the category of adults with disabilities in the national inclusiveness profiles (in section 7.3).

[167] To keep the number of missing values low, the measure of age is not taken into account when depicting the entitlements of the category of adults with disabilities in the national inclusiveness profiles (section 7.3).

[168] An alternative way of measuring inclusiveness of adults with disabilities would have been constructing the category until age 60 (complementarily to the target category of persons of working age), and treating older persons with disabilities as part of the target category of older persons (as subcategories).

pilot programmes cover between 1/3 and 2/3 of the administrative units of the countries. I take the mean of these values to define the sub-score of programmes which use geographical targeting ((1/3 + 2/3)/2 = 0.5).
I use the inclusion index to construct *inclusiveness profiles* of programmes and countries respectively. The inclusiveness profiles depict the extent to which each of the six target categories are entitled (included) to social cash transfers under a programme and in a country respectively. The inclusion scores of each target category are presented in the following order: children – persons of working age – older persons – adults with disabilities – small groups – poor people (see sections 6.3 and 7.3).

4.5 The dimension of inclusion (countries): The country approach to social cash transfers

I argue that if taking the concept of social citizenship seriously, analysing social cash transfer *programmes* is not enough to assess the degree of inclusion of social cash transfers. If the analysis remains at the level of programmes, we are only able to answer questions related to the programmes (*programme perspective*): What do the programmes "do"? Whom do they address? However, the concept of social citizenship requires a wider perspective, since it extends to all citizens of a country (*country perspective*).[169]

I put forward two arguments for following the country perspective:

Firstly, citizenship is a *national* issue dealing with national membership of persons as citizens of countries (section 3.2.1). So, the citizens of a country are the adequate scope to assess the social citizenship in this country. But any analysis of social cash transfers which follows the programme approach is naturally limited to the scope of (single) *programmes*. But this does not necessarily allow assessing the social citizenship in a country. I argue that taking the wider perspective of the entire country is imperative for assessing social citizenship as a national issue.

Secondly, I conceive of *inclusion* as the central dimension of social citizenship in the context of social cash transfers (see Chapter 3). As I show in the empirical analysis, inclusion entails *exclusion* (sections 6.2 and 7.2). However, in order to trace exclusion a perspective on the entire country with all its social cash transfer programmes (the *national social cash transfer*

[169] For early, brief versions of the following introduction of the country approach and related measures, see Weible 2016, pp. 178–179; Weible and Leisering 2019, pp. 153–154.

arrangement) rather than on single programmes of the country is indispensable. That is why I follow the country perspective.

A basic issue to be addressed by the country perspective is the spread of social cash transfers across the countries of the global South, measured as the number of countries with/without social cash transfers (see Table 4.8 in section 4.8 below). But this is only the first step of the country approach to social cash transfers.

As sketched in the state of the art (section 2.4.4), the country perspective is still new in large n analyses of social cash transfers.[170] And the first methodological approaches to measure inclusion in social cash transfer programmes across many countries, which have been contributed only recently, are not adequate to measure entitlements to all social cash transfers across the global South (see section 2.4.2).

Consequently, I develop a systematic approach to assessing entire countries in view of their social cash transfer programmes: the *country approach to the analysis of social cash transfers*. It takes into account

1.) all social cash transfer programmes in a country, which together form - what I call - the *national social cash transfer arrangement* of the country[171]
2.) all citizens of the country as potentially entitled persons in case they are or fall poor (according to the relevant national definitions of poverty and programme regulations), classified into six standardized target categories (see section 4.3).

Following the country approach, I map the *national social cash transfer arrangements*, that is all social cash transfer programmes of a country with all their target groups, in view of inclusion, separately for each of the six target categories. For this end, I aggregate the values at the country level, adding the inclusion scores (measured by the inclusion index) of all social cash transfer programmes of a country up, again separately by target category (*national inclusion scores*, by target category; for an illustration see section 7.3). Only regarding the target category of poor people, I follow a different principle of data aggregation. For the

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[170] This is in contrast to the comparative analysis of minimum income protection systems in EU countries, in which all programmes of a country as „functional equivalents" are taken into account for the assessment of countries (Bahle et al. 2011, p. 194).

[171] I prefer the term "social cash transfer arrangement" to "social cash transfer system", since "system" has a connotation of coherence and coordination between the single elements, which is, however, not the standard in the global South.

(three) countries in which two or three social cash transfer programmes address poor people, I take the *maximum* score of all social cash transfer programmes in the country that address poor people as the national inclusion score of the target category of poor people (*maximum principle*). [172] The reason for this distinct procedure is that I assume that two programmes that only address *some* poor people do not complement each other in a way that they together would entitle *all* poor people of this country.

In technical terms, I turn the original cases (social cash transfer programmes with separate inclusion scores per target category) into variables, with the help of the statistical software SPSS (version 25) (for an illustration see Appendix 4.5).[173] This way I construct the *national social cash transfer arrangement* of a country as a new unit of analysis.

If several programmes in a country address the same target category, the national inclusion score of the target category may exceed the maximum of 1. In this case the national inclusion score is cut off at 1, which means "full inclusion" and implies that all members of this target category (if classified as poor) in the country are entitled to a social cash transfer.

The country approach to social cash transfers enables us to assess whether, and if so, to what extent a target category is entitled to social cash transfers in a country. So, it also makes it possible to perceive which target categories are *not* entitled to social cash transfers. In other words, the country approach makes it possible to record what social cash transfer programmes "do", but it also reveals what social cash transfer programmes do not "do", that is whom they leave excluded (Weible 2016). So, it permits assessments of inclusion and exclusion respectively of particular groups of citizens in a country. In this respect the country approach is a "*systemic approach"* (Schubert 2020).

4.6 The dimension of rights principles: conditions of access

The perspective of social citizenship draws not only attention to the issue of "who" is entitled (dimension of inclusion), but also to the issue of "how" someone is entitled, that is the conditions of access to social cash transfers, which I analyse in the dimension of *rights principles*. As explained above (section 3.2.1), social citizenship is an open concept, which offers space for contingent options of designing the principles of entitlement (instead of

[172] The three countries that have more than one social cash transfer programmes that address poor people include Mexico, Pakistan, Malaysia, Zimbabwe, and Jordan (see Table 6.1.6 in section 6.1.6).

[173] I am indebted to Tobias Böger for support with this step.

requiring a universal principle to be followed). Taking the open nature of the concept of social citizenship seriously, it is important to analyse the conditions of access in an open way, refraining from judgments on the different conditions of access in terms of "better" or "worse". This contrasts with most debates in the literature on the conditions of access, where authors usually argue in favour or against certain conditions (see below in this section). But the open approach to the analysis of entitlements to social cash transfers also contrasts with the analysis of the dimension of inclusion, since the dimension of inclusion of social citizenship (at least at the level of countries) implies a benchmark and a direction, taking maximum inclusion (all poor citizens) as the option to be strived for (see Chapter 3).

As mentioned in section 2.2.2, I limit my investigation to those three conditions of access that figure most prominently in the literature on social cash transfers: the issue of whether the social cash transfers are means-tested or not (4.6.1); the issue of whether the transfers are individual payments or household transfers (4.6.2); and the issue of whether behavioural conditions are linked to the social cash transfers or not (4.6.3). Access to data on these indicators was comparatively easy. And choosing these indicators makes it possible to discuss them in view of the debates in the literature.

4.6.1 Means test

"Means-tested or universal transfers?" [174] is an issue which is intensely debated in academic discourses and even more so among practitioners in search of the most adequate programme designs (see Ellis 2012; Kidd 2015; Sabates-Wheeler et al. 2015; Schubert 2020; UNRISD 2010, p. 157, for example). Although often discussed in this way, the juxtaposition may be misleading, since the term "universal" usually refers to one target category only, such as older persons or children (see section 3.1.2). That is why I speak of *means-tested* and *non-means-tested* transfers.

Means tests "require potential beneficiaries to provide information on their income and assets, which programme mangers use to determine eligibility" (Barrientos 2013a, p. 114). The means test may be one aspect of the definition of the target groups and the selection of entitled persons and households, respectively (Barrientos 2013a, pp. 113–116). Depending on the programme objectives, the means test is applied as an instrument to either concentrate the

[174] Some authors use the term "targeted transfers" (instead of "means-tested") as an antonym of "universal" transfers (see Samson et al. 2010, p. 105, for example).

support on the poor(est) sections or to exclude the wealthy population from entitlements (Böger and Leisering 2017, pp. 18–19, on different types of means tests in social pension programmes). In both cases a means test reduces the *scope* in terms of the number of entitled persons, compared to the same programme design without means test. However, I do not consider the means test as regards the scope of programmes (in the dimension of inclusion), since my research interest in this study is limited to entitlements of citizens who are classified as poor and/or vulnerable according to the programme regulations, and since I assume that if a social cash transfer programme applies a means test to identify *poor* citizens, the citizens classified as poor pass the test at any case (see also section 6.1.2). So, the means test does not make a difference for the analysis of entitlements of the persons classified as poor according to the relevant national regulations. I concentrate on a different aspect of the rights principles instead.

In the literature on deservingness perceptions, the means test is also used as a relevant aspect to compare different *conditions of access* (Hubl and Pfeifer 2013; see section 10.3).[175] The means test can be stricter or less strict[176] - or it can be absent. I argue that conditions of access to an entitlement to a social cash transfer which is linked to a means test *of any kind* are different from the conditions of access to an entitlement to a social cash transfer which is not linked to a means test, since additional requirements have to be met to access the transfer in the case of any means test. Consequently, I analyse whether entitlements to social cash transfers are means-tested or not, again separately by target category.

In contrast to the definition of means tests by Barrientos quoted further above in this section, I use a wider definition of means test in this doctoral dissertation: I classify any social cash transfer as *means-tested* if the definition of the target group entails *any reference to the economic or financial situation of the beneficiaries*, regardless of whether the applicants have to provide information on their economic and financial situation. To give an example, Mexico´s *Programa de Atencion a Adultos Mayores en Zonas Rurales* addresses older persons from age 60 who “live in conditions of poor nutrition” (Federación Internacional de

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[175] Hubl and Pfeifer speak of “conditions of circumstance” (Hubl and Pfeifer 2013, p. 165). The absence of a means test (as well as its reduced strictness) may also be interpreted as an indicator for relative deservingness of target groups (see also section 10.3).

[176] The wider the scope (that is, the more types of income such as benefits from social insurances and income from work) and the wider the extent of the means test (that is the individual or all household members), the stricter the test is (Bahle et al. 2011, p. 15).

Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones 2011, p. 48) is classified as a means-tested social cash transfer programme in this wider sense. I do not distinguish between the different types of means test, such as the (traditional) means test by proving monetary income, the proxy means test[177], and community targeting.[178] However, I distinguish the means test from other strategies to select beneficiaries, which are discussed in the literature, but which do not *directly* refer to the financial or economic situation of the beneficiaries, such as categorical targeting (see sections 2.2.1 and 4.3), self-selection, and geographical targeting (see section 4.4.4; for the different strategies see also Barrientos 2013a, pp. 113–116).

4.6.2 The degree of individualization: the individualization index

Are social cash transfers individual transfers or household transfers? There is an ongoing debate in the literature about this question. Whereas social pensions for older persons are commonly recognized as individual transfers in the literature, other forms of social cash transfers are widely perceived as household transfers (such as the *conditional cash transfers* in Latin America by de la O (2015, p. 3)). Some scholars even consider all social cash transfers in developing countries "in practice" as household transfers (Barrientos 2013a, p. 105; Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S60). In his analysis of global policy models of social cash transfers von Gliszczynski confirms that social cash transfers are largely perceived as targeting households (Gliszczynski 2015, p. 3).

I challenge the debate about "individuals versus households", contributing an *empirical* analysis of the degree of individualization of entitlements to social cash transfers. Following the entitlement approach, I argue that it is not a question of how the transfers are shared or spent in *practice*, but rather a question of how the entitlements are *designed.* Moreover, I argue that the aspect of individualization of social cash transfers is not a question of black or white, but rather one of extent. The quality of entitlement is different, depending on their degree of individualization. I argue that the higher the degree of individualization, the more independent are entitlements from the composition of the household.

[177] "*Proxy means tests* use ´easy to observe – difficult to manipulate´ household or individual variables to generate a welfare index, which is then used to decide on entitlement" (Barrientos 2013a, p. 115; emphasis there; see there for some details of means testing with the help of proxy indicators).

[178] The advantage of community selection is that local information can be used to identify the poorest members and households of the communities, but this selection strategy is sensitive to manipulation by local elites and to using inconsistent criteria across communities (Barrientos 2013a, p. 115; Fiszbein and Shady 2009, p. 206).

I refer to two aspects:

1. The composition of the transfer: Does the volume of the transfer take each member of the unit of intervention into account?
2. Maximum of transfers per household: Is the number of social cash transfers per household limited to a maximum?

The *composition of the transfers* has a direct impact on the volume of the transfer if households are targeted. Some programmes only pay one flat rate transfer irrespective of the household composition. Other social cash transfer programmes that address households compose the transfer by adding up different values according to particular features of (some of) the household members such as age, disability, etc. But not necessarily all household members are taken into account. Again other social cash transfer programmes that address households use a sliding scale to determine the benefit level, taking *each* of the members into account (that is, the first member gets a certain amount, for the second a smaller amount is added, and for every further member an even smaller amount is added, for example).

Social cash transfers that address individuals can be easily classified as individually composed transfers. But, as just explained, assessing the composition of transfers that address households is not as evident, since the volume of the transfers may consider the members of the households to varying degrees.

The *maximum of transfers per household* refers to the question whether the number of transfers per household is limited to a maximum. If a programmes that addresses families with children is limited to a maximum of two transfers per household, only two children of the family are (directly) entitled to the transfer, but other siblings, if any, are not. In this respect a cap of the number of transfers per household restricts the scope of entitlement.

In order to find out to what extent social cash transfers are individualized entitlements, I construct an *individualization index* to analyse the *degree of individualization* of social cash transfer entitlements (see Table 4.6.2). The individualization index takes the two aspects mentioned above into account (composition of the transfer; maximum of transfers per household).

Table 4.6.2 Individualization index

Component	Indicates whether…	Items	Sub-scores (weights)
Composition of transfer	…the transfer takes all individuals of the unit of intervention into account	Entirely individual composition	4
		Partially individual composition	2
		Not individually composed/flat rate transfer for entire household	0
Maximum per household	… the number of transfers is limited to a maximum per household	No	2
		Yes	0

Source: the author.

The individualization index is an additive index, since it assumes that its two components can principally substitute each other (Bortz and Döring 2003, p. 146). Besides, the individualization index is a weighted index, since I claim that the aspect of the composition of the transfer influences the degree of individualization of the social cash transfer to a higher extent than the issue whether there is a maximum per household.

To calculate the individualization score of each target category, the sub-scores of each of the two components (composition of the transfer; maximum per household) are added up.[179] The final scale of individualization spans from 0 (not individualized at all/flat rate household-related transfer) to 6 (fully individualized transfer), with the scores of 2 (subtly individualized transfer) and 4 (partially individualized transfer) in between.[180]

The individualization index makes it possible to measure the degree of individualization across a large number of social cash transfers, separately per target category.

[179] This way a programme with a partially individual composition of the transfer volume (sub-score: 2) and no maximum per household (sub-score: 2) reaches the same score (total score: 4) as a programme with an entirely individual composition of the transfer volume (sub-score: 4) and a maximum per household (sub-score: 0).

[180] A proximity test (separately for each target category) revealed that for all target categories the indicators correlate strongly and positively with one another (V>=0.638). Just as regards the target category of poor people, the indicators *maximum per household* and *composition of transfer* correlate only moderately (V=0.577).

4.6.3 Behavioural conditions

The issue of "conditional" versus "unconditional" (non-conditional) social cash transfers has played a big role in debates ever since the massive spread of social cash transfers in the early 2000s (for an overview see Barrientos 2013a, pp. 121–125). *Conditional* transfers require the recipients to meet certain behavioural conditions, mostly in the area of education (children´s attending school, but also professional training for young people and for adults) and health (such as regular health checkups and vaccinations, mostly among children).[181] *Non-conditional* transfers (often referred to as "unconditional" transfers[182]) do not impose such behavioural conditions.

The aspect of *behavioural conditions* (often referred to as "conditionality"[183]) gained prominence through one of the most famous policy models of social cash transfers, the *conditional cash transfer programmes* or simply *CCTs* (Britto 2010; Cecchini and Madariaga 2011; de la O 2015; Gliszczynski and Leisering 2016). Since then, the distinction between conditional and non-conditional transfers has become a popular aspect in comparative research on social cash transfers (see for example sections 2.3 and 6.4 on typologies of social cash transfers). Debates on the advantages and disadvantages of behavioural conditions in the design of social cash transfer programmes continue (to mention a few examples, Baird et al. 2014; Barrientos 2009; Lund 2011; Valencia Lomeli 2009; Veit-Wilson 2009; UNRISD 2010, p. 157; Yeates 2009). The idea behind conditional cash transfers consists in providing incentives for poor people to invest "optimally" into their human capital (Gliszczynski 2015, p. 42). The behavourial conditions are supposed to address "demand-side constraints for structural poverty reduction" (Britto 2010, p. 181) and under-investments into human capital of families with children, which "often contains the implicit assumption that parents in the

[181] A few programmes impose other conditions than those related to health and education. To give a few examples, under Brazil´s *Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil (PETI)* the children of the recipient family must not work for income; under *Chile Solidario,* the recipient households are required to participate in training programmes and accept psychosocial support; the *Programa Solidaridad* in the Dominican Republic requires recipients to apply for identification documents (among other conditions).

[182] I prefer "non-conditional" to "unconditional", since any social cash transfer implies certain conditions and is not unconditional. Moreover, "unconditional" conveys notions of the *unconditional basic income*, which I do not classify as a social cash transfer (see section 3.1.2).

[183] I prefer speaking of "behavioural conditions" rather than of "conditionality" to be precise about the kind of conditions.

target families are unable or unwilling to make sufficiently rational decisions by themselves" (Gliszczynski 2015, p. 42). Critics argue, among other issues, that even if we recognized that conditional cash transfers were more effective if they are strictly sanctioned, this may only be achieved at the cost of denying the transfer to households that do not meet the behavioural conditions (Hoop 2018).

In view of the concept of social citizenship, I argue that behavioural conditions affect the nature (quality, in a neutral sense) of entitlements. Entitlements that are linked to behavioural conditions are different from entitlements without such conditions.

The literature generally distinguishes conditional from non-conditional programmes (Brooks 2015; Dodlova et al. 2017; see the typologies in the sections 2.3 and 6.4). This suggests that all social cash transfer programmes would either be conditional or non-conditional. However, I argue that the question of conditionality is difficult to answer independently of the target group. That is why I analysed the aspect of conditionality separately for each target category.

I limit my analysis of behavioural conditions to the question of whether any behavioural condition is imposed or not. Assessing whether a requirement constitutes a behavioural condition is self-evident in most cases. With respect to unemployment benefits, I do not classify the requirement of looking for a job and/or to accept job offers made by the employment agency in charge as a behavioural condition. Contrary to that, participation in labour programmes or in professional trainings or in education (such as enrolment in school) are treated as behavioural conditions.

4.7 The dimension of institutionalization: security of entitlements

How reliable are entitlements to social cash transfers? I argue that reliability and security through institutionalization is an important aspect of social citizenship rights (see section 3.4; see also Leisering and Barrientos 2013, pp. S57–S59). As Leisering explains, institutionalisation of social assistance "creates reliability for politicians and citizens facing local clientelism, facing the changeability of national policies and inflows, and facing the defined time windows and instabilities of the involvement of international donors" (Leisering et al. 2006, pp. 192–193; translated by K.W.). Consequently, I measure the reliability and "security" of social cash transfer entitlements in terms of institutionalization of social cash transfer programmes.

Institutionalization refers to the *process* of making something permanent (Leisering et al. 2006, p. 193). It implies that a social cash transfer programme runs according to certain rules and regulations which make entitlements to transfers predictable, including their quality and conditions. Taking the example of a country with a family allowance for poor families, a family in this country may have the (social) "security" of being entitled to this allowance if the family is classified as poor according to the programme regulations.

Several scholars have made contributions to the analysis of institutionalisation of social cash transfers. Barrientos (2013a, pp. 15, 99) and Leisering and Barrientos (2013, pp. S57–S59) sketch a *programme approach (or project approach),* which they compare with *institutions*. From these descriptions, I reconstruct the following indicators of institutionalization:

1.) legal recognition (vs. absence of legal recognition)

2.) reliable funding (vs. insecure funding and dependence on international donors)

3.) long-term perspective (as opposed to short-term intervention with predefined time window and uncertain prospects, such as pilot projects)

4.) integration in the regular government administration (vs. self-standing programmes and formulation and management by non-governmental agencies).[184] [185]

I basically use the indicators no. 1 to 3 for my analysis of institutionalization of social cash transfer programmes. As regards the fourth indicator - integration in the regular government administration - I analyse whether a regular government department is in charge of a social cash transfer programme, as opposed to a programme overseen by a political body such as the Presidency, for example, as in Paraguay´s *Tekoporâ*. This indicator is based on the assumption that a government department as part of the permanent *administration* of a country is independent of short-term political cycles (Székely 2008, p. 7). As this indicator, however, provided little empirical variance (for an interpretation of this finding see section 9.6), I did not include it in the main analysis (institutionalization index, section 4.7.4).

[184] A similar aspect is whether a specialized government department is in charge and has been created respectively (Székely 2008, pp. 7, 8, 13; Barrientos 2013a, p. 15).

[185] Barrientos (2013a, pp. 207–208) mentions two further aspects of institutionalization: operation and disbursement are subject to accountability to parilament as well as "adequate appeal and review processes" with regard to decisions on eligibility.

Finally, I focus my analysis on three aspects of institutionalization: legal recognition of programmes (4.7.1); sources of funding of social cash transfer programmes (4.7.2); and finally, duration of entitlements (4.7.3).

4.7.1 Rights-based security: legal recognition

Social cash transfer programmes are usually introduced as (time-limited) projects by the executive powers and sometimes, they are institutionalised by a statute later (Barrientos 2013a, p. 207). In a few cases, a statute or constitutional principle is established first and a social cash transfer programme based on this statute and on the Constitution respectively is introduced later, such as in the cases of India´s *Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS)* and Brazil´s *Benefícios de Prestação Continuada (BPC)* (Barrientos 2013a, pp. 15, 207).[186]

I limit my investigation of the legal recognition of social cash transfers to the issue of the legal basis, that is whether the programmes are based on a national statute. I argue that a social cash transfer programme which is based on a statute cannot be as easily abandoned as a social cash transfer programme which was introduced by an executive decree or a similar initiative by the executive power. Consequently, I consider entitlements which are based on a statute as more secure and reliable than entitlements without such a basis. That is why I argue that a social cash transfer programme that is based on a statute shows a higher degree of institutionalisation as a programme that is *not* based on a statute.[187]

[186] Ideally, it would make sense to analyse the national constitutions with respect to social rights that are relevant to social cash transfers, but this idea turned out as too demanding for all Southern countries. See, however, my analysis of South Africa´s national social cash transfer arrangement, taking into account the Constitution of the country (Weible and Leisering 2012), as well as Himpe´s study on basic income security in the context of the universalization of social human rights, which includes an analysis of the constitutions, national statutes and regulations on social cash transfers in Mexico, China, and India, among other countries (Himpe 2017).

[187] Admittedly, it would have been desirable to take into account the legal enforcement of entitlements, too. This, however, is impossible for the large number of cases. But see the case study on South Africa´s *social grants* with an analysis of the legal enforcement of entitlements, including the appeals system and court decisions, which suggests a high degree of institutionalization (Weible 2012).

4.7.2 Financial sustainability: source of funding

Funding is a crucial aspect of social cash transfers, particularly in developing countries, where poverty rates are high on the one hand and where public resources are scarce on the other hand. Social cash transfers in developing countries are funded from different sources. The sources can be classified into two categories: domestic sources - above all taxes but also non-tax revenues such as from natural resources as well as expenditure switching -, and external sources, including foreign aid and debt cancellation (Barrientos 2013a, pp. 166, 178–180).

The distinction between domestic and external sources of funding is important with regard to the issues of sustainability of programmes and of security of entitlements respectively. Externally financed social cash transfer programmes tend to imply a short-term perspective, since international donors work with predefined time windows for which they grant their aid (Barrientos 2013a, p. 187). Although donor funding can be important when a new social cash transfer programme is introduced to cushion the initial costs, international aid with its usually short-term financing perspective may have adverse effects on institution building and financial sustainability in the long run (Barrientos 2013a, pp. 186–190). Consequently, entitlements that are based on external funding imply insecurity from a long-term perspective. That is why I argue that social cash transfer programmes that are fully domestically funded reflect a higher degree of institutionalization than programmes that are (in parts) externally funded.

Measuring financial sustainability by the source of funding is subject to a few qualifications:

First, even if a social cash transfer programme is funded from national revenues, the sustainability and reliability is not always guaranteed, of course. The financial sustainability may also be influenced by further issues: whether the programme budget is clearly defined, whether it is of significant size, and whether it can sustain a minimum level of stability in the longer run (Székely 2008, p. 11).

Second, it refers only to those forms of international financial support which are *directly* linked to a social cash transfer programme. More open forms of international aid such as support to be used for the entire policy sector or even for any public expense ("budget support"; Barrientos 2013a, p. 179) cannot be taken into account here. So, strictly speaking, the indicator of the source of funding used here takes into account whether a social cash transfer programme is (partially) funded through direct international aid flows or exclusively through a national budget, no matter in what way this budget is externally supported.

4.7.3 Time horizon: duration of entitlements

The perspective of time is one of the most central aspects when analysing institutionalisation of social cash transfers (Barrientos 2013a, pp. 15, 99, 207). *Continuity* of the transfers is crucial with respect to reliability and security of entitlements. Two aspects of time have implications on the quality of entitlements to social cash transfers:

First, the time horizon of the *entire* social cash transfer *programme*: Programmes may be created as "*permanent* institutions that come into play *whenever* households fall into poverty" (Barrientos 2013a, p. 127; italics by K.W.) In practice, however, many social cash transfer programmes in developing countries have short-term framings, due to international funding (see previous section 4.7.2) or due to unstable political support after changes in government (Barrientos 2013a, pp. 125–126). Evidently, the time horizon of social cash transfer *programmes* is linked to other aspects of institutionalization (legal basis, funding) and may hardly be analysed with a separate indicator. Data on the time horizons of programmes is difficult to access at a large-scale. That is why I analyse the time horizons of programmes as part of the entire concept of *institutionalization* which I measure by the institutionalization index (see following section 4.7.4).

Second, the *duration* of entitlements to social cash transfers: This aspect of time relates to the question of how long the transfers are paid for the entitled person or household. Some social cash transfer programmes limit the entitlements to a maximum period (see section 9.3). This time limit of entitlements is linked to the idea of "graduation" (meant as exit) from poverty, which is popular in Latin America.[188] However, no matter if the recipients of the transfers have "graduated" or not from poverty, the payments stop after their *individual* period of entitlement as the entitlement has ended. I argue that such a time limit of entitlement contrasts with the idea of security and reliability.

To measure the time horizon of entitlements, I focus on the second aspect of time, the duration of entitlements. Entitlements to social cash transfers that are time limited reflect a low degree of institutionalization, while entitlements without a time limit reflect a high degree of institutionalization.

[188] The target groups are supposed to overcome their situation of poverty after a determined period of time. In order to facilitate their graduation, the programmes provide additional support, complementary to the cash benefits such as capacity development and asset accumulation.

4.7.4 The institutionalization index to measure the security of entitlements

This section on measuring the institutionalization of social cash transfers (section 4.7) suggests that the institutionalization of social cash transfer programmes is a complex process with several facets. Consequently, we need an integrated set of indicators that is able to capture this complexity. Inspired by the contribution by Miguel Székely (Székely 2008) who assesses the degree of institutionalization of social protection programmes in Latin America,[189] I suggest an index to measure the *degree of institutionalization*.

The *institutionalization index* comprises the three indicators discussed in the preceeding paragraphs: legal recognition (4.7.1), source of funding (4.7.2), and duration of entitlements (4.7.3). Each of the three indicators is a binary indicator that takes the value of either 1/3[190] or of 0 (see Table 4.7.4). As all three indicators of institutionalization positively correlate with each other[191], the three indicators can be combined to a simple additive index.[192] I add the sub-scores of each of the three indicators up to calculate the institutionalization score of a

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[189] Székely suggests 10 indicators. In addition to the indicators of government ministry, legal framework, and funding that I use for my own analysis, he suggests the following indicators (Székely 2008, pp. 13–14): concrete objectives, indicators for evaluation, mechanisms of coordination within and between different levels of government, civil society participation, rules of operation, social registries, codes of conduct for staff. - Although these indicators refer to the programmes, he assesses entire countries, however, without making the aggregation of the information at the country level transparent and even without discussing this issue.

[190] I choose the value of 1/3 to operate with a maximum of 1. As the index comprises three indicators, the maximum score consists of 1/3 + 1/3 + 1/3 = 1.

[191] Each of the three components of the institutionalization index are dichotomous variables, so Phi as well as Cramer´s V are relevant measures to test their association (Cleff 2015, pp. 74, 80–85). A proximity test for the three indicators of security – legal basis, funding, duration – confirms that each of the three indicators correlate positively with each of the other two indicators (standardized residuals indicate positive correlations). The extent of the correlation is moderate between the indicators *legal basis* and *funding* (V=0.475) as well as between the indicators *funding* and *duration* (V=0.313). The correlation between the indicators *legal basis* and *duration* is only weak (V=0.215).

I use Cramer´s V to test the association of the institutionalization score with the three dichotomous components of the index (Cleff 2015, pp. 74, 84–85). All three dichotomous variables (legal basis, funding, duration) correlate strongly with the institutionalization score (V= 0.732 and above). The correlations are similar if we use an alternative institutionalization score in which missing values on the legal basis are interpreted as a lack of statute (see section 9.5).

[192] As any unweighted additive index, the institutionalization index is based on the assumption that all of its three indicators are equally important to measure the dimension in question (here: institutionalization) and that the indicators can compensate each other (Bortz and Döring 2003, p. 146).

programme. The final institutionalization score ranges on a scale from 0 (minimal institutionalization; minimum) to 0.33 (low degree of institutionalization) to 0.66 (medium degree of institutionalization) to 1 (high degree of institutionalization; maximum).

I argue that the institutionalization index can be used to measure the security and reliability of entitlements to social cash transfers. Security in this sense is related to both current and (potential) future benefit receipt. The *degree of institutionalization* indicates the extent to which the programmes are based on regulations that make the entitlements to social cash transfers reliable and predictable, both for the current recipients and for all citizens as potential future recipients.

Table 4.7.4 The institutionalization index

Dimension of institutionalization	Sub-score	Entitlement to social cash transfer is …
Legal recognition	1/3	… based on a statute
	0	… not based on a statute
Source of funding	1/3	… (entirely) domestically funded
	0	… (partially) externally funded
Duration of entitlement	1/3	… not limited in time
	0	… limited in time

Source: the author.

4.8 Conclusion: the concepts and measures at a glance

Table 4.8 provides an overview of the analytical framework which I construct to analyse entitlements to social cash transfer in view of social citizenship in the empirical part of this doctoral dissertation (Chapters 6 to 9).[193] I claim that all social cash transfer programmes in the global South can be mapped, measured and compared with the help of this analytical framework. Besides, I claim that the measures may be used by any large n study on social cash transfers in the global South with a focus on *entitlements*.

[193] For an early version of the overview of (parts of) the following analytical framework, see Weible and Leisering 2019, pp. 153–154.

Table 4.8 Concepts and measures for the analysis of entitlements to social cash transfers in view of social citizenship

Concepts: Dimensions of social citizenship in the context of social cash transfers	Measures	Values (items)
Inclusion: scope of entitlements, separately for programmes (Chapter 6) and countries (Chapter 7)	Target category (*Incidence of target categories*)	Children; persons of working age (without disabilities); older persons; adults with disabilities; small groups (residual category); poor people
	Inclusiveness (*Inclusion index*, separately per target category)	
	• Social range of a target group	Entire target category; half the target category; subcategory; [no one]
	• Age range of a target group	Ratio (years covered/total age range of the target category) Age ranges of the target categories: children: 18 years (age 0-17); persons of working age: 42 years (age 18-59); older persons: 21 years (age 60-80); adults with disabilities: 18-80 (63 years)

	• Geographical range of programmes	The entire country; large area of the country; small area of the country (pilot programme); [no social cash transfer programme for the target category]
	Inclusiveness profile	Inclusion scores of each target category, which indicate to what extent each of the six target categories are included (entitled), in the following order: children – persons of working age – older persons – adults with disabilities – small groups – poor people
	Target configuration/ Entitlement profile *(Target code)*	Binary code which indicates whether each of the six target categories is addressed (entitled), in the following order: children – persons of working age – older persons – adults with disabilities – small groups – poor people; 1: target category addressed; 0: target category not addressed
	Spread across countries	Number of countries with/without social cash transfers
Rights principles: Conditions of access to entitlements (Chapter 8)	Means test	Yes; no
	Degree of individualization (*individualization index,* separately per target category)	Composition of transfer: - entirely individual composition; - partially individual composition; - not individually composed/flat rate household-related transfer Maximum per household: - yes;

		- no
	Behavioural conditions	Yes; No
Institutionalization: Security of entitlements (Chapter 9)	Degree of institutionalization *(Institutionalization index)*	
	• Legal recognition	based on statute; not based on statute
	• Source of funding	(entirely) domestically funded; (partially) externally funded
	• Duration of entitlements	not limited in time; limited in time

Source: the author.

CONTRIBUTION II: CONSTRUCTING A DATABASE

5 Constructing FLOORCASH-SocCit – the comprehensive dataset on social cash transfers in view of social citizenship

This doctoral dissertation aims at analysing the social cash transfer programmes across the global South in view of social citizenship to find out which contribution social cash transfers make to the social protection of persons considered poor and/or vulnerable in the global South. Taking social citizenship in the context of social cash transfers seriously, this requires an entitlement approach (sections 3.4 and 4.2). However, as mentioned above (sections 2.5 and 2.6), a dataset suitable for comparative large n analyses of *entitlements* to social cash transfers across the global South has not been available so far. Consequently, I constructed a suitable dataset myself: FLOORCASH-SocCit, the social citizenship dataset on entitlements to social cash transfers in the global South.[194]

Over a period of two years (spring 2011 until spring 2013), a team of two students and myself was building up a new and comprehensive database on social cash transfer programmes in the global South: FLOORCASH-Basic.[195] [196] FLOORCASH-Basic includes quantitative and qualitative data on all identifiable social cash transfer programmes across the global South that are administered at the national level, as of 2012/2013 (Weible et al. 2013, 2015; for the FLOORCASH-Basic Manual and Codebook see Appendices 5-2 and 5-3, respectively; the dataset including the manual and codebook is available at www.floorcash.org). FLOORCASH-Basic is the first database to comprise all the 282 social cash transfer programmes in all countries of the global South (but see Barrientos et al. 2010 as an earlier,

[194] For an early, short version of the following introduction of the FLOORCASH databases, see Weible and Leisering 2019, pp. 152–153.

[195] The construction of the database formed part of the research project FLOOR (FloorCash), principal investigator Lutz Leisering, Faculty of Sociology, Bielefeld University; see www.floorcash.org. I thank the German Research Foundation DFG for funding the project 2010 to 2013.

[196] I thank Tobias Böger and John Berten for their great support. Through close cooperation, open communication, regular meetings and exchange of ideas, the research team made sure that the data was collected and constructed according to the same standards.

but much more selective data collection; see section 2.5.1).[197] FLOORCASH-Basic is a largely descriptive database in the form of text rather than in computable codes.

Based on FLOORCASH-Basic, I constructed another, *computable* dataset on entitlements to social cash transfers for the purpose of the large N analysis of social cash transfers in view of social citizenship: FLOORCASH-SocCit (Leisering and Weible 2020; Weible 2014, 2015, 2018; for the FLOORCASH-SocCit Codebook see Appendix 5-1).[198] FLOORCASH-SocCit records the entitlements to social cash transfers across all the 148 countries in the global South at one point in time (2012/2013). This doctoral dissertation is mainly based on FLOORCASH-SocCit version 4 (Leisering and Weible 2020), freely accessible at SowiDataNet|datorium by GESIS.[199] [200]

This Chapter makes the different aspects of the data construction transparent: selecting the sample of programmes (section 5.1); finding relevant data sources (section 5.2); constructing the data in three steps (section 5.3); finding ways of handling missing values (section 5.4); and finally, reflecting on some challenges when constructing the data (section 5.5).

5.1 The comprehensive sample: all nationally administered programmes, all Southern countries

FLOORCASH-SocCit comprises 282 social cash transfer programmes and 148 countries of the global South. Social cash transfer programmes are defined as publicly financed programmes that provide regular non-contributory, non-repayable, and untied payments in the form of cash to individuals and households considered poor and/or vulnerable, as defined by the programme regulations (see section 3.1.1). The number of programmes that come under

[197] FLOORCASH-Basic was published in 2017, after the dataset NSTP (Dodlova et al. 2016; see section 2.5.2), but analyses based on FLOORCASH-Basic had been published earlier (Böger 2013a; Weible 2016).

[198] Members of the research project FLOOR constructed further databases on social cash transfers: *FLOORCASH-SocPen* on non-contributory old age pensions ("social pensions"; Böger 2013b) and *FLOORCASH-Discourse* on discourses around social cash transfers (Gliszczynski 2013), see www.floorcash.org.

[199] https://doi.org/10.7802/2249.

[200] Continuous improvements in the data construction may entail slight differences in the empirical analyses compared to previous publications based on earlier versions of the dataset (Weible 2016; Weible and Leisering 2019).

this definition is confined in three respects: the level of administration of programmes, the range of countries to be chosen, and the focus on citizenship-based programmes.

Firstly, with respect to the administrative level of programmes, only those social cash transfers are included in the sample which are administered at the national level. Admittedly, in federal countries like Brazil and India, the state level is of importance to social protection and welfare.[201] Thus, it would have been desirable to take the programmes at the level of the federal states into account, too.[202] This, however, was not feasible due to the limited capacities for the data collection. Nevertheless, programmes at the sub-national level are included if there is a *co-responsibility* of the national government and the federal states for the country´s social protection arrangements referred to in constitutional provisions and if consequently, the national government refers to the federal states´ schemes in government documents when describing the entire *national* arrangement of social assistance, such as in the case of Malaysia.[203] [204]

Secondly, with respect to the geographical scope, FLOORCASH-SocCit covers all 148 countries and territories of the so-called global South as of 2012/2013. Understandings of

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[201] The big social cash transfer programmes in these countries were introduced at the sub-national level before they were implemented at the national level. Brazil´s *Bolsa Família* had its predecessor in the federal district of Brasilia (*Bolsa Escola*) as well as in the municipality of Campinas (*Programa de Garantia de Renda Familiar Mínima*), both set up in 1995. India´s *Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme* has its roots in a similar Act in the state of Maharashtra, implemented in 1979 (Independent Evaluation Group, pp. 85, 88, 91–92).

[202] As an example of social cash transfers administered at the level of federal states of India, see Sekher 2010 on conditional cash transfers for girls.

[203] As regards the *Financial Welfare Assistance Services*, for example, the Department of Social Welfare emphasizes: “Welfare support services is our common responsibility between the Federal and State Governments on the List III, Article 95B (1) (b) the Federal Constitution”; http://www.jkm.gov.my/content.php?pagename=perkhidmatan_bantuan_kewangan_kebajikan&lang=en; 2014-01-27.

[204] In India, social welfare is, according to the Constitution, the responsibility of the federal states. So contrary to Malaysia, there are no co-responsibilities and common frameworks, to which the Federal Government refers. The only frameworks of social protection at the national level include the *MNREGA*, the food distribution programme, and the health insurance for unorganized sector workers (interview no. 13, 2011, as listed in FLOORCASH-SocCit (Leisering and Weible 2020)). Similarly, the programme *Tekun* in China, which can be found throughout the country, is not included in the sample, since there are no national regulations on it (interview no. 5b, 2012, as listed in FLOORCASH-SocCit version 4 (Leisering and Weible 2020)).

what the global South consists of are diverse (Hollington et al. 2015).[205] I suggest defining the *global South* by combining geographical aspects with criteria of development. For this purpose, I refer to the classification of world regions by the UN Statistics Division[206] and to the Human Development Index (HDI) respectively.[207]

Out of the 193 UN member states all are included with the following exceptions:

(a) Geographical restriction:

The 45 European countries, as classified by the UN Statistics division, are excluded.[208]

(b) Restriction with regard to development:

5 non-European, but highly developed countries are excluded (with very high HDI scores over decades): Australia, New Zealand, Canada, USA, and Japan.

In addition to the UN member states, FLOORCASH-SocCit includes the following territories: Palestine, Macao, Hong Kong, Taiwan,[209] Cook Islands.

The sample of countries covered by the dataset is illustrated in Figure 7.1-1 in section 7.1. Moreover, Appendix 5.4 provides a list of the countries included in FLOORCASH-SocCit.

Thirdly, in accordance with the concept of social citizenship, entitlements are recorded for national citizens only. Consequently, only programmes for national citizens (and permanent residents) are included in the dataset.[210]

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[205] A wide-spread opinion is that "what was then called the Third World (…) is now called the Global South" (Hanlon et al. 2010, p. 19).

[206] https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/ (accessed 24 October 2017).

[207] http://hdr.undp.org/en/data (accessed 24 October 2017).

[208] Whereas Cyprus and Turkey are classified as West Asian countries according to the UN statistics division, I classify them as European countries due to their actual or pending membership in the European Union. The excluded countries correspond to the 47 member states of the Council of Europe (including Cyprus and Turkey) and Belarus, but Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia are included in the dataset; http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm; 2014-01-27.

[209] Although Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan are formally part of Mainland China, they are treated as independent cases since their political and economic evolution has been very different from Mainland China.

[210] In South Africa, refugees are also entitled to a few social cash transfers as of 2011 (Disability Grant, Foster Child Grant; South African Social Security Agency 2012). Since 2011/12 entitlements of refugees have been extended to all *social grants* with the exception of the *War Veteran´s Grant* (South African Social Security Agency 2020).

5.2 Data sources

As mentioned in the introduction to this Chapter, the *computable* dataset FLOORCASH-SocCit is constructed based on the wider *descriptive* database FLOORCASH-Basic. For the construction of FLOORCASH-Basic the following four types of sources have been used (listed according to relevance, decreasing from top to bottom; see Leisering and Weible 2020; Weible et al. 2015):[211]

1. 27 data collections on social security and social protection respectively (see also section 2.5):

   The *Social Security Country Profiles* provided by the International Social Security Association (ISSA),[212] the *Social Security Inquiry* provided by the International Labour Organization (ILO),[213] and the *Pension Watch Database* provided by HelpAge International[214] were used as a starting point for all countries. In order to complement the basic data collection, a fourth data collection was scanned, depending on the world region: for Latin America, the two data collections on *Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes* and on *Social Pensions* published by UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC);[215] for Africa, *The Cash Dividend*, a publication by the World Bank (Garcia and Moore 2012); for Asia, the surveys on social protection of older persons and on social cash transfer programmes respectively, published by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR; see Weible et al. 2015). Only in case of lacking information in these main sources or in case of discrepancies between the data sources, the research team continued to check subsidiary data sources.
2. 218 governmental documents and websites respectively such as papers on social cash transfer programmes, annual reports, budget reports, speeches, etc.

[211] Each type of source is recorded in a distinct manner in the spreadsheet on social cash transfer programmes in FLOORCASH-Basic, see FLOORCASH-Basic Manual (Appendix 5-2).

[212] Now available at https://www.issa.int/en_GB/country-profiles; 2020-07-10.

[213] Now available at https://www.social-protection.org/gimi/WSPDB.action?id=40; 2020-07-10.

[214] http://www.pension-watch.net/about-social-pensions/about-social-pensions/social-pensions-database/; 2020-07-10.

[215] https://dds.cepal.org/bpsnc/cct; 2020-07-10.

3. 214 studies from the academic literature and policy papers by national development agencies, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and similar agencies;
4. 14 expert interviews.

The number of documents consulted is much higher, since it was sometimes hard to find the required information. Besides that, many documents were consulted to decide whether programmes comes under the definition of social cash transfers, but these sources are not documented if the programmes were finally not classified as social cash transfers.

In case of contradicting sources, priority is given to government data, with the exception of information on funding (national vs. international), which is often not mentioned in government documents or on government websites.

5.3 The three steps of constructing FLOORCASH-SocCit

Constructing the data according to the concepts and measures presented in Chapter 4 was done in three steps:

1. Collecting the “raw”, non-computable data for the set of indicators, using text and, if any, codes in the form of acronyms: This step was realized as the construction of the database FLOORCASH-Basic (see introductory paragraph to this Chapter). At this stage of data construction, the units of research consisted of the *social cash transfer programmes* and in case that a social cash transfer programme consisted of a composite programme (see section 3.1.1), of the *single components of composite social cash transfer programmes* respectively.
2. (Re)coding the descriptive data of FLOORCASH-Basic into quantitative *computable* data (FLOORCASH-SocCit): For this step the original data sources of many programmes were consulted again in order to code and classify the data precisely. When recoding the target population of the programmes, I followed strict rules of assigning the target groups to the six standardized target categories in order to ensure standardized and reliable data construction (see section 4.3).
3. Aggregating the data of components of composite social cash transfer programmes (which are recorded separately in FLOORCASH-Basic) at the level of (the composite) programmes: Some social cash transfer programmes consist of several components,

that is why I call them *composite programmes* (see section 3.1.1). To reduce complexity, the components of the composite programmes had to be aggregated at the level of the composite social cash transfer programme as the central unit of research. This compression and reduction of cases makes sense because the components of the composite social cash transfer programme share the values for many indicators, above all in the dimension of institutionalization. “Aggregation” in the dimension of inclusion means adding up the values of each component for each indicator. After the data aggregation, *one case* represents one composite social cash transfer programme with possibly several target groups.

While I took step 2 (recoding of the data) and step 3 (data aggregation) at the same time, the three steps represent analytically different stages of data construction. The data construction in three steps was necessary since the raw data base of step 1 is a team product following broader research interests, providing more indicators than required for my own investigation. Moreover, as the components of composite social cash transfer programmes often differ in several indicators, it was necessary to record the components of the composite programmes in a first step. Once all the information had been taken down and once the empirical variance in all indicators was known, the codes for the quantitative dataset could be constructed.

5.4 Handling of missing values[216]

Data is missing for some indicators of some programmes in FLOORCASH-SocCit. This has implications when aggregating the data at the level of countries (the national social cash transfer arrangements) in the dimension of inclusion. To depict the inclusiveness profiles of as many programmes and of as many countries as possible (sections 6.3 and 7.3), I minimize the number of missing values pursuing the following strategies:

If only some data is missing, I either extrapolate values (strategy a. below) or I use only the data available (strategy b. below), depending on the type of missing data. If data on all target categories addressed is missing, the countries are not included in the national inclusiveness profiles in section 7.3 (strategy c below).

[216] For an early version of this section, see Weible and Leisering 2019, pp. 387–389.

In the following, 'entire' and 'sub' refer to target categories, for example 'D-entire' denotes the target category of adults with disabilities as a whole ("all adults with disabilities"), whereas 'D-sub' denotes a subcategory of adults with disabilities, in case a programme only targets a subcategory ("particular adults with disabilities").

a.) Countries with partially extrapolated data on inclusiveness profiles:

To limit the number of missing values for the inclusion scores of social cash transfer programmes and of countries, respectively, for some target categories addressed by a programme I assume that the programme entitles persons of all ages within these target categories. "This applies to the following target categories:

- Adults with disabilities (D-entire), since details on age are rare.
- Persons of working age (WA-entire), if age is not qualified.
- Subgroups of children such as orphans (C-sub), subgroups of persons of working age such as poorly educated persons (WA-sub) as well as subgroups of older persons such as persons living alone (OA-sub), if age is not qualified, since their overall impact on the score is moderate.

Extrapolated values have been used for calculating the inclusion scores of programmes in the following 27 countries, relating to the target category specified:

Argentina: C-sub, WA-sub; Azerbaijan: C-sub; Bahrain: C-sub; Brunei: C-sub; China: C-sub; Cuba: WA-sub, OA-sub; Egypt: C-sub, WA-entire; Ghana: C-sub; Guyana: C-sub, OA-sub; Iraq: C-sub, WA-entire; Israel: WA-entire [from age 20]; Jordan: WA-sub; Kazakhstan: C-sub; Kyrgyzstan: C-sub; Liberia: WA-sub; Mauritius: WA-entire; Qatar: C-sub; Saint Vincent & Grenadines: C-sub; Sierra Leone: C-sub; Singapore: WA-entire, OA-sub; Sri Lanka: C-sub; Swaziland: C-sub; Tanzania: C-sub; Uruguay: WA-entire; Vietnam: C-sub; Yemen: C-sub; Zimbabwe: C-sub.

In addition, extrapolated values have been used for calculating the inclusion scores of all programmes addressing adults with disabilities.

b.) Countries with incomplete data on inclusiveness profiles:

For 18 countries, the inclusion scores of certain target categories (children-C, older persons-OA) are incomplete or entirely missing. For the following countries the scores for the categories indicated are probably higher than depicted in the figures on inclusiveness profiles:

Bahamas: C (incomplete); Bahrain: OA (missing); Belize: C (missing); Botswana: OA (incomplete); East Timor: C (missing); Egypt: C (incomplete), OA (incomplete); Jordan: OA (missing); Liberia: OA (missing); Malaysia: C (incomplete), WA (missing); Nigeria: OA (missing); Peru: OA (incomplete); Qatar: OA (missing); Sierra Leone: OA (missing); Syria: OA (missing); Tunisia: OA (missing); Yemen: OA (missing).

In the case of China (OA), Mongolia (OA), Venezuela (OA), and Malaysia (D), incomplete scores are irrelevant, since the target categories in question reach the maximum score through programmes for which data is available.

c.) Countries with entirely missing data on inclusiveness profiles:

Data on all target categories addressed is missing for the following eight countries. Therefore, the inclusiveness profiles of these countries are not depicted in the figures.

Djibouti, Iran, Kuwait, Morocco, Nicaragua, Saudi Arabia, Tuvalu, United Arab Emirates.

5.5 Challenges to the data construction

The FLOORCASH research team did their best to provide good quality data. Yet there were a few challenges to the construction of data.

First, when the FLOORCASH research team started the data collection for FLOORCASH-Basic in 2011, access to the data on social cash transfer programmes was much more restricted than today. The few data collections on social cash transfers were very selective (see section 2.5.1). Only *after* the construction and revision of FLOORCASH-Basic in 2015 (Weible et al. 2015), the availability of large n data has improved (see section 2.5.2; but there is still no large N dataset on entitlements to social cash transfer programmes across the global South – the gap which FLOORCASH-SocCit closes).

Secondly, the data collection was time consuming. If the data required was not available in the major data sources (as described above in section 5.2), the team searched for more data, but sometimes not for all indicators required due to restrictions in time.

Thirdly, some data on the state of social cash transfer programmes as of 2012/2013 became accessible only after 2013, when the main data collection (and funding for the FLOOR project) was over already. I fed new data in sources published after 2013 into FLOORCASH-Basic and FLOORCASH-SocCit, respectively, but could not consider sources published after 2015.

Fourthly, the data included in the data base FLOORCASH-Basic might be, to some extent, biased with respect to the languages the research team was capable to understand. These languages are English, Spanish, French, German, and Chinese.[217] For some countries with other languages, we resorted to the help of country experts (see the list of interviews indicated as sources in FLOORCASH-Basic and FLOORCASH-SocCit version 4 (Leisering and Weible 2020), respectively). In some exceptional cases the research team used the service of online translation tools to find information on very particular issues in other languages.

Despite these limitations on the side of the research team, it has become evident in the course of the research that it is partly the *quality of the objects of research* – the social cash transfer programmes –, which makes it difficult to construct the data precisely. Fuzzy definitions of entitlements are an important finding of my study, in particular with respect to those social cash transfer programmes that I have classified as programmes that address "some poor people" (see section 6.1.6). The target populations of these programmes are vaguely defined, since relevant government documents mention fuzzy and different target groups, such as in case of St. Vincent and the Grenadines´ *Public Assistance*.[218] Some governments explicitly admit that the eligibility criteria of the social cash transfer programmes are unclear (see also section 4.4.2).[219]

Another challenge stemming from the quality of the very objects of research is the finding that social cash transfer programmes as social policy measures are subject to constant change and adaptation over time. Sometimes the changes are linked to changes in the composition of the national governments after elections, such as in Colombia, when the former social cash transfer programme *Familias en Acción* was changed into *Más Familias en Acción* (More

[217] We are indebted to our FLOOR colleague Liu Tao for the research in Chinese.

[218] In one and the same government document, the target group of the *Public Assistance* is described as "elderly poor, persons who are sick and poor, and deserving children of poor parents" (Government St. Vincent and the Grenadines 2012, p. 42) and as "indigent poor and economically disadvantaged, including students attending primary, secondary and post-secondary educational institutions" (Government St. Vincent and the Grenadines 2012, p. 124). An earlier government document of 2011 mentions elderly persons at age 65 and above, disabled at age 60 and under, foster care parents of orphans and suggests that the grant for students is a transportation grant (which is not classified as a social cash transfer programme) (Government St. Vincent and the Grenadines 2011, p. 61).

[219] A document by the national government of St. Lucia finds that "eligibility criteria were not clearly defined" (Government of St. Lucia n.d., p. 10, see FLOORCASH-Basic); and similarly, the government of Dominica states that "criteria for eligibility are not documented" (Commonwealth of Dominica 2006, p. 83).

families in action) under a new President (interview no. 11, 2013, as listed in FLOORCASH-SocCit version 4 (Leisering and Weible 2020)). But even under one and the same government, programmes are developed and adjusted, such as Mexico's famous pioneer conditional cash transfer programme *Oportunidades* of 1997 (changed into *Prospera* in 2014), to which a couple of new components were added under the Presidency of Calderón between 2006 and 2012 and which was finally disbanded in 2019.[220]

These issues underline that the task of recording entitlements to social cash transfer programmes precisely remains challenging, even disregarding the resources and capabilities of the researchers.

[220] The *Vivir mejor food support component* was introduced in 2008 and the *Vivir mejor child support component* in 2010, along with two components which were set up closer to the beginning of the incumbency, the *Apoyo adultos mayores (Elderly support)* in 2006 and the *Apoyo energético* (Energy subsidy) in 2007. In 2012, the *Energy Subsidy* was merged with the *Food Support* (for further details see the *Non-contributory Social Protection Programmes Database* by *UN ECLAC* at https://dds.cepal.org/bpsnc/cct; 2020-07-10.

CONTRIBUTION III: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

6 The scope of programmes: Who is entitled to social cash transfers across the global South?

Who is entitled to social cash transfers? This question refers to the *target population* of social cash transfers. Even informed readers may think that the target population of social cash transfers is evident. The literature suggests that it is "the poor" (see the title of Leisering 2009; Gliszczynski 2015, p. 1) and the poor or vulnerable population respectively (Barrientos 2013a, p. 3; Dodlova et al. 2018, pp. 51–52). But who are "the poor", is it all of "the poor" or only some of them? And who is the vulnerable population?

According to my definition of social cash transfers (section 3.1.1), the transfers address "individuals and households considered poor and/or vulnerable, as defined by the programme regulations". Although the aspects of poverty and vulnerability are also included in this definition, it suggests that the issue of the target population is more complex.

In the literature, single target groups of social cash transfer programmes are mentioned, such as children and families with children respectively, older persons, and persons with disabilities (see the literature review in the sections 2.2.1 and 2.3). However, an in-depth analysis of the whole range of target groups based on empirical data has not been done so far.

In this Chapter I analyse the *scope* of social cash transfer programmes, which reflects the dimension of *inclusion* of the concept of social citizenship (see Chapter 3). It follows the entitlement approach to social cash transfers (see section 4.2), applying the concepts and measures introduced in Chapter 4 (sections 4.3 and 4.4; for an overview, see Table 4.8 in section 4.8). While I also analyse the scope of national social cash transfer arrangements of entire countries (subsequent Chapter 7), this Chapter 6 focuses on the scope of social cash transfer *programmes.* This way I systematically map and measure entitlements to social cash transfers across the global South.

I start with an analysis of the target categories of social cash transfer programmes, inquiring "who is entitled?" (section 6.1). But even if we know who is entitled, this does not tell anything about the *inclusiveness* of entitlements, that is the *degree* to which the target categories are entitled. Therefore, I continue to ask, "who is entitled to what extent?" (section 6.2). I develop this question further, investigating to what extent each social cash transfer programme addresses ("includes") the target categories. This entails a new approach to mapping social cash transfer programmes in view of entitlements (*inclusiveness profiles*; section 6.3). The issue of mapping programmes by the extent to which they "include" target categories takes us further to another question: What types of social cash transfer programmes in the global South can be constructed if we focus on the entitlements of target categories (section 6.4)? I finally discuss the findings in section 6.5.

6.1 Who is entitled? Target categories of social cash transfer programmes

Who is entitled to social cash transfers? As I explained above (section 4.2), the *target groups* of social cash transfer programmes are key to analyse entitlements. If a social cash transfer programme addresses particular groups, those individuals and households respectively are *entitled* to social cash transfers.[221] Therefore, in order to find out *who* is entitled to social cash transfers, we have to scrutinize the target groups of the programmes. So, who are the target groups of the social cash transfer programmes across the global South?

There is no methodological approach available so far that would permit to analyse all (types of) social cash transfers across the global South with a focus on the target groups and entitlements respectively (see section 2.4). That is why I develop my own analytical approach to the comparative analysis of entitlements of target groups, including new standardized measures.

The structure of the section is as follows: At first, I take stock of the target groups of all identifiable social cash transfer programmes across the global South, presenting a precise inventory of all target groups (section 6.1.1). Based on these findings, I reconstruct by which criteria the target groups are "constructed" (defined) in the relevant national rules and regulations that shape the design of social cash transfer programmes (section 6.1.2). Based on these reconstructions, I develop a new approach to analysing target groups, which is adequate for large n analyses - a classification of target groups into six standardized *target categories* (section 6.1.3). With the help of these standardized target categories, I then introduce a novel measure that permits to map entitlements to social cash transfers across the global South separately by target category (*incidence of target categories*; section 6.1.4). Applying this measure to the data from FLOORCASH-SocCit, I am able to provide an answer to the question as to which target categories are addressed by the social cash transfer programmes

[221] In the context of this doctoral dissertation, an *entitlement* to a social cash transfer is not necessarily based on a statute (see the empirical analyses in section 9.1).

across the global South (section 6.1.5). I then present a particular target category that has widely been ignored in the literature, the category of "poor people" (section 6.1.6).

6.1.1 What target groups do social cash transfer programmes address? An inventory of the enormous variety

Which target groups do social cash transfer programmes address? Based on the dataset FLOORCASH-SocCit, I analyse the totality of target groups of social cash transfer programmes across the global South as of 2012/13. The results are provided in Appendix 6.1.1.[222]

In total, I identified 103 different kinds of social groups as target groups of social cash transfer programmes.[223] This figure exceeds by far what we may have expected from the few previous studies on target groups of social cash transfer programmes and even more so from the typologies of social cash transfer programmes, which suggest that social cash transfer programmes address a small number of groups (see sections 2.3 and 2.2.1). The first conclusion of the analysis of target groups is clear: Social cash transfer programmes do not "simply" address "the poor" of a country. By constrast, the programmes address a huge variety of heterogeneous target groups.

Who are these groups? The range of target groups is enourmous. To mention just a few examples, programmes address neglected children, lone-parent families ("children of single parents"), families of ethnic origin, adults with poor school education, older persons who live alone, chronically ill adults, divorced women, war veterans, labour-restricted poor households – and many more. These examples suggest that the criteria how target populations are defined must be diverse (see my exploration in the following section 6.1.2).

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[222] In Appendix 6.1.1, the target groups are arranged according to six wider *target categories* (children, persons of working age, older persons, adults with disabilities, small groups, and poor people), which I introduce below in section 6.1.3. Contrary to all other empirical analyses, Appendix 6.1.1 also includes the target groups of six mostly small-scale programmes run by non-governmental organizations. The six programmes include *Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction/Targeting the Ultra Poor (TUP)* in Bangladesh, *Support to Vulnerable Individuals* (as part of *Tarayana*) in Bhutan, *Renda Basica de Ciudadanía* in Brasil, the *Global Social Trust* in Ghana, *KwaWazee* in Tanzania, as well as a small-scale initiative in Zimbabwe.

[223] This figure refers to social groups defined by biological aspects (except age), social aspects, and work-related criteria. It does not take further distinctions into account such as age and geographic location (see section 6.1.2 for the details on the different kinds of targeting criteria).

The social groups that are most frequently addressed are older persons (without additional targeting criteria), adults with disabilities[224] (without additional targeting criteria), and children (without additional targeting criteria), who are addressed by 93, 81, and 51 programmes respectively. Furthermore, orphans, children with disabilities, and pregnant women are also frequently addressed, by 43, 30, and 20 programmes respectively. The prominence of these main target groups suggests a focus on children, older persons, and adults with disabilities as the major target groups of social cash transfers. This however needs to be confirmed by further analyses (below in this Chapter), since I have identified many more target groups.

If we look at the target groups from a gender perspective, we find a positive discrimination of women and girls. Not even one social cash transfer programme addresses males only.[225] But 63 programmes address women only, above all pregnant women, widows and divorced women. Evidently, women and girls are frequent target groups of social cash transfer programmes.

It is important to mention that Appendix 6.1.1 does not include references to *poverty* (with the exception of the five target groups related to the category of "poor people" at the end of the Appendix).[226] Recalling the definition of social cash transfers above, social cash transfers address individuals and households who are considered poor *and/or vulnerable* (see section 3.1.1). As references to poverty are not recorded in Appendix 6.1.1 (except those related to "poor people", Table 6.1.1-6), I argue that the target groups listed there (except those related to "poor people) may be interpreted as groups that are considered as *vulnerable* groups, that is at risk of falling into poverty (see the definition of vulnerability by Barrientos (2013a, p. 13). Put it differently, the target groups may depict the broad range of how *vulnerability* is constructed in social cash transfer programmes (for more on the construction of vulnerability, see the subsequent section 6.1.2).

At the same time, the great variety of target groups suggests that social cash transfers are linked to varied social problems which cannot be reduced to "poverty" alone. To mention an

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224 "Disability" is a concept that is only vaguely defined in the programme designs (but see Table 6.1.1-4 in Appendix 6.1.1 for more precise subcategories of persons with disabilities).

225 Although, possibly war veterans can be supposed to be men in most cases.

226 This does not necessarily mean that the programmes disregard the aspect of poverty. Infact, we find that most programmes define their target groups by referring to particular social groups and to criteria of poverty at the same time (see section 8.1)

example from South Africa, the *Foster Child Grant* and even the *Grant for Older Persons* are not only seen as responses to poverty, but also as responses to the HIV/AIDS pandemic, since many orphaned children are raised by their grandmothers (Weible and Leisering 2012, p. 256).

There is no space to analyse the target groups of the social cash transfer programmes in detail in this doctoral dissertation. Instead, my focus is on inquiring *all* the social cash transfer programmes throughout the global South with their varied target groups in view of their contribution to social citizenship for persons considered poor and/or vulnerable. But how to analyse the 282 social cash transfer programmes identified across the global South including all their most diverse target groups?

The large number of programmes makes a standardized approach and quantitative analysis based on computable data and with the help of statistical software imperative. However, the heterogeneity among the target groups of the programmes poses a methodological challenge.

Responding to this challenge, I construct standardized units of analysis that are supposed to cover all empirical target groups (section 6.1.3). But how to make sure that these standardized units are indeed able to comprehend all empirical target groups?

If we want to analyse the very heterogeneous target groups - as the objects of study - in a standardized way, we must make sure that the indicators to be used are able to cover all the different kinds of target groups, *in what ever way the groups are defined*. This requires knowledge about the critieria *how* the target groups are defined, the so-called *targeting criteria*. For this purpose, I reconstruct the criteria of how the social cash transfer programmes define their target groups as the first step of the analysis in the subsequent section 6.1.2.

6.1.2 How are target groups defined? Reconstructing targeting criteria

To my knowledge, a meta-analysis of how target groups of social cash transfers are constructed has not been done before. I split it in two parts.[227]

First, the analysis of target group reveals two distinct types of target groups: *categorical* target groups and *non-categorical* target groups. To illustrate the difference between categorical and non-categorical target groups, I compare two social cash transfer programmes. Namibia´s

[227] For an early version of the following analysis of targeting criteria, see Weible and Leisering 2019, pp. 180–183.

Foster Care Grant targets orphans and other children “found to be in need of care and placed in custody of foster parents”. South Korea´s *Minimum Living Standard System* targets any poor household and any poor individual. The two examples illustrate two basic types of target groups: On the one hand there are social cash transfer programmes that address *particular* social groups such as the orphans and other particular groups of children under the Namibian programme. These programmes define their target groups primarily with reference to particular “categories” of people, defined by biological, social, and work-related aspects, although often complemented by financial criteria (poverty; see further below in this section). We may speak of *categorically constructed target groups* and, in short, of *categorical* target groups (see Tables 6.1.1-1 to Tables 6.1.1-5 in Appendix 6.1.1).

On the other hand, we identify programmes which address “poor people” such as the Korean programme, without referring to any particular category of people (see Table 6.1.1-6 in Appendix 6.1.1). These target groups - poor households, poor individuals - are defined in financial (economic) terms only, without referring to particular social, biological, and work-related “categories”.[228] Consequently, we may speak of *non-categorically constructed target groups* of social cash transfer programmes and, in short, of *non-categorical* target groups.[229]

So far, the distinction between categorical target groups and non-categorical target groups (“the poor”) has rarely been made explicitly in the literature on social cash transfers (see also section 6.1.6). Only indirectly, in the context of (the search for the “right”) targeting strategies, the issue has become prominent. “Universal” transfers, which means in practice non-means-tested categorical transfers (see section 3.1.2), have been distinguished from “poverty-targeted” transfers, that is means-tested transfers.[230]

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[228] Yet the empirical analysis in section 6.1.6 reveals considerable variations of how “poor people” are defined.

[229] Speaking of “non-categorical groups” may seem contradictory, but for convenience I speak of the addressees of social cash transfer programmes as the “target groups”.

[230] See the distinction between social cash transfers to “specific vulnerable groups” and poverty-targeted transfers (Garcia and Moore 2012, pp. 355–357; section 2.3.2). Gooding and Marriot (2009) were perhaps the first to distinguish between social cash transfer programmes for a particular target group – persons with disabilities – and what they called “mainstream” social cash transfer programmes, in which the particular target group (persons with disabilities) are included. However, the authors did not continue this track and did not develop a methodological approach to analysing these two types of inclusion. Instead, they seem to complain that programmes with several target groups “blur[..] the distinction between mainstream and disability-specific social transfers” (Gooding and Marriot 2009, p. 689). Evidently due to a lack of data, their investigation of the

But the distinction between categorical and non-categorical target groups is of great importance when analysing entitlements to social cash transfers: Categorically defined target groups imply that the entitlements to social cash transfers are limited to particular biological, social, and work-related categories of people (*categorical entitlements*). This is not the case with non-categorically defined target groups. In these cases, entitlements to social cash transfers simply refer to individuals and households classified as poor, without further limitations to particular categories of people (*non-categorical entitlements)*. The important difference between the two types of entitlements is that non-categorical entitlements may extend to all categories of people – on the condition that these categories of people are classified as poor. But only in exceptional cases may a number of categorically limited entitlements extend to "the poor" in general. Put differently, non-categorical entitlements may function as substitutes for any other categorical entitlements. The different kinds of entitlements are crucial when measuring inclusion of citizens in social cash transfer *programmes* (section 6.2) and in national social cash transfer arrangements (*countries*; section 7.2).

Second and apart from the distinction between categorical and non-categorical target groups, what other criteria do the programmes use to define their target groups? Analysing the target groups of all 282 social cash transfer programmes, I could identify the following criteria which are used in the programme regulations to define (and thereby construct) the target groups:

1. *Biological aspects* such as age, including the life cycle groups of children and older persons; disability, illness; pregnancy;
2. *Social aspects,* referring to the social situation of the groups, such as the situation of care, of education, and of the household composition, gender, especially women with a certain marital status (divorced women, widows), war veterans, orphans;
3. *Aspects* related to *income generation* and *work* such as unemployed persons, informal workers, adults with lack of education or qualification;
4. Aspects related to the economic and financial situation, above all poverty;
5. *Geographical aspects* such as a regional limitation;

mainstream social cash transfer programmes in view of disability remains limited to two examples of programmes.

6. The aspect of the *unit of intervention* (individuals or households as the *beneficiary units*).

Some contributions to the literature on social cash transfers distinguish between social cash transfers to "specific vulnerable groups" (identified by targeting based on vulnerability) from poverty-targeted transfers (identified by poverty-targeting), respectively; Garcia and Moore 2012, pp. 62–65). Consequently, I argue that criteria 1 to 3 are criteria ascertaining *vulnerability*, while criterion 4 ascertains *poverty*.

In practice, social cash transfer programmes often combine the different criteria of defining target groups. To give an example, Peru´s *Juntos* addresses families with children up to 14, semi-orphans, pregnant women, older persons if they are classified as poor *and* if they live in particular regions of the country. So, the programme uses biological, social, financial, geographical, and the aspect of the unit of intervention to define its target groups.

In view of the objective of mapping entitlements of *all* social cash transfer programmes across the global South, I argue that *all* the aspects of how the target groups are constructed have to be taken into account: both the distinction between categorical and non-categorical target groups and all six kinds of targeting criteria. Consequently, I refer to all these aspects in the following analyses, although in different ways:

When analysing the scope of entitlements (dimension of inclusion, Chapters 6 and 7), I do not only take the distinction between categorical and non-categorical target groups into account, but also the biological, social, work-related, and geographical aspects. The unit of intervention will be part of the analysis of the conditions of access to entitlements (degree of individualization of entitlements/ dimension of rights principles, section 8.2). Finally, I cover the aspect of the economic and financial situation when investigating whether the programmes apply a means test as a condition of access to entitlements (dimension of rights principles, section 8.1). However, I do not take the aspect of the means test and of poverty respectively into account in my analysis of the scope of entitlements (dimension of inclusion), since my analysis of inclusion is based on a crucial assumption: If a programme applies a means test, the scope that I determine refers to those individuals and households only who "pass" this test, that is *who are classified as poor according to the definition in the relevant national rules and programme regulations*.[231]

6.1.3 Constructing six target categories

Evidently, social cash transfer programmes address a huge variety of target groups which are defined by a number of different aspects, as the preceeding sections revealed. Facing such a tremendous heterogeneity among the target groups, how might it be possible to map the target groups in a standardized way to assess the scope of social cash transfers? Taking a few examples, how to compare Mexico´s *Oportunidades*, which targets households with children up to 18, older persons from age 70, and poor households, with Egypt´s *Ma'ash al daman/ MOSA Social Solidarity pension,* which addresses persons older than age 64, orphans, families of prisoners, households with unemployed persons, adults with disabilities, chronically ill heads of households, widows, divorced women, abandoned women, and unmarried women older than 49, and with Fiji´s *Care and Protection Allowance,* which addresses children of female-headed households, of prisoners and of foster parents?

For the purpose of comparative analysis, I classify all the target groups of the social cash transfer programmes into standardized *categories* of target groups. I call these categories *target categories*. The target categories are analytical units based on the empirical analysis of the target groups and the (re)construction of the targeting criteria (sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2).

I claim that all target groups of the 282 social cash transfer programmes across the global South can be assigned to (no more than) one of the following six target categories (see section 4.3 on how the target groups were assigned to the target categories):

Categorically constructed target categories:

7. children (from age 0 to including 17, including children with disabilities);
8. persons of working age (18-59);
9. older persons (from age 60 to including age 80);
10. adults with disabilities (from age 18 to including age 80);

[231] Due to this constructivist perspective, the issue of how poverty is defined and measured is beyond the scope of this doctoral dissertation. For different poverty concepts and conceptions of poverty reflected in different programme types see Barrientos 2013a as well as section 2.3.1.

11. small groups (residual category)

Non-categorically constructed target category:

12. poor people (defined in economic terms, not categorically constructed).

The target categories 1 to 3 are defined by age: they constitute *life cycle categories* (see Leisering 2003 on social policy as life course policy). The age thresholds of the target categories are derived from the legal programme designs. Appendix 6.1.3 provides a list of the ages of eligibility of the target groups within each target category.[232]

0 and 18 are the ages that most programmes determine as ages when entitlements of children start and end respectively. The age range of 0 to 17 is also in accordance with international law, in particular with the *Convention on the Rights of the Child* of 1989 (United Nations 1989). Evidently, the age range of 0-17 and in particular the formal confinement of childhood up to the age of 17 can be interpreted as a global "age norm" in terms of global life course policy (see Leisering 2003, p. 215).

Most programmes that address older persons define age 60 or age 65 as age of eligibility. In view of the generally lower life expectancy in the global South, I chose the age of 60 to define the category of older persons. Evidently, the ages of 60 and 65 respectively define global norms when old age starts. Both age thresholds are also prevalent as qualifying ages in social assistance programmes that address older persons in the global North (Bahle et al. 2011, p. 39).[233]

As entitlements of older persons start as late as at age 80 under one programme, the target category extends to including age 80 to measure entitlements (with the help of the inclusion index, see sections 6.2.1 and 4.4.5). The same upper age threshold is applied to measure entitlements of the category of adults with disabilities.[234]

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[232] For some programmes I estimated the qualifying age based on the information provided in the sources, as indicated in the comments on each target category in FLOORCASH-SocCit (variable "C_comm" for the target category of children, "WA_comm" for the target category of persons of working age etc.; see Leisering and Weible 2020). To give an example, if a programme addresses "children at primary school", I estimate that entitlements start at age six.

[233] For an overview of the qualifying ages of social pension for older persons across the global South see Böger and Leisering 2017, pp. 10–11.

[234] The latest qualifying age when entitlement of adults with disabilities start is age 60.

As regards the target category of persons of working age, most programme designs do not define this category in terms of age as programmes do with respect to the categories of children and older persons. Therefore, the upper and lower age thresholds of the life cycle categories of children (17) and older persons (60) respectively are used to confine the category of persons of working age as an analytical unit (18-59).

Category 4 is defined by health and disability. It includes adults with disabilities and adults with chronical illness. Category 5 is a residual category to comprise all those target groups which are not part of the other target categories. Examples of target groups within this target category are victims of natural disasters, refugees, and (relatives of) prisoners. These groups are generally small groups of the population since they show very particular features. The most frequently identified groups classified under the category of *small groups* are different groups of women (pregnant, divorced, widowed), war veterans, and survivors (see Appendix 6.1.1, Table 6.1.1-5).

The target categories 1 to 5 are categorically constructed that is they refer to social groups which are defined by biological, social, and work-related criteria (see section 6.1.1.). This approach is also called *categorical targeting.*

Target category 6, by contrast, is the only non-categorically constructed "category". It only refers to the economic situation of the target groups, often expressed as a definition of the target groups as "poor". This approach is referred to as *non-categorical targeting*. This category comprises any individuals and households defined as poor, according to the programme regulations. The distinction between *categorical* and *non-categorical* target categories is of great importance since they imply different types of entitlements (categorical versus non-categorical entitlements; see section 6.1.2). This distinction becomes relevant when analysing the *inclusion* of target categories in the national social cash transfer arrangement of a country (see section 7.2).

6.1.4 Constructing comparative measures I: Incidence of target categories

The *target categories* that I introduced in the preceeding section 6.1.3 facilitate a standardized mapping of entitlements to social cash transfer programmes. For this purpose, I create a new measure, the *incidence of target categories*. It indicates the total number of social cash transfer programmes that address the target categories. I calculate this number separately for each of the six target categories, since programmes may address several target categories at the same time (see sections 6.3 and 6.4). This way of mapping entitlements ensures that all target groups of the programmes are taken into account and that the entitlements of single programmes are not reduced to a single target category, as done in some typologies of social cash transfer programmes (see sections 2.3 and 6.4). In other words, I aggregate the entitlements to social cash transfers at the level of the entire global South, separately by target category.

6.1.5 Who is addressed (I)? The target categories of social cash transfer programmes across the global South

Who is entitled to social cash transfers? Using the indicator *incidence of target categories* introduced in the preceeding section 6.1.4, I examine: How frequently are the target categories addressed across the global South?[235]



Figure 6.1.5 Social cash transfer programmes by target categories (programmes that target the respective category, in % of all programmes; multiple references possible)

Source: Weible and Leisering 2019, p. 161; FLOORCASH-SocCit; N=276 (six missing values; for adults with disabilities and small groups one more missing value).

Figure 6.1.5 presents the number of social cash transfer programmes that address the six target categories. Children (and families with children respectively) turn out as the target category that is most frequently addressed: 45% of the social cash transfer programmes

[235] For an early version of the following analysis of target categories, see Weible and Leisering 2019, pp. 161–162.

address this category. By contrast, persons of working age are the category which is least addressed, by 10% of all social cash transfer programmes. This makes sharp differences among the target categories evident: While nearly half of the social cash transfer programmes address children, only one in ten programmes addresses persons of working age. What might account for these big differences? In section 10.3 I discuss the differences in view of public perceptions of *deservingness* ascribed to the different target categories. But there are additional aspects to be mentioned.

As regards the target category of children, children have been referred to as representing "the future" in the global discourses on social cash transfers (Gliszczynski 2015, p. 133). This is important in view of development and progress, since children are at an early stage of their lives where their potential for the future is still to be developed (Gliszczynski 2015, p. 133). Investment in children has been linked to the notion of long-term promotion of human capital and the hope of them being capable to "free themselves from poverty in the future" (Gliszczynski 2015, pp. 115, 38, 42). In fact, two of the five types of social cash transfers, which I reconstructed from the three global typologies of social cash transfers that are relevant to entitlement analysis (see section 2.3.3), target children and families with children respectively: the *conditional cash transfers* and the *family allowances*. Against this backdrop, it seems to make sense that children constitute the major target group of social cash transfer programmes.[236]

Persons of working age are the target category which is least addressed. This may be due to the wide-spread argument that social cash transfers for persons of working age might create "welfare dependency". In South Africa, for example, a country facing a high rate of poverty, fears about creating welfare dependency are still wide-spread (Weible and Leisering 2012, p. 265). Proposals for introducing a youth unemployment grant for persons aged 18-35 was rejected by the South African government, also on that account (Weible and Leisering 2012,

[236] However, we must keep in mind that in particular cases preference was given to the target category of children when assigning the target groups to a particular target category (for the rules of assigning target groups to target categories, see section 4.3). All the target groups that refer to children and another target category at the same time were assigned to (and "counted" as part of) the target category of children, such as that target group of *children/families of widows*, which refer both to the categories of *children* and *small groups* (see Table 6.1.1-1 in Appendix 6.1.1). If different rules of assigning such "combined" target groups had been followed, the number of programmes that address the target category of children might have been lower and the number of programmes that address the other target categories might have been higher.

p. 256). What is more, *public works programmes*, which I do not consider social cash transfer programmes except in case of employment guarantees (see section 3.1.1), are frequently considered alternatives to social cash transfer programmes, at least among development organizations (Gliszczynski 2015, p. 61). In global discourses, persons of working age are widely conceived of as capable and obliged to earn their living from labour. Von Gliszczynski concludes that "the utility of PEPs [Public Employment Programmes; K.W.] for supporting workinge-age poor is practically unquestioned" (Gliszczynski 2015, p. 62).

Older persons and adults with disabilities are addressed by around one third of the social cash transfer programmes (38% and 34% respectively). Regarding older persons, we could expect a big share of programmes to address this target category, since one of the five types reconstructed from the relevant global typologies of social cash transfers is linked to older persons, the so-called *social pensions* (see section 2.3.3). By contrast, the high share of programmes which target adults with disabilities is rather unexpected, since this target category hardly appears in the global typologies of social cash transfers (see section 2.3.1). And it is not even among the alternative policy models which did not make it to the global agendas (Gliszczynski and Leisering 2016, p. 329). The same applies to the target category of small groups, which a remarkable share of 28% of all social cash transfer programmes address. The high share of programmes may be seen as contradictory to the definition of the target category of small groups as a *residual* target category (see section 4.3). What is more, the high number of programmes that address small groups may hint at a *fragmentation* and *particularization* of social cash transfer entitlements in the global South. I revert to this issue below (sections 6.2, 7.2, and 7.5).

One in five programmes (54; 20%) addresses the category of poor people. On the one hand, if we recall the definition of social cash transfers as transfers that address "individuals and households considered poor and/or vulnerable" (section 3.1.1), we may be surprised by the comparably low share of programmes that "simply" address the category of *poor people* as the only category that is non-categorically constructed. On the other hand, the share of 20 percent may seem surprisingly high, if we take into account that the *general household assistance* has been identified as the weakest model of social cash transfers in global discourses (Gliszczynski 2015, pp. 52–60; see section 2.3.1 on von Gliszczynski´s typology of policy models of social cash transfers). The share of programmes that address *poor people* is relevant because it sheds light on a basic feature of social cash transfer entitlements: Evidently, the share of *non-categorical* entitlements to social cash transfers is comparatively small (see section 6.1.2 on the distinction between categorical and non-categorical entitlements). The vast majority of social cash transfer programmes (80%) address only target categories that are *categorically* constructed. This means that entitlements to social cash transfers are vastly categorically constructed. The categorical construction of entitlements implies that entitlements are at the same time categorically limited (see section 6.1.2). The clear dominance of categorical entitlements becomes relevant when we examine the *inclusion* of persons defined as poor and/or vulnerable in the entire national social cash transfer arrangement of the country (section 7.2).

In the following section 6.1.6 I put the spotlight on the target category of poor people.

6.1.6 "Poor people": A neglected but widespread target category

In the preceeding section 6.1.5 we found that one in five (54) social cash transfer programmes address the target category of *poor people*.[237] Who are these "poor people"? Which groups does the target category comprise? The target category of *poor people* turned out to be the most challenging to comprehend. This is contrary to what we may expect of the social cash transfer model of *general household assistance* (see section 2.3.1), which addresses "any household which can be identified as poor, using a means test or a comparable method", "irrespective of household composition" (Gliszczynski 2015, p. 52). The description of the model seems clear and simple.

Only through a systematic mapping of *all* the social cash transfer programmes in each country and through a precise analysis of the *institutional structure of the programmes*, I was able to develop indicators to distinguish different *target groups* within the target category of *poor people* (see section 4.4.2). Table 6.1.6 lists the indicators that I used to classify the target groups within the target category of *poor people* as well as all the subcategories which I identified. The subcategories are grouped by the *targeting approach*, that is the way of how the target groups are selected: whether the programmes adress categorical or non-categorical target groups (see section 6.1.2).

Two of these indicators turned out as indispensable to distinguish programmes that address *all poor people* from programmes that address only *some poor people*, although the data sources are silent about these differences (see section 4.4.2): Whenever "two social cash transfer

[237] For an early version of the analysis of poor people programmes, see Weible and Leisering 2019, 160, 189-192.

programmes that address poor people in the same country" could be identified, I assume that neither of these programmes does address all poor people, but that both address only *some poor people*. And if a programme addresses other target groups than poor people in addition, a programme is supposed to address *all poor people* if "additional target groups are institutionally separated into detached programme components". The distinction between these two target groups within the target category of poor people is essential when assessing the degree of inclusion of the target category of poor people in social cash transfer programmes and in national social cash transfer arrangements (see sections 6.2 and 7.2 resepctively).

Table 6.1.6 Subcategories of *poor people*, by targeting approach, including features used as "indicators" to identify the subcategories

Targeting approach	Sub-category	Features ("indicators")	Countries	Fre-quency
Non-categorical approach	All poor people (any poor individual)	Individually composed[238] transfers to poor households, mostly including to single-person households[239]	Armenia[240], Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan[241]; China, Macau, Taiwan, South Korea; Palestine; Cook Islands	11
	All poor people (any poor household)	Flat rate transfers to poor households, possibly including to single-person households[242]	Brazil[243], Mexico 1*^ Mexico 2*^, ***[244], Chile^, Panama*; Niger*^, Mauritius; Pakistan 1	8
Sub-total	2	2		19
Inconse-quently non-categorical	Some poor people	Two social cash transfer programmes to address poor people in the same country	Malaysia 1^, Malaysia 2^, Zimbabwe 1	3

[238] See section 8.2.2 on the composition of the transfers, as one aspect of the degree of individualization of transfers.

[239] Whether single-person households are part of the target group remains unclear for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan. The programme in Armenia, for example, uses a proxy-means test, which might prevent single-person households from qualifying for the transfers.

[240] The individual composition of the transfer remains incomplete, since supplements are paid for each child only.

[241] Transfers can be refused if there are able-bodied household members. The composition of the household is taken into account, although it remains unclear to what extent.

[242] In Brazil and Chile, single-person households are entitled to the transfers. But this seems less likely for other countries such as Niger.

[243] In 2013 the programme *Bolsa Família* shifted to individual composition of benefits through expanding a component of another social cash transfer programme (*Bono para la Superación de la Extrema Pobreza* - Benefit to overcome extreme poverty, then part of the programme *Brasil Carinhoso*, designed for families with children up to age 6) to any poor household (with and without children).

[244] The two Mexican programmes are designed as consecutive programmes that poor households may apply for. Each is limited in time (see section 9.3).

approach ("blurred targeting")		Social cash transfer programme addresses further target group(s) without institutional separation by different programme components	Trinidad and Tobago, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Venezuela Suriname, Costa Rica, Guyana; Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan 1, Yemen*, Egypt, Tunisia; Benin, Nigeria*; Botswana, Swaziland;	16
		Religious funds, suggesting religiously defined target groups	Jordan 2; Pakistan 2	2
		Proven lack of eligibility criteria	Dominica, Saint Lucia; Jordan 3; Guinea-Bissau; Sri Lanka,	5
Sub-total	1	4		26
Quasi-categorical approach	Labour-restricted poor households	Poor households with *limited* work capacity and high dependency ratios	Uganda**[245], Kenya**[246], Liberia**, Malawi**, Mozambique, Zambia**, Zimbabwe 2*	7
		Poor households *without* work capacity	Ethiopia*^, Rwanda** [247]	2
Sub-total	1	2		9
Total	4	8		54

Source: the author; FLOORCASH-SocCit; N=54; for an early version, see Weible and Leisering 2019, p. 192.

Numbers refer to multiple programmes that adress poor people in some countries.

* The programme is available only in selected geographical areas of the countries (see section 4.4.4 and Appendix 4.4.4).

[245] "The (...) Vulnerable Families Grant (VFG) (...) uses a points-based system to identify vulnerable households. The scoring system is designed to prioritise households with low labour capacity (and high dependency ratios) and households with orphans, people living with disabilities, and the elderly" (Republic of Uganda 2012, p. 31).

[246] One pilot component addresses poor households identified with the help of *community targeting* (see section 4.6.1), one pilot component addresses households with high dependency ratios.

[247] The programme in Egypt, classified under *some poor people* in Table 6.1.6, also addresses poor households without work capacity, but several other target groups in addition, that I why I assigned it to the *inconsequently non-categorical targeting approach.*

** The programmes are pilot programmes (see section 4.4.4 and Appendix 4.4.4).
^ The transfers are paid for a limited period of time (see section 9.3 for details).

The findings presented in Table 6.1.6 bring to light four different subcategories of poor people addressed by social cash transfer programmes: all poor people as individuals, all poor people as households, some poor people, and labour-restricted poor households. This underlines that the target category of poor people does not simply consist of "the poor", but that it takes several shapes. In order to get to know more about the "poor people", I scrutinize the *poor people programmes,* as I call the social cash transfer programmes that address this target category.

First, only one third of the programmes (35%; 19 out of 54) address *all poor people* (as individuals or households), just as the social cash transfer model of *general household assistance* suggests (see section 2.3.1 and further above in this section). These programmes consistently follow the non-categorical targeting approach (see section 6.1.2). They either address poor people as *individuals* with an individually composed volume of the transfer or they address poor *households* with a *flat rate* transfer.[248] It is striking that the programmes with *individually* composed benefits are located in (Western, Central, East) Asian countries with a communist and/or socialist history, with the exceptions of Palestine and the Cook Islands.[249] In the former Soviet Union member states such as Azerbaijan, Georgia and Kazakhstan, the programmes were introduced between 1999 and 2006 (except in Uzbekistan as early as 1994). The programmes in South Korea and China, Taiwain, and Macau were launched between 1997 and 2000 (except in Macau in 2007). The programmes that provide a *flat rate household-related transfer* consist of two clusters. In both clusters are programmes that limit the transfers to a certain period of time. The first cluster consists of the *conditional cash transfer* programmes (CCTs) in Latin America that supplement the flat rate transfer for the household by additional transfers for particular target categories such as children and older

[248] See section 8.2.2 on the composition of the transfers, as one aspect of the degree of individualization of transfers.

[249] As regards the Cook Islands, the ILO Database *Social Security Inquiry* stipulates: "There are very few destitute people in the Cook Islands given the tradition of the extended family providing a social safety network."

persons. Brazil´s *Bolsa Família*, Mexico´s O*portunidades*[250], Chile´s *Chile Solidario*[251], and Panama´s *Red de Oportunidades*, introduced between 2001 and 2006, belong to this cluster. The second cluster of programmes provides transfers that consist of the flat rate household-related transfer only. This second cluster comprises Niger´s *Cash Transfer*, Maurutius´ *Food Aid Scheme*,[252] and Pakistan´s *Benazir Income Support Programme*.[253] These programmes are younger, they were introduced between 2006 and 2011.

Nearly half of the poor people programmes (48%; 26 programmes) address only *some poor people* – findings that are based on the "indicators" listed in Table 6.1.6 (column in the middle). In Jordan we identify even three social cash transfer programmes that address the target category of poor people. For each of the three programmes I have good arguments to make plausible that they evidently address only *some poor people* (rather than all poor people), in each case referring to a different "indicator" to determine the target group.

Most of these programmes (16) address one or more further target group(s), but without separating these target groups out from the target group of "poor people" into detached programme components, as the conditional cash transfer do (see further above in this section). That is why I argue that what the programmes refer to as "poor people" cannot be meant as "all poor people". Examples are Botswana´s *Programme for Destitute Persons* and Trinidad and Tobago´s *Public Assistance*. Five programmes evidently address only some poor people, since they lack clear criteria of eligibility, which is documented in evaluation reports and similar documents. Examples are Saint Lucia´s *Public Assistance* and Guinea-Bissau´s *Protecção social de cidadania.* The *Guzara Allowance* in Pakistan and the *National Zakat Fund* in Jordan are religious funds, and although they are administered by a government

[250] This cluster also comprises Mexico´s *Differentiated support scheme,* to which the beneficiary households of *Oportunidades* are translated after the maximum period of six years. Oportunidades was renamed *Prospera* in 2014 and was finally disbanded in 2019.

[251] *Chile Solidario* stands out from the conditional cash transfer programmes due to its emphasis on psycho-social support of the beneficiaries. Barrientos refers to it as an „integrated poverty reduction programme" (Barrientos 2013a, p. 109). Since 2011, the programme has been gradually replaced by the *Ingreso Ético Familiar*, and was finally disbanded in 2017.

[252] The programme provides a flat rate transfer for the entire household, but it follows a subsidiary approach: Only those are targeted who are not covered by the categorical programmes in the country. This is contrary to the approach followed by the CCTs, which supplement the flat rate household-related transfer by transfers to categorical groups.

[253] In 2012 a child component was added to the *Benazir Income Support Programme* as a pilot programme.

department, eligibility criteria remain unclear. Finally, two programmes that both claim to address “poor people” were identified in Malaysia and Zimbabwe. In each case, I argue that these programmes cannot address *all* poor people, but only some of them, otherwise a second programme would be superfluous. All the programmes that address *some poor people* evidently follow an *inconsequently non-categorical targeting approach*.

Most of the programmes that address *some poor people* (8) are located in countries in or close to the Caribbean Sea (Trinidad and Tobago, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Dominica, Saint Lucia), including Guyana, Venezuela, and Suriname in South America as well as Costa Rica in Central America. The programmes in the four Caribbean island states and in Guyana, which are all English-speaking former British colonies, are all called “public assistance”, introduced several decades ago (in Trinidad and Tobago in 1939; in Saint Lucia in 1967; in Suriname in 1999).[254] They address subgroups of children and adults with disabilities in addition to poor people or they lack clear criteria of eligibility. Evidently, the colonial legacy has coined these social protection programmes until the present day (see Midgley and Piachaud 2011).[255] Three programmes are located in Southern and Eastern Africa. They were introduced between 1985 (in Swaziland) and 2005 (in Zimambwe).[256] Three programmes are located in West African countries (Nigeria, Benin, Guinea-Bissau).[257] The four programmes in the Arab countries in Western Asia (Bahrain, Qatar, Yemen, Jordan) plus Egypt and Tunisia in Northern Africa all address several target groups, in addition to poor people. They mostly address orphans, older people and adults with disabilities as well as divorced, widowed and abandoned women.[258] They were introduced (or entirely reformed) between 1986 and 1996.

The discovery that several poor people programmes address further (categorically constructed) target groups, in addition to poor people, takes us to the combination of target groups - the *target configurations* - of social cash transfer programmes, which I analyse in section 6.4.2.

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[254] Data on the year of introduction of the programme in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is missing.

[255] A programme called “public assistance” is also running in former British Swaziland (now called Eswatini).

[256] The programme in Botswana was introduced in 1980, but reformed in 2002.

[257] The programme in Nigeria was introduced in 2007. Data is missing for the other programmes.

[258] Jordan´s *National Aid Fund* targets 14 different groups in total, including *poor people*. Tunisia´s *Programme national d’Aides aux Familles Nécessiteuses (PNAFN)* addresses five target categories plus different target groups within the category of *poor people* (labour-restricted households and “poor people”).

Nine programmes (17%) address *labour-restricted poor households.* The programmes follow two different targeting approaches to identify their target population. The programmes that address (extremely) *poor households with limited work capacity and high dependency ratios* refer to a fix ratio of dependent household members (children, older persons, disabled persons) to capable adults of working age in the household.[259] Most of these programmes can be traced back to the involvement of a German development consultant, Bernd Schubert, who has - for decades - promoted this programme type particularly for very poor African countries (Schubert 2020; Gliszczynski 2015, pp. 52–60; interview no. 7a, 2012, as listed in FLOORCASH-SocCit version 4 (Leisering and Weible 2020)). Schubert distinguishes between households with a high dependency ratio and households with a low dependency ratio on the one hand, and between moderately poor and extremely poor households on the other hand (Schubert 2020, p. 192). He argues that social cash transfers should target those who are most deprived, the extremely poor households with a high dependency ratio. Two programmes target poor households without any household member able to work. Contrary to the assumptions on the social cash transfer model of *general household assistance*, household composition does matter in the case of *labour-restricted poor households*, since a single household member can make a difference with respect to the qualification for the transfer. Consequently, I argue that both strategies to identify the target populations follow a quasi-categorical approach to selecting beneficiaries. It is remarkable that all programmes that address *labour-restricted poor households* are located in Africa.[260]

When we compare the four types of *poor people programmes* - each with a distinct subcategory of poor people - with the income of a country, two links are remarkable:

First, most programmes that address *all poor people* are located in better-off countries. Programmes that target *any poor individual* are found in the lower and upper-middle-income countries, but also in high-income countries. The flat rate household-related transfer,

[259] To qualify for the entitlements, this ratio is often fixed at 3:1, three household members without labour capacity to one household member with labour capacity (interview no. 7a, 2012, as listed in FLOORCASH-SocCit version 4 (Leisering and Weible 2020)).

[260] Under Uzbekistan´s *Social Assistance,* benefits can be refused if a household member is capable to work. However, we have no information to what extent this discretionary rule is applied in practice.

however, clearly prevails in upper-middle-income countries, although single programmes can be found across the income groups, even in low-income countries (Niger).[261]

Second, the programmes that address *labour-restricted poor households* run in low-income countries (with the exception of Zambia as a lower-middle-income country). This might confirm to some extent the *Middle Africa model* of social cash transfers identified by Niño-Zarazúa and colleagues in low-income countries in Eastern, Central, and West Africa (Niño-Zarazúa et al. 2010; Niño-Zarazúa et al. 2012; see section 2.3.2).

6.2 Who is entitled to what extent? Inclusiveness of programmes

My comparative analysis of entitlements to social cash transfers has so far been limited to examining which of the six target categories are addressed by the programmes. Now I refine the measure, analyzing *to what extent* the programmes across the global South address the six target categories. For this purpose, I develop a particular index, the *inclusion index* (section 6.2.1), which I apply to the dataset FLOORCASH-SocCit (section 6.2.2).

6.2.1 Constructing comparative measures II: The inclusion index

Now I measure *to what extent* the programmes across the global South address the six target categories, again separately by target category. For this purpose, I construct the *inclusion index*. It indicates to what extent a target category is entitled ("included") to social cash transfers. I apply the index both to social cash transfer programmes (programme level, section 6.2) and national social cash transfer arrangements (country level, section 7.2). The index has three components: The social range of the target groups, the age range of the target groups, and the geographical range of the programmes (see section 4.4.5). To calculate the inclusion score of a target category of a social cash transfer programme or of a national social cash transfer arrangement respectively, the subscores of the three indicators are multiplied. For each programme and country, the inclusion score is calculated separately for each target category, disregarding whether the programme and country, respectively, address further target categories. The score of the inclusion index ranges from 0 (no inclusion) to 1 (full inclusion). 0 means that nobody of the target category is entitled to a social cash transfer, 1

[261] The programme in Niger is, however, limited both geographically and as regards the duration of entitlement (see section 9.3).

means that all members of the target category are entitled to a social cash transfer, always presuming that they are classified as poor according to the definition and methods applied by the programme regulations in case that the programme applies a means test (see section 6.1.2). Section 4.4.5 provides the details of the includion index, including the examples of two target categories to make transparent how the scores were calculated.

6.2.2 Who is addressed but not entitled? Exclusion of subcategories from programmes

In section 6.1.5 above, I examine how many programmes address the six target categories. But what does it mean when a target category is "addressed"? Does it mean that all members of the relevant target category are (equally) entitled to a social cash transfer? To find an answer to this question, I use the inclusion index (see section 6.2.1) to examine to what extent the programmes address each of the six target categories. I do this separately per target category.[262]

Table 6.2.2 Global (programme-based) inclusion scores by target categories, based on the analysis of social cash transfer programmes*[263]*

Target category	Inclusion score	n	Missing values
Children	.327	92	33
Persons of working age (without disability)*	.294 [.497]	11 [24]	16 [3]
Older persons	.66	85	20
Adults with disabilities*	.754 [.796]	29 [90]	65 [4]
Small groups	.134	70	6
Poor people	.568	53	1

Source: the author; FLOORCASH-SocCit; for an early version, see Weible and Leisering 2019, p. 168.

Inclusion score: average inclusion score of all social cash transfer programmes in the global South that address the target category (disregarding the inclusiveness of the programme with regard to other categories targeted by the programme)

[262] For an early version of the following analysis of within-category exclusion, see Weible and Leisering 2019, pp. 167–169.

[263] I calculate another global inclusion index, based on the analysis of the national social cash transfer arrangements of countries in section 7.2.4.

Scores: 1=max, 0=min; see section 5.4 on the handling of missing values.
* In brackets: Values for the inclusion index without the dimension of age, since information on age-based requirements was rarely found.

Table 6.2.2 presents the inclusion scores of each target category. We see that all inclusion scores are well below 1, the score which indicates full inclusion of the target categories. Evidently, the target categories are not addressed entirely, but only parts of them. Let us take the example of the target category of children. In section 6.1.5 we learned that children are the category which programmes address most frequently. However, this finding does not tell us anything about the social range of the target groups of children and the extent to which the target category of children - defined as all persons from 0 to including age 17 - are entitled under the programmes on average. The inclusion index facilitates to fill this gap. It indicates the extent of inclusion of each target category in social cash transfer programmes. The inclusion score for the category of children amounts to only 0.327. This suggests that the social cash transfer programmes which address children and families with children in one way or another do not address the entire target category of children (and all families with children respectively), but rather one third of the children and families with children respectively.[264] The programmes leave the remaining members of the target category excluded from (direct) entitlements to social cash transfers.[265] The components of the inclusion index provide the grounds for these exclusions: The programmes limit their target groups either to subcategories of children defined by aspects of vulnerability such as orphans and children with disabilities (see sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2), to children of a certain age, and to children living in particular geographic areas of the countries.

The score for the target category of *small groups* has to be interpreted in a different manner, since the scores are calculated according to a different rule.[266] The finding that the global inclusion score of all social cash transfer programmes for the target category of small groups

[264] The inclusion score does not distinguish between programmes that address children as individuals and programmes that address families (defined as households with children). I analyse the aspect of the unit of interventions and the degree of individualization of social cash transfers in section 8.2.

[265] Direct *entitlements* are different from *benefits* through intra-household redistribution. A person may benefit from a social cash transfer to which another household member is entitled, but this is distinct from entitlement (see section 4.2).

[266] If a programme addresses one small group, its inclusion score for the target category of small groups is 0.1. For each additional small group that the programme addresses, the score increases by 0.1. If a programme addresses four small groups, its inclusion score for the category of small groups is 0.4 (see section 4.4.5).

amounts to 0.134 suggests that on average, programmes do address more than just one small group if they address the category. This may be interpreted as an indicator of *particularization* of entitlements (rather than of exclusion; see section 7.5).

A conspicuous finding is the score of the target category of poor people. The score of 0.568 suggests that, if social cash transfer programmes address the category of poor people, they include only half of this target category, leaving the other half of the people classified as poor excluded. This seems surprising, since the target category of "poor people" has been introduced as a non-categorically constructed category, constructed by referring to financial criteria only and without referring to social, biological or work-related criteria (as done to construct the other target categories; see section 6.1.2). But the unexpectedly low score underlines the findings of section 6.1.6, that most programmes which address poor people do not adress *all* poor people, but only *some* poor people. Moreover, geographical targeting accounts for the reduced inclusion score for the target category of poor people, too.

Again, sharp differences between the target categories become evident. Whereas programmes that address adults with disabilities and older persons include roughly 75 per cent and 66 per cent, respectively, of the target category, programmes that are designed for children and for persons of working age respectively do not even include one third of the respective target category.[267] I revert to these differences in the analysis of inclusion in national social cash transfer arrangements (section 7.2).

6.3 Mapping social cash transfer programmes in view of inclusiveness

How to map single social cash transfer programmes in view of *entitlements*? I suggest, once again, focusing on the *target groups* of the programmes. Each programme may be mapped in view of *inclusiveness*, which is the extent to which the programme addresses ("includes") each of the six target categories (section 6.3.1). The results may be displayed in the *inclusiveness profile* of each social cash transfer programme (section 6.3.2).

[267] If we omit the dimension of age to reduce the number of missing values, the share of persons included raises to 50 per cent for the target category of persons of working age.

6.3.1 Mapping social cash transfer programmes by inclusiveness profiles

To map programmes by inclusiveness, I use the *inclusion index* (see sections 6.2.1 and 4.4.5). For each programme, I calculate the inclusion scores separately per target category. This means that a programme does not have one inclusion score, but *one score per target category*. If a programme does not address a target category at all, the inclusion score of this target category is zero. If a programme addresses all individuals and households respectively of the target category in the country, the inclusion score of the target category is 1 (full inclusion). I first calculate the subscores of the three index components (social range of the target group, age range of the target group, and geographical scope of the programme) and then calculate the final inclusion score of the target category. The subscores are defined in section 4.4.5 above. I illustrate the procedure with the examples of three social cash transfer programmes: Nepal´s *Child Grant*, Bolivia´s *Bono Madre Niña-Niño Juana Azurduy,* and Trinidad and Tobago´s *Public Assistance.*

How inclusive is Nepal´s *Child Grant*? The programme is a nation-wide programme that addresses poor Dalit children from 0 to (including) 5 years.[268] Children are the only target category that the programme addresses. Consequently, we need to calculate the inclusion score of the target category of children only. Table 6.3.1-1 illustrates how the inclusion score is composed.

Table 6.3.1-1 Inclusion score of Nepal´s *Child Grant*

Dimension	Definition of target group	Sub-scores	Inclusion score of the target category of children
Social range	One subcategory (Dalit children)	1*0.1 = 0.1	(0.1*0.33*1) = 0.033
Age range	0 – 5 (6 years)	6/18 = 0.33	
Geographical range	Nationwide	1	

Source: the author; FLOORCASH-SocCit.

The inclusion score of the target category of children of Nepal´s *Child Grant* amounts to only 0.033. This suggests that only a minimum fraction of around 3% of all children in Nepal who

[268] In one region of the country (*Karnali* zone), not only Dalit children, but all children are targeted. However, I do not take account of such local exceptions for the calculation of the inclusion scores.

are classified as poor (that is, who pass the means test) are entitled to the Child Grant.[269] Finally, we can summarize the inclusiveness profile of Nepal´s *Child Grant* in Table 6.3.1-7 below.

How inclusive is Bolivia´s *Bono Madre Niña-Niño Juana Azurduy?* The programme is nation-wide and addresses both children up to 23 months and pregnant women (unless they are covered by a health insurance). Consequently, we need to calculate the inclusion scores of the target categories of *children* and of *small groups*. The Tables 6.3.1-2 and 6.3.1-3 illustrate how the inclusion scores are composed.

Table 6.3.1-2 Inclusion score of the target category of children of Bolivia´s *Bono Madre Niña-Niño Juana Azurduy*

Dimension	Definition of target group	Sub-scores	Inclusion score of the target category of children
Social range	Entire target category	1	(1*0.11*1) = 0.11
Age range	0 – 1 (two years)	2/18 = 0.11	
Geographical range	Nationwide	1	

Source: the author; FLOORCASH-SocCit.

Table 9.1.1-3 Inclusion score of the target category of small groups of Bolivia´s *Bono Madre Niña-Niño Juana Azurduy*

Dimension	Definition of target group	Sub-scores	Inclusion score of the target category of small groups
Social range	One small group (pregnant women)	1 x 0.1 = 1	(0.1*1*1) = 0.1
Age range	[Maximum age coverage]	1	
Geographical range	Nationwide	1	

Source: the author; FLOORCASH-SocCit.

The inclusion score of the target category of children (0.11) suggests that around 11 percent of the children who are not covered by a health insurance are included in the programme. What is more, the inclusion score of the target category of small groups (0.1) suggests that a small range of small groups are also included (namely pregnant women who are not covered

[269] If we take into account that all children are addressed in the Karnali region, the share of children included by the programme might be slightly larger.

by a health insurance). Both inclusion scores shape the *inclusiveness profile* of Bolivia´s *Bono Madre Niña-Niño Juana Azurduy*, depicted in Figure 6.3.2-1 in section 6.3.2 below.

How inclusive is Trinidad and Tobago´s *Public Assistance?* It is a nation-wide programme that addresses persons of at least 18 years of age who have been "certified by a Government Medical Officer as unable to earn a livelihood due to illness" or who have been "found to be living in needy conditions with little or no means of support" (Ministry of the People and Social Development n.d.). Moreover, "Public Assistance may also be granted on behalf of necessitous children where the father (or both parents) is dead, institutionalized, has deserted and cannot be found, also children with special needs (Special Child)" (Ministry of the People and Social Development n.d.). Transferred to my analytical approach based on the six standardized target categories (see section 6.1.3), the programme addresses the target categories of children, adults with disabilites, and poor people. Consequently, we have to calculate the inclusion scores of these three categories in order to assess the inclusiveness of the programme. Tables 6.3.1-4 to 6.3.1-6 illustrate how the inclusion scores are composed.

Table 6.3.1-4 Inclusion score of the target category of children of Trinidad and Tobago´s *Public Assistance*

Dimension	Definition of target group	Sub-scores	Inclusion score of the target category of children
Social range	Four small groups (orphans; children with disabilities; families of prisoners; abandoned children)	4*0.1 = 0.4	(0.4*1*1) = 0.4
Age range	0 – 17 (18 years)	18/18 = 1	
Geographical range	nationwide	1	

Source: the author; FLOORCASH-SocCit.

Table 6.3.1-5 The inclusion score of the target category of adults with disabilities of Trinidad and Tobago´s *Public Assistance*

Dimension	Definition of target group	Sub-scores	Inclusion score of the target category of adults with disabilities
Social range	One subcategory (persons who are ill and thus unable to work for income)	1*0.1 = 0.1	(0.1*1*1) = 0.1
Age range	18-59 (42 years)	42/42= 1	
Geographical range	nationwide	1	

Source: the author; FLOORCASH-SocCit.

Table 6.3.1-6 The inclusion score of the target category of poor people of Trinidad and Tobago´s *Public Assistance*

Dimension	Definition of target group	Sub-scores	Inclusion score of the target category of poor people
Social range	Some poor people[270]	0.5	(0.5*1*1) = 0.5
Age range	[Maximum age coverage]	1	
Geographical range	Nationwide	1	

Source: the author; FLOORCASH-SocCit.

The inclusion score of 0.4 of the category of children suggests that around 40% of the children who are defined as "necessitous" are entitled to Trinidad and Tobago´*Public Assistance*. As regards the target category of adults with disabilities, the inclusion score of 0.1 suggests that roughly 10% of the adults with disabilities are entitled to *Public Assistance* (namely only those adults who have been assessed as chronically ill). And with respect to the category of poor people, the inclusion score of 0.5 suggests that around half of all people who are classified as "found to be living in needy conditions with little or no means of support" are entitled to *Public Assistance*.

The inclusion scores of all target categories form together the inclusiveness profile of Trinidad and Tobago´s *Public Assistance,* depicted in Table 6.3.1-7.

[270] As described above, the programme addresses subcategories of children and a subcategory of adults with disabilities in addition to the target category of poor people. But the additional target groups are not separated into detached programme components. That is why I assume a blurred selection of "poor people" (see section 6.1.6).

Now, as we have calculated the inclusion scores of all target categories of Nepal´s *Child Grant*, Bolivia´s *Bono Madre Niña-Niño Juana Azurduy,* and Trinidad and Tobago´s *Public Assistance*, we may construct the *inclusiveness profiles* of the three social cash transfer programmes, separately by target category (see Table 6.3.1-7).

Table 6.3.1-7 Inclusiveness profiles of three social cash transfer programmes

Social Cash Transfer Programmes	Inclusion scores of the target categories of...					
	children	persons of working age	older persons	adults with disabilities	small groups	poor people
Nepal´s *Child Grant*	0.03	0	0	0	0	0
Bolivia´s *Bono Madre Niña-Niño Juana Azurduy*	0.11	0	0	0	0.1	0
Trinidad and Tobago´s *Public Assistance*	0.4	0	0	0.1	0	0.5

Source: the author; FLOORCASH-SocCit.

I visualize the inclusiveness profiles of the three programmes in the following section 6.3.2.

6.3.2 Inclusiveness profiles of selected social cash transfer programmes

How inclusive are social cash transfer programmes? Based on the mapping approach introduced in the previous section 6.3.1, we may now depict any social cash transfer programme in view of its inclusiveness.

Figure 6.3.2-1 illustrates the inclusiveness profiles of the three social cash transfer programmes explained in the previous section in the form of bar charts. The segments of the bars respresent the target categories of the programmes. The size of the bar segments depicts the inclusiveness (expressed by the inclusion score) and indiciates the extent to which the programmes include each target category. Inclusiveness is depicted on a scale ranging from 0 to 1, separately per target category (see section 4.4.5 on the *inclusion index*).



Figure 6.3.2-1 Inclusiveness profiles of three social cash transfer programmes (illustrating Table 6.3.1-7)

Source: the author; FLOORCASH-SocCit.

Figure 6.3.2-1 underlines that each of the programmes adresses only parts of the target categories. All three programmes address children, but to different degrees and in different ways. Inclusiveness of children ranges from a marginal degree (*Child Grant*, Nepal) to a minimal degree (*Bono Madre Nina-Nino Juana Azurduy*, Bolivia) to a medium degree (*Public Assistance*, Trinidad and Tobago). Whereas the first two programmes are categorical programmes, Trinidad and Tobago´s *Public Assistance* additionally addresses the category of poor people that also comprises children classified as poor (see section 6.1.3).

Comparing the three programmes underlines that we have to scrutinize the entitlements of each social cash transfer programme in order to make assessments on their inclusiveness. If a social cash transfer programme addresses children, this tells little about the extent to which children are entitled to a social cash transfer. The example of Nepal´s *Child Grant* illustrates that the inclusiveness may be very small, although the *Child Grant* is a nationwide programme.

We may now map any social cash transfer programme in view of its inclusiveness by drawing its inclusiveness profile. Figure 6.3.2-2 depicts the inclusiveness profiles of selected social cash transfer programmes as of 2012/13, among them the most famous “flagship” programmes.[271]

[271] Please note that some programmes have undergone changes since 2012/13, such as *Chile Solidario* which has been replaced by *Seguridades y Oportunidades in 2013*, Mexico´s *Oportunidades* (renamed *Prospera* in 2014) which was disbanded in 2019, and Zimbabwe´s *Harmonized Social Cash Transfer Programme* which covered only selected areas by 2012/13, but has reached national scale in the meantime.



Figure 6.3.2-2 Inclusiveness profiles of selcted social cash transfer programmes

Source: the author; FLOORCASH-SocCit; for country codes, see Appendix 5.4.

Figure 6.3.2-2 illustrates the huge diversity of inclusiveness profiles among programmes. Some programmes address only one target category such as Mauritius´ *Food Aid Scheme*, whereas other programmes address five or six categories, such as Jamaica´s *Programme of Advancement through Health and Education (PATH)*. The range of inclusiveness among the programmes is enormous. Whereas Haiti´s pilot programme *Ti Maman Chéri* addresses only some children (children from the first to the sixth form of primary school) in selected areas, Hong Kong´s *Comprehensive Social Security Assistance* is (almost) fully inclusive throughout the life cycle (see also section 7.3.2). The huge diversity among social cash transfer programmes turns out as a challenge when classifying programmes (see next section 6.4).

The inclusiveness profiles have turned out as an appropriate, standardized way of mapping and comparing social cash transfer programmes based on entitlements. It facilitates, for the first time, a precise mapping of any social cash transfer programme in view of the extent to which it addresses each of the six target categories. This analytical approach may also be used to compare different programmes in one country with respect to inclusiveness (see the three programmes in Pakistan in Figure 6.3.2-2, for example).

Moreover, the inclusiveness profiles of single programmes may gain relevance when assessing the contribution of the single programmes to the overall inclusion of the national social cash transfer arrangements of countries (see section 6.4).

6.4 Classifying programmes: Typologies of social cash transfers

The preceeding section 6.3 on the inclusiveness of programmes underlines that social cash transfer programmes are highly diverse. How may the highly diverse social cash transfer programmes be classified? This question takes us to the issue of *typologies* of social cash transfer programmes. In accordance with the focus of this doctoral dissertation, this section is centred on typologies relevant to the study of *entitlements*. So, in what ways are entitlements to social cash transfers in the global South typically combined in the programme designs?

As mentioned in section 2.3 on the state of the art, several scholars have developed typologies of social cash transfer programmes which are similar to each other and which I (re)constructed as the "dominant" typology of social cash transfers (see section 2.3.3). Although these typologies are based on empirical data (of different kind, depending on the typology), none of them is based on a quantitative dataset (see section 2.3.1). This section is dedicated to closing this research gap, in order to test the dominant typology based on the dataset FLOORCASH-SocCit (section 6.4.1). Once more, I develop a methodological approach to mapping programmes in view of entitlements, this time focusing on the combination of target categories (*target configurations*) in order to reduce diversity (section 6.4.2). Based on this mapping approach, I revise and refine the dominant typology, presenting the universe of social cash transfer programmes "in a nutshell" (section 6.4.3). I then create a new classification of all social cash transfer programmes based on the microstructure of entitlements (section 6.4.4).

6.4.1 Challenging dominant typologies

In the state of the art above (section 2.3), I (re)constructed the dominant typology of social cash transfer programmes derived from the three entitlement-based typologies identified in the literature on social cash transfers. According to this dominant typology, the world of social cash transfers seems clearly shaped by the following five types: *conditional cash transfers* for families with children, (non-conditional) *family allowances* for families with children (and children as individuals respectively), (non-conditional) *social pensions* for older persons (and persons with disabilities, orphans, widows respectively), (non-conditional) *general household assistance* for all poor and vulnerable households, including working age poor, and finally, (conditional) *public work programmes* for persons of working age fit for work (see Table 2.3.3 in section 2.3.3). However, there are several issues with this typology.

First, the dominant typology suggests that the number of target groups comprises five groups: (families with) children, persons of working age, older persons (as well as persons with disabilities, orphans, widows), and poor and vulnerable households. However, the analysis of target groups based on FLOORCASH-SocCit (section 6.1.1) revealed a huge variety of target groups which goes well beyond the five groups referred to in the dominant typology (see Appendix 6.1.1). The dominant typology does not refer to many of these target groups. Where do the children of single parents, families of prisoners, and neglected children feature in the typology? What about persons of working age with poor school education? What about older persons who live on their own and about chronically ill adults? Moreover, where do those social cash transfer programmes feature in the typology that address very particular small groups, such as Afghanistan´s *Cash transfer to martyrs´ families* and Azerbaijan´s *Karabakh and Chernobyl benefits*? Evidently, all groups which I assign to the target category of *small groups* do not feature in the dominant typology (possibly with the exceptions of orphans and widows). What about the pregnant women, divorced women, and war veterans - to mention just a few *small groups -,* that are addressed by 20, 10, and 12 programmes respectively (see Table 6.1.1-5 in Appendix 6.1.1)? One in four social cash transfer programme addresses at least one *small group* (see section 6.1.5), but the dominant typology of social cash transfers keeps quiet about most *small groups*. In short, the dominant typology ignores the wide diversity of target groups and also the heterogeneity *within* the target categories.

Second, the dominant typology suggests that each programme type is clearly linked to one target group (and to a few more in the case of social pensions) and that, vice versa, each target group is linked to one particular programme type, with the exception of families with children that both feature in *conditional cash transfers* and in (non-conditional) *family allowances.* These clear links between target groups and programme types give the impression that each social cash transfer programme addresses only one target group and that each target group (with the exception of families with children) is addressed by one only programme type. However, if we look at a few programmes, we instantly realize that the relationship between target group and programme type must be more complex. Let me give a few examples taken from the dataset FLOORCASH-SocCit, which reflects the situation as of 2012/13. Mexico´s famous *Oportunidades* (later renamed *Prospera*), which is consistently classified as a *Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT)* programme in the literature (Barrientos 2013a, p. 121; de la O 2015, for example) does not only target households with children up to 18 (as expected from the model of *CCT*), but also older persons from age 70, and poor households.[272] Egypt´s *Ma'ash al daman/ MOSA Social Solidarity pension* addresses not only persons above age 64, but also orphans, families of prisoners, households with unemployed persons, adults with disabilities, chronically ill heads of households, widows, divorced women, abandoned women, and unmarried women older than 49. Yemen´s *Social Welfare Fund* addresses orphans, older persons, persons with disabilities, divorced women, widows as well as poor people. Finally, Costa Rica´s non-contributory pension *(Régimen No Contributivo de Pensiones por Monto Básico)* addresses not only older persons from age 65 (as expected from the model of *social pensions*), but also adults with disabilities, orphans, as well as widows aged 55-65 with children younger than 18 or, if the children are students, younger than 21. These examples suggest that social cash transfer programmes may have (much) more than just

[272] The *proxy means test* to determine whether households are classified as *poor* takes some categorical features into account, such as the number of women between 15 and 49 in the household and the ratio between the number of household members younger than 16 and older than 64 and the number of household members between age 16 and 64.

one single target group. The examples furthermore suggest that a particular target group is not "naturally" linked to a particular programme type. As a consequence, assigning programmes with all their target groups to a particular programme type may not be as straightforward as the dominant typology suggests.

Third, the dominant typology suggests that behavioural conditions in social cash transfer entitlements are uniform across a programme type. However, the analysis of behavioural conditions above (section 8.3) reveals differences between the target categories, sometimes even under one and the same social cash transfer programme. This puts into question the assumption that the issue of behavioural conditions clearly depends on the programme type.

All these observations underline that it makes sense to put the dominant typology to a test based on a quantitative dataset. This has not been done before (see Table 2.3.1 in section 2.3.1). I consider the dominant typology as empirically confirmed if each social cash transfer programme can be assigned to one of the five programme types of the dominant typology.

But how to assign the empricial social cash transfer programmes to the five programme types? The previous explorations suggest that assigning all 282 social cash transfer programmes (the sample of FLOORCASH-SocCit; see section 5.1) to the five programme types might not be as straightforward as the dominant typology makes us believe. In some cases, assigning a programme to a programme type seems self-evident. To give an example, Botswana´s *Old age pension* suggests entitlements of older persons, and in deed, the programmes provides social cash transfers to older persons from age 65. In many other cases, assigning programmes to programme types cannot be simply done by relying on the name of the programme. Trinidad and Tobago´s *Public Assistance* targets several categories (see sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2). In other cases, the name of the programme is contra-intuitive and might be misleading when classifying the programmes. To give an example, Fiji´s *Family Assistance Programme* does neither target families with children nor households in general (as "family" and "household" might be used as synonyms); instead, they target older persons, adults with disabilities as well as divorced women, widows and dependents of prisoners.[273] That is why I argue that assigning social cash transfer programmes to programme types

[273] Similar difficulties arise when we try to classify programmes by behavioural conditions, simply based on the name of the programmes. Contrary to what we may expect, Tajikistan´s *Cash Transfers for Education/Cash compensation benefits* is non-conditional and Swaziland´s *Pilot cash transfer scheme for OVC* is conditional.

requires a particular methodological approach, which I introduce in the subsequent section 6.4.2.

6.4.2 Mapping social cash transfer programmes by target configurations

How to map social cash transfer programmes from an entitlement perspective in order to group the programmes by types? While the analytical approach to mapping social cash transfer programmes by inclusiveness (*inclusiveness profiles,* introduced in section 6.3) seems appropriate to reveal the immense variety of programmes, the outcome is too diverse to facilitate assigning the programmes to groups of programmes. Yet I argue that the *combinations* of target groups in the programme design are key to comprehend the maze of social cash transfer programmes. But the combinations of target groups in the design of programmes has not played a part in comparative analysis of social cash transfers so far and has not been studied based on large n data yet. To close this research gap, I develop a new parameter: the configuration of target categories of programmes or short, the *target configurations*. This way of precisely mapping social cash transfer programmes makes it possible to assign programmes to programme types in a consistent and transparent manner.

The target configuration of each social cash transfer programme can be displayed either as a combination of acronyms of the target categories of a programme (right hand column in Table 6.4.2) or as a fully computable code of six digits, the *target code* (penultimate column from the left in Table 6.4.2). Each digit represents one of the six target categories in the following order: children – persons of working age – older persons – adults with disabilities – small groups – poor people. All target categories that a programme addresses are marked by "1". The remaining target categories which are not addressed by the programme are marked by "0". The target configurations may be refined by the social range of the target groups, to distinguish target groups that cover the target categories entirely from target groups that represent only a subcategory of the target category (see section 4.4.1 on the social range; see Appendix 6.4.2 for examples). Table 6.4.2 depicts the target configurations of the three social cash transfer programmes presented above in the sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2.

Table 6.4.2 Mapping social cash transfer programmes by target configuration

Social cash transfer programmes	Target categories						Target code	Target configuration
	Children	Persons of working age	Older persons	Adults with disabilities	Small groups	Poor people		
Nepal´s *Child Grant*	1	0	0	0	0	0	100000	C
Bolivia´s *Bono Madre Niña-Niño Juana Azurduy*	1	0	0	0	1	0	100010	C-SG
Trinidad and Tobago´s *Public Assistance*	1	0	0	1	0	1	100101	C-D-PP

Source: the author; FLOORCASH-SocCit.

Appendix 6.4.2 shows the target configurations of all social cash transfer programmes. The programmes are clustered by target category (see also section 6.4.4).

With the help of the new parameter of the target configuration, I both test the dominant typology of social cash transfer programmes (subsequent section 6.4.3) and develop a new classification of social cash transfer programmes based on the quantitative dataset FLOORCASH-SocCit (section 6.4.4).

6.4.3 Revising the dominant typology: The universe of social cash transfer programmes in a nutshell

To what extent may the "dominant" typology of social cash transfers be reproduced and confirmed based on a large N analysis of all identifiable social cash transfer programmes across the global South?[274] What I refer to as the "dominant typology" is what the three typologies of social cash transfers relevant to the study of entitlements share: the five types of *conditional cash transfers*, *family allowances*, *social pensions, general household assistance,* and *public work programmes* (see section 2.3.3).[275] In order to test the dominant typology of social cash transfer programmes based on the dataset FLOORCASH-SocCit, I take the same two parameters that feature in the dominant typology - target group and behavioural conditions -, but I modify the parameter of the target group. Whereas the authors of the original typologies use a single target group to construct each of the programme types, I use the indicator of the *target configuration* (see previous section 6.4.2). The target configuration makes it possible to depict the entitlements of the six target categories under a programme precisely. I argue that the target configurations are essential to reconstruct programme types. Moreover, I argue that the target configuration is more important to classify programmes than the issue of conditionality of transfers (see also my discussion in section 6.5). That is why I take the target configuration of a programme as the starting point for the classification of the social cash transfer programmes (see the rules below). If it is possible to assign all empirical social cash transfer programmes to one of the five programme types of the dominant typology, the dominant typology of social cash transfers can be considered as verified.

How to assign programmes to the five dominant programme types? I develop the following rules that guide the way of assigning programmes to programme types in a transparent way.

1.) Any programme that addresses the target category of poor people is assigned to the non-categorically constructed type of *cash transfers for ′poor people′*, regardless of behavioural conditions. This implies a strict separation between categorically and non-categorically constructed programme types (see section 6.1.2 on the distinction between categorical and non-categorical entitlements).

2.) If a programme targets several groups, those target groups that address entire target categories are of prime importance (rather than target groups that address only subcategories).

3.) Any programme that addresses the *entire* category of children (but that does not address poor people, see rule 1) is assigned to the child-centred types (either

[274] For an early version of the following revision of extant typologies based on FLOORCASH-SocCit, see Weible and Leisering 2019, pp. 175–180.

[275] The dominant typology is based on Leisering 2008, 2009; Leisering et al. 2006, Gliszczynski 2013, 2015, Grosh et al. 2008.

conditional cash transfers or *family allowances*) in order to clearly distinguish them from social pensions.

4.) Any programme that addresses children and that is conditional (but that does not address poor people, see rule 1) is assigned to the type of *conditional cash transfers*, no matter whether it addresses a subcategory or the entire category of children.

Now, following these rules, may we assign all 282 social cash transfer programmes to one of the five programme types? Table 6.4.3 shows the result of the classification.

Table 6.4.3 Revising the dominant typology: classifying social cash transfer programmes by target configurations and conditionality

Child/family transfers		Cash transfers related to **work** (or employability, education, vocational training) (conditional, with 6 exceptions) N=17[1] [2]	**Social pensions** (non-conditional, with 1 exception) N=77[1] [2]	Cash transfers related to **disability** (non-conditional) N=22[1] [2]	Cash transfers related to **small groups** (non-conditional, with 1 exception) N=22	Cash transfers for **'poor people'** (non-categorical programmes, partly with categorical elements) (non-conditional, with 10 exceptions) N=54
Conditional cash transfers (CCT) (behavioural conditions for children; partly non-conditional for further target categories) N=53	**Family allowances** (non-conditional) N=27[1]					
Simple CCT: *all C or subcategories of C* (31) [South Africa's Child Support Grant] **Early care CCT:** *all C + pregnant women* (8) [Honduras' Bono 10.000 Educación, Salud y Nutrición] **Comprehensive CCT:** *all C or subcategories of C + OA and/or D (+ small groups)* (13; incl. 9 non-conditional for OA/D/small groups)	**Simple child transfers:** *all C or subcategories of C* (26) [Mongolia's Child Money Programme] **Extended child transfer:** *all C + disabled children + disabled adults* (1) [Kyrgyzstan's Unified Monthly	**Simple transfers:** *WA only* (12; incl. 6 non-conditional) [India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS)] **Particular groups:** *young people (C + WA)* (2)*, subcategories of WA + subcategories of D* (3) [Colombia's	**Old age pensions:** *OA only* (39; incl. 1 conditional) [Bolivia's Renta Dignidad] **Extended old age pensions:** *OA + D or subcategories of C or small groups* (38) [Brazil's Benefícios de Prestação Continuada (BPC)]	**Disability pensions:** *D only* (15) [Namibia's Disability Grants] **Extended disability pensions:** *D (+ subcategories of C) + small groups* (7) [Mauritius' Social Aid Scheme]	**Re-compensation and particular support:** *small groups (war veterans, 'martyrs', pregnant women etc.)* (21; incl. 1 conditional) [Vietnam's War invalids' and contributors' social assistance] **Survivors' pensions:**	**General household assistance:** *all PP (+ supplements for C and for OA or for D)* (19; incl. 5 conditional for all categories, 1 conditional for C only) [China's Di Bao; Brazil's Bolsa Família] **Quasi-categorical:** *labour-restricted ultra PP households* (9) [Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Programme] **Selective household assistance:** *'some PP' (+ D + subcategories of C or small*

<table>
<tr>
<td rowspan="3">[Ecuador’s Bono de Desarollo Humano]

Inclusive CCT: all C + WA + OA + D + pregnant/ breastfeeding women
(1)
[Jamaica’s PATH]</td>
<td rowspan="2">Benefit Programme]</td>
<td>Jóvenes en Acción]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>orphans + widows (1)
[Bahamas’ Survivors’ Assistance]</td>
<td rowspan="3">groups) (14; incl. 1 conditional for C)
[Sri Lanka’s Samurdhi Relief Programme]

Categorically dominated combined programmes: PP + subcategories of C or all C + OA + D (+ small groups and WA) (12; incl. 2 conditional for C/WA; 1 conditional for all categories)
[Jordan’s National Aid Fund]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="3">Unemployment protection and disability pension combined: all WA or subcategories of WA + D (+ OA or subcategories of C) (2; incl. 1 non-conditional; for the other, data on conditionality is missing)
[Liberia’s Social Assistance]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="4">Inclusive categorical programme (non-conditional): all C + WA + OA + D (1)
[Hong Kong’s Comprhensive Social Security Assistance]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</table>



C: Children WA: Persons of working age OA: Older persons D: Adults with disabilities PP: Poor people

Numbers denote the number of programmes of the respective subtype; examples in brackets.

(1) plus one programme that combines family support, unemployment protection, a social pension and a disability pension (see bottom of the columns)

(2) plus two programmes that combine unemployment protection and a disability pension (see bottom of the columns)

Sample: all social cash transfer programmes in the global South in FLOORCASH-SocCit (N=275; data for seven programmes is missing).

Source: the author; FLOORCASH-SocCit; for an early version, see Weible and Leisering (2019, pp. 176–177).[276]

[276] I am indebted to Lutz Leisering for the idea of separating *cash transfers related to disability* and *cash transfers related to small groups* out into separate columns of the Table.

Table 6.4.3 illustrates how the 282 social cash transfer programmes as of 2012/13 may be classified according to the dominant typology (re)constructed from Leisering 2008, 2009; Leisering et al. 2006, Gliszczynski 2013, 2015, Grosh et al. 2008 (see section 2.3.3). I refer to the result of this classification as the “revised typology” (as opposed to the “dominant typology”).

First of all, five columns of the Table basically correspond to the five programme types of the dominant typology: the programme types of *conditional cash transfers*, *family allowances*, and *social pensions* figure both in the dominant and in the revised typology; *cash transfers related to work* (third column from the left) corresponds to *public work programmes* of the dominant typology; and *cash transfers for poor people* (outer right column) corresponds to the *general household assistance* of the dominant typology. However, two further columns (second and third column respectively from the right) establish two additional programme types: the *cash transfers related to disability*, and the *cash transfers related to small groups*.

The precise mapping of target configurations offers several new insights, including in view of the five types of the dominant typology. Each of the types in Table 6.4.3 is subdivided into between two to four subtypes. The subtypes reveal a huge variety of target configurations in social cash transfer programmes. This contrasts with what the dominant typology suggests. The subtypes increase the complexity of the typology remarkably.

Above all, the type of *conditional cash transfers* (CCT) of the dominant typology is more complex and more heterogeneous than the dominant typology suggests. CCTs are transfers that make payments conditional upon certain behavioural requirements, such as regular health checks and children´s regular school attendance (for an overview, see Britto 2010; de la O 2015; see section 2.3.1). In the literature, *conditional cash transfers* are usually described as transfers that address families with children (see section 2.3). The precise mapping of target configurations reveals, however, that many of these programmes address further target groups, in addition to children. And it also reveals that these programmes impose behavioural conditions on children, but not necessarily on other target groups of the programmes. Consequently, in order to map programmes consistently, the type of *conditional cash transfers* in the revised typology is limited to those transfers that address *children* and that impose behavioural conditions on *children* (but not necessarily on other target groups of the programmes). However, it does not include all those programmes that address the target category of “poor people” (instead of or in addition to the category of children) and that also impose behavioural conditions (on children and sometimes on further target groups). These conditional *poor people programmes* are commonly classified as CCTs, too. But in the revised typology they figure as part of the non-categorical type of *cash transfers for poor people* because the revised typology strictly distinguishes programmes that address the target category of poor people (non-categorical targeting approach) from programmes that do not address this target category (categorical targeting approach; see rule 1 above on assigning programmes to types; see section 6.1.3 on the targeting approaches). I argue that the target groups, the target configurations, and the targeting approaches are the crucial aspects which determine the type in the first place, and the issue of behavioural conditions follows in the second place (see my discussion in section 6.5). Consequently, the programmes with behavioural conditions are split up between the type of *conditional cash transfers* (CCT) and the type of *cash transfers for poor people* (in addition to the type of *cash transfers related to work*, see below). To give an example, Brazil´s famous *Bolsa Família*, commonly classified as a CCT, requires children to attend school regularly, it requires children to be vaccinated against certain diseases, and it requires children, pregnant women and breastfeeding mothers to attend regular health check-ups. But the programme addresses not only families with children, but also the target category of poor people. Consequently and following rule 1 above, I classify *Bolsa Família* as a *poor people programme* (rather than as a CCT).

As Table 6.4.3 (first column from the left) shows, the programme type of *conditional cash transfers* in the revised typology comprises four subtypes, each with particular target configurations. The subtypes consist of the *simple CCT* which addresses children only and which is the most frequent subtype of CCTs; the *early care CCT* which addresses children and pregnant women; the *comprehensive CCT* which addresses children and older persons and/or adults with disabilities; and finally, the *inclusive CCT* which covers all life cycle categories including adults with disabilities and which comprises a single programme only (Jamaica´s *PATH*).

The figures in Table 6.4.3 demonstrate that the family-related *conditional cash transfers*, on which much of academic and political debates focus, account for only 19% of all programmes (53 out of 275).[277] This is much less than what the widespread emphasis on CCT in the literature suggests.

In contrast to the type of c*onditional cash transfers*, the non-conditional *family allowances* is a homogeneous type (second column from the left in Table 6.4.3). It basically consists of the

[277] Even if we add the 10 conditional *poor people programmes*, the share amounts to 23% only. For the share of all programmes that apply behavioural conditions see section 8.1.

simple child transfers that address children only (the entire category and subcategories of children respectively), with one exception (the subtype of *extended child transfers*).

The programme type of *cash transfers related to work, employability, education, and vocational training* provides evidence that social cash transfers that address persons of working age comprise several variants (third column from the left in Table 6.4.3). The revised typology distinguishes the most frequent subtype of *simple transfers* which addresses persons of working age only from a less frequent subtype that addresses *particular groups* of persons of working age as well as of other target categories. As regards the subtype of the *simple transfers*, the aspect of behavioural conditions is helpful to distinguish another two variants: the conditional variant of *cash for work* and the non-conditional variant of *unemployment benefits*[278] (not displayed in Table 6.4.3; but see Appendix 6.4.2). *Cash for work* programmes (or *public employment programmes*) are commonly understood as "fixed-term programmes for the construction of public infrastructure through low-wage labour" (Gliszczynski 2015, p. 61), that is participants receive cash in exchange for work in short-term projects.[279] Whereas c*ash for work* is mainly prevalent in the global South,[280] non-conditional *unemployment benefits* have constituted an important part of social assistance in some of the European welfare states for decades (see Bahle et al. 2011, pp. 193–214, for example). This example underlines that in the global South, both *classical* interventions of welfare states and *new* forms as Southern (re)inventions and adaptations of social assistance can be found.[281]

[278] I do not assess the obligations to register with the unemployment agency and to search for employment as a behavioural condition (see section 4.6.3).

[279] Only those cash for work programmes are included in the sample of FLOORCASH-SocCit which guarantee a transfer even if no work can be offered in due time, such as in India´s *NREGS* (see section 3.1.1).

[280] Historically, however, the requirement to work in order to receive social assistance was a Northern tradition dominant in the 19th century. According to the British New Poor Law of 1834, "the poor" received benefits only on the condition of their internment in the workhouse (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S55; Marshall 1950, p. 24, for example).

[281] Although the *unemployment benefits* and the *cash for work* programmes are very few in number with two and five programmes respectively across the South, the findings might suggest that it is a privilege of richer countries to provide unemployed persons of working age with social cash transfers – unless the recipients work for the money. Appendix 6.4.2 shows that *non-conditional unemployment benefits* are mainly offered in high-income countries and are absent in low-income countries. The *"Non-conditional" transfer for temporary unability to work* is paid in a high-income country, too (Singapore). Interestingly, almost all the programmes belonging to the type *conditional training for particular groups* are located in upper-middle-income countries. By contrast,

The programme type of *social pensions* (fourth column from the left in Table 6.4.3) comprises the subtypes of *old age pensions* and *extended old age pensions*. The latter addresses adults with disabilities or subcategories of children or small groups in addition to older persons. This programme type is comparably homogenous and therefore close to what the dominant typology suggests.

However, there is an additional, new programme type which is similar to the *social pensions*, but which has been ignored by the dominant typology: the *cash transfers related to disability* (third column from the right). Most notably, *disability pensions* do not constutite a type of its own in the dominant typology, but are merely a supplement to the type of *social pension*. Like the social pension, the programme type of *cash transfers related to disability* comprises two subtypes, the pure *disability pensions* and the *extended disability pensions*.

The revised typology establishes another additional programme type: *cash transfers related to small groups* (second column from the right). It comprises *recompension and particular support* which addresses small groups such as war veterans and pregnant women as well as a *survivors´ pension*. Most target groups of this type do not feature in the dominant typology of social cash transfer programmes.

Contrary to what the type of *general household assistance* of the dominant typology suggests, *cash transfers for poor people* do not address "all poor and vulnerable households". Instead, the revised typology identifies different subtypes of *cash transfers for poor people* (or *poor people programmes*, see section 6.1.6; first column from the right in Table 6.4.3). They correspond to the subcategories of poor people identified in section 6.1.6: the subtype of *general household assistance* addresses "all poor people"; the subtype of *quasi-categorical programmes* addresses "labour-restricted poor households"; and the subtypes of *selective household assistance* and *categorically dominated combined programmes* both target "some poor people" (and the subtype of *categorically dominated combined programmes* additionally at least three life cycle categories including adults with disabilities). The subtypes underline that poor people programmes do not simply target a homogenous mass of "(all) the poor" in a uniform way, but that they define and target "poor people" in different ways (by non-

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both *cash for work* programmes are located in low-income and lower-middle-income countries, respectively (Bangladesh and India).

categorical targeting, quasi-categorical targeting, and blurred targeting respectively; see first column from the left in Table 6.1.6).[282]

Apart from all the programmes assigned to one of the seven main programme types, we identify two subtypes in the revised typology that do not really fit in the dominant typology (at the bottom centre in Table 6.4.3): the *unemployment protection and disability pension combined* that comprises two programmes including Liberia's *Social Assistance,* and one *(non-conditional) inclusive categorical programme,* namely Hong Kong's *Comprehensive Social Security Assistance.* I argue that these programmes constitute *hybrid* types.

With respect to the prevalence of the programme types, the figures confirm that the most frequent types are also the most famous types. Among the most frequent programme types are the *social pensions* (77 programmes) and the *conditional cash transfers* (53 programmes). But there is one exception: The prevalence of *cash transfers for poor people* amounting to 54 programmes – one more than *conditional cash transfers* - is most unexpected, since the *general household assistance* has played a marginal role in global discourses around social cash transfers (Gliszczynski 2015, pp. 52–60). I discuss this finding in section 6.5.

Perhaps suprisingly, the revised typology confirms a stable link between the programme types and conditionality. I do not so much refer to the clear distinction between "conditional" and "non-conditional" transfers among the transfers that address children, since this separation is a result of rule 4 of how to assign programmes, presented above in this section. I rather refer to the other programme types. Despite a few exceptions, most *cash transfers related to work* apply behavioural conditions, whereas *social pensions*, *cash transfers related to disability,* and *cash transfers related to small groups* and even most of the *cash transfers for poor people* do not apply behavioural conditions. It is remarkable, however, that the exceptions are frequently limited to *particular* target groups of the programmes. If *poor people programmes* impose behavioural conditions, they partly impose them on children and/or on persons of working age only; and *conditional cash transfers* often exempt target groups other than children from the behavioural conditions (see Table 6.4.3). This suggests that conditionality may often be linked to the target groups of programmes. I revert to this issue in section 8.3.

[282] For further explanations on the different targeting approaches, see section 6.1.6.

I conclude that the dominant typology can be partially confirmed when being tested based on the dataset FLOORCASH-SocCit. However, this assessment requires important qualifications.

First, the dominant typology mirrors only parts of the world of social cash transfers. Most importantly, social cash transfer programmes with smaller target groups and many of those that address adults with disabilites are ignored by the dominant typology. The types of *cash transfers related to disability* and *cash transfers related to small groups* do not figure in the dominant typology. These omissions constitute gaps in the dominant typology.

Second, the test reveals that the five types of the dominant typology are highly stylized abstractions. They oversimplify the heterogeneous and complex world of social cash transfer programmes to a considerable extent. Above all, the *conditional cash transfers* and the *general household assistance* of the dominant typology turned out as much more complex than what the dominant typology suggests. A large number of programmes assigned to the types do not address a single target category (as the dominant typology suggest), but addresses a number of different groups, which is reflected in distinct target configurations. These target configurations constitute frequent patterns, so that they can be classified as subtypes. The subtypes have been unknown specifications so far, which add valuable knowledge of the world of social cash transfers.

6.4.4 A new classification of social cash transfer programmes by the microstructure of entitlements

How to classify social cash transfer programmes in view of social citizenship? Whereas the revised typology of social cash transfer programmes (in the preceeding section 6.4.3) is based on the parameters of target configurations and conditionality, I claim that a different classification is possible which is closer to the core of social citizenship. For this purpose, I develop a classification of social cash transfer programmes with a focus on the social citizenship dimension of *inclusion*. Based on the parameters of *targeting approach* and *scope (inclusiveness),* I classify all 282 social cash transfer programmes as of 2012/13. I argue that this classification of social cash transfer programmes reconstructs both the way of *how* the programmes approach and define their target populations (targeting approach; see section 6.1.3) and the *extent* to which the programmes contribute to the inclusion of all citizens in a country defined as poor (inclusiveness; country approach, see section 4.5 and Chapter 7). The dimension of *inclusiveness* including the view on *all* target categories is a new aspect in classifying social cash transfer programmes.[283] So, this classification assesses single social cash transfer programmes in view of their contribution to social citizenship for all the citizens of a country (country approach; see section 4.5).

In a first step, the social cash transfer programmes are classified according to their targeting approach (see section 6.1.3). Depending on whether they address categorically constructed target groups only or non-categorically constructed groups (possibly in addition to categorical groups), they are classified either as *categorical programmes* or as *poor people programmes*.[284] In a second step, the classification is refined by the scope (inclusiveness) of the programmes. I measure the inclusiveness on a crude scale, ranging from “all-embracing” inclusiveness (if a programme addresses all target categories entirely, that is all citizens if classified as poor), to “selective” (if a programme addresses one or more target categories entirely), and finally to “minimal” (if programme addresses one or more subcategories). So, unlike in the classification of countries further below in which inclusiveness is measured precisely by the *inclusion index* (sections 7.3 and 7.4), here inclusiveness is limited to the number of target categories addressed and to the social range of the target groups (see section 4.4.1 on the social range). Table 6.4.4 presents the classification of social cash transfer programmes by targeting approach and scope.

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[283] But see the dimension of scope/extent in the typologies of “minimum income protection schemes” (national social cash transfer arrangements) of European welfare states (Bahle et al. 2011; Eardley et al. 1996a; Gough 2001; for an overview see Bahle et al. 2011, pp. 223–224).

[284] For a classification of poor people programmes by subcategories see section 6.1.6.

Table 6.4.4 Classification of social cash transfer programmes by targeting approach and scope

Scope (inclusiveness)	Targeting approach		
	Poor people programmes (N=54)		Categorical programmes (N=221) that address
	Non-categorical programmes	Combined programmes	• (Families with) children • Persons of working age • Older persons • Adults with disabilities • Small groups
All-embracing (N=21)	´All poor people´ programmes (n= 15)	´All poor people plus categories´ programmes (n=4)	´All categories entirely´ programmes (n=2)
Selective (N=186)	´Some poor people´ programmes (n=16)	´Some poor people plus categories´ programmes (n=19)	´Several categories entirely´ programmes (n=60) ´Single category entirely´ programmes (n=91)
Minimal (N=68)	-	-	´Within-category selective´ programmes (n=68)

Source: the author; FLOORCASH-SocCit; N=275; data on seven programmes is missing.

Table 6.4.4 identifies eight types of social cash transfer programmes that are distinct in terms of targeting approach and scope.

As regards the targeting approach, the Table indicates again (as in section 6.1.5) that four out of five social cash transfer programmes (80.4%; 221) are *categorical* programmes. This high share confirms earlier findings by Garcia and Moore on Sub-Saharan Africa (Garcia and Moore 2012, p. 63).[285]

The *poor people programmes* comprise the *non-categorical* programmes and the *combined programmes*. Depending on how *non-categorical* programmes define their target population and depending on their institutional structure, *non-categorical* programmes are either classified as *′all poor people′ programmes* or as *′some poor people′ programmes* (see section 6.1.6 for details). 23 programmes (8.4%) are *combined programmes* (*′All poor people plus categories′ programmes* and *′Some poor people plus categories′ Programmes*). They combine both the categorical and the non-categorical targeting approach, that is they both address the category of poor people and at least another target category. This underlines how complex target configurations are.

While in the revised typology by target configuration and conditionality (section 6.4.3), the *poor people programmes* figure as the second largest programme type (in terms of the number of programmes), this classification reveals clearly that the *poor people programmes* are yet a minority in the world of social cash transfers.

With respect to the *inclusiveness* of programmes, the classification reveals that the difference in inclusiveness is immense. At one extreme, we find the programmes of *all-embracing* inclusiveness that cover all target categories of a country in a single social cash transfer programme.[286] At the other extreme, we find the programmes of *minimal* inclusiveness, classified under the programme type of *within-category selective programmes* that address

[285] Garcia and Moore found that between 65% and 96% of the programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa use categorical targeting, depending on the country income group including a group of fragile states (Garcia and Moore 2012, p. 63). They distinguish the *poverty focused approach,* in which programmes apply a means test, from a *vulnerability focused approach,* in which programmes use categorical targeting (Garcia and Moore 2012, pp. 62–65). Dodolova and colleagues find that only 66% of the social cash transfer programmes in developing countries use categorical targeting (Dodlova et al. 2018, p. 55), but it is difficult to compare their analysis to my own study (see section 2.5.2).

[286] I recall that the programmes may, however, apply further restrictions in terms of the age range of the target groups, the geographical range of the programmes, and a means test (if any), since the inclusiveness here only takes the number of target categories addressed and the social range of the target groups into account.

only a minimal fraction of the population classified as poor and/or vulnerable. One quarter of all programmes (25%; 68) are assigned to this type, that is these programmes are minimally inclusive. This finding confirms that a considerable part of the social cash transfer programmes are selective, since they address the target categories only partially (see section 6.2.2). The finding underlines that each programme should be carefully assessed.

The distribution of programmes across the types confirms several findings of the analyses in the preceeding sections. The vast majority of social cash transfer programmes (79.6%; 219) are *categorical* programmes of *selective* and *minimal* inclusiveness respectively (the programme types of *´several categories entirely´ programmes*, *´single category entirely´ programmes*, and *´within-category selective´ programmes*). Again, this supports the findings that entitlements to social cash transfers are vastly categorically constructed (see section 6.1.5) and that the average degree of inclusion of all target categories is far from full inclusion (see section 6.2.2). So, the new classification of social cash transfers helps to explain the selectiveness of entitlements in that it demonstrates that most programmes are categorically constructed and are of selective and minimal inclusiveness respectively.

The value of the typology consists in that the distribution of programmes is unexpected in two respects:

First, we might expect that poor people programmes address “the poor” in a country. However, Table 6.4.4 demonstrates that two thirds (65%; 35) of the poor people programmes are classified as *´some poor people´ programmes* and as *´some poor people plus categories´ programmes* respectively. They do not address “the poor” in the sense of “all poor people”, but only some of them.

Second, we might expect that categorical programmes are limited in inclusiveness, since they can be assumed to address only particular categories. Indeed, the Table shows that nearly all categorical programmes are of selective and minimal inclusiveness respectively (*´several categories entirely´ programmes*, *´single category entirely´ programmes*, and *´within-category selective´ programmes)*. However, there are two exceptions: Two *´all categories entirely´ programmes* (Jamaica, Hong Kong[287]) address all target categories entirely. These two examples prove empirically that programmes that follow categorical targeting approaches are not necessarily of limited inclusiveness.

[287] The inclusion score of the category of children of Hong Kong´s *Comprehensive Social Security Assistance* is slightly less than 1, since persons from age 15 are considered as parts of the workforce (see section 7.4).

The observations suggest that the link between targeting approach and inclusiveness of social cash transfer programmes is less clear than expected. Evidently, non-categorical programmes are not necessarily all-embracing and, in turn, categorical programmes may be all-embracing (although such programmes are admittedly a minority).

Table 6.4.4 is the result of an extensive process of manually clustering social cash transfer programmes by target configurations, refined by the social range of the target groups.[288] In Appendix 6.4.2 all social cash transfer programmes are mapped by target configurations and behavioural conditions. Information on behavioural conditions is added, mainly in order to facilitate comparing the target configurations with the typologies referred to above (section 6.4.3). The countries where the programmes are located are indicated, too.

Appendix 6.4.2. reveals a huge variety of target configurations. It makes clear how complex the world of social cash transfer programmes is. Evidently, entitlements to social cash cash transfer are constructed in plenty of ways. The programmes differ, but they hardly differ in systematic ways. This makes simple classifications very challenging.[289]

6.5 Discussion and interim conclusion: Distinct patterns of social cash transfers within the bewildering variety of target groups and programmes

What can we conclude from the findings on the scope of social cash transfer programmes? Who is entitled to social cash transfers in the global South?

First, social cash transfers do not simply address "the poor", but an unexpectedly wide range of diverse social groups. The 103 different groups identified across the global South outnumber by far the comparably few groups mentioned in the scant literature on target groups of social cash transfers and on types of social cash transfer programmes (see sections 2.2.1 and 2.3). When clustering the high number of target groups into *target categories*, we find that all life cycle categories (children, persons of working age, older persons) and adults

[288] I decided to cluster the programmes manually, after attempts at clustering programmes with the help of statistical software had failed, evidently due to the large number of programmes as well as due to the high diversity and immense complexity of the programme features. Often programmes have a similar, but not the same design, so that the grouping of the programmes requires common sense to handle single cases.

[289] I owe this comment to Kerem Öktem.

with disabilities), plus some *small groups*, and the non-categorically constructed category of *poor people* are addressed.

Even the target category of poor people is not homogeneous but turned out as diverse. Some programmes address *any* poor individual and *any* poor household respectively in the country, defining their target groups in financial and economic terms only. But the largest number of *poor people programmes* address only *some* poor people. Distinct critieria could be identified in the design of these programmes that suggest a *blurred* definition of their target groups (see section 6.1.6). Moreover, one out of six poor people programmes selects (extremely) poor *labour-restricted households* as the target population. All these observations suggest that most *poor people programmes* do not "simply" address a homogeneous category of "the poor". What is more, one quarter of all programmes address the target category of *small groups*. This considerable frequency of *small groups* testifies to the diversity of target groups.

So, the wide range of target groups refutes the idea of social cash transfers as money given to "the poor" as a *homogeneous* section of the population, as prominent titles in the literature might suggest (Barrientos and Hulme 2010; Hanlon et al. 2010; Leisering and Barrientos 2013). Instead, the target groups are highly diverse. Social cash transfers address *both* groups who are defined as poor, defined by criteria related to their financial and economic situation, and groups who are defined as vulnerable, defined by biological, social, and work-related criteria. This confirms the definition of social cash transfers developed in this doctoral dissertation, as transfers provided to "*individuals and households considered poor and/or vulnerable, as defined by the programme regulations"* (section 3.1.1).[290] The diversity of target groups also suggests diverse underlying social problems, beyond poverty (for an exploration of the social problems linked to the *social grants* in South Africa, see Weible and Leisering 2012).

Second, social cash transfers address, above all, those target categories who are restricted in their capacity to gain their own income (children, older persons, adults with disabilities), while the target categories of poor people and persons of working age are rarely addressed.

The dominance of children and older persons among the target categories of social cash transfer programmes could be expected against the background of the global typologies of social cash transfers (with the types of *conditional cash transfers* and *family allowances* for

[290] In section 8.1 below, I demonstrate that the vast majority of *categorical* social cash transfer programmes are means-tested, too, that is they are address persons who are considered *poor and vulnerable* at the same time.

(families with) children and *social pensions* for older persons respectively; see section 2.3). By contrast, adults with disabilities come as a surprise, since this target category hardly plays a part in the global typologies of social cash transfers (see section 2.3.3). Persons with disabilities are mentioned as target groups of the *non-contributory pensions* in the typologies by Leisering (2008, 2009; Leisering et al. 2006) and Grosh and colleagues (2008; see section 2.3.1). But even within these types of non-contributory pensions, persons with disabilities merely appear as add-on target groups, lacking their own proper type of social cash transfer. This coincides with my own finding that most programmes which address adults with disabilities target further categories, too, above all, older persons (see Table 6.4.3 in section 6.4.3). Moreover, it seems as if persons with disabilities had been of little relevance on the global agendas on basic social protection, since they do not figure in any of the global policy models of social cash transfers identified in global discourses among the leading development policy actors (Gliszczynski 2015, pp. 48–52; see section 2.3.1).[291] The ignorance of (adult) persons with disabilites in the global models contrasts with their prominence among the target groups of social cash transfer programmes. It is striking that most social cash transfer programmes that target adults with disabilities were introduced before 2000, that is they are relatively old. I suppose that the frequency of the target category of adults with disabilities might be linked to public perceptions of deservingness of this group. I discuss the aspect of deservingness in section 10.3.

The finding that comparatively few social cash transfer programmes address poor people and persons of working age respectively confirms the marginal role of these two target categories in the global models of social cash transfers, since *general household assistance* for poor people is considered a weak model and since public employment programmes for persons of working age do not even constitute a proper social cash transfer model, although it is mentioned among the "alternative models of basic social protection" (Gliszczynski 2015, pp. 60–63).

[291] As a rare and early contribution to the topic of social cash transfers for persons with disabilities, Gooding and Marriot discuss challenges to inclusion of persons with disabilites in social cash transfers (Gooding and Marriot 2009). Brownie maintains that "[d]isability is rising on the social protection agenda, but coverage of PWD [Persons with disabilities; K.W.] is still low" (Brownie 2015). The situation might have changed since persons with disabilities are part of the measure to monitor Target 1.3 of the Sustainable Development Goals; https://www.social-protection.org/gimi/WSPDB.action?id=16; 2021-07-02.

My case study on South Africa revealed that in an environment with high levels of poverty, fears about creating welfare dependency are still wide-spread (Weible and Leisering 2012, p. 265). This might explain the reservations about social cash transfers to support persons of working age and might contribute to explaining why only a comparatively small number of programmes address this target category. Leisering and Barrientos mention two further possible reasons for the widespread exclusion of persons of working age from entitlements to social cash transfers: first, the difficulties to define this target category as “the unemployed” under conditions of widespread informal labour and a big shadow economy including subsistence production; second, “the sheer size of the group”, for which considerable public resources would be required if they were included in the national social cash transfer arrangements (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S61).

Social cash transfers evidently address primarily those groups who are not reached by classical instruments of development policy (such as microcredits, instruments to support the informal sector, and employment programmes) due to their restricted capacity to work.[292] I argue that the finding that both target categories are rarely addressed may be linked to public perceptions of deservingness. Both the categories of poor people and persons of working age might be considered as less deserving compared to other target categories. I revert to the issue in section 10.3 with a discussion of the findings in view of deservingness.

Third, entitlements to social cash transfers are surprisingly selective. Even if a target category is addressed by social cash transfer programmes, frequently only *particular* members of the target categories are entitled to the transfers. Depending on the target category, inclusion may be as low as 33% within a target category (in case of the target category of children; section 6.2.2). This is unexpected, since not discussed in the literature (Chapter 2). The global models of social cash transfers (Gliszczynski 2015, pp. 27–66; section 2.3.1) are silent about the *extent* of inclusion in the programme designs. While children and older persons figure as the major target groups in both the global models of social cash transfers and the designs of social cash transfer programmes, the global models do not reflect the *extent* of inclusion within these target categories in the legal programme designs. I argue that in that the global models of social cash transfers define their target groups so vaguely, they leave room for interpretations – and for tacit exclusions of substantial parts of the target categories from the programmes.

[292] I owe this observation to Bernd Schubert (communication via email, 2016).

What is more, the global models of social cash transfers are models of *programmes* rather than of national social cash transfer *arrangements ("systems")*. This means, they emphasize what the social cash transfer programmes "do" for their target group, rather than admitting what they do *not* do if taking the entire poor population (all citizens) into account (country approach, section 4.5; see Weible 2016 on middle-income countries). Against this backdrop, the extent of inclusion might be regarded as an indicator for political commitment to entitling target categories. A programme which addresses children but under which hardly a few percent of all children who are classified as poor in a country are entitled may hardly be interpreted as a strong political commitment for including "children".

Fourth, we find an enormous variety of inclusiveness profiles and target configurations respectively in the programme designs, but the revised typology and the new classification of social cash transfer programmes facilitate the perception of clear patterns within this variety.

The inclusiveness profiles (section 6.3) make clear that there is an enormous variety of how programmes combine entitlements of different target groups, with different degrees of inclusion. At the same time, the revised typology (the reconstruction of the dominant typology based on the dataset FLOORCASH-SocCit; section 6.4.3) reveals distinct *patterns* of target configurations (that is, how target categories are combined in the programme designs) as well as patterns of target configurations and conditionality. The new classification of social cash transfer programmes (section 6.4.4) identifies the empirical *combinations* of targeting approaches and inclusiveness of programmes in view of the entire population classified as poor in a country (all target categories; country approach, see section 4.5). So, we may conclude that there are clear patterns within the enormous variety of target configurations and frequent combinations of a targeting approach and a distinct level of inclusiveness in the design of social cash transfer programmes. The insights from the revised typology and the new classification underline that only taking stock of and analysing *all* social cash transfer programmes across the global South let emerge the *complete* picture of the universe of social cash transfer programmes.

Fifth, the revision of the dominant typology of social cash transfers based on FLOORCASH-SocCit confirms the dominant typology including the global models of social cash transfers partially, but with important qualifications.

The precise mapping of all identifiable social cash transfer programmes across the global South administered at the national level facilitates the first comprehensive reconstruction and, thereby, strictly empirical revision of the dominant typology of social cash transfers. The revision brings to light that the dominant typology has several blind spots, since it ignores the *cash transfers related to disability* and *the cash transfers related to small groups*. Moreover, the revision reveals that the types are highly stylized abstractions which do not reflect the heterogeneity and complexity of the empirical diversity of programmes. This finding might hint at the "national ownership" of social cash transfer designs in the countries of the global South, independent from or not fully dependent on the influence of the big international organisations and the global agendas.

What is more, *cash transfers for poor people* are much more prevalent than what the agendas of the major international organisations suggest, since they represent the second largest programme type (revised typology; section 6.4.3) and account for one fifth of all programmes (19.6%; new typology; section 6.4.4). So, while the *general household assistance* constitutes a "weak" policy model in global discourses according to the criteria elaborated by von Gliszczynski (statistical data, national examples, advocacy by international organisations; Gliszczynski 2015, p. 59), programmes that by and large correspond to the model are comparatively prevalent on the ground. This suggests that other influential development actors beyond the big international organisations might have facilitated the spread of the *poor people programmes*, such as the German development consultant Bernd Schubert who promoted the *quasi-categorical programmes* for extremely poor labour-constrained households in very poor African countries (Gliszczynski 2015, pp. 55–60; see also section 6.1.6).

At the same time, it is remarkable that in principle, it is possible to cluster the empirical programmes according to the dominant typology, with the exceptions of the *cash transfers related to disability* and *the cash transfers related to small groups*. This suggests that the social cash transfer programmes at the national level - represented in the revised typology - share central aspects with the dominant typology, including the global models of social cash transfers constructed by the leading international and global non-governmental organizations (Gliszczynski 2015, pp. 27–66; see section 2.3.1). The findings suggest a linkage between national programmes and global ideas around social cash transfers. But it remains unclear whether the global models of social cash transfers have been implemented in the countries of the South (with considerable national variations) or, vice versa, whether the programmes in the countries have shaped the (highly stylized) global models of social cash transfers and to what extent an interaction in both directions might have taken place (for an analysis of the diffusion of conditional cash transfers in Latin America, see Sugiyama 2011).

Confirming the overall structure of the dominant typology and discovering the important qualifications was only possible by analysing *all* social cash transfer programmes across the global South.

Sixth, as regards the mapping and classification of programmes, putting the emphasis on the target groups (target configurations, targeting approach, inclusiveness in view of all target categories) has proven both as valuable and feasible approaches to adequately comprehend the empirical variety and complexity of entitlements in the universe of social cash transfer programmes.

The universe of target configurations is evidently complex, as the share (8%) of programmes that combine both the categorical and non-categorical targeting approach underlines. And at the same time, most programmes seem to address very *particular* target groups, as the categorial targeting approach and the selective inclusion of target groups under these programmes suggest. In analytical respects, these findings underline the challenges of constructing programme typologies.

Both the revised typology and the new classification of social cash transfer programmes that I contribute continue the tradition of earlier typologies to focus on the *target groups* of programmes (see section 2.3), but both the revised typology and the new classification reconstruct the target groups of programmes *precisely* according to their legal programme designs.

Whereas the global typologies of social cash transfers (reconstructed as the "dominant typology"; see section 2.3.3) suggest that two aspects are central - the target groups of a programme and whether it imposes behavioural conditions or not -, this doctoral dissertation focuses above all on the issue of how entitlements of different target groups are combined in the programme design (the "target configurations" of the programmes). I argue that the target groups, the target configurations, and the targeting approaches are the crucial aspects to group social cash transfer programmes with the focus on *entitlements*. The issue of behavioural conditions is subordinate. These assumptions have been confirmed in this Chapter in as far as the dominant typology could be reconstructed and a new classification of programmes could be constructed, based on the targeting approach and on the inclusiveness of programmes in view of all target categories.

Evidently, the universe of target groups of the social cash transfer programmes across the global South has so far been unclear, blurred, but also unquestioned. The insights gained in this Chapter might contribute to explaining why the aspect of conditionality was emphasized much more than the target groups in the earlier typologies, despite the central role that the target groups played in these typologies (see section 2.3.3). It might have simply been the scholars´ ignorance with respect to the target groups, which made them turn to the (supposedly) clearer aspect of the behavioural conditions to name and label the programme types, making the „conditions“ the salient aspects in the world of social cash transfer until today.

7 The scope of countries: Who is included in national social cash transfer arrangements, who remains excluded?

While the previous Chapter focused on social cash transfer *programmes*, I now turn to the national social cash transfer arrangement of the *countries*. A national social cash transfer arrangement comprises all the social cash transfer programmes in a country.

Who is included in the national social cash transfer arrangements and who remains excluded from entitlements to social cash transfers? I follow the country approach to social cash transfers (section 4.5), since I maintain that only this systemic perspective on *all* the programmes in a country facilitates a thorough analysis of social cash transfers in view of the social citizenship dimension of inclusion. The country approach makes it possible to assess the inclusion of target categories in the national social cash transfer arrangements and the exclusion of target categories from entitlements respectively.

I start by inquiring into the spread of social cash transfer programmes across the global South in order to identify the countries with and without social cash transfer programmes (section 7.1). I then focus on the countries *with* social cash transfer programmes, analysing which target categories are included in the national social cash transfer arrangements and to what extent (section 7.2). In the subsequent section, I map the countries in view of the inclusiveness of their national social cash transfer arrangements (*national inclusiveness profiles*; section 7.3). In the next step, I classify the countries by patterns of inclusion in national social cash transfer arrangements (section 7.4). I finally discuss the findings (section 7.5).

7.1 How widespread are social cash transfers across the countries of the global South?

Studies on social cash transfers emphasize that social cash transfers have spread across the global South within a comparatively short period of time, since the middle of the 1990s and early 2000s (Barrientos 2013a, p. 4; Hanlon et al. 2010; Leisering 2008, pp. 77–78). However, these observations have hardly been underpinned by quantitative figures.[293]

[293] For early versions of the following analysis of the spread of social cash transfers, see Weible 2016, pp. 182–183 on middle-income countries as well as Weible and Leisering 2019, pp. 155–157.

Statements on the scope of social cash transfers require a sound database that covers the entire global South – but which has been lacking until recently (see section 2.5).[294] FLOORCASH-SocCit is among the first databases that facilitate a quantification of the range of countries that have installed social cash transfer programmes. More precisely, FLOORCASH-SocCit is the most comprehensive dataset on social cash transfer programmes in the global South in terms of programmes and countries covered.[295]

282 programmes could be identified across the countries of the global South as of 2012/13.[296] Most programmes (118) are located in Asia, followed by Latin America (80 programmes) and Africa (74 programmes). Comparably few social cash transfer programmes were found in Oceania (10 programmes). These figures confirm what the literature suggests: that social cash transfer programmes can be found on all continents of the global South.

Half of all programmes that were running in 2012/13 were introduced by 2002, the other half of the programmes was introduced after 2002 (see Weible and Leisering 2019, p. 155, Figure 5.1). This finding underpins the observations of the "rise" of social cash transfers in the early 2000s referred to in the literature (see the titles of Leisering 2019 and of Garcia and Moore 2012).

However, I argue that in the context of an analysis of social cash transfers in view of social citizenship, the number of *programmes* per world region may tell us little about the entitlements of persons considered poor and/or vulnerable. Therefore, I rather focus on the *countries* (see section 4.5 on the *country approach*). It is important to know whether there is any social cash transfer programme in a country – for if there is none, no one of the persons considered poor and/or vulnerable in these countries can be entitled to a social cash transfer.

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[294] Only recently, with the publication of the *Non-Contributory Social Transfer Programmes (NSTP) in Developing Countries Data Set* (Dodlova et al. 2016) and the *Social Assistance in Low and Middle Income Countries Dataset* (*SALMIC*; Barrientos 2018a), quantitative figures on the scope of social cash transfers across the global South have become available.

[295] The samples of both NSTP (N=186) and SALMIC (N=224) are smaller if compared to FLOORCASH-SocCit (N=282), although NSTP includes any public work programme, whereas SALMIC and FLOORCASH-SocCit only include employment guarantee programmes (see section 3.1.1). NSTP covers 101 countries (including 12 European countries) and SALMIC covers 110 countries (including 13 European countries), while FLOORCASH-SocCit covers 148 countries of the global South, including 35 countries without social cash transfer programmes.

[296] All data referred to in this doctoral dissertation draws on the dataset FLOORCASH-SocCit (mainly version 4; Leisering and Weible 2020, accessible at www.gesis.org), unless other sources are indicated.

The country level is the first fork in the road which leads either in the direction of entitlements to social cash transfers (of whatever groups) or in the direction of no entitlements to social cash transfers in a country.

The focus on countries rather than on programmes in the analysis of social cash transfers in the global South is a very young development (see section 2.4.4), with - to my knowledge - the first elaborate contribution by myself (Weible 2016) and with a few contributions based on the SALMIC dataset (Barrientos 2018a, 2019), including the *Map Explorer* visualizing the data by geographic illustrations.[297] [298]

Knowledge about the incidence of social cash transfer programmes *per country* is essential to assess the entitlements to social cash transfers of the persons considered as vulnerable and/or poor. Consequently, I argue that instead of asking 'How many programmes can we identify?', the relevant question is: How many countries have introduced social cash transfer programmes?

[297] http://www.social-assistance.manchester.ac.uk/?page_id=223; retrieved 2021-07-04.

[298] The *Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database* of 2010 by Barrientos and colleagues (Barrientos et al. 2010) includes an index of countries, but as the database is entirely programme based, no countries without social assistance programmes are included, just as in the *SALMIC dataset*.



Figure 7.1-1 Countries of the global South with and without social cash transfer programmes as of 2012/13

Legend: black: countries of the global South with at least one social cash transfer programme; grey: countries of the global South without any social cash transfer programme; white: countries outside the sample (global North).

Source: Weible and Leisering 2019, p. 156; FLOORCASH-Basic; N=148.[299]

[299] I thank Tobias Böger for drawing up this version of the world map.

The world map in Figure 7.1-1 illustrates the scale and the geographical dimension of the spread of social cash transfers. Three out of four countries in the South (76.4%; 113 of 148 countries) have introduced social cash transfer programmes by 2012/13.[300] This is the vast majority of Southern countries.

At the same time, the map clearly outlines a geographical bias in the world of social cash transfers. Whereas nearly all the countries in Latin America and in Asia have introduced social cash transfer programmes, this is the case in only around half of the countries in Africa and Oceania (see Table 7.1).

Table 7.1 Countries with social cash transfer programmes, by continent

Continent	Countries with social cash transfer programme(s)
Africa	57% (31 out of 54 countries)
Latin America	97% (32 out of 33 countries)
Asia	92% (44 out of 48 countries)
Oceania	46% (6 out of 13 countries)
Global South	76% (113 out of 148 countries)

Source: the author; FLOORCASH-SocCit; N = 148.

Countries are classified by continents according to the United Nations Statistics Division; http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm; 2020-10-12.

Figure 7.1-2 depicts the countries with and without social cash transfer programmes by world region. It confirms that all the countries of Middle Africa and nearly half of the countries in Western Africa lack any social cash transfer programme. This corresponds to the two big grey spots without any social cash transfer programme on the African continent in Figure 7.1-1. Two African regions represent the extremes of the entire range regarding the incidence of social cash transfers on the African continent: Whereas not a single country in Middle Africa has introduced any social cash transfer programme, all countries in Southern Africa have installed at least one social cash transfer programme.

[300] The two other available datasets identify a smaller number of countries of the global South (disregarding the European countries in the datasets): 97 countries in SALMIC and 89 countries in NSTP. This is evidently due to smaller samples (see the remarks on the different samples further above in this section).

As regards Oceania, three out of four Melanesian countries and three out of five Micronesian countries lack any social cash transfer programme. But all four Polynesian countries have introduced a social cash transfer programme.

Evidently, both the continents and the world regions within the continents differ sharply with respect to the introduction of social cash transfer programmes.



Figure 7.1-2 Countries with and without social cash transfer programmes, by world region

Source: the author; FLOORCASH-SocCit; N = 148.

Countries are classified by continents according to the United Nations Statistics Division; http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm; 2013-06-15.

I argue that in countries without any social cash transfer programme all individuals and households may be regarded as “excluded” from entitlements to social cash transfers if they are in or if they fall into poverty. Most countries without any social cash transfer programme are located in Middle Africa (e.g. Angola, Cameroon), Western Africa (e.g. Burkina Faso, Gambia), and Eastern Africa (e.g. Eritrea, Somalia) as well as in Oceania (e.g. Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea).

Differences between the countries in Africa become evident, which might be linked to the colonial past. In most former French colonies, we do not find social cash transfer programmes in 2012/13, except in the Maghreb countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia in the Northern African region)[301] as well as in Senegal, Niger, and Benin in Western Africa and Djibouti in Eastern Africa.[302] This contrasts with the former British colonies such as South Africa and Egypt, which all had installed at least one social cash transfer programme by 2012/13, with the exceptions of North Sudan in Northern Africa and The Gambia in Western Africa (see Midgley and Piachaud 2011 on the legacy of the British rule in the area of social policy). Interestingly enough, most programmes - even in the countries under former British colonial rule - are still quite young,[303] which implies that they were introduced (long) after the countries gained independence from the colonial powers.

Nevertheless, the observations suggest that countries which were formerly under British colonial rule were more likely to have introduced a social cash transfer programme by 2012/13 than countries that were under French colonial rule. This finding seems to be supported by studies on social policy in former British colonies on the one hand and on social policy in former French colonies on the other hand (Hall and Midgley 2008; Kangas 2012; Midgley and Piachaud 2011; Seekings 2007).[304]

Moreover, it becomes evident that most of the countries without any programme are low-income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. More generally, we find that the higher the income group, the lower the share of countries without any social cash transfer programme (see Figure 7.1-3).

[301] Tunisia´s *Programme national d'Aides aux Familles Nécessiteuses (PNAFN)* was launched in 1986; Algeria´s *Allocation Forfaitaire de Solidarité* started in 1992. The years of introduction of Morocco´s social cash transfer programmes are missing.

[302] The programmes in Senegal were introduced in 2008 and 2009, the programmes in Niger in 2011. The years of introduction are missing for Benin and Djibouti.

[303] In Western and in Eastern Africa, nearly all social cash transfer programmes were introduced in the 2000s, with the exception of the two social cash transfer programmes of 1979 in the Seychelles. This contrasts with Egypt in Northern Africa and the Southern African countries, where some of the social cash transfer programmes date back to the middle of the 20th century. The old age pension in South Africa was introduced in 1928. Egypt´s Social Solidarity Pension was originally introduced in 1950.

[304] Former French colonies introduced *social insurance* laws earlier than British colonies (Kangas 2012). The traditional focus on social insurance might be one reason why non-contributory forms of social protection such as social cash transfers are still rare.



Figure 7.1-3 Countries with social cash transfer programmes, by country income group*

* World Bank classification of 2015, based on data of 2013; GNI calculations use the World Bank Atlas method; see http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups, accessed 6 January 2017.

Source: the author; FLOORCASH-SocCit; N = 144, missing values: 4

I summarize the findings on the spread of social cash transfers in four points:

First, social cash transfer programmes are evidently widespread, since three out of four Southern countries have introduced a programme by 2012/13. Although we have not analysed the dimension of time here in depth, the findings seem to support the remarkable "rise" of social cash transfers at the scale of a "revolution" (Hanlon et al. 2010). What is more, the global spread underpins the potential relevance of social cash transfers to social citizenship across the (entire) global South - which I analyse in the subsequent Chapters.

Second, the spread of social cash transfers is very uneven. This supports Barrientos´ observation of 2018, based on data until 2015 (Barrientos 2018a).[305] Both the continents and the regions within the continents differ markedly with respect to the spread of social cash transfers, with Africa as the most heterogeneous continent. As a methodological consequence I argue that analysing single continents and or single world regions (as even smaller units) is

[305] "Key findings", SALMIC website, http://www.social-assistance.manchester.ac.uk/; 2020-09-26.

not enough to make qualified statements on the "world" of social cash transfers in Southern countries, since the observations may not necessarily be transferable to other regions of the global South. That is why I include all 148 countries of the global South in my analysis.

Third, distinct geographical patterns in the world of social cash transfers become evident. Whereas all countries of the Latin American continent (with the exception of Grenada) and all countries in Southern Africa have introduced social cash transfer programmes, they cannot be identified in any country in Middle Africa. World regional patterns are further explored in section 7.4.

Fourth, 35 countries in the global South have not installed any social cash transfer programme by 2012/13. I argue that the country level is the first fork in the road towards social citizenship (as a national issue; see section 3.2.1) and towards entitlements to social cash transfers of citizens considered poor and/or vulnerable. With no social cash transfer programme in place in a country, entire societies remain excluded from entitlements to social cash transfers in case of poverty (see also the discussion on alternative social protection measures in section 10.2.2). The country level is the first level of exclusion from entitlements to social cash transfers which is relevant in view of social citizenship. But I identified even more levels of exclusion, as I show in the subsequent sections.

7.2 Who is included in national social cash transfer arrangements, who remains excluded?

Who is entitled to social cash transfers in the countries of the global South? I claim that analysing social cash transfer *programmes* (Chapter 6) is not enough to answer this question adquately. That is why I now turn to the countries with all their social cash transfer programmes that were running at the point of data collection (2012/13). I want to find out: To what extent are the persons defined as poor and/or vulnerable in a country entitled to a social cash transfer?

For this purpose, I first introduce the *systemic approach* to analysing social cash transfers (country approach; section 7.2.1). I then analyse which target categories the Southern countries *address* in their national social cash transfer arrangements (section 7.2.2). This is, however, not sufficient to assess the *inclusion* of target categories in the national social cash transfer arrangements of the countries, which I analyse separately in section 7.2.3. To complete the analysis of inclusion, I finally inquire to what *extent* the target categories are included in the national social cash transfer arrangements (section 7.2.4).

7.2.1 Systemic approach: Entitlement profiles of countries

Research on social cash transfers has so far been centred on social cash transfer *programmes* as the obviously relevant unit of analysis (see section 2.4.4). I call this the *programme approach* to social cash transfers. I argue that analyses that follow the programme approach can substantially contribute to studying entitlements to social cash transfers, as done in Chapter 6. However, taking the concept of social citizenship seriously, I claim that analyzing programmes is not enough. It is rather the *countries* with all their social cash transfer programmes and their entire population (as potentially entitled individuals and households) which have to be analysed. I call this the *country approach* to social cash transfers (see also section 4.5). Following this approach, I examine the *national social cash transfer arrangements* as the entirety of the social cash transfer programmes in a country. I illustrate the national social cash transfer arrangement of South Africa with all its "social grants", as the programmes are called, depicted in view of the life cycle, including persons with disabilities and residual small groups (Figure 7.2.1).[306]

[306] As visualized in South Africa´s national inclusiveness profile in Table 7.3.2-1 in section 7.3.2, the target category of poor people is not addressed. The official brochure on *social grants* provides an overview of the programmes (South African Social Security Agency 2012; for a topical version see South African Social Security Agency 2020).



Figure 7.2.1 South Africa's national social cash transfer arrangement

Source: Weible and Leisering 2019, p. 193.

The requirement of a systemic approach is underpinned by the finding that as of 2012/13, the countries had on average 2.5 social cash transfer programmes running at the same time (out of the 113 countries that had introduced at least one social cash transfer programme). Some countries have only one programme running, such as Nigeria (*Care of the Poor (COPE)*); other countries have up to ten programmes (Bangladesh and Egypt).

Keeping in mind that programmes address a huge variety of target groups (section 6.1.1), how may we compare all the national social cash transfer arrangements in a standardized way? And in methodological terms, how to take the analysis beyond the level of the programmes to the country level?

Data aggregation is a demanding issue, and even more so with highly heterogeneous objects of study such as social cash transfers. The first few attempts at analysing the social cash transfer programmes of *entire countries* of the global South which have been made so far seem disputable and are not adequate for an entitlement analysis (see sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.4).

I suggest mapping each national social cash transfer arrangement in view of the question whether at least one social cash transfer programme of the country addresses the six target categories (somehow; the extent is not relevant here). Again, the mapping is done separately per target category. As a result, we obtain an *entitlement profile* of each national social cash transfer arrangement. It indicates whether each of the six target categories is addressed by one or more social cash transfer programmes in a country.[307]

I take the example of Bolivia to illustrate how entitlement profiles of national social cash transfer arrangements are constructed (for a more refined mapping of Bolivia see section 7.3.1). There are three social cash transfer programmes in Bolivia:

1. the nation-wide programme *Bono Madre Niña-Niño Juana Azurduy,* which addresses poor children up to 23 months and pregnant women;
2. *Bono Juancito Pinto,* which addresses all school aged children up to age 18 and children with disabilities who attend special schools, regardless of income;
3. a so-called “universal” old age pension, *Renta dignidad,* which addresses any citizen from age 60.

[307] For an illustration of the entitlement profiles of the middle-income countries, see Weible 2016, p. 187.

In Table 7.2.1 I show how the *national entitlement profile* is constructed. Each target category is assigned an entitlement score (1) if it is addressed by at least one programme in the country. Otherwise, the target category is assigned the score 0, which means that a target category is not addressed in a country. The bottom row of the Table indicates that Bolivia´s social cash transfer arrangement addresses children, older persons, and the category of small groups.

Table 7.2.1 Constructing the entitlement profile of Bolivia´s national social cash transfer arrangement

Social Cash Transfer Programmes		Target categories					
		Children	Persons of working age	Older persons	Adults with disabilities	Small groups	Poor people
	Bono Madre Niña-Niño Juana Azurduy	1	0	0	0	1	0
	Bono Juancito Pinto	1	0	0	0	0	0
	Renta Dignidad	0	0	1	0	0	0
Target category addressed? (entitlement score)		Yes (1)	No (0)	Yes (1)	No (0)	Yes (1)	No (0)

Source: the author; FLOORCASH-SocCit.

Entitlement scores: 1 means that a target category is addressed, 0 means that a target category is not addressed.

Constructing entitlement profiles is a standardized way of mapping the national social cash transfer arrangements of any country. We may analyse all national social cash transfer arrangements across the global South in this way. I do this in the following section 7.2.2.

7.2.2 Who is addressed (II)? The target categories of the Southern national social cash transfer arrangements

Whom (which target categories) do the 148 countries in the global South address in their national social cash transfer arrangements?[308] Based on the national entitlement profiles of all countries (section 7.2.1), we may now analyse all national social cash transfer arrangements of the global South. Figure 7.2.2 indicates the number of countries which address the target categories (multiple references are possible).



Figure 7.2.2 Countries with social cash transfer programmes, by target categories
(countries with programmes that target the respective category, in % of all countries; multiple references possible)
Source: Weible and Leisering 2019, p. 163; FLOORCASH-SocCit; N=145, data for three countries is missing.

We find that all target categories are addressed by the countries, but the frequency differs noticeably. Whereas the target categories of older persons, children, and adults with disabilities are addressed by around half of the 148 countries (59%, 51%, and 49%

[308] For early versions of the following analysis of target categories of countries, see Weible 2016, pp. 183–184 on middle-income countries as well as Weible and Leisering 2019, pp. 162–163.

respectively), the categories of small groups and of poor people are addressed by one third of the countries only (38% and 33% respectively). One target category is the odd one out: persons of working age are addressed by only 15% of the countries.

When we compare the target categories of *countries* with the target categories of *programmes* (section 6.1.5), we find that the number of programmes which address the categories are generally higher than the number of countries that address the same category. This is due to the fact that countries have on average 1.91 social cash transfer programmes and that in nearly half of the countries (44.6%; 66 countries) more than one social cash transfer programme could be identified. Evidently, several programmes address the same target categories in some countries and this share varies markedly by target category.

Once more comparing the target categories of *countries* with the target categories of *programmes* (section 6.1.5), we find that persons of working age are the category which is least addressed by both programmes and countries. But countries and programmes differ with respect to the category that is most frequently addressed: Countries address older persons most frequently, whereas programmes address children most frequently. In other words, there are more programmes which address children than programmes which address older persons, but evidently this dominance of children is not reflected at the country level, since less countries address children than older persons. Why? The Figures 6.1.5 and 7.2.2 indicate that 125 programmes address children in 74 countries, that is 1.69 programmes on average per country, compared to 105 programmes which address older persons in 85 countries, resulting in 1.24 programmes on average per country. Obviously, if countries address children, they often run several social cash transfer programmes that target children. This is less frequently the case with programmes that address older persons, for whom the number of programmes comes closer to the number of countries which address this target category. In the following sections I revert to the differences between the target categories.

The finding that half of the countries in the global South address adults with disabilities might be surprising, since this target category plays, at best, a marginal role in the literature on social cash transfers (see sections 2.2.1 and 2.3; but see Gooding and Marriot 2009). Above all, there is no global policy model of social cash transfers that would be related to persons with diabilities (Gliszczynski 2015, p. 37).[309] Against this background, adults with disabilities

[309] At most, persons with disabilities are grouped together with older persons, such as for the type of the „noncontributory pensions and disability transfers" mentioned by Grosh et al. 2008, pp. 253–337.

may be called the "hidden but strong" target category. Further analyses in this doctoral dissertation will underpin this first statement.

Another surprise to the reader may be that one in three countries addresses the category of poor people, since the *general household assistance* is a weak policy model in the global discourses on social cash transfers (Gliszczynski 2015, pp. 52–60). So, how to interpret this finding? Are one third of all poor people in the global South entitled to social cash transfers? The in-depth analysis of the target category of poor people (section 6.1.6) suggests that this may hardly be the case, since few programmes address *all* poor people. Further investigations on the issue are provided in the following sections.

The analysis of national social cash transfer arrangements brought to light that 38% of the Southern countries address small groups. This clearly points at a strong fractionalization and particularization of national social cash transfer arrangements. "Special entitlements" for small groups seem to be common.

7.2.3 Who is included, who remains excluded?

The previous section revealed how frequently the countries *address* target categories in their national social cash transfer arrangements. – But it leaves open, how frequently the target categories are *included* in each of the national social cash transfer arrangements, since several programmes may address a target category in one country, but no programme may address the same target category in another country. The systems approach now enables us to make statements on the *inclusion* of target categories in a national social cash transfer arrangement and on their *exclusion* from it, respectively. For this purpose I again use the inclusion index (section 6.2.1).[310]

Applying the inclusion index to the national social cash transfer arrangments provides us with one *national inclusion score* per target category for each country.[311] If the national inclusion score of a target category is greater than zero, this means that at least one social cash transfer programme in a country addresses the target category. Consequently, I assess the target category as "included" in the country´s national social cash transfer arrangement.

[310] For early versions of the following analysis of varieties of inclusion of target categories, see Weible 2016, pp. 185–186 on middle-income countries as well as Weible and Leisering 2019, pp. 163–164.

[311] The national inclusion scores of the six target categories add up to the *national inclusiveness profile* of a country (see section 6.3).

If the national inclusion score of a target category is zero, the interpretation is more complex. A national inclusion score of zero means that there is no programme that addresses the target category in the country, but it does not necessarily mean that the target category is excluded from the entire national social cash transfer arrangement. Why? The answer is that both categorical and non-categorical entitlements (see section 6.1.2) may be of relevance and both have to be taken into account to assess whether a target category is included or excluded, respectively. The point is that the non-categorical entitlements of *poor people programmes* (section 6.1.6) may extend to all other (categorically constructed) target categories. To give an example, if a country does not address the category of older persons, older persons may nevertheless be included in the national social cash transfer arrangement through a programme which addresses poor people, since the non-categorical entitlements of the poor people programme may cover older persons, too.

This takes us to the three ways of how target categories can be included in national social cash transfer arrangements (Figure 7.2.3): a target category may be included

(a) by categorical entitlements (mostly through categorical programmes[312]) or

(b) by non-categorical entitlements (through non-categorical programmes) or

(c) by both categorical and non-categorical entitlements (through a combination of categorical and non-categorical programmes or combined programmes).

In each of the varieties, the target categories can be included by one or by several social cash transfer programmes. Therefore, to find out whether a target category is included in the national social cash transfer arrangement or excluded from it, respectively, the inclusion scores of both the categorically constructed target categories on the one hand and of the category of poor people (as the non-categorically constructed target category) on the other hand, have to be taken into account. And only in those cases, in which the inclusion scores of both the categorically constructed target category and of the category of poor people are zero, we conclude that there is no social cash transfer programme that addresses this categorically constructed target category. We may then assess the target category as *excluded* from (direct) entitlements to social cash transfers in the country even if the persons and households, respectively, are classified as poor according to the national regulations.

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[312] Most categorical entitlements are linked to categorical programmes, but there are the exceptions of particular *poor people programmes*, which address – in addition to the target category of poor people – further target categories (see sections 6.4.3 and 6.4.4).



Figure 7.2.3 Varieties of inclusion of target categories in national social cash transfer arrangements (by countries, in absolute numbers, shares in brackets)

Source: the author; FLOORCASH-SocCit; N=145, data for three countries is missing; for an early version of this Figure, see Weible and Leisering 2019, p. 164.

Figure 7.2.3 indicates the absolute numbers of countries that follow the different strategies to include their citizens in the national social cash transfer arrangements, separately by target category. We find that as to the target categories of children, older persons, and adults with disabilities, each strategy is chosen by a similar number of countries: Around 30 % of the countries include each of these categories by categorical entitlements (categorical inclusion), followed by the roughly 20% of the countries that include them by both categorical and non-categorical entitlements (by both categorical and non-categorical inclusion); only 10% of the countries address these categories by non-categorical entitlements only (non-categorical inclusion). The ratios for the category of persons of working age are different: This category is mostly included by non-categorical entitlements (28%), only 5% of the countries combine categorical and non-categorical inclusion, and only 10% of the countries include them by categorical entitlements only. These reverse rations are due to the comparably lower number of (categorical) programmes that address persons of working age (see section 6.1.5). So if this category is included in social cash transfer arrangements, it is mostly through the non-categorical entitlements in *poor people programmes* (see sections 6.1.6, 6.4.3 and 6.4.4).

Figure 7.2.3 brings an important issue to light: the top segments of the bars represent the countries without any social cash transfer programme to address the target categories, including the 35 countries without any social cash transfer programme. For example, 53 Southern countries (37%) do not include the category of children in their social cash transfer arrangement, neither through categorical nor through non-categorical entitlements. Therefore, I argue that in one third of the countries children remain *excluded* from the national social cash transfer arrangements, even if they are classified as poor. Again we find that the target categories differ considerably regarding the extent of exclusion: exclusion is lowest for older persons (32% of the countries) and highest for persons of working age (57%). Adults with disabilities (41%) and children (37%) rank in between.

We can conclude that in between one third and more than half of all Southern countries children, persons of working age, older persons, and adults with disabilities, respectively, are not addressed by any social cash transfer programme. So in these countries entire life cycle stages remain excluded from the national social cash transfers arrangements. They are not entitled to any social cash transfer, even if they come under the relevant national definitions of poverty. The implications are discussed in the concluding section 7.5.

At this point I want to emphize an important qualification of the findings: Even if a target category is assessed as "included" in the national social cash transfer arrangement, this does not imply any statement on the *extent* of inclusion. I focus on this issue in the following section.

7.2.4 Who is included but not entitled? Exclusion of subcategories from national social cash transfer arrangements

In the preceeding section we found that the target categories of children, persons of working age, older persons, and adults with disabilities are included in the national social cash transfer arrangements of most countries (and respectively, in 43% of the national social cash transfer arrangements as regards persons of working age). But to what extent are the categories included? Does inclusion of a target category mean that all persons belonging to this category are entitled to a social cash transfer (assuming that they are classified as poor if a programme applies a means test)?

Whereas in section 6.2 I used the inclusion index to measure the (average) extent of entitlement ("inclusion") in social cash transfer *programmes,* I now use the inclusion index to measure the (average) extent of inclusion in national social cash transfer arrangements, again separately per target category. This provides us with a national inclusion score for each target category per country (for the construction of the national inclusion scores, separately per target category, see section 7.3.1 below). The *national inclusion score* of a target category displays the share of a target category which is entitled to a social cash transfer and so "included" in the national social cash transfer arrangement, on the condition that the persons and households, respectively, are classified as poor (that is, they pass the means test if a programme applies such a test). I aggregate the *national inclusion scores* of each target category at the level of the entire global South, expressed as an average among all countries, in the *global country-based inclusion score*.[313] The global country-based inclusion score of each target category indicates to what extent a target category is included in the national social cash transfer arrangements across the countries of the global South and to what extent the target category is (directly) entitled to a social cash transfer (if the persons and households, respectively, are classified as poor). The global inclusion scores of each target category are displayed in Table 7.2.4. The scores are expressed as an average of those countries that address the target category by any social cash transfer programme.

[313] The average across countries implies that countries with small populations are attributed the same weight as countries with large populations. The global country-based inclusion scores are distinct from the global programme-based inclusion scores, for which the average extent of inclusion of the target categories in all *programmes* is calculated (see section 6.2.2).

Table 7.2.4 Global (country-based) inclusion scores per target categories, based on the analysis of national social cash transfer arrangements (countries)

Target category	Inclusion score*	Number of countries	Missing values
Children	.478	57	17
Children [including extrapolated values**]	.428	71	3
Persons of working age (without disability)	.294	11	11
Persons of working age (without disability) [including extrapolated values**]	.482	20	2
Older persons	.752	72	13
Older persons [including extrapolated values*]	.737	74	11
Adults with disabilities	.805	25	46
Adults with disabilities [including extrapolated values*]	.874	68	3
Small groups	.180	52	3
Poor people	.580	48	0

Source: the author; FLOORCASH-SocCit.

*Average of all countries which address the target category; scores range between 1 (all members of the target category have direct entitlements) and 0 (no one in the target category has direct entitlements)

** To reduce the number if missing values, I assume full inclusion in the dimension of age for some cases: for 20 countries with programmess for subgroups of children; for four countries with programmes for subgroups of persons of working age and for six countries with programmes for the entire category of persons of working age; for three countries with programmes for subgroups of older persons). For the category of adults with disabilities the dimension of age was skipped, since information on age-based requirements were rarely found. As data on further dimensions are lacking for some programmes in particular countries, a few inclusion scores remain incomplete (of three countries in the category of children; of three countries in the category of older persons); for details on the handling of missing values, see section 5.4.

Let us take the example of the tareget category of children to illustrate the meaning of the global inclusion scores. The global inclusion score of children amounts to 0.48. This suggests that, *across all countries of the global South that address children*, roughly half of the children in these countries (and their families, respectively) are entitled to a social cash transfer, if classified as poor.[314] This is what countries "do" in terms of basic social

[314] If we include the countries with extrapolated values, the score of 0.43 suggests that an even lower share of roughly 43% of all children are included in the national social cash transfer arrangements (on the condition that they are defined as poor).

protection: They include around half the target category of children into their national social cash transfer arrangements.

However, looking at the inclusive side of a national social cash transfer arrangement is not enough. FLOORCASH-SocCit also permits to analyse the other side of the coin: *exclusion* from the national social cash transfer arrangements. The inclusion score of children of 0.48 suggests that, across all countries of the global South that address children, roughly half of the children are *not* entitled to any social cash transfer, even if defined as poor. I argue that they (and their families, respectively) are excluded from direct entitlements to social cash transfers and excluded from the national social cash transfer arrangements. In short, although these countries do run programmes that address children, only half of all children are entitled to a social cash transfer (if classified as poor). Consequently, I speak of *hidden exclusions within included target categories* and, in short, of *within-category exclusions*. These exclusions shed light on what the countries do *not* do in their policies of basic social protection (see Weible 2016 on middle-income countries).

As before, we find huge differences between the target categories with regard to their global inclusion scores. Apparently, persons of working age are included in the national social cash transfer arrangements to the least extent and to a similar extent as children if the extrapolated values are included (score of 0.29 and 0.48 respectively). By contrast, adults with disabilities and older persons seem to be included to a higher extent (score of 0.75 and 0.74, respectively, for older persons; score of 0.81 and 0.87, resepectively, for adults with disabilities). The scores suggest that, when countries address these target categories, they tend to include most people belonging to the target categories. But still, around one quarter of the older persons and at least one fifth of the adults with disabilities remain excluded from the national social cash transfer arrangements, although these countries address the relevant target categories.

Finally, the score of the category of poor people (0.58) sheds light on the inclusion of "poor people" in Southern national social cash transfer arrangements. The score suggests that if countries address the category of poor people in the global South, slightly more than half of the category are entitled to social cash transfers. However, the remaining half (42%) of the "poor people" in the countries remain excluded, although a *poor people programme* is running in those countries.

The global inclusion score of the category of small groups is difficult to interpret in view of inclusion (see section 6.2.2; see section 6.1.1 on examples of small groups). It may rather be interpreted in view of particularization of entitlements. The score of 0.18 suggests that countries which addresses the category of small groups address 1.8 small groups on average. If we recall that 38% of all countries address the target category of small groups (section 7.7.2), entitlements to particular small groups seem widespread.

When we compare the scores with the global inclusion scores based on the social cash transfer *programmes* (section 6.2.2), we find that the country-based scores are nearly equal for the categories of persons of working age and poor people, whereas they are higher for adults with disabilities (by 0.06 points), for older persons (by 0.09 points) and for children (by 0.15 points). This suggests that countries mostly have one single programme to address persons of working age and poor people, but often have several programmes to address the categories of older persons, adults with disabilities, and above all, children.[315]

How to explain the huge within-category exclusions? Just as regarding the findings on the global programme-based inclusion scores (section 6.2.2), all three dimensions of the inclusion index contribute to the within-category exclusions: the social range of the target groups, the age range of the target groups, and the geographical range of the programmes. In the following section 7.3.1 I illustrate the combination of the three factors with the example of one country (Bolivia).

7.3 Mapping countries: National social cash transfer arrangements in view of inclusion and exclusion

In the previous section 7.2, I analysed the national social cash transfer arrangements in terms of the *average* inclusion of the target categories across the global South. Now I assess each national social cash transfer arrangement separately in view of inclusion, again with the help of the inclusion index, separately per target category.[316]

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[315] That the global *country-based* inclusion scores are higher than the global *programme-based* inclusion scores is related to the way how the inclusion scores of *each programme* of a country are aggregated at the country level: The inclusion scores of each programme are added up, separately per target category (until a maximum score of 1), which provides the *national inclusion score* of each target category; see section 7.3.1 below). The global country-based inclusion score is then calculated as the average of the national inclusion scores, separately per target category.

[316] For early versions of this section on national inclusiveness profiles, see Weible 2016, pp. 188–190 on the inclusiveness of the target categories of children and poor people in middle-income countries as well as Weible and Leisering 2019, pp. 191–207.

In which countries are the target categories included in the national social cash transfer arrangements and to what extent? I first introduce the analytical approach to mapping national social cash transfer arrangements in view of inclusion of target categories (section 7.3.1). I then present the *inclusiveness profile* of each national social cash transfer arrangement in the global South (section 7.3.2).

7.3.1 Mapping national social cash transfer arrangements by inclusiveness profiles

How to map and compare national social cash transfer arrangements in a standardized in view of the inclusion of target categories? Asking differently, how to measure the inclusiveness of the national social cash transfer arrangements of countries?

I suggest an analytical approach which, once more, relies on the inclusion index (see section 6.2.1). I suggest to construct an *inclusiveness profile*[317] of the national social cash transfer arrangement of each country. The inclusiveness profiles of countries indicate to what extent each target category in the country is directly entitled to social cash transfers (if classified as poor) and so included in the national social cash transfer arrangement of the country.

If a country has installed just one social cash transfer programme, the inclusiveness profiles of the country and of the programme are identical (see section 6.3 on the inclusiveness profiles of programmes). But for most countries, the mapping of the entire national social cash transfer arrangement is more complex.

For each country I add up the inclusion scores of all the social cash transfer programmes identified in a country, again separately per target category (see Table 7.3.1). This way I obtain a *national inclusion score* of the country for each target category. The six national inclusion scores of the target categories form the *national inclusiveness profile* of the country´s national social cash transfer arrangement.

The national inclusion score of each target category ranges from 0 to 1. A score of 0 indicates that no programme in the country addresses the target category. A score of 1 indicates that the target category is addressed to the full extent. This means that first, the entire social range of the category is addressed (the entire category rather than subcategories only); second, the entire age range of the target category is covered; and third, the entire geographical range of the country is covered, that is the entire country without geographical restrictions (see section

[317] I owe this expression to Lutz Leisering.

6.2.1 on the inclusion index). A score greater than 0 indicates that the target category is addressed to some extent. National inclusion scores greater than 1 are cut off at 1 as the maximum inclusion score.

Aggregating the scores separately per target category at the country level is a complex, but accurate way to measure the inclusion of a national social cash transfer arrangement. The biggest advantage of this way of aggregating data is that it permits to measure inclusion and exclusion of target categories from the national social cash transfer arrangement.

In this section I again take the national social cash transfer arrangement of Bolivia as an example to explain how the data are aggregated at the country level. In 2012 there were three social cash transfer programmes running in Bolivia (see Figure 7.3.1; see also section 6.3.1).



Figure 7.3.1 Bolivia's national social cash transfer arrangement
Source: the author; FLOORCASH-SocCit.

Table 7.3.1 makes transparent how Bolivia´s national inclusiveness profile is constructed. All social cash transfer programmes in the country are taken into account. We see that both the programmes *Juana Azurduy* and *Juancito Pinto* address the target category of children. Consequently, I add up the inclusion scores of this category of both programmes (0.11 and

0.67) to calculate the *national inclusion score* of the target category of children (0.78). This national inclusion score suggests that around four out of five children in Bolivia are entitled to a social cash transfer (if they are classified as poor, since the programme *Juana Azurduy* is limited to poor children).

In addition to children, Bolivia´s national social cash transfer arrangement addresses older persons to the full extent (score 1.0) and one small group (pregnant women; score 0.1).

Bolivia´s national inclusiveness profile is illustrated in the following section 7.3.2.

Table 7.3.1 Constructing the inclusiveness profile of Bolivia's national social cash transfer arrangement

Pro-grammes	Dimension of inclusion	Target category	Inclusion sub-scores	Inclusion score	Target category	Inclusion sub-scores	Inclusion score	Target category	Inclusion sub-scores	Inclusion score
		Children			Persons of working age			Older persons		
Juana Azurduy	Social range	Entire category	1	1x0.11x1 = 0.11	0	0	0x0x1=0	0	0	0x0x1=0
	Age range	0-1 (2 years)	2/18= 0.11		0	0		0	0	
	Geograph-ical range	nationwide	1		Nation-wide	1		Nation-wide	1	
Juancito Pinto	Social range	Entire category*	1	1x0.67x1 = 0.67	0	0	0x0x1=0	0	0	0x0x1=0
	Age range	6**-17 (12 years)	12/18=0.67		0	0		0	0	
	Geograph-ical range	nationwide	1		Nation-wide	1		Nation-wide	1	
Renta Dignidad	Social range	0	0	0x0x1=0	0	0	0x0x1=0	Entire category	1	1x1x1=1
	Age range	0	0		0	0		>=60 (60-80=21 years)	21/21=1	
	Geograph-ical range	nationwide	1		Nation-wide	1		Nation-wide	1	
National inclusion score per target category				0.11+0.67 +0=0.78			0+0+0=0			0+0+1=1

*all children, including children with disabilities

**Entitlement starts with enrolement in primary school; I take age 6 as an estimate.

Table 7.3.1 (continued)

Pro-gramme	Dimension of inclusion	Target category	Inclusion sub-scores	Inclusion score	Target category	Inclusion sub-scores	Inclusion score	Target category	Inclusion sub-scores	Inclusion score
		Adults with disabilities			Small groups			Poor people		
Juana Azurduy	Social range	0	0	0x0x1=0	One small group	1x0.1=0.1	0.1x1x1= 0.1	0	0	0x1x1=0
	Age range	0	0		Maximum***	1		Maximum***	1	
	Geograph-ical range	Nation-wide	1		Nationwide	1		Nationwide	1	
Bono Juancito Pinto	Social range	0	0	0x0x1=0	0	0	0x1x1=0	0	0	0x1x1=0
	Age range	0	0		Maximum***	1		Maximum***	1	
	Geograph-ical range	Nation-wide	1		Nationwide	1		Nationwide	1	
Renta Dignidad	Social range	0	0	0x0x1=0	0	0	0x1x1=0	0	0	0x1x1=0
	Age range	0	0		Maximum***	1		Maximum***	1	
	Geograph-ical range	Nation-wide	1		Nationwide	1		Nationwide	1	
National inclusion score per target category				0+0+0=0			0.1+0+0 =0.1			0+0+0=0

Source: the author; FLOORCASH-SocCit.

*** The age coverage of the target categories of small groups and poor people reaches by definition the maximum (see section 4.4.5).

7.3.2 Comparing the national inclusiveness profiles across the global South

In this section I present the *national inclusiveness profile* of each country in the global South in the form of bar charts (Figures 7.3.2-1 – 7.3.2-4). Each bar represents the *national social cash transfer arrangement* of one country. The national social cash transfer arrangements are mapped in view of the extent to which each target category in the country is directly entitled to social cash transfers (on the condition that the members of the target category are classified as poor). The segments within each bar correspond to the *national inclusion score* of each target category, up to the maximum score of 1 (see section 7.3.1). So, the segments depict the extent to which each of the six target categories is included in the national social cash transfer arrangement. However, it is important to start “reading” the bar from bottom to top, since the target category of poor people (placed at the bottom of the bar) may include all the other target categories (see section 7.2.3).

In order to keep the number of incomplete profiles low, particular missing values for the dimension of age are extrapolated and the dimension of age is entirely skipped for the target category of adults with disabilities (see section 5.4 on the handling of missing values).



Figure 7.3.2-1 National inclusiveness profiles in Africa

Source: Weible and Leisering 2019, p. 196, FLOORCASH-SocCit; N=29; data for Morocco and Djibouti is missing; profiles of Botswana, Egypt, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Tunisia are incomplete due to lack of data (for details see section 5.4).



Figure 7.3.2-2 National inclusiveness profiles in Latin America

Source: Weible and Leisering 2019, p. 198; FLOORCASH-SocCit; N=31; data for Nicaragua is missing; profiles of Bahamas, Belize, and Peru are incomplete due to lack of data (for details see section 5.4).



Figure 7.3.2-3 National inclusiveness profiles in Asia

Source: Weible and Leisering 2019, p. 197; FLOORCASH-SocCit; N=40; data for Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates is missing; profiles of Bahrain, East Timor, Jordan, Malaysia, Qatar, Syria, and Yemen are incomplete due to lack of data (for details see section 5.4).



Figure 7.3.2-4 National inclusiveness profiles in Oceania

Source: the author; FLOORCASH-SocCit; N=5; data for Tuvalu is missing.

The profiles open up a huge diversity in inclusiveness among the national social cash transfer arrangements. The countries differ both with respect to the number and types of target categories included and with respect to the degree of inclusion (inclusiveness). A few countries address all six target categories and to a high extent, such as Mauritius and Egypt (Figure 7.3.2-1). Other countries address a single category only, but to the full extent, such as Thailand (older persons) and Palestine (poor people) (Figure 7.3.1-3). Other countries, by contrast, hardly address anyone, since their social cash transfer programmes were at a pilot stage as of 2012/13, such as Rwanda (poor people), Senegal (children up to including age 5, orphans and vulnerable children up to including 17), and Haiti (children at primary school age) (Figures 7.3.2-1 and 7.3.2-2). Further countries limit their social cash transfers to a tiny social group, such as Afghanistan ("martyrs´ families") and Bhutan (monks) (Figure 7.3.1-3).

Evidently, the national social cash transfer arrangements across the global South are very heterogeneous. Even the four continents do not clearly represent similar groups of countries (for a comparison of the continents including some patterns see Weible and Leisering 2019, pp. 196–199). And when we focus on low-income countries such as Niger, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe in Africa, Haiti in Latin America as well as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal in Asia, they can hardly be described as a homogeneous world of social cash transfers (see the inclusiveness profiles of the low-income countries in Africa and Asia in Weible and Leisering 2019, pp. 203–204). Despite the diversity, we may identify some patterns which I discuss in the subsequent section 7.4

The national inclusiveness profiles also make the extent of *exclusion within target categories* evident (findings in section 7.2.4). When inquiring exclusion, it is important to check at first, whether a country addresses the target category of poor people (bottom segment in the profiles), since these non-categorical entitlements may compensate the lack of categorical entitlements to social cash transfers (see section 7.2.3). South Korea, for example, addresses neither children, nor persons of working age, nor adults with disabilities, but any poor individual is entitled to social cash transfers through a poor people programme, the *National Basic Livelihood Security System* (Figure 7.3.2-3). However, as I found out above, only one third of the countries provide non-categorical entitlements through poor people programmes (see section 7.2.2). In the vast majority of countries, categorical exclusions are consequently not compensated by poor people programmes (non-categorical entitlements).

Within-category exclusions from national social cash transfer arrangements take many shapes. If we take the example of the target category of children, we find that in some countries the years of life covered are very limited, such as in South Sudan (children up to 30 months; Figure 7.3.2-1). In other countries, only subcategories of children are targeted such as in Fiji (children of female-headed households, of prisoners and of foster parents; Figure 7.3.2-4). In again other countries such as in the Dominican Republic, some of the social cash transfer programmes address only selected parts of the country, which affects the inclusion of children, particular young adults of working age, and pregnant women (geographical targeting; Figure 7.3.2-2). India, an emerging economy as one of the BRICS countries and famous for its public employment programme, combines all three factors of exclusion with respect to *children* (Figure 7.3.2-3): The only social cash transfer programme in India that addresses children is designed for the small group of girls with insurance cover from age 6 to 18, living in selected areas (inclusion score of 0.02). As there is no poor people programme in India to compensate exclusions from entitlements, the low level of inclusion of the target category of children implies that almost all children in India considered poor remain excluded from any direct entitlement to a social cash transfer.

So, above all, in those countries without a (fully inclusive) poor people programme, all three dimensions taken into account in the inclusion index contribute to the exclusion of target categories (social range and age range of target groups as well as geographical range of programmes). The national inclusiveness profiles do not permit to trace how many programmes a national social cash transfer arrangement consists of and which programmes account for which share of inclusion of each target category.

The national inclusiveness profiles illustrate the different strategies of including target categories by either categorical entitlements or by non-categorical entitlements (*poor people programmes*) or by combining both categorical and non-categorical approaches (see section 7.2.3). Taking the example of the inclusion of older persons, we see that South Korea and Kazakhstan include older persons by both categorical programmes and poor people programmes (non-categorical entitlements), since both the target category of older persons and the target category of poor people are included in the national social cash transfer arrangements. By contrast, many countries include older persons in their national social cash transfer arrangement only through categorical programmes, such as Algeria and Colombia. As a third alternative, Benin and Sri Lanka include the category of older persons only through a poor people programme (and to a limited extent). I take the different strategies of inclusion further towards a classification of the national social cash transfer arrangements in the following section 7.4.

7.4 Classifying countries: Patterns of inclusion in national social cash transfer arrangements

Keeping the enormous variety of national inclusiveness profiles in mind, how might we classify the huge diversity of national social cash transfer arrangements?[318] The analyses in the preceding sections revealed that the national social cash transfer arrangements of the countries differ in at least two aspects of inclusion. The first aspect is the *targeting approach* as a particular *mode of inclusion* (see sections 6.1.3 and 6.1.6). The second aspect is the *scope* understood as the *extent of inclusion* (see sections 6.3 and 7.3). I suggest classifying the national social cash transfer arrangements by these two aspects.

The *targeting approach* (mode of inclusion) is defined as the way by which countries include the citizens defined as poor and/or vulnerable in the national social cash transfer arrangements, namely either through categorical targeting only (categorical entitlements in categorical programmes) or through non-categorical targeting (non-categorical entitlements in poor people programme) or through both categorical and non-categorical targeting (through a combination of categorical and non-categorical programmes or combined programmes; see section 7.2.3).[319] If a national social cash transfer arrangement addresses categorically constructed target categories only (children, persons of working age, older persons, adults with disabilities, small groups), it follows the *categorical targeting approach*. An example of categorical targeting is Bolivia, which has installed three categorical social cash transfer programmes (see section 7.3.1) and addresses the categories of children, older persons, and small groups (section 7.3.2). If a national social cash transfer arrangement addresses the target category of poor people only, it follows the *non-categorical targeting approach*. An example is Ethiopia, since its national social cash transfer arrangement addresses the target category of poor people only (by one poor people programme). If a national social cash transfer arrangement addresses both the non-categorically constructed category of poor people and categorically constructed target groups, it follows a *mixed targeting approach*. To give an

[318] For an early version of a few aspects of the following analysis of countries in view of inclusiveness, see Weible and Leisering 2019, p. 194.

[319] Strictly speaking, a *targeting approach* may refer to further mechanisms of how the target groups are defined (see section 2.2.1), but I limit the term here to the distinction between categorical and non-categorical selection.

example, Sri Lanka addresses both the target category of poor people and children (by two different programmes; see the national inclusiveness profiles in section 7.3.2).

The *scope* (extent of inclusion or *inclusiveness*) is defined as the extent to which a national social cash transfer arrangement includes each target category, measured by the inclusion index. I use two scores to measure inclusiveness: the first is the national inclusion score of the target category of poor people, which is the score of non-categorical inclusion (short: *non-categorical inclusion score;* see section 7.3.1 on the construction of the national inclusion scores). This score is zero for all countries which do not address the target category of poor people. The second score is the score of categorical inclusion (short: *categorical inclusion score)* of the national social cash transfer arrangement. I calculate this score as the mean of the inclusion scores of the four main target categories which are categorically constructed (children, persons of working age, older persons, adults with disabilities (without age limit)).[320] [321] This score is zero for all countries that only address the target category of poor people. The *categorical* and *non-categorical inclusion scores* of each country are then compared. The higher one of the two scores is taken as the *overall inclusion score* of a country, which indicates the inclusiveness of a national social cash transfer arrangement (first column from the left in Table 7.4-1).[322] [323]

In Table 7.4-1 the national social cash transfer arrangements of each country are classified by targeting approach (categorical, non-categorical, mixed) and scope. For those countries which follow the mixed targeting approach, both the categorical and non-categorical inclusion scores are indicated.

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[320] Inclusion scores of single target categories that account to ”zero” are fully included when calculating the average of the four target categories.

[321] The categorical inclusion score does not take into account that the target categories cover different numbers of years of life (see section 6.1.3), so it should not be interpreted as the share of the population (all citizens) who are included, but rather as the average share of citizens included in the target categories.

[322] This is relevant to all the countries that follow the mixed targeting approach. Countries that follow either the categorical or the non-categorical targeting approach by definition score zero in the non-categorical and in the categorical inclusion scores, respectively.

[323] A cluster analysis to classify countries by target configuration and inclusiveness (inclusion score per target category) failed.

Table 7.4-1 Classification of national social cash transfer arrangements in view of inclusion (targeting approach and scope)

Scope (extent of inclusion)	Targeting approach^ (mode of inclusion)			Number of countries
	Categorical targeting	Mixed targeting	Non-categorical targeting	
Largely inclusive/ near universal	**Complementary-near universal arrangements**	**Dual-near universal arrangements**	**Uniform-near universal arrangements**	
(overall inclusion score 0.75 - 1)	JAM 1.00	MUS 0.86*/ 1.0	PSE 1.000	
	CHN-HKG 0.96	ARM 0.51/ 1.0		
	URY 0.88*	AZE 0.51*/ 1.0		
	MNG 0.75	BRA 0.70/ 1.0		
	ZAF 0.75	CHL 0.71/ 1.0		
		CHN 0.39* / 1.0		
		CHN-MAC 0.48/ 1.0		
		COK 0.67/ 1.0		
		GEO 0.47/ 1.0		
		KAZ 0.54* /1.0		
		UZB 0.72/ 1.0		
		CHN-TWN 0.25/ 1.0		
		KOR 0.19/ 1.0		
		PAK 0.08/ 1.0		
		EGY 0.85*, **/ 0.5		
		VEN 0.75/ 0.5		
Sub-total	n=5 (5%)	n=16 (16%)	n=1 (1%)	n=22 (22%)
Partially inclusive/ selective	**Multiple-selective arrangements**	**Dual-selective arrangements**	**Uniform-selective arrangements**	
(overall inclusion score 0.26-0.74)	ARG 0.61*	BEN 0.25/ 0.5	DMA 0.500	
	ATG 0.30	GNB 0.25/ 0.5	LCA 0.500	
	BGD 0.53	LKA 0.025* / 0.5	MOZ 0.500	
	BHS 0.47*, **	PAN 0.13/ 0.5	NER 0.500	
	BOL 0.44	BHR [cat miss] / 0.5		
	BRB 0.43	BWA 0.49**/ 0.5		
	BRN 0.63*	CRI 0.57/ 0.5		
	COL 0.51	GUY 0.34* / 0.5		

	CPV 0.50	JOR [cat miss] / 0.5		
	DOM 0.66*	MEX 0.38/ 0.5		
	DZA 0.50	QAT [cat miss] / 0.5		
	ECU 0.67	SUR 0.50/ 0.5		
	FJI 0.58	SWZ 0.50* / 0.5		
	GTM 0.41	TTO 0.54/ 0.5		
	IDN 0.30	VCT 0.44* / 0.5		
	IND 0.64	ZWE 0.35* / 0.5		
	IRQ 0.58*	MYS [cat miss] / 0.5		
	KGZ 0.74*			
	KNA 0.48			
	MDV 0.49			
	NAM 0.68			
	NPL 0.39			
	OMN 0.55			
	PHL 0.26			
	PRY 0.48			
	SGP 0.33*			
	SYC 0.49			
	TJK 0.66			
	TKM 0.50			
	VNM 0.36*			
Sub-total	n=30 (30%)	n=17 (17%)	n=4 (4%)	n=51 (51%)
Slightly inclusive/ exclusionary	**Multiple-exclusionary arrangements**	**Dual-exclusionary arrangements**	**Uniform-exclusionary arrangements**	
(overall inclusion score 0-0.25)	CUB 0.08*	KEN 0.111/ 0.063	ETH 0.250	
	GHA 0.25*	LBR [cat miss] / 0.063	MWI 0.063	
	HND 0.13	UGA 0.024/ 0.063	RWA 0.063	
	HTI 0.01	NGA [cat miss]/0.25	ZMB 0.063	
	ISR 0.24*	TUN [cat miss]/0.25		
	KHM 0.003	YEM [cat miss]/0.25		
	KIR 0.25			
	LSO 0.19			
	NRU 0.25			
	PER 0.12**			

	SEN 0.01			
	SLV 0.18			
	SSD 0.03			
	THA 0.25			
	TZA 0.04*			
	WSM 0.19			
	AFG***			
	BTN***			
Sub-total	n=18 (18%)	n=6 (6%)	n=4 (4%)	n=28 (28%)
Total	n=53 (53%)	n=39 (39%)	n=9 (9%)	N=101 (100%)

Source: the author; FLOORCASH-SocCit; for the country acronyms, see Appendix 5.4; data for the following 12 countries is missing: KWT, ARE, SAU, SYR, TLS, BLZ, DJI, IRN, MAR, NIC, SLE, TUV.

Percentages indicate the share of countries out of the total number of countries with data available (N=101).

*(Partly) extrapolated values due to lack of data; for details, see section 5.4.

** Incomplete values due to lack of data, score might be higher; for details, see section 5.4.

***The national social cash transfer arrangements of AFG and BTN target small groups only. Although the target category of small groups is not included in the analysis here, we may add the two countries to the group of national social cash transfer arrangements with multiple-exclusionary inclusion.

[cat miss]: Data on the categorical inclusion score is missing.

^ Definition of the *targeting approaches*: *Categorical targeting*: categorical inclusion score >0, non-categorical inclusion score: 0; *mixed targeting*: categorical inclusion score >0, non-categorical inclusion score >0; *non-categorical targeting*: con-categorical inclusion score>0, categorical inclusion score: 0.

Table 7.4-1 presents distinct patterns of inclusion in national social cash transfer arrangements. As regards the frequency of *targeting approaches*, the Table indicates that the vast majority of countries either follow the *categorical targeting approach* (53 countries) or they *combine categorical and non-categorical targeting* (39 countries). By contrast, only nine countries follow a purely *non-categorical targeting approach*.

As regards the *scope* of the national social cash transfer arrangements, the Table clearly demonstrates that only one fifth of the national social cash transfer arrangements (22%; 22) are *largely inclusive* and *“near universal”*. This means that in these countries at least 75% of the members of the target categories on average are entitled to social cash transfers if they classify as poor according to the relevant national regulations.

The biggest group among the largely inclusive national social cash transfer arrangements consists of those 16 countries that provide both non-categorical and categorical entitlements to social cash transfers. By combining categorical and non-categorical programmes, they achieve *dual-near universal inclusion* of their citizens classified as poor and/or vulnerable.[324] This means that at least one target category is entitled to categorical social cash transfers, in addition to the non-categorical entitlement of *poor people*.

Another five national social cash transfer arrangements are limited to categorical programmes, which complement each other in such a systemic way that the countries reach *complementary-near universal inclusion*. One example is Hong Kong, which follows the categorical approach, unlike the other Chinese territories Taiwan, and Macao as well as mainland China, which follow the mixed targeting approach. Both strategies result in largely inclusive national social cash transfer arrangements.

The State of Palestine is the only territory which follows the non-categorical targeting approach and which achieves large (and even *full*) inclusion (*uniform-near universal inclusion*). All other national social cash transfer arrangements that follow the non-categorical targeting approach are only partially inclusive (Dominica, St. Lucia, Niger, Mozambique) or even slightly inclusive (the Sub-Sahara African countries Malawi, Rwanda, and Zambia with pilot programmes and Ethiopia with a geographically limited programme). Bestowing only some or a few poor people respectively, with entitlements to social cash transfers, they have *uniform-selective arrangements* and *uniform-exclusionary arrangements*, respectively.

Half of the national social cash transfer arrangements, that is the majority of the countries (51 out of 101), achieve only *partial inclusion* of the citizens classified as poor. This means that in these countries on average between 26% and 74% of the members of the target categories are entitled to social cash transfers if they classify as poor according to the relevant national regulations.

Most of them (30 out of 51) follow the categorical approach with one or several categorical programmes, adding up to *multiple-selective arrangements*. This group constitutes the largest group among all national social cash transfer arrangements (30%; 30 out of 101 countries). So

[324] I chose the term „dual" following Eardley and colleagues' type of "dual social assistance" (Eardley et al. 1996a, p. 169).

nearly one third of the countries address their poor and/or vulnerable citizens through categorical social cash transfer programmes but include only parts of the target categories.

Another 17 countries also include the target categories only in parts, but they combine non-categorical and categorical entitlements to social cash transfers. This leads to *dual-selective inclusion* of the target categories that are considered poor and/or vulnerable.

Around one quarter of the national social cash transfer arrangements (28; 28%) are only *slightly inclusive*, that is they include on average only around 25% or less of the members of the target categories if they classify as poor. In view of such low inclusion, I speak of *exclusionary* national social cash transfer arrangements.

18 out of the slightly inclusive national social cash transfer arrangements only consist of categorical programmes, which results in *multiple-exclusionary inclusion*.

Another six countries combine the two targeting approaches, which entails *dual-exclusionary inclusion*.

Table 7.4-1 also shows that only 16 countries provide *full inclusion* of the population classified as poor (maximum overall inclusion score of 1), that is *all members of all target categories* are entitled to a social cash transfer if classified as poor. This equals 11% of all 148 countries and 15% out of the 110 countries with social cash transfer programmes and data on the target groups available. It is remarkable that almost all national social cash transfer arrangements that are fully inclusive follow the mixed targeting approach, that is they complement non-categorical entitlements by further categorical entitlements to social cash transfers (such as Chile and Pakistan). The State of Palestine remains an exception as the only fully inclusive national social cash transfer arrangement based on non-categorically targeting only. And Jamaica (and, with qualifications, Hong Kong[325]) are exceptions as the only fully inclusive national social cash transfer arrangements based on categorical targeting only. When we compare the categorical and non-categorical inclusion scores of those countries which follow the mixed targeting approach and which are fully inclusive, we find that all these countries achieve full inclusion due to *poor people programmes* (rather than due to the

[325] Hong Kong´s inclusion score in the category of children is slightly less than 1 because all children are entitled to a social cash transfer until (including) age 14 only. From age 15 children are considered as persons of working age and either have to have to work for (insufficient) income or to attend school or receive professional education in order to qualify for social cash transfers. As, according to my definition, the target category of working age starts at age 18 only, an entitlement gap emerges for the category of children.

categorical programmes). The non-categorical poor people programmes evidently play a crucial part with respect to *full* inclusion.

In conclusion, the patterns of the mode and extent of inclusion demonstrate that countries mostly resort to *categorical* programmes to construct and complement, respectively, their national social cash transfer arrangements (with a few exceptions of which most are Sub-Saharan low-income countries). At the same time, the country classification reveals that most countries of the global South have a selective (partially inclusive) national social cash transfer arrangement. This finding confirms the exclusion of target categories and of subcategories, respectively, from entitlements in national social cash transfer arrangements (sections 7.2.3 and 7.2.4).

When we analyse the *largely inclusive* and even more so, the *fully inclusive* national social cash transfer arrangements, the non-categorical targeting approach (with a poor people programme only) remains a rare exception (Palestine). But purely categorical targeting approaches that reach large or even full inclusion are neither frequent. Most countries with largely and fully inclusive national social cash transfer arrangements *combine* the categorical and non-categorical targeting approach. This might suggest that the non-categorical targeting approach is crucial to constructing largely inclusive and even more so, fully inclusive national social cash transfer arrangements – but only in combination with categorical *complements*. As opposed to non-categorical programmes, the widespread categorical entitlements open space for *categorical differentiation* (see sections 7.5, 10.2.3, and 10.3).

In addition to the patterns of inclusion, Table 7.4-1 reveals nine *clusters of national social cash transfer arrangements*, which differ in the mode of inclusion (targeting approach) and extent of inclusion (inclusiveness). How may the nine clusters be described? Table 7.4-2 depicts the nine clusters of national social cash transfer arrangements by prevalence across world regions and country income groups, derived from Table 7.4-1.

Table 7.4-2 Prevalence of the nine clusters of national social cash transfer arrangements across world regions and country income groups*

Scope (extent of inclusion)	Targeting approach (mode of inclusion)		
	Categorical targeting	Mixed targeting	Non-categorical targeting
Irrespective of extent**	Asia, Latin America, Africa Lower-middle-income, upper-middle-income	Asia, Africa, Latin America Upper-middle-income, lower-middle-income	(Eastern) Africa, (Latin America) Low-income (Upper-middle-income)
Largely inclusive/ near universal	**Complementary-near universal arrangements** Global South High-income, Upper-middle-income	**Dual-near univeral arrangements** Western Asia, Central Asia, Eastern Asia Upper-middle-income, lower-middle-income (high-income)	**Uniform-near universal arrangements** (Palestine) -
Partially inclusive/ selective	**Multiple-selective arrangements** Asia, Latin America Lower-middle-income, upper-middle-income (high-income)	**Dual-selective arrangements** Global South Upper-middle-income	**Uniform-selective arrangements** Sub-Saharan Africa, Caribbean Low-income, Upper-middle-income
Slightly inclusive/ exclusionary	**Multiple-exclusionary arrangements** Global South Lower-middle-income	**Dual-exclusionary arrangements** Africa Low-income, Lower-middle-income	**Uniform-exclusionary arrangements** Eastern Africa Low-income

Source: the author; FLOORCASH-SocCit.

*World Bank classification of 2015, based on data of 2013; GNI calculations use the World Bank Atlas method; see http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups, accessed 6 January 2017.

** See Appendix 7.4-1 on the classification of national social cash transfer arrangements by targeting approach and continent as well as Appendix 7.4-2 on the classification of national social cash transfer arrangements by targeting approach and country income group.

As regards the prevalence of the *targeting approaches*, we find that both the categorical and the mixed targeting approach are prevalent in middle-*income* countries *across the global South* (Table 7.4-2, first row). This is clearly in contrast to the non-categorical approach, which is, above all, followed by low-income countries in Africa.

With respect to the *scope* (*inclusiveness)*, a link to a particular *continent* is evident (Table 7.4-2, three bottom rows): half of the exclusionary national social cash transfer arrangements are located in Africa. Moreover, some of the nine clusters are found in particular world regions only: the *dual-near universal* national social cash transfer arrangements are mostly located in Western, Central, and Eastern Asia, the *dual-exclusionary* arrangements are found in Africa only (with the exception of Yemen), and the *uniform-exclusionary* arrangements were identified in Eastern African countries only.

Once more with respect to *inclusiveness*, Table 7.4-2 indicates that the largely inclusive national social cash transfer arrangement prevail in high-income and upper-middle-*income countries*, whereas the exclusionary arrangements dominate in lower-middle- and low-income countries. It is striking that not a single low-income country achieves near-universal inclusion of poor citizens. This suggests a link between the inclusiveness of a national social cash transfer arrangement and the income of a country. But the crosstabluation of national social cash transfer arrangements by inclusiveness and country income group demonstrates that the correlation is not straightforward (see Appendix 7.4-3). The finding that there might be a link between national income and inclusiveness is possibly confirmed by the latest *State of Social Safety Nets* Report (although the object of study of the Report is not identical and although the measure used is *coverage* rather than *entitlement*).[326] The Report states that the coverage rates of social assistance/social safety nets among the poorest quintile of the population is highly correlated with the level of income of the countries: the lower the country income group, the lower the share of the quintile who receive support of any of these programmes (World Bank 2018b, pp. 32, 35).

How may the *country income groups* be described? When we explore the relationship between the *income of a country and the targeting approach* of a national social cash transfer arrangement, we find that most high-income and upper- and lower-middle-income countries

[326] See sections 2.4.2 and 4.2 on the difference between the measures of *coverage* and *entitlement*; see section 2.1.4 on social safety nets; the figures published by the World Bank are taken from the ASPIRE database, which is based on household surveys, see section 2.5.2.

respectively follow the categorical approach (between 53% and 68%), a smaller share of these countries follow the mixed approach (between 29% and 42%), and very few follow the non-categorical approach (between 0% and 6%; Appendix 7.4-2). By contrast, the low-income countries follow the categorical, non-categorical, and the mixed targeting approach, respectively, to a similar extent (slightly more than one third categorical, slightly less than one third non-categorical, one third mixed approach). So, the share of (purely) non-categorically constructed national social cash transfer arrangements is considerably larger among low-income countries compared to middle and high-income countries.

If we attempt to characterize the four *continents by targeting approach* (see Appendix 7.4-1), we find that the national social cash transfer arrangements that follow the *categorical* targeting approach dominate on all continents. But whereas in Latin America the share of categorically constructed national social cash transfer arrangements amount to 63%, this share is lower in Asia (56%) and in Africa (42%). In Africa, the shares of national social cash transfer arrangements that follow the categorical targeting approach and the share of arrangements that follow the mixed targeting approach is nearly equal (42% and 39%, respectively). In Oceania, nearly all national social cash transfer arrangements provide only categorical entitlements to social cash transfers.

Africa is outstanding, as regards the non-categorical targeting approach: Whereas the non-categorical approach is (nearly) absent in Oceania, Asia, and Latin America, it is comparatively widespread in Africa, where we find non-categorically constructed national social cash transfer arrangements in one out of five countries with social cash transfers.

Finally, how do the *continents* perform *in view of overall inclusiveness* of their national social cash transfer arrangements? Whereas around two thirds of the Latin American countries and half of the Asian countries have *partially* inclusive national social cash transfer arrangements, around half of the African countries and half of the Oceanian countries remain with *exclusionary* national social cash transfer arrangements (Table 7.4-1; percentages not indicated). The share of countries with *near universal* national social cash transfer arrangements differs remarkably among the continents. Remarkably, one out of three arrangements is largely inclusive in Asia, whereas only one in six arrangement is largely inclusive in Latin America. In Africa, only 10% of the national social cash transfer arrangements are largely inclusive. These findings are reflected in the national inclusiveness profiles of the four continents (see section 7.3.2).

The findings on Africa seem to confirm two social cash transfer "models" proposed in the literature (see section 2.3.2): the *Middle Africa model* identified by Niño-Zarazúa and colleagues (Niño-Zarazúa et al. 2010; Niño-Zarazúa et al. 2012), in particular as regards the prevalence of the non-categorical targeting approach in low-income countries; and the *low-income and fragile cash transfers* identified by Garcia and Moore (2012, pp. 48–50), especially in view of the generally low overall inclusiveness in low-income countries.

7.5 Discussion and interim conclusion: National social cash transfer arrangements between inclusion and exclusion

What can we conclude from the findings on the entitlement to social cash transfers in the countries of the global South? Who is included in national social cash transfer arrangements, who remains excluded? The large n analysis of national social cash transfer arrangements facilitates, for the first time, a comprehensive assessment of the scope of countries across the global South. In this section, I present seven theses to answer the questions that I have inquired in this Chapter and to discuss the findings.

First, social cash transfers have indeed reached a global scale, but their spread across the global South varies to a great extent. The programmes are spread all over the global South (and North; see Bahle et al. 2011). By 2012/13, a large number of programmes (282) could be identified on all Southern continents, on average 1.91 social cash transfer programmes per country (referring to all the 148 Southern countries). These figures seem to confirm the "Global Rise of Social Cash Transfers" (title of Leisering 2019) and the "Development Revolution from the Global South" (subtitle of Hanlon et al. 2010). The global spread also suggests that social cash transfers have become popular not only among global development actors and international organisations (Gliszczynski and Leisering 2016), but also among the *national* governments across the global South.

But although global of scale, the "rise" and the "revolution" have not reached all states and territories alike, but only 76% of the countries (113). Whereas (nearly) all countries in Latin America and Asia have at least one programme, in the middle African region not a single social cash transfer programme could be identified. Even among the countries with social cash transfer programmes, the number of programmes as well as the target categories addressed differ considerably. This confirms Barrientos´ statement that the expansion of social assistance has been "uneven across regions and countries" (Barrientos 2018a). I qualify and refine this rather general statement by uncovering world regional patterns and patterns related to the national income of the countries (section 7.4).

The sharp differences between countries and world regions underline that it is not sufficient to analyse single world regions to make qualified statements on the "world" of social cash transfers as has been common so far (see section 2.1), since the observations may not necessarily be transferable to other regions of the global South. Instead, a global analysis including all Southern countries is required – as presented in this doctoral dissertation.

Second, national social cash transfer arrangements often support the early and the late stages of life, but most of them are far from including all citizens defined as poor and/or vulnerable throughout the life course.

When comparing the incidence of target categories with three traditional life cycle stages identified in life course research - childhood/youth, working age, and old age - (Leisering 2003, p. 208),[327] it becomes evident that social cash transfers address childhood and old age as well as the (adult) life with disabilities, since the target categories of children, older persons, and adults with disabilities are most frequently addressed by both programmes and national social cash transfer arrangements. By contrast, persons of working age (without disability) are hardly addressed. If we also consider non-categorical entitlements, we find that around two thirds of all 148 Southern countries include children, older persons, and adults with disabilities if classified as poor, but only 43% of the countries include persons of working age in their national social cash transfer arrangements (if classified as poor; section 7.2.3). This suggests that most national social cash transfer arrangements leave a wide gap in the middle of the life course. The finding contrasts sharply with European welfare states, where entitlements of persons of working age constitute a major part of the minimum income protection systems (Bahle et al. 2011, p. 222).

What is more, the social cash transfers which address persons of working age are limited to persons who are unemployed (with two exceptions[328]). This means that those persons of working age who are not unemployed, but underemployed (without sufficient employment) or

[327] From a perspective of life course research, social policies structure life courses of individuals as so-called "life course policies" (see Leisering 2003).

[328] Morocco addresses persons who suffer from a "reduction in employment"; Israel includes also the "working poor".

"working poor" (with employment, but insufficient income) are not even considered in the analyses in this Chapter.[329]

Moreover and in contrast to what the life course approach suggests, entitlements of children to social cash transfers are not necessarily available contiuously during childhood, but are sometimes linked to particular periods within childhood, above all the school age (see Appendix 6.1.3, Tables 6.1.3-1 and 6.1.3-2). This suggests that entitlements to social cash transfers are often not only interrupted in the middle of the life course, but they are sometimes patchy *within* a stage of life, too.

The life course perspective is limited to the aspect of *age*, ignoring other factors of how entitlements to social cash transfers are restricted. Additional limitations such as a restricted social range of the target groups and a restricted geographical range of the programmes make entitlements even more fragmented (see sections 6.2 and 7.2 as well as the subsequent paragraph).

Third, most national social cash transfer arrangements across the global South reveal a fragmented landscape of particularized social cash transfer entitlements, due to the categorical construction of most entitlements on the one hand and due to the selective inclusion of target categories on the other hand.

The analyses revealed that entitlements to social cash transfers are mostly categorically constructed, since the target groups which the programmes address are categorically constructed (for the link between target groups and entitlements see section 6.1.2). In the analysis of the targeting approaches of national social cash transfer arrangements, we found that - with few exceptions - countries implement *categorical* social cash transfer programmes: either only categorical programmes (53% of the countries with social cash transfers) or categorical programmes complemented by poor people programmes (another 39% of the countries; see section 7.4). As the categorical construction always implies a *confinement* of entitlements to the target group(s) in question, entitlements to social cash transfers are mostly confined to one or several categorically constructed target groups. Following the country approach with a focus on the national social cash transfer arrangements of the countries, we found that single programmes that are categorically constructed (and therefore categorically limited, too) may add up to a comprehensive national social cash transfer arrangement to

[329] To recall, I do not take the public employment programmes into account, which have increased in number across the global South (Subbarao et al. 2013).

include *all* life cycle categories plus adults with disabilities (see section 7.3). However, such complementary social cash transfer arrangements are very rare. The remaining entitlement gaps might be compensated for by non-categorically programmes that address poor people (*poor people programmes*). However, we found that first, not even half (44%)[330] of the national social cash transfer arrangements address poor people (section 7.2.2) and that second, even if poor people are addressed, on average only a bit more than half of the target category is included in the national social cash transfer arrangement (section 7.2.4). This means that the categorical limitations of single programme are often not compensated for by other (categorically or non-categorically constructed) social cash transfer programmes. As a consequence, national social cash transfer arrangements remain patchy, with significant shares of citizens classified as poor excluded from entitlements to social cash transfers, depending on the country and on the target category.

Moreover, the social cash transfer programmes frequently address subcategories rather than the entire target categories (see Appendix 6.1.1 and section 6.1.2), which makes the structures of national social cash transfer arrangements even more patchy. In addition to that, half (50%)[331] of all national social cash transfer arrangements address the target category of small groups (section 7.2.2). Therefore, many target groups consist of small and even tiny fractions of the overall poor population. I interpret these findings as evidence for a *fragmentation* of entitlements to social cash transfers.

The fragmentation of national social cash transfer arrangements is underpinned by the finding that each national social cash transfer arrangement consists of 2.50 social cash transfer programmes on average (see section 7.2.1). If we compare this figure with the minimum income protection systems in the European Union, we find that EU systems comprise even 4.8 programmes on average (Bahle et al. 2011, p. 196, Table 4.4). However, practically all EU countries have *poor people programmes* (general social assistance schemes; Bahle et al. 2011, p. 196). This is a big difference to most Southern countries. Consequently, when compared to the European systems of minimum income protection, the Southern social cash transfer arrangements appear as less differential, but as much more fragmented and patchier.

[330] 48 out of 110 national social cash transfer arrangements with data on the target categories available. This corresponds to 33% of all 148 countries, as indicated in Figure 7.2.2, section 7.2.2.

[331] 55 out of 110 national social cash transfer arrangements with data on the target categories available. This corresponds to 38% of all 148 countries, as indicated in Figure 7.2.2, section 7.2.2.

In those national social cash transfer arrangements which combine categorical and non-categorical targeting strategies at least some target groups and target categories respectively are “dually” included in the national social cash tranfer arrangement (see sections 7.3.2 and 7.4). How come this double treatment? The answer is simple: different categories might have different conditions of entitlements. Categorical construction of entitlements may open space not only for particularization of entitlements, but also for *differentiation* among poor and vulnerable citizens. To find out more about such differentiation, I analyse the conditions of access to social cash transfers in the following Chapter 8.

Fourth, the vast majority of the national social cash transfer arrangements are only partially inclusive or even exclusionary, leaving large shares of the citizens defined as poor excluded from (direct) entitlements.

Half (51) of the national social cash transfer arrangements are only partially inclusive (section 7.4). This means that on average, between more than a quarter but less than three quarters of the members of the target categories (if classified as poor) are entitled to a social cash transfer. Further 28% (28) of the national social cash transfer arrangements are only slightly inclusive, which means that on average, at most a quarter of the members of the target categories are entitled to a social cash transfer if classified as poor. In at least ten out of these 28 countries only a few percent of the members of the target categories are included. Although these countries have installed at least one social cash transfer programme, still, with few exceptions, nearly all the persons and households who qualify as poor remain excluded from (direct) entitlements to a social cash transfer.

At the other extreme, we find the national social cash transfer arrangements which are largely inclusive/ near universal, that is on average at least three quarters of the members of the target categories are entitled to a social cash transfer if classified as poor. But these cases represent only 22% (22) of the national social cash transfer arrangements (section 7.4). And when we search for arrangements in which *all* persons and households who are considered poor are entitled to a social cash transfer, we find that only 15% of the national social cash transfer arrangements are truely universal by design (16 countries, that is 11% of all 148 countries respectively).

The figures suggest that the extent of inclusion in national social cash transfer arrangements across the global South is by and large moderate. Depending on the country, the extent of inclusion ranges from universal inclusion to “collective exclusion” of the citizens classified as poor. These findings are crucial to assess social citizenship of poor persons across the global South (Chapter 10).

It is striking that almost all national social cash transfer arrangements which are fully inclusive, follow the mixed targeting approach, that is they complement non-categorical entitlements by further categorical entitlements to social cash transfers (section 7.4). But they are fully inclusive due to a poor people programme. We may draw two conclusions from these findings:

First, poor people programmes - and more precisely, the non-categorical targeting approach - seem crucial for achieving full inclusion (the inclusion of all persons and households considered poor) in the national social cash transfer arrangements. This issue becomes relevant in view of (global) claims to *universal* social protection, such as the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* with its principle of "leaving no one behind" (see section 10.2.3).

Second, national social cash transfer arrangements with entitlements for the target category of poor people *only* seem hardly viable. Additional entitlements for particular categories seem required, possibly because categorical entitlements open space for categorical differentiation (see "third" above in this section). This issue becomes relevant when particular categories are considered as more deserving than other categories (see my discussion in section 10.3).

Fifth, the extent of exclusion from (direct) entitlements to social cash transfers varies considerably by country, by target category, and by subgroups within target categories.

Contributing novel aspects to research on social cash transfers, I identified three levels of exclusion: countries, target categories, and subcategories. Nearly one quarter of all countries in the global South (24%; 35 countries) do not run any social cash transfer programme as of 2012/13 (section 7.1). Consequently, no one in these societies is entitled to any social cash transfer in case of poverty.

If we look at those countries which have installed social cash transfer programmes we find that entire life cycle categories are not entitled to any social cash transfer in between 11% and 43% of these countries, depending on the target category, although these countries do run social cash transfer programmes (section 7.2.3).[332] In these cases, I speak of *excluded stages*

[332] The percentages refer to the white segments of the bars below the dotted line in Figure 7.2.3, section 7.2.3. Unlike in Figure 7.2.3, the shares now refer to the 110 *countries with social cash transfers* and for which data on the target categories is available. 12 out of 110 countries (11%) exclude older persons and 47 out of 110 countries (43%) exclude persons of working age from their national social cash transfer arrangements.

of life, since the life cycle categories are excluded from the national social cash transfer arrangements.

Even if countries include a target category in their national social cash transfer arrangement, this does not necessarily mean that all members of this category are (directly) entitled to a social cash transfer. Instead, depending on the target category, between 13% and more than half of the members of the target categories remain excluded from the national social cash transfer arrangements due to a restricted social range of the target groups, a limited age range of the target groups, and/or a restricted geographical range of the programmes (section 7.2.4).[333] The target category of persons of working is the category which is most frequently excluded (in terms of the number of countries that do not address this category; section 7.2.3) and which is excluded to the highest degree (referring to the global country-based inclusion score; section 7.2.4).

The analysis of entitlements to social cash transfers by target category brings to light sharp differences between the target categories. These differences might reflect different normative orders and different degrees of political commitment. Further below I argue that different public perceptions of deservingness linked to the target categories might contribute to explaining the differences between the target categories (section 10.3).

The exclusion of target categories and, even more so, exclusion within target categories in the programme designs has been ignored in research on social cash transfers so far (with few case studies as exceptions, such as Schubert 2020). The findings have implications for assessing social citizenship across the global South (Chapter 10).

We should keep in mind that the inclusion and exclusion I measure refer to the programme designs only and do not take implementation deficits into account. As we know from a study on *conditional cash transfers* in Latin America, implementation often lags *behind* the programme design (de la O 2015, p. 40). Moreover, exclusion errors tend to be high, which means that large shares of the citizens who are entitled to social cash transfers do not receive any transfer in practice (see the discussion by Barrientos on the example of Brazil´s *Bolsa Família;* Barrientos 2013a, pp. 138–140, for example). What is more, some programmes such as Zimbabwe´s *Support for families in distress* have persisted on paper only, but not in

[333] These factors of exclusion correspond to what Davy mentions as *targeting mechanisms* in developing countries, based on her analysis of the state party reports under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), submitted between 2000 and 2009, as regards ICESCR Articles 9 and 11 (Davy 2014, p. 260).

practice (communication via email with interview partner no. 7, June 7th 2018; for the list of interviews, see FLOORCASH-SoCit version 4 (Leisering and Weible 2020)). Another issue is that this Chapter on the scope of countries is restricted to those aspects which I consider most relevant as regards the dimension of inclusion (social range, age range, geographical range; see section 4.4.5 on the inclusion index). Yet programmes may have further conditions of access such as means tests, maximum number of transfers per household, behavioural conditions (see analysis in Chapter 8) as well as family liability rules. If we recognize that these further conditions may constitute further barriers and limitations to entitlements to social cash transfers, the actual extent of inclusion of people defined as poor and/or vulnerable is supposed to be at an even lower level than found in this Chapter. Keeping all these aspects in mind, the findings on the inclusiveness of national social cash transfer arrangements should rather be interpreted as the supposed *maximum* levels of inclusion. In practice, inclusion is probably lower.

Sixth, although the national social cash transfer arrangements across the global South vary extremely in view of whom they include and to what extent, patterns by world region and by country income group become visible.

The inclusiveness profiles of the single countries in the global South demonstrate that the world of social cash transfer entitlements is most diverse (section 7.3.2). But when comparing the national social cash transfer arrangements in view of their overall inclusiveness, we see clear patterns by world region and by country income group (section 7.4). Even the targeting approaches of the national social cash transfer arrangements seem to follow regional patterns (section 7.4). The analysis of the poor people programmes reveals world regional patterns, too (section 6.1.6). Finally, even the spread of social cash transfer programmes across the global South reveals some patterns related to world regions, since (nearly) all countries of the Latin American continent and all countries in Southern Africa had introduced social cash transfer programmes by 2012/13, but not a single country in Middle Africa (section 7.1). All these findings suggest that the scope of social cash transfers, the ways of how poor and/or vulnerable persons are included and to what extent, might be related to geographical regions and to the national income of the countries.

*Last, the country approach proved as essential to assess the scope of social cash transfers and in order to find out who is entitled to social cash transfers across the global South***.**

This study is the first to apply the country approach to entitlements to social cash transfers at a global scale (entire global South). The investigation underlines that knowledge not only on the *inclusion* of target groups, but also on the *exclusion* of target groups is imperative when assessing the scope of social cash transfers. It underpins that analysing social cash transfers in view of social citizenship is much more than analysing single programmes. What is more, the analysis in this Chapter suggests that the more we scrutinize the inclusiveness of entitlements to social cash transfers in depth, the more exclusions and limitations we may find, which have been concealed and remained unconsidered so far. Against this backdrop, the country approach might revolutionize the comparative large n analysis of social cash transfers across the global South.

8 What conditions of access? The rights principles of social cash transfers

How “conditional” are entitlements to social cash transfers in the global South?[334] In the preceeding Chapters 6 and 7 I studied who is entitled to social cash transfers. Now I continue the analysis of social cash transfers, inquiring the *conditions of access* to entitlement in this Chapter. What conditions must individuals and households meet in order to be entitled to a social cash transfer? I use “conditions” in a broader sense, referring to the *rights principles* which are linked to the entitlements to social cash transfers. This understanding includes but is not limited to the widely debated behavioural conditions. I rather study three kinds of rights principles:

1. *means testing*: Are the entitlements to social cash transfers dependent upon a maximum level of income and on being classified as poor, respectively, that is, is the financial situation of the applicants tested (section 8.1)?
2. *degree of individualization*: Are the entitlements to social cash transfers designed as payments for individuals or for entire households (section 8.2)?
3. *behavioural conditions*: Are the entitlements to social cash transfers complemented by certain duties in terms of activities (section 8.3)?

Each of the three aspects has produced debates in the literature with pros and cons (see section 4.6). Due to the extensive debates, I consider these three conditions of access the most relevant rights principles linked to entitlements to social cash transfers. Inquiring the three conditions of access in this Chapter facilitates a comprehensive empirical picture of the rights principles linked to entitlements to social cash transfers across the global South.

Unlike the scholars involved in the debates, I do not argue in favour or against the conditions of access in question. Instead, I analyse *empirically* what conditions of access are defined in the *design* of social cash transfers programmes. Refraining from judgements on the rights principles is important from the perspective of social citizenship, since (social) citizenship is an open concept to be defined and adapted by each society according to the given circumstances and conditions (see section 3.2.1). When explaining the concept of citizenship, Marshall emphasized that there is „no universal principle that determines what those rights

[334] For an early version of the following analysis of conditions of access to entitlements, see Weible and Leisering 2019, pp. 169–171.

and duties [with which the status of citizenship is endowed; K.W.] shall be“ (Marshall 1950, pp. 28–29). Therefore, an analysis of the “rights and duties” linked to social cash transfers in view of the concept of social citizenship requires an analytical approach which is able to comprehend the huge empricial sprectrum of different rights principles. So, in this Chapter on the social citizenship dimension of rights principles, the conditions of access to entitlements to social cash transfers are analysed empirically, but not judged (see section 4.6).

This Chapter focuses on the results of the empirical analyses. The background to the analyses is provided in Chapter 4, with an outline of the context of each condition of access in section 4.6.

8.1 Means-tested or “universal” entitlements?

To what extent are social cash transfers in the global South means-tested?

Means tests “require potential beneficiaries to provide information on their income and assets, which programme mangers use to determine eligibility” (Barrientos 2013a, p. 114). Depending on the programme objectives, the means test is applied as an instrument to concentrate the support on the poor(est) sections and to exclude the wealthy population from entitlements respectively (for a classification of means tests in social pension programmes, see Böger and Leisering 2017, pp. 18–19). Programmes which do not apply a means test are often referred to as “universal” programmes (see sections 3.1.2 and 4.6.1). In my view, the term “universal” may be misleading, since restrictions other than a means test such as social and age-related aspects to define the target group may also apply to those programmes (see section 6.1.2). That is why I prefer the term “non-means-tested” programmes.

Table 8.1-1 provides an overview of means tests in the design of social cash transfer programmes.

Table 8.1-1 Means-tested social cash transfers, by target category (Social cash transfer programmes which apply a means test out of all programmes that address the target category)

	Programmes with a means test, per target category	Valid N (programmes that address the target category)	Programmes with mixed means testing, within (*) and across (**) target categories respectively	Missing values
Children	92 (80.7%)	114	6 (2*[335] + 4**; 4.8%)	11
Persons of working age	19 (82.6%)	23	-	4
Older persons	87 (83.7%)	104	6 (2*[336] + 4**; 4.7%)	1
Adults with disabilities	75 (83.3%)	90	5 (1*[337] + 4**; 5.3%)	4
Small groups	56 (83.6%)	67	1** (1.3%)	9
Poor people	54 (100%)	54	4** (7.5%)	-
All programmes (irrespective of target categories)	204 (80.3%)	254	10 (4.6%; 5*+5**[338])	28

Source: the author; FLOORCASH-SocCit; N= 254.

[335] Girls *with disabilities* are exempted from the means test in Bangladesh; *displaced* and *indigenous* families with children are exempted from the means test in Columbia.

[336] In China, the *Urban Residence Old Age Pension* is means-tested, in contrast to the *New Type Rural Social Pension*; in Hong Kong, the transfer to older persons between 65 and 69 is means-tested, and no means test is applied from age 70.

[337] In Nepal, the transfer to *partially* disabled persons is means-tested, in contrast to the transfer to *fully* disabled persons.

[338] Under Kenya´s *Hunger Safety Net Programme*, transfers to the target category of poor people are means-tested, but older persons are exempted from the means test. Under Kyrgyzstan´s *State Minimum Benefit,* transfers to older persons are means-tested, while transfers to children with disabilities, adults with disabilities, orphans, children living with HIV/AIDS, and families with many children are exempted from the means test. Under Malaysia´s *Financial Assistance for Single Mothers*, transfers to orphans whose guardians cannot care for them, children of single mothers, children of prisoners, children of disabled parents without income, children of underpriviliged family, poor people, and adults with disabilities are means-tested, while children living with foster parents are exempted from the means test. Under the Tunisian *Programme National d'Aides aux Familles Nécessiteuses (PNAFN)*, transfers to children, older persons, poor people (including labour-restricted poor households and households without a breadwinner) are means-tested, while adults with disabilities and widows are exempted from the means test. In *Uganda Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment (SAGE)*, labour-restricted poor households are means-tested, while older persons are exempted from the means test.

As table 8.1-1 (bottom row) indicates, four out of five social cash transfer programmes (80.3%) are means-tested. Böger and Leisering indicate a similar (though slightly lower) share of means-tested programmes among the social (old age) pensions across the global South (76.9%; own calculations based on (Böger and Leisering 2017, p. 22, Table 4). Dodlova and colleagues identify a considerably lower share (52%) of means-tested programmes in their dataset *Non-contributory social transfer programs* (Dodlova et al. 2018, p. 55). The lower shares might be due to the much smaller number of programmes in their sample and due to their omission of programmes that address smaller groups including (all) "the disabled" (Dodlova et al. 2018, p. 53; see my critical discussion in section 2.5.2). Evidently, means-tested social cash transfers are the "norm" in the global South.[339] This is in stark contrast to the widespread calls for "universal" programmes, above all as regards old age pensions (Kidd 2015; Ellis 2012, for example).

Surprisingly, the share of means-tested programmes is similar across the target categories – except for the category of poor people. All social cash transfers which address the category of poor people are means-tested. This was to be expected, since a social cash transfer programme that follows the non-categorical targeting approach must be means-tested by definition, otherwise it would constitute a "universal" and "unconditional" basic income grant (see section 3.1.2). Universal basic income is, however, different from the definition of social cash transfers as payments to *persons who are considered poor and/or vulnerable*.[340]

Ten programmes with mixed means testing could be identified. Whether these programmes apply a means test depends on the target category and sometimes even on the subcategory. The programmes differ with regard to the target groups which they exempt from the means tests. A target group may be exempted in one programme, but it may be subject to a means test in another programme. To give a few examples, orphans and adults with disabilities are exempted from the means test under Kyrgyzstan´s *State Minimum Benefit*, they are means-tested in Malaysia. In one of Kenya´s pilot programmes and in Uganda, older persons are exempted from the means test, but this target category is means-tested in Tunisia and in

[339] As I show further below in this section, the share of programmes which apply a means test is lower among subcategories of children.

[340] A non-means-tested social cash transfer to *subgroups* of the category of poor people, such as labour-constrained households, might be imaginable, but could not be identified anywhere.

Kyrgyzstan (see footnotes in Table 8.1-1).[341] Five programmes even differentiate between target groups within the same target category. According to these programmes, the following criteria justify exemptions from the means test: higher age among older persons, higher degree of disability among adults with disabilities, conflict victims as well as indigenous families with children (among all poor families with children) and girls with disabilities (among all girls).

So, at least the findings on the programmes with mixed means testing suggest that the target group may matter after all with respect to the issue of means testing. Table 8.1-2 distinguishes between programmes which target the entire category (such as all children) and programmes which target subcategories (such as orphans and children with disabilities; for the distinction between the different social ranges of target groups, see section 4.4.1; for the inventory of target groups, see Appendix 6.1.1).

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[341] In Kyrgyzstan, the means test consists of a pension test which checks whether the applicants receive an old age pension rather than whether they receive any income (see Böger and Leisering 2017, pp. 18–19 who provide a classification of means tests in social pension programmes).

Table 8.1-2 Means-tested social cash transfers, by target category and by the social range of the target group

	Social range of the target group				N	Missing values
	Entire target category		Subcategory			
Target category	Means-tested programmes per target category	n	Means-tested programmes per subcategory	n		
Children	42 (91.3%)	46	50 (73.5%)	68	114	11
Persons of working age[342]	8 (80.0%)	10	11 (84.6%)	13	23	4
Older persons	77 (83.7%)	92	10 (83.3%)	12	104	1
Adults with disabilities	64 (87.0%)	77	11 (84.6%)	13	90	4
Small groups[343]	-	-	56 (83.6%)	67	67	9
Poor people[344]	19 (100%)	19	35 (100%)	35	54	0

Source: the author; FLOORCASH-SocCit; N= 254; data on 28 programmes is missing.

Table 8.1-2 illustrates that among the social cash transfer programmes that address children, the share of means testing differs depending on whether the programmes address the entire category of children or only a subcategory of children such as orphans and children of single parents. Among the programmes that address subcategories of children, less programmes are means-tested (74%) if compared to the programmes that address the entire category of

[342] The non-means-tested programmes for subgroups of persons of working age are education programmes for young adults, such as Argentina´s *Jóvenes con más y major trabajo,* and for young adults with lack of primary or secondary education. One of the two non-means-tested programmes for the entire category of persons of working age is India´s MNREGA. It is a so-called "self-targeted" programme, for which the benefit level is so low that only poor people are assumed to apply for it. The second non-means-tested programme for persons of working age is Uruguay´s *Unemployment Assistance*, which can be characterized as a blend of social assistance and social insurance, since access depends on having worked at least six months in the 12-month period before unemployment.

[343] The category of small groups consists of subcategories by definition, due to the due to the small numbers and residual features of the groups (see section 4.4.1).

[344] Social cash transfer programmes which follow the non-categorical targeting approach are by definition means-tested (see explanations on Table 8.1-1 further above in this section; for details on poor people programmes, see sections 6.1.6, 6.4.3, and 6.4.4).

children (91%). In other words, if social cash transfers that address children are non-means-tested, they target subgroups of children only, with few exceptions.[345]

As regards the programmes that address the other target categories, only slight, if any differences in the share of means-tested programmes are noticeable if the programmes are compared by the social range of their target groups.

In conclusion, some differences between subcategories (rather than between the target categories) can be identified as regards the means test. But these differences are not as evident as in the dimension of inclusion (Chapters 6 and 7).

The aspect of the means test is important in another respect. As the Tables 8.1-1 and 8.1-2 indicate, the programmes that apply a means test address both categorical and non-categorical target groups. At the same time, I identified programmes that do not apply a means test and that address social groups who are exclusively defined by criteria other than poverty, which I call criteria of *vulnerability* (biological, social, and work-related aspects; see sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2). The findings suggest that there are three basic modes of how social cash transfer programmes construct their target groups, depending on the targeting approach and on whether they apply a means test (see Table 8.1-3).

[345] The rare exceptions are Bolivia´s *Juancito Pinto* for children aged 6 to including 17, the *Child Welfare Payments* of the Cook Islands for children up to 12 years, Mongolia´s *Child Money Programme* for children up to 18, and South Sudan´s *Child Benefit Cash Transfer Programme* for children up to 30 months.

Table 8.1-3 How social cash transfer programmes define their target groups: programmes by targeting approach and means test

		Targeting approach	
		Categorical targeting n=200	Non-categorical (and mixed) targeting[346] n=54
Means test	Means-tested[347]	Citizens considered poor and vulnerable (59.1%; 150 programmes)	Citizens considered poor [348] (21.3%; 54 programmes)
	Non-means-tested	Citizens considered as vulnerable (regardless of means) (19.7%; 50 programmes)	All citizens (0)[349]

Source: the author; FLOORCASH-SocCit; N=254; data on means testing is missing for 22 programmes and data on the target groups is missing for further 6 programmes.

From Table 8.1-3 we may conclude that social cash transfer programmes have three main target populations:

1. persons and households who are considered poor (non-categorical entitlements through means-tested programmes)
2. persons and households who are considered as *vulnerable* (categorical entitlements through non-means-tested programmes)
3. persons and households who are considered as *both poor and vulnerable* (categorical entitlements through means-tested programmes).

Table 8.1-3 indicates that most social cash transfer programmes (59%) address persons and households that are considered as both poor and vulnerable. One fifth of the programmes (21%) address persons and households classified as poor, without any reference to criteria of vulnerability (for criteria of vulnerability, see section 6.1.2). Altogether, means-tested programmes account for 80 percent of all social cash transfer programmes. This confirms that the vast majority of social cash transfer programmes is designed to address persons and

[346] For details see Table 6.4.3, section 6.4.3.

[347] Some programmes apply a means test for some of their target groups only, see Table 8.1-1 further above in this section.

[348] For details see Table 6.1.6 in section 6.1.6.

[349]Transfers that address the entire population (all citizens) are not defined as social cash transfers; see further above in this section.

households who qualify as poor (according to the relevant national regulations). Against this background, it might be legitimate to speak of social cash transfers as “social assistance” as often done in the literature (see section 3.1.2). Another fifth of the programmes (20%) addresses persons and households who are defined in terms of vulnerability only. The findings confirm that it is correct to define social cash transfers as payments to those “considered poor and/or vulnerable” as done in this doctoral dissertation (see section 3.1.1 above).[350]

Table 8.1-3 also demonstrates that no country has introduced a basic income grant for all citizens so far, since all social cash transfer programmes which address the target category of poor people are means-tested. Evidently, if social cash transfers are non-means-tested, they are limited to certain target categories or even to subcategories. The examples of *Otjivero* in Namibia, *Renda Basica de Ciudadanía* in Brazil, and pilot projects in India, often quoted in the literature as flagship programmes, are *civil society initiatives* at the level of villages (Gliszczynski 2015, p. 65), which do not come under my definition of social cash transfers as publicly financed transfers. The finding that not a single non-means-tested social cash transfer programme could be identified complements the assessment by von Gliszczynski in view of global discourses on development policy. In his view, universal basic income “has, to date, not been discussed as an alternative to SCT [social cash transfers; K.W.]” (Gliszczynski 2016, p. 98).

8.2 Degree of individualization: Entitlements of individuals or households?

Are entitlements to social cash transfers entitlements of individuals or households? Whether social cash transfers are and whether they should be payments to individuals or households has been an issue in continuing debates in the literature (e.g. Schubert 2020; see also section 4.6.2). I claim that the question above may be answered based on empirical data on the programme designs. Consequently, this section contributes an innovative analysis to the

[350] Dodlova and colleagues present a table of how „targeting methods“ are combined in social cash transfer programmes (Dodlova et al. 2018, p. 55, Table 2). As they distinguish different types of means tests (means test, proxy-means test, community based targeting) and as they include self-targeting and geographical targeting (both of which are not relevant to define target groups in terms of vulnerability and poverty; see section 6.1.2), the figures are difficult to compare. In addition to that, their sample of programmes is much smaller (see section 2.5.2).

debate on "individuals versus households" by assessing the *degree* of individualization of social cash transfers across the global South, based on empirical figures. This has not been done before.

I argue that the issue of "individuals versus households" is not a question of black or white, but rather a complex issue which comprises several aspects: first, whether the target group is described as individual persons or as households (*unit of intervention*; section 8.2.1); second, if the target groups are households, whether all members of the households are taken into account for calculating the volume of the transfer (*composition of the transfer volume*; section 8.2.2); third, whether transfers are *limited to a maximum number of transfers per household* (section 8.2.3). In order to assess the degree of individualization of social cash transfers I develop an *individualization index* based on all three aspects of individualization (section 8.2.4). The index makes it possible to assess the overall degree of individualization of social cash transfers across the global South, separately per target category (section 8.2.5).

8.2.1 The unit of intervention: individuals versus households

In this doctoral dissertation, social cash transfer programmes are defined as programmes which provide payments "*to individuals and households considered poor and/or vulnerable*" (section 3.1.1) According to this definition, social cash transfers may have two distinct units of intervention: individuals and households (see also section 6.1.2). I define the *unit of intervention* as the persons who, according to the programme design, are entitled to a social cash transfer (see section 4.2). To find out whether the units of intervention are individuals or households, I analyse the target groups of the social cash transfer programmes.

Are the target groups described as individuals or households? Table 8.2.1 indicates how many social cash transfer programmes target individuals and how many target households, separately per target category. If a programme addresses both individuals and households *within the same target category* (such as orphans as individuals and families with children with disabilities as households), I classify its unit of intervention as *mixed*.

Table 8.2.1 The units of intervention of social cash transfer programmes, by target category

Target category	Units of intervention			N	Missing values
	Individuals	Households	Mixed		
Children	51 (42.5%)	65 (54.2%)	4 (3.3%)	120	5
Persons of working age (without disability)	15 (62.5%)	9 (37.5%)	-	24	3
Older persons	84 (83.2%)*	17 (16.8%)	-	101	4
Adults with disabilities	58 (71.6%)*	22 (27.2%)	1 (1.2%)	81	13
Small groups	33 (51.6%)	30 (46.9%)	1 (1.6%)	64	12
Poor people	10 (19.6%)	41 (80.4%)	-	51	3

Source: the author; FLOORCASH-SocCit.

* Mongolia´s *Conditional Cash Benefit* targets persons who nurse and care old people and persons with disabilities under permanent medical services; in this case I determine the unit of intervention as the carer as an individual.

N indicates the number of programmes which address a target category and for which data is available.

Table 8.2.1 demonstrates that the differences between the target categories are immense. Most social cash transfer programmes which address older persons, adults with disabilities, and persons of working age respectively target individuals (83%, 72%, and 63% of the programmes respectively). By contrast, most programmes which address children and - above all - poor people target households (54% and 80% of the programmes respectively). This might help explain why the social cash transfers designed for these two target categories are sometimes summarized as “family support” (Dodlova et al. 2016, 2018). The figures suggest that the answer to the question whether social cash transfers target individuals or households crucially hinges on the target category.

As I argue below, the unit of intervention does not necessarily permit an assessment of the degree of individualization of social cash transfers, since this is a more complex issue. That is why I introduce a set of indicators to measure the degree of individualization of social cash transfers precisely in the subsequent sections.

8.2.2 Composition of the transfer volume

How is the volume of the social cash transfers composed? Social cash transfers that target individuals are individually composed transfers by definition, since the amount of the transfer is calculated and composed for one beneficiary (the individual). By contrast, transfers that target households are not necessarily individually composed transfers. The empirical analysis revealed that social cash transfers that target households may be composed in three different ways: the amount of the transfer may either be designed as a flat rate transfer for the entire household, regardless of the size and composition of the household; the transfer volume may be individually composed, that is all household members are taken into account to determine the transfer volume; or the transfer volume may be individually composed in parts, that is, some household members are taken into account to determine the size of the transfer, while other members of the household are not taken into account. I analyse these distinctions by means of the variable *composition of transfer volume.* It permits to analyse to what extent the amounts of the transfers are individually composed. Table 8.2.2 depicts the composition of the transfer volumes, separately per target category.

Table 8.2.2 Composition of transfer volume in social cash transfer programmes, by target category (number of programmes per target category)

	Composition of the transfer volume			N	Missing values
	Consistently individual composition	Partially individual composition	Flat rate transfer		
Children	57 (50.9%)	41 (36.6%)	14 (12.5%)	112	13
Persons of working age (without disability)	14 (70.0%)	4 (20.0%)	2 (10.0%)	20	7
Older persons	85 (85.0%)	6 (6.0%)	9 (9.0%)	100	5
Adults with disabilities	62 (79.5%)	8 (10.3%)	8 (10.3%)	78	16
Small groups	37 (62.7%)	12 (20.3%)	10 (16.9%)	59	17
Poor people	25 (53.2%)	7 (14.9%)	15 (31.9%)	47	7

Source: the author; FLOORCASH-SocCit.

N indicates the number of programmes which address a target category and for which data is available.

As Table 8.2.2 indicates, the transfer volume is individually composed in most social cash transfer programmes (consistently individual composition). Depending on the target category, the share of these programmes amounts to between 51% and 85% out of all the social cash transfer programmes which address the target category. The share of programmes with individually composed volumes is highest among the programmes that address older persons and adults with disabilities (85% and 80% respectively) and lowest among the programmes that address children and poor people respectively (51% and 53% respectively).

Surprisingly, programmes with flat rate transfers, which provide a standard amount irrespective of the household composition, constitute a minority in nearly all target categories, with shares between 9% and 17% of the programmes (with the exception of the target category of poor people, see below). This is in contrast to what the literature suggests (section 4.6.2). But as regards the share of programmes with flat rate transfers, there is one exception among the target categories: nearly one third (32%) of the social cash transfer programmes that address poor people provide flat rate transfers. This suggests that a considerable part of the transfers to the target category of poor people are indifferentiate transfers to households rather than individually composed transfers, which is distinct from the other target categories.

As mentioned above, in some social cash transfer programmes the volume of the transfer is composed by taking into account only *particular* individuals among the household members. These programmes with *partially individual composition* of the transfer volume are comparatively small in numbers, but, again, with one exception: these programmes account for one third (37%) of the programmes that address children. Typically, conditional cash transfers that address poor families with children are composed by a flat rate transfer for the household plus an additional amount for each child. In these cases, only the children of the household are taken into account for the composition of the transfer volume. Partially individually composed transfer volumes are also found among the programmes that address persons of working age. Four of these programmes (20%) take the composition of the household into account *to some degree*. As regards the programmes which address poor people, partially individual transfer volumes are based on different kinds of partial composition.[351] In most cases, they comprise a flat rate transfer plus a supplement for particular household members such as children, persons with disabilities, and older persons.[352]

8.2.3 Limitation to a maximum number of transfers per household

As my in-depth empirical analysis of programme designs brought to light, there is another aspect that may limit the degree of individualization of the transfer volume. Even if the composition of a transfer is partially or entirely individualized, the volume may be capped at a maximum number of transfers per household. I analyse this aspect by means of the variable *maximum per household.* It permits to analyse to what extent social cash transfers are limited to a maximum number of transfers per household. Flat rate household-related transfers (see previous section 8.2.2) imply by definition a maximum of transfers per household, namely one transfer per household.

Table 8.2.3 displays the shares of social cash transfer programmes which restrict the number of transfers per household, separately per target category.

[351] Jordan´s *National Aid Fund* does not take into account the number of household members to add up different components of the transfer volume, but rather the income earned by the household members to substract parts from the maximum benefit level. Any income received by one of the family members decreases the benefit received by 25 per cent of the income amount up to the level when it is eliminated. This way mingles the composition of the transfer volume with a kind of means test.

[352] Examples are Armenias *Paros*, which adds a supplement for each child in the household, and Ethiopia´s *HSNP*, which provides supplements for children, older persons and adults with disabilities.

Table 8.2.3 Social cash transfer programmes with and without a maximum number of transfers per household, by target category

	Programmes ...		N	Missing values
	... with maximum per household	... without maximum per household		
Children	45[353] (40.5%)	66 (59.5%)	111	14
Persons of working age (without disability)	4 (21.1%)	15 (78.9%)	19	8
Older persons	20 (20.6%)	77 (79.4%)	97	8
Adults with disabilities	18 (23.7%)	58 (76.3%)	76	18
Small groups	24 (42.1%)	33 (57.9%)	57	19
Poor people	32 (68.1%)	15 (31.9%)	47	7

Source: the author; FLOORCASH-SocCit.

Table 8.2.3 demonstrates that most social cash transfer programmes do not restrict the number of transfers per household. In nearly all target categories, the share of programmes that limit the number of transfers per household ranges between 21% and 42%. Above all, programmes that address older persons, adults with disabilities, and persons of working age, respectively, pay the transfers irrespective of the question whether further household members are entitled to the same transfers.

However, there is one exception among the target categories: more than two thirds (68%) of the social cash transfer programmes that address poor people apply a maximum per household. This share includes the 15 programmes (32%) of *flat rate* transfers identified in section 8.2.2 (Table 8.2.2). The remaining 36% consist of programmes that provide partially individually composed transfers and, above all, of programmes that provide entirely individually composed transfers. This underlines that some social cash transfer programmes limit the number of transfers per household, although the amounts of the transfers they pay are entirely individually composed.[354]

[353] Three programmes (2.7%) apply the maximum per household only to children of particular ages and to certain subgroups, respectively.

[354] One example is the *Palestinian National Cash Transfer Programme*, which decreases the additional amount paid for each household member after nine family members and which limits the maximum number of transfers to 17 household members.

With regard to the target category of children, a considerable share (41%) of the programmes that address children restrict the maximum number of transfers per household. Again, this share includes the 14 programmes (13%) of *flat rate* transfers identified in section 8.2.2 (Table 8.2.2). So, very similar to the findings on the category of poor people, more than one quarter of the programmes pay transfers that are (partially or entirely) individualized and limit the number of transfers per household at the same time. Evidently, an individualized composition of the transfers (even if partially individualized only) does not rule out a restriction of the number of transfers per household.

It is striking that the target category of poor people is the odd one out in all three respects relevant to the degree of individualization: it has the largest share of programmes that address households as the unit of intervention, the largest share of programmes that provide flat rate benefits, and the largest shares of programmes that limit the number of transfers per household. By contrast, the target categories of older persons, adults with disabilities, and persons of working age have the largest shares of programmes that address individuals as the unit of intervention, the largest shares of programmes that provide entirely individually composed benefits, and the largest shares of programmes that do *not* limit the number of transfers per household.

The last observation takes us to the issue of how these different aspects are combined, which I analyse in the subsequent section.

8.2.4 Constructing comparative measures III: The individualization index

The findings in the preceding sections suggest that the relevant aspects to determine the degree of individualization of social cash transfers - the unit of intervention, the composition of the transfer volume, and the restriction to a maximum number of transfers per household – are combined in different ways in the programme designs. Some programmes target households, but the benefit level is individually composed. Other programmes take some of the household members into account to define the benefit level, but not all household members (partially individual composition of the transfer). Again other programmes provide transfers that are individually composed (partially or entirely), but that apply a maximum number of transfers per household. These observations reveal variegated forms of individualization in social cash transfer entitlements. They underline how complex the issue of whether social cash transfers are individual or household transfers is and that it is not enough to focus on the unit of intervention only.

Taking into account all these variegated forms of individualization in social cash transfer entitlements, I construct another index, the *individualization index,* in order to measure to what degree social cash transfers are *individual* entitlements. I claim that both the composition of the transfer size as well as the aspect of a maximum per household determine the degree of individualization of the social cash transfers. That is why I combine both variables to construct the individualization index. The individualization index is an additive index, since both the composition of the transfer volume as well as the maximum per household may substitute each other. And the individualization index is a weighted index, in which the aspect of the composition of the transfer takes double weight. The index allows to measure the degree of individualization across a large number of social cash transfer programmes and separtely per target category. For details see section 4.6.2.

8.2.5 Individualization of social cash transfer entitlements across the global South

Now, to what extent are social cash transfers individualized entitlements?

Table 8.2.5 displays the degree of individualization of social cash transfers according to the individualization index presented in section 8.2.4, separately per target category and based on an analysis of all programmes. The values in square brackets refer only to those programmes that address the *entire* target category, not counting the programmes that address subcategories only.

Table 8.2.5 Degree of individualization of social cash transfers, number of programmes by target category

Target category	Degree of individualization (Score)				Average score per target category	N	Missing values
	High: Fully individualized transfer (6)	Medium: Partially individualized transfer (4)	Low: Subtly individualized transfer (2)	Extremely low: non- individualized transfer (0)			
Children	50 (45,9%)	21 (19,3%)	24 (22,0%)	14 (12,8%)	3.96	109	16
	[11 (25.0%)]	[9 (20.5%)]	[16 (36.4%)]	[8 (18.2%)]		[44]	[7]
Persons of working age	14 (73,7%)	1 (5,3%)	2 (10,5%)	2 (10,5%)	4.84	19	8
	[5 (62.5%)]	[1 (12.5%)]	[0 (0%)]	[2 (25.0%)]		[8]	[5]
Older persons	76 (78,4%)	9 (9,3%)	3 (3,1%)	9 (9,3%)	5.13	97	8
	[68 (79.1%)]	[9 (10.5%)]	[2 (2.3%)]	[7 (8.1%)]		[86]	[7]
Adults with disabilities	52 (70,3%)	12 (16,2%)	2 (2,7%)	2 (10,8%)	4.92	74	20
	[46 (70.8%)]	[11 (16.9%)]	[1 (1.5%)]	[7 (10.8%)]		[65]	[16]
Small groups	29 (51,8%)	11 (19,6%)	6 (10,7%)	10 (17,9%)	4.11	56	20
Poor people	14 (31,1%)	11 (24,4%)	5 (11,1%)	15 (33,3%)	3.07	45	9

Source: the author; FLOORCASH-SocCit.

Square brackets: without programmes that address subcategories only.

Table 8.2.5 indicates that, depending on the target category, between 31% and 78% of the social cash transfer programmes provide fully individualized transfers. This means that all members of the beneficiary unit are taken into account to determine the volume of the transfer and there is no maximum number of transfers per household. In these cases, we may speak of social cash transfers as *individual entitlements*. But there are considerable differences between the target categories. Above all, in the category of poor people the share of programmes with individualized transfers is much smaller (31%) compared to the other target categories, in which the share of programmes with individualized entitlements range between 46% and 78%. Therefore, I conclude that the majority of *categorical* entitlements (strictly speaking, of programmes that address the target categories which are categorically constructed; see section 6.1.2) consist of fully individualized transfers, whereas non-categorical entitlements (strictly speaking, programmes that address the target category of poor people) are entirely individualized to a much lower degree.

Transfers to older persons, to persons of working age (without disabilities), and to adults with disabilities are individualized to the highest degree: in these three target categories we find both the highest shares of programmes with entirely individualized transfers and the lowest shares of programmes with non-individualized transfers. Between 70% and 78% of the social cash transfer programmes that address one of these three target categories provide transfers that are entirely individualized, with the highest share in the category of older persons.[355] The average individualization score is highest in the target category of older persons.

Social cash transfers that address (families with) children[356] are individualized to a lesser extent than the other life cycle categories, including adults with disabilities. Moreover, we

[355] If we neglect the programmes that address subcategories of older people and of adults with disabilities respectively (see the values in square brackets), the shares of programmes with entirely individualized transfers remain nearly identical. This is different with regard to the category of persons of working age. If we omit all programmes that address *subcategories* of persons of working age, the shares of programmes with entirely individualized transfers change: then only two thirds (63%) of the programmes provide entirely individualized transfers and one quarter of the programmes pay non-individualized transfers (25%). Although interpretations should be made very carefully due to the small number of cases in this target category, we might conclude that among the programmes that address subcategories of persons of working age, the transfers are entirely individualized to a higher extent (see section 6.1.1 for examples of target groups).

[356] Examples of programmes that address children with *entirely individualized* transfers are Brazil´s *Brazil Carinhoso* and Kyrgyzstan´s *Unified monthly benefit programme*; examples of programmes that address (subcategories of) children (above all, orphans) with *partially individualized* transfers are Ghana´s *LEAP* and Yemen´s *Social Welfare Fund* (due to a maximum number of transfers per household) as well as Iraq´s *Social*

find a considerable difference between the degree of individualization among *all* the programmes that address children (including subcategories) and the degree of individualization among those programmes only which target the entire category of children (that is, without the programmes that target subcategories of children only). If we only focus on those programmes with transfers to the entire category of children, the share of programmes with entirely individualized transfers drops to 25%, as opposed to 46% among all programmes that address children. This suggests that above all the programmes that address subcategories of children such as children with disabilities and orphans provide transfers that are entirely individualized, whereas large shares of programmes with transfers to the entire category of (families with) children provide transfers with a medium and low degree of individualization (21% and 36%, respectively) or they are even flat rate household-related transfers (18%). As already mentioned in section 8.2.2, this is partly due to (mostly conditional) social cash transfer programmes to poor families that determine the transfer size depending on the number of children per family (partially individualized composition).

Social cash transfers to poor people are evidently least individualized, as reflected in the lowest average individualization score. In the target category of poor people we find both the highest share of programmes with non-individualized transfers (33%) and the lowest share of entirely individualized transfers (31%). The finding that one third of the programmes that address the category of poor people provide transfers that are *entirely individualized* is in contrast to the social cash transfer model of "general household assistance" identified in global discourses, about which von Gliszczynski found out that "[b]enefits are paid irrespective of household composition" (Gliszczynski 2015, p. 53). This underlines that the global models of social cash transfers are abstract and highly stylized (see section 6.4.3).

All in all, the scores based on the individualization index confirm the differences between the target categories discovered in the preceeding sections on the single aspects of individualization of social cash transfers. But the individualization index facilitates measuring the degree of individualization of social cash transfers in a standardized and simple manner, across targe categories.

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safety net and Timor Leste´s *Bolsa Mãe* (due to the partially individual composition of the transfer). Many conditional cash transfer programmes achieve a low degree of individualization only, as a result of the flat rate household-related transfer that is complemented by supplements for children only and as a result of the frequent rule that this supplement is paid only up to a maximum number of children per household. One example is Mexico´s *Oportunidades*.

8.3 Behavioural conditions or non-conditional entitlements?

Are entitlements to social cash transfers linked to behavioural conditions or are they non-conditional?

Table 8.3.1 depicts the shares of conditional and non-conditional social cash transfer programmes, separately by target category.

Table 8.3.1 Social cash transfer programmes with transfers that are linked to behavioural conditions, by target category

	Programmes with behavioural conditions	N	Missing values
Children	63*[357] (50.8%)	124	1
Persons of working age (without disability)	13 (56.5%)	23	5
Older persons	6[358] (5.9%)	101	5
Adults with disabilities	8 (9.3%)	86	8
Smaller groups	17 (25.4%)	67	9
Poor people	6[359] (11.3%)	53	1
All programmes (irrespective of target categories)	76*[360] (29.0%)	262	20

Source: the author; FLOORCASH-SocCit.

*includes programmes with mixed conditionality across subcategories and target categories, respectively.

[357] In four programmes the requirements for children are mixed. In three programmes, particular subcategories of children are exempted from the behavioural requirments: disabled children of unemployed single-mothers in the Dominican Republic´s *Programa Solidaridad*; orphans both in Pakistan´s *Bait-ut-Mal* and in Zimbabwe´s *Support for Children in difficult Circumstances*. In South Africa´s *Child Support Grant*, the conditionality starts only from age 7. Apart from these exceptions, Fiji´s *Care and Protection Allowance* imposes no "strong" behavioural condition, that is non-compliance is not sanctioned by reducing or cancelling transfers, it is rather a positive incentive, since the transfer is higher if the children attend school.

[358] Examples of programmes with conditional transfers are Jamaica´s *PATH*, Nigeria´s *COPE* and Panama´s *100 a los 70*. Conditions for older person usually refer to health-related activities.

[359] Examples are Nigeria´s *COPE*, Niger´s *Cash Transfer* and Panama´s *Red de Oportunidades*.

[360] 14 programmes impose behavioural conditions only on certain target categories.

As Table 8.3.1 shows, slightly more than one quarter (29%) of the programmes impose behavioural conditions on at least one target category. This share underlines that the vast majority of social cash transfer programmes does not impose behavioural conditions – despite the prominence of the model of the *conditional* cash transfers that sometimes seem to prevail in debates.[361]

Again, we find that the shares of *conditional* programmes differ extremely between the target categories. Whereas around half of the programmes that address children and persons of working age (51% and 57%, respectively) are conditional, conditional programmes that address older persons and adults with disabilities are comparatively rare (6% and 9%, respectively). As regards the target category of poor people, only 11 % of the programmes are conditional. This underlines that the issue of conditionality is closeling linked to the target categories of a social cash transfer programme.

14 programmes (18% of the programmes with behavioural conditions) have been classified as programmes with mixed conditionality. While the transfers to some target categories of one of these programmes are conditional, the transfers to other target categories of the same programme are non-conditional. Interestingly, the conditions are imposed on the category of children in each of the 14 programmes, whereas older persons, adults with disabilities, the category of poor people and/or widows do not have to meet any behavioural conditions.[362] Once more, this finding underlines that conditionality is linked to the target category, in some cases within one and the same programme.

Moreover, we find mixed conditionality even within the same target category. Among the programmes that address the target category of children, five conditional programmes exempt certain subcategories of children from the behavioural requirements: orphans, disabled children of unemployed single-mothers and children below age 7 do not have to meet the behavioural requirements as opposed to all the remaining children. This mixed conditionality

[361] Dodlova and colleagues find that 46% are conditional social cash transfer programmes (Dodlova et al. 2018, p. 55). This higher share might be due to the smaller sample of their dataset NSTP, including the omission of programmes that address smaller groups such as (all) “the disabled” (Dodlova et al. 2018, p. 53; see my critical discussion in section 2.5.2).

[362] In three programmes the conditions on the category of children are complemented by conditions on pregnant women (and partly on lactating mothers); and in two programmes the conditions on the category of children are complemented by conditions on persons of working age (vocational training). Examples of programmes with mixed conditionality are Chile´s *Ingreso Ético Familiar*, the Dominican Republic´s *Programa Solidaridad* and Pakistan´s *Benazir Income Support Programme.*

within one and the same target category suggests that under these programmes, behavioural conditons are evidently not considered as adequate in view of particular target groups.

In short, the findings underpin that the issue of conditionality depends on the target categories and in some cases on subcategories within a target category. These observations confirm the findings on the link between programme type and behavioural conditions in section 6.4.3, which suggest that the target groups of social cash transfer programmes play a central part with respect to the issue whether programmes apply behavioural conditions or not. This supports my approach to analysing conditionality separately per target category. The huge differences between the target categories, however, challenge any classification of *entire* programmes into either conditional or non-conditional programmes. And even more so, the findings challenge the assertion that countries would either opt for "unconditional" or for conditional cash transfers (Brooks 2015, p. 560) – a statement that is clearly rejected on the basis of FLOORCASH-SocCit. As a minimum requirement such a claim demands further qualifications, above all on the unit of analysis.[363] But even then, the argument seems hardly convincing empirically.[364]

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[363] Most probably Brooks limits her investigation to social cash transfers to the target categories of (families with) children and poor people. What is more, Brooks probably does not take into account the programmes that address subcategories only.

[364] I tested Brook´s hypothesis on the basis of FLOORCASH-SocCit and limited the cases to those programmes that address the target category of poor people and the *entire* target category of children respectively (that is, I excluded all programmes that address only subcategories of children), just as Brooks assumingly has done. Based on these qualifications, I can "confirm" that most countries opt either for a non-conditional or a conditional social cash transfer programme. However, this is due to the fact that they only have one programme that *either* addresses the entire target category of children *or* poor people. Apart from this general observation, I identified nine countries which evidently introduced social cash transfer programmes in a consistent manner with respect to conditionality across the two target categories of children and poor people, respectively: they have either two non-conditional or two conditional social cash transfer programmes or they use the same conditionality for children and poor people in the same programme. At the same time, however, I identified six countries that have a mixed "conditionality profile" as regards the categories of children and poor people: in these countries one programme that addresses one of the two target categories (usually children) is conditional and another programme that addresses the other one of the two target categories (usually poor people) is non-conditional.

8.4 Discussion and interim conclusion: Vastly individualized and non-conditional, but means-tested entitlements

Finally, how "conditional" (in the wider sense) are entitlements to social cash transfers across the global South? What conditions of access do individuals and households have to meet in order to be entitled to a social cash transfer?

The large n analysis facilitates, for the first time, a comprehensive assessment of the quality of the conditions of access to entitlements to social cash transfers. The findings in this Chapter suggest the following conclusions:

First, entitlements to social cash transfers are vastly means-tested, that is individuals and household have to qualify as poor in order to be entitled to a transfer. This supports the common descriptions of social cash transfers as transfers "to the poor" in the literature. At the same time the findings demonstrate that most social cash transfers address citizens who are considered as both poor *and* vulnerable at the same time, since most programmes combine categorical targeting (to address categories considered as vulnerable) with means testing (to address persons considered poor). In brief, social cash transfers address, above all, "the poor and vulnerable". This picture based on the empirical figures on all social cash transfer programmes across the global South is new.

What is more, the empirical figures demonstrate that the juxtaposition of "targeted (means-tested) versus (categorical-)universal" programmes, frequently constructed in the literature (see section 4.6.1), cannot be confirmed empirically. Instead, most programmes combine the two targeting aproaches by defining their target population as both "means-tested *and* categorical".

Second, entitlements to social cash transfers are individualized to a large extent. This comes as a surprise, since social cash transfers are commonly viewed as household transfers in the literature and in global discourses, with the exception of social pensions (see section 4.6.2). But the empirical figures suggest that most social cash transfer programmes (and not only social pensions) put the emphasis on the *individual* as the right holder, which makes the entitlement (entirely or partially) independent from the household composition.

Arguments that social cash transfer may increase individuals´ social status (in family relations and in terms of respect shown to them by others) have been put forward by human rights organizations such as Helpage International[365] (see Barrientos and Lloyd-Sherlock 2011, p. 5, for example). These arguments, based on *individual experience* reported in case studies, seem to be underpinned by the findings in my *large n* analysis of the *programme designs*.

At the same time the findings of largely individualized entitlements to social cash transfers confirm a study on the relationship between human rights and social citizenship by Davy (2014), based on the state party reports under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Davy finds that between 2000 and 2009, when the states describe their policies under Article 9 (Right to social security) and Article 11 (Right to an adequate standard of living), they emphasize *individual* (rather than collective) welfare, that is "welfare of individuals belonging to groups deemed vulnerable" (Davy 2014, p. 259).[366] This is a new development, starting around 1993, which Davy interprets as a shift in the "states´ perception and understanding of social rights" (Davy 2014, p. 263; see also the discussion in section 10.2.3).

Moreover, the finding of largely individualized entitlements is in accordance with findings from an analysis of the global discourses around social cash transfers, shaped by international (governmental and non-governmental) organizations. Analysing the discourse on development linked to social cash transfers, von Gliszczynski identifies an individualization of the concept of development, since individuals were increasingly considered the units to benefit from development rather than collectives such as states and communities (Gliszczynski 2015, p. 125).

All in all, the high degree of individualization might turn social cash transfers closer to the entitlements-based social assistance programmes in the welfare states of the global North than commonly perceived so far.

Apart from that, the analysis revealed that it makes sense to inquire the degree of individualization in a comprehensive way, taking into account the unit of intervention, the composition of the transfer volume, and the maximum number of transfers per household, since these aspects are combined in diverse ways.

Third, the degrees of individualization of the transfers differ clearly between the target categories. Whereas transfers to older persons, persons of working age, and adults with disabilties are typically fully individualized, the highest degree of individualization is less

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[365] See Leutelt (2016) on the role of Helpage International in promoting social cash transfers.

[366] Davy´s study is not limited to the global South but includes all member states to the ICESCR.

frequent among the transfers to children and even less among the transfers to the category of poor people. The finding that transfers to older persons reflect a high degree of individualization confirm the common view of social pensions as individual transfers (see section 4.6.2). By contrast, the high degree of individualization among social cash transfers to persons of working age has to be interpreted differently, since the programmes address only those who are registered as *unemployed* (with two exceptions, see section 7.5). We may assume that at least in several countries, the persons of working age who have registered as unemployed are mostly men, such as reported for a public works programme in Morocco (Jalal 2002, p. 4). As 63% of the programmes address individuals (rather than households) (Table 8.2.1 in section 8.2.1), the transfers to persons of working age might often refer to the male heads of household, leaving the housewives of working age excluded from individual entitlements. This might suggest a gender bias among the transfers to the middle-aged life cycle category.

Fourth, social cash transfers are mostly free from behavioural conditions, but the extent differs enourmously between the target categories. The finding that most transfers are non-conditional clearly contradicts the dominance of *conditional cash transfers* that is often found in the literature (see section 4.6.3). But the findings also qualify conditionality in programme designs by linking the issue of conditionality to particular target categories (rather than to programmes). This perspective, systematically centred on the target population, is new in the study on social cash transfers. The literature generally distinguishes conditional from non-conditional programmes (section 4.6.3). My analysis demonstrates that nearly one in five of the conditional programmes limits the behavioural conditions to particular target categories only (section 8.3.1). This underpins that what matters in view of conditionality is, above all, the target group rather than programmes.

Fifth, the analysis revealed clear differences between the target categories as regards individualization and behavioural conditions. While evidently the vast majority of the social cash transfers to older persons, adults with disabilities, and persons of working age are entirely individualized, transfers to the target category of poor people are entirely individualized to a much lower degree. And whereas transfers to older persons, adults with disabilities, and poor people are non-conditional with few exceptions, a large part of the transfers to persons of working age and to children are linked to behavioural conditions. The huge differences between the target categories underline that entitlements to social cash transfers take different shapes, depending on the target category.

Although the analysis hardly found any differences between the target categories as regards the means test, an in-depth analysis revealed that children are the only target category for which "universal" (non-means-tested) transfers are limited to subcategories of children only (with few exceptions). This complements the findings on the degree of inclusiveness of social cash transfers (sections 6.2.2. and 7.2.4), which revealed that the social cash transfers that address children are among the least inclusive transfers, leaving large shares of the target category excluded.

I discuss the differences between the target categories in section 10.2.3.

Finally, if we interpret particular conditions of access as further limitations of access to entitlements to social cash transfers, the barriers are low as long as the citizens (as applicants and entitlement holders, respectively) are classified as poor. I argue that particular conditions of access (passing a means test, limitation to a flat rate household-related transfer, behavioural conditions) might reduce the scope of social cash transfers (see section 6.5). However, the analyses in this Chapter suggest that even if we took into account these further limitations of access, their impact on the scope would be modest, since social cash transfers are mostly individualized and non-conditional entitlements. Only the means test has proved a wide-spread feature of the programme designs. This underlines once more that entitlements to social cash transfers are largely conditional on being recognized as poor.

9 How secure are entitlements? Institutionalization of social cash transfer programmes

How reliable and "secure" are social cash transfers in the global South?[367] As explained above, I analyse the security of *entitlements* to social cash transfers in terms of the degree of institutionalization of the *programmes* (sections 3.4 and 4.7). The *degree of institutionalization* indicates the extent to which the programmes are based on regulations that make the entitlements to social cash transfers reliable and predictable, both for the current recipients (and more precisely, entitlement holders) and for all citizens as potential future recipients (and more precisely, entitlement holders).

According to the research design presented in section 4.7, I look at three aspects. Within each of the three aspects we can distinguish one form, which indicates a higher degree of institutionalization, from another form, which indicates a lower degree of institutionalization. The three aspects are:

1. the legal basis of entitlements, that is, whether the programmes are based on laws that have been passed by the legislator (national parliament) or whether they are based on decrees issued by the executive power (section 9.1.);
2. the funding of entitlements, that is, whether the programmes are nationally or externally financed (section 9.2);
3. the duration of entitlements, that is, whether the programmes are principally unlimited or limited in time (section 9.3).

I then construct an institutionalization index to measure the degree of institutionalization of social cash transfer programmes, based on these three aspects (section 9.4). With the help of the index, I analyse the degree of institutionalization of social cash transfer programmes across the global South (section 9.5). I conclude the Chapter by a discussion and interim conclusion (section 9.6).

[367] For an early version of the following analysis of institutionalization of social cash transfers, see Weible and Leisering 2019, 158–159, 165-166.

9.1 Legal recognition

To what extent are social cash transfers genuinely legal entitlements based on a statute, enacted by the national parliament? Social cash transfer programmes that are based on a statute can be assumed to be more stable than transfers based on executive decrees, since the latter are presumably easier to repeal. Consequently, I attribute social cash transfer programmes based on statutes a higher degree of institutionalization than programmes based on decrees or similar executive regulations.

Figure 9.1 depicts the social cash transfer programmes based on statute, separately by target category.



Figure 9.1 Social cash transfer programmes based on statute (in % of all programmes that address the respective target category)

Source: Weible and Leisering 2019, p. 165 ; FLOORCASH-SocCit; N differs by target category: children: N=81 (44 missing values); persons of working age: N=16 (11 missing values); older persons: N=81 (24 missing value); adults with disabilities: N=62 (32 missing values); small groups: N=47 (29 missing values); poor people: N=32 (22 missing values); for the mean across all programmes: N=176 (106 missing values).

Figure 9.1 indicates that slightly more than half (52%; 92 programmes) of the social cash transfer programmes for which data is available are based on a statute. However, the number of programmes with missing data is high. I argue that, contrary to other missing data, lack of reference to a statute might be interpreted as the *absence* of such a legal basis. In her analysis of the state party reports under the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), Davy confirms that the legal background of (any type of) social assistance in developing countries often remains unclear (Davy 2014, p. 260). Drawing a similar link from the lack of data to a lack of institutionalization, Davy interprets the lack of references to a law not only as a lack of clarity, but also as indicators of "volatility" of social assistance programmes.

If we assume that missing data *particularly on the legal basis* might indicate that there is no statute linked to the social cash transfer programme, the share of social cash transfer programmes which are based on a statute might even be lower (37.9%; N= 240; 42 missing values).[368]

According to Figure 9.1, the shares of social cash transfer programmes based on statutes differ considerably by target category. Whereas 65% of the programmes that address adults with disabilities and 59% of the programmes that address older persons are based on statutes, this share amounts to only 38% among the programmes that address the category of person of working age. Programmes that target small groups, poor people, and children, respectively, rank in between, with around half of these programmes based on statutes.[369]

Often such differences among programmes that address different target categories can even be found within one and the same country. Let us take Brazil as an example. Both pension programmes that target older persons and adults with disabilities (*Previdência Social Rural* and *Benefícios de Prestação Continuada – BPC)* as well as *Bolsa Família*, which addresses children and poor people, are based on statutes. By contrast, the two programmes that address children only (*Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil – PETI* and *Brasil Carinhoso*) lack such a statutory basis.[370] [371]

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[368] This assumption and substitution of data is made only for those cases for which at the same time data on funding and the duration of the entitlements is available.

[369] If we assume that missing data on the legal basis may indicate that there is no statute linked to the social cash transfer programmes, we find a very similar distribution. The shares of programmes that are based on statutes are highest in the categories of older persons and adults with disabilities and lowest in the category of persons of working age, with the categories of children and poor people in between.

[370] Some sources see *Brasil Carinhoso* as part of *Bolsa Família*; however, *Brasil Carinhoso* was introduced by a decree only.

[371] Another programme, the *Monthly Life Pension* or *Pensão Mensal Vitalícia (PMV)*, which addresses persons who worked as rubber tappers in the Region of Amazonas during World War II, is based on a statute. Data on the legal basis is missing for a programme that addresses particular groups of young people to support their integration in the labour market (*Projovem Integrado*).

In conclusion, the figures suggest that social cash transfers often lack a sound legal basis (statute), although the share differs between the target categories. Only parts of them may be classified as "genuine" entitlements in the strict sense, based on a statute.[372]

9.2 Source of funding

What is the financial basis of entitlements to social cash transfers? I distinguish two types of programme funding:

1. fully domestic funding, that is the social cash transfer programmes are entirely financed through the national budget;
2. external funding, that is the programmes are at least partially financed by international donor agencies (such as the World Bank, regional development banks, ILO, UNICEF, and the European Union) or bilateral agencies, such as UK´s *Department for International Development (DFID)*.

Donor funding is generally limited in time. If a social cash transfer programme relies (even partially) on funding by external donors, it is an open question whether the programme continues after the end of the funding period or not. Consequently, I attribute those programmes which are nationally funded a higher degree of institutionalization. Figure 9.2 displays the programmes which are domestically funded.

[372] In this doctoral dissertation I use the term entitlement in a wider sense, irrespective of the legal basis (see section 4.2).



Figure 9.2 Social cash transfer programmes which are domestically funded (in % of all programmes that address the respective target category)

Source: Weible and Leisering 2019, p. 166; FLOORCASH-SocCit; N depends on the target category: children: N=100 (25 missing values); persons of working age: N=23 (4 missing values); older persons: N=99 (6 missing values); adults with disabilities: N=84 (10 missing values); small groups: N=59 (17 missing values); poor people: N=48 (6 missing values); for the mean across all programmes: N=236 (46 missing values).

Figure 9.2 indicates that four out of five social cash transfer programmes (81%) are entirely financed through the national budget.[373] This share is similar to the one of an earlier study of social cash transfer programmes, however, with a smaller sample (74%; Dodlova et al. 2018, p. 58; see section 2.5.2). This suggests that the vast majority of the programmes are built on a stable financial base. At the same time, the findings suggest that donors play a limited part in the funding of social cash transfer programmes.

Like in the preceeding analyses, we find differences between the target categories. The extent of domestic funding varies considerably by target category. 91% of the programmes which address adults with disabilities are domestically funded. Among the programmes which

[373] Pakistan´s *Bait-ul-Mal* is the only programme with mixed financing within the programme components, since an externally funded pilot component, which addresses children, was added in 2012. Unlike the component for children (*Child support programme*), the main and older component *(Food support programme),* which addresses older persons, adults with disabilities, and small groups, is domestically funded.

address older persons, persons of working age, and small groups, respectively, domestically funded programmes account for between 81% and 87%. By contrast, the shares of domestically financed programmes that address children and poor people, respectively, amount to only 71% and 67%, respectively.

The differences between the target categories might be interpreted with reference to the politics of (global) social policy: The findings might suggest that international donors are more willing to financially support social cash transfer programmes that address poor people or children than other categories; and that the national governments, in turn, are more willing to accept financial support for programmes that address children or poor people.

In fact, the high share of donor funding among programmes that address children coincides with the dominant role of children in global models of social cash transfers, constructed by the major international (governmental and non-governmental) organizations in global discourses: two out of the four main models - *conditional cash transfers* and *family allowance* - focus on children (Gliszczynski 2015, pp. 115, 133; see also sections 2.3 and 6.4.3).

As regards the category of poor people, there is no such popularity of the category among international organizations, quite the reverse (Gliszczynski 2015, pp. 52–60). But the high share of externally funded programmes might be related to politics of global social policy, too. Nine programmes out of all the programmes that address the category of poor people target a subcategory only, namely *labour-restricted poor households* (see Table 6.1.6 in section 6.1.6). Most of these programmes can be traced back to the involvement of a German development consultant, Bernd Schubert, who has - for decades - promoted this programme type particularly for *very poor* African countries (von Gliszczynski labelled this model "general household assistance"; see section 6.1.6). Evidently, several very poor countries resort to development aid in order to fund their *poor people programmes*, since all nine programmes for *labour-restricted poor households* are donor-funded. These nine programmes account for more than half of the 16 externally financed programmes that address the target the category of poor people.[374] So the "general household assistance" model developed for very poor countries in Africa contributes to explaining the lower shares of entirely domestically funded programmes that address the category of poor people.

[374] Put it differently, without these nine programmes the share of domestically financed transfers that address poor people would amount to 85% - just as for the other target categories (except children).

9.3 Duration of entitlements

How long are persons considered poor and/or vulnerable entitled to social cash transfers?

In this section I investigate the duration of entitlements. Investigating this aspect is innovative in comparative research on social cash transfers. To my knowledge, there is no other such large n analysis available. Basically, I distinguish two forms of social cash transfer programmes:

1. programmes that limit the entitlements to the transfers to a certain period of time;
2. programmes that do not limit the entitlements to the transfers to a certain period of time so that the transfers may – principally – be paid as long as the conditions of access are met.

The aspect of duration can make a big difference for the (social) security which the social cash transfers may contribute to. A time limit implies that once the period of support is over, the transfers are stopped, since the recipients are not entitled to a social cash transfer anymore - although they may still qualify as poor and/or vulnerable and meet all other requirements.

Pilot programmes are often set up for a determined period of time. In one way or another, this constitutes also a time limit, but a time limit of the *programme* rather than of the *entitlement*. But I do not assess pilot programmes as programmes with time-limited entitlements per se, for if the pilot programmes continues to be funded or if it is scaled up, the potential time limit vanishes.

For some target groups, the support is naturally time-limited such as for pregnant women and lactating mothers. These natural limitations are not considered as time limits here, since once a women is not pregnant or lactating anymore, she does not comply with the access criteria anymore.[375]

Now, to what extent are entitlements to social cash transfers limited in time? Table 9.3.1 provides the relevant figures.

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[375] I would assess transfers to pregnant women and lactating mothers as time limited if there was a total number of months or years per women for which she could receive the transfers. This might be the case in Bangladesh´s *Maternity Allowance Programme for the Poor Lactating Mothers*, in which the transfers are limited to a period of 2 years. It remains, however, unclear, if this period is meant as a total per woman or per child the woman bears.

Table 9.3.1 Social cash transfer programmes with entitlements that are not limited in time, by target category

Target category	Programmes	N	Missings values
Children	104 (88.1%)	118	7
Persons of working age (without disabilities)	15 (62.5%)	24	3
Older persons	94 (94.0%)	100	5
Adults with disabilities	79 (92.9%)	85	9
Small groups	57 (85.1%)	67	9
Poor people	42 (85.7%)	49	5
All programmes	225 (89.6%)	251	31

Source: the author, FLOORCASH-SocCit.

As Table 9.3.1 demonstrates, 90% of all social cash transfer programmes do not limit the entitlements in time, but pay the benefits as long as the recipients meet the conditions of access. The shares of programmes are similar in all target categories (amounting to between 85% and 94%), with one exception: Among the social cash transfer programmes that address persons of working age, only 63% of the programmes do not limit the transfers to a certain period of time.

Let us now focus on those programmes with time-limited transfers. How long are recipients entitled to a social cash transfer under these programmes? Table 9.3.2 presents all social cash tranfer programmes with time-limited entitlements (for which data is available), indicating the maximum periods of benefit receipt under each programme.[376]

[376] Several programmes grant a shorter period of support first, which is not indicated in the table.

Table 9.3.2 Social cash transfer programmes with time-restricted transfers, in clusters by target population and in order of increasing maximum period of entitlement

Type of time limit	Target categories	Target groups (and programme objective, respectively) of the cluster	Maximum period of entitlement within the cluster of programmes			Number of pro-grammes per cluster	Programmes of the cluster[377]
			On average [378]	Range... from	to		
Con-tinuous entitle-ments with a final cut-off	Small groups[379]	Households/ individuals in situation of acute crisis/ Disaster relief	4.5 months	3 months	6 months	2	SGP: *Urgent financial assistance*; ZAF: *Social Relief of Distress*[380]
	Persons of working age	Unemployment benefits	2 years	2 years	2 years	1	SGP: *Employment assistance*[381]
		Training programmes for (mostly young[382]) adults with lack of (school or professional) education	25.75 months	2 months	4 years	4	ARG: *Seguro de capacitación y empleo*; ARG: *Jóvenes con más y mejor trabajo*; BRA: *Projovem integrado*; COL: *Ingreso para la prosperidad social*
	Poor people	Poor people	3.5 years	2 years	5 years	2	CHL: *Chile Solidario*; NER: *Cash transfer*

[377] See Appendix 5.4 for the country codes.

[378] The average is calculated as the arithmetical mean of all programmes per cluster. If one programme indicates several maximum periods of entitlements depending on the target group, I use the arithmetical mean of all periods for that programme.

[379] South Africa´s *Social Relief of Distress* targets three different groups who are all classified as *small groups*. In addition to these *small groups*, the programme targets a subcategory of children and a subcategory of adults with disabilities, too.

[380] For Swaziland´s *Public Assistance Grant*, which also targets households who have experienced a shock or a disaster (see Table 6.1.1-5 in Appendix 6.1.1), a time limit could not be identified.

[381] Under this programme, the transfers are limited to 3-6 months, but they are only capped at a total of 24 months.

[382] Adults up to 35 years; only Argentina´s *Seguro de Capacitacón y Empleo* refers to adults in general.

	Children	Child/Family focused Programmes[383]	3.6 years	6 months	6 years	5	BRA: *PETI*; CHL: *Subsidio Único Familiar*; HTI: *Ti Manman Cheri*; SEN: *Child-Focused Social Cash Transfer and Nutrition Security Project*; BGD: *Maternity Allowance Programme for the Poor Lactating Mothers*
	Children + older persons	Children[384] and older persons combined	4.4 years	2 years	8 years	5	CHL: *Ingreso Ético*; DOM: *Programa Solidaridad*; SLV: *Comunidades Solidarias*; PRY: *Tekoporã*; PER: *Juntos*
	Poor people + Children + older persons	Poor people and children and older persons combined	8 years	7 years	9 years	2	MEX: *Opportunidades* + *Differentiated Support Scheme*[385]
	Poor people + several other target categories	Mix of several target categories, including children, adults with disabilities, and poor people, but without older persons[386]	11 months	6 months	12 months	2	MYS: *Financial Assistance for Single Mothers*; MYS: *Financial Assistance for poor families* [387]
Yearly maxi-mum	Persons of working age	Public employment programmes (PEPs)	100 days per house-	100 days per house-	100 days per house-	2	BGD: *100 Days Employment Generation Scheme*; IND: *MNREGA*

[383] The target groups comprise children/families as well as pregnant women and lactating mothers.

[384] The target groups comprise children/families as well as pregnant women and lactating mothers.

[385] Once the entitlement period of Mexico´s *Opportunidades* is over, recipients are transferred to the *Differentiated Support Scheme* if they still meet the conditions of access. If the entitlements of the two subsequent programmes are added up, the maximum period of entitlement for rural and semi-rural areas is even 9 years.

[386] *Financial Assistance for poor families* addresses the entire category of children, a subcategory of persons of working age, adults with disabilities, small groups, and poor people; *Financial Assistance for Single Mothers* addresses subcategories of children, adults with disabilities, and poor people.

[387] The data on the two Malaysian programmes with their numerous components is not very clear. This is one reason, among others, why I separated these two programmes from other clusters.

period of entitle-ment	Poor people	Labour-restricted poor households	hold per year 6 months/ year	hold per year 6 months/ year	hold per year 6 months/ year	1	ETH: *PSNP*

Source: the author, FLOORCASH-SocCit; N=26.

Table 9.3.2 demonstrates that the maximum periods of entitlement vary considerably by programme (fifth and sixth column from the left). The span of maximum periods of entitlement is enormous, ranging from two months to nine years. But even within some countries, the duration of entitlement differs. Chile has three social cash transfer programmes with time-limited entitlements. *Chile Solidario* addresses poor people and has a maximum time limit of 5 years; *Subsidio Único Familiar* for families with children provides entitlements of 6 years at maximum; and the *Ingreso Ético Familiar*, which addresses children and older persons as well as small groups, is limited to 2 years at maximum.

What patterns can we identify?

First, I identified two types of time limits (first column of the Table): a continuous entitlement with a final cut-off after a determined period of time; and a yearly maximum period of entitlement, in which the payments stop for the rest of the year, but restart the following year. The vast majority of the social cash transfer programmes with time-limited entitlements offer a continuous period of entitlement. Once a person or household starts to receive the transfer, the record of months or years of entitlement starts. The recipients continue to receive the transfers up to the maximum period of time (assuming that they still meet the criteria of access). By contrast, only three programmes use a *yearly* maximum to limit the period of entitlement, among them the public employment programmes in India and Bangladesh.

Second, Table 9.3.2 presents the programmes clustered by target categories (second column of the Table).[388] [389] And the clusters are ranked by the average periods of entitlement (fourth column of the Table from the left). This results in remarkable observations.

[388] See section 6.1.3 for the classification of target groups into the standardized *target categories*.

[389] Although six social cash transfer programmes with time-limited entitlements address adults with disabilities, they do not shape a cluster of their own, since all these programmes address further, different target categories. The programmes in the following countries, listed in Table 9.3.2, additionally address adults with disabilities: ZAF, PRY, MYS (both programmes), CHL (*SUF*; SUF addresses children with disabilities without age limit, which implies that beneficiaries might be beyond 18), ARG (*Seguro de capacitación y empleo*). The average period of entitlement in the programmes that address adults with disabilities is 2.25 years.

At the low end rank the emergency relief programmes for small groups in acute crises in Singapore[390] and in South Africa.[391] Under these programme, the benefits are limited to three months and in South Africa to three more months in "exceptional cases" (South African Social Security Agency 2012). A similarly short period of entitlement is partly be found under Argentina´s training programme for young adults, who are unemployed and poorly educated (*Jóvenes con más y mejor trabajo).* The programme offers support for two to 18 months at maximum. On average, however, the programmes that address persons of working age provide entitlements of a longer duration (around 2 years) than the emergency programmes for small groups (4.5 months on average).

The programmes that target poor people and children respectively provide even longer maximum periods of entitlement (on average 3.5 years and 3.6 years, respectively). It is remarkable that the average period of entitlement is even higher among the programmes that not only address children, but older persons at the same time (4.4 years). This suggests that older persons might make a difference, with longer periods of entitlements under the programmes altogether. The social cash transfer programme with the longest entitlements in this cluster is Peru´s *Programa Juntos*. Under this programme, the recipient households are supported four years at maximum, but the transfers can be "renewed" for another four years (over which the amount of the transfer decreases continuously). So, the households are entitled to eight years of support in total.

Mexico´s consecutive programmes *Oportunidades* and *Differentiated Support Scheme* address the cateogry of poor people as well as children and older people, and interestingly, the duration of entitlement is even higher (8 years). Again, this example might indicate a kind of "privilege" of older persons, since the average period of entitlement among the programmes that target children only and poor people only, respectively, is remarkably shorter (3.6 and 3.5 years respectively). Mexico is, however, the only country with time-limited entitlement for this combination of target categories, so we should be cautious in interpreting this single case.

As mentioned above, only three programmes limit the entitlement to a social cash transfer *per year*. The employment guarantee programmes in India and Bangladesh limit the entitlement to

[390] *Urgent financial assistance* for people "[who are] going through a difficult period and [who] require immediate, short-term assistance" (Ministry of Social and Family Development 2012).

[391] *Social Relief of Distress* for "persons in such dire need that they are unable to meet their or their families' most basic needs" (South African Social Security Agency 2012). The programme information leaflet provides precise criteria, of which at least one has to be met in order to be entitled to the benefit.

a transfer of each household to a maximum of 100 days per year. Under Ethiopia´s *PSNP* households are entitled to the transfers only in the six months of the lean period every year. Here, the transfers start and stop at the same time collectively for all recipients (the lean period), there is no individual record and choice.

Among the programmes that grant a maximum per year, the period of entitlement is shorter under those programmes that address persons of working age than under the programmes that address the category of poor people, just as among the programmes with the continuous entitlements with a final cut-off.

In conclusion, entitlements to social cash transfers are rarely limited to a certain period of time. Although the number of cases is low and interpetations shoud be made cautiously, the findings suggest that both the share of time-limited entitlements and the average duration of entitlement vary by target category. Most striking are the findings for the target category of person of working age with both the highest share of time-limited entitlements and the shortest period of entitlements (disregarding the disaster relief for small groups).

9.4 Constructing comparative measures IV: The institutionalization index

How can institutionalization of social cash transfer programmes be measured? I suggest combining the three aspects analysed in the preceeding sections in order to construct a single index of institutionalization. In technical terms, each of the three aspects constitutes a binary variable: the *legal basis* in terms of whether programmes are based on a statute or not; *funding* in terms of whether programmes are financed entirely through the national budget or not; the *duration of entitlements* in terms of whether the transfers are limited in time or not. The three indicators feed into a simple additive index of institutionalization of social cash transfer programmes, with scores ranging from 0 (minimal institutionalization) to 1 (high degree of institutionalization; see section 4.7.4 for details).

I argue that the institutionalization index facilitates assessments of the security of entitlements to social cash transfers, since the *degree of institutionalization* of programmes indicates the extent to that the programmes are based on regulations that make the entitlements to social cash transfers reliable and predictable, both for the current recipients and for all citizens as potential future recipients.

9.5 Institutionalization of social cash transfers across the global South

To what extent are social cash transfer programmes institutionalized? Table 9.5 indicates the degree of institutionalization of the social cash transfer programmes across the global South, measured by the institutionalization index

Table 9.5 Degree of institutionalization of social cash transfer programmes, by target category

Target category	Degree of institutionalization (Score)				Average score per category	N	Missing values
	high (1)	medium (0.67)	low (0.33)	minimal (0)			
Children	41.2% (28)	27.9% (19)	20.6% (14)	10.3% (7)	0.67	68	57
	[28.9% (28)]	[44.3% (43)]	[18.6% (18)]	[8.2% (8)]		[97]	[28]
Persons of working age	33.3% (5)	26.7% (4)	26.7% (4)	13.3% (2)	0.60	15	12
	[25.0% (5)]	[40% (8)]	[20.0% (4)]	[15.0% (3)]		[20]	[7]
Older persons	56.4% (44)	29.5% (23)	7.7% (6)	6.4% (5)	0.79	78	27
	[46.3% (44)]	[40.0% (38)]	[8.4% (8)]	[5.3% (5)]		[95]	[10]
Adults with disabilities	59.3% (35)	32.2% (19)	5.1% (3)	3.4% (2)	0.83	59	35
	[44.9% (35)]	[46.2% (36)]	[6.4% (5)]	[2.6% (2)]		[78]	[16]
Small groups	50.0% (19)	23.7% (9)	15.8% (6)	10.5% (4)	0.71	38	38
	[34.5% (19)]	[43.6% (24)]	[14.5% (8)]	[7.3% (4)]		[55]	[21]
Poor people	37.9% (11)	34.5% (10)	17.2% (5)	10.3% (3)	0.67	29	25
	[25.0% (11)]	[43.2% (19)]	[25.0% (11)]	[6.8% (3)]		[44]	[10]
All programmes*	49.7% (76)	28.8% (44)	15.0% (23)	6.5% (10)	0.74	100% (153) [217]	129 [65]
	[35.0% (76)]	[44.7% (97)]	[14.8% (32)]	[5.5% (12)]			

*irrespective of target categories

Source: the author, FLOORCASH-SocCit; the values in square brackets are based on the assumption that missing data on the legal basis indicates a *lack* of a statute if at the same time data on funding and duration is available (for details see section 9.1).

The data suggests that half of all social cash transfer programmes (49.7%) reflect a high degree of institutionalization. They are based on a statute, are entirely domestically funded and do not limit the entitlements in time. Another quarter of the social cash transfer programmes (28.8%) reflects a medium degree of institutionalization. Comparatively few programmes (15.0%) reflect a low degree of institutionalization. And very few programmes (6.5%) are minimally institutionalized, which implies that they are neither based on a statute, nor are they nationally funded, and the entitlements are time-limited.

If we assume that missing data *only* on the legal basis indicates a *lack* of a statute (since at the same time, data on funding and duration is available; for details, see section 9.1), the share of programmes of a high degree of institutionalization shrinks to 35%; and nearly half (44.7%) of the programmes reflect a medium degree of institutionalization. But the shares of programmes of a low and minimum degree of institutionalization remain basically the same.

Once more, the Table reveals remarkable differences between the target categories, above all as regards the shares of programmes with a high degree of institutionalization. Whereas 59% and 56% of the programmes that address adults with disabilities and older persons, respectively, reach a high level of institutionalization, only 33% of the programmes that address persons of working age reach this high level of institutionalization. In the target categories of poor people and children the shares of programmes with a high degree of institutionalization are in between (38% and 41%). The average scores per target category underline these differences.

Apart from the differences between the target categories, the year of introduction of the programmes seem to be relevant with respect to the degree of institutionalization in 2012/13. Institutionalization is higher among the programmes that were introduced before 2000 and even higher among those introduced before 1993.[392] This suggests that the earlier a programme was introduced, the higher tends to be its degree of institutionalization; and the later a programme was introduced, the weaker its institutionalization. But the correlation

[392] 78% (28 out of 36) of the social cash transfer programmes that were introduced before 1993 reflect a high degree of institutionalization in 2012/13. But only 50% (19 out of 38) of the programmes introduced between 1993 and 1999 and only 21% (23 out of 110) of the programmes introduced from 2000 onwards reflect a high degree of institutionalization in 2012/13.

seems moderate only (see Appendix 9.5).[393] These findings seem to confirm a study on social cash transfer programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa, which suggests that older programmes (introduced before 2000) are better institutionalized (in terms of funding, rights and legal basis, administration; Garcia and Moore 2012, pp. 48–50). However, the authors of the study see institutionalization connected to the income of the countries in the first place.[394] It remains an open question whether the older programmes were introduced right from the beginning as fully institutionalized programmes (the earlier, the better institutionalized) or whether these differences indicate that institutionalization, above all the legal underpinning, is a process that takes time (the older, the better institutionalized; see also Barrientos 2013a, p. 207). Further research on the topic would be required.[395]

9.6 Discussion and interim conclusion: Reliable entitlements due to significant institutionalization

Finally, what can we conclude from the findings on the degree of institutionalization of social cash transfer programmes? How "secure" are entitlements to social cash transfers across the global South?

The large n analysis facilitates, for the first time, a comprehensive assessment of the degree of institutionalization of all identifable social cash transfer programmes across the global South and, based on these findings, the first systematic assessment on the reliability and "security" of entitlements to social cash transfers across all countries of the global South.

The findings in this Chapter suggest the following conclusions:

First and quite surprisingly, most social cash transfer programmes in the global South reach a high and medium degree of institutionalization respectively.

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[393] We should interpret the degree of institutionalization of programmes introduced in earlier decades with caution, since in the sources available in 2012/13, only such programmes of earlier years might be visible that were introduced by statute.

[394] Garcia and Moore distinguish the *middle-income cash transfers* that are older and better institutionalized with a wider scope from the short-term and weakly institutionalized *low-income and fragile cash transfers* with a limited target group. These two types are similar to those constructed by Niño-Zarazua and colleagues (Niño-Zarazúa et al. 2012; see section 2.3.2).

[395] A time series analysis, which this doctoral dissertation does not include, might shed light on the development of the degree of institutionalization of programmes over time.

If institutionalization of programmes is measured in terms of legal recognition, funding, and duration of entitlements, half of all social cash transfer programmes are institutionalized to the highest extent and further 29% of all programmes reach a medium level of institutionalization. These levels of institutionalization are higher compared to what the scarce literature suggests. In the only study on institutionalization of social cash transfer programmes across the global South published so far, Barrientos mentions that the early social cash transfer programmes in the 2000s were introduced as “self-standing flagship programmes” rather than as stable institutions (Barrientos 2013a, p. 99). He admits that the degree of institutionalization differs sharply by country; and he is certain that (by 2013) “the progression from embryonic to mature forms of institutionalisation (…) is under way in many countries” (Barrientos 2013a, p. 15). However, still in 2013, he considers the social cash transfer programmes as “significantly under-institutionalised” (Barrientos 2013a, p. 207).

If we focused *on the legal basis only*, the analyses in this Chapter would confirm his assessment, since, in fact, half of the programmes are not based on a statute (or even more, if we interpret lacking data on the legal basis as a lacking statute). However, all other relevant indicators of institutionalization suggest the opposite. So, how come these different views? I assume that the data bases underlying the different assessments account for the diverging views.

First, the case selection, and consequently, the number and kind of programmes are different. Barrientos´ assessment is based on selected examples of social cash transfer programmes, among them the most outstanding and prominent programmes, including the flagship programmes (see sections 2.1.5 and 2.5.1). The flagship programmes tend to be linked to a limited time window, based on executive decisions, and funded by international donors (Barrientos 2013a, p. 207). My analyses, by contrast, are based on the comprehensive dataset FLOORCASH-SocCit which comprises all social cash transfer programmes administered at the national level (see section 5.1). Second and related to the first point, possibly the period of observation is different. Barrientos´ assessment might be based, above all, on those programmes introduced more recently. Among those programmes introduced *after 2000* only one out of five programmes reaches a high degree of institutionalization. So if we focused on these younger programmes only, my findings would again confirm Barrientos´ assessment – but this is only one part of the whole picture. FLOORCASH-SocCit also takes into account all the programmes that were introduced a long time ago (on the condition that they were still running by 2012/13). In fact, half of all the programmes of the dataset FLOORCASH-SocCit were introduced after 2002 (see section 7.1). And as I found out, among the programmes that were introduced before 2000 and even more so, among those introduced before 1993, the share of programmes with a high degree of institutionalization was considerably higher (see section 9.5).

This discussion underlines how important a comprehensive database is to facilitate drawing the *complete* picture.

Second, further data included in FLOORCASH-SocCit confirm the relatively high level of institutionalization of social cash transfer programmes in the global South.

At least two further aspects may be relevant to measure institutionalization (see section 4.7), which have not been analysed in this Chapter: 1.) *pilot programmes* and 2.) the extent of *integration in the regular government administration* of the *agency in charge* of a programme.

Pilot projects (or *pilot programmes*) are an important aspect in view of the time horizon of a programme (see also section 9.3).[396] If a programme has the status of a pilot, its future is usually uncertain, since pilots are commonly launched for a predefined period of time only, in which they are supposed to provide evidence that a programme is feasible and may have certain impacts. However, according to an analysis of the dataset FLOORCASH-SocCit, pilot programmes account for 9% (25) of all social cash transfer programmes only (N= 271; 11 missing values).[397] This low share is similar to the finding of the low share of time-limited entitlements (10%; section 9.3). The pilot programmes do not overlap with those (regular) programmes with time-limited entitlements (with two exceptions). So, if we add up the shares of both the programmes with time-limited entitlements and of the programmes with a pilot status, we find that nearly one fifth of the social cash transfer programmes provide entitlements of an either limited or uncertain time horizon. But the vast majority of social cash transfer programmes are regular programmes and provide entitlements which are not limited in time.

The extent of *integration in the regular government administration* of the *agency in charge* of a social cash transfer programme is another crucial aspect of institutionalization. Programmes

[396] See section 4.4.4 on the distinction between pilot programme and programme with geographically limited scope.

[397] Well-known programmes which were at a pilot stage in 2012/13 include Kenya's *Hunger Safety Net Programme* and Rwanda's *Vision Umerenge Programme*. Most pilot programmes (64%) are found on the African continent, where a quarter of all social cash transfer programmes are pilots.

under the control of a regular ministry of government indicate a higher degree of institutionalization than self-standing programmes under special bodies of administration. In the dataset FLOORCASH-SocCit we identify only 9% (21) of all programmes that are not under the control of a regular government ministry (N= 225; 57 missing values). Again, this is clearly a minority of programmes. Contrary to what we might expect, the programmes outside the government administration are not pilot programmes (with one exception), but rather regular social cash transfer programmes under the control of the presidency or of the council of government ministers in Latin American countries (such as in the Dominican Republic or Peru) or special pension administrations in small island states such as the Maldives and Cape Verde.[398]

These additional empirical observations confirm the impression of this Chapter that institutionalization among the social cash transfer programmes across the global South is relatively high.

Third, a large part of entitlements to social cash transfers can be considered as secure if we accept the institutionalization of programmes as an indicator of reliability and "security" of entitlements. If a strong institutionalization of programmes - in terms of domestic funding, legal underpinning by a statute, and absence of restrictions of entitlements in time - is accepted as an indicator of security of entitlements, we may conclude that half of all social cash transfer programmes (50%) provide secure entitlements. And more than a quarter of the social cash transfer programmes (29%), institutionalized to a medium degree, provide *fairly secure* entitlements. If we add the programmes of a high and medium degree of institutionalization up, we find that nearly four out of five social cash transfer programmes (79%) provide secure and fairly secure entitlements respectively.[399]

By contrast, few programmes (15%) – those that indicate a low degree of institutionalization - provide largely insecure entitlements. And even fewer programmes (7%) are minimally institutionalized, which implies that they are neither based on a law, nor nationally funded, and the entitlements are time-limited. Only the entitlements of these few programmes we could assess as clearly *insecure*.

[398] Target categories hardly differ with respect to the agency in charge.

[399] The share is fairly the same (80%) if we reduce the number of missing values by assuming that a programme is not based on a statute if data on the legal basis is missing (while data on funding and duration is available).

Fourth, the issue of the legal basis turns out as the major gap in terms of institutionalization of social cash transfers in the global South, since entitlements to transfers are rarely limited in time and mostly independent from international donor support; but only parts of them are based on statutes.

Around 9 out of 10 social cashs transfer programmes do not limit entitlements in time. Instead, the transfers are principally paid as long as the recipients meet the conditions of access. 4 out of 5 social cashs transfer programmes are domestically funded. By contrast, only half of the social cash transfer programmes are based on a statute. This large share cannot be attributed to pilot programmes alone, since pilots only account for 18% of all programmes without a statutory basis.

Evidently, the lack of a statutory basis frequently prevents social cash transfers from being fully reliable and "secure" entitlements.[400] This finding confirms an analysis of the *Right to social security* (Article 9) and the *Right to an adequate standard of living* (Article 11) of the *International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights* (ICESCR), based on the state party reports under this Covenant, by Davy (2014). Davy finds that the legal background of (any type of) social assistance in developing countries often remains unclear in the states´ descriptions of their policies. That is why she assess these measures as "particularly volatile" (Davy 2014, p. 260). This assessment underlines how important the legal base is for the security of entitlements.

Fifth, once again the analyses reveal considerable differences between the target categories.

The share of programmes with secure entitlements is highest for the categories of adults with disabilities and older persons, lower for the categories of children and poor people, and lowest for the category of persons of working age. The distribution between the target categories reveals a certain "order" of the target categories regarding the security of entitlements, which is mostly repeated with regard to the single aspects.

Statutory entitlements are more frequent among the social cash transfer programmes that address adults with disabilities and older persons, respectively, than among the programmes that address poor people and children, respectively. And statutory entitlements are rarest among the programmes that address persons of working age.

[400] It might be disputable whether social cash transfers that are not based on a statute constitute proper „entitlements", since they lack a statutory basis. However, I use the term in a wider sense, irrespective of the legal basis (see section 4.2). That is why I nevertheless speak of *entitlements*.

With respect to the duration of transfers, this distribution between the target categories is similar. (Principally) unlimited entitlements are more frequent among the social cash transfer programmes that address older persons and adults with disabilities, respectively, than among the programmes that address children and poor people, respectively. And unlimited entitlements are rarest among the programmes that address persons of working age.

Only as regards funding, the distribution deviates from this pattern: Again, adults with disabilities and older persons are the categories with the highest shares of programmes with (entirely) domestically funded entitlements. But children and poor people are the two categories with the lowest shares of programmes with domestically funded entitlements – instead of the category of persons of working age. As explained above, this might be due to the support and promotion of programmes that address children (and families with children respectively) by international donors; and due to the popularity of a social cash transfer model to address extremely poor labour-constrained households among extremely poor countries in Sub-Saharan Africa which are dependent on financial support from abroad (see section 9.2).

I discuss the differences between the target categories in section 10.3.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

10 Discussion: social cash transfers and social citizenship for "the poor" across the global South

Now that the empirical analyses in the four dimensions of social citizenship are complete, we can discuss the findings in view of the overarching concept of social citizenship. At first, I summarize the findings of the empirical analyses (section 10.1). Then I discuss the contributions of social cash transfers to social citizenship and assess what social citizenship social cash transfers confer on the poor and/or vulnerable persons across the global South (section 10.2). In the next section, I discuss the differences between the target categories in view of public perceptions of deservingness. Ranking all the findings of the empirical analyses by target category, I elaborate a distinct order of deservingness across the global South (section 10.3). Finally, I discuss a few remaining methodological challenges and limitations of this study (section 10.4).

10.1 Summarizing the main findings: social cash transfers across the global South

In this section, I summarize the main findings of the empirical analyses, separately for each dimension of social citizenship (inclusion; rights principles; institutionalization; Chapters 6 to 9). The summary may serve as a clear and transparent basis for the assessment of the contributions of social cash transfers to social citizenship, which follows in the subsequent section 10.2.

I answer the sub-ordinate research questions raised in section 3.4: *Which groups are entitled to social cash transfers* (section 10.1.1) *in which countries of the global South* (section 10.1.2)*, on what conditions* (section 10.1.3), *and with what degree of security* (section 10.1.4)*?* What variety and what patterns can be identified regarding programmes (section 10.1.1) and countries (section 10.1.2) respectively?

10.1.1 The scope of programmes (Dimension of inclusion/Chapter 6)

I start with summarizing the findings on the programmes (rather than on the countries, of which I summarize the findings in the subsequent section 10.1.2).

Who is entitled to social cash transfers? (Section 6.1)

A huge variety of heterogeneous social groups are entitled to social cash transfers. 103 different kinds of social groups could be identified as target groups of social cash transfer programmes.

Poor groups as well as vulnerable groups are entitled. A wide range of target groups are refer to biological, social and work-related aspects, which ascertain vulnerability – although most social cash transfer programmes use criteria of poverty to define their target groups *at the same time*. These findings underline that not only persons and households who qualify as *poor* are entitled to social cash transfers, but also many of those persons and households who are considered as *vulnerable,* defined as *at risk* of falling into poverty.

When assigning all target groups to six standardized target categories *(children, persons of working age, older persons, adults with disabilities, small groups, poor people)**, we find that few progammes address "the poor" of a country; instead, the vast majority target categories, defined by reference to biological, social, and work-related criteria.*** Only 20% of all social cash transfer programmes address the (non-categorically constructed) category of poor people which is constructed by reference to financial and economic criteria. The remaining 80% of the programmes address only categorically constructed target categories.

The six target categories differ markedly as regards the frequency with which they are addressed by social cash transfer programmes. The target category of children is most frequently addressed (by 45% of all social cash transfer programmes), while the target category of persons of working age is least addressed (by 10% of all social cash transfer programmes). Older persons and adults with disabilities are addressed in around one third of the social cash transfer programmes (38% and 34% respectively). The high share of programmes (28%) that address the target category of small groups suggests a fragmentation and particularization of social cash transfer entitlements in the global South. One in five programmes (20%) addresses the category of poor people.

There are four different kinds of "poor people" addressed by social cash transfer programmes. 54 programmes claim to address persons who are defined as poor according to the programme regulations, but the “poor people” who they address are not necessarily the same group. Instead, the target groups of these programmes can be split up into four distinct subcategories: *all poor individuals*, *all poor households*, *some poor people* (resulting from “blurred targeting”), and *labour-restricted poor households*. This subdivision of the target category of poor people entails different types of poor people programmes (see section 6.4.3).

Who is entitled to what extent (Section 6.2)?

The target categories are not addressed in their totality, but only partially. Although the social cash transfer programmes address all six target categories, they leave considerable shares of the target categories excluded from (direct) entitlements to social cash transfers (*within-category exclusion*). The programmes limit their target groups either to particular social groups within the target category (such as orphans within the target category of children), to a certain age, and/or to geographical areas within a country.

The target categories differ sharply regarding within-category exclusions. Whereas the programmes that address adult persons with disabilities include roughly 75 per cent of the target category on average and whereas the programmes that address older persons include roughly 66 per cent of the target category on average, programmes that address children and persons of working age respectively, include the target categories to hardly one third, leaving the remaining two thirds of these target categories excluded from any (direct) entitlements. Remarkably, programmes that address the category of poor people leave nearly one half of the category excluded. This may be due to geographical limitations of the programmes, but also due to the way how the target group of poor people is defined (see section 6.1.6).

What variety of programmes can be identified in view of inclusion and exclusion? How inclusive are the (single) social cash transfer programmes (Section 6.3)?

Social cash transfer programmes are most diverse in terms of inclusiveness. The range of inclusiveness profiles is enormous. Programmes differ sharply in the number of target categories addressed (between one and six) and in the extent of inclusion within the target categories (between minimal and full inclusion).

What types of social cash transfer programmes can be identified? In what ways are entitlements to social cash transfers typically combined in the programme designs (Section 6.4)?

The 282 social cash transfer programmes identified across the global South can be grouped into seven types. While five types (*conditional cash transfers, family allowances, cash transfers related to work, social pensions, cash transfers for "poor people"*) are similar to the "dominant" typology of social cash transfers reconstructed from the literature, two additional types were discovered: *cash transfers related to disability* and *cash transfers related to small groups.*

Each of the seven types is subdivided into between two and four subtypes. The subtypes reveal a huge variety of target configurations in social cash transfer programmes. This contrasts with what the dominant typology suggests.

The most frequent types are also the most famous types – with the exception of poor people programmes: *Social pensions* and *conditional cash transfers* are the most numerous types. That *cash transfers for poor people* are frequent, too, is most unexpected, since in the literature and in global discourses the corresponding social cash transfer model ("general household assistance") plays a marginal role.

The revision of the dominant typology reveals that the dominant typology ignores parts of the world of social cash transfers and that its five types are highly stylized abstractions. *Cash transfers related to disability* and *cash transfers related to small groups* do not feature in the dominant typology. Moreover, the five types of the dominant typology (conditional cash transfers, family allowances, social pensions, general household assistance, public employment programmes) oversimplify the heterogeneous and complex world of social cash transfer programmes to a considerable extent. A large number of programmes do not address a single target category as the dominant typology suggest but addresses a number of different target configurations. These target configurations constitute frequent patterns, so that they can be classified as distinct subtypes. The subtypes have been unknown specifications so far.

My new classification of social cash transfers by the microstructure of entitlements (targeting approach and scope) shows that, contrary to what we might expect, non-categorical programmes are not necessarily all-embracing (fully inclusive) and categorical programmes may be all-embracing (fully inclusive). Most poor people programmes (non-categorical targeting) do not address "the poor" in the sense of "all poor people" (full inclusiveness) but only some of them. Moreover, it shows that most categorical programmes are limited in inclusiveness (as expected), but not all. The observations suggest that the link between the targeting approach and scope of social cash transfer programmes is less clear than expected.

10.1.2 The scope of countries (Dimension of inclusion/Chapter 7)

I switch now from programmes to national social cash transfer arrangements as units of analysis.

How widespread are social cash transfers? (Section 7.1)

Social cash transfers are widespread. 282 social cash transfer programmes could be identified across the global South as of 2012/13. They can be found on all continents. Three out of four countries in the South (76%; 113 of 148 countries) have introduced social cash transfer programmes by 2012/13.

The spread of social cash transfers is very uneven. Continents and the world regions within the continents differ markedly. Most social cash transfer programmes (118) can be found in Asia, followed by Latin America (80 programmes) and Africa (74 programmes). Comparably few can be found in Oceania (10 programmes). Whereas nearly all countries in Latin America and Asia have introduced social cash transfer programmes, about half of the countries in Africa and in Oceania lack any social cash transfer programme. Africa is the most heterogeneous continent: Whereas all countries in Southern Africa have installed at least one social cash transfer programme, all the countries of Middle Africa and half of the countries in Western African lack any social cash transfer programme as of 2012/13.

One quarter of all countries lack social cash transfer programmes. 35 countries in the global South have not installed any social cash transfer programme by 2012/13. No one in these countries is entitled to any social cash transfer in case of poverty.

The findings suggest a link between the prevalence of social cash transfer programmes on the one hand and the income of the countries and their colonial history on the other hand. The observations indicate that countries which were formerly under British colonial rule are more likely to have introduced a social cash transfer programme by 2012/13 than countries that were under French colonial rule. Moreover, the higher the income group, the lower is the share of countries without any social cash transfer programme.

Who is included in and who is excluded from the national social cash transfer arrangements? (Section 7.2)

Not all countries address all six target categories. Around half of the 148 countries in the global South address older persons, children, and adults with disabilities (59%, 51%, and 49% respectively of the countries). Around one third of the countries address the categories of small groups and of poor people (38% and 33% respectively of the countries). The target category of persons of working age is the odd one out, addressed by only 15% of the countries.

Countries follow different approaches of including target populations. Some countries have *categorical* programmes only to include the categories of children, persons of working age, older persons, and adults with disabilities. Other countries include these target categories with *both categorical programmes and poor people programmes* (non-categorical programmes). A third group of countries has installed *poor people programmes only* which, in principle, include the categorically constructed categories, too.

In many of the Southern countries, entire life cycle stages remain excluded from the national social cash transfers arrangements. Depending on the target category, in between one third to over half of all Southern countries, children, persons of working age, older persons, and adults with disabilities respectively, are not addressed by any (categorical or non-categorical) social cash transfer programme.

The target categories differ considerably in the extent to which they are on average excluded from the national social cash transfer arrangements. Exclusion is lowest for older persons (32% of the countries) and highest for persons of working age (57%). Adults with disabilities (41%) and children (37%) rank in between.

Even if the target categories are included in the national social cash transfer arrangements, they are frequently not fully included, but only partially. Considerable shares of the target categories remain excluded from the national social cash transfer arrangements (*within-category exclusion*). Although the countries do run programmes that address the target categories, depending on the target category between 13% and 57%[401] of the target categories are not entitled to a social cash transfer.

[401] The shares are based on extrapolated values (see Table 7.2.4 in section 7.2.4).

The target categories differ markedly regarding within-category exclusion. The national social cash transfers arrangements of the Southern countries exclude on average around half of the target categories of children (57%) and of persons of working age (52%), but only one quarter (26%) of the older persons and one eighth (13%) of the adults with disabilities.[402] Remarkably, 42% of the category of poor people is excluded from the Southern social cash transfer arrangements. This means that, although the countries have installed poor people programmes (which correspond to the model of "general household assistance"), on average nearly half of "the poor" are excluded from the national social cash transfer arrangements.[403]

What variety of national social cash transfer arrangements can be identified in view of inclusion and exclusion? How inclusive are the (single) countries of the global South (Section 7.3)?

The national social cash transfer arrangements of Southern countries are most diverse. They differ enormously both with respect to the number and types of target categories included and with respect to the degree of inclusion (inclusiveness). There is no homogeneous "global South" as regards social cash transfers.

What patterns of inclusion can be identified among the national social cash transfer arrangements? What groups of countries can be identified? (Section 7.4)

Categorical targeting prevails among the Southern national social cash transfer arrangements, followed by mixed targeting, whereas purely non-categorical targeting is rare. Half of the countries (53%) select only particular categories for social cash transfer entitlements (*categorical targeting*); and one third (39%) of the countries include both particular categories and the (non-categorically constructed) category of poor people (*mixed targeting*). By contrast, 9% of the countries include the category of poor people only (*non-categorical targeting*).

The majority of the countries achieve only partial inclusion of their poor and vulnerable citizens, while considerable shares of the poor remain excluded. In half of the countries between 26% and 74% of the members of the target categories on average are entitled to

402 The shares are based on extrapolated values (see Table 7.2.4 in section 7.2.4).

403 This may be due to geographical limitations of the programmes including the status of a *pilot project*, but also due to the way how "poor people" are defined (see section 6.1.6).

social cash transfers if they classify as poor according to the relevant national regulations (*selective scope*). In one quarter of the countries (28%) on average only 25% or less of the members of the target categories are entitled to social cash transfers if they classify as poor (*exclusionary scope*). Only one fifth of the countries are largely inclusive (*near universal scope*). In these countries, on average at least 75% of the members of the target categories are entitled to social cash transfers if they classify as poor according to the programme regulations.

Poor people programmes (and the corresponding policy model of "general household assistance", respectively) are rarely mentioned in the literature, but play a crucial part in achieving a high degree of inclusion among the poor population. Two thirds of the largely inclusive countries (68%; 15 out of 22) and all but one of the fully inclusive countries (94%; 15 out of 16) respectively achieve the high degree of inclusion due to the poor people programmes (rather than due to the categorical programmes). Most of these countries follow the mixed targeting approach, that is they complement (fully inclusive) non-categorical programmes by one or more (less inclusive) categorical programmes. The only *purely* non-categorical national social cash transfer arrangement that achieves large and even full inclusion (Palestine) is an exception.

Most national social cash transfer arrangements are selective in multiple ways (multiple selectivity), that is they include only particular categories and even these only to a limited extent. If classifying the national social cash transfer arrangements by targeting approach and scope, the largest group (30%; 30 out of 101 countries) consists of national social cash transfer arrangements that are categorically constructed and that are partially inclusive.

The three modes of inclusion (categorical, non-categorical, and mixed targeting) can be identified on all continents (with the exception of Oceania), even though to different extents. Categorical inclusion is remarkably widespread in Asia and Latin America, whereas non-categorical inclusion is most prevalent in Africa (and absent in Oceania).

Different world regions have different patterns of national social cash transfer arrangements, with different ways of including poor and/or vulnerable persons. Most Latin American countries have partially inclusive national social cash transfer arrangements, either following the categorical or mixed targeting approach. Many African countries achieve a low extent of inclusion only.

The higher the income group of a country, the more inclusive the national social cash transfer arrangement. The findings suggest a (moderate) link between the scope inclusiveness of national social cash transfer arrangements and the income of a country, although the relationship is not straight-forward.

10.1.3 The conditions of access to social cash transfers (Dimension of rights principles/Chapter 8)

To what extent are entitlements to social cash transfers means-tested? (Section 8.1)

Most entitlements to social cash transfers are means-tested. 80% of the social cash transfer programmes apply a means test for at least one target category. This is in stark contrast to the widespread calls for "universal" programmes.

The share of means-tested entitlements is nearly the same for all target categories. Depending on the target category, between 80.7 % and 83.7% of the programmes that address the target category are means-tested.

The combination of different targeting approaches with means testing/non-means testing reveals three ways of defining target groups: poor citizens, vulnerable citizens, and citizens who are both poor and vulnerable. Depending on the targeting approach and on whether the programmes apply a means test, social cash transfer programmes define their target groups as either persons and households who are considered poor (means-tested, non-categorical entitlements), or as persons and households who are as considered *vulnerable* (non-means-tested, categorical entitlements), or as persons and households who are considered as *both poor and vulnerable* (means-tested, categorical entitlements).

Most social cash transfer programmes (59%) address groups who are considered as both poor and vulnerable (means-tested, categorical entitlements)**.** One fifth (21%) of the programmes address persons and households that are considered poor. Another fifth (20%) of the programmes address persons and households that are considered as vulnerable.

To what extent are entitlements to social cash transfers individualized? (Section 8.2)

The shares of programmes that target individuals and households respectively vary greatly, depending on the target category. The majority of programmes that address older persons, adults with disabilities, and persons of working age respectively target individuals (83%, 72%, 63% respectively). By contrast, the shares of programmes that target individuals is remarkably lower among the programmes that address children and - above all - poor people (43% and 20% respectively).

Most social cash transfer programmes compose the transfer volume individually, but the shares of programmes with individually composed transfer volumes varies considerably by target category. Social cash transfers that target individuals are individually composed by definition. Transfers that target households are individually composed if they take each member of the household into account. The share of programmes with individually composed transfer volumes ranges from 51% in the category of children to 85% in the category of older persons.

Entitlements to flat rate benefits are rare, except in the category of poor people. One third (32%) of the poor people programmes provide flat rate household-related transfers. In between 9% and 17% of the programmes that address the other target categories entitlements are flat rate benefits, depending on the target category.

Entitlements are in most cases not restricted to a maximum number of transfers per household, except in the category of poor people. In two thirds (68%) of the programmes that address the category of poor people transfers are limited to a maximum number per household. By contrast, in only between 21% and 42% of the programmes that address the other target categories, the transfers are limited to a maximum number per household.

All in all, the bulk of entitlements to social cash transfers are entirely individualized. If we combine the aspects of the composition of the transfer volume and of the limitation to a maximum number of transfers per household in the *individualization index*, we find that the share of programmes with entirely individualized entitlements ranges between 46% and 78%, with the exception of the category of poor people.

To what extent entitlements are individualized, depends to a large extent on the target category. Whereas entitlements are entirely individualized in 78% of the programmes that address older persons, the share of programmes with entirely individualized transfers amounts to only 31% among the programmes that address the category of poor people.

To what extent are entitlements to social cash transfers linked to behavioural conditions? (Section 8.3)

29% of the social cash transfer programmes link the entitlements of at least one target category to behavioural conditions —much less than what the widespread emphasis on

CCT in the literature suggests. However, the conditionality of entitlements differs enormously by target category. Whereas in around half of the programmes (51% and 57% respectively) that address children and persons of working age respectively, entitlements of these target categories are conditional, the share of programmes with conditional entitlements of older persons and adults with disabilities is small (6% and 9%, respectively). Only 11% of the programmes that address the category of poor people link the entitlements of this target category to behavioural conditions.

10.1.4 The security of social cash transfers (Dimension of institutionalization/Chapter 9)

To what extent are entitlements to social cash transfers based on statutes? (Section 9.1)

By far not all entitlements to social cash transfers are based on a statute. Slightly more than half (52%) of the social cash transfer programmes are based on a statute. If we assume that missing data on the legal basis may indicate that there is no law linked to the social cash transfer programme, the share of social cash transfer programmes that are based on statutes might be even lower (38%).

The legal basis of entitlements differs considerably by target category. Whereas two thirds (65%) of the programmes which address adults with disabilities and 59% of the programmes which address older persons are based on a statute, only 38% of the programmes which address person of working age are based on a statute. Programmes that target small groups, poor people, and children, respectively, rank in between, around half of these programmes are based on a law.

To what extent are entitlements to social cash transfers domestically funded? (Section 9.2)

Entitlements are largely based on national funding. 81% of the social cash transfer programmes are entirely financed through the national budget. This demonstrates that the role of international and bilateral donor agencies in the funding of programmes is limited.

The extent of domestic funding varies by target category. 91% of the programmes that address adults with disabilities are domestically funded. And the shares of domestically funded programmes that address older persons, persons of working age, and small groups, respectively, amount to between 81% and 87%. By contrast, domestically financed programmes that address children and poor people, respectively, account for only 71% and 67% respectively of all the programmes that address these target categories.

To what extent are entitlements to social cash transfers limited in time? (Section 9.3)

Entitlements to social cash transfers rarely limit the duration of benefit receipt. Only 10% of the social cash transfer programmes limit the period of entitlement.

The shares of time-limited entitlements are similar for all target categories, with the exception of persons of working age. 37% of the social cash transfer programmes that address persons of working age restrict entitlements in time. By contrast, among the programmes that address the other target categories, the shares of programmes with time-limited transfers range between 6% and 15%.

The periods of entitlement vary considerably. The span of periods is enormous, ranging from two months to nine years.

The duration of entitlement varies by target category. The periods of entitlement of older persons are longest. And the periods of entitlement of small groups and of persons of working age are shortest.

To what extent are social cash transfer programmes institutionalized? So how secure are entitlements to social cash transfers? (Section 9.5)

Combining the three dimensions of institutionalization described above, the overall degree of institutionalization can be assessed.

Half of all social cash transfer programmes (50%) reach a high degree of institutionalization. They are based on a statute, are domestically funded and do not limit the entitlements in time. Another quarter of the social cash transfer programmes (29%) still reaches a medium degree of institutionalization.

Very few social cash transfer programmes (7%) are institutionalized to a minimal degree. They are neither based on a law, nor are they nationally funded, but they limit the entitlements in time. Few programmes (15%) reflect a low degree of institutionalization.

The level of institutionalization varies by target category. Whereas 59% and 56% of the programmes that address adults with disabilities and older persons, respectively, reach a high level of institutionalization, only 33% of the programmes that address persons of working age reach this high level of institutionalization. Regarding the target categories of poor people and children, the shares of programmes which reflect a high degree of institutionalization are in between (38% and 41% respectively).

By and large, entitlements to social cash transfers are remarkably secure. This is unexpected in view of what the literature suggests. If we take the institutionalization index as an indicator of security of entitlements, we may argue that half of all social cash transfer programmes provide secure entitlements. If we add the programmes of high and medium degrees of institutionalization up, we find that four out of five social cash transfer programmes provides secure and fairly secure entitlements respectively.

The summary of the findings may now serve as the basis to assess the contributions of social cash transfers to social citizenship in the subsequent section 10.2.

10.2 Assessing the contributions of social cash transfers: what social citizenship?

This study of social cash transfers across the global South is undertaken in view of the theoretical concept of *social citizenship* as elaborated by Thomas H. Marshall (see Chapter 3). In the preceding Chapters 6 to 9 I investigated social cash transfers in view of three dimensions of social citizenship: the *scope* of social cash transfers to investigate the dimension of *inclusion*, with both programmes (Chapter 6) and the national social cash transfer arrangements of countries (Chapter 7) as units of analysis; the *conditions of access* to entitlements to social cash transfers to analyse the dimension of *rights principles* (Chapter 8); the *security* of entitlements to social cash transfers to inquire into the dimension of *institutionalization* (Chapter 9).

Now I am able to discuss the findings in each dimension of social citizenship. The discussion starts with the central research question about the extent to which and the ways by which social cash transfers contribute to social citizenship for persons considered poor and/or vulnerable (section 10.2.1). But the discussion goes beyond the contributions of social cash transfers. Comparing the *relative* significance of the contributions of social cash transfers with those of alternative instruments, I explore whether the *state of social citizenship* of persons considered poor and/or vulnerable in the global South can be assessed on the basis of the findings on social cash transfers (section 10.2.2). In the process, I discuss what kind of social citizenship for the poor and/or vulnerable can be found in the global South (section 10.2.3). Finally, I discuss two aspects of social citizenship which could not be analysed in the empirical part of this doctoral dissertation (section 10.2.4).

10.2.1 Significant, but selective - the contributions of social cash transfers to social citizenship

Now that we have the relevant knowledge of the scope, the conditions of access, and the security of social cash transfers, how to assess social cash transfers in view of social citizenship?

I argue that entitlements to social cash transfers (according to the regulations of the social cash transfer programmes) may be interpreted as reflecting social citizenship for the poor and/or vulnerable. In this context I basically understand social citizenship as the *recognition* of a person *as a full* and - in this sense - *equal member* of a society through the *integration*[404] in the person´s society in the dimensions of inclusion (scope of entitlements), rights principles (conditions of access to entitlements), and institutionalization (security of entitlements) (and to a lesser extent with regard to participation and resources, which could not be taken into account in the empirical analysis; see sections 3.2 to 3.4).

As mentioned above (section 3.4), I assume that the dimension of inclusion has to be assessed in the first place; in a second step, the quality of this inclusion in terms of rights principles and institutionalization becomes relevant.

Repeating the central research question (Chapter 1; section 3.4), *to what extent and in what ways do social cash transfers across the entire global South contribute to social citizenship for persons considered poor and/or vulnerable*?

I raise ten points:

First, the findings in the dimension of inclusion suggest that the contributions of social cash transfers to social citizenship for the persons and households considered poor and/or vulnerable are significant and remarkable, but highly selective and in many ways even exclusionary.

[404] Leisering and Barrientos speak of "inclusion" to define social citizenship (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S63), but I use the term "integration" for the overarching concept in order to clearly distinguish it from one dimension of social citizenship, which is "inclusion".

Social cash transfer programmes are spread across the vast majority of countries across the global South. And countries include all life cycle categories (children, persons of working age, older persons) including adults with disabilities, although to different extents. These findings in the dimension of inclusion underpin Leisering and Barrientos´ argument that "[t]he extension of citizenship associated with the expansion of social assistance is associated with greater inclusion in social protection" (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S61). Although my analysis is not an analysis over time, it supports the link between the contribution of social cash transfers ("social assistance") and an expansion in the social citizenship dimension of inclusion.

But social cash transfers are not available in a quarter of all Southern countries. And even if social cash transfer programmes have been introduced in a country, entitlements are widely confined to one or a few *categorically* constructed target categories (rather than to the category of "poor people" which, in principle, includes all life cycle categories). And if we scrutinize the target categories, we find that considerable sections of the target categories remain excluded from entitlements both in social cash transfer programmes and in national social cash transfer arrangements.

Second, social cash transfers contribute above all to social citizenship for categories with restricted capacity of self-help (older persons, children, and adults with disabilities), but much less to social citizenship for persons of working age without disabilities.

Social cash transfers do not simply address "the poor", but an unexpectedly wide range of diverse social groups. If we classify these social groups into standardized target categories, we find that they mostly address children, older persons, and adults with disabilities, while they address persons of working age only rarely. Countries include above all older persons, children, and adults with disabilities in their national social cash transfer arrangements, while persons of working age are much less frequently included.

Third, social cash transfers may contribute to social citizenship in an enormous variety of ways, although clear patterns (programmes types and groups of national social cash transfer arrangements) can be identified.

The huge diversity of inclusiveness profiles (of both programmes and countries) suggests that there are many ways of how social cash transfers contribute to social citizenship. Depending on the inclusiveness of programmes and national social cash transfer arrangements respectively, the contributions of social cash transfers to social citizenship for poor and vulnerable persons differ enormously. I argue that the contribution of programmes and countries that address only a single subcategory of a life cycle category - such as orphans or older persons who live alone -, are considerably smaller than those of other programmes and countries respectively that address several life cycle categories entirely or "all poor people" (that is, the target category of poor people entirely).

Despite the diversity, the types of social cash transfer programmes and the groups of national social cash transfer arrangements identified suggest that there are distinct forms of how and to what extent programmes and countries respectively contribute to social citizenship for poor and/or vulnerable persons. Depending on the typology, the forms differ by target configurations and behavioural conditions (revised programme typology, section 6.4.3) and by targeting approach and scope (inclusiveness) respectively (new programme typology, section 6.4.4; country classification, section 7.4). I argue that each type of both the revised and of the new programme typology as well as each group of countries classified by the mode and extent of inclusion of their national social cash transfer arrangements identifies such a particular form of how and to what extent social cash transfers contribute to social citizenship for poor and vulnerable persons.

I argue that the ways of how and to what extent social cash transfers contribute to social citizenship shape the social citizenship of poor and vulnerable persons in the global South (see section 10.2.3).

Fourth, contributions of social cash transfer **programmes** ***to the social citizenship for the*** **entire** ***population considered poor are most frequently achieved by ′all poor people′ programmes which are consistently non-categorical, similar to the model of general household assistance.***

We may distinguish three ways of how social cash transfer programmes contribute to social citizenship for the *entire* poor and vulnerable population of a country (the types of *′All poor people′ programmes*, *′All poor people plus categories′ programmes*, and *′All categories entirely′* programmes; new classification of social cash transfer programmes, Table 6.4.4 in section 6.4.4). All three ways address all target categories entirely, but the manners *how* they construct their contribution to social citizenship are different. They choose different approaches of defining (and thereby, selecting) their target population. This underlines that there are three basic ways of approaching social citizenship for the *entire* poor and vulnerable population: by non-categorical, mixed, and categorical targeting.

By contrast, the remaining five typical ways (programme types) contribute to social citizenship for *particular* categories only of the poor and vulnerable population of a country (the types of the *´some poor people´ programmes*, the *´some poor people plus categories´ programmes*, the *´several categories entirely´ programmes,* and *the ´single category entirely´ programmes)* and for a *minimal* fraction of the poor and vulnerable population of a country respectively (the type of the *´within-category selective´ programmes).* This is so, although they follow the same three targeting approaches as the three all-embracing programme types. Comparing the all-embracing programmes types with the types of particular scope suggests that the targeting approach seems of subordinate relevance for the contribution to social citizenship, since each approach is successful in covering the entire population. However, the empirical frequency of programmes indicates that contributions to social citizenship for the *entire* poor and vulnerable population is most frequently achieved by *´all poor people´ programmes* that follow a consistently non-categorical targeting approach. The two *´all categories entirely´ programmes* in Hong Kong and Jamaica are exceptions among the all-embracing programmes in the global South.

Fifth, the complexity of entitlement structures revealed in the empirical analyses suggests that the contributions of social cash transfer programmes to social citizenship are equally complex.

The complexity of entitlement structures is illustrated by the programmes that combine both the categorical and non-categorical targeting approach (new typology; section 6.4.4) and by the different types of *poor people programmes* (revised typology; section 6.4.3), which are either classified as *´all poor people´ programmes* or as *´some poor people´ programmes,* depending on how *non-categorical* programmes define their target population and depending on their institutional structure (see sections 4.4.5 and 6.1.6). These examples underline that the contributions of social cash transfers to social citizenship takes many shapes and cannot be narrowed down to one or a few simple forms.

Moreover, only with the help of a sophisticated analytical approach we may map and reconstruct these diverse contributions of social cash transfers to social citizenship adequately.

Sixth, the findings in the dimension of rights principles suggest that the contributions of social cash transfers to social citizenship are mostly targeted at sections of the population

classified as vulnerable and at the same time as poor, that they are individualized to a great extent, and that they are mostly free from behavioural requirements.

Social cash transfers contribute above all to social citizenship for such sections of the population who are at the same time considered poor *and* vulnerable, since the entitlements of most social cash transfer programmes are both means-tested (ascertaining poverty) and targeted at categorically constructed groups (ascertaining vulnerability; see section 6.1.2). The contributions of social cash transfers are individualized to a high extent, since most social cash transfer programmes take each member of the household into account to determine the volume of the transfers and do not limit the number of transfers per household. The contributions of social cash transfers are largely free from behavioural requirements, since a minority of programmes links the transfers to behavioural conditions (but the share of programmes with behavioural conditions varies considerably by target category).

Seventh, if we interpret particular conditions of access (means test, limitation to a maximum number of transfers per household, behavioural conditions) as further limitations of the contributions of social cash transfers to social citizenship, such additional barriers are comparatively rare, except that citizens must mostly proof their poverty formally through a means test.

According to the open nature of the concept of social citizenship, the empirical analyses in the dimension of *rights principles* were performed in an open way, refraining from judgments of the variants (see section 4.6). At the same time, however, it might be legitimate to interpret *particular* conditions of access as a further limitation to access social cash transfers (see also section 8.4). Following this interpretation, means-tested entitlements, transfers limited to a maximum number per household,[405] and transfers linked to behavioural conditions may be interpreted as further limitations of the contributions of social cash transfer to social citizenship.

The most frequent “limitation” to the contribution of social cash transfers to social citizenship consists in the condition of being formally recognized as “poor”, since four out of five social

[405] All flat rate household-related transfers are transfers limited to a maximum number (one) of transfers per household, too (for an illustration see Table 4.6.2 in section 4.6.2). As regards the flat rate household-related transfers, we might argue that the quality of individuals´ entitlements depends on the composition of the household. To give an example, if several members of an entitled target category (such as children) live in the same household, a limitation to a maximum number of transfers per household might have the consequence that only some of the members of the target category are (directly) entitled.

cash transfer programmes apply a means test. In this respect, the way how the means testing is designed (kind of means test, see section 4.6.1; income threshold, see section 10.4) and implemented may make a big difference.
By contrast, behavioural conditions and, above all, flat rate household-related transfers are much rarer and might, to some extent, be assessed as additional barriers to the contributions of social cash transfers to social citizenship. However, the analyses revealed big differences between the target categories as regards both behavioural conditions and the degree of individualization.

Eighth, the findings in the dimension of institutionalization suggest that the contributions of social cash transfers to social citizenship are fairly reliable (reflecting a high and medium degree of institutionalization), since social cash transfer programmes are largely financed through the national budget and since entitlements are to a great extent not limited in time. However, many programmes lack a solid legal basis. The differences in institutionalization between the target categories are considerable.

Ninth, when assessing the contributions of social cash transfers to social citizenship, tensions between the three dimensions of social citizenship may occur due to conflicting ends.
When countries attempt to broaden the scope of social citizenship for their poor populations by expanding their national social cash transfer arrangements, they may be forced to resort to international funds (see for example Fiszbein et al. 2014, p. 175). In such cases the increase in one dimension (here: inclusion) may be at cost of the other dimension (here: institutionalization of programmes and security of entitlements). The role of social cash transfer programmes that are financed by (international or bilateral) donor organizations (see section 9.2) seems ambiguous in view of the contributions of social cash transfers to social citizenship. On the one hand, donor support might be the only way to establish social cash transfer programmes in very poor countries. In this regard, we could argue that externally funded social cash transfer programmes facilitate the inclusion of at least *some* of the persons and households considered as (very) poor and/or vulnerable in a national social cash transfer arrangement and that they consequently increase the scope of social citizenship in a country. On the other hand, external financing of a programme may be interpreted as a deficit in institutionalization. In this regard, we could argue that if externally funded social cash transfer

programmes contribute to social citizenship by increasing its scope, then they only contribute to a form of social citizenship which reflects a lower degree of institutionalization.

Niger´s *Cash Transfer* is an example of a social cash transfer programme in a low-income country with a minimum degree of institutionalization (not based on a statute; externally funded; time-limited entitlements). Nevertheless, the inclusion index suggests that around half of the citizens classified as poor are included by the programme (see Niger´s national inclusiveness profile in Figure 7.3.2-1 in section 7.3.2) – although under conditions of minimum reliability. So, when assessing the contributions of externally funded social cash transfers to social citizenship, there may be a tension between the dimensions of inclusion and institutionalization, since there may be at risk of contradicting ends.

Similar tensions may be possible in view of other aspects of the three dimensions. In these cases, the contributions of social cash transfers might imply an increase in one dimension of social citizenship at the expense of a decrease in another dimension.

Tenth, the contributions of social cash transfers to social citizenship vary considerably by programme, country, target category, and subcategories, but patterns by world region and by country income group become visible.

Although the social cash transfers programmes and the national social cash transfer arrangements across the global South vary extremely in view of whom they include and to what extent, patterns by world region and by country income group become visible. Even more striking are the differences between the target categories which were found in most of the dimensions and aspects analysed. I discuss these observations in section 10.3 below.

In conclusion, I assess the contributions of social cash transfers to social citizenship for persons considered poor and/or vulnerable across the global South as significant but limited and variegated.

The contributions of social cash transfers to social citizenship for persons considered poor and/or vulnerable are widespread across the global South and are fairly stable and remarkably "secure". They are individualized to a high degree, are rarely linked to behavioural conditions, and are mostly dependent on being classified as poor. Moreover, they take a huge variety of shapes. However, the contributions of social cash transfers have considerable limitations, since they are highly selective.

All in all, the findings suggest that the contributions of social cash transfers to social citizenship are more than just "embryonic", as claimed by Leisering and Barrientos above all in view of coverage and benefit levels (the latter of which could not be analysed here; Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S65). Rather, social cash transfers seem to have developed into an essential part of social citizenship for persons considered poor and/or vulnerable in the global South.

10.2.2 The distinct contribution of social cash transfers to social citizenship – comparisons to other types of social protection

The empirical analysis of this doctoral dissertation is limited to social cash transfers. Consequently, the conclusions to be drawn from the analysis are primarily related to the contributions *of social cash transfers* to social citizenship. Yet in this section, I argue that, due to their role in the South, social cash transfers are the key elements in constructing social citizenship for poor and/or vulnerable persons. To underpin this argument, I discuss what *relative* contribution to social citizenship for the poor and/or vulnerable population in the global South social cash transfers make, compared to alternative instruments that might contribute to social citizenship.

Social cash transfers are a variety of non-contributory basic income security (see section 3.1.2). The three alternative approaches include other *non-contributory* measures, *contributory* measures, and *labour market* policies.[406] I briefly sketch these and compare them with social cash transfers, both as regards their potential and their empirical contribution to the social citizenship for poor and vulnerable persons.

First, *non-contributory* forms of social security include social services and benefits in kind (the latter of which are not included in Table 3.1.2 in section 3.1.2). The concept of *social safety nets* may illustrate the wide array of non-contributory social protection instruments (see section 2.1.4 on social safety nets). In addition to different types of social cash transfers, social safety nets (as defined by the World Bank) usually may comprise food and in-kind transfers (food rations, clothes, shelters, school supplies, fertilizers, seeds, for example), school feeding programmes, public works, fee waivers and targeted subsidies (related to health, education, housing, transportation, utilities), and social services (World Bank 2018b, pp. 5–6, 38–40). Each of these provisions may make an important contribution to the living conditions of poor people. However, each of these measures is confined to a particular aspect

[406] The three alternatives represent the central elements of social protection policy (see the definition of social protection by Barrientos 2013a, p. 12).

of basic social security (such as nutrition, housing, and education). Moreover, many measures are per definition limited to a particular target group (such as school feeding and public works). Taking the example of in-kind transfers (and more generally, tied benefits which include in-kind transfers), their objectives "are usually to provide food security, improve nutrition, increase agricultural productivity, and deliver emergency relief" (World Bank 2018b, p. 40). Consequently, each of these programmes may only contribute to a very limited, predefined aspect of basic social security. This contrasts with social cash transfers, which, in principle, may be used freely for any purpose, according to the needs and priorities of the persons entitled.[407] [408] To achieve a substantial contribution to social citizenship through non-cash social protection programmes, poor people would need to be entitled to a complex and complementary set of interventions, each one for a distinct purpose. But building up an integrated set of tied instruments to address several (and ideally, all) aspects of basic social security is very demanding, even more so in development contexts with structural challenges. The non-tied nature of social cash transfers directed to cover general subsistence may be more appropriate. Available empirical figures on the recipients of social safety net benefits suggest that only a smaller part of the poor households in the Southern countries receive non-cash (tied) benefits, with school feeding programmes as the most widespread benefit.[409] The figures demonstrate that in most countries, there is no comprehensive coverage of the poor population by different (complementary) types of non-cash social safety net benefits. By contrast, cash transfer programmes seem to account for a large, if not the largest share of recipient households among the poorest quintile in the countries among all types of social

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[407] That is why the receipt of money is sometimes associated with an increase in recipients´ autonomy (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S65).

[408] How many aspects of basic social security may be addressed and to what extents, depends on the transfer volume (benefit level), of course (see the discussion in section 10.2.4). Notwithstanding the advantages of social cash transfers over in-kind benefits, there may be social and economic conditions in which other interventions may be more adequate than social cash transfers, such as food subsidies in conditions of high inflation and insufficient financial resources and capacities of the government to adequately adapt the transfers to the level of inflation (Korayem 2011).

[409] Due to a lack of large n data on entitlements, I refer to data on receipt of benefits, which I consider an aspect of programme implementation (see section 2.4.2). As mentioned above, programme implementation usually lags behind the entitlements derived from the programme design (see de la O 2015, p. 40). The empirical data in this section refers to the ASPIRE data of the World Bank, which is based on household surveys rather than on data on the programme designs and which also includes some European countries; see section 2.5.2 for a critical discussion of the ASPIRE data.

safety net programmes.[410] Evidently, social cash transfers play a crucial part within the array of non-contributory social protection instruments that may contribute to social citizenship for the poor population in the global South. They have a relevant stake both potentially and empirically – potentially, since they may be used much more flexibly to address many different aspects of basic social protection and empirically, since they are evidently more widespread than other non-contributory instruments of basic social protection, each of which contributes only to a confined aspect of basic social protection.

Second, in addition to non-contributory forms of social security, there are *contributory* alternatives to social cash transfers (see section 3.1.2, Table 3.1.2). The main contributory alternative are social insurances that provide flat-rate or earnings-related benefits, financed through previous contributions from employees and/or employers and sometimes financed by the government in addition (Overbye 2005, p. 307). Paying contributions to the social insurance regularly requires sufficient financial capacity. However, poor people lack this capacity by definition and informal workers cannot easily be integrated in social insurance programmes (Overbye 2005, p. 308). That is why social insurance is evidently is very limited when it comes to providing social security to the poor (see Overbye 2005, p. 309), even if some countries try to integrate informal workers in social insurance.

According to the *State of Social Safety Net Report* 2018 published by the World Bank, the share of households among the poorest quintile of the population that receive a benefit from any social insurance programmes is minimal (2%) in low-income countries and reaches only around one quarter in middle-income countries (World Bank 2018b, p. 35). By contrast, the share of households among the poorest quintile of the population that receive a benefit from (non-contributory) social assistance and social safety net programmes is considerably higher, amounting to 18% in low-income countries and to 43% and 62% in lower- and upper-middle-income countries respectively (World Bank 2018b, pp. 32, 35). Social assistance and social safety net programmes account for the highest coverage rates of the poorest quintile in all

[410] *The State of Social Safety Nets 2018,* a report by the World Bank, indicates the following shares of households among the poorest quintile that receive a benefit from a social safety net programme: school feeding 37.1%, in-kind transfers 27.1%, fee waivers and targeted subsidies 12.8%, public works 10.8%, conditional cash transfers 40.3%, unconditional cash transfers 23.4%, social pensions (including transfers that address older persons, persons with disabilities, and survivors) 19.6% (World Bank 2018b, pp. 34–43). Although the figures may not simply be added up, the three cash transfer programmes *conditional cash transfers, unconditional cash transfers,* and *social pensions* together seem to cover a big share of the poorest quintile on average, compared to the shares covered by the remaining non-cash programmes.

country income groups, compared to social insurance and labour market programmes. This is confirmed by Fiszbein and colleagues´, who compare social insurances and social safety nets by coverage (of the *entire* population, not of the poorest sections). Based on the ASPIRE dataset, they shows that in all Southern world regions social safety nets cover a considerably higher share of the population (Fiszbein et al. 2014, p. 169).[411]

There are a few other contributory alternatives, beyond social insurance. *Micro-insurance* programmes operate at a local level in a way that their members usually know each other. Unlike social insurance, which provides comprehensive benefits, micro-insurance has mostly rather modest objectives with confined benefits (Overbye 2005, pp. 309–310). Moreover, micro-insurances are based on the assumption that their members remain living in the local area, which makes them unsuitable for (urban) mobile settings and groups such as migrant workers. As Overbye emphasizes, they are unlikely to include marginalized and poor people since their risk pool is too small to run the danger of including “bad risks” (Overbye 2005, pp. 309–310). The *mutual societies* that consist of members of the same occupational status are another alternative to the standard social insurances. However, they are formed by comparably richer professions with a reduced risk pool, which renders them inadequate for marginalised and/or poor groups (Overbye 2005, p. 310).

In short, contributory forms of social security do not seem adequate to the conditions of many or even most poor people and they do not reach larger shares of the poor populations in the Southern countries. Consequently, the contribution of contributory schemes to social citizenship for poor and/or vulnerable persons in the global South seems modest compared to the contributions of non-contributory forms of social security and of social cash transfers in particular.

Third, *labour market policies* may contribute to social security. Labour market interventions comprise diverse measures such as minimum wages as in Brazil and public employment programmes as in South Africa.[412] Still, a major challenge in many countries of the global

[411] The findings of a study on old age pensions by Schmitt (2020) confirms the crucial role of non-contributory programmes. Schmitt compares low- and middle-income countries with and without non-contributory programmes by the coverage rates of persons above statutory pensionable age. She finds that in countries with contributory pensions only (including provident funds and mandatory individual accounts in addition to the social insurances) the mean coverage rate is at 23.8% as opposed to 68.1% in countries with non-contributory pensions (Schmitt 2020, pp. 8–10).

[412] http://www.epwp.gov.za/; 2021-03-24.

South is the size of the non-registred, “informal” economy with “jobs that generally lack basic social or legal protection or employment benefits, irrespective of whether they are performed inside or outside the informal sector” (ILO 2014a, p. 38). But new employment policy initiatives in the global South “are thin on the ground” (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S57).

As regards labour programmes as part of social safety nets, the share of households among the poorest quintile of the population that receive a benefit from any of these programmes is minimal in low-income countries and very low (between 6% and 7%) in middle-income countries (World Bank 2018b, p. 35).[413]

So, we may assume that labour market interventions may have some potential to contribute to social security in the South, but currently reach a small scale only and are consequently very limited in their contributions to social citizenship for poor and/or vulnerable persons in the global South.

In conclusion, the reflections on the potential of alternatives and on the empirical data suggest that social cash transfers make a distinct contribution to the social citizenship for poor and/or vulnerable persons in the global South which other types of social protection do not make, and that social cash transfers reach more poor persons than the other types and has no built-in limits, unlike contributory social insurance or tied programmes. Two points are crucial: First, as regards the three major alternatives of non-contributory, contributory, and labour market focused policies, the brief discussion confirms that *non-contributory* forms of social security programmes (cash and non-cash) play the crucial part in developing contexts. Here, due to the limitation of the social insurances as higher tier of social protection, non-contributory programmes are often not residual programmes of last resort, but „have to shoulder the full burden of poverty“ (Bahle et al. 2010, p. 460; see also Barrientos 2011, p. 243). Second, the discussion illustrates that *cash-based provisions (social cash transfers)* are most relevant, since the non-cash and tied provisions are usually limited to particular areas of basic social security and to particular purposes, respectively, and comprehensive and complementary entitlement structures which are required for a substantial contribution to social citizenship are evidently lacking.

Since most social cash transfers are means-tested, the comparison with other social protection programmes sheds new light on the role of the means-tested programmes (social assistance)

[413] See Subbarao et al. (2013) on “public works as a safety net” (title).

which had been considered as impairing rather than promoting social citizenship for a long time (see section 3.3.1).

The focus of social cash transfers on poor and vulnerable target groups who were previously not covered by *any* form of social security, is the reason why the expansion of social cash transfers "implies a large expansion of social citizenship globally" (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S63). Leisering and Barrientos see the growing role of social cash transfers in "a *shift in the social organisation of social citizenship* [in the global South; K.W.], namely a growing share of non-contributory, mostly means-tested welfare provisions", that is social cash transfers (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S64; emphasis there). They even hold that social assistance in some countries of the South is becoming "a major *national policy* and *institution* that affects significant sections of the population" and moved "from a residual role to the centre stage of social security" (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S64; emphasis there). Social assistance has turned into a "source of *social citizenship*" (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S64; emphasis there).

I conclude that social cash transfers not only contribute to social citizenship for the poor, but that the spread and the design of social cash transfer programmes *shape* the kind of social citizenship enjoyed by poor and/or vulnerable persons in the global South to a considerable extent. Due to the contributions of social cash transfers, I maintain that to a significant degree, the findings on social cash transfers provide a picture of the general *state of social citizenship* of persons considered poor and/or vulnerable in the global South. I elaborate on the state of social citizenship of the poor in the subsequent section 10.2.3.

10.2.3 What social citizenship do social cash transfers confer on the poor and vulnerable population across the global South?

Whereas in section 10.2.1 above, I discussed the contributions of social cash transfers to social citizenship for poor and vulnerable persons, in this section I now discuss what social citizenship of the poor and/or vulnerable population emerges in the global South, which is shaped by social cash transfers to a remarkable extent (see preceding section 10.2.2).

According to Marshall´s concept of social citizenship, the extent to which citizens are granted social rights[414] to partake in their society sheds light on the extent to which they may be

[414] Marshall mentions the "rights" along with the "duties" as citizens (Marshall 1950, pp. 28–29), but the duties are not in the focus of this study.

considered *full* members of society (see Chapter 3). Repeating the interpretation of Marshall´s concept of social citizenship in the context of this study on social cash transfers, I basically understand social citizenship as the *recognition as a full* and - in this sense – *equal member* of a society through the *integration*[415] in one´s society with regard to inclusion (scope of entitlements), rights principles (conditions of access to entitlements), and institutionalization (security of entitlements) (and to a lesser extent with regard to participation and resources, which could not be taken into account in the empirical analysis; see sections 3.2 to 3.4). To the extent that persons defined as poor and/or vulnerable are entitled to social cash transfers (as a right to a "modicum of economic welfare and security"; section 3.3.2) and depending on the quality of these entitlements, the persons may be assessed as "full citizens" of their society, included in society through their entitlements. Against this background, the analysis of social cash transfers may shed light on the *status* of poor and vulnerable citizens in their societies more generally and on their integration in society based on entitlements. Consequently, I argue that entitlements to social cash transfers (according to the regulations of the social cash transfer programmes as regards scope, conditions of access, and security of entitlements) may be interpreted as reflecting the *integration of poor and/or vulnerable persons* in society and their *recognition as full* - and in this sense - equal *members* of their societies (see sections 3.3. and 3.4).

So, to what extent and in what ways are persons considered poor and/or vulnerable in the global South recognized as full members of their societies and included in their societies through their entitlements to social cash transfers? What social citizenship status do persons considered poor and/or vulnerable in the countries of the global South enjoy? And finally, judging by the findings on social cash transfers, what is the state of social citizenship of the persons considered poor and/or vulnerable in the global South?

Based on the comprehensive analysis of social cash transfers, I maintain that social citizenship of persons considered poor and/or vulnerable in the countries of the global South may be characterized by the following nine features:

[415] Leisering and Barrientos speak of "inclusion" to define social citizenship (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S63), but I use the term "integration" for the overarching concept in order to clearly distinguish it from one dimension of social citizenship, which is "inclusion".

First, social citizenship of persons considered poor and/or vulnerable in the countries of the global South is vastly particularized.

In most countries of the global South *particular* groups defined by reference to biological, social, and work-related criteria (and mostly by poverty-related criteria in addition) are entitled to social cash transfers, sometimes in addition to the category of "poor people". Above all older persons, children, and adults with disabilities enjoy these social rights. But often only subcategories of these categories are addressed rather than the entire categories. Moreover, the number of *small groups*, as part of a residual target category, is considerable. The entitlements of particular categories, subcategories, and small groups means that social citizenship of persons considered poor and/or vulnerable is predominantly *categorically* constructed and consequently categorically limited and *particularized* (see section 6.1.2). These finding support the observations by Davy in her analysis of social citizenship based on States Parties reports filed under the ICESCR (Davy 2014, p. 260). She finds that the "developing countries", when describing their poverty reduction policies, refer to diverse targeting mechanisms that are "group-based", "age-based", "gender-based", and "region-based", as opposed to the OECD states that largely refer to means testing (which in its pure form refrains from categorical selections; see section 4.6.1).

According to Bahle and colleagues, categorical differentiation - measured by the number of programmes that the national system of income protection comprises - may be used as "an indicator for the segmentation of social citizenship" (Bahle et al. 2011, p. 194). While in the welfare states of the European Union the average is 4.75 programmes (Bahle et al. 2011, p. 218), national social cash transfer arrangements across the global South comprise 2.50 programmes on average.[416] Although the average number of programmes per country is lower than in the EU, it also suggests some degree of segmentation of social citizenship in the global South. The fact that the number of programmes per country is smaller in the global South does not necessarily indicate less segmentation. Instead, it might hint at the level of inclusiveness of entire national social cash transfer arrangements which are more fragmentary and with more and bigger entitlement gaps in the South, leaving more target categories excluded (see next point). Furthermore, the inclusiveness profiles and target configurations of social cash transfer programmes (sections 6.3.2 and 6.4.3 respectively) suggest that the Southern programmes might be more diverse in terms of the number of target groups of single programmes and that segmentation by target group in the South tends to take place *within* the

[416] This figure refers to all countries with at least one social cash transfer programme (N = 113).

programmes rather than by way of separate programmes. The particularization has further consequences for the social citizenship of persons considered poor and/or vulnerable (see subsequent point).

Second, social citizenship of persons considered poor and/or vulnerable in the global South is mostly incomplete and even exclusionary.

Social citizenship of persons considered poor and/or vulnerable in the global South is mostly patchy and sometimes even fragmentary, due to its *limited* inclusiveness. In the vast majority of countries, the national social cash transfer arrangements are only partially inclusive or even slightly inclusive, far from granting entitlements to all citizens defined as poor and/or vulnerable. Often the early and the late stages of life as well as persons with disabilities are included (to some extent), but rarely are entitlements granted throughout the life course. And often the target categories are not addressed entirely, but only parts of them. This implies that entitlements are categorically constructed and categorically limited to a large extent. The category of poor people, which is constructed without referring to biological, social, and economic features, may potentially comprise all other target categories if they classify as poor. But even if countries address the category of poor people, which 44% of the countries with social cash transfers do, they mostly include only *some* rather than *all* poor people. Evidently, most poor people programmes are not strong enough to compensate for the huge entitlement gaps. Particularized entitlements are not or not sufficiently complemented – neither by further *tailored* categorical programmes, nor by inclusive poor people programmes. This reveals a *patchy* and *fragmented* landscape of particularized social cash transfer entitlements. Consequently, social citizenship of persons considered poor and/or vulnerable is not only particularized but remains limited and incomplete.

The findings suggest that many countries evidently lack a *systemic* approach to social security (Schubert 2020), which is, however, required to facilitate *inclusive* social citizenship (see discussion in Chapter 11).

Rarely is citizenship of persons considered poor and/or vulnerable fully inclusive, with all persons entitled to benefits if they classify as poor. Only a minority of the Southern countries has fully inclusive and largely inclusive national social cash transfer arrangements respectively (16 countries (11%) and 22 countries (15%) respectively; see section 7.4). If "universal" social citizenship of all persons considered poor is achieved, it is - with very few exceptions - by an ´all poor people´ programme that follows a consistently non-categorical targeting approach, which is sometimes complemented by supplements to particular categories. From this point of view, poor people programmes that do not distinguish by biological, social, and work-related criteria, seem the "backbone" of universal social citizenship.

One quarter of all countries lack social cash transfer programmes entirely, so we can suppose that social citizenship of the persons considered poor and/or vulnerable in these countries is limited and possibly even minimal.

Although social cash transfer programmes are widespread and although they make a considerable contribution to social citizenship for persons considered poor and/or vulnerable, entitlement gaps are huge. The gaps relate to entire world regions, countries, life cycle stages (target categories), and target groups within target categories who are addressed by social cash transfer programmes (*within-category exclusion*). Across the region of Middle Africa (which comprises countries such as Angola and Cameroon) and, in total, in one quarter of all Southern countries not even a single social cash transfer programme could be identified by 2012/13. In one quarter of the countries with at least one social cash transfer programme, at least 75% of the members of the target categories on average remain excluded; and in an additional half of the countries with social cash transfers, between 26% and 74% of the members of the target categories on average remain excluded. Most frequently, the category of persons of working age (covering the span from age 18 to 59) is excluded from (direct) entitlements.

Against this background, I conclude that the social citizenship of the poor and/or vulnerable population is exclusionary, leaving many citizens who are defined as poor and/or vulnerable deprived of (direct) entitlements. Leisering and Barrientos previously argued that social citizenship implied new exclusions (2013, pp. S50, S61, S65). Now the analyses in this doctoral dissertation do not only reveal which groups are included and excluded respectively in each country and to what extent, but they also demonstrate that the extent of exclusion across the South is significant and, most importantly, they identify different levels of exclusion (country, programmes, target categories, within target categories).

This finding of largely incomplete and even exclusionary social citizenship contrasts sharply with the notions of universalism of social citizenship (see section 3.2). But the findings are also in stark contrast to the notions of universalism on global political agendas, such as the ILO´s *Social Protection Floors Recommendation* (2012) and, above all, the Sustainable Development Goals under the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, adopted by the UN

General Assembly (2015).[417] Goal 1 requires to "[e]nd poverty in all its forms everywhere". Target 1.3 requires to "[i]mplement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable". The findings of this doctoral dissertation reveal considerable discrepancies between these grand global Goals and the current state of social citizenship of "the poor and the vulnerable".[418] Most national social cash transfer arrangements do not constitute a national "social protection floor" as defined by the ILO[419] and as called for in the UN *Sustainable Development Goals* (Target 1.3). The analysis makes evident that either there is a long way to go or that a social security revolution is required to make social citizenship of the persons considered poor and/or vulnerable in the South fully inclusive by 2030.

Third, social citizenship of persons considered poor and/or vulnerable is largely non-conditional and individualized to a high degree, but mostly depends on the proof of being poor (a means test).

The finding that entitlements are largely free from behavioural conditions (such as children´s school attendance and regular health check-ups; see section 8.3) suggests that social citizenship of poor and/or vulnerable persons is mostly non-conditional. This is unexpected against the background of the heated debates about conditionality and "co-responsibility" (as labelled in the Latin American context). These debates evidently give an unbalanced picture of the empirical design of social rights.

The finding that entitlements to social cash transfers are individualized to a high degree suggests that social citizenship of persons considered poor and/or vulnerable in the global South is individualized to a high degree, too. Individualized entitlements increase the independence from the composition of the entitled person´s household. The high degree of individualization is unexpected, since traditionally, the household has played the central part

[417] https://sdgs.un.org/; 2021-08-21.

[418] The *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* was adopted in 2015 only, two to three years after the point of time to which my analysis refers (2012/13). So, some more recent programmes and some expansions of existing programmes after 2012/13 are not included in the analysis (see also section 10.4).

[419] The ILO (2012) defines *social protection floors* as "nationally defined sets of basic social security guarantees" (§2) which "should ensure at a minimum that, over the life cycle, all in need have access to essential health care and to basic income security which together secure effective access to goods and services defined as necessary at the national level" (§4).

in interventions in development contexts (Leisering et al. 2006, pp. 33–34) and since even transfers that target individuals are sometimes seen as household transfers due to the common practice to share the benefit within the household (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S60). The remarkable degree of individualization of social citizenship of persons considered poor and/or vulnerable might be related to the changes in the understanding of social human rights. To make such an impact plausible, it is necessary to accept the idea that social citizenship may be conceptualized as "layered", with human rights as the international layer and social rights as the national layer of social citizenship (Davy 2014, pp. 213, 215). As human rights often oblige the states to translate the human rights into national rights, the international layer of social citizenship "may have an impact on citizenship rights on the national level" (Davy 2014, p. 262). Around 1993, states - as the relevant actors in the domain of international law - started to interpret social human rights with reference to *individual* welfare rather than as collective ideas of welfare in the context of economic development and socialism respectively (Davy 2014; Leisering et al. 2014, p. 581). If we accept the idea of layered social citizenship, the new understanding of social human rights might have had an impact on the quality of social rights granted on the national level. More precisely, it seems plausible that the focus on individuals in the interpretation of the human social rights since the 1990s has entailed an increasing individualization of entitlements for citizens in the countries of the global South, including of entitlements to social cash transfers.

The findings that entitlements to social cash transfers are most frequently means-tested suggests that social citizenship of persons considered poor and/or vulnerable is largely dependent on a formal proof of poverty in the form of a means test. Moreover, the analysis revealed that the vast majority of programmes addresses target groups that are both considered poor (since the programme applies a means test) and as vulnerable (since the programme addresses target groups, defined by reference to biological, social, and work-related criteria; see section 6.1.2). This suggests that vulnerability plays an important part in defining social citizenship rights, but vulnerability alone and being recognized as a member of a social group who is perceived as vulnerable, respectively, is seldom sufficient to qualify for social citizenship rights.

Fourth, social citizenship of persons considered poor and/or vulnerable in the global South is institutionalized to a remarkable extent.

The big majority of social cash transfer programmes are domestically financed (rather than funded by international donors, either partially or entirely). The duration of entitlement is not limited in time, with few exceptions. Few programmes are in a pilot stage. And the programmes are part of the regular government administration, with few exceptions.

Yet, a firm legal base (statute) is frequently lacking. As “[i]nadequate institutionalisation implies deficits in social citizenship” (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S59), the lack of a statutory basis probably hinders many provisions from being recognized as full citizenship rights.

All in all, most observations relevant to the institutionalization of social citizenship suggest that social citizenship is institutionalized to a significant, though not to a full extent. If we interpret the degree of institutionalization in terms of reliability and security, we may even argue that the social rights reflect a fair, though clearly not a maximum degree of security.

This is quite unexpected, since social cash transfers are new in the global South (see Chapter 1) and since only due to the expansion of social cash transfers around the turn of the millennium a (proper) development of social citizenship for the persons considered poor and/or vulnerable across the global South may have started (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S57). But it remains unclear whether institutionalization of social citizenship has increased in the past years (in correspondence to the increase in the dimension of inclusion of social citizenship), since it is the (fewer) older programmes, established before 2000 and even before 1993 respectively, that tend to show the higher degree of institutionalization (see section 9.5).

Fifth, social citizenship of persons considered poor and/or vulnerable in the countries of the global South is variegated and takes numerous shapes.

The variety of elements (such as programme types, targeting approaches, target groups, conditions of access) is huge and the elements reveal complex structures, such as programme subtypes, mixed targeting approaches, and subcategories.

On the one hand, the immense variety within social citizenship may be unexpected, since the development towards social citizenship of the persons considered poor and/or vulnerable in the global South started only recently with the spread of social cash transfers (see previous point) and since half of the social cash transfer programmes that were running at the time of my analysis (2012/13) had emerged within one decade (after 2002). On the other hand, the great variety is in accordance with Marshall´s idea of social citizenship as an open concept (see section 3.2). Citizenship rights have to be defined by each society and adapted according to the given circumstances and conditions, such as the national income, the structure of a society, and the position of individuals in the society (Marshall 1981a, p. 88). Against this background, the analysis confirms that social citizenship may take plenty of forms, depending on the country contexts. Additionally, the quality of social citizenship may depend on the target group, too (see subsequent point and section 10.3).

From a methodological point of view, the enormous complexity of social citizenship of persons considered poor and/or vulnerable constitutes a challenge to the empirical analysis of social citizenship (see section 10.4).

***Sixth, social citizenship of persons considered poor and/or vulnerable in the global South is differential and stratified*.**

Notwithstanding the *overall* sketch of social citizenship of persons considered poor and/or vulnerable in the global South in the previous points, there are enormous differences among countries, among different areas within the countries, among target categories, and even within the target categories in all three dimensions of social citizenship (inclusion, rights principles, institutionalization). Depending on where the persons live and on which target groups they are recognized as a member of, social citizenship rights may differ fundamentally. Consequently, I argue that social citizenship of persons considered poor and/or vulnerable in the global South is highly differential.

As regards the differences by group, the analyses suggest that many target groups in many countries tend to have distinct social citizenship rights with a distinct level of inclusiveness, distinct conditions of access, and underpinned by a distinct degree of security. Such distinction by target group (as opposed to uniform entitlements) are discussed as *categorical differentiation.* In the context of welfare states in the global North, categorical differentiation commonly refers to different *programmes* for distinct categories in a country (Bahle et al. 2011, p. 193). But as the analysis of entitlements to social cash transfers in the global South revealed, categorical differentiation may also occur within single programmes. The principle is the same: different categories are “treated” differently.

We may now understand why entitlements are often categorically constructed, as the empirical analyses in the dimension of inclusion revealed (Chapters 6 and 7). Only the *categorical* construction of entitlements opens space for categorical differentiation. So categorical differentiation may be one reason why entitlements are frequently particularized.

Categorical differentiation may also help explain the "overlaps" of programmes in a country as they target the same categories. Why have countries introduced a social cash transfer programme to address poor older persons if they already had a programme that addresses poor households, which comprise poor older persons? Again, one answer may be the differential treatment: Programmes differ in the quality of entitlements, including inclusiveness, conditions of access, and reliability of entitlements. In addition, programmes may differ by the transfer volumen (benefit level; see section 10.2.4), they may apply different rules as regards the liabilities of the family,[420] and means-tested programmes may set different income thresholds (see section 10.4). To give an example, the benefit level of social pensions usually tends to be considerably higher than that of a poor people programme.[421] So by introducing a social pension, the target group of older persons above a certain age may be granted entitlements of better quality than the rest of the population classified as poor.

Categorical differentiation may imply a *stratification* of entitlements and of social citizenship, as expected by Leisering and Barrientos (2013, pp. S61, S65). In order to test this hypothesis, I ranked the target categories according to their relative performance with regard to each aspect of social citizenship. When we compare these orders of the target categories, we find that they are very similar for any aspect of social citizenship, with few deviations (see section 10.3). As a result, we may construct one order of target categories according to the quality of their entitlements to social cash transfers. I argue that this order reflects the stratification of social citizenship of persons considered poor and/or vulnerable across the global South.

According to this order, older persons and adults with disabilities seem to enjoy social citizenship rights reflecting a high level of inclusiveness, favourable conditions of access that do not limit the access any further (no behavioural conditions, high degree of individualization), and a high degree of security. By contrast, social citizenship of the category of poor people and of persons of working age, if granted at all, seems to entail exclusion at different levels, frequently less favourable conditions of access, and a remarkably

[420] Among the requirements that may qualify for entitlements under South Africa´s *Social Relief of Distress* in 2012 is the denial of maintenance from one´s family although they are "obliged in law to pay maintenance" (South African Social Security Agency 2012). This regulation has evidently been abolished (South African Social Security Agency 2020).

[421] This assessment is based on a sample of selected programmes in the database FLOORCASH-Basic.

lower degree of institutionalization. Children rank in the middle. These patterns suggest, first, that social citizenship may vary over the life cycle and that, second, those categories and stages of life are “privileged” for which a reduction in self-help and labour capacity respectively is self-evident. Further below I argue that the ranking of target categories may reflect an order of deservingness (see section 10.3).

All these observations suggest that social citizenship of persons considered poor and/or vulnerable in the global South is stratified to a remarkable extent.

How do the findings of *differential* and *stratified* social citizenship go together with the principle of *basic equality* as part of the concept of social citizenship (see Chapter 3)? In contrast to the mere varieties of social citizenship referred to in the previous point of this section (“sixth”), differentiation and stratification tend to imply *inequalities*. To answer the question, we must distinguish between the three dimensions of social citizenship (inclusion, rights principles, institutionalization).

As regards the dimension of rights principles, I argue that the differential treatment of target groups is in accordance with the concept of social citizenship which is an open concept that permits different modes and ways, as already argued by Marshall (see sections 3.2.1 and 3.3.3). Only in as far as particular conditions of access are interpreted as *barriers* to access entitlements to elementary social protection (such as the requirement to meet behavioural conditions and the limitation to flat-rate household-related benefits which restrain individualized entitlements; see section 10.2.1), categorical differentiation related to the rights principles may be seen as conflicting with the principle of basic equality of social citizenship.

In the dimension of inclusion, the principle of basic equality requires that *all* citizens recognized as poor must be included to a degree. If target groups are not entitled to even basic social protection, they are deprived of their elementary social citizenship rights - they fall below what Marshall requires as a “modicum of economic welfare and security” (Marshall 1950, p. 11) (see section 3.2.2).

The dimension of institutionalization is more gradual, since it depends on various aspects such as the statutory base, source of financing, duration of entitlement, pilot status, and integration in the regular government administration. This contrasts with the dimension of inclusion, which is dichotomous, distinguishing only between “in” and “out” as regards the target groups (although at different levels such as the country level, within the country, the level of target category, within the target category). So, we might argue that, although there is a clear standard to be achieved in the dimension of institutionalization, it might tolerate more nuanced degrees of institutionalization, depending on the target categories.

To sum up, I argue that the categorical differentiation and stratification of entitlements conflicts with the principle of basic equality of social citizenship to the extent that persons who are recognized as poor remain *excluded* from their "right to a modicum of economic welfare and security" (Marshall 1950, p. 11). In this respect I agree with Leisering and Barrientos who argue that stratification may establish "limits" to social citizenship (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S65).

Seventh, social citizenship of persons considered poor and/or vulnerable is global in range, and of a lower level in the South.

Social cash transfer programmes have been established in the vast majority of countries in the global South by 2012/13. They can be found on all continents and in all country income groups (for minimum income protection in Europe see Bahle et al. 2011). This finding confirms the view that there is a development "towards global social citizenship" (Davy et al. 2013b, p. S9). The spread of social cash transfers as new welfare institutions in the Southern countries may be seen as one of the key elements of the "recent rise of global social citizenship" (Davy et al. 2013b, p. S9).[422]

When we compare the findings of this study with basic income protection in European welfare states,[423] social citizenship of poor and/or vulnerable persons in the South seems less institutionalized, slightly less individualized, and, above all, considerably less inclusive.

[422] In addition to the expansion of social cash transfers, Davy and colleagues mention human rights (as binding global norms and as a discourse "that mobilises a global public", 2013b, p. S10), the layered structure of global social citizenship (which encompasses both "the national and the global levels of law and politics", 2013b, p. S10; "layered social citizenship", Davy 2014; see "third" in this section), and the role of land rights in global debates that shape global social citizenship. Regarding human rights as the relevant global norms see also Chapter 1 as well as section 8.4. For the human rights discourse in the context of social cash transfers see Gliszczynski 2015; Gliszczynski and Leisering 2016, pp. 331–332.

[423] Leisering constructs an *ideal-type* of social assistance in West and North European welfare states that may serve as a benchmark to analyse social cash transfers in developing contexts (Leisering 2008, pp. 95–96). This ideal-typical form of social assistance includes all citizens in need (high degree of inclusiveness), provides rights-based, individual entitlements (high degree of individualization), benefit receipt is not limited in time and it is underpinned by substantial administrative capacity and a reliable budget (high degree of institutionalization).

However, even within the European welfare states the variations are substantial. To give an example, Bahle and colleagues classify the social assistance arrangements in East European countries as "patchy safety nets in rudimentary [minimum income protection]" (Bahle et al. 2011, pp. 224, 226–227). Such a label could probably be used for several national social cash transfer arrangements in the global South, too. To what extent Southern arrangements resemble the Eastern European arrangements has to be inquired in further comparative analyses, including their generosity, scope, and expenditure.[424] For the time being, it remains unclear to what extent the findings outline a "potentially new kind of social citizenship in development contexts", as Leisering and Barrientos suggest (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S64) or whether they indicate a lower level of Northern social citizenship.

Eighth, social citizenship of persons considered poor and/or vulnerable in the global South is constraint from a life course perspective.

Inclusion in society of many poor and/or vulnerable persons varies over the course of life, with some recognition during childhood and in old age, but with the perspective of being excluded from society in middle-age. So, following the perspective of the life course, we may conclude that despite the "global rise of social cash transfers" (title of Leisering 2019), the vast majority of "the poor" and "the vulnerable" remain "second-class citizens" (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S50), at least during sizable phases in their lifetimes.

Finally, some persons considered poor and/or vulnerable in the global South can be considered as full members of their societies, included in their societies through their entitlements to social cash transfers, although their social citizenship status is often not fully secure.

If we accept the assumption that entitlements to social cash transfers may be interpreted as reflecting the *recognition of poor and/or vulnerable persons as full* - and in this sense – equal *members* of their societies (see sections 3.3. and 3.4), the analysis of entitlements to social cash transfers suggests that *some* of the persons who are considered poor and/or vulnerable in the countries of the global South may be considered full members of their societies, although their status is often not fully "secure" due to the frequent lack of a statutory basis and due to

[424] These aspects are covered by Bahle et al. (2011).

the constraints over the course of life. But a huge share of the poor and/or vulnerable persons across the global South do not enjoy social citizenship rights. Against this background, social citizenship of (all) "the poor" seems to some degree elusive.

10.2.4 A glance at further aspects: Resources and participation

This study on social cash transfers in the global South, undertaken in view of Th. H. Marshall´s concept of social citizenship, emphasizes the *recognition* aspect of social citizenship (see section 3.4). This entails a focus on *entitlements* throughout the study and an emphasis on the dimension of *inclusion*, which is complemented by two further dimensions of social citizenship – *institutionalization* and *rights principles*. Other aspects of social citizenship, which are also relevant in the context of social cash transfers, could not be investigated in this doctoral dissertation, most importantly the aspects of *resources* and *participation* (see sections 3.3 and 3.4). According to Leisering and Barrientos (2013), the dimensions of *resources* and *participation* form important dimensions of social citizenship. That is why I briefly discuss these two aspects in the following.

As regards *political participation*, research on effects of social cash transfers on political participation is only beginning (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S62). It remains an open question to what extent this issue may be studied in a large n comparative analysis, since finding suitable data and developing an adequate analytical approach might be challenging.

As regards *participation in society*, it is argued that behavioural conditions in the areas of education and health might "raise claimants´ general capacities for participating in social life" (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S62). In this sense, behavioural conditions might foster social citizenship for poor people. By contrast, in this doctoral dissertation behavioural conditions have been assessed as either indifferent in view of social citizenship or even as additional barriers to entitlements (see sections 10.2.1 and 10.2.3). Whether behavioural conditions promote or rather hamper social citizenship certainly depends on the strictness with which they are implemented, that is, on whether *sanctions* are applied and what these sanctions imply. If conditionalities entail that those recipients who are not able to comply with the required conditions, possibly because they face the hardest situations, are excluded from the programmes and transfers are stopped (Hoop 2018), they evidently have an exclusionary effect, which is detrimental to social citizenship for the poor(est). By contrast, if conditionalities are framed as incentives designed to promote recipients´ capacities without refusing them access to support if they fail,[425] they might be supportive to social citizenship for the poor(est). A large n study on the strictness of conditionalities and on the consequences in case of non-compliance with behavioural conditions might shed light on the implications for social citizenship for poor people in the global South.[426] However, as only a minority of social cash transfer programmes apply behavioural conditions, the findings may hardly affect the overall assessments of social citizenship for poor people in the global South.

As regards the aspect of *resources*, the size of the transfer (benefit level) may make an important difference with regard to the quality of entitlements. Only some programmes refer to a general standard to determine the benefit level, such as the minimum wage or the poverty line (see Weible and Leisering 2019, p. 173 for an overview of benefit standards of social cash transfer programmes). Empirical studies that compare the size of the transfer across programmes and countries are available on minimum income protection in European welfares states. Pertinent studies agree that the benefits are not adequate to lift recipients out of poverty (Nelson 2013, p. 386; van Mechelen and Marchal 2013). As these findings refer to the most prosperous world region, the benefit level in the countries of the global South can be expected to be even lower on average. Large n empirical research to compare the benefit levels of social cash transfers in the global South is only beginning, with selected samples (Böger and Leisering 2017; Böger and Öktem 2019). While Böger and Leisering find that the transfer levels of most social pensions in the global South go beyond the international poverty line of $1.25/day, which is used to measure *extreme* poverty, the benefit levels mostly remain below the national poverty lines (Böger and Leisering 2017, pp. 12–13). As the benefit level of social pensions usually tends to be considerably higher than the benefit level of programmes that address the category of poor people,[427] and as the category of older persons generally enjoys the strongest entitlements to social cash transfers (see section 10.2.3 and 10.3 below), we may conclude that the volume of the transfers is usually quite modest. Barrientos argues

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[425] Chile´s *Ingreso Ético Familiar* supports households in extreme poverty by a non-conditional dignity pillar, a duties pillar with transfers conditional on children´s partaking in medical check-ups and regular school attendance, and an achievement pillar with rewards for good performance at school and for women´s integration in the labour market. https://dds.cepal.org/bpsnc/programme?id=61; 2020-04.19.

[426] See de la O (2015) for a comparative analysis of *conditional cash transfer programmes* in Latin America. The dataset provided by Barrientos (2018a) includes a dummy variable on sanctions in case of non-compliance with the behavioural conditions.

[427] This assessment is based on a sample of selected programmes drawn from the data collection FLOORCASH-Basic.

that the “transfer levels are a fraction of what is required to lift households out of poverty“ (Barrientos 2013b, p. 29). This underlines that the transfers constitute income *supplements* rather than income replacement, with few exceptions (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S61). Leisering and Barrientos see the relevance of social cash transfers in the “assured and regular supplementation to households in poverty”, which in their view “signals a different approach to the resource dimension” of social citizenship, different from the income maintenance approach in high-income countries (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S62). Following this perspective, it seems to be justified that this study of social cash transfers focuses on security and conditions of access as key aspects of the *quality* of transfers rather than the benefit level. A large n comparative study of the transfer levels is desirable to complement this doctoral dissertation.

10.3 The Southern order of deservingness

This doctoral dissertation demonstrates that social citizenship for poor and/or vulnerable persons across the global South is highly differential: The quality of entitlements often differs by target category and, depending on the aspect of entitlement, the target categories are treated differently. This observation needs exploration.

In this section I explore the cultural and political background of *differential social citizenship*, linking up with the distinction between “deserving” and “undeserving” poor that has accompanied the history of poor relief since the 16th century.

Differential treatment of target groups in social policy may have a variety of reasons. As the literature on welfare states suggests, policymakers may consider political aspects such as different political lobbies, economic aspects such as different contributions to economic production, and cultural aspects such as judgments based on particular values (see the literature review in van Oorschot 2006, p. 24). There is no space for a causal investigation into the factors that might account for the differences between the target categories here. Instead, I explore the relationship between the differential treatment of target categories in the design of social policies - reflecting differential social citizenship - and particular cultural values: public perceptions of deservingness.[428]

[428] For an early version of the following interpretation of categorical differentiation of social cash transfer entitlements in view of deservingness, see Weible and Leisering 2019, pp. 159–171, 182.

The distinction between “deserving” and “undeserving” poor figures in the British New Poor Law of 1834. The Law distinguished between categories considered as “deserving” of poor relief - older persons, sick and infirm persons, and children - and categories considered as “undeserving”, that is unemployed persons, “idle paupers”, and those who were capable to work (van Oorschot 2006, p. 23; Leisering 2019, p. 68). This historical example illustrates that the design of social assistance may reflect perceptions of deservingness.[429]

In a study on minimum income protection programmes for immigrants and persons with disabilities in European countries, Hubl and Pfeifer (2013) investigate the link between the “cultural norms that shape public attitudes on benefit recipients” (Hubl and Pfeifer 2013, p. 161) and the categorical differentiation in the design of social assistance programmes. They assume that public views on the deservingness of target groups shape the design of social assistance programmes in that different categories are treated differently (*categorical differentiation*; Hubl and Pfeifer 2013, p. 165).[430] The authors expect that the more deserving of support a target group is perceived by the public, the less stringent the conditionalities for this group should be (Hubl and Pfeifer 2013, p. 166).[431] Although the findings largely confirm the hypothesis for the target group of immigrants, but not fully for the target groups of persons with disabilities, the study supports the relevance of deservingness perceptions when exploring the categorical differentiation in the designs of social protection programmes and related entitlements.

Adapting Hubl and Pfeifer´s hypothesis to my analysis of entitlements to social cash transfers, I refer to the concept of social citizenship to explore categorical differentiation. I expect that the more deserving of public support a target category is perceived by the public, the higher the quality of entitlement and the greater the contribution to social citizenship for this target category should be (see section 10.2.1). In view of the dimension of *inclusion*, I suspect that the less deserving a target category is perceived in society, the less inclusive entitlements to

[429] For a recent study of public opinions of deservingness and their interactions with social polices in welfare states, see Laenen 2020. See also the recent contributions on the role of deservingness perceptions in social policy in Laenen et al. 2021, pp. 195–390.

[430] In the context of welfare states, public perceptions are supposed to influence policy making mostly indirectly, through media debates and lobby group activities, for example van Oorschot 2006, p. 24.

[431] Hubl and Pfeifer use the concept of *conditionality* as developed by Clasen and Clegg (2007) and combine it with the deservingness criteria reconstructed by van Oorschot (2000), to which I refer further below in this section.

social cash transfers for this target category and the lower the inclusion score of this target category should be (Hypothesis 1; dimension of inclusion).

Assessing social cash transfer entitlements in view of their contribution to social citizenship makes it possible to *judge* the quality of the entitlements even in the dimension of the rights principles (which I did not do in the empirical analysis in Chapter 8, following the open character of Marshall´s concept of social citizenship, see sections 3.2.1 and 3.4). If we interpret particular conditions of access as *limitations* to access social cash transfers (see section 10.2.1), we may expect that the less deserving a target category is perceived by the public, the more access-restricting requirements (means test, behavioural requirements, maximum number of transfers per household[432]) should be applied and the bigger the share of means-tested transfers, of conditional transfers, and of transfers limited to a maximum number per household for this target category should be (Hypothesis 2; dimension of rights principles).

As regards the dimension of institutionalization, we may expect that the less deserving a target category is perceived in society, the less secure entitlements are and the lower the institutionalization score of this target category should be (Hypothesis 3; dimension of institutionalization).

Each of the Hypotheses 1 to 3 entails a ranking of target categories. To the extent that the rank orders of target categories are the same across the three dimensions, we might suspect that the deservingness perceptions of the target categories are “rooted rather deeply, be relatively widespread and be stable over time”[433] (van Oorschot 2006, pp. 24, 31) and that these may have an impact on the design of social cash transfer programmes in that entitlements are categorically differentiated (Hubl and Pfeifer 2013, p. 165). In this case we may interpret the rank orders of target categories as *orders of deservingness*. The “public´s deservingness rank ordering” is supposed to express “to what degree the public feels an informal solidarity towards each of these groups, and what is each group´s relative position on the solidarity scale” (van Oorschot 2006, p. 24). Target categories for which the inclusion scores are comparatively low, for which the shares of means-tested transfers, of conditional transfers,

[432] The aspect of individualization of entitlements, which I investigated in the dimension of rights principles, is difficult to interpret in view of the *contribution* to social citizenship. That is why I only refer to whether the entitlement is limited to a maximum number of social cash transfers per household, but not to whether individualized transfers are paid. See section 10.2.1 for a similar interpretation.

[433] As I explain below in section 10.4, I do not consider the dimension of time in my analysis.

and of transfers limited to a maximum number per household are comparatively high, and for which the institutionalization scores are comparatively low may be interpreted as categories which are perceived as less deserving (if not "undeserving") of social cash transfers; and target categories for which the inclusion scores are comparatively high, for which the shares of access-restricting conditions of access are comparatively low, and for which the institutionalization scores are comparatively high may be interpreted as categories which are viewed as (comparatively more) deserving of social cash transfers.

Based on the findings from the empirical analyses of entitlements to social cash transfers in the social citizenship dimensions of inclusion (Chapters 6 and 7), rights principles (Chapter 8), and institutionalization (Chapter 9), the target categories may be ranked by the quality of entitlement in terms of contribution to social citizenship (Table 10.3).

Table 10.3 Differential social citizenship by target category: orders of deservingness

Social citizenship	Entitlements	Order of deservingness (descending by contribution to social citizenship)
Inclusion (Hypoth-esis 1)	Incidence by programme (number of programmes that address the categories)[434]	Children, older persons, adults with disabilities, small groups, poor people, persons of working age
	Programme-based inclusiveness (inclusion score)[435]	Adults with disabilities, older persons, poor people, children/persons of working age,[436] small groups
	Incidence by country (number of countries that address the categories)[437]	Older persons, children, adults with disabilities, small groups, poor people, persons of working age
	Country-based inclusiveness (inclusion score)[438]	Adults with disabilities, older persons, poor people, children/persons of working age,[439] small groups

[434] See section 6.1.5.

[435] See section 6.2.2.

[436] To avoid a high number of missing values, I calculated an alternative inclusion score for the category of persons of working age, ignoring the aspect of age. In this case the target category of persons of working age scores even higher than the category of children (see section 6.2.2).

[437] See section 7.2.2.

[438] See section 7.2.4.

[439] To avoid a high number of missing values, I calculated alternative inclusion scores, assuming full inclusion in the dimension of age for some cases. According to the alternative scores, the target category of persons of working age scores even higher than the category of children (see section 7.2.4).

Rights principles (Hypothesis 2)	Non-means-tested entitlements[440]	Children – [persons of working age – adults with disabilities – small groups – older persons][441] – poor people
	Fully individualized entitlements[442]	Older persons – adults with disabilities – persons of working age – small groups – children – poor people
	Sub-aspect of individualization: Entitlements independent from number of transfers per household (no maximum per household)[443]	Older persons – persons of working age – adults with disabilities – children – small groups – poor people
	Entitlements free from behavioural conditions[444]	Older persons – adults with disabilities – poor people – small groups – children – persons of working age
Institution-alization (Hypothesis 3)	Comparatively secure entitlements (high institutionalization score)[445]	Adults with disabilities – older persons – small groups – poor people/children – persons of working age

Source: author´s construction based on the findings from the analysis of FLOORCASH-SocCit.

In what way are the rank orders suggestive of "deeply rooted" deservingness perceptions of the target categories that might contribute to the differences in the quality of entitlements between the target categories? It is obvious that the rank orders are not the same for all aspects of entitlement. They vary across the dimensions of social citizenship and even within the dimensions, depending on the aspect of entitlement. This is particularly evident in the dimension of inclusion. Depending on how inclusion is measured, either the category of adults with disabilities or older persons or even children rank at the top.

Yet we can observe distinct patterns across the three dimensions of social citizenship. In each rank order, the target categories of older persons and of adults with disabilities are among the

[440] See section 8.1.

[441] Differences between persons of working age, adults with disabilities, small groups, and older persons are minimal.

[442] See section 8.2.5; ranking according to the average score per target category.

[443] See section 8.2.3.

[444] See section 8.3.

[445] See section 9.5; ranking according to the average score per target category.

three top categories (except for the means test). The target category of persons of working age is the last or the last but one in each rank order (except for the aspects of individualization and means test). The target category of poor people is among the categories in the middle (again, except for the aspects of individualization and means test, in which they rank last). The (residual) category of small groups ranks among the last three positions (except for institutionalization). The target category of children is the most "unstable" category, since it takes all positions of the rank order, except the very last position. Evidently, the differences among the target categories in social cash transfers entitlements in the global South are not accidental, but follow a similar pattern as regards nearly all aspects of entitlement.

Based on these observations, we may rank the target categories by quality of entitlement to social cash transfers in the following approximate order:

Older persons/adults with disabilities – children – poor people – small groups – persons of working age

The higher the rank of a target category, the higher is the quality of entitlement in terms of contribution to social citizenship for this target category.

Having identified this approximate rank order in all three dimensions of social citizenship and for (nearly) all aspects of entitlement suggests that there might be "deeply rooted" public perceptions of deservingness across the global South that are linked to the categorical differentiation in social cash transfer programmes. In this case we may interpret the rank order of target categories as *order of deservingness.* Depending on how deserving of social cash transfers target categories are perceived, the quality of entitlement for the target categories varies, although the correlation between the quality of entitlement and the order of deservingness seems moderate. Against this background, we may conclude that the Hypotheses 1 to 3 may be confirmed to a considerable extent.

As entitlements seem of the highest quality for the categories of older persons and adults with disabilities and of the lowest quality for the category of persons of working age, the rank order suggests that older persons and adults with disabilities might be viewed as the most deserving categories, and persons of working age as the least deserving category. The categories of children and poor people rank in the middle. We may assume that the distinction between more deserving and less deserving categories among the persons considered poor and/or vulnerable reflects to some extent the categorical differentiation in the design of social cash transfer programmes across the countries of the global South. Evidently, deserving target categories are treated differently (better) than less deserving categories.

How come these differences? While my analysis does not permit direct causal interpretations (Hubl and Pfeifer 2013, p. 184), I limit myself to briefly referring to five dimensions, which van Oorshot identifies as “deservingness criteria”, supposed to shape public perceptions of deservingness (van Oorschot 2000, p. 36): extent of *control* over hardship and responsibility for it; extent of *need*; *identity* (belonging, proximity to one´s own status); *attitude* towards support and gratefulness; and *reciprocity* (giving something in return).

Older persons “belong to us” (*identity*), can be assumed to have contributed a lot to society in their lifetime (*reciprocity*), and as ageing is a natural process, they can be supposed to control their need only to a minor extent (*control* over neediness).

The deservingness of children may be explained correspondingly, although their expected contribution to society is yet to be fulfilled in the future. This might be one reason why they are evidently viewed as partially less deserving of social cash transfers than older persons. At the same time, as von Gliszczynski shows in his analysis of discourses on social cash transfers, the target category of children is often associated with “the future” and with the long-term promotion of human capital (Gliszczynski 2015, pp. 115, 133), two important aspects as regards development (see section 6.1.5) and arguably strong issue as regards identity. Evidently, the deservingness of children (and families with children) is less clear than that of older persons. It might sometimes hinge on additional aspects, which might explain that the category lacks a clear position in the rank order. In particular, deservingness of *families* with children might depend on fulfilling behavioural conditions linked to entitlements as an aspect of *attitude*, since children is the category with the highest shares of conditional programmes (see section 8.3).

The comparatively high rank of the category of adults with disabilities may be unexpected, since both *reciprocity* and *belonging* are not self-suggesting norms with respect to persons with disabilities. Evidently, the criterion of *control* over one´s neediness seems to have more, if not most weight in this respect (see also van Oorschot 2006, p. 26). The category of adults with disabilities is a difficult category, since it lacks precise definitions (see also section 6.1.1).[446]

[446] As an example of how blurred the definition of disability may be in practice are the reports by civil society organizations in South Africa that HIV infected persons in the country sometimes stop taking their treatment in order to qualify for the *Disability Grant* (Weible 2012).

The category of poor people is evidently considered as comparatively less deserving in the countries of the global South. On the one hand, the comparatively low deservingness of the category of poor people is astonishing in view of the extent and spread of poverty in the countries of the global South, which should give rise to the suspicion that the public easily identifies with poor people (*identity*). On the other hand, the feeling that "we are all poor here" (title of Ellis 2012) might have the consequence that *need* alone is evidently not sufficient for being considered as deserving as other categories. This supports the finding of the empirical analyses that most target groups of social cash transfers are considered at the same time poor *and* vulnerable (see section 8.1).

The rank order suggests that persons of working age without disabilities are viewed as the least deserving (or even undeserving) category in the countries of the global South. Evidently, as long as persons are capable to work, they are assumed to have *control* for their neediness and, in the view of the public, do not deserve public assistance. Taking into account the frequent underemployment and the wide-spread phenomenon of the "working poor", respectively (ILO 2020, pp. 39–59), this might be unexpected. But it complements the observation as regards adults with disabilities. While adults with disabilities rank at the top of the order due to their assumed lack of control over their neediness, persons of working age rank at the bottom, since they are assumed to have control over their neediness. This confirms van Oorschot´s supposition, that out of the five criteria of deservingness – control, need, identity, attitude, reciprocity -, *control* over neediness is the most important one, closely followed by the criterion of *identity* (van Oorschot 2006, p. 26). The strength of these two criteria may give a reason why social cash transfers contribute above all to social citizenship for those *life cycle categories* (including adults with disabilities) with *restricted capacity of self-help* (older persons, adults with disabilities, and children; see section 10.2.1 and Appendix 6.1.1), mostly complemented by a subordinate criterion of *need* (see section 8.1 on means testing). By contrast, the category of "the poor" is clearly not considered the most deserving category.[447]

Table 10.3 does not only indicate the relevance of public perceptions of deservingness, but also its limitations. Public perceptions of deservingness do not translate directly into the quality of entitlements. Across the global South, the designs of social cash transfer

[447] This parallels the historical development of Western welfare states, in which age groups rather than "the poor" were the "first modern 'welfare classes'" (Leisering 2003, p. 209).

programmes "deviate" from the approximate order of deservingness, depending on the aspect of entitlement.

What is more, not all aspects of entitlement are evidently linked to the order of deservingness. Whether entitlements are means-tested or not is one example. There is hardly any difference between the target categories in the share of programmes with means-tested entitlements (except for the category of poor people). Possibly, more refined indicators might reveal a different picture, such as the level (income threshold) of the means tests and the type of means test, respectively (see section 10.4 below). But possibly other factors than deservingness perceptions may influence the design of programmes and the quality of entitlements respectively, too.

The order of deservingness may also differ in single countries as well as by world region, as the national inclusiveness profiles (section 7.3.2) as well as the incidence of target categories in the world regions suggest (see Weible and Leisering 2019, pp. 184–189 on patterns of deservingness by world region).

Finally, this brief investigation does not explain how precisely public perceptions of deservingness influence categorical differentiation in entitlements to social cash transfers. This question may be a task for future research.

If we compare the order of deservingness reconstructed from social cash transfers in the global South with the order derived from deservingness perceptions among citizens of Western welfare states (for a literature review, see van Oorschot 2006, p. 24), we find that both orders are similar,[448] with one exception. While in European welfare states the category of "the poor" is considered as least deserving, in the global South the least deserving category is persons of working age. This has two implications:

First, the observations indicate that there might be a global order of relative deservingness, in which older persons, adults with disabilities and (families with) children are considered as the (more) deserving categories and poor people and persons of working age are considered the less deserving categories. This suggests that, across the globe, the same categories are evidently viewed as more deserving of social protection than other categories. This hypothesis

[448] In European welfare states, older persons are considered as even more deserving as persons with disabilities, which is not as clear according to my analyses of social cash transfers in the global South. Yet even is several European welfare states, older persons and persons with disabilities are viewed as equally deserving (van Oorschot 2006, p. 31). The category of small groups, which I use as a residual category, is not considered here.

is remarkable, since the social, economic, political, and cultural contexts and conditions are very different globally, in particular between many countries of the global South and those of the global North. To some extent, it would confirm van Oorschot´s speculation that the same deservingness rank order might be found worldwide (van Oorschot 2006, p. 38). Yet further support by comparative empirical studies, including beyond social cash transfers, is required, ideally complemented by analyses of global values surveys.

Second, there may be a distinct order of deservingness in the global South, in which persons of working age are considered as the least deserving category, rather than the category of poor people as in Western welfare states. In view of the huge gaps in entitlements for persons of working age in many countries in the global South, we might even speak of the persons of working age as the "non-deserving" category. This makes social citizenship in the global South distinct.

10.4 Remaining methodological challenges and limitations of this study

In this section I discuss some limitations of my study linked to the concept of social citizenship and the entitlement approach respectively, some remaining methodological challenges as regards the construction of data and measures, as well as a few aspects which remain uncovered.

Although I briefly discussed the ideas of *layered social citizenship* and *global social citizenship*, respectively (see section 10.2.3), the core concept of social citizenship remains confined to the nation state. It leaves all persons out of consideration who live as non-nationals in a foreign country and even more so those without any national citizenship (stateless persons).[449] In view of global migration and forced displacement, the adequacy of the concept of social citizenship may be questioned. At the same time, social cash transfers are increasingly implemented in fragile states and in situations of political conflict at the intersection between social protection, climate change adaptation, and disaster risk management.[450] Despite these developments, the programme designs reviewed in the process

[449] For an overview of social protection for migrants see ILO (2017, pp. 186–187).

[450] See the model of "adaptive social protection" in the Sahel, for example, which is promoted by the German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development; https://health.bmz.de/events/adaptive-social-protection-in-the-sahel/; 2020-04-19.

of the data collection for FLOORCASH-Basic revealed that entitlements to social cash transfers are still based on national citizenship, with few exceptions.[451]

This empirical study on social cash transfers in the global South in view of Marshall´s concept of social citizenship follows the *entitlement approach*. *Entitlements* are defined as individual claims to a social cash transfer derived from the rules and regulations linked to a social cash transfer programme. The entitlement approach facilitates consistent mapping, measuring, and comparing of the *quality* of individuals´ entitlements to social cash transfers (see section 4.2). But the approach has also limitations, which I discuss in this section.

Moreover, this empirical analysis of social cash transfers is based on a self-constructed dataset on entitlements to social cash transfers (FLOORCASH-SocCit; see Chapter 5). Entitlements are reconstructed from the programme designs. The way how the data is constructed and how entitlements are reconstructed influences the findings (entitlement structures). That is why it is important to make these rules of how the data is constructed transparent (see Chapters 4 and 5) and to discuss them briefly, which I do now.

The analysis uses three distinct *units of analysis*: target categories, programmes, and countries.

Whereas programmes and countries are common units of analysis in research on social protection, standardized target categories are new units of analysis, which I reconstructed from the empirical programme designs (see sections 4.3 and 6.1.3).

The way of how *target categories* are constructed, in particular the age ranges of the life cycle categories, affects the structures of entitlements. To give an example, the category of older persons is defined from age 60. This implies for programmes with an age of eligibility of 65 that the inclusion score of the category of older persons is lower than if the category of older persons was defined from age 65. Similarly, the rules of how the target groups are assigned to the six standardized target categories (see section 4.3) influence the entitlement structures. To give an example, the rule that a target group is assigned to the category of children if the target group refers to two life cycle groups (such as children of elderly parents/elderly parents with minor children/families with elderly parents) may result in a higher number of programmes that address the category of children than if a different rule had been followed (for a list of target groups that at the same time refer to the category of children and another

[451] Examples of programmes that include non-nationals are South Africa´s *Disability Grant* and *Foster Child Grant,* to both of which refugees may be entitled, in addition to South African citizens and permanent residents.

category, see Table 6.1.1-1 in Appendix 6.1.1). So, this rule might have some influence on the finding that the category of children is the one which is most frequently targeted by programmes. However, programmes often address various subcategories of children at the same time or the entire category of children in addition to one or more subcategories. In such cases, a target category is counted only once per programmes, even if the programmes addresses several subcategories of the target category. That is why I assess the impact of this rule of assigning target groups to target categories of minor relevance for the overall high incidence of entitlements for children.

In the analysis, all cases within each unit of analysis (programmes, target categories, countries) have equal weight – no matter whether they cover a tiny or a large number of entitlement holders. When analysing social cash transfer programmes in view of institutionalization, Brazil´s *Bolsa Família,* which covered 14 million households in 2013, has the same weight as Antigua and Barbuda´s *Old age assistance programme,* which covered 99 person in 2013. When assessing the inclusiveness of the national social cash transfer arrangements of the Southern countries, the Indian subcontinent with a population of 1.2 billion has the same weight as the small island state of Samoa, counting 190,000 inhabitants.[452] Similarly, all life cycle categories (children, persons of working age, older persons, and adults with disabilities) have equal weight (and across countries), although the life cycle categories may differ considerably in the size. To give an example, this is relevant, when classifying the countries by overall inclusiveness (among other criteria, by calculating the *categorical inclusion score* as the mean of all life cycle categories; see section 7.4). Taking the example of South Africa, 18 million individuals belong to the category of children, representing around 35% of the population; 29.5 million individuals belong to the category of adults of working age, accounting for 57% of the population; and roughly 4 million belong to the category of older person above age 60, which equals 8 percent of the population (total population in 2011: 51.7 million).[453] So, instead of analysing and comparing the absolute numbers of individuals affected in particular (or all) cases, the entitlement approach makes it possible to analyse and compare the quality of entitlements for particular (or all) cases (programmes, target categories, countries) in a standardized way.

[452] data.un.org; data refers to 2013.

[453] data.un.org; data refers to 2011; the figures are not limited to national citizens. I added the figures up, according to my definition of the target categories.

The concept of social citizenship is operationalized in three dimensions by means of *self-constructed measures*.

The degree of *inclusion* (inclusiveness) of social cash transfer programmes and of national social cash transfer arrangements of countries, respectively, is measured by means of the self-constructed *inclusion index*, which comprises the social range of the target, the age range of target group, and the geographical range of programme (see sections 4.4.5 and 6.2.1). I use *subscores* to distinguish between different social ranges, age ranges, and geographical ranges. Although these subscores are derived from a sample of empirical programme designs and country contexts (see section 4.4.5), they are *approximate* values and will most probably be different from the empirical figures for the programmes and countries, respectively. Most importantly, they do not correspond to the empirical coverage rates. To give a few examples, we do not know, whether a *poor people programme* which lacks clear criteria of selection really addresses half of the poor citizens in a country (which the inclusion score of 0.5 of the target category of poor people suggests) and whether children with disabilities as a sub-category of children account for around 10% of the entire target category of children (which the inclusion score of 0.1 suggests). Against this backdrop, it would be good to complement the findings from my entitlement analysis by further studies to be undertaken in the future that include statistical data on recipients and coverage rates. In this way, the estimated scores which I use could be verified and adapted where required.

Despite these caveats, I argue that it is legitimate to measure inclusion this way, following the entitlement approach, in particular in view of the absence of pertinent large n data until recently and in view of the methodological challenges of data aggregation (see section 2.4.2 and 4.2). This methodological approach highlights the quality of entitlements and allows to compare programmes, target categories, and countries in a standardized way. Abstracting from statistical figures, it may reveal underlying policies, since the entitlements are not God given, but constructed by policy makers.

Further aspects that might limit the degree of inclusion are not considered, above all *family liability rules* that may require potential applicants to resort to the (wider) family and relatives as well as the *eligibility threshold of the means test*. The means test determines who among the target population - defined by the social range, age range, and geographical range – is entitled to the social cash transfers, depending on the resources of the individual and household, respectively (see section 4.6.1). Basically, the eligibility threshold (income threshold) regulates whether “the poor” among the target population are entitled or whether the entire target population is entitled except “the wealthy”. Consequently, this threshold influences to a considerable extent who among the target population is finally entitled. So, it would be good to include the income thresholds of entitlements in future comparative studies on social cash transfers.[454] Even if analyses on eligibility thresholds and types of means test, respectively, was available, it would not affect the findings on the entitlement gaps, since the empirical analyses in this doctoral dissertation are based on the assumption that those who are classified as poor (by definition) pass the means test if programmes apply such a test (see section 4.4 and 6.1.2). Instead, the means test is of relevance when entitlements of groups who do not classify as poor (and as the poorest, respectively) are inquired. And therefore, it is of relevance when assessing the entire national social protection system (following a country approach, see section 4.5).

The dimension of *institutionalization* is operationalized by the *institutionalization index*. This index comprises the aspects of legal recognition in terms of a statutory basis of entitlements, funding of programmes, and duration of entitlements (see section 4.7). The analysis is complemented by findings on the *pilot status* of programmes and on the extent of *integration in the regular government administration* of the agency in charge of a programme (see section 9.6). It would be desirable to add the aspect of legal enforcement of entitlements. This was not possible due to the lack of standardized data for the large number of countries.[455]

As regards the dimension of *rights principles*, the three aspects of the means test, individualization, and behavioural conditions are analysed separately. It remains open to what extent the three aspects are combined in the porgramme designs.

As regards the *typologies of programmes*, it would be good to continue the effort of constructing meaningful programme typologies, possibly including more aspects than the target groups/target configuration and behavioural conditions, and inclusiveness and targeting approach respectively; see sections 2.3 and 6.4). Similarly, it is desirable that the classification of countries, which is based on the targeting approach and scope of the national

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[454] If eligibility thresholds refer to (monetary) income, they may ideally be compared in (standardized) quantitative terms. However, in Southern countries so-called proxy-means test are quite common which refer to non-monetary observable criteria, which are assumed to provide sufficient information to assess eligibility (see section 4.6.1). In these cases, a classification of means tests may be helpful, similar to the one suggested by Böger and Leisering for social pensions (Böger and Leisering 2017, pp. 18–19).

[455] In the case study on South Africa´s social cash transfer arrangement, I also investigated the issue of legal enforcement (Weible 2012).

social cash transfer arrangements (see section 7.4), is complemented by further aspects such as institutionalization of programmes. For such an attempt, however, the enormous heterogeneity among the social cash transfer programmes must be reduced in a convincing way – a challenge left to future research.

The approach which this study adopts focuses on the *programme designs rather than on programme implementation*. The empirical analysis does not take into account to what extent entitlements are realized in practice, although this aspect is important to make social rights and social citizenship real. Maybe not all those who are entitled will apply for the transfer[456] and, above all, not all of those who are entitled finally receive a transfer. *Exclusion errors* - the share of those entitled, but who do not recieve a transfer - are considerable (Barrientos 2013a, p. 133).[457] Implementation of the programmes often faces challenges related to the coordination between different administrative entities involved at different levels of government as well as related to the information of the target population (Barrientos 2013a, pp. 141–145). Sometimes considerable gaps between planned and effective coverage are reported.[458] Consequently, we must be cautious about the conclusions from entitlements to social citizenship realized *in practice*. Even in countries with a fully inclusive national social cash transfer arrangement, few poor people might actually receive the transfers.[459]

Despite all these limitations, I argue that this empirical study on entitlements to social cash transfers presents the *maximum* extent of inclusion we may expect in practice. As we know from a study on *conditional cash transfers* in Latin America, implementation often *lags behind* the programme design and “governments are not promising much more than they are delivering" (de la O 2015, p. 40). So, while we may hardly assume that implementation

[456] This relates to take-up rates and to the public perception of the transfers. Sometimes a stigma is attached to the reception of social cash transfers, although less frequently in the South than in Northern welfare states (Leisering and Barrientos 2013, p. S61).

[457] *Inclusion errors*, referring to those who receive a transfer, although they are not part of the target population, are considerable, too, and a big challenge in practice. They indirectly affect the analysis of social citizenship for poor and or vulnerable groups in that the scares resources are directed away from those entitled and will be missing in the programme budget.

[458] To give an example, Government statistics on Honduras´ *Elderly Bonus* suggest considerable gaps between planned and effective numbers of beneficiaries between 2010 and 2012 (see FLOORCASH-Basic).

[459] According to my analysis, Azerbaijan´s *Targeted social assistance* is a fully inclusive *poor people programme*, granting entitlements to all poor people (see sections 7.4 and 6.1.6). A report by the European Commission indicates, however, that it accounts for only 1% of total social protection expenditures (year is not indicated; European Commission 2011, p. 38)

surpasses the level of inclusion outlined by the programme design, the huge entitlement gaps and limitations of social citizenship for persons considered poor and/or vulnerable will remain *even if we assume perfect implementation of programmes according to design*.

This doctoral dissertation is based on data at one point in time (2012/13). It is no time series analysis and does not allow statements on the development of social cash transfer programmes and their contribution to social citizenship over time.[460] Moreover, it does not trace the latest developments. Programmes have been introduced in countries which did not have any social cash transfer programme by 2012/13, such as the (universal) *Social pension* in Myanmar (in 2017)[461] and the conditional cash transfers in selected areas of Madagascar (Celada 2017, pp. 16–17). In other countries, additional social cash transfer programmes were introduced, such as the CCT *Crecemos* in Costa Rica in 2019, which addresses pre-school and primary school children of families in (extreme) poverty.[462] Programmes were replaced by other programmes such as *Chile Solidario*. It was replaced by Securities and Opportunities (*Seguridades y Oportunidades,* also known as *Ethical Family Income*) in 2013 (but was running until 2017), which combines non-conditional with conditional components. Programmes that were at a pilot stage and geographically limited, respectively, by 2012/13, are now nationwide programmes, such as Kenya´s *Older Persons Cash Transfer (OPCT)*[463] and the cash transfer component for very poor labour-constrained households in Ethiopia´s *Productive Safety Net Programme* (Bahru et al. 2020). Other programmes were disbanded such as the pioneering Mexican programme *Oportunidades* (renamed *Prospera* in 2014) in 2019. Consequently, if we measured entitlements according to the latest figures, we might see a different picture for some target groups in some of the Southern countries. Despite these adaptations, the main findings on entitlement structures and social citizenship for persons considered poor and/or vulnerable across the global South will most probably continue to be valid.

[460] Nevertheless, the years of introduction of the programmes that were running in 2012/13 may provide some hints at the evolution until this point in time (see the illustration of the years of introduction in Weible and Leisering 2019, p. 155).

[461] www.pension-watch.net; 2021-02-26.

[462] For all programmes in Latin America mentioned in this paragraph, see the freely accessible database by ECLAC at https://dds.cepal.org/bpsnc/cct; 20201-04-19.

[463] www.pension-watch.net; 2021-02-26.

11 Conclusion: Contributions of the study and the future of social cash transfers

Concluding this doctoral dissertation, I highlight its major contributions and discuss the future of social cash transfers and social citizenship in the global South.

Contributions of the study

This doctoral dissertation makes substantial contributions to three fields of research, both in substantive and conceptual terms: research on social cash transfers; research on social protection in development contexts; and empirical research on social citizenship in the global South. Six contributions stand out.

First, the doctoral dissertation provides a large N analysis of social cash transfer programmes and national social cash transfer arrangements (countries) that allows to detect global patterns that do not come into view through case studies, which dominate research, nor through small n studies nor through the (rare) medium n studies on a selected programme type or a single world region (see Chapter 2).

In this study on social cash transfers across the entire global South, patterns become evident that could only be specified through the *full analysis of all Southern programmes and countries*. Examples include the share of conditional transfers in the universe of social cash transfer programmes, which turned out to be fairly small (29%; see section 8.3), and the share of family-related *conditional cash transfers*, on which much of academic and political debates focus but which turned out to be even smaller (19% of all programmes; see section 6.4.3). In addition to the global patterns, regional patterns emerge such as the comparatively higher average inclusiveness and widespread categorical targeting approach in Latin American countries and the exclusionary national social cash transfer arrangements and widespread non-categorical targeting approach in African countries. Again, this underlines that studies with selected samples of programmes and/or countries (world regions) are not (necessarily) representative of all the social cash transfers in the global South.

In addition to offering the comprehensive perspective of all programmes in all countries, the analysis has revealed that the perspective on the entire country with all programmes and all citizens of the country defined as poor (*country approach*; see section 4.5) is indispensable for recognizing the extent of inclusion and, above all, the extent of exclusion in national social cash transfer arrangements. More generally, we might argue that the country approach is imperative for recognizing and facilitating inclusive social citizenship. However, the global policies on social cash transfers as well as academic research have been dominated by a focus on single programmes (*programme approach*; see section 2.4.4). Such a narrow approach neglects or even ignores the systemic perspective necessary to include all the persons recognized as poor in a country.

Second, portraying the universe of social cash transfers for the Southern poor and vulnerable population from an entitlement perspective, this doctoral dissertation demonstrates that entitlements and programme designs matter.

This doctoral dissertation makes clear that even if the current programmes achieve the best implementation in the world, basic social protection for the poor and vulnerable will remain patchy and incomplete. The "substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable" to be reached by 2030 crucially depends on the *entitlements* of the poor and vulnerable and on the *design* of social protection system, since these account for inclusion and for exclusion respectively in the first place, preceding implementation. Poor and vulnerable persons may be included in national social protection systems by inclusive designs.

The doctoral dissertation is the first comprehensive study on entitlements to social cash transfers across all countries of the global South, providing both a broad overview and in-depth comparative knowledge of entitlements to social cash transfers. Such extensive knowledge facilitates a complete picture of entitlement structures, which has been lacking so far. This doctoral dissertation does not only make transparent which groups in which countries and world regions are entitled to social cash transfers, but also to what extent, with what conditions of access, with what degree of security, and under which programme types. Moreover, the analysis does not only uncover entitlement gaps and patterns of exclusion, but it also identifies distinct units that are excluded from entitlements (countries, target categories, subcategories). This reveals that the structure of entitlements, including the programme types, is much more complex and diverse than accounted for in the literature and in global discourses around social cash transfers.

Such comprehensive knowledge is not only a strong contribution to academic research on social protection in development contexts. It is also of central importance in view of Goal 1 of the *United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)*, to "end poverty in all its forms everywhere". The Goal is to be reached by aiming for several targets, including Target 1.3: "Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable" (United

Nations 2015). The target clearly underlines that building social protection floors in the global South may be a major step towards the great global goal of ending poverty. We know that if adequate social protection for (all) poor and vulnerable persons were available, both the extent and the incidence of poverty could be reduced. “The evidence from across the developing world is clear: social protection programs have resulted in (often significant) reductions in poverty - and their absence constitutes a potentially serious threat to efforts to end poverty” (Fiszbein et al. 2014, p. 175).

Now, the comprehensive knowledge of entitlement structures including the multi-faceted exclusions at the level of countries, target categories, and even within target categories, which this doctoral dissertation contributes, is essential to construct the required “nationally appropriate social protection systems” across the global South, which are mentioned in Target 1.3. Recognizing the extent of inclusion and the patterns of exclusion from entitlement are key to develop and assess policies that strive for inclusive social protection. As the current national social protection “floors”, if any, are often full of gaps, the new insights are crucial to design *inclusive* social protection systems “for all”, including so far excluded groups systematically.

Third, this doctoral dissertation depicts for the first time the state of social citizenship of citizens considered poor and/or vulnerable across the global South based on a large N analysis of social cash transfers.

Conceptually, it refines the application of Th. H. Marshall´s concept of social citizenship to social cash transfers in the global South, which is a recent undertaking (Leisering and Barrientos 2013). As I have shown through comparisons to other instruments of social protection, social cash transfers are the centre piece of social protection for the poor and vulnerable population in the global South. Therefore, the structure of entitlements to social cash transfers characterizes the state of social citizenship of the poor and vulnerable population across the global South. By precisely measuring entitlements to social cash transfers, this doctoral dissertation assesses the social citizenship of persons considered poor and/or vulnerable in the global South in the dimensions of inclusion, rights principles, and institutionalization.

The study reveals that social citizenship of the persons considered poor and/or vulnerable in the global South is highly differential. These findings underline that a *general* assessment of social citizenship of “the poor” across the global South is difficult, since huge differences among world regions, countries, target categories and life cycle stages, as well as within target categories have been discovered. Consequently, a sophisticated and differentiating conceptual and methodological approach is required to adequately portray the state of social citizenship of different groups among “the poor” and “the vulnerable” across the global South.

Moreover, the empirical analysis discovers that social citizenship of persons considered poor is vastly incomplete and even exclusionary. If we accept the idea of “layered” social citizenship, social citizenship does not only comprise a “national layer of rights”, but also an “international layer”, which consists of human rights treaties and which is close to universal (Davy 2014, p. 215; see section 10.2.3). Based on her analysis of States Parties reports filed under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), Davy argues that “the granting of social citizenship is about to become an obligation states must adhere to, at least when they confront poverty” (Davy 2014, p. 261). And “[e]ach human being living in poverty indicates that the human rights standard of the ICESCR has not been met” (Davy 2014, p. 263). Against this background of human rights (in terms of near-universal state obligations), the exclusions from entitlements to basic social protection identified in this doctoral dissertation appear as even more significant.

Fourth, this doctoral dissertation contributes an innovative framework of measures for recording, analysing, and depicting entitlements to social cash transfers in a standardized way.

No such analytical framework tailored to large N analysis of entitlements to social cash transfers in the global South has been available so far. An integrated set of indicators makes it possible to both (qualitatively) map and (quantitatively) measure entitlements to social cash transfers in view of the three dimensions of social citizenship (inclusion, rights principles, institutionalization). Three self-constructed indices - regarding inclusion, individualization, and institutionalization - allow us to break down complex issues to a single score, facilitating simple comparisons of a large number of programmes and countries respectively.

Three distinct units of analysis (programmes, target categories, countries) make a sophisticated analysis of entitlements possible. In addition to the unit of analysis of *programmes*, on which the few previous comparative studies are based, it introduces six standardized *target categories* as units of analysis that are reconstructed from the empirical social cash transfer programmes. This way, entitlements may be mapped and measured separately per target category. Such a refined mapping by target groups is new in the field of social cash transfers. Only by precisely mapping entitlements separately by target category, it is possible to reveal entitlement structures with distinct patterns and differential orders among the target categories. Recognizing such distinctions by target category - even within programmes - is crucial to assess the quality of the social protection that programmes provide for different groups. Distinguishing groups among the poor is not only relevant to advanced academic research on social protection in the global South. It may also have relevance for development practice, since different groups of poor persons may need different support (Schubert 2020; see second part of this Chapte). As a third unit of analysis, this doctoral dissertation introduces the *national social cash transfer arrangement* as a unit of analysis, which comprises all the social cash transfer programmes in a country (*country approach*; see section 4.5). The country approach to the analysis of entitlements makes it possible to map and compare the 113 countries in view of the extent to which they include the six target categories in the national social cash transfer arrangements. While the analysis of programmes is confined to the issue of "who is addressed", the country approach facilitates statements on *inclusion* (who is included in the national arrangement of a country). The aggregation of programme data at the level of countries is demanding, constituting a major challenge in comparative social protection analysis (see section 2.4.4). This doctoral dissertation is the first study to contribute such an approach to aggregating entitlements to social cash transfers in the global South at the level of countries.

The analytical framework which this doctoral dissertation provides may be useful to both academia and development practice. Due to its underpinning by the sociological concept of social citizenship, this doctoral dissertation may contribute to the effort of developing consistent analytical approaches for the analysis of social policy in developing contexts (see Walker (2013), for example). Moreover, it could be used in political practice as a monitoring tool to assess the development of social cash transfer programmes in each country of the global South, above all in view of SDG Goal 1 to "end poverty in all its forms everywhere".

Fifth, this doctoral dissertation provides the first comprehensive dataset, covering all identifiable social cash transfer programmes in all countries of the global South, with a focus on entitlements to social cash transfers (*FLOORCASH-SocCit*; Weible 2014, 2015, 2018; Leisering and Weible 2020).

It thereby contributes to building up a basic data infrastructure in the area of social cash transfers in the global South, which has been developed only recently (see Barrientos 2018b, 2018a; Dodlova et al. 2016, 2018 with two further contributions, but not tailored to entitlements). FLOORCASH-SocCit is a most comprehensive, self-constructed dataset with computable data on entitlements to social cash transfers in the global South, including all identifiable nationally administered social cash transfer programmes in all countries of the global South (total universe). Such a dataset is indispensable for a thorough analysis of the universe of entitlements to social cash transfers, for two reasons: first, for the analysis of 282 programmes in 113 countries computable data is required; second, only the complete enumeration of programmes ensures that the full picture of the universe of social cash transfers is depicted, rather than one based on a substantially reduced sample. The findings of this doctoral dissertation, which uncovers huge differences among countries and world regions as well as among target categories (that are related to programme types to some extent, but in a complex manner; see section 6.4), suggests that the reduced samples that were studied so far are prone to be biased (see "first" further above in this section). To give another example, data on the design of all social cash cash transfer programmes across the global South was essential to identify different subcategories of "poor people" (see section 6.1.6) and consequently to determine adequate degrees of inclusiveness of the national social cash transfer arrangements in the countries that address these subcategories (see sections 7.3 and 7.4). Complete data on the universe of entitlements to social cash transfers is critical for valid assessments of the state of social citizenship and of entitlements to basic social protection of poor and/or vulnerable persons in the global South.

What is more, by providing the dataset FLOORCASH-SocCit, this doctoral dissertation contributes the data required for *multivariate* analyses related to social cash transfers across the global South (see subsequent point).

Finally, this doctoral dissertation provides hints at factors that might contribute to explaining the huge differences among the target categories as well as among the countries as regards entitlements to social cash transfers and social citizenship for persons considered poor and/or vulnerable.

The analyses show correlations of certain structures of entitlements with national income and world regions, for example, to be explored and refined in future research.

The future of social cash transfers and social citizenship in the global South

This doctoral dissertation ends at a point where things start to become most exciting. Above all, we need to know more about the political, economic, and social factors that might account for the differences in entitlements to social cash transfers and in social citizenship among the countries across the global South. Furthermore, it would be desirable to up-date the large n data on entitlements to social cash transfers and to undertake time series analyses to trace the development of social citizenship over time.[464] The classification of social cash transfer programmes and countries could be refined and complemented by further aspects. Finally, this study on social citizenship for persons considered poor and/or vulnerable in the global South should be complemented by further comparative investigations of social security interventions beyond social cash transfers. All these issues may be tasks for future research.

The analysis of this doctoral dissertation suggests some perspectives on the future politics of social cash transfers and, more generally, of social citizenship for poor and/or vulnerable persons across the global South.

First, the analysis revealed that entitlements gaps with respect to social cash transfers are largest in low-income economies, notwithstanding that the apparent correlation between the income of a country and the quality of social citizenship for persons considered poor and/or vulnerable is not straightforward and requires further investigation. The finding indicates that low-income countries may have the biggest steps to go towards inclusive social citizenship and substantial poverty reduction. However, the levels of *spending* on social protection often seems much too low to reach such goals, since according to recent calculations, half of the low-income countries may not even achieve to halve the poverty gap with their current budgets for social protection, even assuming perfect targeting efficiency (Fiszbein et al. 2014, p. 175). So it is evident that in order to expand entitlements and reduce poverty remarkably, more public resources have to be invested in social protection. The ILO sees fiscal space for expanding social protection even in the poorest countries (ILO 2017, p. 184). The latest ILO *World Social Protection Report* mentions several options such as reallocating public expenditure, increasing tax revenues, expanding contributory social insurance coverage, "eliminating illicit financial flows", and managing debts (ILO 2017, p. 184). Some of these measures might be feasible in some poor countries. However, according to Fiszbein and colleagues, they will probably not be sufficient, since "other resources, including development assistance targeted to social protection, will surely be needed, especially in the poorest countries" (Fiszbein et al. 2014, p. 175). Even the ILO proposes "[l]obbying for aid and transfers" from international organizations and donor governments in the North and, increasingly, in the South as one option to expand the fiscal space for social protection (ILO 2017, p. 184). So, the huge entitlement gaps in the poorest countries combined with insufficient national resources to close these gaps underline how important official

464 The SALMIC dataset published by Barrientos (2018a) includes panel data but only till 2015.

development assistance (ODA), bilateral support, and South-South transfers are to achieve social protection for all poor people. This calls for the responsibility of the international community and of richer societies in particular to do their bit to make social security for all a reality.

Second, the empirical analysis showed that even among the middle-income economies, the degree of inclusion of persons considered poor and/or vulnerable varies enormously. Even if resources are available, the resources do, of course, not necessarily translate into inclusive social protection. Among many other factors, political will and societal commitment might be critical for *inclusive* social citizenship for poor and/or vulnerable persons. Quoting Thomas H. Marshall one last time, "a ´welfare society´, that is to say a society that recognises its collective responsibility to seek to achieve welfare, and not only to relieve destitution or eradicate penury" (Marshall 1981a, p. 88)[465] may make a crucial difference for the state of social citizenship of persons considered poor and/or vulnerable. We certainly cannot expect all societies to turn into "welfare societies", and marked reservations with respect to "grants" for adults of working age is conceivable in some countries such as in South Africa (Weible and Leisering 2012, including a discussion of South Africa´s position between welfare and developmental state). Yet a societal consensus for inclusive social protection of persons considered poor and/or vulnerable and political effort towards including all those members of society who are recognized as poor might be a *conditio sine qua non* for inclusive social citizenship. Once more, further research on this hypothesis is required. It emphasizes a *national* responsibility of the societies to complement the global Goal of ending poverty.

Third, the empirical analysis demonstrated that countries that achieve full inclusion by granting entitlements to social cash transfers to all persons recognized as poor apply *non-categorical* targeting rather than only categorical targeting, with very few exceptions (see section 7.4). Moreover, the analysis showed clearly that categorical inclusion often entails exclusion, since entitlement structures are remarkably patchy and complementary categorical programmes are frequently lacking. This suggests that building inclusive national social cash transfer arrangements by relying on *categorical* programmes only might be (too) demanding for many Southern countries. These observations make the limits of the categorical targeting approach evident. Therefore, it may be reasonable to (re)consider non-categorical targeting

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[465] The quote is taken from Marshall´s discussion whether means-tested provisions and the principle of discretion may form part of a right. He argues that discretion "can only be fully realized in a ´welfare society´"; see also section 3.3.1.

approaches to address poor people without referring to other biological, social, and work-related criteria. However, the only non-categorical global model of social cash transfers, the *general household assistance,* has experienced reluctant support by global organisations so far (Gliszczynski 2015, p. 60; see sections 6.4 and 7.2.2), while the global flagship models - *conditional cash transfers*, *family allowances*, and *social pensions* - target *particular* categories of poor and/or vulnerable citizens. This suggests that the current flagship models, which are promoted by major global governmental (and to a lesser extent, nongovernmental) organizations, may not be sufficient to reach the global target of establishing social protection floors for all.

New flagship models with different targeting approaches and systemic adaptations of the social cash transfer policies are required rather than uniform and purely categorical programme models. Such innovations may include programmes with a consistently non-categorical approach to addressing all poor people in a country, smart combinations of categorical and non-categorical targeting, and systematic integration of social cash transfers with other interventions suitable for basic social protection.

One social cash transfer model to address poor households combines a refined targeting approach with a systemic perspective. The model comprises social cash transfers for extremely poor and labour-constrained households, ideally to be complemented by a public works programme to address extremely poor households with sufficient labour capacity (Schubert 2020, 2018). The model was developed by the German consultant Bernd Schubert and refined over decades with programmes implemented in several low-income and lower-middle-income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (see section 6.1.6), in cooperation with international and bilateral donor organizations (interview n. 7a, 2012, as listed in FLOORCASH-SocCit version 4 (Leisering and Weible 2020); Gliszczynski 2015, pp. 55–60).[466] In as far as the public employment programmes imply a *guaranteed* provision if work cannot be provided in due time, the two components - social cash transfer for labour-constrained households and guaranteed provision for household with sufficient labour

[466] The empirical analysis depicted in this doctoral dissertation refers to the situation as of 2012/13, when most of the programmes for extremely poor labour-restricted households were limited pilot projects and geographically limited programmes, respectively. But the programmes in Ethiopia, Zambia, Malawi, and Zimbabwe have expanded and finally reached a nationwide scope in the past years.

capacity - may add up to a systemic social protection floor for those recognized as extremely poor in a country.[467]

Now the time seems right to put this and further innovative models on the agendas of the relevant international organizations. It might now be appropriate for the international development community and for national governments alike to revise their social cash transfer policies, following a systemic approach with complementary programmes, which may serve as adequate building blocks for inclusive social citizenship.

In conclusion, this doctoral dissertation underlines that striving for a life in dignity and social security for all remains a *political* issue. It is in the hands of the policymakers in the South and across the globe whether and at what pace basic social rights and entitlements to basic (income) protection for all persons recognized as poor and/or vulnerable will be established.

The human rights core of social citizenship, referred to above in this Chapter, implies that all persons, including those defined as poor and who find themselves in life-threatening conditions, should enjoy the right to a minimum of resources, recognition, and social security over the course of life, even if social citizenship is and will probably remain differential.

[467] The well-known *Productive Safety Net Programme* in Ethiopia, which combines both elements, lacked a guarantee to public work at the time of data collection (Lieuw-Kie-Song 2011), which is the reason why it does not come under my definition of social cash transfers (see section 3.1). But now the programme seems close to the aim of proving regular income to all households who qualify as extremely poor (food insecure), including those with and without labour capacity, respectively (Bahru et al. 2020).

Appendix 4.4.4

Social cash transfer pilot programmes and regular programmes with limited geographical scope

Table 4.4.4-1: Pilot programmes

Country	Programme	Regional scope	Ratio: Administrative units covered/total number of administrative units
EGY	Menhet el-Ossra [family stipends]	65 villages	
EGY	Ain es-Sira Conditional Cash Transfers	one slum in Cairo	
HTI	Ti Manman Cheri	four poor districts of capital Port au Prince	
KEN	Cash Transfers for Orphans and Vulnerable Children	37 districts out of 47 districts	0.79, but with less than 300 households enrolled per district (Garcia and Moore 2012, p. 259)
KHM	Targeted Assistance for Education of Poor Girls and Indigenous Children- Secondary school girls stipend programme	100 secondary schools	
PER	Programa Nacional de Asistencia Solidaria "Pensión 65"	6 out of 25 districts	0.24
SEN	Child-Focused Social Cash Transfer and Nutrition Security Project	10 out of 45 districts	0.22
SLE	Social Safety Net Programme	7 out of 149 chiefdoms	0.05
UGA	Uganda Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment (SAGE)	14 out of 111 districts	0.13
ZMB	Several pilot programmes, with three different programme designs	19 out of 89 districts	21.3

Source: FLOORCASH-Basic, the author; the sample consists of 10 social cash transfer programmes that were described as "pilot programmes" in the relevant sources and for which information on their regional scope was available.

Note: The Table reflects the stage of the pilot projects by 2012/2013, according to the sources available by that time.

Table 4.4.4-2: Regular programmes with limited geographical scope

Country	Programme	Regional scope	Ratio: Administrative units covered/total number of administrative units
ETH	Productive Safetynet Programme - Direct Support Component	290 out of 550 “woredas”/districts	0.53
GHA	Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP)	94 out of 275 districts	0.34
SLV	Comunidades Solidarias	urban regions: depending on the programme component, between 25 and 100 out of 262 municipalities	0.10 and 0.38 respectively
IRN	Old age social pension	rural areas only	
NER	Cash Transfer	five out of 8 regions	0.65
NGA	Care of the Poor (COPE)	12 out of 37 states	0.32
PER	Programa Juntos	mainly rural	
ZWE	Harmonized Social Cash Transfer Programme [introduced in 2012]	Inception phase; by 2013, 13 out of 59 districts, but planned to gradually increase number of districts until nationwide coverage	0.22, but planned to gradually increase number of districts until nationwide coverage

Source: FLOORCASH-Basic, the author; the sample consists of 8 social cash transfer programmes that are limited to particular regions of the country, but that were *not* described as pilot programmes in the relevant sources, and for which information on their regional scope was available.

Note: A few social cash transfer programmes run in nearly all administrative units of the country, except in a few administrative units. Nevertheless, these programmes are treated as nationwide programmes.

Examples:

Philipine´s *Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Programme (4Ps)* covers 143 out of 144 cities, 1,484 out of 1,491 municipalities, and 79 out of 81 provinces.

Bangladesh´s *Assistance Programme for Widowed and Destitute Women (APWDW)* covers 4,488 out of 4,550 “unions” (defined as areas with one police station, comprising multiple villages).

Appendix 4.5

Table 4.5-1: Social cash transfer programmes as units of analysis, with inclusion scores by target category

Cases		Country	Inclusion scores by target category					
			Children	Persons of working age	Older Persons	Adults with disabilities	Small groups	Poor People
Social Cash Transfer Programmes	Programme 1	Country A	C.1	WA.1	OA.1	D.1	SG.1	PP.1
	Programme 2	Country A	C.2	WA.2	OA.2	D.2	SG.2	PP.2
	Programme 3	Country A	C.3	WA.3	OA.3	D.3	SG.3	PP.3
	Programme 1	Country B	C.1	WA.1	OA.1	D.1	SG.1	PP.1
	Programme 2	Country B	C.2	WA.2	OA.2	D.2	SG.2	PP.2
	Programme 1	Country C	C.1	WA.1	OA.1	D.1	SG.1	PP.1
	…	…	…	…	…	…	…	…

Source: Author´s construction.

Table 4.5-2: National social cash transfer arrangements as units of analysis, with inclusion scores by target category and by programme

Cases		Inclusion sub-scores by target category									
		Programme 1						Programme 2			
		Children	Persons of working age	Older Persons	Adults with disabilities	Small groups	Poor People	Children	Persons of working age	Older Persons	…
National social cash transfer arrangements	Country A	C.1	WA.1	OA.1	D.1	SG.1	PP.1	C.2	WA.2	OA.2	…
	Country B	C.1	WA.1	OA.1	D.1	SG.1	PP.1	C.2	WA.2	OA.2	…
	Country C	C.1	WA.1	OA.1	D.1	SG.1	PP.1	C.2	WA.2	OA.2	…
	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	…

Source: Author´s construction.

Appendix 5-1[468]

FLOORCASH-SocCit.

The social citizenship dataset on social cash transfers in the global South (version 4, 2020)

Codebook

Katrin Weible[469], Lutz Leisering[470]

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[468] This Codebook was published as part of Leisering and Weible 2020 at SowiDataNet|datorium by GESIS and is downloadable there; https://doi.org/10.7802/2249.

[469] Katrin Weible, Bielefeld University, researcher and member of the research project FLOOR-B (FloorCash; see footnote 2), Bielefeld University; Katrin Weible constructed the dataset FLOORCASH-SocCit based on FLOORCASH-Basic, the basic dataset of the research project FLOOR-B (Katrin Weible, Tobias Böger, John Berten, 2015, FLOORCASH-Basic. The basic dataset on social cash transfers in the global South, Version 2, Research Project FLOOR-B (FloorCash), Bielefeld: Bielefeld University, Germany, funded by the German Research Council/Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, www.floorcash.org).

[470] Lutz Leisering, Bielefeld University, Professor of Social Policy, principal investigator of the research project FLOOR-B (FloorCash), Social Security as a Human Right - Subproject Social Cash Transfers, funded by the German Research Council/Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), Bielefeld University, www.floorcash.org; contact: lutz.leisering@uni-bielefeld.de.

Introduction

FLOORCASH-SocCit provides comprehensive computable data on entitlements to social cash transfers in the global South. The dataset covers 282 social cash transfer programmes in 148 countries and small territories, as of 2012/13. FLOORCASH-SocCit has been constructed in view of the sociological concept of social citizenship, focusing on entitlements to social cash transfers rather than welfare outcomes. FLOORCASH-SocCit emphasises three aspects: inclusion of social groups (with more refined data than the usual target groups), conditions of access to benefits, and institutionalization of the programmes. FLOORCASH-SocCit can be used for studies with different units of analysis (programmes, target categories, countries).

Social cash transfer programmes are defined as publicly financed programmes that provide regular, non-contributory, and non-repayable monetary payments for free, untied use (i.e. for general subsistence rather than, e.g., food subsidies or school fee waivers) to persons (individuals and households) who are considered poor and/or vulnerable, as defined by the programme regulations. Public employment programmes (public works) are not classified as social cash transfer programmes, unless they imply a guaranteed payment even if work is not available within a certain period of time.

The selection of cases is restricted to those programs which are administered at the national level (even if they are confined to selected regions of the country) and which are designed for national citizens. The selection of countries is based on geographical and developmental criteria. All non-European UN member states are included, except five highly developed countries (with very high HDI scores over decades; Australia, New Zealand, Canada, USA, and Japan). Additionally, the following territories are included: Palestine, Macao, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Cook Islands.

The dataset draws on 27 extant data collections on social security and social protection; 218 governmental documents and websites; 214 studies from the academic literature and policy papers; and 14 expert interviews.

Suggested citation:

Weible, Katrin, Leisering, Lutz 2020: FLOORCASH-SocCit. The social citizenship dataset on social cash transfers in the global South (version 4), Research Project FLOOR (FloorCash), Bielefeld: Bielefeld University, www.floorcash.org

See www.floorcash.org for related publications.

Disclaimer

The data has been constructed as accurately as possible and to the best of our knowledge. Researchers and legal entities involved in the creation of this data shall not be liable for any loss suffered through the use of any of this information.

PART A: Identification of social cash transfer programmes

1. **"country" – ISO 3166 three letter country code [string]**

AFG	Afghanistan
AGO	Angola
ARE	United Arab Emirates
ARG	Argentina
ARM	Armenia
ATG	Antigua and Barbuda
AZE	Azerbaijan
BDI	Burundi
BEN	Benin
BFA	Burkina Faso
BGD	Bangladesh
BHR	Bahrain
BHS	Bahamas
BLZ	Belize
BOL	Bolivia
BRA	Brazil
BRB	Barbados
BRN	Brunei Darussalam
BTN	Bhutan
BWA	Botswana
CAF	Central African Republic
CHL	Chile
CHN	China
CIV	Côte d´Ivoire

CMR	Cameroon
COD	Democratic Republic of the Congo
COG	Congo
COK	Cook Islands
COL	Colombia
COM	Comoros
CPV	Cape Verde
CRI	Costa Rica
CUB	Cuba
DJI	Djibouti
DMA	Dominica
DOM	Dominican Republic
DZA	Algeria
ECU	Ecuador
EGY	Egypt
ERI	Eritrea
ETH	Ethiopia
FJI	Fiji
FSM	Federated States of Micronesia
GAB	Gabon
GEO	Georgia
GHA	Ghana
GIN	Guinea
GMB	Gambia
GNB	Guinea-Bissau
GNQ	Equatorial Guinea

GRD	Grenada
GTM	Guatemala
GUY	Guyana
HKG	Hong Kong
HND	Honduras
HTI	Haiti
IDN	Indonesia
IND	India
IRN	Iran
IRQ	Iraq
ISR	Israel
JAM	Jamaica
JOR	Jordan
KAZ	Kazakhstan
KEN	Kenya
KGZ	Kyrgyzstan
KHM	Cambodia
KIR	Kiribati
KNA	Saint Kitts and Nevis
KOR	South Korea
KWT	Kuwait
LAO	Laos
LBN	Lebanon
LBR	Liberia
LBY	Libya
LCA	Saint Lucia

LKA	Sri Lanka
LSO	Lesotho
MAC	Macao
MAR	Morocco
MDG	Madagascar
MDV	Maldives
MEX	Mexico
MHL	Marshall Islands
MLI	Mali
MMR	Myanmar
MNG	Mongolia
MOZ	Mozambique
MRT	Mauritania
MUS	Mauritius
MWI	Malawi
MYS	Malaysia
NAM	Namibia
NER	Niger
NGA	Nigeria
NIC	Nicaragua
NPL	Nepal
NRU	Nauru
OMN	Oman
PAK	Pakistan
PAN	Panama
PER	Peru

PHL	Philippines
PLW	Palau
PNG	Papua New Guinea
PRK	North Korea
PRY	Paraguay
PSE	State of Palestine
QAT	Qatar
RWA	Rwanda
SAU	Saudi Arabia
SDN	Sudan
SEN	Senegal
SGP	Singapore
SLB	Solomon Islands
SLE	Sierra Leone
SLV	El Salvador
SOM	Somalia
SSD	South Sudan
STP	Sao Tome and Principe
SUR	Suriname
SWZ	Swaziland
SYC	Seychelles
SYR	Syria
TCD	Chad
TGO	Togo
THA	Thailand
TJK	Tajikistan

TKM	Turkmenistan
TLS	East Timor
TON	Tonga
TTO	Trinidad and Tobago
TUN	Tunisia
TUV	Tuvalu
TWN	Taiwan
TZA	Tanzania
UGA	Uganda
URY	Uruguay
UZB	Uzbekistan
VCT	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
VEN	Venezuela
VNM	Vietnam
VUT	Vanuatu
WSM	Samoa
YEM	Yemen
ZAF	South Africa
ZMB	Zambia
ZWE	Zimbabwe

2. **"region" – world region[471]:**

AFRICA:

1 = Southern Africa;

[471] Countries are classified following the classification by the UN statistics division, with the exceptions of Cyprus and Turkey, which we classify as European countries that are not included in this dataset; https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/.

2 = West Africa;

3 = North Africa;

4 = East Africa;

5 = Middle Africa;

AMERICA:

11 = South America;

12 = Central America;

13 = Caribbean;

ASIA:

21 = South Asia;

22 =West Asia;

23 = Central Asia;

24 = East Asia;

25 = South East Asia;

OCEANIA:

31 = Melanesia,

32 = Micronesia,

33 = Polynesia

3. "nbSCTcountry" – number of social cash transfer programmes per country

0 = country without any social cash transfer programme

1, 2, 3, … = Consecutive numbering of the social cash transfer programmes in a country

999 = missing values

4. **“anySCT” – countries with/without social cash transfer programmes**

   0 = no social cash transfer programme identified in the country

   1 = at least one social cash transfer programme identified in the country

5. **“SCT” – name of social cash transfer programme [string]**

   If the name of a programme is unknown, a self-constructed label is indicated in square brackets.

PART B: Target categories of social cash transfer programmes

CHILDREN – children and families with children (age <18)

6. **“C” – target category of children**

   0 = not targeted

   1 = entire category

   4 = only females

   5 = only subcategory/subcategories

   999 = missing values

7. **“C_nbsubcat” – number of subcategories of children targeted (possibly in addition to the entire category of children)**

   0 = no subcategory of children targeted

   1,2,3… = number of subcategories of children targeted

   999 = missing values

8. **“C_type” – types of subcategories of children targeted [string]**

   2 = children of divorced women;

4 = children of widow;

7 = orphans;

9 = (children of) single parents;

10 = disabled children;

11= families of prisoners;

14 = poorly educated children;

15 = students of higher education;

22 = children living with AIDS;

23 = children of informal workers;

26 = street children,

27 = abandoned/neglected children/children in need of care;

28 = children with criminal charges;

29 = children of ethnic origin;

30 = children of disabled parents;

36 = children of elderly parents;

46 = children of multiple births;

48 = children of unemployed parents;

49 = children of parents with vulnerable forms of employment/income generation (i.e. seasonal or domestic worker);

57 = families with many children;

58 = families with female heads of household;

59 = vulnerable children;

60 = children of underprivileged families;

61 = children with economic activity/working for income;

62 = peasant families;

70 = other particular groups of children;

71 = small tax payer families (self-employed);

73 = students of professional technical training;

999 = missing values

See also the variable "C_comm" for the description of the target category of children.

9. "C_start" – start of entitlement period of children (age in years)

999 = missing values

10. "C_end1" – standard end of entitlement period (age in years)

999 = missing values

11. "C_end2" – exceptional end of entitlement period of children (age in years)

12. "C_BU" – beneficiary unit of transfers for children

0 = household

1 = child as individual

666 = mixed, depending on the subcategory of children

999 = missing values

13. "C_indiv" – composition of the transfer volume of transfers for children (degree to which each member of the beneficiary unit is taken into account)

0 = flat household transfer;

1 = volume takes each individual of the beneficiary unit into account;

2 = only each child is taken into account;

3 = takes partly number of children into account;

12 = takes the composition of the household to some extent into account;

666 = mixed, depending on the subcategory of children;

999 = missing values

14. “C_nomax” – maximum number of transfers for children per household

0 = maximum per household

1 = no maximum per household

666 = mixed, depending on the subcategory of children

999 = missing values

15. “C_uncond” – behavioural conditions of transfers for children

0 = behavioural conditions

1 = no behavioural conditions

666 = mixed, depending on the subcategory of children

999 = missing values

16. “C_comm” – comments on target category of children [string]

WORKING AGE – persons of working age (age 18-59)

17. “WA” – target category of persons of working age

0 = not targeted

1 = entire category

5 = only subcategory/subcategories

999 = missing values

18. “WA_nbsubcat” - number of subcategories of persons of working age targeted (possibly in addition to the entire category of persons of working age)

0 = no subcategory of persons of working age targeted

1,2,3… = number of subcategories of persons of working age targeted

999 = missing values

19. “WA_type” – types of subcategories of persons of working age targeted [string]

11 = prisoners;

14 = poorly educated persons;

15 = students of higher education/ university students;

23 = informal workers;

38 = persons providing care to others and thus unable to work for income;

48 = unemployed;

49 = persons with vulnerable form of employment/income generation (e.g. seasonal or domestic worker);

53 = unemployed heads of household;

62 = farmers;

64 = workers in particular branches;

66 = students of professional institutions;

72 = very particular groups;

86 = persons doing additional training for reintegration into society

See also the variable “WA_comm” for the description of the target category of persons of working age.

20. “WA_start” – start of entitlement period of persons of working age (age in years)

999 = missing values

21. “WA_end” – end of entitlement period of persons of working age (age in years)

777 = without age limit

999 = missing values

22. “WA_BU” – beneficiary unit of transfers for persons of working age

0 = household

1 = person of working age as individual

999 = missing values

23. "WA_indiv" – composition of the transfer volume of transfers for persons of working age (degree to which each member of the beneficiary unit is taken into account)

0 = flat household transfer;

1 = volume takes each individual of the beneficiary unit into account;

2 = only each person of working age is taken into account;

10 = although the beneficiary unit is an individual, the volume takes the composition of the household to some extent into account;

12 = takes the composition of the household to some extent into account;

999 = missing values

24. "WA_nomax" – maximum number of transfers for person of working age per household

0 = maximum per household

1 = no maximum per household

999 = missing values

25. "WA_uncond" – behavioural conditions of transfers for persons of working age

0 = behavioural conditions

1 = no behavioural conditions

999 = missing values

26. "WA_comm" – comments on target category of persons of working age [string]

OLD AGE – older persons (from age 60)

27. "OA" – target category of older persons

0 = not targeted

1 = entire category

5 = only subcategory/subcategories

999 = missing values

28. "OA_nbsubcat" - number of subcategories of older persons targeted (possibly in addition to the entire category of older persons)

0 = no subcategory of older persons targeted

1,2,3… = number of subcategories of older persons targeted

999 = missing values

29. "OA_type" – types of subcategories of older persons targeted [string]

23 = former informal workers;

32 = older persons living alone;

34 = older persons needing constant care;

52 = older persons formerly with formal employment (with social insurance coverage);

53 = older persons who are heads of households;

62 = farmers;

65 = infirm, thus incapable to work;

66 = agricultural labourers;

72 = very particular groups;

999 = missing values

See also the variable "OA_comm" for the description of the target category of older persons.

30. “OA_start_mix” – start of entitlement period of older persons (age in years), as a mean of the values for males and females

999 = missing values

31. “OA_start_m” – start of entitlement period of male older persons (age in years)

999 = missing values

32. “OA_start_f” – start of entitlement period of female older persons (age in years)

999 = missing values

33. “OA_BU” – beneficiary unit of the transfers for older persons

0 = household

1 = older person as individual

2 = carer of older persons (as individual)

999 = missing values

34. “OA_indiv” – composition of the transfer volume of transfers for older persons (degree to which each member of the beneficiary unit is taken into account)

0 = flat household transfer;

1 = volume takes each individual of the beneficiary unit into account;

2 = only each older person is taken into account;

11 = takes particular members of the household into account who are not older persons;

12 = takes the composition of the household to some extent into account;

999 = missing values

35. "OA_nomax" – maximum number of transfers for older persons per household

0 = maximum per household

1 = no maximum per household

999 = missing values

36. "OA_uncond" – behavioural conditions of transfers for older persons

0 = behavioural conditions

1 = no behavioural conditions

999 = missing values

37. "OA_comm" – comments on target category of older persons [string]

DISABLED – adults with disabilities

38. "D" – target category of adults with disabilities (from age 18)

0 = not targeted

1 = entire category

5 = only subcategory/subcategories

999 = missing values

39. "D_nbsubcat" – number of subcategories of adults with disabilities targeted (possibly in addition to the entire category of adults with disabilities)

0 = no subcategory of adults with disabilities targeted

1,2,3… = number of subcategories of adults with disabilities targeted

999 = missing values

40. "D_type" – types of subcategories of adults with disabilities targeted [string]

22 = persons living with HIV/ AIDS;

32 = adults with disabilities living alone;

33 = chronically ill adults;

34 = adults with disabilities needing constant care;

38 = family members providing care to the PWD's/chronically ill;

44 = ill adults and thus unable to work for income;

53 = adults with disabilities who are heads of households;

54 = adults with disabilities who are employed or self-employed;

66 = adults with disabilities who are students of professional institutions;

67 = blind adults;

72 = very particular groups;

74 = adults with particular disabilities;

999 = missing values

See also the variable "D_comm" for the description of the target category of adults with disabilities.

41. "D_start" – start of entitlement period of adults with disabilities (age in years)

999 = missing values

42. "D_end" – end of entitlement period of adults with disabilities (age in years)

777 = without age limit

999 = missing values

43. "D_BU" – beneficiary unit of transfers for adults with disabilities

0 = household

1 = adult with disabilities as individual

2 = carer (as an individual) of adults with disabilities

666 = mixed, depending on the subcategory of adults with disabilities

999 = missing values

44. "D_indiv" – composition of the transfer volume of transfers for adults with disabilities (degree to which each member of the beneficiary unit is taken into account)

0 = flat household transfer;

1 = volume takes each individual of the beneficiary unit into account;

2 = only each adult with disabilities is taken into account;

11 = takes particular members of the household into account who are not adults with disabilities;

12 = takes the composition of the household to some extent into account

999 = missing values

45. "D_nomax" – maximum number of transfers for adults with disabilities per household

0 = maximum per household

1 = no maximum per household

999 = missing values

46. "D_uncond" – behavioural conditions of transfers for adults with disabilities

0 = behavioural conditions

1 = no behavioural conditions

999 = missing values

47. "D_comm" – comments on the target category of adults with disabilities [string]

OTHERS – other residual, small groups of persons

48. "OTH" – target category of small groups

0 = not targeted

1 = targeted

999 = missing values

49. "OTH_nb" – number of small groups targeted

0 = no small group targeted

1,2,3… = number of small groups targeted

999 = missing values

50. "OTH_type" – types of small groups targeted [string]

WOMEN:

1 = pregnant women;

2 = divorced women;

4 = widows;

8 = abandoned/deserted women;

17 = unmarried women [of higher age];

18 = lactating mothers/ breastfeeding women;

47 = housewives;

75 = young women;

76 = women married to non-citizens;

84 = acid burnt women;

85 = women and young girls who are under court cases;

OTHER GROUPS:

5 = survivors (which may include orphans, widows, widowers);

6 = conflict victims;

11= (families) of prisoners;

13 = war veterans;

19 = very particular other groups;

25 = abandoned persons;

29 = persons of ethnic origin;

42 = persons living in the streets;

43 = victims of political repression;

45 = persons affected by disaster;

51 = internally displaced persons;

63 = stranded people;

77 = victims of nuclear accidents;

78 = persons who worked during times of war;

79 = persons who get no maintenance from family although family is obliged;

81 = ad hoc-decisions;

82 = relatives of disappeared persons;

83 = humanitarian cases;

87 = persons in urgent situations;

999 = missing values

See also the variable "OTH_comm" for the description of the target category of small groups.

51. "OTH_BU" – beneficiary unit of transfers for small groups

0 = household

1 = member of small group as individual

666 = mixed, depending on the type of small group

999 = missing values

52. "OTH_indiv" – composition of the transfer volume of transfers for small groups (degree to which each member of the beneficiary unit is taken into account)

0 = flat household transfer;

1 = volume takes each individual of the beneficiary unit into account;

2 = only the member of the small group is taken into account;

3 = takes partly the number of members of small groups into account;

11 = takes particular members of the household into account who are not members of the small group;

12 = takes the composition of the household to some extent into account;

999 = missing values

53. "OTH_nomax" – maximum number of transfers for members of a small group per household

0 = maximum per household

1 = no maximum per household

999 = missing values

54. "OTH_uncond" – behavioural conditions of transfers for small groups

0 = behavioural conditions

1 = no behavioural conditions

999 = missing values

55. "OTH_comm" – comments on target category of small groups [string]

ANY – Poor people (individuals and households classified as poor, not categorically constructed)

56. "A" – target category of poor people

0 = not targeted

1 = targeted

999 = missing values

57. "A_nb" - number of subcategories of poor people targeted

1,2,3 = number of subcategories targeted

999 = missing values

58. "A_type" – subcategories of poor people targeted [string]

1 = all poor people;

2 = some poor people (blurred selection);

3 = labour-restricted households;

4 = households without able-bodied male;

6= "subsidiary approach" to poor people: particular categories are added up systematically to cover those not covered by the other major programmes;

7 = all poor people, but time-restricted;

9 = any household classified as poor;

11 = destitute, but with age restriction (i.e. complementary to main social cash transfer programmes)

12 = poor people, combined with supplements for other target categories;

13 = poor people (proxy means test results in coverage of children, older persons, and adults with disabilities in practice);

15 = poor people; mix of benefits in cash and in kind;

16 = households without any member capable to work;

17 = households with heads unable to maintain their household;

21 = poor people, seasonally poor people;

27 = poor people, labour-constrained households, households without head of household, households without breadwinner;

28 = people "in severe or urgent situation"; mix of benefits in cash and in kind;

30 = poor people, but entitlements depend on hukou [registration as a permanent resident of a particular district in China];

32 = poor people; proven lack of eligibility criteria;

33 = people "in severe or urgent situation"; proven lack of eligibility criteria; mix of benefits in cash and in kind;

34 = poor people addressed by religious funds;

35 = poor households, but two programmes in the country;

36 = some poor people (selected by community targeting) in one programme component, poor households with high dependency ratio in another programme component

999 = missing values

See also the variable "A_comm" for the description of the target category of poor people.

59. "A_class" – classification of the target category of poor people

1 = all poor people (as individuals or households)

2 = some poor people

3 = labour-restricted poor households

666 = mixed

999 = missing values

60. "A_BU" – beneficiary unit of transfers for poor people

0 = household

1 = poor people as individuals

999 = missing values

61. "A_indiv" – composition of the transfer volume of transfers for poor people (degree to which each member of the beneficiary unit is taken into account)

0 = flat household transfer;

1 = volume takes each individual of the beneficiary unit into account;

11 = takes particular members of the poor household into account;

12 = takes the composition of the poor household to some extent into account;

999 = missing values

62. "A_nomax" – maximum number of transfers for the category of poor people per household

0 = maximum per household

1 = no maximum per household

999 = missing values

63. "A_uncond" – behavioural conditions of transfers for poor people

0 = behavioural conditions

1 = no behavioural conditions

999 = missing values

64. "A_comm" – comments on target category of poor people [string]

GENDER – gender sensitivity of programme design

65. "gender_any" – any distinction by gender in the programme design

0 = no distinction

1 = some distinction

999 = missing values

66. "gender_spec" – types of distinctions by gender in the programme design [string]

1 = target group: partly for females only;

2 = target group: only for females;

3 = target group: partly for males only;

4 = target group: only for males;

5 = certain advantages for females;

6 = advantages for males;

7 = gender sensitivity but unclear for which sex

PART C: Conditions of access to social cash transfers

67. "nolimitgeo" - geographical range of the programme

0 = geographical limitations, programme does not cover entire country

1 = no geographical limitations, programme covers entire country

999 = missing values

68. "noMT" – means test

0 = means test applied

1 = no means test applied

666 = mixed, depending on the target group

999 = missing values

69. "MT_type" – type of means test applied [string]

1 = proxy means test;

2 = income-based means test;

3 = means test in which assets are taken into account;

4 = pension test;

5 = further incompatibility test

Please note that entries for this variable are incomplete.

70. “notimelimit” – time limit of entitlements

0 = time limit

1 = no time limit

999 = missing values

71. “noquota” – quota

0 = quota

1 = no quota

666 = mixed, depending on the target group

999 = missing values

PART D: Institutionalization of social cash transfer programmes

72. “nopilot” – pilot status of the programme

0 = pilot status

1 = no pilot status/regular programme

666 = mixed, depending on the programme component/target group

73. “legal” - statutory basis of the programme

0 = no statutory basis

1 = based on statute

666 = mixed, depending on the programme component/target group

999 = missing values

74. “ministry” – agency in charge of the programme

0 = no government ministry in charge

1 = government ministry in charge

999 = missing values

75. “fund” – funding of the programme

0 = (partly) internationally funded

1 = (entirely) nationally funded

666 = mixed, depending on the programme component/target group

999 = missing values

76. “year_SCT” – year of introduction of the social cash transfer programme

666 = mixed, depending on the programme component/target group

999 = missing values

77. “year_first” – year of introduction of a predecessor programme

78. “comment” – comment on the social cash transfer programme [string]

Appendix 5-2[472]

Katrin Weible, Tobias Böger, John Berten (2015): FLOORCASH-Basic. The basic dataset on social cash transfers in the global South, Version 2, Bielefeld University: Research Project FLOOR (FloorCash), Germany, funded by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, www.floorcash.org.

FLOORCASH-Basic Manual

I. Overview

The FLOORCASH-Basic dataset provides a unique overview of all social cash transfer programmes in the countries of the global South in the period between 2010 and 2013. **We define *social cash transfer* (SCT) *programmes* as publicly financed welfare programmes that provide regular non-contributory monetary payments for free, untied use to persons considered poor and/or vulnerable.** The objective of the dataset is taking stock of the abundance of all current social cash transfer programmes in all developing and transitional countries for which data is available, from the perspective of comparative social policy.

The dataset includes quantitative indicators common in welfare state research as well qualitative indicators used in country case studies. The indicators cover seven **aspects** of social cash transfer programmes:

[472] This Manual was published as part of Weible et al. 2015 at www.floorcash.org and is downloadable there. Slight modifications of definitions, terms, and expressions compared to this doctoral dissertation are possible, but they are irrelevant to the analysis.

- identification of the SCT programmes
- conditions of eligibility
- benefits
- implementation
- institutional core features
- evolution
- goals

Data on the impact or effects of social cash transfers are not included.

The dataset has been constructed from four kinds of **sources**: other databases on social protection; government documents and websites; academic literature and policy papers; expert interviews.

The dataset consists of an excel file with a main spreadsheet, complemented by four further sheets with legends for the four different kinds of sources. In the main spreadsheet each line represents one case, that is, a social cash transfer programme. The cases (SCT programmes) are grouped by countries, and the countries appear in alphabetical order. Within each country, the programmes do not show a particular order.

II. Case selection

We define the **countries of the "global South"** by combining geographical aspects with criteria of development. All independent, internationally recognized countries outside Europe and North America are included (as well as a few disputed territories), except a few countries which have constantly been assigned very high Human Development Index (HDI) scores over decades (Australia, New Zealand, Japan). This implies that South Korea, Hong Kong, Israel and Singapore are included. The State of Palestine is included, too. Cyprus and Turkey, which are West Asian countries according to the UN statistics division (see section III.1), are not included due to their actual or pending membership in the European Union.

With few exceptions, only SCT programmes at the *national* government level have been included in the dataset. As examples of SCT programmes at the sub-national level, data on several Mexican SCT programmes run by federal states have been added.

Public work programmes are not included, unless they provide defined benefits which also cover periods of unemployment. We consider the wages provided under the majority of public work schemes as remuneration for the work done rather than social assistance benefits.

The data collected refers to the **period from 2010 to 2013**, depending on the sources indicated. The records for the *quantitative* variables (benefit level, coverage, costs) generally indicate the precise year to which the data refers. Most of the other data should reflect the situation as of 2012 or even 2013. In some cases, especially for data drawn from other databases on social protection, it is difficult to determine the exact year to which the information refers.

Fields **coloured in grey** – either single SCT programmes or entire countries – do not fall in our selection of cases. yNevertheless, they have been included in the dataset to illustrate select border cases.

III. Description of indicators

The following indicators (variables) are included in FLOORCASH-Basic, grouped under seven aspects. An asterisk (*) indicates that data for a variable has not been collected systematically.

1. Identification of the SCT programmes

    - **Country code:** three-digit alphabetical codes (ISO-alpha3-codes) as standardized acronyms for each country[473]
    - **Country**: For the selection of programmes and countries see section II above.
    - **World region**: The classification is based on the definitions by the UN statistical division.[474]
    - **Name of the SCT programme**: Where available, the translation into English is used, complemented by the original name.

2. Conditions of eligibility

[473] https://www.iso.org/iso-3166-country-codes.html; accessed 08 March 2018.

[474] http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm; accessed 30 August 2013

- **Target group**: SCT programmes are either targeted at individual persons (e.g. elder persons) or at entire "families" or "households". In order to analyse the target group as precisely as possible, including the question to what extent *individual* citizens are entitled to a SCT, two variables are used to analyse the target group, the so-called entitlement person [Target group I] and the beneficiary unit [Target group II]. The variable "**entitlement person"** indicates eligibility for a SCT. An entitlement person is either a member of a certain population category such as the life cycle groups [C=Child, WA=Working age, OA=Old age] and the group of persons with disabilities [D=Persons with disabilities] or just any citizen, that is, the benefit is not restricted to a particular target group [A=any citizen]; other, residual small groups not included in C/WA/OA/D/A are defined as "others" [OTH=Other]. The variable "**beneficiary unit"** indicates how the target group is addressed: via individuals [I] or via households [H]. Example: If a SCT programme targets "families", the target group is - analytically speaking - "a household with at least one child"; the target group is therefore classified as "C" for child in the variable "entitlement person" and as "H" for household as the beneficiary unit.
- **Geographical limitations**: As not every SCT programme covers the entire country, any geographical limitations are taken into account (for further geographical restrictions see section III.4 "implementation" as well as section III.5 "administrative level".) If a SCT programme in a country applies certain measurement techniques to cover only the poorest areas of the country, the SCT is classified as a "SCT with geographical targeting", either at the national or at a local level [N with geo/L with geo = National/local SCT with geographical targeting]. If a SCT programme covers either only urban or only rural areas, it is classified as an exclusively rural or urban programme, respectively [R = only rural; URB = only urban].
- **Means-test:** If a SCT is granted to all persons of the target group without any means testing, the SCT is considered "universal" with respect to the target group [U = universal]. Otherwise, the SCT programme applies at least one form of means testing: either a means-test by income [MT-I], by assets [MT-a], by a proxy method [MT-p], or by an "incompatibility check", which means

that the applicant must not receive other designated social security provisions [MT-incomp]. If it is unclear which form of means-test a SCT programme applies, a general "MT" [MT = means-test] is recorded.

- **Quota:** This variable indicates, if there is a designated maximum number of beneficiaries *at the administrative level*, either in total or in a local administrative unit [with q = with quota; without q = without quota]. Note that a maximum number of beneficiaries *at the household level* is measured by the indicator "benefit level" (section III.3).
- **Behavioural conditions**: If a SCT programme requires the beneficiary to comply with certain conditions in terms of activities, the SCT is classified as conditional ("yes"), and information on the type of behavioural condition is added [education/health/work/OTH, with OTH = Other]. If the SCT programme does not require any particular activities, the SCT is classified as unconditional ("no").

3. Benefits

- **Generosity** (benefit level): The benefit level is indicated in absolute terms in US-Dollar and/or national currency, depending on the availability of data.
- **Benefit limitations:** In those cases where a **maximum number** of benefits per household and/or a **maximum time** period of entitlement are stipulated, the limitations are added.
- **Benefit standard*:** This basis of assessment refers to the (politically established) measure which is used as a benchmark (if any) for the level of the benefits of a SCT programme, e.g. the national poverty line or the minimum wage. In many cases there is no standard.

4. Implementation

- If a SCT programme has been established as a test case in a pre-selected area only, it is classified as a "**pilot programme**" [p = pilot]. Depending on whether the pilot SCT programme was initiated by the national or by a local government, it is classified either as a national or as a local pilot programme [N-p = national pilot; L-p = local pilot].

- **Coverage** of individuals and of households refers to the actual coverage (take-up) rather than legal entitlement. Usually, the figures are absolute numbers.
- **Costs**: Any available figure is indicated, preferably in the national currency, either the real expenditure including administration costs, or the budget including administration costs, or the total of spending on transfers.

5. Institutional core features

- **Administrative level**: If a SCT programme was introduced by the central/national government, it is classified as a national programme [N= national]. If the SCT programme was established by a lower administrative unit, e.g. a regional district, then it is classified as a local programme [L = local] (although, according to the case selection, such programmes are an exception in the dataset).
- **Agency in charge** and **executing agency**: The agency in charge is usually a public administrative unit such as a ministry. In addition, there may be a subsidiary, (semi-) public agency charged with the administration and execution of the SCT programme. Information on commercial companies commissioned with single administrative steps such as the payment of the benefits is not included in the dataset.
- **Legal basis**: Any legal basis of a SCT programme which could be identified is recorded. The crucial classification consists of the distinction between a law, passed by the legislative power, and a mere decree or similar regulation by the executive power, which may be more easily changed or withdrawn.
- **Sources of funding**: The funding may come a) from national resources, either from the budget or from other national resources [NAT-b=national budget, NAT-o = other national source], or b) from international resources [INT=international: -IO, -INGO, -bilateral]. c) Further sources are marked by “OTH” [other source].

- **Institutional umbrella**: This variable indicates if the SCT programme is integrated into a wider institutional framework. Such a framework might be a more comprehensive SCT programme of which the SCT programme in question is only a component with a separate name, or a social insurance agency. Any integration into a wider action plan which is not limited to SCT or social insurance is considered by the variable "integration into national social protection plan/development framework".
- **Integration into national social protection plan/development framework***: This variable indicates whether the SCT programme is integrated into any national action plan or programme which is not limited to SCT or institutions of social insurance, such as a national poverty reduction strategy, a development plan etc..
- **Non-financial involvement of IOs, INGOs or NGOs***: involvement different from funding by international governmental organizations, international non-governmental organizations, or, in exceptional cases, by national non-governmental organizations; e.g. technical assistance, training, implementation.

6. Evolution

- **Year**: Both the year of inception [B = Beginning] and, if needed, of termination [E= End] is recorded.
- **Programme history***: Where appropriate, the immediate predecessor programmes [PRE=predecessor programme] and the immediate successor programmes [SUC=successor programme] are listed in order to trace the evolution of a SCT programme in a country.

7. Goals

- **Intended objectives***: Explicit objectives pronounced by the agency in charge
- **Problem definitions***: Problem definitions apparently linked to the SCT programme

The acronym "**PEC**" is added to a data record to indicate that further explanation is provided in the column "**Peculiarities of schemes**". The column "**Comment on data**" contains remarks and assessments of the data and its validity. "**Further information of interest**" is a residual column with space for further information on a SCT programme which could not be placed in the other columns. "**Link**" provides quick access to the website of the SCT programmes.

Specifications of the indicators used are made in **square brackets […]**, in contrast to the sources, which are supplied in **round brackets (…)**.

IV. Data sources

The data in the main spreadsheet (entitled "SCT programmes") are based on four kinds of sources: 1. other databases on social protection; 2. government documents and websites; 3. academic literature and policy papers often published by international or non-governmental institutions; 4. expert interviews. The types of sources are ranked here according to the extent they fed into FLOORCASH- Basic.

The four types of sources are presented in separate lists (in separate spreadsheets) in order to provide maximum transparency. Precisely tracing back the data sources may enable a more profound judgment when assessing the validity of single data records.

Each data record in FLOORCASH-Basic is followed by a round bracket "(…)" which indicates the source of the record in a short form. In order to find the full reference of the record, the reader has to identify the type of source in a first step, and then look up the reference in the corresponding list/spreadsheet. The four types of source are clearly identifiable: a numerical code, e.g. "(05)", is used for other social protection databases; authors´ names along with the year of publication are used for academic literature and policy papers; the name of a national institution such as a particular ministry or the government as such (e.g. "Gov.") plus the year, if available, are used for government sources; finally, "Interview no. ..." is used for expert interviews.

The databases on social protection fed into FLOORCASH-Basic in the following way: The relevant data from *Social Security Country Profiles* provided by the ISSA (databases no. 1), the *ILO Social Security Inquiry* (database no. 2) and the *Social pensions database* provided by HelpAge International (database no. 8) was extracted as a starting point for all countries. In order to complement the basic data collection, a fourth database was checked, depending on the world region: for Latin America, this was two ECLAC databases on *Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes* and on *Social Pensions* (databases no. 21 and 29); for Africa, it was *The Cash Dividend*, a publication by the World Bank (database no. 22); for Asia, the OHCHR surveys on social protection of older persons and on social cash transfer programmes (databases no. 13 and 15). Information from all the other databases was added in case the four basic databases did not provide any or not sufficient information or to increase the validity of the data.

Whenever a cell is empty, we could not find any data (within the constraints of time and resources) and the **values** are **missing**. By contrast, whenever we have proof that a feature is absent, we mark "**NEG**" for "negative evidence", e.g. if there is no SCT programme at all in a country or if there is no legal basis of a SCT programme at all.

V. Colour legend

In order to refine the case selection and to state the quality of data more precisely, respectively, select cells of the table are coloured.

Grey: case (programme and country, respectively) is not included in the final sample

Yellow: data might require further in-depth investigation, either due to contradicting sources or due to a lack of data on an important indicator (of a relevant SCT programme in a country)

Appendix 5-3[475]

Katrin Weible, Tobias Böger, John Berten (2015): FLOORCASH-Basic. The basic dataset on social cash transfers in the global South, Version 2, Bielefeld University: Research Project FLOOR (FloorCash), Germany, funded by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, www.floorcash.org.

FLOORCASH-Basic Codebook.

Note: For several variables we use an (empirically based) standard item - in this codebook labelled "[default]". The standard item applies to all programmes in the dataset unless a programme differs from the standard. To give an example, most programmes do not apply any quota to limit access to the transfers. Consequently, "no quota" is the empirical standard and programmes without a quota lack any record for the variable "quota" (variable no. 13 "Quantitative limitations of access II – quota"). Records are only made for programmes which apply a quota.

1. **Country**

2. **World Region:**
    - AFRICA:

[475] This Codebook was published as part of Weible et al. 2015 at www.floorcash.org and is downloadable there.

    - Southern Africa;
    - West Africa;
    - North Africa;
    - East Africa;
    - Middle Africa;
- AMERICA:
    - South America;
    - Central America;
    - Caribbean;
- ASIA:
    - South Asia;
    - West Asia;
    - Central Asia;
    - East Asia;
    - South East Asia;
- OCEANIA:
    - Melanesia,
    - Micronesia,
    - Polynesia

3. Name of the social cash transfer programme

4. Institutional umbrella

- another social cash transfer programme
- social insurance

5. Intended objectives

6. Problem definitions

7. Target Group I – Target category:

- C = children
    - any sex [default]
    - male
    - female
- WA = persons of working age,
- OA = older persons (“old age”),
- D = persons with disabilities
- A = “any” poor citizens/households,
- OTH = other small groups

8. Target group II - Beneficiary unit:

- I = individual,
- H = household

9. Geographical scope I - Administrative level:

- N = national,
- L = local,

10. Geographical scope II – Geographical limitations:

- No geographical limitations [default]
- with geo = with geographical targeting,

- R = only rural areas
- URB = only urban areas

11. Geographical scope III - Level of implementation:

- No pilot project [default]
- P = pilot
    - N-p = national pilot
    - L-p = local pilot

12. Quantitative limitations of access I - means-test:

- U = universal/without means-test
- MT = means-test
    - MT-I = means-test by income
    - MT-a = means-test by assets
    - MT-p = proxy means-test
    - MT-incomp = incompatibility check

13. Quantitative limitations of access II - quota:

- without q = without quota [default]
- with q = with quota

14. Behavioural conditions

- yes
    - education
    - health
    - work

- OTH=Other behavioural conditions
- No

15. Year:

- B = Beginning of the programme
- E= End of the programme

16. Programme history:

- PRE=preexisting programme
- SUC=successor programme

17. Legal basis

- Law
- Decree or similar regulation

18. Integration into national social protection plan/development framework

19. National agency in charge

20. Executing agency

21. Benefit level I - amount:

- Amount in national currency and/or USD per beneficiary unit and per period of time

22. Benefit level II – limitations:

- Total number of transfers per household:
    - No maximum [default]
    - maximum number per household
- time limit
    - No time limit [default]
    - Time limit

23. Benefit standard

24. Costs:

- real expenditure including administration;
- budget including administration;
- total of transfers

25. Sources of funding:

- NAT = national
    - NAT-b=national budget,
    - NAT-o=other national source,
- INT=international
    - international (governmental) organisation
    - international non-governmental organisation
    - bilateral organisation
- OTH= other source

26. Coverage of individuals

27. Coverage of households

28. Non-financial involvement of IOs, INGOs, or NGOs

29. Peculiarities of the programme

30. Comment on data

31. Further information of interest

32. Link

Appendix 5-4

Countries and territories covered by FLOORCASH-SocCit

No.	Country Code	Country	No.	Country Code	Country
1	AFG	Afghanistan	75	LBY	Libya
2	AGO	Angola	76	LCA	Saint Lucia
3	ARE	United Arab Emirates	77	LKA	Sri Lanka
4	ARG	Argentina	78	LSO	Lesotho
5	ARM	Armenia	79	MAC	Macao
6	ATG	Antigua and Barbuda	80	MAR	Morocco
7	AZE	Azerbaijan	81	MDG	Madagascar
8	BDI	Burundi	82	MDV	Maldives
9	BEN	Benin	83	MEX	Mexico
10	BFA	Burkina Faso	84	MHL	Marshall Islands
11	BGD	Bangladesh	85	MLI	Mali
12	BHR	Bahrain	86	MMR	Myanmar
13	BHS	Bahamas	87	MNG	Mongolia
14	BLZ	Belize	88	MOZ	Mozambique
15	BOL	Bolivia	89	MRT	Mauritania
16	BRA	Brazil	90	MUS	Mauritius
17	BRB	Barbados	91	MWI	Malawi
18	BRN	Brunei Darussalam	92	MYS	Malaysia
19	BTN	Bhutan	93	NAM	Namibia
20	BWA	Botswana	94	NER	Niger
21	CAF	Central African Republic	95	NGA	Nigeria
22	CHL	Chile	96	NIC	Nicaragua
23	CHN	China	97	NPL	Nepal
24	CIV	Côte d'Ivoire	98	NRU	Nauru
25	CMR	Cameroon	99	OMN	Oman
26	COD	Democratic Republic of the Congo	100	PAK	Pakistan
27	COG	Congo	101	PAN	Panama
28	COK	Cook Islands	102	PER	Peru
29	COL	Colombia	103	PHL	Philippines
30	COM	Comoros	104	PLW	Palau

31	CPV	Cape Verde
32	CRI	Costa Rica
33	CUB	Cuba
34	DJI	Djibouti
35	DMA	Dominica
36	DOM	Dominican Republic
37	DZA	Algeria
38	ECU	Ecuador
39	EGY	Egypt
40	ERI	Eritrea
41	ETH	Ethiopia
42	FJI	Fiji
43	FSM	Federated States of Micronesia
44	GAB	Gabon
45	GEO	Georgia
46	GHA	Ghana
47	GIN	Guinea
48	GMB	Gambia
49	GNB	Guinea-Bissau
50	GNQ	Equatorial Guinea
51	GRD	Grenada
52	GTM	Guatemala
53	GUY	Guyana
54	HKG	Hong Kong
55	HND	Honduras
56	HTI	Haiti
57	IDN	Indonesia
58	IND	India
59	IRN	Iran
60	IRQ	Iraq
61	ISR	Israel
62	JAM	Jamaica
63	JOR	Jordan
64	KAZ	Kazakhstan
65	KEN	Kenya
105	PNG	Papua New Guinea
106	PRK	North Korea
107	PRY	Paraguay
108	PSE	Palestine
109	QAT	Qatar
110	RWA	Rwanda
111	SAU	Saudi Arabia
112	SDN	Sudan
113	SEN	Senegal
114	SGP	Singapore
115	SLB	Solomon Islands
116	SLE	Sierra Leone
117	SLV	El Salvador
118	SOM	Somalia
119	SSD	South Sudan
120	STP	Sao Tome and Principe
121	SUR	Suriname
122	SWZ	Swaziland
123	SYC	Seychelles
124	SYR	Syria
125	TCD	Chad
126	TGO	Togo
127	THA	Thailand
128	TJK	Tajikistan
129	TKM	Turkmenistan
130	TLS	East Timor
131	TON	Tonga
132	TTO	Trinidad and Tobago
133	TUN	Tunisia
134	TUV	Tuvalu
135	TWN	Taiwan
136	TZA	Tanzania
137	UGA	Uganda
138	URY	Uruguay
139	UZB	Uzbekistan

66	KGZ	Kyrgyzstan	140	VCT	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
67	KHM	Cambodia	141	VEN	Venezuela
68	KIR	Kiribati	142	VNM	Vietnam
69	KNA	Saint Kitts and Nevis	143	VUT	Vanuatu
70	KOR	South Korea	144	WSM	Samoa
71	KWT	Kuwait	145	YEM	Yemen
72	LAO	Laos	146	ZAF	South Africa
73	LBN	Lebanon	147	ZMB	Zambia
74	LBR	Liberia	148	ZWE	Zimbabwe

Source: Weible and Leisering 2019, pp. 384–385; FLOORCASH-SocCit.

Appendix 6.1.1

Inventory of the target groups of the social cash transfer programmes across the global South

Table 6.1.1-1: Target groups related to children, clustered by aspects of vulnerability*

Vulnerability is related to…	Aspect of vulnerability	Target groups	Frequency (number of programmes that address the groups)
...the child	Childhood	Children	51
	Lack of care(taker) for the child	Orphan[476]	43
		Abandoned/neglected child/child in need of care	7
		Street children	4
	Health related features of the child	Disabled child	30
		Child living with AIDS	1
	Socialization/ education of the child	Child with criminal charges	2
		Child with economic activity/working for income	2
		Poorly educated child	1
		Students at High School	1
		Students doing professional technical training	1
	Gender	Girls	3
	Explicit "vulnerability" of the child (without further explications)	Vulnerable children	5
...the parents/ family	Lone parents	Family of divorced women	2
		Family of widow	4
		Family of single parent	12
		Families of prisoners	12

[476] Some programmes explicitly address foster parents and persons who take care of an orphan rather than the orphan herself/himself, such as Mauritius´ *National Pension Scheme* and South Africa´s *Foster Child Grant*.

		Female head of household	1
	Health related features of the parent(s)	Family of disabled parent	3
		Family of elderly parents	2
	Particular forms of employment/income generation of the parents	Farmers/peasant families	1
		Family of unemployed parents	1
		Family of small taxpayers	1
		Family of informal workers	1
		Family of parent with particular forms of employment/income generation (i.e. agricultural day labourer; domestic worker)	2
		Families receiving social welfare AND doing additional training	1
	Numerous siblings in the family	Family with children born in a multiple birth	1
		Families with many children	3
	Ethnic origin	Family of ethnic origin	3
	Generally underprivileged situation of the family	Underprivileged families	1
	Total	30	202

*The aspects of vulnerability are constructed by the author.

Source: FLOORCASH-SocCit, the author; N=275 programmes; data on seven programmes is missing.

Table 6.1.1-2: Target groups related to persons of working age, clustered by aspects of vulnerability*

Aspect of vulnerability	Target groups	Frequency (number of programmes that address the groups)
Unemployment (in few cases: underemployment and working poor)	Persons of working age	13
Education/Professional qualification	Persons with poor school education	7
	Students of middle and higher professional institutions	2
	Students of higher education/ university students	3
Income generation/employment	Seasonal workers	1
	Particular workers (without explication) (who are unemployed)	1
Family responsibilities	Person who is the head of a household (who is unemployed)	1
	Persons providing care to others and thus unable to work for income	2
Additional training for reintegration into society	Particular clients of the department in charge (former inmates of institutions, persons under supervision for delinquent cases, other clients)	3
Particular groups	Transgender, female victims of violence, refugees, former drug addicts in programme of rehabilitation, victims of slavery, prisoners (who are each unemployed)	7
Total	10	40

*The aspects of vulnerability are constructed by the author.

Source: FLOORCASH-SocCit, the author; N=276 programmes; data on six programmes is missing.

Table 6.1.1-3: Target groups related to older persons, clustered by aspects of vulnerability*

Aspect of vulnerability	Target groups	Frequency (number of programmes that address the groups)
Old age	Older person	93
Lack of further household members (to provide support)	Older person who is living alone	7
Family responsibilities	Older person who is the head of a household	2
(Former) income generation/employment	Former informal worker	1
	Farmers	1
	Agricultural labourer	1
	Older person with previous formal employment (with social insurance coverage)	1
Health related features	Older person who needs constant care	2
	Infirm older person, who is thus incapable to work	1
Particular group	Older persons who live in Mainland China and who have uninterruptedly received financial assistance in the past 5 years [Macau´s *Settlement in Mainland Programme*]	1
Total	10	110

*The aspects of vulnerability are constructed by the author.

Source: FLOORCASH-SocCit, the author; N=275 programmes; data on seven programmes is missing.

Table 6.1.1-4: Target groups related to adults with disabilities, clustered by aspects of vulnerability*

Aspect of vulnerability	Target groups	Frequency (number of programmes that address the groups)
Disability	Adults with disabilities	81
Forms of disability	Blind adults	1
	Adults with particular disabilities	1
Care of disabled person	Adults with disabilities who need constant care	4
	Care by family member	1
(Chronical) illness	Chronically ill adults	9
	Ill adults who are unable to work for income	3
	Persons living with HIV/ AIDS	4
Lack of further household members (to provide support)	Adults with disabilities who live alone	2
Family responsibilities	Head of household with disabilities	2
Income generation	Adults with disabilities who are employed or self-employed	1
Education	Students of professional institutions with disabilities	1
Particular group	Adults with disabilities who live in Mainland China and who have uninterruptedly received financial	1

		assistance in the past 5 years [Macau´s *Settlement in Mainland Programme*]	
Total		13	111

*The aspects of vulnerability are constructed by the author.

Source: FLOORCASH-SocCit, the author; N=274 programmes; data on eight programmes is missing.

Table 6.1.1-5: Target groups related to small groups, clustered by aspects of vulnerability*

Vulnerability refers to …	Aspect of vulnerability	Target groups	Frequency (number of programmes that address the groups)
...women only (gendered vulnerability)	Women in their role as child bearers	Pregnant women [BGD, IND, IDN, MNG; ARG, BLZ, BOL, CHL, DOM, ECU, SLV, GTM, HND, JAM, PRY, PER, URY, VEN; GHA, NGA]	20
		Breastfeeding mothers [IND, IDN, MNG; GHA; GTM, HND]	6
	Women without male support	Widows [BGD, BHR, BRN, IND, NPL, OMN, PAK, SYR, TLS, TUN, YEM; BHS, NIC; MUS, SLE; FJI]	16
		Divorced women [BHR, BRN, EGY, JOR, MAR, OMN, QTR, SYR, YEM; FJI]	10
		Abandoned/deserted women [BHR, EGY, JOR, MAR]	4
		Unmarried women [of higher age] [EGY, OMN]	2
	Particular groups of women	Housewives [VEN]	1
		Young women [JOR]	1
		Women who are married to non-citizens [JOR]	1
		Acid burnt women [BGD]	1

		Women and young girls who are under court cases [MYS]	1
	Subtotal	11	63
...both sexes (non-gendered vulnerability)	Political conflicts: Award for involvement and/or compensation for harm and loss	War veterans [not necessarily disabled]	12
		Victims of armed conflicts/wars [disabled individuals and families of "martyrs"]	6
	Compensation for work done during war	Persons who worked as rubber tappers in the Region of Amazonas during WW II] [BRA]	1
		Internally displaced persons [AZE]	1
	Compensation for harm or loss caused through state actions or by nuclear accidents	Victims of political repression [KAZ]	1
		Relatives of disappeared persons [ARG]	1
		Victims of nuclear accidents, above all Chernobyl [AZE, KAZ]	2
	(Temporary or Permanent) loss of family member (and probably income earner)	Survivors	10
		Prisoner´s dependent	1
		Persons who have been abandoned (assumably by spouse) [MYS, MUS]	2
		Without maintenance from family although they are obliged [ZAF]	1
	Homelessness	Living in the streets	1
		Stranded people [MYS]	1
		Humanitarian cases [JOR]	1
	Situation of acute crisis	People affected by disaster [ZAF, SWZ]	2
		Urgent situations [SGP]	1
		Persons who are awaiting payment of an approved social cash transfer and the refusal of bridging the payment would cause undue hardship [ZAF]	1
	Delinquency	Criminal charges	2
	Ethnic origin	Indigenous people	2
		[ten groups identified as the worst off and most threatened of Nepal's 59 indigenous groups with populations of fewer than 1,000;	
		Indigenous people in need [VEN]]	

	Ad hoc-decisions	Other candidates who received approval from the Board [JOR]	1
		Awards (ex gratia pensions) by parliament [ARG]	1
	particular other groups	Monks in government monasteries [BTN]	1
		Inmates of Government Subsidized Institutions that would have been entitled to a Basic Pension [MUS]	1
		Persons receiving assistance and rehabilitation loans [JOR]	1
	Subtotal	24	54
	Total	35	117

*The aspects of vulnerability are constructed by the author.

Source: FLOORCASH-SocCit, the author; N=275 programmes; data on seven programmes is missing; the countries where the programmes are located are indicated in square brackets (see Appendix 5.4 on a legend for the country acronyms).

Table 6.1.1-6: Target groups related to "poor people", clustered by aspects of vulnerability*

Aspect of vulnerability	Target groups	Frequency (number of programmes that address the groups)
Poverty	Any poor individual	11
	Any poor household	8
	Poor people (vague definition suggesting blurred targeting)[477]	26
Reduced capacity to work	Poor households with *limited* work capacity and high dependency ratios	7
	Poor households *without* [male] work capacity	2
Total	5	54

*The aspects of vulnerability are constructed by the author.

Source: FLOORCASH-SocCit, the author; N=276 programmes; data on six programmes is missing.

[477] See section 6.1.6 for details.

Appendix 6.1.3

Qualifying ages of social cash transfers

Table 6.1.3-1: Number of social cash transfer programmes, by age when entitlements of children start

Age	Programmes	% of total
0	64	69.6
0.5	1	1.1
2	1	1.1
4	1	1.1
5	3	3.3
6	11	12.0
10	1	1.1
11	1	1.1
12	1	1.1
14	1	1.1
15	2	2.2
16	5	5.4
Total	92	100.0

Source: FLOORCASH-SocCit; data are missing for 33 programmes.

Table 6.1.3-2: Number of social cash transfer programmes, by age when entitlements of children end

Age	Programmes	% of total
1	2	2.2
2	2	2.2
2.5	1	1.1
5	1	1.1
6	1	1.1
10	2	2.2
11	2	2.2
12	2	2.2
13	3	3.2
14	4	4.3
15	7	7.5
16	10	10.8
18	50	53.8
20	1	1.1
21	1	1.1
22	1	1.1
24	1	1.1
25	1	1.1
28	1	1.1
Total	93	100.0

Source: FLOORCASH-SocCit; data are missing for 32 programmes.

Table 6.1.3-3: Number of social cash transfer programmes, by age when entitlements of persons of working age start

Age	Programmes	% of total
15	1	7.1
16	2	14.3
18	10	71.4
20	1	7.1
Total	14	100.0

Source: FLOORCASH-SocCit; data are missing for 13 programmes.

Table 6.1.3-4: Number of social cash transfer programmes, by age when entitlements of persons of working age end

Age	Programmes	% of total
23	1	8.3
24	2	16.7
25	3	25.0
30	1	8.3
35	1	8.3
50	1	8.3
60	2	16.7
no age limit	1	8.3
Total	12	100,0

Source: FLOORCASH-SocCit; data are missing for 15 programmes.

Table 6.1.3-5: Number of social cash transfer programmes, by age when entitlements of older persons (both sexes*) start

Age	Programmes	% of total
54.5	1	1.2
55	1	1.2
57.5	3	3.5
59.5	1	1.2
60	26	30.6
60.5	2	2.4
62	1	1.2
62.5	3	3.5
63	1	1.2
63.5	1	1.2
64.5	1	1.2
65	29	34.1
65.5	1	1.2
66	1	1.2
67	1	1.2
67.5	1	1.2
70	8	9.4
77	2	2.4
80	1	1.2
Total	85	100.0

*In case of different ages depending on the sex, the values indicate the mean of both ages.

Source: FLOORCASH-SocCit; data are missing for 20 programmes.

Table 6.1.3-6: Number of social cash transfer programmes, by age when entitlements of older persons (males) start

Age	Programmes	% of total
57	1	7.1
60	3	21.4
62	1	7.1
63	2	14.3
65	4	28.6
67	2	14.3
70	1	7.1
Total	14	100.0

Source: FLOORCASH-SocCit.

Table 6.1.3-7: Number of social cash transfer programmes, by age when entitlements of older persons (females) start

Age	Programmes	% of total
52	1	7.1
55	3	21.4
57	1	7.1
58	2	14.3
60	3	21.4
62	2	14.3
65	2	14.3
Total	14	100.0

Source: FLOORCASH-SocCit.

Table 6.1.3-8: Number of social cash transfer programmes, by age when entitlements of persons with disabilities (including children with disabilities) start

Age	Programmes	% of total
0	10	33.3
6	1	3.3
15	1	3.3
16	4	13.3
17	1	3.3
18	10	33.3
60	3	10.0
Total	30	100.0

Source: FLOORCASH-SocCit; data are missing for 64 programmes.

Table 6.1.3-9: Number of social cash transfer programmes, by age when entitlements of persons with disabilities end

Age	Programmes	% of total
60	5	16.1
62	1	3.2
65	4	12.9
no age limit	21	67.7
Total	31	100.0

Note: If entitlements of persons with disabilities end at a certain age, entitlements to a social cash transfer programme that addresses older persons (no matter whether with or without disability) start at the same age in these countries (such as in South Africa at age 60).

Source: FLOORCASH-SocCit; data are missing for 63 programmes.

Appendix 6.4.2

Classification of social cash transfer programmes by target configuration and conditionality

Target configuration*	**Condi-tionality**	**Programme type**	**Fre-quency**	**Countries****
C	cond	Simple inclusive conditional child transfer	13	BHS, BGD, BOL, COL, CRI EGY, EGY, EGY, EGY, HTI, IDN, PHL, ZAF
C	non-cond	Simple inclusive non-conditional child transfer	10	ARM; AZE; BRA; COK; LSO; MNG; SEN; SSD; TJK; UZB
c	cond	Simple selective conditional child transfer	15	BGD; BGD; BRA; BRN; DOM; IDN; KEN; MEX; NAM; NAM; PRY; PRY; SEN; SWZ; ZWE
c	non-cond	Simple selective non-conditional child transfer	16	ARM; AZE; BWA; CHL; FJI[478]; MDV; MDV; NAM; NPL; SYC; ZAF; ZAF; LKA; VNM; VNM; VNM
Cc [all girls]	cond	CCT for girls	3	BGD; KHM; IND
C (+c) + pregnant women [RSG]	cond	Early care conditional child transfer	8	BLZ; BOL; ECU; GTM; HND; IDN; TLS; ARG[479]
orphans + widows	non-cond	Survivor's pension	1	BHS
C + OA/oa + RSG (+ D / wa [young people])	1 cond; 6 mixed	Child & old age protection combined	7	PRY Mixed conditionality: SLV; DOM; PER; ECU; PAK; CHL

[478] As regards conditionality, the benefit is higher if the child attends school, among other criteria.

[479] The programme is a border case in this group, since it does not include all children, but rather five subcategories of children.

C + D/d +RSG	2 cond, 1 mixed	Conditional child & disability protection combined	3	Cond: URY; VEN[480] Mixed: CHL;
C + c[disabled] + D	non-cond	Non-conditional child & disability protection combined	1	KGZ
WA	cond	Cash for work	2	BGD; IND
WA	non-cond	Non-conditional unemployment benefit	5	ISR; MUS; MAR[481]; SGP; URY
wa [young people[482]]	cond	Conditional training for particular groups	6	ARG; ARM; COL; DOM COL; BRA
wa + d	cond	Conditional training for extended groups	2	ARG; TJK;
wa + d	non-cond	"Non-conditional" transfer for temporary inability to work (care obligations; illness)	2	SGP, CUB
c + WA + D	non-cond	Non-conditional unemployment protection and social pension combined	1	IRQ
OA	non-cond, 1 cond[483]	Simple inclusive old age pension	37	BHS; BLZ; BOL; BWA; CHN; MAC; TWN; TWN; COL; COK; GTM; GUY; IRN; KEN; KIR; LSO; MYS; MDV; MEX; MEX; NAM; NRU; NPL; PAN; PER; KOR; VCT; WSM; ZAF; SUR; SWZ; THA; TTO; TUV; VEN; VNM

[480] Data on the conditionality of a subcategory of adults with disabilities is missing.

[481] Data on conditionality is missing.

[482] In Columbia, for example, the target group comprises young people between 16 and 24 years.

[483] The programme in Panama is conditional on health check-ups.

oa	non-cond	Simple selective old age pension	2	TWN; IND
OA/oa + RS	non-cond	Extended old age pension	2	BGD; PRY
c + OA/oa (+ D /+ small groups)	non-cond	Non-conditional dependency focused transfer	9	SLE; CHN; KGZ; TJK; UZB; ARG; AZE; MUS; OMN
c + OA (+ D + RSG)	mixed[484]	Conditional dependency focused transfer	3	TZA, GHA, SYR
OA/oa + D/d (+ RSG/ wa)	non-cond[485]	Old age & disability pension combined	28	IDN; DZA; ATG; BRB; BRA; CPV; CHL; HKG; TLS; URY; MAC; CUB; MNG; BRN; KNA; ARM; DOM; KAZ; SYC; TKM; FJI; GEO; IND; MNG; ZAF; SGP; BRA; LBR
D (+ disabled children)	non-cond	Disability pension	15	COK; DJI; EGY; IDN; KEN; MYS; MDV; ZAF; TTO; VNM; ZWE; BHS; NAM; NPL; BGD
D/d + small groups (+ sub-categories of C)	non-cond	Extended disability pension	7	BGD; MAR; BRN; KAZ; MUS; NIC; ZAF
small groups	20 non-cond, 1 cond[486]	Recompensation and particular support	21	Victims of the Chernobyl nuclear accident and of the Karabakh conflict (AZE), internally displaced persons (AZE), war veterans (BGD, NAM, ZAF, SWZ, VNM), pregnant women (BGD), pregnant women and lactating women (IND; MNG), monks (BTN), former rubber tappers (BRA), survivors (CUB), martyrs (AFG, EGY, YEM, ZWE), divorced women and abandoned women (MAR),

[484] Data on conditionality is only partly available for SYR.

[485] Data on conditionality is missing for LBR.

[486] Conditional in IND.

				widows (NPL), endangered indigenous groups (NPL), households in urgent situation (SGP)
C + WA + OA + D + pregnant/ breastfeeding women [RS]	cond	Inclusive-categorical conditional cash transfer	1	JAM
C + WA + OA + D	non-cond	Inclusive-categorical non-conditional cash transfer	1	HKG
Each poor person	non-cond	Simple inclusive (non-conditional) social assistance - individually tailored transfer	10	ARM[487]; AZE; CHN; KAZ; TWN; COK; GEO; UZB[488]; PSE; KOR;
Each poor person + supplements for c + D	non-cond	Complemented inclusive (non-conditional) social assistance - individually tailored transfer	1	MAC
Each poor household	cond	Simple inclusive conditional social assistance - flat rate household-related transfer	3	MEX; NER; PAN
Each poor household	non-cond	Simple inclusive non-conditional social assistance – flat rate household-related transfer	2	CHL; MUS
Each poor household + supplements for C (+ OA)	cond, 1 mixed	Complemented inclusive (conditional) social assistance – flat rate household-related transfer	3	BRA + PAK: supplements for C; MEX1: supplements for C and OA
labour-restricted households (+OA)	non-cond	Quasi-categorically constructed household assistance	9	ETH; LBR; MWI; MOZ; RWA; ZMB; ZWE; KEN; UGA

[487] Takes the composition of the household into account, but not fully individually composed transfer (see sections 6.1.6 and 8.2).

[488] Takes the composition of the household into account, but not fully individually composed transfer (see sections 6.1.6 and 8.2).

‘some PP’	non-cond	Simple selective assistance for poor people	7	JOR; JOR; PAK; DMA; LCA; LKA; ZWE
‘some PP’ + D/d + c/ RSG	non-cond	Complemented selective assistance for poor people	7	BEN; GNB; SWZ; MYS [for single mothers]; VCT; TTO; SUR;
Some PP + C + D + RSG (+ wa/ OA)	1 cond, 2 mixed	Conditional hybrid assistance: Categorically dominated plus selective assistance for poor people	3	NGA; TUN, MYS [for poor families];
Some PP + c/C + OA/oa + D/d (+ RSG + WA/wa)	non-cond	Non-conditional hybrid assistance: Categorically dominated plus selective assistance for poor people	9	GUY; BWA; CRI; BHR; QAT; YEM; VEN; EGY; JOR

Source: FLOORCASH-SocCit, the author; N=275; data for seven programmes is missing.

*Upper case letters indicate that the entire target category is addressed, lower case letters indicate that only a subcategory is addressed; legend: c/C: children; wa/WA: persons of working age; oa/OA: older persons; d/D: adults with disabilities; RSG: (residual) small groups; PP: poor people.

** For the country acronyms, see Appendix 5.4.

Appendix 7.4-1

National social cash transfer arrangements by targeting approach and continent

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Targeting approach * continent	108	73.0%	40	27.0%	148	100.0%

Targeting approach * continent crosstabulation

			Continent				
			Africa	Latin America	Asia	Oceania	Total
Targeting approach	categorical	Count	13	20	22	5	60
		% within targeting approach	21.7%	33.3%	36.7%	8.3%	100.0%
		% within continent	41.9%	62.5%	56.4%	83.3%	55.6%
		% of Total	12.0%	18.5%	20.4%	4.6%	55.6%
		Standardized Residual	-1.0	.5	.1	.9	
	non-categorical	Count	6	2	1	0	9
		% within targeting approach	66.7%	22.2%	11.1%	0.0%	100.0%
		% within continent	19.4%	6.3%	2.6%	0.0%	8.3%
		% of Total	5.6%	1.9%	0.9%	0.0%	8.3%
		Standardized Residual	2.1	-.4	-1.2	-.7	
	mixed	Count	12	10	16	1	39
		% within targeting approach	30.8%	25.6%	41.0%	2.6%	100.0%
		% within continent	38.7%	31.3%	41.0%	16.7%	36.1%
		% of Total	11.1%	9.3%	14.8%	0.9%	36.1%
		Standardized Residual	.2	-.5	.5	-.8	
Total		Count	31	32	39	6	108

	% within targeting approach	28.7%	29.6%	36.1%	5.6%	100.0%
	% within continent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	28.7%	29.6%	36.1%	5.6%	100.0%

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Cramer's V	.216	.123
	Contingency Coefficient	.292	.123
N of Valid Cases		108	

Source: FLOORCASH-SocCit, the author.

Appendix 7.4-2

National social cash transfer arrangements by targeting approach and country income group

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Targeting approach * country income group	104	70.3%	44	29.7%	148	100.0%

Targeting approach * country income group crosstabulation

			Country income group				
			High-income	Upper-middle-income	Lower-middle-income	Low-income	Total
Targeting approach	categorical	Count	10	19	23	7	59
		% within targeting approach	16.9%	32.2%	39.0%	11.9%	100.0%
		% within country income group	62.5%	52.8%	67.6%	38.9%	56.7%
		% of Total	9.6%	18.3%	22.1%	6.7%	56.7%
	non-categorical	Count	0	2	1	5	8
		% within targeting approach	0.0%	25.0%	12.5%	62.5%	100.0%
		% within country income group	0.0%	5.6%	2.9%	27.8%	7.7%
		% of Total	0.0%	1.9%	1.0%	4.8%	7.7%
	mixed	Count	6	15	10	6	37
		% within targeting approach	16.2%	40.5%	27.0%	16.2%	100.0%
		% within country income group	37.5%	41.7%	29.4%	33.3%	35.6%
		% of Total	5.8%	14.4%	9.6%	5.8%	35.6%
Total		Count	16	36	34	18	104
		% within targeting approach	15.4%	34.6%	32.7%	17.3%	100.0%
		% within country income group	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	15.4%	34.6%	32.7%	17.3%	100.0%

Source: FLOORCASH-SocCit, the author; income classifications and data on the targeting approach respectively are missing for nine countries with social cash transfers (N=113).

Appendix 7.4-3

National social cash transfer arrangements by overall inclusiveness and country income group

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Overall inclusiveness * country income group	89	78.8%	24	21.2%	113	100.0%

Overall inclusiveness * country income group Crosstabulation

			country income group				
			High-income	Upper-middle-income	Lower-middle-income	Low-income	Total
overall inclusiveness	1.00 - 0.75	Count	5	8	6	0	19
		% within overall inclusiveness	26.3%	42.1%	31.6%	0.0%	100.0%
		% within country income group	35.7%	26.7%	21.4%	0.0%	21.3%
		% of Total	5.6%	9.0%	6.7%	0.0%	21.3%
	0.74 - 0.26	Count	8	19	12	8	47
		% within overall inclusiveness	17.0%	40.4%	25.5%	17.0%	100.0%
		% within country income group	57.1%	63.3%	42.9%	47.1%	52.8%
		% of Total	9.0%	21.3%	13.5%	9.0%	52.8%
	0.25 - 0.0	Count	1	3	10	9	23
		% within overall inclusiveness	4.3%	13.0%	43.5%	39.1%	100.0%
		% within country income group	7.1%	10.0%	35.7%	52.9%	25.8%
		% of Total	1.1%	3.4%	11.2%	10.1%	25.8%
Total		Count	14	30	28	17	89
		% within overall inclusiveness	15.7%	33.7%	31.5%	19.1%	100.0%
		% within country income group	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	15.7%	33.7%	31.5%	19.1%	100.0%

Source: FLOORCASH-SocCit, the author; values of the variable "overall inclusiveness" are partly extrapolated (for details see Table 7.4.1 in section 7.4 and section 5.4).

Appendix 9.5

Programmes by year of introduction and degree of institutionalization

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Year of introduction * institutionalization	184	65.2%	98	34.8%	282	100.0%

year of introduction * institutionalization Crosstabulation

			institutionalization				
			.00	.33	.67	1.00	Total
Year of introduction	1928	Count	0	0	0	1	1
		% within year of introduction	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% within institutionalization	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.4%	0.5%
		% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.5%
		Standardized Residual	-.2	-.4	-.6	1.0	
	1936	Count	0	0	0	1	1
		% within year of introduction	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% within institutionalization	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.4%	0.5%
		% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.5%
		Standardized Residual	-.2	-.4	-.6	1.0	
	1939	Count	0	0	0	2	2
		% within year of introduction	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% within institutionalization	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.9%	1.1%
		% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.1%	1.1%
		Standardized Residual	-.3	-.6	-.9	1.4	
	1941	Count	0	0	0	1	1
		% within year of introduction	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% within institutionalization	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.4%	0.5%
		% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.5%
		Standardized Residual	-.2	-.4	-.6	1.0	
	1950	Count	0	0	0	1	1
		% within year of introduction	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% within institutionalization	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.4%	0.5%
		% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.5%
		Standardized Residual	-.2	-.4	-.6	1.0	
	1951	Count	0	0	0	1	1
		% within year of introduction	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% within institutionalization	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.4%	0.5%
		% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.5%
		Standardized Residual	-.2	-.4	-.6	1.0	
	1956	Count	0	0	0	1	1
		% within year of introduction	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% within institutionalization	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.4%	0.5%
		% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.5%
		Standardized Residual	-.2	-.4	-.6	1.0	

1960	Count	0	0	1	2	3
	% within year of introduction	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	66.7%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	0.0%	0.0%	1.4%	2.9%	1.6%
	% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	1.1%	1.6%
	Standardized Residual	-.4	-.7	-.1	.8	
1966	Count	0	0	1	0	1
	% within year of introduction	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	0.0%	0.0%	1.4%	0.0%	0.5%
	% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.0%	0.5%
	Standardized Residual	-.2	-.4	1.0	-.6	
1967	Count	0	0	0	1	1
	% within year of introduction	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.4%	0.5%
	% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.5%
	Standardized Residual	-.2	-.4	-.6	1.0	
1973	Count	0	0	1	1	2
	% within year of introduction	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	0.0%	0.0%	1.4%	1.4%	1.1%
	% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.5%	1.1%
	Standardized Residual	-.3	-.6	.3	.3	
1974	Count	0	0	0	1	1
	% within year of introduction	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.4%	0.5%
	% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.5%
	Standardized Residual	-.2	-.4	-.6	1.0	
1977	Count	0	0	0	1	1
	% within year of introduction	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.4%	0.5%
	% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.5%
	Standardized Residual	-.2	-.4	-.6	1.0	
1979	Count	0	0	1	2	3
	% within year of introduction	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	66.7%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	0.0%	0.0%	1.4%	2.9%	1.6%
	% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	1.1%	1.6%
	Standardized Residual	-.4	-.7	-.1	.8	
1980	Count	0	0	0	1	1
	% within year of introduction	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.4%	0.5%
	% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.5%
	Standardized Residual	-.2	-.4	-.6	1.0	
1981	Count	0	0	0	1	1
	% within year of introduction	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.4%	0.5%
	% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.5%
	Standardized Residual	-.2	-.4	-.6	1.0	
1982	Count	0	0	1	1	2
	% within year of introduction	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	0.0%	0.0%	1.4%	1.4%	1.1%
	% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.5%	1.1%
	Standardized Residual	-.3	-.6	.3	.3	

1983	Count	0	0	0	2	2
	% within year of introduction	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.9%	1.1%
	% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.1%	1.1%
	Standardized Residual	-.3	-.6	-.9	1.4	
1984	Count	0	0	0	2	2
	% within year of introduction	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.9%	1.1%
	% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.1%	1.1%
	Standardized Residual	-.3	-.6	-.9	1.4	
1985	Count	0	0	1	0	1
	% within year of introduction	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	0.0%	0.0%	1.4%	0.0%	0.5%
	% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.0%	0.5%
	Standardized Residual	-.2	-.4	1.0	-.6	
1986	Count	0	0	2	0	2
	% within year of introduction	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	0.0%	0.0%	2.8%	0.0%	1.1%
	% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	1.1%	0.0%	1.1%
	Standardized Residual	-.3	-.6	1.4	-.9	
1989	Count	0	0	0	1	1
	% within year of introduction	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.4%	0.5%
	% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.5%
	Standardized Residual	-.2	-.4	-.6	1.0	
1990	Count	0	0	0	1	1
	% within year of introduction	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.4%	0.5%
	% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.5%
	Standardized Residual	-.2	-.4	-.6	1.0	
1991	Count	0	0	0	1	1
	% within year of introduction	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.4%	0.5%
	% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.5%
	Standardized Residual	-.2	-.4	-.6	1.0	
1992	Count	0	0	0	2	2
	% within year of introduction	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.9%	1.1%
	% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.1%	1.1%
	Standardized Residual	-.3	-.6	-.9	1.4	
1993	Count	0	0	3	3	6
	% within year of introduction	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	0.0%	0.0%	4.2%	4.3%	3.3%
	% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	1.6%	1.6%	3.3%
	Standardized Residual	-.6	-1.0	.5	.5	
1994	Count	0	1	2	2	5
	% within year of introduction	0.0%	20.0%	40.0%	40.0%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	0.0%	3.1%	2.8%	2.9%	2.7%
	% of Total	0.0%	0.5%	1.1%	1.1%	2.7%
	Standardized Residual	-.5	.1	.1	.1	

1995	Count	0	0	3	5	8
	% within year of introduction	0.0%	0.0%	37.5%	62.5%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	0.0%	0.0%	4.2%	7.1%	4.3%
	% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	1.6%	2.7%	4.3%
	Standardized Residual	-.7	-1.2	.0	1.1	
1996	Count	0	0	3	3	6
	% within year of introduction	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	0.0%	0.0%	4.2%	4.3%	3.3%
	% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	1.6%	1.6%	3.3%
	Standardized Residual	-.6	-1.0	.5	.5	
1997	Count	1	0	3	1	5
	% within year of introduction	20.0 %	0.0%	60.0%	20.0%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	9.1%	0.0%	4.2%	1.4%	2.7%
	% of Total	0.5%	0.0%	1.6%	0.5%	2.7%
	Standardized Residual	1.3	-.9	.8	-.7	
1998	Count	0	0	1	1	2
	% within year of introduction	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	0.0%	0.0%	1.4%	1.4%	1.1%
	% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.5%	1.1%
	Standardized Residual	-.3	-.6	.3	.3	
1999	Count	0	0	2	4	6
	% within year of introduction	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	66.7%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	0.0%	0.0%	2.8%	5.7%	3.3%
	% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	1.1%	2.2%	3.3%
	Standardized Residual	-.6	-1.0	-.2	1.1	
2000	Count	0	0	5	1	6
	% within year of introduction	0.0%	0.0%	83.3%	16.7%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	0.0%	0.0%	7.0%	1.4%	3.3%
	% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	2.7%	0.5%	3.3%
	Standardized Residual	-.6	-1.0	1.8	-.8	
2001	Count	1	0	2	1	4
	% within year of introduction	25.0 %	0.0%	50.0%	25.0%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	9.1%	0.0%	2.8%	1.4%	2.2%
	% of Total	0.5%	0.0%	1.1%	0.5%	2.2%
	Standardized Residual	1.6	-.8	.4	-.4	
2002	Count	0	2	4	3	9
	% within year of introduction	0.0%	22.2%	44.4%	33.3%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	0.0%	6.3%	5.6%	4.3%	4.9%
	% of Total	0.0%	1.1%	2.2%	1.6%	4.9%
	Standardized Residual	-.7	.3	.3	-.2	
2003	Count	0	1	4	1	6
	% within year of introduction	0.0%	16.7%	66.7%	16.7%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	0.0%	3.1%	5.6%	1.4%	3.3%
	% of Total	0.0%	0.5%	2.2%	0.5%	3.3%
	Standardized Residual	-.6	.0	1.1	-.8	
2004	Count	0	1	0	1	2
	% within year of introduction	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	50.0%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	0.0%	3.1%	0.0%	1.4%	1.1%

	% of Total	0.0%	0.5%	0.0%	0.5%	1.1%
	Standardized Residual	-.3	1.1	-.9	.3	
2005	Count	5	3	8	2	18
	% within year of introduction	27.8%	16.7%	44.4%	11.1%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	45.5%	9.4%	11.3%	2.9%	9.8%
	% of Total	2.7%	1.6%	4.3%	1.1%	9.8%
	Standardized Residual	3.8	-.1	.4	-1.9	
2006	Count	1	2	6	5	14
	% within year of introduction	7.1%	14.3%	42.9%	35.7%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	9.1%	6.3%	8.5%	7.1%	7.6%
	% of Total	0.5%	1.1%	3.3%	2.7%	7.6%
	Standardized Residual	.2	-.3	.3	-.1	
2007	Count	0	3	4	2	9
	% within year of introduction	0.0%	33.3%	44.4%	22.2%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	0.0%	9.4%	5.6%	2.9%	4.9%
	% of Total	0.0%	1.6%	2.2%	1.1%	4.9%
	Standardized Residual	-.7	1.1	.3	-.8	
2008	Count	0	4	3	4	11
	% within year of introduction	0.0%	36.4%	27.3%	36.4%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	0.0%	12.5%	4.2%	5.7%	6.0%
	% of Total	0.0%	2.2%	1.6%	2.2%	6.0%
	Standardized Residual	-.8	1.5	-.6	-.1	
2009	Count	1	5	1	2	9
	% within year of introduction	11.1%	55.6%	11.1%	22.2%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	9.1%	15.6%	1.4%	2.9%	4.9%
	% of Total	0.5%	2.7%	0.5%	1.1%	4.9%
	Standardized Residual	.6	2.7	-1.3	-.8	
2010	Count	0	3	2	0	5
	% within year of introduction	0.0%	60.0%	40.0%	0.0%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	0.0%	9.4%	2.8%	0.0%	2.7%
	% of Total	0.0%	1.6%	1.1%	0.0%	2.7%
	Standardized Residual	-.5	2.3	.1	-1.4	
2011	Count	1	3	5	1	10
	% within year of introduction	10.0%	30.0%	50.0%	10.0%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	9.1%	9.4%	7.0%	1.4%	5.4%
	% of Total	0.5%	1.6%	2.7%	0.5%	5.4%
	Standardized Residual	.5	1.0	.6	-1.4	
2012	Count	1	4	1	0	6
	% within year of introduction	16.7%	66.7%	16.7%	0.0%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	9.1%	12.5%	1.4%	0.0%	3.3%
	% of Total	0.5%	2.2%	0.5%	0.0%	3.3%
	Standardized Residual	1.1	2.9	-.9	-1.5	
2013	Count	0	0	1	0	1
	% within year of introduction	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	0.0%	0.0%	1.4%	0.0%	0.5%

	% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.0%	0.5%
	Standardized Residual	-.2	-.4	1.0	-.6	
Total	Count		11	71	70	184
	% within year of introduction	6.0%	17.4%	38.6%	38.0%	100.0%
	% within institutionalization	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	6.0%	17.4%	38.6%	38.0%	100.0%

Source: the author, FLOORCASH-SocCit.

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